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Chapter 3

Adjusting a Bourdieusian approach to the study of transnational fields

Transversal practices and state (trans)formations related to intelligence and surveillance

Didier Bigo

Introduction

An important debate about the study of the practices of transnational groups of actors – be they called the 1 percent, transnational elites, a global class in formation, or transnational guilds – has arisen since the 1990s in different disciplines, and has recently created new interest in a more complex approach to state formation and transnational practices (Kauppi & Madsen, 2013). Human geography, political sociology, and cultural anthropology have challenged the reductionist views of traditional international political economy about globalization, homogenization, and market democracies being the inescapable future of world politics (Robinson, 1998; Walker, 2009; Cerny, 2012).

But, despite these challenges, the Fukuyama-like analyses of globalization describing the end of the struggles for the meaning of the best forms of politics still resonate today, as the default position of many international relations (IR) professors and of the main leaders of the Western world. Globalization is still seen as a natural process of convergence, even if it has now encountered opponents and “ignorants”, especially with the formation of “ultra-patriotist” parties, often called populists, and the fact that in some places – like the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Hungary – they have succeeded at winning elections. These ultra-patriots accuse the global elites of having driven the world toward more inequalities and even toward its destruction, masking their vested interests with universal claims in proposing their visions of what is needed for a global, safe, and orderly political and economic order.

These discussions about globalization versus nationalistic “populism” are everywhere. Some are longstanding (Swank & Betz, 2003), while others are more recent (Berletm, 2011; Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou, & Passari, 2017; Rodrik, 2018). Unfortunately, they create a long series of analytical confusions by mimicking the analysis from the 1930s of the roles of the state, of leadership, and of representative democracy, saying these now operate at a global scale but without

any serious inquiry about the terminology of “global”. This assumption of having reached a “global” scale, of having a world “empire” with no outside border (Negri & Hardt, 2001), of having a “global field of power” integrating and swallowing the structural lines differentiating different state territories and regimes, has been criticized for its eschatology and for having generated its current anti-thetic discourse based on the opposition between global economic elites and sovereigntist populists rooted locally (Go & Krause, 2016). It has been considered as one of the most damaging illusions of geopolitics and IR political science when they speak of international relations. It has also been a strong resource for both sides, used to support claims that a global (in)securitization process is at work and that prevention, protection, and prediction are central in such an environment. The development of a large group of scaremongers has unleashed the constraints on intelligence gathering and surveillance, and has turned these practices once reserved for espionage into a banal action.

This is why a discussion regarding seriously what transversal practices mean, and more importantly what they do, is so necessary. A theory of practices, and here a reflection on what have been called transnational practices, is a precondition for discussing how fields of power emerge, circulate, evolve, and structure the contemporary international set of problems, including the analysis of the collaboration between secret services and their relations with national security, sovereignty, and loyalty. This will lead us to discuss further the territorial and the digital, and how they affect the transformation of what counts for playing in the field of the state.

Transnational: what do you mean? the travel of a terminology from IPE to IPS

As any IR student knows, a certain tradition of international political economy where the category of transnational is applied has the objective of first differentiating the levels of the national and the international, but with the strategy of reframing the specificity of the latter by insisting that the international is not restricted to governments representative of states. The international (as a level) is also populated by other actors, transnational ones – such as companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and churches – in opposition to the state actors, which possess or are constrained by the use of force and the necessity to act as sovereigns.

Krasner, Keohane, and Nye, as well as James Rosenau in the 1980s, participated in this elaboration of a category of “transnational actors” that is essentially different from state actors (Keohane & Nye, 1987; Krasner, 1999; Nye & Keohane, 1971; Rosenau, 1990). This logic of “bifurcation” transformed the verticality of strict hierarchical levels – Man-State and (international) War – into a logic of “stairs”, allowing the attainment of a multilevel governance differently arranging (international) anarchy and (national) sovereignty by mediating them in a liberal way (Liesbet & Gary, 2003). According to this logic, the “global” is a terminology replacing the “international” to designate a process of governance undertaken by

transnational actors and governments working together. The process of differentiation restructures the power of states and gives places to other actors, but *in fine* it functions as a melting pot, an integrative move toward a new higher level, the global. This narrative of a social whole in the making and of achieving the global without violence and struggles, but nevertheless with some disfunctions (Albert & Buzan, 2013), reproduces at another scale (the global world) previous narratives of the nineteenth century regarding the “homogenization” of society via its embrace by the state, and its slow transformation into an integrated body via functional differentiation. This meaning of a cosmopolitan global culture shared universally is in itself responsible, by its assimilation of progress, elites, bureaucracy, politics, and peace, for the emergence of the counter-narrative that is hostile to these ideas and endorses tradition, patriotism, national values, sovereignty, and revenge. Sometimes, in favor with writers unaware of the paradigm changes in IR and working in other disciplines, this meaning of transnational is still used, despite its unhelpful nature for a contemporary analysis of international problems. If it needs to be remembered, one may say, it is only to keep in mind its inopportune contribution of developing its inverse mirror image of ultra-patriotism and of perpetuating a dualist and essentialist vision of the world.

Fortunately, the contributions of different disciplines acting as critiques of the assumptions in US political sciences of the “global” and its “transnational actors” have reconfigured international relations today. After the crisis of IR that challenged its position as a political science capable of predicting the future of international politics via its knowledge of state behaviors and its pretense to have scientific laws for understanding conflict, exemplified by the incapacity of the discipline to understand what would happen before, during, and even after the end of the bipolarity of the late 1990s, it became obvious that the emergence of the epistemological debate interrogating the simulacrum played by a political science of IR to duplicate physics and the “hard” sciences was even more “actual” and necessary. The so-called third debate gives to historians, sociologists, and most of the disciplines which had already engaged in a constructionist, reflexive, and empirical approach, a possibility to reframe IR by a double move showing first the limits of narrow positivist accounts, and second the exaggerations of some trends of post-structuralism regarding processes of veridictions and appetite for novels and styles over in-depth research concerning historical transformations (Lapid, 1989). The section of the International Studies Association called International Political Sociology (IPS), and later the journal of the same name, along with other publications, have been the locus of a critique of some of the assumptions of the US political sciences concerning what was international relations, and the place for a convergence of researchers wanting to address the international as a crucial question to the world and the globe, urging each specialist to try to cross the boundaries of their own discipline and work collectively with others as a form of collective intellectual (Walker, 2009). This transdisciplinary perspective has been developed on redefining the international away from the dualism between an anarchist situation and a natural political order, insisting on the contrary on

the logics of flows, of change, of different “scapes”, of the heterogeneities and struggles of organizing a political process of transnationalisation, different from a logic of globalization (Bigo, 2016b; Aradau & Huysmans, 2016; Basaran, Bigo, Guittet, & Walker, 2016; Guillaume, 2016; Huysmans & Nogueira, 2016; Gheciu & Wohlforth, 2018).

The authors of IPS, following a vision of a theory of historical change inspired by a Bourdieusian sociology, have reframed the notion of transnational practices and actors, not as a challenge and competitors to nation-states who would be immune from these transnational activities, but on the contrary as transversal practices affecting all actors, including the components of the states themselves, and redefining the latter in their claims of control over the boundaries of territory, identity, and violence (Gorski, 2013). These transversal practices deploy and (re)construct chains of interdependences and fields of power by opening new connections – violent or not – or by trying to reinforce boundaries, not necessarily territorially at the state borders, but through management at a distance of suspicion and use of digital technologies.¹ The maps of the different fields of power and their inscriptions into territories do not easily follow the traditional understanding of statist geopolitics. They describe networks organized in specific social spaces where all actors refuse to stay static and on the defensive, waiting for the mobile ones to spike them. Governmental actors are not reacting as dinosaurs against small mammals; they are themselves transnational, or more exactly, their bureaucracies have often constructed contact at a distance with their counterparts.

Transgovernmental networks and their status

To take into account this phenomenon, the notion of transgovernmentalism has been forged in IR with the objective to avoid the previous trap of reasoning, opposing old state actors and new transnational actors reduced to a mix of private companies, NGOs, and IGOs “free from sovereignty”. This innovation including state bureaucracies in the transnational logic has nevertheless been limited because, for most authors of transgovernmentalism, like Hale and Slaughter, the impact of this reformulation was effective only at the margins of politics. They have considered in their research that these practices of collaboration and solidarity between branches of bureaucracies of different states do not touch the core of national security or social welfare, and can play only a role enabling technical solutions to emerge (Slaughter, 2004; Slaughter & Hale, 2010). Thus, for these authors, states continue to be regulated hierarchically and, despite the development of transgovernmental networks, maintain vertical lines of decision making while governments keep control of the national sphere and its reproduction. Transnational practices of bureaucracies are still dependent on the will of their governments. In this approach, transnational practices are circumventing the state and reorganizing spheres of expertise, but the state is, for the sake of the analysis, a centripetal force, concentrating power in a specific place of decision making – the government.

Therefore, if the image of a unified state is slowly deconstructed by the notion of transgovernmental networks, the state continues nevertheless to be conflated in the description with the government in charge, and transnationalist or transgovernmentalist authors continue to maintain the central illusion of traditional IR: the state is “acting” as a collective “persona” for all key decisions.

Consequently, if transgovernmentalism has partly destabilized the old vision of transnational actors opposed to state actors and shown that transnational networks construct transversal lines which affect all actors, including the actors composing parts of the state (judges, tax collectors, social security workers, and health providers), IPS authors have to go even further and think of the transversal lines as fracturing the bureaucracies themselves to find the set of dispositions of groups in relations, inside these bureaucracies, which drive them toward solidarities at a distance and enmity in proximity.

The added value of a Bourdieusian approach to understanding transnational practices: the transversal logic of practices

The central interest of taking into account the sociological work of Pierre Bourdieu, despite the fact that IR was not at the core of his research, is that, by all his conceptual problematization of sociogenesis, fields and habitus, trajectories and dynamics of change and reproduction, he reveals the assumptions and myths which are considered the pillars of the “discipline” of IR: actorness of the state, centrality of its “action”, exclusivity of representation, belief in forms of hierarchical decision making, organization of a series of distinctions between private and public, inside and outside, welfare and warfare (Bourdieu, Wacquant, & Farage, 1994; Bourdieu, 2004, 2014).

Bourdieu is therefore crucial for understanding sociologically **what the conditions under which “transnational practices”** embed almost all actors engaged in international politics. His approach is not a small add-on for solving an epistemic problem of idealist IR regarding security communities; it is a way to change a paradigm concerning state formation and transformation, transversal practices, and their intertwined relations deployed at a transnational scale. For that, Bourdieu begins with a very simple statement: the state is never an actor playing at a certain “superior” level called the interstate or the international arena. The division between an inside of the state and an outside of the state is not a way to analyze the situation, but the way by which the agents claiming to be part of the state bureaucracies justify a series of major distinctions: public–private, state–societal, citizen–foreigner, friend–enemy, chaos–order. Political science, by reproducing these categories as analytical categories, has a serious difficulty questioning the “power” of the state and its reproduction. A more historical and sociological understanding has to be used to give a more substantial “thickness” to the state and international relations (Buzan, 2004). The sociology of Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Charles Tilly, and many others has already paved



the way for a history of coercion and capital, of city and space, as we will see, but Bourdieu has added a key element by insisting on the symbolic power by which the “magic” of the state is performed. The state, in this case, is the by-product of symbolic struggles to legitimate forms of domination, and each state has its own sociogenesis linked with the combination of different specific fields where their social structuration is simultaneously related not only to national institutions and to a dominant group of actors in a specific territory, but also to transversal networks of solidarity and antagonisms at a distance operating mainly through professional networks, recognition of shared know-how, and competitions around forms of knowledge.

On this topic of state formation, in his course on the state, Bourdieu himself borrows most of his analysis from Weber and Tilly. The latter has very often insisted on the internal-external dialectic forming a dynamic and a “helix” that is never reducible to a single path due to the construction of elites themselves. The making of the state is not the result of a program, as thought by those who consider the state as an “entity”, an “essence” controlled by groups internally; its formation is affected by transversal forces, including war, demographic trends, and many other dimensions that the leaders did not want. States, from their origins, have therefore been the by-product not only of moments of struggle between dynasties in competition, but also of transversal trends (births, diseases, environmental elements). These dynamics have favored, in Europe, the institutional form of a national territorial state stabilized in its consecration into international law as the definition of stateness, against empires and leagues of cities. But when Bourdieu and Tilly met at the Collège de France, both insisted that this pseudo-stability and universality of the “national” state was partly illusionary and that forces are always evolving (Bourdieu, Christin, & Will, 2000). This is a characteristic that Bourdieu has nevertheless sometimes himself forgotten, by emphasizing the centripetal dynamics more than the centrifugal dynamics in state formation and by putting excessive weight on the role of “cultural capital”, education, and therefore the boundary making of language and the struggles of social classes internally around welfare, perhaps because he wanted also to have a specific and stable frame of action to theorize his notion of symbolic power. In his model, it is not so much the territory as such that is important for state formation, but the conditions under which the relations and capacities of the actors in competition create some network connections and succeed at attracting them into a field – a field that already concentrates the powerful actors (or heirs) in a certain place related to the structure of their capitals, distinguishing them from the more marginal pretenders. This is how a homology between the objective positions, the dispositions, and the position-takings can emerge. States and markets are in some ways organized through these centripetal dynamics.

Nevertheless, in centrifugal dynamics generating fields based on professional solidarities, the concentration does not work, and mimetic rivalries about small distinctions can create more struggles between people who share almost the same places and social positions than between those with distant positions.

National and transnational state formation and transformations: reassembling the field of state power

The forms that the field of state power takes are the results of local and world-wide structural dynamics, acting in continuity and emerging from heterogeneous fields of power. Boundaries and limits of state powers are therefore not given by geography or ideology; they are always in a state of flux. They change with time, regardless of what the dominant actors want. This is why sociogenesis is so important as a methodology. Even the most stabilized field of power ends up with crucial changes, which can be abrupt or occur slowly. Boundaries may be fluid, or viscous like magma, but they are never walls that stand firm forever. By the same token, practices are not designed to work at a certain level, either local or national or international; their effects as practices come from the relations they are embedded into. The length of the chain of interactions will determine how a practice is seen as local, national, or international by commentators and their scripts of the relations.

Political processes of transnationalization or transversalization refer therefore (c.f. here Schmidt-Wellenburg & Bernhard, Chapter 1) to a series of struggles over “common principles of vision and division” (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 7), and they are an inherent part of the national and social construction of the state by also organizing the boundaries and limits of “what is national in the state field” and what is “beyond” it, or “across” it. As Bourdieu insisted, “Research also needs to take into consideration changes in the forms and boundaries of power in places other than the territorial state”, and he suggested looking more at the “extra-territorial” forms of power and their jurisdictions by arbitration and/or courts mechanisms and struggles (Bourdieu to Bastien, in Bourdieu, 2012: Discussions). In practice, this means that the national territory does not bind the state. Rather, boundary making depends on the chains of interdependencies of the state’s bureaucracies inside and outside the territory (Gorski, 2013). Boundaries of loyalty and territory are the constructs resulting from mechanisms of stabilization of flows and changes “traversing” institutions, fragmenting them through the struggles for organizing them in order to orient the direction of their stream. Politics of visas, readmissions, and denials of citizenship are examples of this intuition and of the limitations of the theories that do not take into account the projections of state bureaucracies abroad. The question of the “force of the law” and its relations with the use of force is therefore coming back (Derrida, 1994). The mystical foundation of authority is questioned even more at the territorial border than anywhere else when it becomes obvious that inequality, discrimination, and inhumanity lead to practices of violence in the name of sovereignty and survival of a group that is not in danger. Following the sociological work of Bourdieu, more recent works about the role of the profession of lawyers have insisted on this central element of symbolic power via the law (Madsen, 2011a, 2011b; Dezalay & Madsen, 2012; Kauppi & Madsen, 2013). These authors have

analyzed the sociogenesis of the role of legists by looking at the crystallization of boundaries limiting the number of actors entering into the competition for having the “last” word and a position of sovereign, while other scholars have analyzed their current role in the transformations occurring following this pretense to be sovereign affected by the reconfiguration of rule of law, sovereignty, security, and universal claims, along the lines of the positions, dispositions, and interests of the lawyers and law professors contributing to the building of different international European laws and courts (Dezalay, 2004; Cohen, Dezalay, & Marchetti, 2007; Vauchez, 2008; Georgakakis & Weisbein, 2010; Bigo & Madsen, 2011; Cohen, 2011; Kauppi, 2013; Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013). Implicitly reproducing the distinction between the levels of the national and the transnational and looking for a unique field, some have suggested that in this case because of the span of the intermediations, fields are weaker and are less coherent in terms of capitals, but in my view fields are not weak or strong as such. Fields are made of networks of relations which are polarized by certain stakes, but the number and the frequency of the relations depend on the degree of autonomy of each field and its power of attraction. Some fields have intense or sparse relations inside the main group of actors; others are more connected between them by multi-positioned actors filtering the different stakes along territorial or linguistic lines, often along their own interests as “translators” or “parasites”. So transversal practices are “specific” and often fluid and transnational, but sometimes they may solidify via a specific international “organization”. They “pierce” the network of relations and stitch it differently. They are therefore crucial, but they are not a “total social fact”, an “entity”, a bubble, or a form of order. They interconnect (via contradictions); they traverse and reframe by their actions, all the dynamics making the reproduction and transformation of the different nation-states themselves.

This approach to stateness as a specific “field of power” that is not exclusively national, and that is not only the use of force and the pretense to have a monopoly on it, reframes our understanding of the international today. It also reframes the way states have evolved as configurations including, in addition to the political class and public bureaucracies, different emergent powerful actors – like major internet companies, conglomerates of banks, including central banks, and financial institutions, as well as their relations with specific sectors of bureaucracies, especially signal and internet intelligence services and military forces interested in space and cyberspace.

It seems that the field of stateness has evolved and it is, in my view, the best angle from which to discuss the current relations between transnational practices and state formation, as well as their current reproduction and transformations. Stateness is no longer constituted only around coercion by public actors in a specific territory where they can legitimately apply a criminal justice system regulating the use of violence and illegalities. The current dynamics exist more around the conduct of conducts at a distance, beyond and across many territories with an expansion of number and a span on the strength of the chains of interdependence. These chains have expanded considerably from the development of quicker

technologies of travel and the advent of a digital age. They have allowed more travel to happen at a higher speed, and doing so they have compressed distance and time (Harvey, 2005), creating the conditions of possibility for solidarity at a distance and indifference in proximity. Transversal practices have changed in terms of impact because of the speed of the diffusion (contagion, virality) of their contents and the reduction of the spatial distance they can cover by creating the feeling of the instantaneity of events. They reconfigure what the boundaries of the state are and the economy of forces of the field of power, especially in the places where transmission and reproduction of positions has been routinized.

Intelligence data about citizens, consumers, travelers: assembling differently welfare and warfare in the name of predictive suspicion

The current stateness is, especially in the so-called advanced democracies, a disassembling of the public, especially of welfare, and a movement toward a gamble on the future played by private actors and a reassembling around suspicion, prevention, and prediction of all the organizations, both private and public, acting on the extraction of information and personal data for commercial and surveillance purposes.

As we will see, this shift in stateness and the creation of an **assemblage** of suspicion and surveillance organized around a politics of fear and emergency has given to the Signals-Intelligence(SIGINT)-internet intelligence services a specific importance, and explains in some way their self-appreciation that they can “connect the dots” and anticipate the future. At least if the politicians admit that they have to give them the technology, the money, and the workforce necessary to transform haphazard and vague elements into weak signals having a specific meaning in terms of suspicion. The intelligence services are **clef** between the ones that refuse to change their role from informing politics, letting politicians decide and be responsible for failures, and the ones that have the ambition to build total information awareness. Correlated with these opposing stances on the social use of technology and the belief that prediction can emerge from big data, I have shown with Laurent Bonelli that the relations between the deep state of the different secret services and the politicians are subject to huge variations, according to the degree to which the intelligence services are connected or not with their foreign counterparts, as this determines their dispositions toward a preference for national security and obedience to their politicians; or on the contrary, their primary allegiance to the services abroad with whom they collaborate (Bigo & Bonelli, 2019). A practical logic is at work and connects the sense to play the same game, the relations to the national politicians, the vision of global threats beyond the national realm, and the dispositions toward collaboration between agencies operating on the same domain. Intelligence services populated by policemen (the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the United States; Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure

(DGSI) in France; Military Intelligence 5 (MI5) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in the United Kingdom) continue to follow a traditional behavior, even if they use massively digital techniques. On the contrary, the SIGINT and internet intelligence services (National Security Agency [NSA] in the United States; Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] in the United Kingdom; Australian Signals Directorate [ASD]; Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS]; New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau [GCSB]; but also the Swedish Försvarets Radioanstalt [FRA]; and the Direction Technique of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure [DGSE] in France) have very strong transnational links (the Five Eyes plus network), and their transnational exchanges and activities generate a transversal field which challenges strongly the national state field (often represented by a national security office, theoretically coordinating the activities of all national intelligence services). The loyalty to this transversal field even gains supremacy over the national when a service prefers sending secret information to a foreign agency about national suspects than to respect the loyalty they have, in theory, regarding all their national politicians and citizens. The affair around the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) revealed by the leaks of the NSA documents by Edward Snowden demonstrates that the BND agents were spying on their own citizens and even politicians when asked by the NSA, and without the other national services knowing their activities (Bauman et al., 2014; Schulze, 2015). This does not mean that in other cases the national imperative is not successful against foreign collaboration if sensitive matters (industrial secrets, for example) are at stake, but it seems that the government defends better its national companies than its national citizens.

In sum, this digitization of the reason of state, which is distributed between transnational actors first (and not by national or international coordination structures), shows a more important stake for international political sociology in who participates today in the field of the national state. So, beyond the findings of our research on the Five Eyes and their relations with intelligence organizations of continental Europe, what is revealed is the strong transformation of what national security and state agents mean today in a transnationalized, digitized world where private companies have the capacity to resist, merge with, or constrain states if necessary.²

Therefore I suggest that the dimensions of suspicion and security which include intelligence policing, and even criminal justice towards “preventive, predictive” logics are part of a more general trend concerning the field of the state and its polarization between warfare and welfare: polarization that is now changing after a trend in favor of welfare immediately after World War II, into a new logic of warfare characterized by suspicion and surveillance.

Loïc Waquant proposed seeing this transformation of the field of the state (and the balance between the two hands of the state, coercion and redistribution) via the decline of the welfare state and the rise of a renewed penal state through the punitive regulation of poverty in a neoliberal age (Wacquant, 2009). He considered rightly the transformation from taking charge of poverty from the public with

the idea of creating a safety net for the poor, toward a private logic of poverty organizing a society of debtors and the possibility for private companies to make money from the poor, and to participate in the prevention of their disobedience by punishing them more for what they are than for what they have done. He has therefore concentrated his analysis on the reorganization of the criminal system, followed also by Bernard Harcourt, who insisted on the predictive dimension related to a preventative regime of justification (against transnational and global threats) (Harcourt, 2006). Wacquant and Harcourt, along with other criminologists (Loader, 1997; Zedner, 2010; Aas, 2012; Hudson & Ugelvik, 2013), have shown how the preventative argument has modified the current logic of criminal justice regarding presumption of innocence, access to justice, and certainty of penalty. I have also, with Mireille Delmas-Marty, insisted on this reorganization of the state around evaluation and suspicion, about virtual violence which is not actualized but generates anxiety and fear as a state of mind, reinforced by diverse politics of unease (Bigo, 2002; Delmas-Marty, 2010; Bigo & Delmas-Marty, 2012).

All these works are testimony of the current limitation of the use of physical violence, even if it does not disappear, and a strong increase in the use of forms of symbolic power reinforcing surveillance and control at a distance. They are also complemented by research on how military, police, border guards, and intelligence services have ensured their position in this state field of power not only through their use of force, but also through their use of “secrecy” and arguments of forecasting and predicting future threats (Sayad & Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu, 1993; Mérand & Pouliot, 2008; Mérand, 2010; Berling, 2012; Bigo, 2012; Paille, van Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012; Martin-Mazé, 2017). The existence of a field of power that does **not** coincide with the interstate map of the international with neat territorial borders separating the actors in national containers, which become the main stock exchange of the different forms of capital the actors possess, has never existed. This is not an evolution of the world, but a difficulty of understanding the transversal practices of field societies, groups, and individual relations spanning across territorial borders.

Transversal practices at the core of stateness: reading differently the SIGINT-internet intelligence services collaboration

To make the argument of this co-constitution of transversal practices and national state formation and transformations, I want to illustrate it with the example of the secret services, considered as the very core of the state – the deep state structuring the multiplicities of its activities and specialized bureaucracies. Even there, despite the discourse of national security, national sovereignty, national interest, and the supposedly vertical line of decision making and command, solidarity and loyalty between actors are not always driven by the proximity of their structural positions inside the national state. Despite all the narratives about the exclusive loyalty to their respective “nation” by all the different intelligence services, the

national security exclusivity narrative has been destabilized, and the role of a transnational “community” of intelligence has been emphasized. To temper the paradox of the transnational acquisition of information for national security, it has been justified on different bases after the end of the Cold War with the rise of a narrative by Western states of global threats (terrorism, transnational organized crime) imposed by a larger “community” of states than the Anglophone Five Eyes supposedly inherited from World War II. The argument was the necessity to collaborate against terrorism while pursuing national interests on other topics, and it has created the terminology of co-opetition (cooperation and competition simultaneously) to justify the collaboration while maintaining the idea of national security first. But this transversal network between services abroad has *de facto* reinforced the tensions between military secret services and police intelligence services, and given rise to the autonomization of technological ones. The will of politicians to speak in terms of coordination created by fusion centers, or by coordination structures, is in some way the result of this competition between the services and the difficulty to maintain a proximity between the heads of states and the executives of the top agencies. Our research has shown that each time a crisis arises, the different secret services cooperate better with their counterparts abroad than with their national “fellows”, and this disrupts the so-called community of national security in each country. During the extraordinary rendition saga of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), its first opponents came from the FBI and the branch of the military lawyers, and its first supporters were the SIS (Military Intelligence 6 [MI6]) of the United Kingdom, the Polish military intelligence services, and those in Romania, Thailand, and many other places that were *de facto* relying on funds from the CIA for their present and future, and were trained to act completely outside their own legal regime (Guild, Bigo, & Gibney, 2018). The fact of pertaining to a certain informal transnational guild of extraction of information, considering that the services inside this network have a specific know-how and their own rules and ethics, different from the public, seems to be the crucial criterion for collaboration between them, even if it may create tensions with the national government itself. In the case of the disclosures by Edward Snowden of the practices of the NSA and its collaborators (the so-called Five Eyes, which are now more surely nine, if not twelve), it has been clear also that the NSA shared its little secrets about personal data of suspects with its counterparts abroad (English GCHQ, Canadian CSE, French DGSE, Swedish FRA, Australian ASD) to elaborate from a large-scale logic of data interception a transnational map connecting the dots and willing to trace the networks of suspects by differentiating them from the “normal” public and the non-risky travelers (Bigo, 2016a, 2019a, 2019b). It went as far as asking the German BND to put some German citizens under surveillance, including some in the political class, and to send back the information only to the NSA. At the same moment the NSA, which was justifying its operation in the name of counterterrorism, did not share information with the FBI or even the CIA. What makes no sense in the traditional framework of intelligence studies following the distinction between state and non-state actors’ behaviors, and is

easily considered as an aberration both in ethical and in statistical terms, makes on the contrary a lot of sense if the fetishism of the national security community is considered not as a routine in terms of practice, but as a constant necessity to remind the agents that they have to be “patriotic” and serve as an indigenous category of theoretical practice (Bonditti & Olsson, 2016).

Some authors of intelligence studies have already used the term “transgovernmental networks analysis” to discuss the practices of cooperation between different services (Aldrich, 2009), but they have not dared to analyze the intelligence services of the global North as a specific field of power challenging their own professionals of politics. They have preferred to continue to consider that, in normal times, intelligence services have no initiative and obey the orders of the politicians. It is only when such politicians become “rogue”, like Bolsonaro, that the services that have formed an alliance try to “rationalise” them, to act along their own appreciation of the situation as a guild of professionals.

In fact, to clarify who has the most chance of opposing politicians with a certain level of success, it seems from my analysis of the types of capitals of each intelligence service, which are important in the field of management of sensitive information, that the first criterion is the modification in time of allocation of resources between the different services to the advantage of those using technological tools, and especially those in charge of internet surveillance, and the detriment of those continuing the policing practices of human infiltration. It has reinforced the move against criminal justice and anti-terrorist logics related with the traditional military and police services, and it has been rearticulated in favor of the previous service providers, the SIGINT-internet intelligence services, which have imposed their vision in terms of preventative-predictive-algorithmic suspicion and counterterrorist logics of operating preventatively and at a distance. They have used this not only against the other services, but also against some of their own national politicians.

The second element to have in mind is the necessity of seriously reassessing the story of the Five Eyes as a “community” sharing common values between intelligence agencies among Anglo-Saxon countries, and that these “bonds” have created the necessary conditions for a form of mutual trust to develop between political leaders and agency actors. Instead of this cultural analysis, with Laurent Bonelli, we have collected interviews from intelligence professionals and later employed a structural analysis of the space in which the selected intelligence agencies are situated. We have related their exchange of information to a series of defining characteristics of the agencies (type of missions conducted, supervisory authority, territory of action, staff numbers, technological capital, etc.).

Constructing a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) has allowed us to rigorously visualize the space of institutional positions. In making connections between these objective positions and the discourses of actors regarding their practices and the meaning of intelligence, we were able to identify homologies as well as divergences that structure cooperation and data exchanges between agencies. The positions have generated a transnational space where the logic of

transversal practices was organized along three universes of competition and solidarity depending not only on their number of personnel, their capacity to have private contractors and links with the major internet companies and data brokers, and their capacity to have innovative software or specific positioning regarding the internet cables, but also on their ability to be a credible voice in the competition over the symbolic power related to the modes of reasoning (indicial-algorithmic) which are involved in their tools and resources, and to have the support and belief of other fields like artificial intelligence specialists in their efficiency in terms of the prediction of human behaviors (Bigo & Bonelli, 2019).

From this research, it became clear that the “national” factors of identity and “community” do not create a common position or solidarity; on the contrary, the national is not the logic of the field, and nationalism seems outdated. This has obliged all the services to put an emphasis not on national interest (espionage, self-interest), but on shared interest in global risk and threats (dangers): terrorism or trafficking where a majority of citizens are at risk and a very small minority of criminals is acting. This change in the regimes of justification is the most obvious and palatable sign of the modification of patterns affecting all secret services, and simultaneously the sign that the development of practices of exchange is displacing loyalties and of the limits of what democracies can do.

All these transversal practices are therefore modifying the composition of what was called the “deep state” itself: that is, its very core with its secret intelligence services running for the state and their missions to protect national security. Certainly some services continue to subsist only as national actors both in terms of position and narratives, but if they are more implicated in active foreign policy and advocate a global struggle against terrorism, their connections through a centripetal dynamic are contradicted by the opposite direction, which creates allegiance at a distance with foreign services and introduces also private actors, internet companies, and data brokers as mediators into the field of stateness. This is especially the case for the collaboration between SIGINT-internet intelligence services, which are nowadays more powerful than ever in the competition for funds with the other services, and which play a key role by reorganizing the full equilibrium between the different secret services and the politicians of each national state. Their centrifugal dynamics have given to the SIGINT internet collaboration of the Five Eyes plus a dispersed but very effective field of power, which reinterprets state missions along the idea of a global protection against vulnerability and a focus on the suspicion of travelers, minorities, and especially those who are also poor and fragmented, i.e., easy to target.

Transversal lines: how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? how many fields traverse a single agent?

Despite all the demonstrations given by researchers who have observed transversal practices and refused to present them in an inside-outside binary model,

complemented by a vertical scale going from man to state (and the global), this form of blindness about the transformations of stateness is still strongly present in academia. This explains why the myth of national security is still performative in certain areas of politics and geopolitics and continues to be the doxa of some sociologists. We therefore have to come back to this question of stateness through time. How do we avoid essentialism and nominalism? How can we analyze in a sociogenetic way the *longue durée* of the state as a field of actors, and simultaneously as a certain frame of the world which has imposed itself as evidence for quite a long time? Have we ever been “modern”, asked Bruno Latour (2012)? Have we ever had the capacity to escape the sacrality of the state and its rituals, without creating an international separating states into territories and recognizing their claims of sovereignty? The theological empire and global neoliberalism surround by their verticality the world of sovereign states, theoretically equal. It is not sure we can jump from the transversal relations of our deep state agents to the reformulation of contemporary practices of the actors who claim to be part of the field of the state and international, but it is nevertheless necessary to be reflexive on the legitimacy of the practices of the intelligence services that we analyze. Are they the future actors organizing our life in the fields of states we still recognize as such, as long as they claim to be ruled by democratic imperatives?

Rob Walker has insisted that believing that we can resolve the international of the states by arguing about the global as a new totality encompassing homogeneity and equality, is *de facto* a reconstruction of the imperial logic of verticality ending up with a god position, and the end of a sublunar world of humanity. Erasing this verticality is not easy, and the visions of multiple levels of governance are so seductive for the experts that they reappear in many different forms. But if we are serious enough with the notion of transversality, this approach supposes thinking reflexively about a world of equality that no natural hierarchy has already constructed (Walker, 2017).³ Transforming the actors into their data doubles, in depriving them of actions, and treating them as “angels” and/or as “data subjects”, is a temptation of current bureaucracies. But this transformation of actors into non-actors, into subjects which are only the support of their data, is always a way to try to fragment the individuals, to dissociate them into small parcels that can be piled up vertically and organized into the categories of danger and suspicion. The philosophical question of the number of angels on the head of a pin can obsess us, and can certainly resonate with the surveillance by big data, but, as Bourdieu and Yves Dezalay explained many times, in this flat world, an analysis of practices begins by dispelling the ghost of institutional autonomy and the imaginary of the spokespersons who construct them by concentrating the analysis on the struggles in which the agents are engaged because they live at the very same scale (Dezalay, 2004).

A certain kind of critique developing the fears of a dystopic future is therefore sometimes complicit with this vision of a new sense of history leading towards a global empire to come, by evoking the resistance of the multitude against a global unifier instead of analyzing the transversal lines at work (Negri & Hardt,

2001). The authors following this kind of critique dismiss the international of the states to pray for a machinic global, and their research of levels depending still on geographical-territorial scale is a non-sense: the bigger size is not the best fitted form of power.

To say it differently, transversal practices are not hierarchized in vertical levels and becoming bigger and bigger. They are not a pathway to the global. They are fragmented, and may be transversal but minuscule. A unique global field cannot exist and subsume the other ones. Fields exist when they are populated by certain specific groups which have specific interests at stake. For example, the European field of bureaucracy described by Didier Georgakakis is certainly a field of transversal practices, but it is not a “larger” or “superior” field than the different national bureaucratic fields, as some have (wrongly) interpreted (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013). Fields exist through the trajectories of the actions of the persons interested in the games they play, and they always play many games simultaneously, because of multiple dispositions which are activated or not by the constraints of each game.

Bernard Lahire has deconstructed the simplified view of one habitus per person or their interlocking like a Russian doll that some followers of Bourdieu, in search of scientific prediction, wanted to maintain (Lahire, 2001, 2012). He has shown that split habitus(es) are not an exception but the rule. Unfortunately, he has sometimes introduced a psychological language which is not necessary to express his view. In my understanding, this is certainly not a reduction toward an individualization of the collective relations and an IR approach reduced to the everyday and its banality, which will help us to understand the diversity of habitus(es). On the contrary, a strong understanding that all actors play in a series of multiple games by doing one act only is necessary. They are structurally “double agents” and cannot strategize all the effects of their actions and the chains of interdependence in which these actions are inserted (Dezalay & Garth, 2002). Some of these multiple agents hit their targets, but most do not. Most actions in a chain of interdependences with multiple paths and bifurcations are so dispersed that they reach unwanted territories and cross boundaries.

The transversal practices are therefore not all driven by “vector-forces” that polarize the actions towards a center. They cannot be strategic all along their effects. On the contrary, what is central is understanding that the struggles inside and between fields of power and politics do not always polarize; they escape, stretch, disjunct, diffract, or intermingle on overlapping subjects. This is a vision that we share with sociolinguists when they analyze everyday interactions (C. Charalambous, P. Charalambous, Khan, & Rampton, 2016; Rampton, 2016). The way forms of securitization travel from fields to fields and look “unbound” is also an example of this diffraction, or translation, which does not end up as a binary fight with identified actors.

Their local proximities of positions, determined often by the types of resources they can mobilize, exist at the same moment and space that their transversal solidarities and struggles at a distance (be they geographical and/or digital) act. If the

first ones are easily captured by the centripetal dynamics of state making and even market making which concentrate power in specific centralized loci, it is more difficult for traditional apparatuses or *dispositifs* of states and markets, even jointly, to control the centrifugal dynamics of transversal-transnational practices at a distance, which plays with more indeterminacy and freedom, hazard of encounters, reduction of space boundaries, and acceleration of time units (Bigo, 2016b, 2018).

Centripetal and centrifugal dynamics of power: the trajectories of transversal practices

Reading the Five Eyes intelligence collaboration differently is certainly important for analyzing the fragile boundaries of the democratic oversights of intelligence services, but it is also through this analysis of the “deep state” that we can reflect better on a reframing of the theory of state formation and transformation by beginning with the transversal practices of the various actors. Understanding the dynamics, the trajectories, and their diffractions is central to avoiding reducing the fields to spaces looking like miniature territories with strong borders. Fields are always open to many circulations, and their policing is very complex. The spaces of these more or less invisible relations which constitute transversal practices are crossing or avoiding territorial boundaries, but they are also constitutive of the boundaries of the national state today; and these two elements are certainly not to be opposed or to be seen as complementary, but are strongly embedded into the very same logic. State formation and transformation is in itself a transversal-transnational practice.

However, the trajectory may differ depending on the dynamics of these practices (Bigo, 2016c).⁴ Therefore, do they converge and create centripetal dynamics concentrating in proximity the most powerful actors, or do they diverge and create centrifugal dynamics dispersing the most powerful actors who continue to play together but at a distance? The model of a national state whose actors capture transversal forces to help them to control the value of the different forms of capital inside a territory, and differentiating strongly an inside from an outside, is not always successful. The building of fences delimiting an enclosed territory is rare in practice, even if it has colonized the Western political imagination with the reinvention of the myth of an effective Chinese “great wall” and the idea of transposing it to the southern border of the United States. Contrary to a clear enclosure in the form of a circle, it is better to think about boundaries as the apparent two faces of a Möbius strip, which may look different at first sight but which are in fact one single line producing intersubjectively for the observers the idea of borders objectively separating two things, but where the inside and the outside vary in function of the position of the observer (Bigo, 2000). People who have been in waiting zones of airports, detained inside while being considered outside the territory by the border guards, understand this specific geometry.

This is also the form of a Möbius strip that digital documents more and more often have. They are constructed by private companies with our personal data and

delivered to bureaucracies in a time–space zone which is no longer the physical space of the territorial border. Public and private have mixed, while still looking different. State agents work at a distance, via the exchange of information through the interoperability of databases managed by public and private actors, far from the “gates” of their border guards’ territory, and these “new” agents are more informed by intelligence data suspicions than by criminal evidence at the territorial border. Stateness is therefore more complex and fragile than supposed and more subject to fluctuation, and it is not immune from transversal practices because they are part of what constitutes it.

Conclusion: transversal practices and regimes of justification

These processes of transversal practices have constituted state making itself, as Tilly explains in detail, and they are at work if one wants to analyze the transformations of stateness today. But these practices are also, intimately, theoretical practices, folk theories coming from the most authoritative agents of the moment, and processes of justifications which refer to the mythical origins and the current strategies of legitimization of actors who claim to speak in the name of the national state, even if they are neither public nor territorial (Tilly, 1990).

For example, the field of power is now frequently constituted by relations where the capacities (capital) of certain private companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon to voice that they represent the state and protect national security better than the “old public bureaucracies” allow them to play against the political class of their country of origin, which is accused of being incompetent. This is also what regional and international organizations do by claiming that they have access to a universal point of view more reasonable than nationalist sovereign claims enacted by the politicians of a specific territorial state, as informed by the rhetoric between the European Union Commission or the United Nations General Secretariat and US President Donald Trump.

To show this importance of the symbolic power in the construction of the boundaries of state actorness, and the rules of who is forbidden to enter into this transversal field, is crucial and changes the perspectives we have on the world (political order). It allows us to look at the most traditional institutions of the state – ministries of the interior, welfare organizations, armies, secret services – as forms of transnational guilds, as transversal actors who act across boundaries and territories (Bigo, 2016c). The metaphor of the two arms of the state and of this Janus-like form has to be abandoned. The field of the state is always a polymorph, a pulp more than a man.

In this vision of the transnational, the field of the state is therefore not “internalized” into a territory; the state exists beyond its own borders and its own public agents. We certainly have difficulty believing and understanding concretely what this means as it works against our doxa, but this difficulty to reflect may also be productive if, thanks to a reflexive move, it allows us to propose an alternative narrative or a different script in which the national state is not one nation, one

homogeneous entity. The different public and private bureaucracies always act transversally, and they are not obedient or constrained by ministries of foreign affairs deciding on the practices abroad of state agents. Assemblages of actors in networks both public and private claim that they are the “real” state, that they follow the national interest of a population badly represented by the national politicians. They may call themselves a coalition for ecological survival or a collaboration of the silent “deep state” agents when reason escapes the professionals of politics. Anchored in a long tradition of a territorial logic of representative democracies, the boundaries of what is a state are de-essentialized by the formulations of these claims. They are desacralized from the territory as the ultimate distinction between illegitimate violence and the use of force to reestablish order, and they refer also and sometimes mainly to the practices of actors in networks, who may live outside the territory, as for example diasporas, or across different polities and languages, as “frontaliers”, or members of international organizations considering they have to be distant from an egoist national interest but always loyal to the “values” of the state in which they were born and of which they are citizens.

In conclusion, the terminology of “transnational” is therefore used by the authors developing an IPS with a precise meaning of “transversal lines” crossing, traversing national-societal fields (Basaran et al., 2016). Transnational refers neither to a transition towards the global, an in-between place between the national state belonging to the past and the global not yet achieved, nor to a specific “level” gathering exclusively specific actors which would be called “regional” actors, as particular members of non-governmental and/or bureaucratic organizations beyond (above) the national level.

Transnational is therefore neither an intermediary “level”, a path towards homogenization and the global, nor a specific set of actors playing a specific game in a particular arena. It is on the contrary a set of “transversal lines”, of relational practices of power structuring the ways by which actors struggle to impose their own views of what is claimed to be the “common principles of vision and division of a specific set of practices in the social world” (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 8). But the specificity of the stakes gives to each field its “autonomy”, its “originality”. Fields are sets of relations and processes; they do not belong to a group or an institution. They cross, enmesh, entangled. These practices and their regimes of justification cut through and coexist on the same (horizontal) plane as the local, the national, and the international.

Far from opposing transnational actors to state actors, a transversal approach insists on the central element of transgovernmentalism and the fact that the different components of the “state” have never been one actor, but a set of actors fighting for a specific capital allowing the imposition of a final word on the quarrels over hierarchizing the allocation of values. Beyond the differentiation of the left and the right hands of the state opposing welfare and warfare, a transnational approach will show that in all “sectors”, the practices of some groups inside bureaucracies are structurally opposed to other groups in the national game in which they have to participate, but often strongly attached to foreign bureaucracies doing the same kind of tasks as them and generating solidarities at a distance,

and an even stronger loyalty to their “foreign natural correspondents” than to their “national governments which include their opponents” (Bigo, 2016b).

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Thinking transnational practices therefore dismantles the implicit verticality of ordered levels and the correlative creation of prosopopea, of the “artificial conscience” of the state or the community of states acting as “persons” with a specific will and strategy. This horizontalization is necessary to escape from the verticality of traditional IR and their “actors” who play in a shadow theatre (of puppets whose agencies are given only by their creator-writer). Analyzing transversally is the way to rediscover the dynamics of power between groups of individuals playing multiple games simultaneously. This approach (or script) for a different narrative of the transnational desacralizes the superiority of international or state levels over local and “individual in relation” practices. All practices are collective and in the very same sublunar world. The false transcendence of a certain type of US political science of IR reproducing the verticality of different levels to organize thoughts justifying order and obedience to the state (and God) cannot continue to be the guide of the research and to have the canonical definition of terminologies. Our fragmented world is a pluriverse deployed in many different dimensions, but its understanding comes from us only.

Notes

- 1 Transversal and transnational: In the most general terms, the terminology of transversal lines seeks to present a problematization that cuts across conventional planes of scholarship, both theoretically and empirically. Empirically transnational is often the terminology used to describe these crossings and multidimensional scapes (see the following, and for more details see Basaran et al., 2016).
- 2 The ANR research UTIC on the uses of technologies for communication surveillance that Laurent Bonelli, Sébastien Laurent, and myself have conducted from 2015 to 2019 is available at www.sciencespo.fr/ceci/en/content/uses-technologies-communications-surveillance-utic. The main results can be found in Bigo, 2019a, 2019b; Bigo & Bonelli, 2019.
- 3 As Rob Walker explains in his book in the first chapter, “One great difficulty posed by the modern international in this context is that it (modern international) arguably emerged historically precisely as an alternative to imperial forms of hierarchical authority, sometimes theologically ordained, and as an affirmation of principles of pluralism, autonomy and even self-determination; or at least this is has become our standard retrospective understanding of what must have happened at some rather elusive point. Like the modern state and modern nation, the modern international expresses ambitions for secular principles of liberty and equality rather than hierarchy and subordination. Whatever we might suppose we refer to when using the concept of an international, it is not a universal empire, though it has certainly provided opportunities for many universalizing empires” (2017: 19).
- 4 For a discussion of centripetal and centrifugal dynamics, see Bigo, 2016c.

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