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Running title: (Dis)Agreement on family-supportive supervisor behaviors

WHEN EMPLOYEES AND SUPERVISORS (DO NOT) SEE EYE TO EYE ON FAMILY SUPPORTIVE SUPERVISOR BEHAVIOURS: THE ROLE OF SEGMENTATION DESIRE AND WORK-FAMILY CULTURE

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Abstract

Helping employees juggle work and family responsibilities is crucial at a time when the boundaries between work and family life are increasingly blurred. Family-supportive supervisor behaviours (FSSBs) contribute to this and benefit both employees and organizations. Yet, employees and supervisors do not necessarily agree about the displayed FSSBs. We explore how employee–supervisor (dis)agreement concerning FSSB perceptions relates to employees' intrinsic motivation and turnover intentions. Moreover, we incorporate work–family culture and employees' desire for segmentation as boundary conditions. Using 569 employee–supervisor dyads from El Salvador, we found that intrinsic motivation is highest when employees and supervisors agree about strongly exhibited FSSBs, but only when employees desire work/home segmentation. When employees desire integration, such FSSB agreement is associated with relatively low intrinsic motivation. Moreover, turnover intentions are lowest when employees and supervisors agree that the supervisor exhibits a strong level of FSSBs, but only when work–family culture is strong. We contribute to FSSB research by demonstrating the importance of employees and supervisors seeing eye to eye (the level of) FSSBs, as well as the need for a good fit with the work–family culture of an organization and employees' desire for segmentation.

Keywords: Family-supportive supervisor behaviours; work–family culture; intrinsic motivation; turnover intentions; segmentation desire.

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INTRODUCTION

Supervisors are crucial sources of help for employees in juggling work and private life demands (Hammer et al., 2007). In line with this, family-supportive supervisor behaviours (FSSBs) (i.e., supervisors' emotional and instrumental support, their actions as role-models, and implementation of creative work–family policies; Hammer et al., 2009) benefit both employees and organizations (Bagger & Li, 2014; Russo et al., 2018). However, to date, research has assumed that employees' and supervisors' perceptions of FSSBs are accurate and aligned (e.g., Bagger & Li, 2014; Rofcanin et al., 2017). Yet, as Crain and Stevens (2018) rightly argue, this "remains to be known". Employees' perceptions are socially constructed, and can be based on unclear, and inconsistent communications from supervisors. Moreover, supervisors can be unreliable evaluators of their own behaviour (Atwater et al., 1998), as they may inflate their self-ratings and/or lack self-awareness concerning their (in)consistency in communication toward employees (Fleenor et al., 2010).

Accordingly, research has consistently shown that employees do not always see eye to eye with their supervisor concerning the leadership behaviours that supervisors display (Fleenor et al., 2010; Lee & Carpenter, 2018). More importantly, this disagreement might harm employees (Fleenor et al., 2010) because it implies a lack of clear and consistent employee-supervisor communication and, ultimately, creates a "weak situation" (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Mischel, 1979) in which employees perceive uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the support they receive from their employer. As FSSBs are often put forward as the prime means by which to help employees navigate both their work and private lives effectively, it is important to advance our knowledge of how organizations can maximize their benefits. To do so, our first aim is to look into the FSSB-(dis)agreement between employees and supervisors and how this relates to

employee outcomes.

We focus on two employee outcomes. First, we consider employees' turnover intentions as indicative of their attitudes toward the organization. This is important in a context of competitive labour markets, where retaining talent is challenging (Hancock et al., 2013) and where FSSBs can be seen as an informal way of retaining employees (Bagger & Li, 2014). Second, we include employees' intrinsic motivation, which is a job-focused outcome that goes beyond the primary goal of FSSBs to improve work-life related outcomes and retain employees. Nonetheless, it is a highly relevant outcome to organizations because it predicts both employee well-being and performance (Aryee et al., 2015; Kuvaas et al., 2017). As a result, intrinsic motivation has been very recently suggested as a theoretically relevant outcome to study in the context of FSSBs (e.g., Bosch et al., 2018; McKersie et al., 2019). This is because FSSBs are believed to trigger several psychological mechanisms that are important prerequisites to intrinsic motivation. Specifically, FSSBs act as resources that feed into employees' psychological availability (i.e., their personal engagement of their self in their work role) and the meaningfulness they derive from work (McKersie et al., 2019; Russo et al., 2018). There is also indirect evidence that FSSBs satisfy employees' basic needs to feel competent, in control of their job, and improves their relatedness with their supervisors (Bagger & Li, 2014; Huffman & Olson, 2017; Mills et al., 2014), essential factors in generating intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Hence, by including intrinsic motivation, we further test the link between FSSBs and intrinsic motivation, and build on existing research by looking into the outcomes of FSSBs going beyond work-life related outcomes (e.g., Bosch et al., 2018; McKersie et al., 2019).

Our second aim is to explore conditions under which FSSB (dis)agreement matters. Little is known about the conditions under which organizations can maximize the benefits of FSSBs. A

few examples of the contextual factors under which organizations can maximize the benefits of FSSBs are, the level of family-friendly benefits within the organization (Bagger & Li, 2014), whether the person is experiencing a demanding family situation (Hammer et al., 2011; Matthews et al., 2014), or key aspects of the national context (Bosch et al., 2018). We incorporate two alternative boundary conditions, which consider both the organization and the employee involved in the FSSBs: work–family culture, and employees' desire for segmentation.

At the organizational level, we focus on work-family culture. We argue that not only is agreement needed between employees' and supervisors' perceptions of FSSBs, but a fit with the larger context is also necessary to ensure that FSSBs are supported by the organization as a whole (Rofcanin et al., 2017). At the individual level, we explore employees' desire for segmentation (Rothbard et al., 2005). Recent studies show that employees who prefer to separate their work and private lives struggle to manage work-life conflicts because they often lack the resources to do so in a work environment that increasingly blurs boundaries between the two and expects employees to integrate rather than separate (e.g., through work-related use of ICT at home, working at home, etc.) (Foucreault et al., 2018; Gadeyne et al., 2018; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2016). Such employees would particularly benefit from FSSBs that are applied in a consistent manner by their supervisors, because the FSSBs would give them the necessary certainty that their supervisor would support them in their efforts to manage their work-life balance.

We contribute to research on FSSBs by testing the assumption that employees' and supervisors' perceptions are naturally aligned and that, as such, employees benefit fully from FSSBs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to take such an approach, except for an

unpublished thesis (Mahoney, 2017)¹. In doing so, we investigate the dyadic nature of FSSBs to explore how employee outcomes can be maximized in the interaction between employees and supervisors. Moreover, we consider the organizational context (work–family culture) as well as employee characteristics (desire for segmentation) to identify the conditions under which supervisors' FSSB efforts can produce the highest return on investment.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Family-Supportive Supervisor Behaviours

FSSBs refer to a set of supervisory behaviours intended to support employees' family lives (Hammer et al., 2009). Scholars have identified four dimensions that characterize such behaviours: emotional support, instrumental support, acting as a role model, and using creative work–family policies to support employees (Hammer et al., 2009, 2013). Emotional support concerns the affective help, care, and concern that supervisors offer to their employees in balancing work and family life. Instrumental support entails providing day-to-day resources to employees in response to their individual requests to help them successfully juggle work–family issues. The third dimension of FSSBs, role modelling, concerns the enactment of behaviours that inspire and influence subordinates in achieving balance in their work and family roles. The last dimension of FSSBs, creative work–family policies, includes supervisors' proactive efforts to improve the work and family performance of all employees by, for example, rearranging job duties and work hours.

Since the development of the FSSB construct, research has consistently shown its benefits in increasing employees' job satisfaction, work engagement, retention, and work performance

¹ Different from Mahoney (2017), we focus on a different set of employee outcomes and explore boundary conditions. Moreover, Mahoney's work, as he admits, suffered from a number of methodological shortcomings, including the inability to control for the nested nature of the data, and low reliability scores for measurements.

(Bagger & Li, 2014; Hammer et al., 2009, 2011; Matthews et al., 2014; Rofcanin et al., 2017). In theoretical terms, these favourable outcomes have been explained in two ways. First, research has conceptualized FSSBs as social support based resources that help employees accrue more resources in the future and protects them from resource losses (cf. conservation of resources theory; Hobfoll, 1989) (Matthews et al., 2014; Russo et al., 2018). As a result, employees experience improved work-life balance, greater subjective well-being, and fewer work-family conflicts (Matthews et al., 2014), which subsequently results in more positive attitudes and better performance (Las Heras et al., 2015). A second major theoretical perspective comes from the social exchange theory, and the argument that the recipients of FSSBs feel obliged to reciprocate the evident investment made by their supervisor in them (Bagger & Li, 2014; Las Heras et al., 2015). In sum, this suggests that when employees perceive their supervisors as displaying high levels of FSSBs, they experience a resource gain as well as a stronger social exchange relationship, which is conducive to more positive attitudes and behaviours. Yet, we would argue that employees are not only affected by their perceptions of FSSBs, but also by the degree of agreement between these perceptions and the self-evaluation of the supervisor displaying such behaviours.

FSSB Agreement Between Employee and Supervisor

The perceptual (dis)agreement between employee and supervisor (Yammarino & Atwater, 1997; also referred to as the perceptual distance, fit, similarity, or congruence (Bashshur et al., 2011; Fleenor et al., 2010; Gibson et al., 2009; Ostroff et al., 2005) can be defined by both its level and direction. A high *level* of FSSB agreement means that an employee's and a supervisor's perceptions of FSSBs are congruent. However, the *direction* implies that a high level of FSSB agreement can reflect mutually and strongly perceived FSSBs or mutually, yet

weakly, perceived FSSBs. Similarly, in the case of disagreement, a supervisor can overestimate or underestimate their FSSBs (relative to the employee), such that the direction of FSSB (dis)agreement differs.

First, we argue that a high level of FSSB agreement generates more positive employee outcomes than does low agreement. A high level of FSSB agreement implies a strong situation. In this case, a strong situation means that employees and supervisors similarly interpret how much the supervisor values work-life balance; how much they invest in it; and how appropriate it is for employees to value and spend time on family matters (Bashshur et al., 2011; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Mischel, 1979). Such a strong situation is the result of clear and consistent communication from the supervisor to employees, such that the supervisor consistently reinforces the same messages (Bashshur et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2010). Because of this clarity and consistency, there is certainty and predictability in what is valued by the supervisor, and in the kind of social exchange relationship that exists between employee and employer (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Marescaux et al., 2019). Similarly, others refer to this strong situation (or certainty) as a shared reality (Echterhoff & Higgins, 2017; Jost et al., 2008). Essentially, this certainty satisfies employees' needs for control over their interactions with, and support from, their supervisor, as well as their relational needs (vis-à-vis their supervisor) (Basuil et al., 2016). These two basic needs are key to fostering employees' intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), as well as positive attitudes toward the organization (e.g., lower turnover intentions; Marescaux et al., 2013).

In contrast, in the case of low employee-supervisor FSSB agreement, the parties have diverging interpretations of how valuable the supervisor considers work-life balance to be, of their investment in it, and of how acceptable it is for employees to attach value to their personal

lives (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). This typically results from ambiguity in supervisors' communication with employees, implying unclear and inconsistent messages (Bashshur et al., 2011; Humborstad & Kuvaas, 2013). This creates a *weak situation*, or *diverging realities*, and is accompanied by uncertainty and unpredictability (Echterhoff & Higgins, 2017; Meyer et al., 2010). Hence, employees experience less control over their interactions with their supervisor and the support they can get from them, as well as weaker relational ties with them (Basuil et al., 2016). This explains why both turnover intentions would be higher and intrinsic motivation lower in such circumstances (Marescaux et al., 2013; Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The *level* of FSSB agreement is negatively related to employees' turnover intentions (H1a) and positively related to their intrinsic motivation (H1b).

Besides the level of FSSB agreement, its *direction* also matters. When employee and supervisor agree that the supervisor displays strong FSSBs, it would arguably lead to better outcomes compared to a situation in which employee and supervisor agree on weak FSSBs. Although both suggest a strong situation, or a shared reality, and the benefits that come with this (cf. Hypothesis 1), only mutual perceptions of strong FSSBs imply a shared certainty that the supervisor values work–life balance, invests in it, and encourages employees to balance their work and private lives, thereby engaging in a social exchange relationship characterized by care for, and investments in, work–life balance. This would be reciprocated by employees having more positive attitudes (e.g., lower turnover intentions) (Bagger & Li, 2014; Las Heras et al., 2015). Moreover, building on research that has directly tied social exchange mechanisms to employees' intrinsic motivation (e.g., Aryee et al., 2015; Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2009), it would build the mutual trust and perceptions of organizational support that are necessary for

employees' basic needs to be satisfied, for them to take ownership of their job, and to focus on the intrinsic elements of the job that motivate them.

In contrast, when employees and supervisors agree on a display of weak FSSBs, which is still an example of *a strong situation*, the certainty that exists is inherently negative as there is a weak social exchange relationship characterized by little care for employees' work–life balance. As a result, both turnover intentions and intrinsic motivation suffer. This expectation is in line with research showing that shared perceptions only pay off insofar as those perceptions are indicative of a favourable exchange relationship (Fleenor et al., 2013; Sora et al., 2013).

Hypothesis 2 (H2): FSSB agreement with regards to strong FSSBs is associated with lower employee turnover intentions (H2a) and higher employee intrinsic motivation (H2b) than FSSB agreement with regards to weak FSSBs.

Finally, FSSB disagreement can also be considered from two points of view. Extant research has demonstrated that supervisors who overestimate their leadership (e.g., their transformational, ethical, and empowering behaviours) are ineffective and generate relatively poor attitudes and behaviours among their employees (e.g., Amundsen & Martinsen, 2014; Kuenzi et al., 2019; Tekleab et al., 2008). This is believed to be because they misjudge their own skills, are unwilling to accept feedback from employees, set unnecessarily high and unrealistic goals for themselves, and communicate in an egotistic and arrogant manner (Amundsen & Martinsen, 2014; Atwater et al., 1998; Tekleab et al., 2008; Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). Applying this to the context of FSSBs, one could infer that overestimating supervisors would be unable to demonstrate effective FSSBs in their behaviour towards employees, yet would seem convinced that they display strong FSSBs in their communication with employees. Hence, not only does this imply that "overestimators" create weak situations with poor outcomes as a consequence, they also harm

the social exchange relationship with employees through their lack of FSSBs and their more widely assumed unfavourable behaviours, lowering both employee retention and intrinsic motivation.

In contrast, having an underestimating supervisor implies that they perceive their own FSSBs to be weaker than the employee's perception of these behaviours. Research has shown that underestimating supervisors are more effective leaders than "overestimators" and produce relatively more favourable attitudes and behaviours among their employees (e.g., Amundsen & Martinsen, 2014; Kuenzi et al., 2019; Tekleab et al., 2008). Yet, an assumed disadvantage of such understimators is that they undervalue their strengths, set easy and unchallenging improvement goals for themselves, and suffer from low self-efficacy (Tekleab et al., 2008; Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). As a result, they create ambiguity in their communication to employees (Humborstad & Kuvaas, 2013). Adopting this logic to FSSBs, underestimating supervisors would be less likely to believe in their capabilities to provide family support for employees, and would send mixed messages to employees, which leads to a weak situation, or diverging realities, and consequent uncertainty and unpredictability (Echterhoff & Higgins, 2017; Meyer et al., 2010). Yet, because in this situation employees still experience relatively high levels of FSSBs (in contrast to their supervisors' self-evaluation), their social exchange relationship with their employer will be relatively protected, such that the outcomes are relatively more favourable as opposed to overestimating supervisors.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Supervisors who overestimate their FSSBs (relative to employees) are associated with higher employee turnover intentions (H3a) and lower employee intrinsic motivation (H3b) than those who underestimate their FSSBs.

The Role of Work-Family Culture

Work-family culture can be defined as "the assumption, belief, and value regarding the extent to which an organization supports and values the integration of employees' work and family lives" (Thompson et al., 1999, p. 394). A major component of this type of culture is employees' perceptions of negative career consequences for those making use of work-family practices or devoting time to family obligations. It also includes employees' perceptions of the time demands placed on them and whether or not they are expected to prioritize work over family. A strong work-family culture offers support for work-life balance from a source that differs from FSSBs. Whereas FSSBs derive from supervisors, the work-family culture is created by the organization (Greenhaus et al., 2012). It is, for example, influenced by the formal work-life policies of the organization, the reputation it has in the media (for being family-friendly), and from personal experiences spread among employees. These two different sources of social support can complement and enhance each other in their effect on employees because they both send messages to employees about how important the organization considers work-life balance and employees' personal lives (Rofcanin et al., 2017).

We expect that the benefits of employees and supervisors agreeing about strong FSSBs would be strongly reinforced in a family-supportive work culture. In this case, the organization further reinforces the strong (and positive) situation created by the supervisor, such that uniform messages are sent to the employee concerning the value of, and support for, family life. In other words, employees are exposed to consistent and positive messages from different sources, which creates further certainty and predictability regarding the social exchange relationship the organization wishes to foster, as well as full access to resources that help employees to juggle their work and family demands more successfully (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Marescaux et al., 2019). However, when employees disagree with their supervisors about the FSSBs on display, a

strong work–family culture in the organization contradicts the signals sent by the supervisor and/or the perceptions of employees regarding the value of and support for work-life balance, suggesting that employees are exposed to mixed signals regarding the value of, and support for, work–life balance and are therefore negatively impacted (Marescaux et al., 2019). This is also the case when employees and supervisors agree about weak FSSBs despite a strong work–family culture, thus contradicting the signals sent by the organization. Moreover, supervisors – as gatekeepers of the formal work–life balance practices offered by an organization (McCarthy et al., 2013) – may actively deny employees access to such accommodations, thereby causing them additional harm.

Similarly, when employees work in a culture that is not supportive of family demands, the benefits of agreeing on strong FSSBs would be reduced. In this situation, supervisors consistently signal high value and investment in work–family balance, but the culture of the organization does not support the same aspects. For employees, this generates mixed messages, thereby creating a weak situation in which employees' willingness to stay in the company, as well as their intrinsic motivation, is diminished (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). Moreover, it may lead to employees believing that there will be negative career consequences if they make use of and/or accept their supervisor's support in this realm (Greenhaus et al., 2012). As a result, in the absence of a strong work–family culture, whether or not employees agree with their supervisor about FSSBs might be less relevant.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Work–family culture will moderate the relationship between FSSB agreement and employees' turnover intentions (H4a) and intrinsic motivation (H4b), such that the relationship between the level and direction of FSSB agreement and employee outcomes are stronger (weaker) in a strong (weak) work–family culture.

The Role of Employees' Desire for Segmentation

Finally, having considered the supervisor's and organization's roles in the effectiveness of FSSB agreement, a focus should also be placed on employees. Thus, we focus on employees' desire for work–family segmentation, which lies on a continuum from full segmentation (i.e., a desire to keep work and home separate by drawing temporal and spatial boundaries between them) to full integration (i.e., desiring that the two be intertwined, e.g., working from home, addressing personal matters at work) (Rothbard et al., 2005).

We argue that employee-supervisor agreement on strong FSSBs is more likely to benefit employees who have high segmentation desires. Such employees have a particularly difficult time managing work-life conflicts (Gadeyne et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019), and they experience more exhaustion at work (Foucreault et al., 2018) than those who prefer integration. Improvements in technology have resulted in a work culture characterized by constant availability and blurred boundaries between work and family life, increasing levels of workschedule flexibility, thereby making it particularly challenging for employees to separate their work and private lives (Derks et al., 2016; Foucreault et al., 2018; Gadeyne et al., 2018). Moreover, employees with a stronger desire for segmentation less easily and less frequently transfer resources (e.g., affect, knowledge, and skills) from their home to their work domains (and vice versa), and, therefore, experience especially negative consequences from the increasingly blurred boundaries between work and family life (Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2016). Such employees would therefore especially benefit from a high level of support from their supervisor and the social exchange relationship this support fosters. More importantly, experiencing strong FSSBs in a consistent manner would give them the certainty that their supervisor will support them in their efforts to manage their work-life balance in a way that fits

with their preference (cf. a strong situation; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). In contrast, employees favouring integration would be less affected by this, given their lower need for clear and consistent support to balance their work and family lives in a work environment that is increasingly tailored to their preferences anyway (Foucreault et al., 2018).

Following a similar logic, employees who prefer segmentation would be influenced negatively when they either disagree with their supervisor about their level of FSSBs or agree with them on the lack of displayed FSSBs. In the former case, they lack the certainty that their supervisor will support them in a way that fits with their preferences (cf. a weak situation and its negative consequences; Bashshur et al., 2011; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004), while in the latter case, they lack this support altogether, as well as experiencing a supervisor who seems unwilling and/or unable to help them. In contrast, such circumstances would be less unfavourable for employees preferring integration because they more easily manage the boundaries between their work and family life (Derks et al., 2015) in a work environment that increasingly fits their preferences anyway (Foucreault et al., 2018). This suggests that such employees are less likely to be unfavourably affected by the lack of FSSBs and the certainty and predictability thereof.

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Employees' desire for segmentation moderates the relationship between FSSB agreement and employees' turnover intentions (H5a) and intrinsic motivation (H5b) such that the relationship between the level and direction of FSSB agreement and employee outcomes is stronger (weaker) for employees who have a high (low) desire for segmentation.

METHODOLOGY

Sample and Procedure

We collected data in the democratic Central American country of El Salvador in 2015 and 2016. El Salvador is a conservative country, holding patriarchal social attitudes reinforced by

traditionalist religious, and family-centred values. Inhabitants maintain close ties with family members, and taking care of children and the elderly are important roles in the society, irrespective of employment status (Las Heras et al., 2017). Yet, in El Salvador employees also work relatively long hours compared to the countries predominantly studied in this context (e.g., the US), frequently exceeding their contractual hours (International Labour Conference, 2005; International Labour Office, 2019). Taking these unique aspects into account, organizations in El Salvador acknowledge the importance of offering a family-supportive culture and practices. Yet, they have been slow in adopting work–family policies (Carlier et al., 2012; Las Heras et al., 2015; Poelmans et al., 2003), which positions FSSBs as an informal way of starting to encourage and enabling employees to better address their work–family needs.

We collected data from supervisor-employee dyads. We administered questionnaires in Spanish with scales that were translated and back-translated from the originals (Brislin, 1986). We gathered data from four companies: VIVI, SIMI, TRAS, and PIZZ (names altered for anonymity). VIVI is a financial institution (headquartered in another Latin-American country); SIMI is a retail chain from El Salvador; TRAS is a call centre belonging to a group of companies in Central America; and PIZZ is a fast-food chain of US origin. We accessed these companies through non-academic partners in El Salvador as part of a large project headed by a leading European business school. As an incentive, the researchers offered detailed outcome reports to the participating companies. Company representatives were briefed about the purpose of the study and the data collection procedure. The confidentiality of the study was guaranteed, such that the report focuses on the aggregate level findings to ensure confidentiality. We alone had access to the employee responses, which were anonymized prior to data analysis. Because surveying all employees was considered too taxing for the organizations, in each company, the

researchers and the HR manager identified a sample. We used the following criteria to establish a representative sample: 1) gender; 2) corporate building vs. branch offices; 3) age. Once selected, employees and their supervisors received an email from the European business school inviting them to participate. Participation was voluntary and offered no form of compensation. Table 1 provides an overview of the population, selected sample, usable matched data, and descriptive statistics for each of the firms. Each employee was reporting to only one sole supervisor. Using the unique identifier that was assigned to each employee and their supervisor, we matched data for 569 employees across 139 teams across all four firms. The average team size was 4 (SD = 2.3; min = 3; max = 18).

Insert Table 1 about here

Measures

Unless stated otherwise, we used a seven-point scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).

Family-supportive supervisor behaviours. We measured FSSBs using the four-item scale developed by Hammer et al. (2013) (e.g., *My supervisor is willing to listen to my problems in juggling work and non-work life*; $\alpha = .91$). For supervisors, the items were adapted (e.g., *I am willing to listen to my employees' problems in juggling work and non-work life*; $\alpha = .83$).

Work-family culture. To measure work-family culture, we used Thompson et al.'s (1999) scale. Following previous research (e.g., Rofcanin et al., 2017), two dimensions of the scale were used to capture the aspects of work-family culture that specifically emanate from the organization rather than from managers (the latter being represented by FSSBs): the extents to which employees (1) perceive negative consequences for spending time on family responsibilities (four items; e.g., *Many employees are resentful when men in this organization*

take extended leave to care for newborns or adopted children; reverse item, $\alpha = .74$); (2) perceive the organization to make demands or have expectations that interfere with their family responsibilities (five items; e.g., *Employees are often expected to take work home at night and/or weekends*; reverse item, $\alpha = .84$).

Desire for segmentation. Desire for segmentation was measured using four items with a seven-point scale (*Completely unacceptable* to *Completely acceptable*; $\alpha = .88$) (Edwards & Rothbard, 1999). Employees were asked how acceptable they found it to (1) be required to work while at home; (2) think about work while at home; (3) think about work once they leave the workplace; (4) be expected to take work home. Scores were reversed such that high scores denoted a high desire for segmentation and low scores denoted a low desire for segmentation, as our hypotheses reasoned from the point of view of segmentation (i.e., high versus low) (Rothbard et al., 2005).

Intrinsic motivation. To evaluate the intrinsic motivation of employees, we used four items (Grant, 2008). An example item is: *I work because I enjoy the work itself*; $\alpha = .88$.

Turnover intentions. Three items were used to capture turnover intentions. An example item is: *I frequently think about quitting my job*; $\alpha = .83$ (O'Reilly et al., 1991).

Control variables. We used control variables that previous research has argued and found may affect employees' need for and value of FSSBs, as well as our outcome variables (Bosch et al., 2018; Humborstad & Kuvaas, 2013; Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2009; Rofcanin et al., 2017): employees' gender, marital status, education level, tenure, and number of children. At the supervisor level, we also controlled for gender, as previous research has shown that it can be correlated with employees' perceptions of FSSBs (Basuil et al., 2016). Moreover, we controlled for the nested nature of our data by controlling for the organization using dummy variables.

Table 1 supports this need because there are significant differences between the companies. For example, employees' and supervisors' perceptions differ significantly between the companies (F = 2.87 and 2.95, p < .05), as do employees' intrinsic motivation (F = 6.40; p < .0001). Moreover, because our analyses involve variables at two levels (employee and supervisor), we used the TWOLEVEL procedure in Mplus, which clusters data at the team level. The ICC1-values showed small to moderate intra-class correlations, for example, for FSSBs (ranging from .13 to .18) and work–family culture (between .07 and .21), indicating the need to take these intra-team correlations into account.

RESULTS

Factor Analyses

Our data consists of six factors: (1) FSSBs; (2) work–family culture (career consequences); (3) work–family culture (organizational time demands); (4) desire for segmentation; (5) turnover intentions; (6) intrinsic motivation. The second and third are dimensions of the work–family culture construct. Previous research (e.g., Rofcanin et al., 2017) has combined these two dimensions into one measure for ease of analysis. Our data supports this as a six-factor model, in which the two dimensions of work–family culture together form a higher-order factor, fits the data well (RMSEA = .06; CFI = .93; TLI = .92; SRMR = .07), and the composite measure is reliable (α = .83) (Bentler, 1990; Byrne, 2001). Hence, we used the composite measure in all analyses.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlations between our variables. There was no significant correlation between employee and supervisor perceived FSSBs (r = -.01; p > .05), showing initial support for the disagreement between them. Specifically, only 38.3% of

employee respondents held a similar perception of FSSBs to that of their supervisor (i.e., values within half a standard deviation of one another; Shanock et al., 2010). Of these respondents, 11.5% shared a perception of weak FSSBs (i.e., negative FSSB agreement), whereas 45% shared a perception of strong FSSBs (i.e., positive FSSB agreement); the remaining 43.5% shared a perception of FSSBs as "medium" (i.e., within half a standard deviation of the average). 32.0% of employees had an underestimating supervisor, such that the supervisor had a lower perception of their FSSBs than the employee, and 29.7% of employees had an overestimating supervisor.

Insert Table 2 about here

Polynomial Regressions: Main Relationships Between FSSB Agreement and Outcomes

We used polynomial regressions with a response surface analysis to test whether the level and direction of FSSB agreement relates to employee outcomes (Shanock et al., 2010). These polynomial regressions use five variables: employee perceived FSSBs; supervisor perceived FSSBs; employee perceived squared values; supervisor perceived squared values; and their interaction. We illustrate this in Equation 1 in which Y is the outcome variable, E refers to employee-perceived FSSBs, and E represents supervisor-perceived FSSBs. We scale-centred the two predictor variables to remove multicollinearity issues (Shanock et al., 2010). E is a variable at the team level, so the regressions were specified in a multi-level way such that E is situated at the between level, and E at the within level:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 E + b_2 S + b_3 E^2 + b_4 (E \times S) + b_5 S^2 + e$$
 (1)

Table 3 summarizes the results. In a first step, we used employee and supervisor perceived FSSBs and all control variables, showing that employee perceived FSSBs correlate with lower turnover intentions ($\beta = -.40$; p < .001) and higher intrinsic motivation ($\beta = .25$; p < .001). In a

second step, we performed the aforementioned polynomial regressions for both outcomes. This

significantly increased the explained variance of both outcome variables by 1%, and a chi-square

difference test showed that the difference between the two models is significant ($\Delta \chi^2(26)$ =

365.09 and 363.39; p < .001). In a third step, a surface response analysis uses the regression

coefficients to test the slope and curvature of two lines: the agreement (or *congruence*) line (E =

S) and the disagreement (or *incongruence*) line (E = -S) (Shanock et al., 2010). These lines were

subsequently used to create a graph (see Figure 1). The disagreement line shows the outcome

variables at extreme levels of disagreement (leftmost and rightmost ends of the disagreement line

in the graph) and how the outcome variables change as disagreement becomes smaller (until

perfect agreement is reached [i.e., in the middle of the line]). The slope and curvature of this

disagreement line show whether agreement is better than disagreement (curvature; cf. H1), and

whether the direction of disagreement matters (slope; cf. H3). The agreement line visualizes the

outcome variables when employees agree with their supervisor, going from agreement on strong

FSSBs (back of the graph) to agreement on weak FSSBs (front of the graph). The slope of this

line shows whether the direction of agreement matters, and the curvature shows whether this

relationship is (curvi) linear.

Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here

We first describe the results for employees' turnover intentions (H1a, H2a & H3a). We find

no support for H1a - which suggested that FSSB agreement is associated with lower turnover

intentions than FSSB disagreement - because the curvature of the disagreement line is not

significant ($\beta = -0.16$; p > .05). H2a is confirmed because the slope of the agreement line is

significant, indicating that turnover intentions are lower when employees and supervisors share

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perceptions of strong FSSBs rather than weak perceptions (β = -.80; p < .05). This relationship is linear because the curvature of this line is not significant (β = -0.02; p > .05). Visually, Figure 1a shows this as turnover intentions gradually decrease as one follows the agreement line from the front of the graph (agreement on weak FSSBs) to the rear (agreement on strong FSSBs). Finally, H3a is not supported because the slope of the disagreement line is not significant (β = -0.16; p > .05). Hence, there is no statistical difference in employee turnover intentions between those with supervisors who overestimate their FSSBs and those who underestimate them.

For intrinsic motivation, the results are different. First, the curvature of the disagreement line is positive (β = .15; p < .01), which means that disagreement generally correlates with higher intrinsic motivation than agreement. This contradicts H1b, yet is driven by the finding that agreement only outperforms disagreement when employee and supervisor agree on strong FSSBs, which is where intrinsic motivation is maximized (see Figure 1b). This is further confirmed by the slope of the agreement line (β = 0.46; p < .05), which shows that intrinsic motivation is significantly higher in the case of agreement on strong FSSBs. Figure 1b shows this as intrinsic motivation increases as one follows the agreement line from the front to the rear of the graph, confirming H2b. Finally, because the slope of the disagreement line is significant (β = .22; p < .001), we find that employees are more intrinsically motivated when their supervisor underestimates their FSSBs (the right-hand side of Figure 1b) than when they overestimate them (the left-hand side), which supports H3b.

Interaction with Work-Family Culture and Desire for Segmentation

To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, we performed moderated polynomial regressions (Edwards & Rothbard, 1999). We extended Equation 1 by adding five interaction terms; Equation 2 illustrates this for the interaction with work–family culture (*WFC*):

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 E + b_2 S + b_3 E^2 + b_4 (E \times S) + b_5 S^2 + b_6 (WFC \times E) + b_7 (WFC \times S) + b_8 (WFC \times E^2) + b_9 (WFC \times E \times S) + b_{10} (WFC \times S^2) + b_{11} WFC + e$$
 (2)

Next, we performed simple slope analyses to test the relationship between FSSB agreement and the outcomes at high and low levels of the moderator (one standard deviation above and below the mean). We reran the surface response analysis at high and low levels of the moderator (Table 4).

Work-family culture. H4a is supported. For turnover intentions, we only find FSSB agreement to matter in a strong work-family culture because only then are some of the coefficients of the (dis)agreement line significant. In this case, we find that disagreement is better than agreement (curvature of the disagreement line $\beta = -.29$; p = .00). However, this is driven by the finding that agreement only outperforms disagreement when employee and supervisor agree about strong FSSBs, which is where turnover intentions are minimized (see Figure 1c). This is further confirmed because agreement on strong FSSBs is associated with lower turnover intentions than agreement on weak FSSBs (slope of the agreement line $\beta = -.91$; p < .05). As such, turnover intentions are extremely high in the front of the graph in Figure 1c (representing negative FSSB agreement) as compared to the rear (positive FSSB agreement). Finally, we find no evidence that the two directions of disagreement are significantly different because the slope of the disagreement line is not significant. In sum, only in the case of a strong work-family culture do we find that turnover intentions are minimized in cases of agreement on strong FSSBs.

We find little support for H4b regarding intrinsic motivation. In a weak work–family culture, employees are more intrinsically motivated when their supervisor underestimates their FSSBs than when they overestimate them (slope of the agreement line β = .25, p < .001). In a strong work–family culture, employees are more intrinsically motivated in cases of disagreement than

agreement (curvature of the agreement line β = .20; p < .05). As such, we find no conclusive evidence that FSSB agreement matters more in a strong work–family culture.

Insert Table 4 about here

Desire for segmentation. This analysis was performed on a subset of the sample because this variable was only available for two of our firms (n = 296; Table 4). H5a was not supported: regardless of employees' desires for segmentation, one of the slopes/curvatures of the (dis)agreement lines was significant for turnover intentions. However, our results do support H5b. When employees have a low segmentation desire (i.e., a preference for integration), intrinsic motivation is higher in cases of agreement on weak FSSBs than agreement on strong FSSBs (slope of the agreement line $\beta = -.61$; p < .05). Figure 1d shows this as intrinsic motivation is highest at the front of the graph (agreement on weak FSSBs) and declines toward the rear (agreement on strong FSSBs). The opposite is true for employees who strongly desire segmentation; for them, agreement on strong FSSBs is associated with higher intrinsic motivation than agreement on weak FSSBs (slope of the agreement line $\beta = 1.32$; p < .001; Figure 1d). Moreover, for these employees we find that, on average, disagreement is better than agreement (curvature of the agreement line $\beta = .29$; p < .001). This implies that, for disagreement, the values of intrinsic motivation are close to, although lower than, the optimum (which is when both parties share strong FSSB perceptions). Hence, agreement on strong FSSBs maximizes intrinsic motivation for employees desiring segmentation, but minimizes it for employees preferring integration.

DISCUSSION

Summary of Results and Theoretical Contributions

In response to calls to study the employee–supervisor agreement regarding FSSBs (Crain & Stevens, 2018), we employed a dyadic perspective to study the joint influence of supervisor and subordinate rated FSSBs on employee outcomes. We used polynomial regression and a response surface methodology (Shanock et al., 2010) to take a closer look at the various outcomes that arise when managers and their subordinates (dis)agree regarding the FSSBs displayed by the supervisor. In general, our results supported the argument that FSSB agreement is an important construct in and of itself, explaining variance in employees' intrinsic motivation and turnover intentions. However, this is strongly dependent on the boundary conditions that we considered, specifically the employees' desire for segmentation and the organization's work-family culture.

Our results demonstrate that when employees prefer to separate their professional and personal lives, they exhibit the highest intrinsic motivation when they share strong FSSB perceptions with their supervisor. In contrast, their intrinsic motivation is lower when their supervisor overestimates or underestimates their FSSBs, and is minimized when both parties perceive FSSBs to be weak. In contrast, for employees with a high desire for integration between work and family, intrinsic motivation is maximized when employees share perceptions of weak FSSBs with their supervisor. A suboptimal situation applies when their supervisor overestimates or underestimates their FSSBs, while intrinsic motivation is minimized when both parties perceive FSSBs to be strong. For turnover intentions, on the other hand, we only find FSSB agreement to matter when employees perceive a strong work–family culture. Only in this situation do employees exhibit minimal turnover intentions when they share a strong FSSB perception with their supervisor. In contrast, their turnover intentions are significantly higher when their supervisor either overestimates or underestimates their FSSBs, and is maximized when both parties share a perception of weak FSSBs. In sum, FSSB agreement matters for both

turnover intentions and intrinsic motivation, but our results differ for these different employee outcomes and depend on the boundary conditions.

These results contribute to the FSSB literature in four ways. First, we confirm previous research in that FSSBs relate positively to employees' intrinsic motivation and retention, assumedly because these behaviours build a social exchange relationship with employees and give them access to work-life balance resources (Bagger & Li, 2014; McKersie et al., 2019; Russo et al., 2018). Nevertheless, FSSBs are dyadic and depend on the interactions between supervisors and employees (Hammer et al., 2009). As such, while previous research on FSSBs has assumed that employees' and supervisors' perceptions of FSSBs are aligned (e.g., Bagger & Li, 2014; Rofcanin et al., 2017), our results disprove this. More importantly, our results suggest that the (dis)agreement in the employee–supervisor dyad matters, above and beyond employees' and supervisors' individual perceptions, as it significantly explains additional variance in employee outcomes.

Second, we incorporated a person-centred perspective, acknowledging that employees may have varying work–life balance desires. Specifically, for employees who wish to separate their professional and private lives, intrinsic motivation is highest when employees and supervisors see eye to eye on strongly exhibited FSSBs. This supports the idea of a strong situation or shared reality between employees and supervisors, characterized by clear and consistent messaging, certainty regarding the importance and value the supervisor attaches to work–life balance, the level of support they provide, and how appropriate or acceptable it is for employees to make efforts to separate their work and private lives (Bashshur et al., 2011; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Mischel, 1979). This not only strengthens employees' social exchange relationships with their employers, but also satisfies their basic needs for autonomy and relatedness, explaining the

positive outcomes associated with this situation (Marescaux et al., 2013; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In contrast, when employees who desire segmentation lack this strong and positive situation (and thus disagree with their supervisor about the FSSBs displayed), their exchange relationship and basic needs assumedly suffer, which is associated with suboptimal intrinsic motivation. Most detrimental is when both parties agree that the supervisor exhibits weak FSSBs: not only do employees suffer from the lack of FSSBs, but they might also be in a situation in which the supervisor has little ability or motivation to change (Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). Hence, this might be a sign of a toxic relationship between employees and their supervisor, as well as a lack of resources for employees to manage their work–life balance, which would explain their low intrinsic motivation.

Yet, interestingly, for employees who desire integration of their professional and personal lives, intrinsic motivation is highest when both parties agree that the supervisor provides weak FSSBs. While this is a strong situation, it would intuitively be considered negative because of the lack of support, yet it seems to be satisfactory for these employees. On the one hand, the increasing dominance of a work culture characterized by constant availability and blurred boundaries between work and family life is increasingly tailored to employees who prefer integration, suggesting that such employees might simply not need their supervisor's clear and consistent support (Derks et al., 2016; Foucreault et al., 2018; Gadeyne et al., 2018). On the other hand, research suggests that such employees more easily transfer resources from the home to the work domain and vice versa, again explaining why they would need less clear and consistent support in the first place (Hunter et al., 2019; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2019).

Third, high FSSB agreement only goes hand in hand with low turnover intentions when

employees also perceive a strong work–family culture emanating from the organization. In this case, we can argue that there is a "double fit" when both the organization and supervisor send consistent and positive signals, that is, of support for work–life balance, hence creating an even stronger situation or shared reality. This binds employees to the organization by enhancing their social exchange relationship as well as satisfying their basic needs. Previous research has supported the value of such consistency in messages from the organization and from supervisors (e.g., Marescaux et al., 2019; Rofcanin et al., 2017). Yet, we also find evidence of a "compensation effect" from a strong work–family culture because it seems to compensate – to some extent – for disagreement between employees and supervisors concerning FSSBs. This aligns with research (Bagger & Li, 2014) showing that organizations' family-supportive policy offerings can compensate for the absence of FSSBs. In contrast, however, in a weak work–family culture, FSSB agreement does not correlate with turnover intention. This suggest that work–family culture may act as a primary boundary condition if FSSBs are to bind employees to the organization.

Fourth, our results suggest that different "fits" matter for different outcomes. What matters for turnover intentions is a fit between supervisor and employee perceptions of strong FSSBs, *and* a fit with a strong work–family culture. It essentially provides a breeding ground for a social exchange relationship, which lowers turnover intentions as employees reciprocate the investments made in their work–life balance and protect these through their loyalty (Hammer et al., 2009). Because turnover intentions represent an individual's attitude toward the organization as a whole, it is regarded as a typical outcome of a social exchange relationship (Aryee et al., 2015). In contrast, while intrinsic motivation can also be driven by social exchanges (Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2009), research has argued and shown that it is mainly fostered by supplying employees

with resources that satisfy their basic needs (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Van den Broeck et al., 2008). Yet, what individuals need depends on their personal preferences, for example, their desire for segmentation. In other words, what seems to matter when it comes to intrinsic motivation is that supervisors provide clear and consistent support when employees particularly need it, which our results suggest is the case when employees desire segmentation. While one could argue that intrinsic motivation acts as a mediating mechanism that explains lower turnover intentions (e.g., Kuvaas et al., 2017), post hoc analyses² (i.e., a mediated polynomial regression analysis) show that the same conclusions still hold regarding the relationship between FSSB agreement and turnover intentions when taking intrinsic motivation into account. Thus, at best, intrinsic motivation is only a partial mediator. This is not surprising given that when we consider employees' preferences for segmentation/integration, as well as the work–family culture, the results are fundamentally different for intrinsic motivation and turnover intentions. This shows that it is important to look at the boundary conditions that influence the relationship between FSSB agreement and employee outcomes in a very different way.

Finally, we need to interpret our findings within their specific societal context. In El Salvador, family lives are critical, yet employees work long hours and, therefore, work–family conflict represents a major problem for organizations. Moreover, formal work-life balance policies are not yet widely adopted (Carlier et al., 2012). Given this particular context, the findings of this study are rendered unique. It is of little surprise that the relationship between FSSB (agreement) and employee outcomes is as strong in this context as that in which FSSB theory was originally developed and validated (i.e., the US context; Hammer et al., 2009). Yet, considering the lack of a formal approach to work–life balance in El Salvador, it makes sense that the relationship of

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² Analyses available upon request from the corresponding author.

informal FSSBs to employee outcomes can be further reinforced when they are supported by a strong firm-level work-family culture, as well as when they fit with individual needs and desires regarding work-life balance. As such, it shows why, especially in such a context, organizations can achieve competitive advantage through a systematic approach to work-life balance. By focusing on this unique context, we address the concern that more international samples are required that diverge from the dominant focus on the US (Kossek et al., 2011).

Practical Implications

Researchers have started studying interventionist designs to train managers in FSSBs (Kossek, 2016). These interventions aim to teach supervisors how to discuss their subordinates' work and family demands and to set goals to track whether their own FSSBs are effective. To date, interventions have focused on subordinates' FSSB perceptions. Given our results, however, supervisors need not only be sufficiently equipped with the skills and self-efficacy to demonstrate FSSBs but also to communicate consistent messages to employees to create a strong situation and maximize the effectiveness of their FSSBs. Within these interventions, it seems crucial to clarify the expectations of both supervisors and subordinates in relation to FSSBs, so that the content of the associated training and HR policies are developed accordingly and greater alignment between employees and supervisors can be achieved. Importantly, our results with respect to employees' desire for segmentation underline the need to personalize treatment. Employees whose desire for segmentation is high tend to benefit from FSSB agreement, while this is not the case for employees who desire integration. As such, in designing and delivering interventions on FSSBs, managers and HR departments should particularly target employees who prefer clear boundaries between their work and non-work. Finally, supervisors' efforts may be in vain if they are not supported by a positive work-life culture at the organizational level.

Therefore, an important responsibility for HR departments is to invest in higher-level support for work–life balance, for example, work–life policies and practices offered at the organizational level (Greenhaus et al., 2012).

Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Suggestions

Our study has some limitations. First, the design was cross-sectional, preventing us from making definitive causal inferences. However, we relied on a theoretical approach to formulate our hypotheses and collected data from both supervisors and subordinates. Nevertheless, a longitudinal design is needed in future research. Second, our measurement of work-family culture was based on employees' perceptions. Future research could focus on measuring this construct at the team or organizational level through shared perceptions. Third, we focused on employees' work outcomes. Future research is needed to examine whether FSSB agreement generates similarly positive effects on employees' lives beyond work (e.g., their family motivation and performance in their private lives). Fourth, while our results suggest that FSSB agreement explains additional variance above and beyond individual perceptions of FSSBs, future research would benefit from further validating these findings. Fifth, we collected data for segmentation desire from two companies of our sample context (TRAS, a call centre and SIMI, a retail chain). This could raise doubts as to how relevant segmentation desire is, as there might not be many possibilities or requirements to work from home in companies of such natures. However, in both companies, all employees reported having worked at least one hour from home in the week before the survey (SIMI: mean = 1.53; SD = 1.34; TRAS: mean = 1.23; SD = 0.84). Moreover, in SIMI (TRAS), 25% (12%) of employees reported performing most of their work at home for at least one day in the week. Hence, we have significant evidence of employees taking at least some work home. Nevertheless, we would recommend future research to extend our

findings to other industries and jobs where working from home is more common because it is more feasible or simply expected because of high work hour expectations (e.g., professional service work).

Furthermore, future research could benefit from exploring the segmentation preference of supervisors and how influences their displayed FSSBs, and subsequently, employee outcomes. It may be that supervisors who prefer integration find it particularly challenging to display consistent FSSBs to help employees who prefer segmentation, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Hence, the fit between employees' and supervisors' preference for segmentation might ultimately matter. Alternatively, future research could explore whether and how supervisors can adapt their FSSBs to fit with employees' preference for either segmentation or integration. Some behaviours (e.g., rearranging job duties so that employees do not need to take work home) might be particularly satisfying for "segmentors", while others (e.g., allowing employees to work from home) would be more satisfying for "integrators". Hence, it would be worthwhile exploring whether FSSBs can be individually tailored. Finally, other organizational or team factors (e.g., team orientation, work-life policies, perceived organizational support), and individual factors (e.g., proactivity, self-determination), as well as relational dynamics with one's manager (e.g., Leader–Member Exchange), are potential boundary conditions that may also play a role.

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Table 1.Demographics of the Four Companies

| Company ¹ | VIVI | SIMI | TRAS | PIZZ | Total |
|---|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Total number of employees | 1764 | 3500 | 801 | 5208 | 11273 |
| Number of employees selected | 568 | 525 | 584 | 722 | 2399 |
| Number of supervisors selected | 139 | 138 | 129 | 66 | 472 |
| Final matched dyads | 88 | 253 | 43 | 185 | 569 |
| Percentages of female employees/supervisors | 58.6 / 67.9 | 70.4 / 74.0 | 39.5 / 41.7 | 61.6 / 23.1 | 63.4 / 39.6 |
| Percentage of married employees | 77.0 | 76.3 | 74.7 | 74.1 | 75.5 |
| Average age (SD) | 37.97 (7.52) | 36.36 (8.36) | 33.63 (5.01) | 30.47 (7.21) | 34.55 (8.19) |
| Average tenure (SD) | 13.340 (7.51) | 11.70 (6.86) | 6.14 (1.52) | 8.82 (4.79) | 10.59 (6.43) |
| Average number of children (SD) | 1.36 (1.11) | 1.19 (1.15) | 0.84 (0.87) | 0.95 (0.90) | 1.11 (1.06) |
| Education (in percentages of the sample): | | | | | |
| * Low (high-school graduate or below) | 13.8 | 16.2 | 11.7 | 20.0 | 16.7 |
| * Medium (bachelor's degree) | 41.4 | 68.0 | 39.5 | 70.8 | 62.7 |
| * High (master's degree) | 44.8 | 15.8 | 48.8 | 9.2 | 20.6 |

Note. ¹ Fictional names to protect anonymity.

Table 2.Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

| Variable | Mean SD |) 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|--|-----------|-------------------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|
| 1. Employee-perceived FSSBs | 5.40 1.6 | 50 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Supervisor-perceived FSSBs | 6.25 0.9 | 9001 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Work–family culture | 3.27 1.4 | 14 .20*** | .07 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Desire for segmentation | 2.10 1.4 | 4008 | 00 | 33*** | 1 | | | | | | | |
| 5. Turnover intentions | 3.17 1.9 | 9530*** | 14*** | 44*** | .20*** | 1 | | | | | | |
| 6. Intrinsic motivation | 5.91 1.2 | 25 .32*** | .09* | .29*** | 16** | 53*** | 1 | | | | | |
| 7. Employee gender (1 = man) | 0.37 0.4 | 4810 [*] | .03 | 05 | .20** | 06 | 05 | 1 | | | | |
| 8. Supervisor gender (1 = man) | 0.60 0.5 | 50 .05 | .06 | 03 | .13* | 05 | .01 | .24*** | 1 | | | |
| 9. Employee marital status (1 = married) | 0.75 0.4 | 1306 | .05 | 01 | .06 | 00 | 06 | .06 | .03 | 1 | | |
| 10. Employee education ^a | 2.04 0.6 | 61 .00 | .01 | 04 | .03 | .07 | 08 | .07 | 03 | .02 | 1 | |
| 11. Employee tenure | 10.59 6.4 | 1304 | 04 | .02 | .04 | 06 | .06 | .02 | 09* | .02 | .03 | .1 |
| 12. Employee number of children | 1.11 1.0 | 06 .03 | .00 | .06 | .05 | 11* | .13** | .04 | 04 | 18*** | .03 | .47*** |

Note. n (employee-level data) = 569 except for desire for segmentation (n = 296); n (supervisor-level data) = 139; FSSBs = Family-supportive supervisor behaviours.

 $^{^{}a}$ 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high

^{*}p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 3.Results of Polynomial Regression Analyses

| | Turnover | intentions | Intrinsic motivation | | | |
|---|-----------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|--|--|
| | β (Std. error) | β (Std. error) | β (Std. error) | β (Std. error) | | |
| Constant | 4.79*** (0.40) | 5.80*** (0.49) | 4.68*** (0.30) | 4.02*** (0.32) | | |
| Employee-perceived FSSBs (E) | -0.40*** (0.06) | -0.48* (0.21) | 0.25*** (0.04) | 0.34* (0.14) | | |
| Supervisor-perceived FSSBs (S) | -0.25** (0.08) | -0.32* (0.15) | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.12 (0.09) | | |
| E² | | -0.06* (0.03) | | 0.04 (0.02) | | |
| S ² | | -0.03 (0.04) | | 0.05* (0.02) | | |
| ExS | | 0.07 (0.08) | | -0.06 (0.05) | | |
| Agreement line $(E = S)$ | | | | | | |
| Slope | | -0.80* (0.34) | | 0.46* (0.22) | | |
| Curvature | | -0.02 (0.09) | | 0.03 (0.06) | | |
| Disagreement line $(E = -S)$ | | | | | | |
| Slope | | -0.16 (0.13) | | 0.22*** (0.08) | | |
| Curvature | | -0.16 (0.09) | | 0.15** (0.05) | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.15*** (.04) | 0.16*** (.04) | 0.18*** (.04) | 0.19*** (.04) | | |
| ΔR^2 | | 0.01 | | 0.01 | | |
| Chi-square difference test ($\Delta df = 26$) | | 365.09*** | | 363.39*** | | |

Note. n = 569; Analyses performed controlling for gender (employee and supervisor), tenure, education level, marital status, organization and number of children; unstandardized regression coefficients reported; FSSBs = Family-supportive supervisor behaviours.

^{*}p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 4.Moderated Polynomial Regression Analyses

| | Turnover intentions | | | | Intrinsic motivation | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|--|--|
| | Work–family culture ¹ | | Desire for se | egmentation ² | Work–fam | ily culture ¹ | Desire for segmentation ² | | | |
| | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | | |
| Intercept | 6.02*** (.43) | 5.04*** (.43) | 5.60*** (1.00) | 5.59*** (1.00) | 3.93*** (.31) | 4.39***('31) | 5.13*** (.49) | 3.32*** (.49) | | |
| Employee-perceived FSSBs (E) | -0.35 (.19) | -0.44 (.24) | 02 (.29) | -0.74 (.48) | 0.25 (.16) | 0.31 (.24) | 31 (.20) | .71*** (.18) | | |
| Supervisor-perceived FSSBs (S) | -0.12 (.24) | -0.47*** (.17) | 10 (.16) | 70* (. <i>36</i>) | -0.00 (.15) | 0.21 (.11) | 30*** (.09) | .61* (.26) | | |
| E^2 | -0.02 (.04) | -0.10* (.04) | 05 (.06) | 04 (.05) | 0.03 (.03) | 0.06 (.03) | .10*** (.03) | .03 (.03) | | |
| S^2 | -0.07 (.05) | -0.02 (.04) | 01 (.08) | .08 (.06) | 0.08*** (.03) | 0.03 (.04) | 00 (.05) | .02 (.05) | | |
| ExS | -0.01 (.08) | 0.17* (.09) | 08 (.09) | .24 (.18) | -0.01 (.07) | -0.11 (.09) | .14* (.06) | 24*** (.06) | | |
| Agreement line $(E = S)$ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Slope | -0.47 (.40) | -0.91*(·38) | 12 (.42) | -1.44 (.83) | 0.25 (.30) | 0.52 (.32) | 61* (.25) | 1.32*** (.42) | | |
| Curvature | -0.10 (.12) | 0.05 (.10) | 14 (.14) | .28 (.20) | 0.10 (.09) | -0.02 (.07) | .24*** (.07) | 19 (.10) | | |
| Disagreement line $(E = -S)$ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Slope | -0.23 (.17) | 0.03 (.17) | .08 (.21) | 04 (.19) | 0.25*** (.07) | 0.10 (.19) | 01 (.18) | .10 (.16) | | |
| Curvature | -0.08 (.11) | -0.29*** (.10) | .02 (.13) | 20 (.20) | 0.12 (.09) | 0.20* (.07) | 04 (.06) | .29*** (.10) | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.29*** (.04) | 0.29*** (.04) | .20*** (.05) | .20*** (.05) | 0.23*** (.04) | 0.23*** (.04) | .42*** (.11) | .42*** (.11) | | |

Note. Analyses performed under control of gender (employee and supervisor), tenure, education level, marital status, organization, and number of children; unstandardized regression coefficients reported (standard errors in parentheses); FSSBs = Family-supportive supervisor behaviours.

 $^{^{1}}$ n = 569; 2 n = 296.

^{*}p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.




Figure 1. Surface Response Analyses for FSSB (Dis)Agreement

Note. E = Employee-perceived family-supportive supervisor behaviours; S = Supervisor-perceived family-supportive supervisor behaviours.