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Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Mapping, Evolution and Patterns (June 2006 - May 2014)

Shamsudeen Kabir Bello

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Shamsudeen Kabir Bello. Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Mapping, Evolution and Patterns (June 2006 - May 2014). [Research Report] IFRA Working Papers Series 49, IFRA-Nigeria. 2015. <hal-03480567>

HAL Id: hal-03480567

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**Political and Electoral
Violence in Nigeria: Mapping,
Evolution and Patterns
(June 2006 - May 2014)**



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Shamsudeen Kabir BELLO*

Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Mapping, Evolution and Patterns (June 2006– May 2014)

Executive Summary

- An analysis of the Nigeria Watch database for the period between June 2006 and May 2014 revealed 915 fatal incidents related to elections. The research did not include terrorist attacks by Islamic or militant groups with religious, social, or economic undertones, but it did study the involvement of such groups in political violence.

- A total of 3,934 deaths were recorded from these 915 incidents, with the highest prevalence in Plateau State and the lowest in Jigawa State.

- As the main stakeholders of electoral processes, political parties are directly involved in electoral violence.

- A spatial analysis of the Nigeria Watch database shows that the bloodiest geopolitical zone is the Middle Belt, with 1,463 deaths. The region is characterized by pre-existing ethno-religious tensions, just as in the North-West (911 deaths). The North-East (319 “political deaths”) is affected mainly by the Boko Haram insurgency, which is not covered by this study. So-called godfatherism affects more the South-West (386 deaths) and the South-South (644). The South-East also witnesses political thuggery but records the lowest occurrence of deaths from electoral processes (152).

- Most electoral violence in northern Nigeria was found to have an ethno-religious background, whereas the

* Shamsudeen Kabir Bello works in the Procurement Department of a private company, Isasha Investments Limited. Any errors that remain are the sole responsibility of the author. Contact: shams018@gmail.com

southern part of the country is more affected by the high prevalence of criminal gangs.

- Security forces are also key catalysts in electoral violence, as they often exacerbate cases where they intervene.

INTRODUCTION: ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Political violence is the only cyclical violence the Nigeria Watch project could identify in Nigeria, and this violence occurred during the polls of April 2007 and April 2011 (Pérouse de Montclos 2011: 3). Indeed, according to the CLEEN Foundation, violence has been “a feature of the country’s electoral process since the colonial era” (Alemka 2011).

In 1983, for instance, post-election violence followed the declared landslide victory of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in Oyo and Ondo states, which were the stronghold of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). During the planned transition from military rule to democracy, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida and his successor, Sani Abacha, also witnessed demonstrations and bombings when supporters of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) called on the Government to step down in favour of the winner of the 12 June 1993 election, late Chief MKO Abiola. With the return to a civilian regime in 1999, Nigerians went to the polls again, though this time with relatively low violence before and after the vote. Yet the elections, which brought retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to power, were blighted by widespread fraud. Likewise in 2003, the election was characterized by violence, corruption, and the falsification of results, according to the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 170 NGOs in Nigeria. Similarly, in 2007, foreign and national monitors observed violence, corruption, fraud, and manipulation. The 2011 round, on the other hand, was reported to have been well-run relative to past elections. Nonetheless, “violence claimed 800 lives over three days in Northern Nigeria and displaced 65,000 people, making the elections the most violent in Nigeria’s history” (Bekoe 2011).

Political violence has thus been inherent in almost all the elections held since independence in 1960. However, there are hardly any detailed statistics to investigate further the patterns of such conflicts; hence, this research relies on the Nigeria Watch database to analyse the 2007 and 2011 elections. It answers two main questions:

1. What are the main features of electoral violence in Nigeria?
2. Who are the main stakeholders involved in electoral violence in Nigeria?

MAPPING AND PROCESSES

The methodological approach to this research also borders on the findings of the Nigeria Watch's third report and the assertions of Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente, who claimed that "no violence is likely to arise in situations where the challenger is strong". To support their views, these two authors used surveys based on a panel of 1,149 respondents and conducted by an international NGO, ActionAid, in Oyo, Lagos, Kaduna, Plateau, Delta, and Rivers states just before the 2007 elections. They found that weaker opposition parties were prone to use violence because they needed to resort to intimidation to compensate for their lack of base support. On the contrary, the PDP was more likely to resort to vote-buying and fraud in locations where it was the incumbent.

According to Nigeria Watch's third report, this conclusion

could be understood as an invitation to support authoritarian state-parties with no opposition. The problem is mainly methodological, notwithstanding its

moral implications. First, the panel of states chosen by ActionAid is geographically not representative. Four are in the Christian-dominated South, one in the Middle Belt and only one in the Muslim North. Incidentally, one can wonder if NGOs are the best channel to conduct such surveys if they want to prove their efficiency and find a decrease of electoral violence precisely in the areas where their programs oppose voter intimidation. In this case, the results of the survey also risked introducing a bias by convincing voters to vote for the PDP and not for the AC, which was portrayed in the media as the weakest and most instable party. (Pérouse de Montclos, 2011: 17)


To avoid misrepresentation, this study thus investigated the states with the highest occurrence of electoral violence in each of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria (Fig. 1). It also considered a wider timeline to encompass election processes, tribunal results and their trigger effects, party clashes and resultant attacks before and after the 2007 and 2011 elections. Interestingly, four of the six states where ActionAid conducted the aforementioned survey coincide with the states with the highest prevalence of electoral and politically related deaths in their respective zones, according to the Nigeria Watch database: Kaduna (North-West), Plateau (North-Central), Oyo (South-West) and Rivers (South-South). However, the states of Bauchi (North-East) and Imo (South-East) were not covered by ActionAid's survey. Moreover, five of the top ten highly volatile states in terms of electoral violence (Nasarawa, Kano, Benue, Kogi, and Bayelsa) were not investigated by ActionAid or by this study, based on geopolitical zones (see Table 1).

Table 1: Ranking of states from highest to lowest prevalence of political/electoral fatalities (2006–2014)

RANKING	STATE	NUMBER OF FATALITIES
1	PLATEAU	850
2	KADUNA	653
3	NASARAWA	258
4	RIVERS	181
5	KANO	152
6	DELTA	142
7	OYO	110
8	BENUE	109
9	KOGI	107
10	BAYELSA	93
11	AKWA IBOM	91
12	NIGER	86
13	BORNO	84
14	EDO	83
15	LAGOS	80
16	BAUCHI	63
17	TARABA	61
18	FCT	59
18	OSUN	59
19	ONDO	55
20	CROSS RIVER	54
21	KWARA	53
22	OGUN	51
23	ADAMAWA	49
24	IMO	45
25	ANAMBRA	38
26	KATSINA	37
27	GOMBE	33
28	EKITI	31
29	YOBE	29
30	ZAMFARA	25
31	ENUGU	24
32	KEBBI	23
32	ABIA	23

33	EBONYI	22
34	SOKOTO	11
35	JIGAWA	10
	TOTAL	3,934

FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF FATALITIES FROM ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PER STATE AND PER ZONE (JUNE 2006 - MAY 2014)



North-West Zone: Kaduna State

According to the Nigeria Watch database, Kaduna has the second-highest occurrence of election-related deaths in the country during the period under study. The state is believed to have an almost equal number of Muslim and Christian residents, and it has a history of crises largely attributed to tensions between the northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the southern Kaduna Christians. These clashes point to the relationship between ethno-religious conflicts and electoral violence where the latter is used as a pretext to carry out attacks between rival groups. In 2011, for instance, the results announced tagged the People's Democratic Party (PDP) as victor of both the Presidential and gubernatorial elections in the state. This sparked protests by supporters of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and its presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. The demonstrations quickly transformed into religious fighting, with several churches, mosques, and homes burnt (see Table 2). On 1 June 2011, the Inspector General of Police, Alhaji Hafiz Ringim, disclosed that 518 persons, including six policemen, were killed in Kaduna State. The death toll of Human Rights Watch was even higher, with a total of 800 persons who died in post-election violence (HRW 2011: 8).

Table 2: Major electoral violence events in Kaduna (2006-2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	LGA*
Violence during the elections	4	14/4/2007	Kaduna North
Mayhem over elections, CPC vs. winning PDP killed at least 60 persons, the bodies being brought to Kaduna hospitals. Churches, mosques, and homes were burnt. The fighting opposed Bajju Christians to Hausa-Fulani Muslims. According to Human Rights Watch, 10 Christians were killed and 335 Muslims were recorded buried.	69	16/4/2011 to 19/4/2011	Jema'a
	147	16/4/2011 to 19/4/2011	Zangon-Kataf
	331	19/4/2011	Kachia
Pro Buhari members protested the results of the presidential elections. Two policemen, one lecturer, and four students were killed. Many houses, churches, and government properties were burnt. According to Vanguard, Dr. Ali Obge of the Department of Guidance and Counseling, Faculty of Education, Ahmadu Bello Zaria, was one the scores of academics and students killed.	17	17/4/2011	Zaria
The town of Maraba Rido was razed during the presidential elections	28	19/4/2011	Kaduna North,

aftermath. Houses, shops, and the main mosque were torched. A total of 28 Muslims were killed.			Kaduna South
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* Local Government Area

South-West Zone: Oyo State

Given the history of political crisis in the former Western Region, the South-West geopolitical zone is seen as prone to the use of thugs and criminals employed by godfathers to win elections. According to Human Rights Watch, for instance:

Chief Lamidi Adedibu has been involved in Oyo politics since the 1950s. His many detractors allege that he got his start as a small-time organizer of political thugs for the Action Group Party of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. By the late 1980s, however, he had emerged as a powerful political force through a combination of populist politics, patronage, violence and extortion’’(Albin-Lackey 2007). Governor Rashidi Ladoja could not do without him when he was elected in 2003. Chief Adedibu called him “an ingrate” because he rebuffed several of his demands regarding public funds, appointments and projects in Oyo State. (Albin-Lackey, 2007)

The split between the two men resulted in the numerous clashes in the run-up to the 2007 elections, claiming several lives and property. The election eventually pronounced the godfather’s power in the state

and saw the emergence of Chief Adedibu's PDP candidate, Christopher Alao-Akala, against the incumbent. In this regard, the Nigeria Watch database confirms that political incidents recorded in Oyo State have links to hoodlums and, sometimes, Chief Lamidi Adedibu (see Table 3).

Table 3: Cases of godfatherism and associated electoral violence in Oyo State (2006–2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	LGA
Thugs went on the rampage, killing people, burning houses, and kidnapping several persons linked to the state governor, A. R. A. Ladoja. The violence was linked to a factional crisis within the NURTW. Loyal to Governor Ladoja, the factional chairman of NURTW, A. G. Abubakar, was detained at the home of L. Adedibu.	5	24/5/2007	Saki East, Saki West
50 political thugs attempted to attack the former Governor of Oyo State, Senator Rashidi Ladoja. They were overpowered by security men; 3 gunmen died.	3	3/7/2007	All Ibadan LGAs
Hoodlums carrying a large banner of Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu, veteran politician and PDP chieftain, blocked Governor Christopher Adebayo Alao-Akala of Oyo State's convoy on his way home from a ceremony. They demanded their mobilization money as earlier agreed with the organizers of the ceremony and began	2	11/9/2007	Ibadan North

to throw stones when the governor refused.			
PDP hoodlums stormed the rally of AC Senator Rashidi Ladoja, just after AP members attacked them. Two apprentices at the market died in the pandemonium and 22 were injured.	2	6/4/2011	All Ibadan LGAs

North-Central Zone (Middle Belt): Plateau State

According to the Nigeria Watch Third Report, which covered the period 2006–2011, Plateau was then the most dangerous state because of ethnic conflicts (Pérouse de Montclos 2011: 22) Tensions usually oppose Christian or Animist natives to settlers from the Hausa-speaking Muslim North vying for control of fertile farmlands. Electoral violence is thus linked to pre-existing ethno-religious conflicts, as in Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs. The capital city of Plateau State, in particular, has been very much affected by such tensions since the creation by the military regime of Jos North and Jos South from the old Jos LGA in 1991. This administrative reform has triggered many contests on demarcations and exacerbated the opposition between Muslims in Jos North and Christians in Jos South (ActionAid International 2007).

Figure 1 also shows that Plateau State has the highest number of deaths from political clashes. This is commensurate with the ethno-religious tensions that fuel electoral violence in the region. Aside from the insurgency in the North-Eastern region, Plateau State thus holds the record for being one of the most violent states in the country. According to the Nigeria Watch database, it also has the highest number of deaths for a single political

incident related to elections, with 540 fatalities (see Table 4).

Table 4: Major electoral violence incidents in Plateau State (2006–2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	LGA
Governorship aspirant of ACD, J. Aruku, was murdered after a political rally.	2	2/6/2006	Jos North
Christians from the PDP were declared winners of the state elections but Muslims from the ANPP contested the results. A clash ensued, and homes, mosques, and churches were burnt. A Muslim charity said it collected more than 300 bodies; the Information Minister for Plateau Nuhu Gagara reported 200 dead. According to the Nigerian Red Cross, 10,000 people fled their homes and camped in various locations in the metropolis. On 30 November, Agence France Press reported that 381 bodies were placed in a mosque. On 1 December, a Muslim official at the main mosque, Murtala Sani Hashim, reported 367 bodies. Health officials reported at least 400 bodies. Other sources reported 500 buried in mass graves on 1 December. On 30 December, Agence France Press reported that the police carried out more than 90 summary executions in the course of suppressing violence. Human	540	27/11/2008 to 29/11/2008	Jos East, Jos North, Jos South

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<p>Right Watch reported that at least 130 people were killed by policemen and soldiers. On 29 July it was reported that sectarian attacks in Jos claimed nearly 1,000 lives in total. Mercenaries were said to have been brought from neighbouring states (perhaps linked with Boko Haram). Muslim religious authorities in Jos registered between 469 and 632 dead amongst Hausa/Fulani and 23 amongst Catholics. The Stefanos Foundation named 103 Christians dead in Congo-Russia, Nasarawa, Rikkos, Sarki Mangu, and Tudun Wada. Ajibola Plateau State Judicial Commission stated that 312 people were killed, including 118 Christian Ibo and 31 Yoruba.</p>			
<p>Hausa youths escorted by Special Task Force (STF) members for voter registration were attacked by Christian youths. One Hausa boy was killed. The STF gunned down one Christian boy while dispersing the mob. One electoral official was reportedly lynched and burned, and two soldiers were wounded.</p>	3	17/1/2011	Jos North
<p>At least one person was killed and three others injured in a pre-dawn attack. In the governorship election period, many actions by some politicians to pitch the Berom against other ethnic nationalities were</p>	1	22/4/2011	Riyom

uncovered by the state government.			
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South-South Zone: Rivers State

The appearance of Rivers State in the zonal list points to the inherent battle to gain power and control over its abundant oil resources. The region is also seen to be very violent because of a high concentration of illegal arms. The Nigeria Watch database thus recorded multiple events where gunmen attacked political meetings. Most (77%) of the election-related violence reported in Rivers involved hoodlums, cultists, and other criminal groups with heavy arms (see Table 5).

Table 5: Major electoral violence incidents in Rivers State (2006–2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	LGA
Rival cult groups, Deebam and Deewell, fought for two politicians, respectively Kenneth Kobani (State Commissioner for Finance) and Gabriel Pidomson (Member of the Rivers State House of Assembly), who were engaged in a 2007 elections battle with militias to control Bodo. Streets were deserted and schools were closed. Three more persons died on 29 July.	9	20/7/2006	Gokana
Two PDP members were shot dead in a gun battle during a PDP congress.	2	17/11/2006	Tai
Gunmen allegedly hired by PDP invaded Port-Harcourt, terrorizing many strategic areas, shooting into the crowd, into the air, or at guards in front of Governor Peter	4	24/5/2007	Port-Harcourt

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Odili. Helicopters flew over the city as police pursued the assailants. A bus conductor was shot in the head, and another in the rib near Abali Park. A woman selling plantain and a man were shot dead at the Fire Service and Water Line Junctions.			
A PDP member was shot dead by 8 gunmen who invaded the venue of a party meeting.	1	8/5/2011	Ikwerre

North-East Zone: Bauchi State

Aside from Borno State—because of the dreaded attacks of Boko Haram—Bauchi State ranks high in terms of political violence in the North-East Zone. According to AOA, Katagum, Bauchi, Misau, Danbam, and Alkali were the LGAs most heavily affected by the 2011 post-election violence (AOAV, 12 December 2013). But the list is even larger according to the Nigeria Watch database for the period covering 2006 to 2014. Giade, which does not appear on the AOA's list, is thus the second-most affected LGA in the state (Fig. 2). The Nigeria Watch database also confirms the involvement of armed gangs of youths, exploited and sometimes financed by politicians or political groups (see Table 6).

Figure 2: Number and percentage of deaths from electoral violence per Local Government Area, Bauchi State, cumulated figures (2006–2014)




Table 6: Major electoral violence incidents in Bauchi State (2006–2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	LGA
Thugs killed a schoolteacher during rivalries between PDP Governorship candidate Alhaji Nadada Umar and his ANPP counterpart Malam Isa Yuguda	2	25/1/2007	Bauchi LGA
The convoy of the gubernatorial candidate of the ACN, Senator Baba Tela, was attacked by thugs sponsored by PDP stalwarts. Seven persons were injured.	1	19/3/2011	Giade

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Aliyu S. Bello, a poly student of the Department of Food Science and Technology, was killed by hired political thugs.	1	16/4/2011	Bauchi LGA
At least 32 Christians were killed by Hausa thugs, including 11 corps members. A total of 72 churches were burnt in the state over presidential elections results.	6	16/4/2011 to 17/4/2011	Katagun

South-East Zone: Imo State

This geopolitical zone recorded the lowest number of deaths related to electoral violence, with a total of 45 fatalities in 2006–2014 according to the Nigeria Watch database (Fig. 3). Notwithstanding, Imo State incidents involve the use of ‘political thugs’ and point to the influence of godfathers. Most of the cases reported had to do with kidnapping, assault, and group attacks (see Table 7).

Figure 3: Number of deaths from electoral violence by highest occurrence per geopolitical zone (2006–2014)




Table 7: Major electoral violence incidents in Imo State (2006–2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	LGA
Thugs attacked the electoral officer, who was saved by police. Five people were shot dead.	5	14/4/2007	Njaba
PDP thugs killed an INEC official and took away the ballot boxes.	1	14/4/2007	Ikeduru
House of Assembly aspirant, Marcus Ebeziem, escaped assassination, but gunmen killed his gateman.	1	30/10/2010	Ehime-Mbano
Gunmen stormed the place of Chairman of Nwangele LGA, Chief Chukwukere, killing him and five other persons. The Chairman had cash to distribute during elections.	6	8/4/2011	Nwangele

STAKEHOLDERS IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

1) Political Groups

A) The ruling party, PDP

The PDP has been the ruling party since the return to a civilian regime in 1999. It has subsequently employed all methods possible to ensure it retains in power. During the general elections in April and May 2003, Human Rights Watch stated that “at least one hundred people were killed and many more injured. Majority of serious abuses were perpetrated by members or supporters of the ruling party, the PDP” (Albin-Lackey 2007). The Nigeria Watch database confirmed that the PDP was the main party involved in political and electoral

violence in 2007, as its followers were to be found in 73% of the total number of fatal incidents reported. Of course, this does not mean that they were always the aggressor (Pérouse de Montclos 2011: 18), but from 2006 to 2014, the PDP was also to be found in 474 electoral violence incidents out of a total of 915 extracted from the database, representing almost 52% of incidents.

B) The opposition parties

According to Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente, the opposition parties in Nigeria are major contributors to electoral violence because they are prone to resort to intimidation to compensate for their lack of base support (Pérouse de Montclos 2011: 17) In addition, they can contest election results, as in Kano in May 2007, where such protests resulted in the killing of more than 100 persons. In April and May 2011, many people also died following the inflammatory declarations of the main opponent, General Muhammadu Buhari, who had lost the Presidential elections. Human Rights Watch reported approximately 800 killed after this election, mostly from protests by opposition parties which claimed the results were falsified and rigged.

2) Security forces/agencies

The Nigerian security forces are also catalysts of violence (Pérouse de Montclos 2011: 22). They are found to be involved in many fatal incidents related to elections. Sometimes they are even alleged to carry out political attacks instead of maintaining peace and stability (see Table 8). According to the CLEEN Foundation in 2010, for instance, “the police have generally failed to perform their electoral functions. Not only have they been unable to provide effective security for elections, the police themselves have been involved in acts of electoral fraud and crime” (CLEEN Foundation 2010)

Table 8: Major cases of electoral violence involving security agencies (2006–2014)

Event description	No. of deaths	Date	State	LGA
Violence over the annulment of the results of the state House of Assembly, which announced Dr. Ayar Gwer winner before reversing its decision and favouring Asema Achado. Mobile policemen were held responsible for the deaths.	10	12/8/2006	Benue	Gwer West
Police shot two people dead at a PDP Governor Theodore Orji campaign rally in contest with Chief Orji Kalu of PPA. One of the governor's supporters died on the spot; another died on the way to hospital.	2	29/3/2011	Abia	Ohafia
With the complicity of the police, a former leader of Irri community, AIG Joshua Uturu of Zone 5 Benin City, killed 26 people over leadership issues.	26	4/9/2011	Delta	Isoko South
At least eight persons died in attacks that targeted PDP chieftains. Churches are razed and some rioters were killed by police. The state government imposed a curfew.	7	18/4/2011	Kano	Kano Municipal

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<p>Youths protested the arrest of a gubernatorial candidate of CPC, Umaru Tanko Al-Makura. He was accused of complicity over the defacing of the campaign posters and billboards of President Goodluck Jonathan and Governor Aliyu Akwe Doma. Four persons were killed during that protest, including three children, hit by stray bullets shot by anti-riot policemen and soldiers.</p>	4	10/2/2011	Nassarawa	Lafia
<p>Twenty supporters of governors and President Goodluck Jonathan during the campaign for the South-South zone died in a stampede at the venue of the rally, after security operatives refused to open the gate for those who wanted to leave the arena during the speech of the President. The situation became worse when a policeman shot in the air to disperse the crowd. The victims were mainly women.</p>	20	12/2/2011	Rivers	Port-Harcourt
<p>Two women were killed when policemen shot into a crowd of women protesting the conduct of</p>	2	19/11/2013	Anambra	Awka South

the Anambra election.				
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3) Criminal groups and godfatherism

A third category of political violence stakeholders are criminal groups, armed gangs, and cult societies that are sponsored by wealthy and powerful godfathers to win elections (Albin-Lackey 2007). These godfathers are not mere financiers of electoral campaigns; rather, they are individuals whose power also stems from their ability to deploy violence and corruption to manipulate national, state, or local political systems in support of the candidates they sponsor (Albin-Lackey 2007). The Nigeria Watch database shows that such ‘militant groups’ are concentrated in the southern part of the country, while the northern part sees more the use of political thugs and gangs.

4) Religious institutions and/or ethnic organizations

Sometimes, religious and ethnic organizations are also involved in political violence, for instance in Bauchi State, where 32 Christians were killed and 72 churches were burnt over presidential election results in April 2011. The attackers were mainly Hausa thugs encouraged by Muslim preachers, even if the official Islamic umbrella body in the North, Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), claimed no responsibility for the violence. Kaduna and Plateau are also very much affected by such killings: most electoral incidents occur in LGAs with a mixed population of Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Christian natives. Nationwide, places of worship—churches, mosques, and temples—are also targeted during political riots. This was the case in 51 (5.57%) of 915 fatal incidents related to elections during the period 2006–2014, according to the Nigeria Watch database.

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- Figure 3: Number of fatalities from electoral violence by highest occurrence per geopolitical zone (2006–2014)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

- AC - Action Congress
- AIG - Assistant Inspector General (of Police)
- ANPP - All Nigeria People's Party
- AOAV - Action on Armed Violence
- CPC - Congress for Progressive Change
- FCT - Federal Capital Territory
- HRW - Human Rights Watch
- INEC - Independent National Electoral Commission

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JTF - Joint Task Force

LGA - Local Government Area

MB - Middle Belt

NADECO - National Democratic Coalition

NE – North-East

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

NPN - National Party of Nigeria

NURTW - National Union of Road Transport Workers

NW - Nigeria Watch

PDP - Peoples Democratic Party

PPA -Peoples' Progressive Alliance

SE – South-East

SS – South-South

STF - Special Task Force

SW –South-West

TMG - Transition Monitoring Group

UPN - Unity Party of Nigeria