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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2021

Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection

Andrea Attar
François Salanié

Résumé

This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tari making additional trades with an entrant unprotable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we nally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets..
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Dates et versions

hal-03485384 , version 1 (17-12-2021)

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Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, François Salanié. Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection. 2021. ⟨hal-03485384⟩
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