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Securing Internet of Medical Things Systems: Limitations, Issues and Recommendations

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Abstract—Traditional health-care systems suffer from new challenges associated with the constant increase in the number of patients. In order to address this issue, and to increase the accuracy, reliability, efficiency, and effectiveness of the health-care domain, the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) was proposed. IoMT can be considered as an enhancement and investment to respond more effectively and efficiently to patients' needs. However, IoMT suffers from different issues and challenges such as the lack of security and privacy measures, in addition to the necessary training and awareness. In this paper, we highlight the importance of implementing the right security measures and the required training skills, in order to enhance the immunity of IoMT against cyber-attacks. Moreover, we review the main IoMT security and privacy issues, and the existing security solutions. These solutions are classified as cryptographic or non-cryptographic. Then, the different solutions are analyzed and compared in terms of computational complexity and required resources. It is important to note that the security measures for IoMT exhibit a trade-off between the security level and the system performance, especially in the rise of digital healthcare v4.0 era. Next, we discuss the appropriate security solutions such as lightweight cryptographic algorithms, and protocols that attempt to reduce the overhead in terms of computations and resources. This leads to the conclusion that there is a need to design an efficient intrusion detection/prevention system that cooperates with dynamic shadow honeypots. Finally, we propose a security solution, which is divided into five different layers to detect and prevent attacks, in addition to reducing/correcting the damage of these known attacks and preserving the patients' privacy. However, it should be noted that zero-day attacks and exploits are still the main challenging issue that surrounds IoMT.

Index terms— Healthcare; IoMT; Medical Cyber Physical Systems; Medical Devices.

I. INTRODUCTION

The integration of medical devices within the Internet of Things (IoT) (see Fig. 1), led to the emergence of the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) [18]. With the emergence of the new digitized healthcare era, called Healthcare v4.0 [154], [122], IoT devices were deployed in several medical domains, especially with the excessive use of medical wireless sensors, devices, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),

and robots. In fact, medical sensors and actuators are used as wearable devices in the context of body area networks. Instead of keeping patients in hospitals, these devices are capable of constantly monitoring the patient's health in real-time, while offering them better physical flexibility and mobility. On the other hand, medical robots can also serve as surgical robots, as well as hospital robots [21], which are capable of accurately performing small surgeries. They are also capable of performing several medical tasks such as Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) [134]. However, the main issue is that many IoMT devices are prone and vulnerable to cyber-attacks simply because medical devices are either poorly secured against potential adversaries, or not secure at all. Therefore, any cyber-attack can have drastic consequences, threatening patients' lives, which would hinder the wider deployment of IoMT.

Furthermore, IoMT applications are closely related to sensitive healthcare services, especially that they handle sensitive information about patients including their names, addresses, and health conditions. The main challenge in the IoMT domain is preserving the patient's privacy without degrading the security level. In addition, appropriate security and privacy solutions should include minimum computations and require minimal resources.

A. Motivations & Aims

Recently, medical IoT systems became among the most important advanced medical technologies. This technology can achieve a significant gain by enhancing the remote monitoring of medical services. Moreover, it can help in detecting any medical issue very early and thus, preserve patients' lives and health.

However, in the IoMT domain, many of the connected medical devices present security vulnerabilities that make them prone to malicious exploitation attempts. Such issues may lead to drastic consequences, which would affect patients' lives by perturbing (or controlling) medical devices.




Fig. 1: An Example of Internet-of-Things System with n IoT Devices, k Aggregation Nodes & m Servers

Therefore, it is mandatory to overcome these issues to preserve the efficiency and accuracy levels of medical IoT systems.

On the other hand, the pervasiveness of medical sensitive data within IoMT systems makes them prone to advanced attacks (e.g. Ransomware) that target their main security aspects including privacy, integrity and confidentiality. This would severely impact the credibility, adoption, and wide deployment of IoMT systems.

Our aim, in this paper, is to identify the main threats that may compromise the security of IoMT devices and systems, and to identify the necessary and appropriate measures that are essential for their security.

B. Related Work

Medical IoT systems became core to the e-Healthcare domain whereby smart medical sensors and devices are installed to improve patients' lifespan and medical conditions. However, this domain came under a variety of attacks such as botnets targeting medical systems [181], as part of targeted cyber-crimes [182]. In [81], IoT security and privacy issues were discussed but were not effectively linked to IoMT. Various intrusion detection [100], [180] and authentication/authorisation [142], [158] methods were presented to ensure a secure IoT environment with little notice to their application to IoMT. Moreover, only recently more work was directed to the security of healthcare systems. A generic survey on medical big data analysis was conducted in [80] to sort big data issues and challenges of adopting IoMT solutions [27], while an on-demand IoT adoption in hospitals was conducted in [70] to enhance nurses' experience based on the pros and cons of the IoT adoption in healthcare technologies [3]. In this paper, we

present a more detailed, holistic and analytical view point on the IoMT and healthcare domains, as well as the integration of cyber-physical systems within the medical field. All the mentioned cyber-attacks exclusively target healthcare systems, while the presented security measures are discussed in a way to ensure their adoption in such domains.

C. Contributions

The novelty of the paper stems from the fact that it includes a comprehensive overview and analysis of all security and privacy issues related to medical IoT systems. Also, the paper discusses the recent lightweight security solutions, which consist of cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques. Moreover, several lessons are learned from the overview and accordingly, several recommendations are proposed towards making medical IoT systems secure and safe to deploy and use.

More specifically, the contributions of this paper can be summarized in the following points:

- **Perspective & Future Trends** of IoMT systems are presented, including their communication types, device types, and applications.
- **Benefits** of IoMT systems and applications are presented and discussed.
- **Concerns & Risks** are highlighted, especially in terms of public and privacy concerns, while risks are presented and evaluated through a proposed qualitative risk analysis method.
- **Attack Sources & Characteristics** are presented and discussed in details, including their scope and impacts.
- **Cyber-Attacks** are presented per security breach, while exploring malware and code injection attacks. Moreover, real-case cyber-attacks are also presented.

- **Security Measures** including technical and non-technical ones are presented, evaluated and analysed especially in terms of their advantages and limitations.
- **Suggestions & Recommendations** are presented based on the conducted research for a much more efficient and secure IoMT environment.

D. Organization

This paper is divided into seven sections, in addition to the introduction, which sheds light on the digitization era of healthcare v4.0. Section II presents and details the main IoMT communication protocols and application domains. Section III highlights the main IoMT challenges, constraints, concerns, and risks, while presenting a qualitative risk assessment. Section IV presents and discusses the most recurring cyber-attack types against IoMT main security goals, including real-case cyber-attacks against well-known hospitals in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Section V presents various technical and non-technical security measures that are suitable for protecting the IoMT and e-Healthcare systems, communication and devices, along with their advantages and limitations. Section VI highlights this paper's main suggestions & recommendations which include the adoption of lightweight cryptographic solutions, hybrid and dynamic non-cryptographic solutions, and finally the implementation of artificial intelligence for a higher accuracy and in a real-time. Section VII concludes the presented work with some prospects on future work.

II. IOMT BACKGROUND, PERSPECTIVE & FUTURE

In this section, the main communication types used in IoMT are presented, in addition to the different types of medical devices, as well as the benefits offered by IoMT systems. Moreover, the future prospects of IoMT are also highlighted and presented in Fig. 2.

A. IoMT Communications

Real-time data transmission among medical devices takes place via four main communication networks types. These types include Body Area Networks, Home Area Networks, Neighbourhood Area Networks, and Wide Area Networks.

- **Body Area Network:** A Body Area Network (BAN) is a network medium for the transmission of patients' vital signals, which are measured by either a wearable or a portable sensor. In [75], Kocabas et al. stated that the communications between medical devices can be secured using biomedical signals. Therefore in [129], Poon et al. presented a low-power bio-identification mechanism by using an Inter-Pulse Interval (IPI) to secure the communication between Body Area Network sensors. In [164], Venkatasubramanian et al. managed to use a physiological signal that agrees over a secret key of the symmetric key cryptosystem for BAN sensor communications. As a result, the collected medical data is sent to the controller in two different ways:

- **Smart-Phone:** transmits the collected data via a mobile network to the base station (BS) that routes it until it reaches the medical data center.
- **Wireless Medical Device:** (see Fig. 3) transmits data using one of several wireless communication protocols such as Zigbee [183], Bluetooth [24], or Wi-Fi [7].

- **Home Area Network:** A Home Area Network (HAN) uses a controller, which handles the communication for sending the gathered data to an available Access Point (AP) located in the patient's home. Transmissions can rely on Wi-Fi, or LTE/LTE-A [42] in case of a Femtocell AP [28].
- **Neighbourhood Area Network:** A Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN) enables users to quickly connect to the Internet [175]. It is used to establish wireless communication between close areas such as homes and their neighbourhoods. It can be based on an omnidirectional antenna that allows a single AP to cover a radius of at least half a mile. Moreover, a NAN can rely on a directional antenna to improve the AP's signal as shown in Fig. 4. As such, the AP forwards the data to a mobile data station, which allows the data sent from the home's AP to be directly received at the mobile Base Station (BS).
- **Wide Area Network:** A Wide Area Network (WAN) represents the communication from a mobile Base Station or from an access point to the mobile/Internet (remote) medical infrastructure. In case of emergencies, a WAN ensures real-time data transmission to emergency response teams. Once the data is received, the AP can also send the data to cloud services for storage at the specified server.

B. IoMT Devices & Protocols

Medical devices are differentiated according to their needs. In fact, many of them are available as a gadget in the medical market, or are being used by hospitals for real-time smart remote monitoring. These smart medical devices can range from fitness devices, to blood-pressure devices, to sugar-level devices. A set of these medical devices is listed in TABLE II.

Given that the aging population in developed countries is growing, there is a need for a much more sophisticated and suitable health-care system. The recent IoMT technology is considered as one of the most important solutions, which was introduced to answer the growing needs and demands. IoMT ensures physical mobility for patients, which leads to the reduction of the number of patients in a hospital performing Blood Pressure (BP) tests, or a Cardio-Vascular Disease (CVD) tests, which constitute 30% of global death, as stated by the World Health Organization (WHO). Moreover, diabetic cases can now be remotely monitored from hospitals.

These devices can be either implanted, worn, or held. Moreover, some devices can be used in-home and others are specialized and to be used in hospitals and clinics. In the




Fig. 2: IoMT's Communication, Perspective & Future Taxonomy




Fig. 3: Body Area Network

following, we give examples of such devices. The different protocols supported and employed to (inter-)connect such devices are listed in TABLE I.

- **Wearable and Personal Devices:** these include smart and electronic medical devices that collect, monitor and improve patients' health conditions in a real-time manner,

and at a reduced cost [169]. Wearable devices include fitness trackers, smart health watches, wearable Blood Pressure Monitors (BPM), ring-type heart rate monitor and biosensors [78], [58]. Due to the increase in the number of ageing population and spread of diseases, there is even a higher demand for tele-home healthcare. In the




Fig. 4: Neighbouring Area Network

TABLE I: A set of protocols used for IoMT interconnection

| Protocol | Classification | Range | Description |
|--------------------------|----------------|--------------|---|
| 4G or LTE | Wireless | Medium Range | Cellular Technologies that Connects Medical Personal and Wearable Devices |
| Wi-Fi, 802.1x | Wireless | Medium Range | Reliable, Real-Time, High Power and Long Range Medical Connection |
| Zigbee | Wireless | Medium Range | Used for Low Data Rate Medical Connections with Minimum Latency & Energy Consumption |
| Z-Wave | Wireless | Medium Range | Used for Low Data Rate Medical Connections, include Sending Alerts & Tele-Home Healthcare (Remote Monitoring) |
| Bluetooth | Wireless | Short Range | Used for Short Range Connection to a Nearby Medical Device including Smart Medical Sensors |
| 6LoWPan | Wireless | Medium Range | Used for Medical Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks |
| Machine-to-Machine (M2M) | Wireless | Long Range | Real-Time Remote Patient Monitoring & Error Detection, Enhanced Patient Care & Attention |
| Internet Protocol (IP) | Wireless | Long Range | Software Responsible of IoMT and E-Healthcare Communications |

following some of these devices are described in detail.

- **Smart Fitness Devices** are used to maintain a healthy lifestyle for patients and to improve their health conditions. This is achieved by adopting a daily workout routine, which varies and depends on the patients' ability and physical status, along with their condition, age and gender. Several additional smart fitness devices were mentioned in [105], including "TomTom Spark 3", which is a fitness tracker and "on-wrist navigator" [178] and "Moov Now", which is also a fitness tracker [127].
- **Smart Blood-Pressure Devices** are deployed in many IoMT fields and domains. They are used to remotely and continuously monitor the blood pressure of patients. These devices check for deviations in blood pressure from the norm towards detecting rapidly any anomaly and transmitting the data in real-time. A set of such devices includes "Omron EVOLV" [12], "iHealth Feel & View BPM" [71] and "Philips Upper Arm BPM" [108].
- **Smart Glucose-Level Devices** are used to monitor

and to track the real-time sugar levels of patients who suffer from diabetes types I and II. They help in maintaining the right insulin level to protect the patients. This reduces the implications and risks associated with unexpected higher or lower levels of insulin. Examples of such devices include the GlucoWise device [4], in addition to turning a given IoT device (mainly smartphones) into a blood sugar meter sensor [150], and iBGStar Blood Glucose Meter [157]. In case of an insulin drop, signals are sent to the actuators of the insulin pump to inject the appropriate insulin dose. Another actuator example is the spinal cord stimulator, which is implanted in the patient's body to ensure long-term pain relief [79].

- **Smart Heart-Rate Devices** are used in several medical domains and they are capable of saving patients' lives. A set of k devices can monitor patients' heart rates in real-time, while other devices communicate only urgent data, when an anomaly is detected. As such, the main task of these devices is to predict any possible heart-attack before it occurs. These devices

may include wearable wireless sensor networks and BANs [168], along with different heart-rate monitoring devices [77].

- **Smart Diet Devices** are being used to maintain a healthy diet for patients who mainly suffer from eating disorders. They are specifically used by obese people who struggle in following a certain diet or sometimes forget about diet restrictions. In fact, smart diet devices have become a substitute for paper-written diets. Such devices would send users automatic updates about their daily diets, with different nutrition ingredients, via a smart diet software [92].
- **In-home Medical Devices:** these include ventilators, infusion pumps, and dialysis machines that are currently being used outside the hospital or clinic, which are also provided by a health care professional, and rely on simple technologies (e-mail, the Internet, smart medical devices) to communicate with the hospital [60]. Among these devices, we mention test kits, first aid equipment, durable medical equipment, feeding equipment, voiding equipment, treatment equipment, respiratory equipment, infant care, and other equipment which are further discussed in [37].
- **In-Hospitals and Clinics Medical Devices:** hospitals must always be prepared for any emergency or incidence, whether or not these are life threatening. As such, a high level of readiness of both medical equipment and staff is a must to offer the right treatment for patients. In this context, medical donations play a crucial role [125]. Among such medical devices we list defibrillators, anesthesia machines, patient monitors, Electrocardiogram (EKG) Machines [2], surgical tables, blanket and fluid warmers, electro-surgical units, surgical tables and lights, which are further discussed in [1].

TABLE II: A set of medical IoT applications [160]

| Application | Data rate | Bandwidth (Hz) | Accuracy (bits) |
|--------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------|
| ECG (12 leads) | 288 kbps | 100–1000 | 12 |
| ECG (6 leads) | 71 kbps | 100–500 | 12 |
| EMG | 320 kbps | 0– 10,000 | 16 |
| EEG (12 leads) | 43.2 kbps | 0–150 | 12 |
| Blood saturatio n | 16 bps | 0–1 | 8 |
| Glucose monitoring | 1600 bps | 0–50 | 16 |
| Temperature | 120 bps | 0–1 | 8 |
| Motion sensor | 35 kbps | 0–500 | 12 |
| Cochlear implant | 100 kbps | 70-350/3500-8500 | 16 [162] |
| Artificial retina | 50-700 kbps | <10 | 12 [90] |

C. IoMT Application Domains

Despite the challenges that surround the IoMT domain, this technology offers several advantages via health-care applications [149]. First, and since the vital signs of a patient could be monitored in real-time, this allows patients and the medical staff to communicate instantly. This reduces the cost of medical care by reducing the number of doctor visits.

Improving patients health and lifestyle is another benefit of IoMT. The immediate access to a patient vital signs allows the early diagnosis, the prescription of medication and the injection of medication via a wearable device.

The future of IoMT aims at further involving devices and applications in the roles of doctors, nurses, medical kits and receptionists. However, the general public still has concerns about the necessary security, privacy, trust and accuracy of such IoMT systems.

- **Smart-Doctor:** One of the future plans is to introduce the concept of smart-medical robots to perform the role and tasks of a real doctor. Some patients have expressed concerns regarding this matter while others felt more comfortable speaking to a robot doctor about their private medical issues than they would with a real doctor. Despite the opposing views, in the near future, the term smart-doctor will be frequently heard and used.
- **Smart-Nurse:** Smart-medical robots will also be able to perform secondary medical tasks such as taking the role of a nurse. In many cases, they may perform the task of a smart-assistant to a given nurse to facilitate the nurse’s tasks. The plan is to rely on robots to perform a secondary or/and supportive medical task, according to the medical conditions and needs.
- **Smart-Medical Technology:** It includes Smart medical equipment and kits that are currently being deployed and used by paramedics to provide immediate help to patients who are in urgent need of medical care and assistance. One example is the use of of medical drones to perform such a task [52]. Medical drones were originally introduced to respond to emergencies related to patients suffering from cardiac arrests [131], since these drones are the fastest to arrive at the emergency scene. The drones would be directed to fly to specific destinations, which saves time and as such, saves lives since paramedics might end up stuck in traffic, and may not be able to respond as quickly as needed. This encourages the reliance on smart medical robots [87] to perform surgical operations within a hospital setting. Virtual/Augmented Reality and Artificial-Intelligence (AI)-based medical technologies were also employed for various medical purposes. This includes Virtual-Reality to perform various realistic operations such as simulated training [94], emergency training [102], and Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) training [19]. AI-based medical technologies are also being used to ensure a higher accuracy rate [65]. This includes exploring biochemical interactions [61], such as IBM Watson and Gene Network Sciences (GNS) Healthcare AI systems [143] used to search for the right cancer treatment [5].
- **Smart-Receptionist:** A smart-receptionist is yet another trend in the IoMT domain; a medical robot is capable of operating as a normal receptionist, having the ability to “think” and “understand” a given medical, or urgent case before diverting the patient towards the right medical department. Also, these robots would answer phone calls and book appointments for patients, whilst classifying the

urgent and normal appointments. Such a classification could be based on statistical or machine-learning algorithms.

- **Personal Emergency Response Systems (PERS):** these are seeing increasing use to alert patients and doctors in a real-time manner of any patient's abnormal medical event (E.g stroke, cardiac arrest, seizure etc.) by remotely sending vital signals to the hospital [156] based on a predictive risk assessment method [123]. PERS are now being modified to become location-based [124] for a higher accuracy and faster response time. A typical example is the Active-Protective's smart belt which can be placed on a patient's waist and uses Bluetooth and AI to transmit real-time data.
- **Ingestible Cameras:** these are cutting-edge and cost-effective capsules that can be swallowed (in-vivo/in-vitro) by a patient to provide internal-organ real-time visual monitoring for early detection of chronic diseases and cancer [74]. Many ingestible devices were presented including Swallow-able data recorder capsule medical device [93], ingestible endoscopic optical scanning device [20], and ingestible hydrogel device [88]. Ingestible devices rely on an X-ray or camera capsule, a tracking/recording system and the diagnostics toolkit for evaluation.
- **Real-Time Patient Monitoring (RTPM):** this is a new evolving trend among the new generation, including millennials, due to their heavy reliance on smart devices as a key part of their daily lives [155]. In fact, RTPM is used to ensure a real-time, cost-effective remote consistent monitoring depending on the sensors linked to the patient's body, either through a homecare telehealth systems [137], [95] or telecare monitoring systems [38], [136]. This may include monitoring fitness level, glucose level, respiration rate, and heart rate, etc. Many new RTPM trends are now available including, but not limited to, connected inhaler delivery systems, Apple Watch app that monitors depression, Apple's Research Kit and Parkinson's Disease and ADAMM intelligence Asthma Monitoring [9], [69].

As listed above, IoMT will enable innovative healthcare applications; however, there are many challenges that might hinder the evolution of this technology. One of the key challenges is related to the security and privacy issues. In the next section, we discuss the main security concerns, challenges, and risks that might be associated with the deployment of IoMT systems.

III. CONCERNS, CHALLENGES & RISKS

In this section, we highlight the main concerns that are related to IoT systems, in general, with emphasis on medical issues.

A. IoMT Concerns

IoMT-related concerns can be classified into four key categories, one of them is raised by the general public and is related to the security, privacy, trust and accuracy issues.

- **Security Concerns:** Due to the reliance of IoMT devices on the use of open wireless communications, these devices are prone to various wireless/network attacks. In fact, an attacker can eavesdrop and intercept incoming and outgoing data and information due to the lack of security measures that most IoMT devices either suffer from by design, or due to weak security authentication measures that can be easily bypassed by a skilled attacker. Another security issue is the ability to gain unauthorized access, without being detected, due to the inability to detect and prevent such attacks. This would result into gaining an elevated privilege, injecting malicious codes, or infecting devices with a malware. On the other hand, IoMT devices could be hijacked (as botnets) and used to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In [32], Clark et al. showed how medical devices are prone to botnets or "zombies" attacks, which can lead to physical attacks on human patients. An attack, for example, can logically manipulate a drug dose that would kill or have serious health implications on a given patient. Moreover, IoMT devices, when hijacked by terrorists, could be used as a mean for targeted assassination. For this reason, the US Vice President, Dick Cheney, disabled the wireless functionality of his heart implant out of fear of being hacked to eliminate him [126]. Moreover, as described in [32], IoMT devices can have a negative effect on the psychological state of patients, since these can potentially scare patients, causing them to suffer from a heart-attack due to being surrounded by machines instead of humans.

Manufacturers of medical devices need to focus on security as a primary task to ensure and maintain the security of the Medical-Cyber Physical System (MCPS), along with medical systems and devices alike. In other terms, protection against passive and active attacks is a must to mitigate the main IoMT security concerns. Hence, the need for the right security measures and tools is crucial.

- **Privacy Concerns:** Passive attacks such as traffic analysis leads to privacy issues since it would be possible to gather and disclose information about patients' identity, in addition to sensitive and confidential information.

This is a very serious threat for patients since an attacker is capable of identifying his/her medical records and medical conditions, which poses drastic life-threatening effects on patients.

Another reason for breaching the privacy of patients, through attacking hospitals, is identity theft. Most of these real-case attacks led to a breach of patients' privacy either through the leakage, or through the disclosure of personal/sensitive information.

As a summary, privacy is more than ensuring the secrecy of sensitive and private medical information. It also entails the need for anonymity, non-linkability, and non-observability.

- **Anonymity:** a patient should not be identifiable;

when a patient is in communication, his identity should be kept hidden. In other terms, passive attacks can see what you do, but not who you are.

- **Non-Linkability:** Items of Interest (IoI) such as subjects, messages, events, actions should not be disclosed by passive attacks. This means that the probability of those items not being exposed from the attacker’s perspective should stay the same, before and after observation.
- **non-Observability:** non-observability is the state of Items Of Interest (IoI) being indistinguishable from any IoI of the same type. This means that messages are not discernible from any random noise(s). In other words, it should not be noticeable whether, a message has been exchanged between a sender/receiver in any relationship.
- **Trust Concerns:** The breach of patients’ privacy translates into serious trust issues. Patients are becoming skeptical of the idea of machines taking over the roles of humans (doctors, nurses, and receptionists). As a result, people are more concerned about having a medical robot, or a medical machine, or even a medical device monitoring and controlling their health conditions [72].
- **Accuracy Concerns:** This type of concern has surfaced after more than 144 patients in the U.S. lost their lives [25] due to accidental mistakes related to medical robots’ lack of accuracy and diagnosis. This also resulted into having more than 1,400 patients being partially or permanently injured, where reports of malfunction revealed that more than 8,061 malfunctions have occurred within thirteen years (2000-2013) [13]. Another example is the false diagnosis of some patients as having dementia or Alzheimer. These incidents indicate the lack of accuracy and precision in the operations being led by medical robots, along with the false diagnosis of patients, and wrong medical prescriptions [141].

B. IoMT Challenges

IoMT challenges emerged as soon as the integration of medical devices into IoT systems started. One major challenge is the lack of standardization. In [55], Hassanaliheragh et al. discussed in details the main IoMT challenges. The issue of standardization is essential to having different medical devices operating together, and for vendors to adopt the right security measures to protect them from being hacked. This would lead to higher protection, efficiency, scalability, consistency, and effectiveness. In fact, many of these challenges are mainly related but not limited to various IoMT security constraints (see Fig. 5).

C. IoMT Risks

The deployment of IoMT systems into the healthcare domain is associated with a number of risks which are listed as follows:

- **Disclosure of Personal Information** can seriously affect patients’ medical conditions, as well as hospital’s reputation.
- **Data Falsification** can result into having the transmitted data from any medical device altered and modified, which would result into a higher drug dosage or wrong medical description that can lead to further medical complications.
- **Whistle-blowers** are based on unsatisfied or rogue medical employees leaking medical details and information about the hospital or patients by either being bribed, or part of an organised crime activity, risking patients’ privacy and lives.
- **Lack of Training** among nurses and doctors can result into risking patients’ lives with permanent disabilities or the loss of life.
- **Accuracy** is still a debatable issue and is still responsible for inaccuracies in the medical operations conducted by specialised robots. This can also seriously affect patients’ lives and lead to disabilities or fatalities.

Thus, a new risk assessment method is required to quantify the security risks of IoMT attacks, which is a complicated task. Addressing threats in IoMT and analyzing their associated risks is the first step towards identifying the required security solutions to be adopted by IoMT applications and communication protocols. The risk analysis, presented in [159], is based on Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Analysis (TVRA) methodology [101]. This methodology is based on the likelihood of a given attack, and the attack impact on the system including the system assets and its associated threats. In addition, the threat agent which is trying to break the system is also identified by the TVRA method. Therefore, the outputs of TVRA are measures of the risk of the already identified threats and can be determined based on their estimated value of likelihood and impact on the system. The existing threats can be ranked as either critical, major, or minor, and they are represented in TABLE III, depending on their impact on human emotional conditions, which should also be taken into consideration.

In fact, given the above listed concerns, challenges and risks, it is essential to review the possible security attacks and their causes. Thus, in the next section, we give a detailed description of the attack types, causes and effects.

IV. CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST IOMT

Such attacks can either be targeted, organized or even coordinated, based on the attackers’ skills, experience, knowledge, and tools in order to carry out a successful cyber-attack. These attacks target the confidentiality, integrity, availability and/or the authentication of a given system and/or its components. In fact, it depends on the malware type used in order to carry out the attack.

A. Characteristics of Cyber-Attacks

Before identifying and classifying a given attack, it is important to understand its characteristics. In general, any attack can be classified as one of five main categories (see Fig. 6), based on its nature, target, scope, capacity, and impact, all of which are directly related to the attacker’s purpose,




Fig. 5: IoMT Security Constraints

TABLE III: Qualitative Psycho-Emotional Medical Risk Assessment

| Threat Type | Nature | | Motivation | | Risk | | Emotional/Psychological Impact | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------------------|-------|----------|---------|------------|---------|-------|---------------|
| | Human | Non-Human | Malicious | Non-Malicious | Likelihood | Impact | Anger | Fear | Mistrust | Sadness | Depression | Anxiety | Guilt | Embarrassment |
| Medical Information Disclosure | Yes/No | No/Yes | ✓ | X | High | High | Yes | Yes | Yes | Maybe | Maybe | Yes | Maybe | Yes |
| Medical Data Manipulation | Yes | No | ✓ | X | High | High | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Medical Data Interception | Yes | No | ✓ | X | Moderate | High | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Maybe | No | Yes |
| Medical Data Hijacking | Yes | No | ✓ | X | High | High | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Medical Data Exposure | Yes/No | No/Yes | ✓/X | X/✓ | Low/Moderate | Moderate/High | Yes | Yes | Yes | Maybe | Maybe | Yes | No | Yes |
| Wrong Dosage | Yes/No | No/Yes | ✓/X | X/✓ | Low/Moderate | High | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Maybe | No | No |
| Medical Data Delay | Yes/No | No/Yes | ✓/X | X/✓ | Moderate | Moderate/High | Yes | No | Maybe | No | No | No | No | No |
| Insiders | Yes | No | ✓ | X | High | High | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Misconfiguration | Yes/No | No/Yes | X | X | Low | Moderate | Maybe | Maybe | Yes | No | No | No | No | Maybe |

aim, objectives and goals. More precisely, it depends on the attacker's skills, knowledge, experience, available tools and resources at his disposal.

- **Attackers' Nature:** There are four categories of attackers, internal, external, passive and active attackers. In some cases, different types of attackers may collude to ensure a more sophisticated cyber-attack.
 - **Internal & External Attackers:** An *internal attacker* is mainly a rogue employee who can be a nurse, a doctor or a medical staff who wants to cause damage to a hospital by damaging its reputation via removing or modifying data, or targeting patients' health and privacy. In some cases, it can be a spy masqueraded as a nurse or a doctor who managed to successfully evade all the security measures of a given hospital to eliminate a given patient for either political or other criminal purposes. Internal attackers might pave the way for external attackers to perform their cyber-attacks easily.

External attackers are mainly classified as malicious hackers who aim at gaining an elevated unauthorized privileged access into the hospital's system. This is

mainly achieved through worms, Rootkits, or Remote Access Trojan attacks. In many cases, the attack is based on spear-phishing techniques through sending a malicious Portable Document Format (PDF) file, or any other file as a Curriculum Vitae (CV). Once downloaded, a backdoor or a key-logger will be installed on the given system. The main aim is to breach the privacy of patients and sell them to malicious third parties through the deep dark web for scamming purposes.

- **Passive & Active Attackers:** A *passive attacker* tries to evade detection by remaining "hidden" in the background, without making any activity. The aim here is to intercept data, transmitted via any wireless communication, between different medical devices, read them and build up their own information gathering process that can be used for further exploitation, which may lead to a much more sophisticated cyber-attack. Passive attackers can be cooperating with external or even internal attackers as part of the information gathering process.

Unlike a passive attacker, an *active attacker* relies

on intercepting the communication between a given source and destination. Such interception is done aggressively by altering, modifying and deleting the given information and data being transmitted without the knowledge of the source and destination. Such an attack is very dangerous when used for example to inject a patient with a higher dosage of a drug, or when prescribing the wrong drugs, and thus, seriously risking patients' lives.

- **Malicious & Rational Attackers:** *Malicious attackers* do not have a specific goal and do not look for specific results either. They launch their attacks simply because they can do it with the intention to disrupt an IoMT system. This can be done, for example, by transmitting false information to the data center in a specific geographical area. In contrast, *rational attackers* have a specific target which can have a very dangerous impact. In other terms, they are unpredictable and generally follow the passive class.
- **Organized & Coordinated Attackers:** Cyber-attacks against IoMT can be organized or coordinated. *Organized attacks* are usually based on having prior knowledge of a given medical device or system before launching a cyber-attack against it. In fact, the aim is to either gain an unauthorized access or disclose sensitive information. *Coordinated attacks* are based on the cooperation and collaboration between insiders and outsiders. In fact, insiders are rogue/unsatisfied employees (Hospital IT, staff, nurses, receptionists, etc..) having an authorized access to the system and possibly install a malware. Malware types allow outsiders to have an elevated remote access or privilege and carry out a combined attack against a specific medical system. The attack might be carried out in order to hit the system's availability and prevent authorized medical personnel and patients from accessing medical records, book appointments, or disrupt medical operations.
- **Target:** A targeted attack is typically used for assassination or terrorism purposes. Such an attack targets a specific patient or a hospital for various reasons that could be political (assassinating a public figure), ideological, racial or religious reasons. The attackers' goal could be to target a minority group of patients or to target a foreign country with the aim of fueling racism, or spreading terrorism, or part of a cyber-warfare campaign linked to cyber-politics.
- **Scope:** the scope of an attack is related to the targeted area, which may be quantified as small scale or large scale. Typically, attackers try to extend their malicious actions to a large area [140], [15] to increase the number of victims, such as patients in hospitals.
- **Impact:** the impact of an attack is quantified by the amount of damage it causes, along with its nature and its scope.
- **Capacity:** this refers to the protection required to prevent,

mitigate, or reduce the damage associated with an attack.

B. Targeted IoMT's Security Aspects

IoMT security seems to be jeopardized by various types of cyber-attacks, which are divided and described depending on the security aspect that they target. As illustrated in Fig. 7, in this section we aim at reviewing the security attacks that target the IoMT data security, including its availability, confidentiality and integrity. On the other hand, we aim to dissect the security attacks that target the system security including user privacy, system availability, confidentiality/trust, authentication and integrity.

1) *Data Confidentiality Attacks:* In order to hit the confidentiality of IoMT data, gathering information is a must. Due to the open and public nature of IoMT wireless communications, patients are becoming more prone to being intercepted through confidentiality (sniffing) attacks. Therefore, the risk of personal and private information being either leaked, hijacked, modified or even stolen is seriously high. However, in order to achieve it, different passive attacks can be carried out. This includes eavesdropping, traffic analysis, and brute force attacks. TABLE IV presents the main confidentiality attacks.

- **Eavesdropping Attacks** are typically based on gathering information and they are divided into two main types. The first one is **Passive Eavesdropping** [34], where wireless access points are scanned to identify which medical device is connected to them. The second type is the **Active Eavesdropping**, where the adversary can monitor incoming and outgoing data during transmission and Thus, gathering more information in a faster and easier manner.
- **Data Interception Attacks** occur when a man-in-the-middle attack is carried out. This allows the adversary to intercept data and re-transmit it at a later time [56]. This allows the attacker to eavesdrop the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request and keeps on repeating it in order to capture a handshake. This handshake is then used to obtain encryption keys and gain unauthorized access to medical systems and records.
- **Packet Capturing Attacks** or packet sniffing attacks include the capture of the transmitted medical data packets that are unencrypted and revealing their content including patients' medical conditions and passwords. Wireshark is a prime example of a network monitoring software tool.
- **Wiretapping Attacks** include hacking medical telecommunication and tele-healthcare devices to intercept real-time incoming/outgoing medical data.
- **Dumpster Diving Attacks** include searching through dumpsters and retrieving any medical information including papers and file thrown in the bin including patients records, medical prescriptions, staff names, etc. This is one of the main reasons why most file and data records are becoming paperless.

2) *Social Engineering (SE) Attacks:* Social engineering is a technique used to manipulate people through either baiting or pre-texting in order to lure people to give out information. This includes passwords, names, IDs, private




Fig. 6: Characteristics and profiles of attackers and its corresponding impact




Fig. 7: IoMT Security Goals

information in order to proceed with a cyber-attack later on. Luring people can be easily achieved by relying on human emotions which seems to be easier than exploiting a system’s vulnerability. Therefore, the attacker relies on people’s curiosity, or lust, and sends infected adult

pictures (phishing), for example, in order to gain access to medical systems or/and records. Different SE attacks are presented in TABLE V.

- **Reverse Engineering Attacks:** A reverse social engineering attack is also known as a person-to-person

TABLE IV: Different types of data confidentiality attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Data Confidentiality Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| Eavesdropping | Encryption | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broadcast nature of messages via wireless channels • Unencrypted communication channel |
| Data Interception | Encryption | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-Secure Channels • Open Wireless Communications |
| Packet Capturing | Encryption | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open Wireless Communications • Non-Secure Channels • Lack of Encryption |
| Wiretapping | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure Communications • Closed Communications | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open Wireless Communication • Non-Secure Channels |
| Dumpster Diving | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced Employee Training • Paperless Process | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of Employee Training • Lack of Awareness |

attack [62]. This allows the attacker to masquerade himself as a technician trying to fix an issue in a hospital's medical system and gaining insight and physical access to the system. It also allows him to possibly upload a malware or detect vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In other cases, an attacker can masquerade himself as a person visiting a patient, asking questions in order to gain a better insight about the used medical systems and devices.

- **Error Debugging Attacks** are usually caused by an improper handling of error, which results into medical systems becoming vulnerable to various security problems [138], [177]. Such exploitation can lead to internal error messages that target medical web servers, application servers, and web application environments by displaying database dumps, stack traces and error codes to the attacker. This would mainly result into a system call failure/crash, network timeout or unavailable database. This consumes a high amount of resources and causes a tremendous network overhead, preventing and disrupting the availability of medical services to patients.

3) *Privacy Attacks*: Ensuring patients' privacy is one of the most important challenges in IoMT. Preserving patients' privacy is mainly related to preventing the disclosure of their real identities, in addition to their location and information. This requires patients to keep their private information protected such as their identity, their behaviour, their past and present location [121], [153], [103]. Moreover, in the following, the main privacy attacks are listed and described in TABLE VI.

- **Traffic Analysis Attacks**: TAA mainly affects patients' privacy in addition to their data confidentiality. This attack is extremely dangerous and consists of intercepting and analyzing the network traffic pattern(s), trying to infer useful information. This is due to the fact that IoMT devices' activities can potentially reveal enough information, enabling an adversary to cause malicious harm to the medical devices.

More precisely, traffic analysis can target certain information that can be used to establish or facilitate new social engineering attacks.

- **Identity/Location Tracking Attacks**: The attacker spies on an IoMT device during its journey to discover the identity of the patient (relating the patient to a place of

work or home). In fact, an attacker may get a trace of the IoMT devices' movements. Studying this trace can reveal the true identity of the patient, in addition to their personal information. Therefore, getting the identity of a given patient can put their privacy and possibly their life at risk.

In order to preserve the privacy of any patient, the MAC and IP addresses must be constantly changed to avoid any possible identity disclosure and denial of service, or spoofing attack [140]. Hence the need to design some new algorithms to address the large memory-space dilemma. Therefore, each patient should be allocated a pool of certified pseudonyms obtained from a certificate authority [170], [146]. The most popular attack is the Sybil attack. The pool of pseudonyms can be used to pretend they are for different patients whilst sending false messages to a data center. This includes false traffic jams, or false alerts forcing hospitals to react to a false event. The main authorities' goal is to ensure that the identities and their corresponding sensitive data are protected and verified during any communication attempt. In case of any issue, the system operators must interfere, however, it requires knowing the identity of the user (digital forensics). This indicates that a trade-off between privacy and digital forensics, indeed, exists.

4) *Data Integrity and Message Authentication Attacks*: Integrity attacks are based on the ability to alter the messages that are being transmitted in order to target the integrity of a system or data. Different attacks can be carried out to achieve this goal, such as injection attacks and data interception. Therefore, it is essential to secure and maintain the integrity of data as much as possible [66], [144].

- **Message Tampering-Alteration Attacks**: The attacker here aims to break the data integrity of the exchanged messages. This happens when the attacker manipulates the received messages for his/her own goals [173]. This will result into doctors making wrong decisions that might compromise the health of patients.

One of these security methods is using a message authentication algorithm such as cryptographic keyed hash function as HMAC to ensure data integrity and source authentication.

- **Malicious Data injection**: This kind of attack is gener-

TABLE V: Different types of social engineering attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Social Engineering Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) | Related Threats |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|
| Social Engineering | Training staff against baiting/pretexting | Poor training of employees | May affect the confidentiality and privacy. |
| Reverse Social Engineering | Training staff against strangers' questions | No identification and verification processes | Depends on the asked questions, primarily targets confidentiality and privacy. In addition, to affecting authentication and availability. |
| Error Debug | Limit appearing information | Different error questions giving additional information | May affect (data/system's) confidentiality and privacy. |

TABLE VI: Different types of privacy attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Privacy Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| Traffic Analysis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> VPNs & Proxies Non-Linkability Pseudonyms | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Source and destination information are not encrypted Lack of secure channels Weak encryption algorithm |
| Identity/Location Tracking | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anonymity Non-Linkability Pseudonyms | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of secure channels Location and identification parameters are not encrypted |

ated from an entity that can be legal or can authenticate with the system. Thus, this can cause hazardous effects in the IoMT system and it may lead to fatal accidents [89], by creating a false message and transmitting it to the hospital data center or to doctors. The strategy of this attack is to prevent the real and correct messages from authorised users, and instead inject false messages into the network.

To defend against such an attack, messages should be authenticated.

- **Malicious Script Injection Attacks:** Such attacks introduce false update script system where adversaries can mimic a legitimate server for system backup. This allows a given adversary to gain unauthorized access to any IoMT device and might introduce a backdoor [132].
- **Cloning And Spoofing Attacks** can be combined in order to carry out a more sophisticated attack [147] against a medical system or device. Cloning attacks duplicate the data spoofed, whilst spoofing attacks use the cloned data to gain unauthorised access [166].

TABLE VII summarizes the main message integrity and authentication attacks.

TABLE VII: Different types of data integrity and message authentication attacks along their corresponding solutions.

| Message Integrity and Authentication Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) |
|--|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Message Tampering-Alteration Malicious data injection Malicious Script Injection Cloning & Spoofing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keyed Hash Function (HMAC); Message Authentication Algorithms | No data integrity and source authentication protection scheme |

5) *Availability Attacks:* In order to target the availability of medical systems, different attacks are carried out to degrade the performance of medical systems and devices. As a result,

the availability attacks can either target data availability or system availability.

- **Data Availability attacks:** The attacker aims to break the data availability of the exchanged messages by dropping these messages. This happens when the attacker manipulates the received messages for his/her own goals, which results into hospital data center or doctors missing important information about the patients' health conditions.
- **System Availability attacks:** The main system availability attacks are listed below and summarized in TABLE VIII.
 - **Denial of Service Attacks (DoS):** In order to disrupt the availability of a given medical IoMT system or device, DoS attacks are initiated and launched, preventing legitimate patients from getting proper medications, and preventing nurses and doctors (GPs) from accessing medical information and records. This prevents real-time data from being sent and received through the disruption and interruption of service.
 - **Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS):** These attacks can also be simultaneously carried out from different geographical locations and from different countries. This can have a far greater impact on the availability of medical devices and systems resulting into a negative impact on the patients' lives with the inability to respond on time.
 - **De-Authentication Attacks:** Such attacks are usually carried out to ensure a single de-authentication attack against a given medical device. It can also be used in order to lead a mass de-authentication process, which prevents all connected devices from being operational either temporarily or permanently. This process also allows the capture of a handshake, which can be used later on to launch a cracking attack, which enables an adversary to gain unauthorized access to a medical system, device or even server.
 - **Wireless Jamming** aims to severely interrupt and disrupt any established wireless communication of medical devices between patients and hospitals. More specifically, wireless networks are severely targeted [161] by a series of continuous denial of service attacks, which disrupts any communication

attempt on secure and non-secure channels, depending on whether the jamming attack is selective or non-selective [130]. However, this attack can be mitigated through frequency hopping and frequency shifting, as described in [50].

- **Flooding Attacks:** they are based on overwhelming and exhausting the medical system's resources by injecting false information and data to flood the system with false data and information requests [16].
 - * **ICMP Flooding Attacks** are an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) flood or Ping flood attacks with a Denial-of-Service (DoS) ability that overwhelms a targeted medical device with ICMP echo-requests known as pings [54]. Attackers rely on exploited IoMT devices (zombies or bots) controlled by a bot master to conduct such type of attacks.
 - * **SYN Flooding Attacks** or "half-open" attacks primarily target high-capacity IoMT devices since they rely on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) services to communicate (i.e email/web servers) [26]. The aim of this attack is to cause a medical server to crash by exhausting the e-Healthcare server's memory reserve to make insecure connections available for further attacks.
 - * **Black Nurse Attacks** are highly effective low bandwidth (15-18 Mbit/sec) ICMP attacks that target firewalls with high Central Processing Unit (CPU) load through denial of service attacks [145]. This attack results into preventing Local Area Network (LAN) users, including patients and medical staff from transmitting internet network traffic.
- **Delay Attacks:** They introduce high delays for high priority message transmissions. This offers the ability to either re-transmit them or not transmit them at all after the elapsed time.

6) *Device/User Authentication Attacks:* Authentication attacks aim to overcome passwords, which are classified as the first and primary line of defence, in order to gain access to a given system [33]. Usually, attacks are successful in many cases including when a given password is either too weak or too short, or is static. These attacks can either be encryption cracking (brute force, dictionary, birthday, or rainbow-table attacks), among other attack types mentioned in TABLE IX.

- **Man-in-the-Middle Attacks:** This attack is one of the main authentication attacks; it controls and monitors the communication between two legitimate parties, whilst altering the transmitted data. This attack can either be passive or active. It is considered as a passive attack when the attacker only intercepts and reads the exchanged messages between the two entities. On the other hand, it is considered as an active attack, if the attacker is able to alter, manipulate or/and modify the transmitted data or information without any of the devices' knowledge.
- **Brute Force Attacks** are based on an excessive search for all possible combinations that make up and crack a given password of a medical [152]. Such an attack aims to acquire patients' credentials and private medical information for fraud purposes. Most targeted devices include, but are not limited to, remote medical sensors and patient monitors [96].
- **Masquerading Attacks** occur when a wireless network relay node is exploited by a given attacker for malicious purposes. Such attack can constantly send false alarms about an emergency medical condition, and can disrupt the availability of medical services [83]. Moreover, masquerading attacks can modify a patient's medical condition and may result into injecting the wrong drug or an excessive medicine usage, which may result into the loss of human lives.
- **Replay Attacks** modify the control signal being transmitted to another medical device, especially once an attacker gains a high privilege to the system with the ability to control the system's signals. The adversary may either steal or/and intercept the transmitted information by redirecting it to another location. In some cases, physical damage can be achieved against a given system [16], including medical systems. System communications are recorded first before being 'replayed' later to the receiving device [147]. This can lead to either stealing, leaking or disclosing sensitive information to gain an unauthorized access and elevated privilege on a given medical system [51].
- **Cracking Attacks** are based on capturing a handshake through a de-authentication attack. Thus, luring the intended AP (Access Point) to respond back with a handshake. Once the handshake is captured, a password cracking attack is conducted against a given medical system or device. This allows the leakage of information and data disclosure.
- **Dictionary Attacks** usually take place when trying to gain access to a given medical system [106]. Attacks are usually successful when security measures are less tight

TABLE VIII: Different types of system availability attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Availability Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| Jamming | Frequency Hooping, direct sequence spread spectrum, beam-forming | Targets Access Points or wireless IoMT devices |
| Denial Of Service | Backup Devices | Lack of Backup Devices |
| Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) | DDOS detection solutions. Increase the security levels of devices to avoid becoming bots. | Exploiting devices turning them into bots |
| De-authentication | Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, Encryption | Captures a handshake to Launch DoS or Password Cracking Attack |
| Flood | Timestamps, Certificate Authority, IDS | Overwhelms & Exhausts IoMT's Resources through False Information Injection |
| Delay | Firewalls, Timestamps, IDS | Overwhelms & Prevent or Severely Delays any Transceiving of Medical Information |

than the security measures of a given IoT device. Such attacks occur by relying on a large set of dictionary words in an attempt to guess the password so that the adversary can gain access. In fact, such an attack type is exhaustive in terms of resources and time, and can take time from minutes to hours, and sometimes days. Brute force attacks are usually aimed at targeting a medical device where the security measures are weak [30]. In many cases, they still rely on a number combination including the personal identification number (PIN).

- **Rainbow Table Attacks** are usually aimed at targeting the password and its hash value relying on a technique process known as "fault and trial" through the use of reverse engineering. It usually contains a table of passwords along with their hashes, which is executed until a match is found. To overcome this problem, different solutions were presented in [107], [151]. However, salt passwords can be a good solution to mitigate this type of attacks.
- **Session Hijacking Attacks** are also known as TCP Session Hijacking. This attack is achieved by using a Session sniffer that involves a packet sniffer capable of altering, capturing and reading the network traffic (header and data) between two parties. This includes users or/and devices alike. In fact, this attack can capture a valid Session ID (SID).
- **Birthday Attacks** are also due to users relying on weak hashing mechanisms, where two different passwords can have the same hash. Such weakness can easily be exploited to gain an unauthorised access to any medical system. A suggested hash function balance was presented in [22]. However, Secure Hash Algorithm (E.g SHA-3 and SHA-512) mechanisms remain the best solution against such attacks.

7) *Malware Attacks*: IoMT devices can be targeted by various forms of malware [36], [119], such as Trojans, worms, viruses, spyware, backdoor, botnet, and many others. This is due to many reasons such as their wireless and permanent connection to the Internet, in addition to a weak security protection and monitoring. A malware is based on the exploitation of a software weakness, vulnerability, or/and security gap. This leads to the possibility of having a backdoor to a given medical device or system. Moreover, it can lead to an unauthorized access to IoMT devices, leakage, disclosure, modification or deletion of sensitive patient information. In the event of a malware succeeding in creating back-doors into IoMT devices, attackers can use them to initiate other types of attacks or to deny access to their services (e.g. Denial of Sleep attacks).

Clearly, one of the main security requirements for IoMT devices is to prevent malware attacks. This aspect is evident by the recent cyber attacks, which exploited IoT devices to form botnets (e.g. Mirai). Another type of a malware attack that can affect IoMT devices is ransomware [41], [14], which causes the denial of their services. In this context, advanced malware types, based on encryption or polymorphic techniques, impose serious threats [109]. As such, to prevent malware attacks, an anti-malware software is required, and we present in Section V-B6 the different intrusion detection techniques that can be implemented in order to detect, track down and prevent

any possible malware attack. In the following, we list the main types of malware attacks that can target IoMT systems and devices:

- **Spyware Attacks**: The main purpose of a spyware is to collect and gather information about patients and to send them to either a third party or to sell them through the deep dark web. This is done by keeping users under constantly covert surveillance. Actually, spyware may collect enough information about a given patient for possible assassination. They can be also used as key-loggers to steal patients' credentials [85].
- **Ransomware Attack** Insufficient attention is paid to IoT ransomware, which can lead to catastrophic results [17] compared to traditional ransomware [41]. The classic ransomware model is simply not feasible in the IoT case because, in most cases, IoT data is stored in the fog and/or cloud and not at the device level. IoT ransomware consists of locking IoT devices and asking for ransom from their owners to unlock them [179]. Normally, in traditional ransomware, attackers employ the user interface (screen display) to warn the user to pay the ransom. However, there is no display interface for a significant percentage of IoT devices. In this case, attackers attempt to discover their owners emails or hacking the app that controls the compromised IoT devices. IoT ransomware is efficient since it is timely, critical, and reversible. Therefore, attackers choose scenario where users do not have enough time and are not in place to reset the device or counter the ransomware effects. In these cases, users are more than willing to pay the ransom. Unfortunately, IoMT devices are attractive targets for ransomware [174]. Thus, locking the functions of some devices such as pacemakers, drug infusion pumps, etc., can lead to catastrophic results since patients would be seriously harmed or even dead if these devices are not unlocked in due time.
- **Worm Attacks** Worms are likely the most destructive and dangerous type of malware in the IoMT case [39]. Worms are a form of malware that self-replicates vertically over a connected device, after exploiting the device's existing vulnerabilities. Thus, they are capable of self-propagating without human intervention. They can impact all data and devices' security services (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), which may result in critical loss of data or life risks. For example, they can be designed to target a given industrial control system [46]. A recent malicious Internet worm, "dubbed", which targeted IoT devices was presented in [45]. Unfortunately, worms can be implemented and used against IoMT devices in order to gather information, damage or even destroy a given device. Thus, in the IoMT case, if insecure devices are installed, they can compromise the security of the whole medical system once they are infected by worms, which can propagate automatically in the whole system by exploiting existing vulnerabilities. Note that worms also can be combined with other malware types such as ransomware and botnets to propagate through the whole IoMT network [35].

TABLE IX: Different types of system authentication attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Authentication Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) | Related Threats |
|-----------------------|---|---|--|
| Man-in-the-Middle | Multi-Factor authentication scheme | Poor authentication scheme (one factor) | Depending on attacker goals, it might affect the data's integrity, confidentiality and availability. |
| Masquerading | Multi-Factor authentication scheme | Poor authentication scheme (one factor) | May affect data's confidentiality. |
| Cracking | Multi-Factor authentication scheme | Poor authentication scheme (one factor) | may affect the data's confidentiality and integrity. |
| Replay | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timestamp or a new random number for each session connection • Multi-Factor authentication scheme | Weakness in the authentication protocol | May affect system's availability. |
| Dictionary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong password • sufficient size of secret key | Weak password and one authentication factor | May affect the data's confidentiality & integrity |
| Brute force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong and long password • sufficient size of secret key • Multi-Factor authentication scheme | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak password • and one authentication factor | May affect data's confidentiality and integrity |
| Rainbow Table | Long Salt Passwords | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak Usernames/Password • Short Salt Passwords | May affect data's confidentiality and integrity |
| Birthday | Secure Hash Algorithm | Weak Hashing | May affect data's confidentiality and integrity |
| Session Hijacking | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption • Sniffing Filters | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of/Poor Encryption • Non-Secure Channels | May affect data's confidentiality, integrity and availability |

- Botnet Attacks** These attacks are based on exploiting vulnerabilities within IoMT devices [23], [68], and turning them into bots, awaiting orders from the adversary through command-and-control to send fake or false information concerning patients. They can also be used to bring the whole medical system down through DoS or DDoS attacks [148], [181]. In fact, in many cases, such attacks are aimed at disclosing sensitive information and using them for malicious or personal gains. An example of such attacks is the Mirai attack [76], which infected IoT devices by malware to form botnets and to conduct DDoS attacks on the network servers, infrastructure, etc. On Sept 19, 2016, the first Mirai incident targeted OVH, one of the largest European hosting providers. Since then, an increased rate of attacks were launched by skilled and unskilled attackers given that the source code of this attack was made available online. Thus, in the medical domain, implants, smart pens, monitors, temperature sensors, infusion and insulin pumps, etc. are wireless devices that can be compromised by Mirai, if the convenient security measures are not in place. Consequently, these devices can be used as bots to attack the medical systems. Note that the Mirai attack has new mutated versions and there is a continuous effort in creating new and more powerful versions of this attack.
- Remote Access Trojan Attacks (RAT):** RAT attacks occur through the exploitation of a medical system's vulnerability, weakness or security gap in a targeted medical system. Such attacks are based on evading all security procedures and countermeasures by gaining a covert unauthorized access as a backdoor. This leads

to overcoming all of the security measures employed. It is mainly achieved by bypassing the authentication process. The most infamous attack was the operation Shady RAT [8].

- Logic Bomb Attacks:** Logic bombs are classified as small programs that logically explode after reaching a certain date or time [99], damaging the medical systems' components such as IoMT devices.

All malware attacks and their solutions are summarized in TABLE X.

8) *Implementation Attacks:* Different implementation attacks on medical systems are presented in this section, including the side channel attacks, fault attacks, and timing attacks.

- Side Channel Attacks** can possibly occur due to IoMT embedded systems having very limited physical properties. Moreover, they are used to recover the secret key using power consumption, differential power consumption or electromagnetic analysis. In fact, IoMT devices with Physical non-cloneable Functions (PUF) can guard against different implementation attacks.
- Fault Attacks** target a physical electronic device by stressing the device by external means. This includes the increase/decrease of voltage to generate errors, which mostly leads to a security failure [128].
- Timing Attacks** are classified as side channel attacks where an attacker attempts to compromise a cryptosystem by analyzing the needed execution time of cryptographic algorithms. In addition, a timing attack is a security exploitation, where an attacker discovers security vulnerabilities surrounding the computer or network system. Moreover, timing attacks are also used to target

TABLE X: Different types of malware attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Malware Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) | Related Threats |
|-----------------------------|---|--|---|
| Botnet | Botnet detection solution (anti-malware), pen-testing, intrusion detection | A logical collection of exploited internet-connected devices or IoMT devices | Depends on the attacker's target (confidentiality, integrity, authentication and/or availability) |
| Worm & Viruses | Anti-virus, anti-malware, pen-testing, intrusion detection | Relies on computer network security failures | Depends on the attacker's (confidentiality, integrity, authentication and/or availability) |
| Spyware | Use antivirus and anti-spyware solutions, update OS, ensure higher security and privacy levels, intrusion detection | Part of other software or downloads on file-sharing sites | Primarily targets privacy and data confidentiality but it can be used for other purposes such as availability, authentication and/or integrity. |
| Remote Access Trojan | Keep antivirus software up to date, block unused ports, intrusion detection | Downloaded invisibly with a program or update software | Depends on the attacker's (confidentiality, integrity, authentication and/or availability) |
| Rootkit | Appropriate system configuration, strong authentication, patch and configuration management, intrusion detection | Exploits and targets either the kernel, or the user application space gains root privileges. | Primarily targets system's authentication |
| Ransomware | Up-to-date Anti-Virus/Anti-Malware, Avoid Using Personal Information, Enhanced System's Security, Higher Awareness | Weak Passwords, Weak Multi-Factor, Paying Ransoms | Targets system's Authentication and Availability, in addition to data confidentiality and privacy |

medical devices that use OpenSSL [40].

This attack can become inefficient when using the "time stamping mechanism" for packets of delay-sensitive applications. However, this proposition encountered the problem of time synchronization between entities [98], [31].

All implementation attacks along with their solutions are summarized in TABLE XI.

To defend the listed attacks, several security measures should be taken, including technical and non-technical ones. In the next section, we review the existing security solutions for IoMT data and systems. In addition, we include the security practices and guidelines that should be followed to ensure IoMT systems and data confidentiality, integrity, privacy, etc.

V. IOMT SECURITY MEASURES

Overcoming the rising IoMT security issues and challenges is a challenging task. However, mitigating them can be achieved by implementing multiple security measures, some being technical and others non-technical measures.

A. Non-Technical Security Measures

This section is dedicated to highlight the different non-technical security measures that can be applied according to the needs. This includes training the staff and safeguarding the patients' private medical health records.

Training the medical and IT staff could be accomplished in three different ways: raising awareness, conducting technical training, and raising the education level as illustrated in Fig. 8.

- **Raising Awareness:** It is highly necessary and recommended to raise awareness among medical employees and staff, mainly the IT department in order to know and identify an occurring attack from normal network

behaviour. However, this is not enough, as there is a higher need for defining what is a threat, risk and a vulnerability. This offers them the chance to identify a risk from a threat. It also offers the possibility to assess the likelihood and impact of a risk. Once a risk is assessed, it is also essential to explain how to mitigate it and use the right security measures to deal with any threat and reduce its risk.

- **Technical Training:** Raising awareness is not enough, it is equally important to start training the medical staff and employees of the IT department, right after the teaching phase. The training must be divided into seven different phases, starting with:
 - **Identification Phase** where the IT is capable of identifying a suspicious behaviour from an abnormal behaviour.
 - **Confirmation Phase** that is based on the ability to confirm that an attack is occurring.
 - **Classification Phase** that is based on the ability to identify the type of the occurring attack.
 - **Reaction or Responsive Phase** is based on the ability of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to quickly react to a given attack using the right security defensive measures and prevent an attack from escalating.
 - **Containment Phase** is based on containing the attack incident and overcoming it.
 - **Investigation Phase** is the implementation of forensic evidences where an investigation process takes place to identify the cause of the attack [118], its impact and damage.
 - **Enhancement Phase** is based on learning from the lessons of previous attacks.
- **Raising Education Level:** The current focus must be targeted towards raising the level of education, espe-

TABLE XI: Different types of implementation attacks with their corresponding solutions.

| Implementation Attack | Solutions | Possible Reason(s) | Related Threats |
|-----------------------|---|--|---|
| Side Channel Attack | Hardware countermeasure (PUF) and software randomization processes | Limitations of physical properties related to the embedded devices | It may lead to secret key recovering and consequently affect the data confidentiality. |
| Fault Attack | uses protected hardware and Spatial Retreat | Memory & disk manipulation | May affect the System integrity. This type of attacks modifies the execution code to recover the secret key and consequently affect both data authentication and confidentiality. |
| Timing Attack | Constant Cryptographic Computations Execution Time, Independent Cryptographic Algorithm | Possible cryptographic software or algorithm Exploitation | May cause the secret key recovering and consequently affect data's confidentiality. |




Fig. 8: IoMT Staff Training

cially for those in the IT domain. This is based on teaching and educating cyber-security and IT staff the necessary techniques to classify each attack and what it targets (confidentiality, integrity, availability, and/or authentication). Attackers are also divided into insiders or outsiders. However, it is important to assess the level of damage of an attack caused by an insider, along with the possibility of a remote or outsider attack. Afterwards, it is also highly recommended to educate them on how to evaluate the possibility of a risk from occurring (likelihood/impact). It is also important to know what encryption or cryptographic technique can or should be used to prevent any alteration or interception. To limit the possibility of insider attacks, the right authorization and authentication techniques should be applied, along with the best Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in order to detect any attack based on either signature, anomaly or behaviour.

B. Technical Security Measures

In this section, we discuss the technical security measures that should be put in place to ensure an end-to-end secure IoMT system. Thus, the following subsections discuss techniques that aim at ensuring IoMT data and systems security.

1) *Multi-Factor Identification and Verification:* In order to prevent any possible unauthorized access to IoMT systems, it is important to ensure a strong identification and verification mechanism. The best solution is to rely on biometric systems. There is also the need for a database to store the biometric templates safely and securely for future use [43]. However, achieving identification and verification requires several biometric techniques, which can be divided into physical and behavioural biometric techniques [43].

- **Physical Biometric Techniques:** Secure physical biometric techniques can be adopted and used to safeguard and maintain patients' medical privacy without being prone to any insider threat. This includes facial recognition, retina scan, or iris scan.
 - **Facial Recognition:** Facial recognition managed to prove a high verification rate [171]. Hence, it was

used in order to recognize a person's facial structure, using a specialised digital video camera that identifies and measures the face's structure. This also includes the distance between the triangle of eyes, nose and mouth. Hence, it is able to verify legitimate users from non-legitimate users by comparing a scanned face with the authorized faces registered in the database.

- **Retina Scan:** A retinal recognition scan is based on analyzing the blood vessel region located behind the human eye. It proved to be a very accurate and secure verification method by [64].
- **Iris Scan** proved to be essential for both identification and verification purposes, due to its ability to generate accurate and precise measurements [48]. Iris scan operates by analyzing and scanning the coloured tissue around a specific eye pupil to check if it matches the stored data to either grant access or not.
- **Behavioural Biometric Technique:** A secure behavioural biometric technique that can be used for both identification and verification phases is the hand geometry. Such biometric systems rely on hand measurements, including palm size, hand shape, and finger dimensions [43]. Then, it is compared to the set of stored data in a database to verify users. If there is match, a given staff will be granted access. If not, access will be denied. However, such systems are only limited to one-to-one systems [6]. In fact, current systems are capable of differentiating between a living hand and a dead hand. This prevents adversaries from trying to deceive the system and gain any illegal access [63].

2) *Multi-Factor Authentication Techniques:* Venka & Gupta [163] presented a survey that focused on patients' privacy violation, with the reliance on encryption, authentication and access control mechanisms as countermeasures. Authentication is classified as the first line of defence that authenticates the source and destination alike. In fact, authentication can be a single-factor authentication that only relies on a password as the only security measure, which is not preferable. It can also be a two-factor authentication that relies on another security measure aside from the password in order to access a given system. Finally, it can be a multi-factor authentication where a third security mechanism is required in order to access a system. Therefore, authentication plays a key role in providing security for the accessible resources on a given network. Authentication can be either centralized where two nodes authenticate themselves through a trusted third party, or it can be distributed where two nodes use a pre-defined secret key to authenticate each other, without relying on a trusted third party.

Furthermore, in [59], Halperin et al. presented a cryptography-based key-exchange authentication mechanism that relies on external radio frequency rather than batteries as an energy source. This approach can be used in order to constantly prevent any unauthorized personnel from gaining access [53]. The out-of-band authentication was also deployed

in a number of wearable devices including mainly heart rate and blood pressure monitors [139]. It is based on the use of additional channels including audio and visual channels to generate a key to encrypt and secure the body sensor communications in a given network [135]. In [11], Ankarali et al. presented a physical layer authentication technique which relies on pre-equalization. Furthermore, an enhanced dual-factor user authentication scheme was presented and used by both authors in [57], [176] in order to protect WSNs. According to [165], Das et al. presented a smart-card-based password authentication scheme for WSNs [29], which mainly lacked user's anonymity [73]. In [86], Li et al. presented their own advanced temporal credential-based security scheme which included a mutual authentication and key agreement for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Gope et al. presented another authentication scheme based on a realistic lightweight anonymous authentication protocol used for securing real-time application data access for WSN [49]. Kumar et al. [82] attempted to develop a privacy-preserving two-factor authentication framework exclusively for WSNs to overcome various attack types.

3) *Authorisation Techniques:* An assigned authorization must be based on offering the least privilege. Hence, the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model is adopted. This model offers the least privilege for a given medical staff or employee to perform a given task with the least (necessary) permissions and functionalities to accomplish a specific task.

- **T-Role-Based Access (T-RBAC)** is mainly designed for cloud computing environments, especially where medical data is stored [120]. T-RBAC is a proper access control model for Smart Health-care Systems [167]. In addition, T-RBAC also stands for Temporal Role Based Access Control, and can be spatio-temporal [133], intelligent [104], and generalized [67]. It is also capable of validating any needed access permission for any medical user according to the assigned role and tasks. In fact, T-RBAC can be divided between two task types, the workflow tasks that need to be completed in a particular order (this requires an active access control), and the non-workflow tasks, which can be completed in any order that requires a passive access control.

4) *Availability Techniques:* The importance of maintaining availability against any possible disruption or/and interruption of signals is a must. However, maintaining the server's availability requires the implementation of computational devices that act as backup devices, along a verified backup and Emergency Response Plans (ERP) in case of any sudden system failure.

- **Against Jamming:** Jamming can take many forms (see Fig. 9), including DoS, DDoS, or/and de-authentication. In the event of jamming attacks, several medical services would be severely affected, especially with the disruption and interruption of medical services. This can lead to the disruption and prevention of communications between medical devices and the doctor or GP, which leads to missing updates of patients' health records and hence, health complications. Furthermore, with these medical

services being brought down by a jamming attack, first responders will not be able to arrive to the scene on time. This would increase the potential of a given patient being prone to strokes that can possibly lead to their death. For this specific purpose, different security measures must be implemented in order to overcome any attack that would target the availability of any given system. For example, having backup computational medical devices and servers is crucial. In fact, medical devices must be available 24/7 in order to ensure the necessarily medical requirements and needed attention. Furthermore, backup devices must be quick to respond in real-time and activated in case of any emergency that threatens the availability of a given medical system. In fact, additional security measures can be taken into consideration, including Channel surfing, spatial retreat, and priority messages [172], which can be very useful against wireless denial of service attacks. This can be a good countermeasure for medical devices, especially in the IoMT domain.

5) *Honeypots*: Honeypot systems are really useful when it comes to detecting attackers, their targets (see Fig. 10), tools and used methods. However, the reliance on static honeypot systems is challenging. Hence, the need for a dynamic honeypot system configuration. Although there are no specific honeypots for IoMT, some honeypots are being employed in IoT systems and these might also be useful in the IoMT system as well. In [91], Luo et al. mentioned that building honeypots for IoT devices is challenging using traditional methods. Therefore, they presented an automatic and intelligent way to collect potential responses using a scanner and a leverage machine technique to learn the correct behaviour during an interaction with an attacker. Their evaluation revealed that their proposed system can improve the session interaction with the attackers to capture further attacks.

In [84], La et al. developed a game theoretic model to analyze deceptive attacks and defense problems in a honeypot enabled IoT network. In fact, a Bayesian belief update scheme was used in their repeated game. Their presented game model and simulation results showed that whenever facing a high concentration of active attackers, the defender's best interest was to heavily deploy honeypots. This allowed the defenders to use a mixed defensive strategy that keeps the attacker's successful attack rate low. Finally, their game theoretic approach may be suitable for medical health-monitoring systems, and sensor networks.

In [44], Dowling et al. presented an analysis of the results from bespoke ZigBee simulated honeypot deployed on Secure Shell (SSH). This simulated honeypot is used to detect and analyze automated and random attack types before being examined and identified. Brute-force and botnet attacks provided a better material for examination, unlike individual and dictionary attacks. Therefore, these attacks managed to treat the honeypot as an SSH device and concentrated on compromising it. This was done by showing interest in the honey-tokens to manipulate them. Individual attacks have shown an interest in a small number of files that were already downloaded and sandboxed. This also included the scripts that were analyzed, rather than having any specific knowledge towards Zigbee

networks. In [10], Anirudh et al. managed to conduct a detailed study on how a DoS attack is conducted against IoT systems. This included how they can be averted by a honeypot relying on a verification system to maintain the efficiency of transmitted and received data. Their outcome demonstrated the capability of their presented scheme to secure an IoT system through the implementation of honeypots. Their future work includes deploying honeypots to overcome DDoS and botnet attacks.

6) *Lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems*: IoMT devices are prone to different types of security threats and challenges. To protect IoMT systems against intruders, the activities of IoMT devices must be monitored and analyzed. Typically, an IDS is the first line of defense towards detecting attacks. The different IDS types that can be applied within IoMT systems are Host-based IDS (HIDS), and Network-based IDS (NIDS). While HIDS is attached to a given IoMT device to monitor any possible malicious activity, NIDS monitors the network traffic of several IoMT devices towards detecting any malicious activity.

IoMT systems and networks should be protected by implementing IDS to detect abnormal activities as early as possible and to initiate the right actions to stop any incident. An IDS can be either anomaly-based, signature-based, or specification-based, as shown in Fig. 11. Signature-based and specification-based detection methods require low overhead compared to the anomaly-based one. Unfortunately, due to the limited computing power and the high number of interconnected devices, a traditional anomaly-based IDS is not efficient in the IoMT case.

Anomaly-based detection is the most efficient in detecting zero-day attacks, which is not possible via signature-based or specification-based detection methods. Developing a lightweight anomaly-based IDS is essential for the detection of unknown attacks within the IoMT context. Such lightweight techniques will be used to make prompt decisions in a resource-constrained environment, as is the case in IoMT networks. Without an efficient anomaly IDS, IoMT devices can be compromised leading to drastic effects especially for patients. This raised a real security concern about current IoMT deployments in general, and the need for a robust and lightweight IDS. Research and industrial communities are still facing challenges in designing a reliable and efficient IDS for IoT systems since large amounts of data are supposed to be handled in a real-time manner. Lightweight and hybrid cooperative IDS with hybrid placement and hybrid detection techniques are candidate solutions that can make IoT networks resilient against various types of attacks including zero-day attacks.

VI. SUGGESTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Failing to implement encryption would lead to intercepting, modifying, and even deleting data beyond recovery. As such, encryption techniques, and more so dynamic encryption, must be implemented to safeguard the data and ensure its privacy and confidentiality (see Fig. 12). Moreover, since most attacks have occurred due to social engineering or phishing attacks, a




Fig. 9: An Example Of Possible Jamming Attacks & Their Impact On IoMT Systems Including: Data Center, First responders, Doctors & Patients - Targeting Main IoMT Communication Channels.




Fig. 10: Honeypot Taxonomy Based on 4 Metrics: Purpose, Classification, Implementation, & Interaction.

budget must be allocated to raise the awareness and to conduct training of medical staff, and to raise their technical knowledge to identify any potential phishing or social/reverse engineering attack. Moreover, the IT staff should undergo more specialised training in order to secure, maintain and safeguard the privacy of stored sensitive confidential medical data and information. Additionally, a strong multi-factor authentication must be employed (see Fig. 13).

Note that there is a high level of mistrust among patients who are raising serious concerns about their privacy, especially that the recent attacks disclosed private medical information and data about patients. Therefore, it is crucial to establish trust

and it should be given a high priority. Aside from protecting and securing data by ensuring both security and privacy, it is also important to maintain a high level of accuracy of medical robotics operations, to avoid errors that may lead to unnecessary loss of life. In addition, lightweight security mechanisms are required for authentication and encryption to ensure a safe transmission of real-time medical data, especially for resource-constrained smart healthcare devices. This requires ensuring the right trade-off between IoMT's system performance, and security and privacy mechanisms.

In the following, we list the main recommendations towards securing IoMT systems and data.




Fig. 11: Modern IDS Classification Based on 5 Factors: Architecture, Locality, Reaction-Response, Decision Class & Detection Methods.




Fig. 12: Existing Cryptographic Algorithms




Fig. 13: Existing Authentication Cryptographic Protocol Techniques

A. Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithms

In general, security is based on cryptographic algorithms (see Fig. 12) to ensure data confidentiality, integrity and availability, with source authentication, and non-repudiation. However, implementing security and privacy countermeasures introduces an overhead, which is considered high for some type of IoMT devices. Many related works were presented towards reducing the required latency and resources for these countermeasures. In some scenarios, medical data must be exchanged in real-time, without any delay, such is the case of live monitoring and exchanging surveillance data. Moreover, the existing algorithms would quickly drain the battery life of small medical sensors, or small endpoints within IoMT. To address this issue, the cryptographic algorithms proposed in [97]-[112] rely on a dynamic structure instead of the typical static structure, whereby the cipher primitives change for each new input message, and thus, they require a small number of rounds to achieve the required security level, which would require multiple rounds in a static structure. In [113], the

technique meets the expected requirements and ensures a high level of security that is both essential and mandatory for IoMT.

B. Lightweight Authentication Protocols

A survey on the existing authentication protocols for IoMT is presented in [142], [158], [47], and typically, such protocols use cryptographic algorithms as a basic element. This includes a hash function (with or without key), as well as symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (see Fig. 13). Designing an efficient cryptographic algorithm for IoMT would lead to reducing the required latency and resources of the corresponding computation. Also, it is important to reduce the required number of exchanged messages, and the size of the messages in the authentication step.

C. Layered Security Architecture

The security layers in IoMT, as shown in TABLE XII, should consist of three main layers:

TABLE XII: Recommended Security Layers & Components

| Accuracy Layer | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Trust Sub-layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accurate Medical Applications • Least Error Prone • Patients Trust • Trusted Medical Device/Equipment • Certified Authority • Trusted Third Party |
| Prevention Layer | |
| Authentication Sub-layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • User/Device Authentication: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-factor Authentication • Physical Protection • Strong and Variable Password • Source Authentication and Message Integrity • Access Control |
| Privacy Sub-layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patients Privacy • Anonymity (Pseudonymity) • Proxies VPN • Preserving Privacy at Cloud (Differential Privacy, Secret Sharing, Homomorphic Encryption) |
| Data Confidentiality Sub-layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption Algorithm |
| Defensive Layer | |
| Detection Sub-layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intrusion Detection Systems (Anti-malware) • SIEM • Honeypots • Data System Integrity |
| Correction Sub-layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intrusion Prevention Systems • Firewalls • Data Backup • Alternative Devices and Configuration |

- 1) **Accuracy Layer:** Accuracy of medical operations and tasks heavily relies on ensuring a three-way mutual trust that is set between medical staff (nurses and doctors) and medical applications and operations, medical staff and patients, patients and applications and operations.
 - **Trust Sub-Layer:** it requires the adoption of the most accurate medical applications, which must be highly accurate in a real-time manner, with zero tolerance to errors. Moreover, digital medical devices and equipment must also be verified through a certified authority, which may or may not be linked to a trusted third party.
- 2) **Prevention Layer** is required to prevent any attack from within the organization, and to reduce the likelihood of any remote attack to disclose the patients' medical data. This requires establishing the right authentication, privacy and confidentiality mechanisms.
 - **Authentication Sub-Layer** requires establishing a multi-factor authentication that relies on a strongly dynamic and variable password, and on a biometric technique that is unique for each patient, which makes any attempt to breach into patients' data extremely difficult. This can also be applied to medical staff to establish the right access control mechanism by establishing the least privilege per employee's role. Moreover, user/device authentication must be established to ensure a physical protection when using medical applications to prevent any physical tampering. Finally, source authentication and message integrity must be established by relying on a certified authority between the hospital and the patient.
 - **Privacy Sub-Layer** requires taking into consideration patients' privacy as a high priority. This requires allowing patients to adopt anonymity and pseudonymity, by ensuring that they use a well-established private connection (Proxies and VPN) when being linked to medical websites or applications. Moreover, medical IT staff must rely on privacy preserving data mining techniques based on cloud and fog computing, aside the adoption of traditional privacy preserving data mining techniques such as differential privacy (Signal-to-Noise), secret sharing [114], and homomorphic encryption.
 - **Data Confidentiality Sub-Layer** must be maintained at all times to guard against passive attacks. This requires the adoption of lightweight cryptographic algorithms, as well as relying on quantum cryptography to protect high-value assets.
- 3) **Defensive Layer:** to maintain a secure e-health environment, early detection measurements are required before any corrective measures are established.
 - **Detection Sub-Layer** requires establishing and employing the most advanced up-to-date anti-malware and anti-viruses, along AI-based solutions linked to dynamic and hybrid Intrusion Detection Systems Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), and dynamic honeypots. This will ensure an early and highly accurate detection rate.
 - **Correction Sub-Layer** must be maintained as the second line-of-defense to mitigate and overcome security attacks. This includes an enhanced dynamic

Intrusion Prevention Systems, dynamic and next generation firewalls, while ensuring a secure and verified data backup, with alternative devices being available for necessary computational requirements.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Despite its advantages, IoMT is prone to a variety of attacks, issues and challenges that mainly target the privacy of patients and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of medical services. In this paper, we presented and discussed the main problems, challenges and drawbacks facing IoMT, along with the different security measures that can be implemented to safeguard and secure the IoMT domains and their associated assets, which include medical devices, systems, and medical CPSs. Moreover, different frameworks, taxonomies and approaches were presented to ensure a more enhanced and robust IoMT, and improve the patients' health and experience. Furthermore, it is important to secure the different wireless communication protocols that the IoMT relies on. Finally, it is essential to maintain a high level of security, privacy, trust and accuracy. Hence, it is highly essential and recommended to train medical and IT staff so that they do not fall victims to physical or/and cyber-attacks. As a summary, the aim of is paper is to tighten the ties between different technical solutions and non-technical solutions to ensure a much more sophisticated, secure and efficient system in all IoMT domains.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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