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### SEVEN

# Funding community organising: diversifying sources, democratising civil society

Robert Fisher and Hélène Balazard

#### Introduction

Throughout the history of community organising in the United 16 States, funding has been a serious and, until recently, neglected issue 17 (Fisher, 1994). This chapter recognises the variety, complexity and 18 contested politics of community organising, a practice that ranges 19 from consensus-based community building to more conflict-oriented 20 grassroots organising confronting oppression. Our main interest is the 21 need for movement-like organising for economic and social justice 22 at the local level and beyond. Since 2008, funding for organising in 23 the US has declined. A 2009 National Organizers Alliance survey 24 of 203 community organisations reported that 65% of respondents 25 had undergone dramatic funding cuts since the recession, 40% had 26 depleted their financial reserves, and 33% survived on a month-to-27 month basis (Waheed et al, 2010). According to an Urban Institute 28 study, community organising organisations were hit the hardest (Boris 29 et al, 2010). While there has been increasing interest in community 30 organising since the election of Obama in 2008, 'one of the most 31 important questions facing organisers [remains] can we translate this 32 growing public awareness into serious funding that will propel growth 33 and strengthen the field?' (Dorfman and Fine, 2009: 2). 34

This chapter will make the case that an over-reliance on progressive 35 philanthropic sources has resulted in the underfunding of community 36 organising. It has also contributed to the depoliticisation of 'civil 37 society' (we will scrutinise the use of this term more closely later) 38 and has obscured the potential role the state can play in achieving 39 egalitarian social change. We argue that it is time to diversify funding 40 sources for community organising and to re-evaluate debates in the 41 field about the limits and difficulties associated with state funding. 42

We foreground a case study from outside the US – the Community 1 Organising Programme (COP) (2011–2015) in England – to illustrate 2 how state funding for community organising can lead to progressive 3 outcomes, even when initiated by a Conservative government that is 4 firmly committed to neoliberal policies. Community organisers in the 5 US have, we believe, much to learn from this programme. We argue 6 that a failure to advocate for greater state support for US community 7 organising unintentionally reinforces the delegitimisation of the state 8 which has occurred under neoliberalism and limits the scope and 9 power of grassroots organising. 10

The chapter begins by outlining the value of community organising 11 and the variety of funding models currently in operation in the 12 US before turning to a review of critical debates on funding for 13 community organising in which we think the importance of public 14 sector funding is generally underplayed. It then makes the case that 15 highlighting the importance of public sector funding for community 16 organising highlights the existing interconnections between civil 17 society, state and market. This offers a way of challenging depoliticised 18 interpretations of civil society and, ultimately, we argue could serve 19 counterhegemonic purposes. Finally, the COP case is presented 20 in support of these claims. The aim is to contribute to debates on 21 resourcing community organising and democratising state and civil 22 society under neoliberalism (Edwards, 2010; Trudeau, 2012; Fisher 23 and Shragge, 2017). 24

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# The importance of community organising

The value of community organising has been widely recognised (Boyte, 28 1980; Warren, 2001; Staples, 2004). Walker and McCarthy (2012) [[see 29 query in References]] suggest that grassroots organising contributes 30 to substantial changes in communities, improving employment 31 opportunities, workplace conditions, neighbourhood safety and the 32 quality of public services. These initiatives also empower people and 33 amplify the voices of poor and moderate-income citizens in the public 34 sphere. To pick just one example, Delgado (2009: 268) highlights 35 the success of ACORN, once the largest community organising 36 organisation in the United States, in 'successfully accruing power and 37 benefits for its low-income base.' ACORN blended a conflict-oriented 38 labour union strategies and tactics with a social movement culture and 39 sought to organise at the local as well as national and even international 40 level. ACORN's contributions included getting its members, primarily 41 people of colour, to act in their own interest, on issues such as a living 42

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wage, better housing and services and predatory financial lending practices. It achieved this by creating strong community organisations, building a multiracial constituency, developing both local and national capacity, experimenting with alternative institutions, engaging in electoral politics, internationalising membership beyond US borders, and using conflictual tactics such as direct action protests.

Clearly community organising is not without its limits or critics. 7 Romanticisation of community and community initiatives is 8 widespread (Joseph, 2002). Major contemporary challenges include 9 sustaining organisations over time, developing and advancing 10 progressive goals in hostile conditions, building beyond local contexts 11 in order to increase power and impact, fending off attacks from the 12 Right if an organisation successfully accrues scale and power and 13 having enough capacity to hire community organisers to provide 14 leadership, training and continuity. As Dodge et al (2013: 2) puts 15 it, 'We are in a moment when it is critical to make investments in 16 learning and experimentation to better understand what support can 17 increase long-term sustainability for social justice organizations.' Before 18 exploring critical issues of resourcing and sustainability, an overview of 19 the predominant forms of funding used in contemporary community 20 organising in the US is in order. 21

## Models of funding for community organising in the US

There are at least nine major funding sources within community 25 development and 'third sector' organisations in the US: campaign 26 victories, which can win funds from corporate or public sources;<sup>1</sup> 27 canvassing, which solicits funds through personal or electronic 28 requests; congregation tithing; institutional support from unions 29 and churches; membership dues; philanthropic foundations; political 30 parties; government contracting for community service delivery, and 31 social entrepreneurialism. Different segments of the not-for-profit 32 sector rely on different sources of funding. For example, arts and 33 culture and environmental organisations get most of their funding 34 from individual, foundation and corporate donations. The human 35 and social service delivery sector overall, including social justice 36 organisations, has a more diverse funding base: 41% from private 37 payments by clients, 36% from government contracts and 16% from 38 other contributions (Boris et al, 2010). Despite the existence of a 39 multiplicity of funding models, social justice community organising 40 is dominated by philanthropic foundation funding sources. A study of 41 213 grassroots organisations by the Center for Community Change 42

in 2006 concludes that the social change sector received 62% of its 1 funding from foundation grants. Government sources represented only 2 5% of total funding for these organisations. Current funding is driven 3 by institutionalised practices, network connections and accepted norms 4 and what is viewed as convenient sources (Beckett et al. 2006: 5). Of 5 course this over-reliance on the philanthropic sector has spawned a 6 literature highly critical of philanthropic funding (INCITE! Women 7 of Color Against Violence, 2007; Ashton and DeFilippis, 2014) and 8 has helped to ignite a debate regarding alternative funding sources for 9 progressive social change. 10

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### A review of the debates on funding community organising

Despite the funding crisis within community organising and the 14 corresponding need for diversifying funding sources, the debate 15 over funding remains curiously 'stuck' and public sector funding of 16 community organising is rarely mentioned within the US literature on 17 this topic. For example, Beyond foundation funding: Revenue-generating 18 strategies for sustainable social change (Dodge et al, 2013), a study which 19 is wary of the anti-democratic dimensions of 'philanthrocapitalist' 20 foundation funding, concludes by encouraging more dialogue between 21 foundations, social change organisations and technical assistance 22 providers.<sup>2</sup> This conclusion is especially intriguing given their critique 23 of foundations as beneficiaries of the state as well as their understanding 24 of the prominent role the public sector plays in funding human service 25 organisations. Similarly, a report of the National Committee for 26 Responsive Philanthropy and the Center for Community Change 27 proposes that this is a good time to fund community organising. They 28 advise developing 'good relations and expanding networks with a 29 wide variety of donors and funders,' but focus almost exclusively on 30 philanthropic sources (Dorfman and Fine, 2009: 2). 31

INCITE!'s The revolution will not be funded (2007) sharply criticises 32 social change organisations' reliance on philanthropic foundations. 33 For the Women of Color Against Violence collective, foundations 34 are part of the problem, supporters of the status quo. But INCITE!'s 35 suggestions regarding alternative models - membership dues and 36 partnerships with other community organisations - also focus heavily 37 on sources within the civil society sector. Most recently, a Center for 38 Popular Democracy report, Seeding justice (2015), identifies lessons of 39 revenue generation from the field of mass base-building organisations. 40 While the study recognises the need to diversify funding streams and 41 become less dependent on grants from foundations for their financial 42

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health, it excludes public funding as a possible source. This relates in part from an analysis, questioned by others, that an overdependence on federal funding caused ACORN's downfall in 2009 (personal communications, former ACORN employee, 2016).

Another stream in the literature explicitly warns against public 5 sector funding for social change. For example, Piven and Cloward 6 (1978) illustrate how state funding and government involvement 7 lead to the control of labour and movement incorporation, blunting 8 militancy, inhibiting membership growth and weakening membership 9 ties. They contend it shifts the focus from grassroots organising and 10 brings movements into the maze of legislative and bureaucratic politics. 11 More recently, problems of government contracting are examined 12 in Fabricant and Fisher's (2002) study of contemporary settlement 13 houses in New York City where organisations were trying to survive 14 draconian budget cuts, excessive project goals and bureaucratic burdens. 15 These grassroots organisations were under siege due to the highly 16 partisan, unstable and demanding system of government contracting 17 and cutbacks brought about by the right-wing 1994 'Contract with 18 America'. 19

While critics underscore the problems associated with both current 20 government programming and dominant forms of charitable giving, 21 including movement philanthropy, some do acknowledge the potential 22 of public funding of democratic initiatives. For example, Wolch (1990: 23 224) argues that the involvement of the state 'could lead to greater 24 state control over everyday life and/or to an extension of participation 25 and democracy.' Fabricant and Fisher (2002: 290) concur and conclude 26 their study with a call to challenge the privatisation of contemporary 27 government contracting, rather than the public sector per se. 28 Organisations must struggle to balance the dynamic of maintaining 29 their core mission and avoiding incorporation and manipulation. 30 Michael Edwards captures these complexities well. He argues that 31 money is both the 'beauty' and 'beast' in community organising, no 32 matter the funding source. 'In market-based societies "money talks", 33 but it rarely speaks the language of democracy and social justice. 34 Recognizing and acting on this fact is vital rather than pretending that 35 money is somehow neutral or separated from the broader processes in 36 which it is accumulated, expended, and exchanged' (2013: 5). 37

Clearly neoliberal hegemony makes achieving public sector funding more difficult than before. For some, a key task is to render the system of outsourced public governance more effective (Salamon, 2002). In our view, what matters most in the struggle against neoliberal hegemony is the democratisation of the public sector and civil society. 42

For example, the welfare state, a primary target of neoliberalism, is 1 not simply a tool of capitalist hegemony; it reflects concessions won 2 by popular struggles. Publicly funded community organising can itself 3 be a challenge to the shrinking state under neoliberalism. It has the 4 potential to contribute to counterhegemonic movements with the 5 potential capacity to win crucial concessions. Even in the historically 6 weak and decentralised state form that has predominated in the US, 7 gains secured by publicly funded organising during the 1930s and 8 1960s are clear examples of this sort of 'democratic realignment', a 9 point which we will return to below. 10

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## Relations between state, civil society and market

The argument for diversifying funding for community organising and to seek public sector support for such activity rests on two key claims: we must challenge the idea that civil society can be regarded as independent of either state or market; and we must recognise the role that public funding has historically played in funding social change in the US.

First, it is worth recalling that there are long-standing 20 interconnections between civil society, state and market through the 21 existence of funding partnerships, tax breaks for philanthropy, policy 22 networks and other such phenomena. The erroneous idea that civil 23 society constitutes a sphere separate from the state and the market has 24 been reinforced by developments over the last 40 years. Ehrenberg 25 (2011: 23) argues that the revival of the notion of civil society over 26 the past generation has its origins in the antagonism towards the state 27 of Eastern European dissidents who called for 'a revolt of civil society 28 against the state'. Thus, civil society has become associated with a 29 celebration of the local as the source of democracy (Bellah et al, 1985) 30 while the state became associated with top-down control. But this 31 coincided with the emergence of a neoliberalism in the mid-1970s that 32 also distrusted the 'big state' and has led to the hollowing out of social 33 welfare and the outsourcing of public services to business (DeFilippis 34 et al, 2010; Smith, 2011). 35

The reality is far more complex than this notion of civil society allows for – the state, market and civil society are highly interrelated and the 'public' and 'private' are not easily disentangled. We believe it is useful to begin with this premise in analysing possible sources of funding for organising. For example, the philanthropic sector uses public sector subsidies in the form of tax breaks and exemptions. While private foundations are said to control their funds for private

ends, in reality they 'intervene in public life with no accountability 1 to the public required' (Barkan, 2013). The Gates Foundation's work 2 around charter schools and public school reform is highly political 3 and controversial, as is the conservative lobby group ALEC (American 4 Legislative Exchange Council). Such 'civil society' organisations use 5 'wealth derived power in the public sphere with minimal democratic 6 controls and civic obligations' (Barkan, 2013). Greater public funding 7 for community organising could arguably serve as something of a 8 counterbalance to the unaccountable political influence of policy-9 active philanthropies. 10

Second, despite contemporary historical amnesia about the role of 11 public funding, as we noted briefly before, the US government has a 12 long history of funding social change. There is an authentic and deep, 13 if intermittent, tradition of state action to address inequalities on a 14 significant scale (DeFilippis et al, 2010). Although since 1980 there 15 has been a major thrust, largely successful at the national level, to 16 undermine the federal government, there is a well-established practice 17 of state funding for social change in the US. There are historical 18 examples that should remind both practitioners and academics not 19 to exclude the state as a potential partner in supporting community 20 organising and grassroots social change. In the 1960s, for example, 21 President Johnson's 'Great Society' and, more specifically, the 22 Community Action Program offered a model of federally funded 23 community action as an instrument of social reform grounded in 24 an anti-racist, anti-poverty, participatory view of democratic politics 25 (Korstad and Leloudis, 2010). Since then there have been a series of 26 government programmes that funded organising, including VISTA 27 (Volunteers in Service to America), which trained volunteers as 28 organisers in the late 1970s, and support for organisations challenging 29 bank redlining and predatory lending during the Clinton era (Dreier, 30 1996). 31

The interrelationships between state, market and civil society in 32 the here and now and the longer historical record of state initiatives 33 are especially important to bear in mind in a neoliberal era. While 34 acceptance of state funding can, as critics have highlighted, lead to the 35 spread and 'normalisation' of neoliberal values and practices (Larner 36 and Craig, 2005), the narrow focus on civil society as a 'pure' and 37 separate sphere, and the belief that it is more legitimate to secure 38 funding from within civil society rather than from outside it, arguably 39 reinforces the neoliberal 'turn to community'. Reclaiming the historical 40 memory of successful state initiatives and using them as a basis for 41 advocating for greater public funding for community organising could 42 1 help challenge the delegitimisation of the state that has occurred under

- 2 neoliberalism.
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#### The Community Organisers Programme

In 2011, the British Conservative government under David Cameron 6 initiated the COP in England to hire and train 500 'senior organisers' 7 and educate 4,500 volunteers in the basics of community organising. 8 With government funding of approximately  $\neq 20$  million (Fisher 9 and Dimberg, 2015), its explicit focus on the hiring and training of 10 community organisers on such a grand scale is extraordinary. What 11 is also singular about COP is that it emerged from Cameron's so-12 called 'Big Society' initiative that fused neoliberal and communitarian 13 goals by arguing for a strong role for the state in strengthening 14 communities and expanding grassroots participation (Balazard and 15 Fisher, 2016). Big Society organisers would, it was argued, 'facilitate 16 local action and give support to groups looking to come together to 17 tackle identified problems' (Cabinet Office, 2013: 1). It was, however, 18 intended primarily to undercut the British welfare state (Fisher and 19 Shragge, 2017). In fact, at the same time of Cameron's unveiling of 20 'Big Society' policies, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 21 concurrently announced a five-year austerity plan that included the 22 largest budget cuts since the Second World War and the elimination 23 of almost half a million public sector jobs (O'Hara, 2014). In a period 24 of neoliberal policies and austerity the Big Society plan was not fully 25 implemented. But COP remained and continued to move forward 26 through the end of Cameron's first term in 2015, partly because it was 27 already contracted out to two organisations, Locality and RE:generate, 28 and partly because it attracted so much interest, especially among 29 existing community development professionals and among people 30 wanting paid work as community organisers (Fisher and Dimberg, 31 2015). That interest and support continues; in March 2017, the 32 COP legacy organisation, the Company of Community Organisers 33 (COLtd), received a  $\pounds$ .4.2 million contract from the post-Cameron 34 Conservative government's Office of Civil Society for further training 35 of community organisers (Community Organisers Ltd, 2017). 36

While the value and the impact of the COP remain contested it nevertheless provides an illuminating example through which to explore the limits, but also the potential, of state-funded community organising in a neoliberal era. Drawing on secondary research and on interviews undertaken during the summer of 2014 with COP staff, organisers and external organising professionals, we can state

that COP clearly promoted a neoliberal interpretation of community 1 organising that lent support to the retreat from public service delivery. 2 But it also provided, amid draconian budgetary cuts and austerity 3 policies, an alternative opportunity for the development of movement-4 like community organising inspired by the ideas of US community 5 organiser Saul Alinsky (1972). Alinskyite approaches typically involve 6 the recruitment of trained organisers who build power within poor 7 communities by mobilising its members and forging alliances with 8 organisations with common interests. Tactics range from negotiation 9 to more confrontational modes of protest (Taylor, 2011). 10

There was some ambivalence in the government's approach to the 11 programme. On the one hand, a preference for a more consensual 12 community organising model can be discerned from the fact that 13 Locality (2010) won the tender to operationalise COP over Citizens 14 UK, an organisation loosely affiliated with the IAF (Industrial Areas 15 Foundation), the direct heir to Alinsky organising in the US. The 16 Locality tender emphasised personal responsibility, entrepreneurialism 17 and assets-based approaches, which are characteristic of more 18 neoliberalised models of community organising. On the other hand, 19 while most observers think that Citizens UK didn't get the contract 20 because its approach was too confrontational (Third Sector, 2011), 21 other experts suggest the Cameron administration was selectively 22 open to collective action on the part of citizens and, where it suited 23 Cameron's political interests, to protest tactics targeted at public 24 authorities. According to one source, the Cameron administration 25 had no problem with citizens marching on local town halls to reform 26 public services, especially in Labour Party strongholds (M. Taylor, 27 personal communication, 12 October 2014). Indeed, at first Cameron 28 had seemed willing to give the bid to Citizens UK. He was quite 29 taken with an impressive Citizens UK meeting where he told the large 30 audience, 'You are the Big Society.' Cameron advisers were sent to the 31 US to meet with the American equivalent of Citizens UK and with 32 President Obama advisers on how Obama used community organising 33 to get elected in 2008. 34

Evidence of varying discourses, different types of political 35 commitment and diverse modes of engagement are also evident within 36 the programme itself. The capacity for COP to achieve far-reaching 37 social change was stymied by the training model used by the programme 38 which followed traditional forms of government-funded community 39 development in the UK rather than using more radical models (Craig 40 et al, 2011; Scott, 2011). For much of the four years, RE:generate 41 (Action to Regenerate Community Trust), the organisation which 42

provided the training on behalf of Locality, delivered a depoliticised 1 community-building model. Its 'Root Solutions - Listening Matters' 2 (Kearney and Olsen, 2009) educational programme emphasised the 3 basics of listening to local people, letting them decide on key issues 4 and projects. Training sessions held by RE:generate focused more on 5 resolving, rather than creating conflict, and on building relationships 6 with all stakeholders rather than challenging people in positions of 7 power. They were much stronger on process and relationship building 8 than organisation building or social justice outcomes. 9

Besides these training modules, for a year organisers had to 'listen' to 10 500 people, recruit and train nine volunteers and help three projects 11 come about, even if they stayed at the level of an idea. The projects 12 mainly depended on a few training sessions offered to residents that 13 focused on the creation of social network bonds, neglecting the 14 importance of creating organised groups and actions. Despite the 15 progressive inclinations of Locality staff and Board members, the 16 choice of this depoliticised model had a huge impact in determining 17 the types of issues selected and results accomplished. For example, 18 much of the community work was about helping improve service 19 delivery and outreach in 'host' social welfare organisations or activities 20 such as creating community gardens, litter picks, an annual music 21 festival for young people, and neighbourhood watches. 22

However, there were also instances where Alinsky-style community 23 organising did occur. Though a large number of organisers have 24 indeed focused on community-building methods (listening, building 25 relationships, recreating a sense of community and using existing 26 assets), a minority of organisers succeeded in using direct action to 27 help groups to organise and voice demands to improve their living 28 conditions. Among these latter initiatives, one can find the Sheffield 29 group of residents who managed to pressure local authorities to save 30 a bus line and the development of an ACORN branch in Bristol, 31 which took actions for economic and social justice, especially around 32 housing issues (Rathke, 2015). 33

In fact, interviews conducted in 2014 revealed a great deal of 34 autonomy at the grassroots level. The lack of a political vision for 35 this experimental programme and the loose management in each 36 organisation hosting trainees gave the organisers a significant degree 37 of independence. This 'hands-off' policy was a surprise to almost 38 everyone, including Locality staff, but especially those hired as 39 organisers. Young people who had applied for the job because of their 40 commitment to changing society used their relative independence 41 to implement action-oriented community organising: "Some people 42

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got really dispirited by the lack of structure, the lack of training. I just thought great, I can do what I want. This is a great opportunity. Because I come from a politicised background, I do want to change things. This is the first step towards doing that" (organiser A).

Furthermore, as organisers were part of the same cohort, being and reading together enabled them to voice critiques of the programme and to build alternative visions of community organising:

'The people on our team were all pretty bright individuals and so we would have our team meetings every week and there were great moments for us to kind of develop our own ideas around what community organising should be and what we didn't like about the programme, ... eventually that what was led us in to building ACORN now.' (Organiser B)

Another positive impact of the COP was noted by this participant: "The great thing about the programme is the idea that, along with your salary in year 1, you were also given matched funding in year two so that you could go out and set up your own organisation" (organiser B).

A critical lesson of hiring and training people to do this work is 21 that they often come with activist politics and, given the chance, 22 pursued more radical forms of community organising and civic 23 engagement. Such outcomes are not unprecedented. As a result of 24 state incorporation of local community organisations, Trudeau (2012: 25 442) finds that community organisations in the US are increasingly 26 able to 'inflect agendas with other priorities or subtly resist them'. 27

It is easy to dismiss the Big Society and its associated funding 28 initiatives as neoliberal policies disguised as reforms to strengthen civic 29 life and local participation. The COP can, with some justification, 30 be seen 'as a mechanism by which business and state co-opt and 31 compromise integrity and independence of civil society activities 32 previously based around participation, active citizenship and political 33 change' (Nicholls, 2011: 80) [[see comment in References]]. 34 But such analyses miss the particular distinctiveness and potential 35 importance of COP. It was the largest and best-funded social change 36 initiative in more than a generation explicitly focused on hiring and 37 training community organisers. Even with the programme's obvious 38 limits in terms of training and outcomes, it did, in places, help to 39 seed a more transformative model of community organising and, not 40 to be underestimated, it further legitimised community organising 41 as an approach to community development in England. Despite the 42 1 dilemmas and contradictions this form of funding has entailed its effect

2 on community organising cannot be fully predicted.

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#### Conclusion

As Taylor and Wilson (2016) note, all organising, especially among 6 disenfranchised groups, is difficult, complex and challenging work 7 and obviously this valuable activity requires funding. We have argued 8 that there is a strong case that community organising in the US should 9 demand, and seek the legitimation of, more public funding especially 10 from the state. Among community organisers and researchers in 11 community development there is a well-established critique of relying 12 on state funding. However, we think circumstances have changed 13 and we need to reconsider this position. The long-term effects of 14 neoliberal thinking have had an enormous impact and part of the 15 response to this should be, we believe, a struggle to democratise the 16 state and to challenge depoliticised interpretations of civil society. 17

Moreover, as discussed earlier, we need to bear in mind the realities 18 of funding community organising through sources other than the 19 state. Such sources carry risks similar to those associated with state 20 funding, that is to say, funders setting the agenda, insecurity of funding 21 over the medium term and so forth. At least with the state there is 22 a conception, however notional, of the public good and historically 23 we know this can be built on in significant ways. We also know that 24 even in unpropitious circumstances, such as under a strongly neoliberal 25 government of the British Conservative Party, securing funding for 26 community organising can have important and interesting unintended 27 consequences. 28

Our aim here is to provoke debate and to engage in dialogue on 29 how we can best rethink funding community development. There 30 is no simple answer on how to approach this. What we have done 31 is provide arguments and models for considering how to broaden 32 funding efforts. The ultimate aim is to support community organising 33 in the belief that it has a vital role in addressing critical societal needs 34 such as the widespread contemporary challenges to democracy. The 35 public sector - at the local, state and/or national levels - should be 36 reconsidered as a potential ally and target, depending on the context, 37 for the public support of grassroots initiatives in social change and 38 democratic practices. In the US, with the Trump administration 39 (in office as at the time of writing), public funding of progressive 40 community organising is most likely to come from state and city levels, 41 certainly not from the federal government. Nearly all funding comes 42

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with 'conditions' and it requires careful thought and consideration 1 to maintain core organisational practices and values and to avoid 2 manipulation in securing and sustaining funding. But neither the 3 contemporary turn to the Right, nor evidence of incorporation and 4 'domestication' of community organising in the past through public 5 funding, should lead us throw up our hands and cede the vital territory 6 of the state to other forces. Accordingly, we propose that diversifying 7 and expanding resources for community organising, while seeking to 8 democratise the state and civil society, are crucial short- and long-term 9 strategies for transformative change. 10

Notes

1.	One significant example of this was ACORN's campaign against H&R Block, a
	US multinational tax preparation company, which won funds for ACORN and
	reduced predatory rates for neighbourhood people (see Fisher et al, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> Technical assistance providers consult not-for-profit organisations on development and funding matters.

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one supplied conflated two other works by Edwards into a	6
single ref (one of which had a similar title), but this is the	7
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