Increasing complexity in electricity regulation: to whose benefit? - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles European Review of Industrial Economics and Policy Year : 2011

Increasing complexity in electricity regulation: to whose benefit?

Abstract

After a short description of the evolution of incentive regulation, this paper explores some of the issues that have arisen with its implementation in the electricity sector both in the UK and Italy. It illustrates the challenge facing a regulator in implementing an incentive mechanism under imperfect information, and focuses on some distortions emerging as a result of the design of the incentive scheme itself.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
eriep.2.6.pdf (293.14 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin Explicit agreement for this submission

Dates and versions

hal-03469059 , version 1 (07-12-2021)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03469059 , version 1

Cite

Laura Solimene. Increasing complexity in electricity regulation: to whose benefit?. European Review of Industrial Economics and Policy , 2011, 2. ⟨hal-03469059⟩

Collections

ERIEP EPI-REVEL
14 View
25 Download

Share

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More