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# Does catch-and-release increase the recreational value of rivers? The case of salmon fishing 

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## Conflicts of interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest

## Availability of data and materials

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request

## Authors' contribution

The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: CRC and PLG; survey and data collection: CRC and QL; data analysis : CRC and QL; interpretation of results: CRC and PLG; drafting the article: CRC; critical revisions of the paper and final approval of the version to be published : CRC and PLG.

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# Does catch-and-release increase the recreational value of rivers? The case of salmon fishing 


#### Abstract

Catch-and-release (C\&R) could be an interesting management tool in recreational fisheries as long as mortality remains low and the anglers' well-being does not drop. We used a choice experiment to examine the potential of $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ angling as a monitoring tool for the salmon recreational fishery in Brittany (France) in summer 2017. Anglers were asked to choose between hypothetical fishing day trips differing in terms of their combination of relevant attributes and levels and distance to travel. From the analysis of respondents' trade-offs between the fishing trip's attributes, willingness-to-pay were estimated for each level of attribute. Our results show that anglers prefer unrestrictive regulations. On average, we observe that $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ has a depressive effect on the valuation of the fishing day. However, some socioeconomic groups positively value $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$. All in all, the majority of the anglers nonetheless hold a positive valuation of a $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ fishing day, which could therefore be used to generate economic returns for the river once the total admissible capture (TAC) is reached. Lastly, the fishing season, and especially the level of river use, impact more on the value of fishing than C\&R.


Keywords: recreational activity, salmon fishing, catch and release, choice experiment

JEL Classification: C25, C9, Q26, Q22

## La pêche en no-kill augmente-t-elle la valeur récréative des rivières? le cas de la pêche au saumon


#### Abstract

Résumé La remise à l'eau des prises peut être une mesure de gestion intéressante dans le cas de la pêche récréative tant que la mortalité demeure faible et que le bien-être des pêcheurs ne diminue pas. Nous avons utilisé une expérience de choix pour examiner le potentiel de la pêche en no-kill comme mesure de gestion de la pêche récréative du saumon en Bretagne à l'été 2017. Il était demandé aux pêcheurs de choisir entre des destinations de pêche hypothétiques différant par la combinaison des paramètres de gestion et la distance pour s'y rendre. À partir de l'analyse des arbitrages des répondants entre les attributs d'une sortie de pêche, le consentement à payer a été estimée pour chaque niveau d'attribut. Nos résultats montrent que les pêcheurs préfèrent une règlementation peu restrictive. En moyenne, on observe que le no-kill a un effet dépressif sur la valorisation de la journée de pêche. Cependant, certaines CSP valorisent positivement le no-kill. Au total, il faut retenir que la majorité des pêcheurs conservent néanmoins une valorisation positive de la journée de pêche en no-kill, ce qui permettrait donc de valoriser la rivière après la clôture du TAC. Enfin, la saison de pêche et surtout la fréquentation impactent davantage la valeur de la pêche que le no-kill.


Keywords: activité récréative, pêche au saumon, no-kill, expériences de choix

Codes JEL: C25, C9, Q26, Q22

## Does catch-and-release increase the recreational value of rivers? The case of salmon fishing

## 1. Background and purpose

In a century, wild salmon have almost disappeared from all the great French rivers except in Brittany, which is one of the few regions in France with a true network of salmon rivers. The River Léguer, one of the most highly frequented game fishing rivers in Brittany (France), is also one of the rare rivers with a significant population of Atlantic salmon. The fishing management method used for the River Léguer is a total admissible capture (TAC) of spring salmon and one of grilse. ${ }^{1}$ Fishing stops as soon as this TAC is reached. Although the fishing season extends from March to June, this TAC is quickly reached and the salmon fishing area closed early to prevent free access to the resource. Moreover, before the TAC is reached, the fishing effort is not controlled at all, either by a number of fishermen or by a number of individual fishing days, which leads to a race-to-fish and a decrease in the quality of fishing. This in turn reduces the value of the river's use for fishing. Yet although the fish resource is not affected by this drop in value, there is a risk that the recreational and ecological uses of the river will have little weight compared to economic issues that compete with the water resource (e.g. agriculture, livestock, industry, etc.). However, the TAC is a necessary measure. One solution to optimise the river's fishing value could be to introduce a compulsory catch-and-release measure once the TAC is reached. The Côtes d'Armor Fishing Federation ${ }^{2}$ argues that this early closure is a source of frustration for keen salmon anglers. Moreover, compulsory catch declarations show that the majority of the TAC is caught exclusively by local anglers. Closure once the TAC has been reached also limits the development of the area's fishing tourism. However, the Accredited Fishing and Aquatic Environment Protection Associations (AAPPMAs) present on the River Léguer and others decision-making authorities ${ }^{3}$ have a desire to develop fishing tourism in this area. The ambition is to develop the River Léguer's aquatic heritage without impacting on the salmon resource. It has therefore been proposed to introduce

[^0]an extension of the salmon fishing season once the quota (TAC) is reached, with this season extension being in the form of catch-and-release (C\&R). Therefore in 2017, the Côtes d'Armor Fishing Federation conducted a catch-and-release experiment on salmon fishing. Anglers who wanted to limit the catch they kept or go on fishing past the date when the total allowable catch (TAC) was reached, were asked to join a fishing experiment, whereby the salmon caught were released back into the water. The experimental sector concerned the River Léguer. The scheme was available to anglers holding a fishing permit and who had paid the "migratory fish angling" fee. It concerns around 1,000 anglers in Brittany, but even if there are fewer, some anglers from other regions can also come and fish on this river. Enrolment was free of charge and on a voluntary basis for the anglers, who could join the experiment whenever they wanted as of the start of the fishing season (mid-March). Enrolment was compulsory once the TAC was reached if anglers wanted to continue to fish through to the end of the fishing season (mid-June). Anglers who enrolled for the experiment had to sign a commitment to good practices charter. ${ }^{4}$

As angling affects fish stocks as well as commercial fisheries, catch-and-release angling has received increasing attention recently (Arlinghaus et al., 2007). North America or some countries in Europe (U.K., The Netherlands) have introduced catch and release as a resource management measure for recreational fishing. But this measure has gained little, if no, traction in France, where few recreational river fisheries have introduced compulsory catch and release as a resource management measure. In other countries such as Germany, voluntary catch and release may lead to conflict with the Animal Protection Act (Arlinghaus et al., 2007). Before being a full-fledged and specific management measure, compulsory catch-and-release was mainly associated with restrictions on size limits, on capture and on species of fish, with release required of any catch not meeting the restrictions imposed by the regulations. In addition to compulsory or regulatory catch and release, some anglers voluntarily catch and release for various personal reasons (philosophical, ${ }^{5}$ moral, ethical, etc.). Arlinghaus et al. (2007) present the complex and multifaceted nature of catch and release based on historical, physical, sociopsychological, biological and management insights. The practice of catch and release remains controversial, with opinions differing between anglers, biologists and fishing area managers for various reasons. Whereas catch and release is intended as a resource conservation technique,

[^1]some contend that the practice has damaging biological effects, in particular with a low survival rate after release and biological stress that can affect the growth and reproduction of the fish populations. Others put forward issues of animal welfare (Aas et al., 2002).

Although the practice of catch-and-release should be evaluated in biological terms, the economic returns of extending the fishing season with catch-and-release on the River Léguer also call for consideration. In terms of direct returns, this calls for an evaluation of the anglers' satisfaction. Measurement of anglers' satisfaction brings into play the concepts of demand and willingness to pay (WTP) for recreational fishing and non-market assets in general. There are two main types of methods used to reveal anglers' WTP. Revealed preference methods examine individuals' observed behaviour ex-post. This is the case with the travel cost method, which seeks to explain the level of use of a recreational site as a function of unit travel costs. The stated preference methods study hypothetical behaviour ex-ante and analyse the trade-off made by individuals in the choice of hypothetical situations or goods. These methods include contingent valuation, conjoint analysis and choice experiments. Stated preferences methods are commonly used to elicit angler preferences for new regulations or for fishing trip attributes when some kinds of attributes are not available (Lew and Larson, 2014).

Although the collective benefits of recreational fishing have been largely analysed by the Anglo-Saxon literature based on revealed preference or stated preference methods, very few studies valuing recreational fishing have been conducted for the case of France. As there is an interest of fisheries biologists and managers in angling effort in France, fishery management lacks of understanding angler behaviours. But neglecting the satisfaction of anglers may lead to perverse effects of some resources management measures. To our knowledge, only Le Goffe and Salanié (2004) analyse the well-being derived from freshwater game fishing in France, focusing on salmon fishery. Another study conducted in Brittany (France) by Salanié et al. (2004) paints a picture of salmon anglers' characteristics, their fishing effort and its components. This analysis identifies the management measures valued by recreational fishing users. But none of these studies were interested in catch-and-release. In a review of the last three decades of site choice research in recreational fisheries, Hunt et al. (2019) do not mention any published studies on fisheries in France.

Many studies establish the link between recreational anglers' well-being and resource management measures. Anglers consider stock conservation measures such as TAC and fish stocking to be beneficial, while they see fishing effort limitation regulations in a negative light. Many recreational fisheries subject to $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ through regulation or conservation-minded anglers
have been studied. Lew and Larson (2015) show how very strict harvest restrictions, such as a bag limit ${ }^{6}$ with a maximum size limit for the fish, reduce anglers' satisfaction. They suggest some management policy recommendations to curb excessive pressure on the estuary, especially recreational, while maintaining the users' collective level of well-being. Olaussen (2016) considers catch and release to analyse anglers' preferences for this type of measure for Norwegian Atlantic salmon fishery management. The measure is capable of creating a win-win situation as long as mortality remains low when the fish are released and the anglers' well-being does not drop, since this type of measure could affect the very quality ${ }^{7}$ of the fishing experience. Nevertheless, Olaussen (2016) concludes that catch and release reduces anglers' utility. Moving to a strict C\&R regime reduces the WTP with almost $80 \%$ for the Norwegian Atlantic salmon fishery. Although this kind of measure is designed to increase salmon populations and the potential catch rate, it does not offset the loss of well-being due to the regulation's introduction. Olaussen (2016) notes a difference when the measure concerns the release of all fish as opposed to when it concerns the release of fish due to size limits or bag limits. Wilson et al. (2016) applied a novel bivariate model of fishing quality based on fish size and catch rates to evaluate angler preferences for $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ compared to harvest fish. They found low preferences for caught and released which modified anglers' perception of fishing quality. For Askey et al. (2006), $C \& R$ fisheries could exhibit poor angling quality if angler effort is sufficiently high. Their results indicates that catch rates may decline because of high effort even when the number of fish remains constant. This decrease in catch rates could be explained by learned hook avoidance and environmental factors. Johnston et al. (2011) studied the implementation of a mandatory $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ regulation and a bait ban on a lake in Canada. Harvest-oriented anglers moved to others lakes because of these restrictive regulation, even if catch-related fishery quality increased. They found a decline in angler effort by $90 \%$ suggesting that these regulations may have impacted some anglers' perception about the quality of the lake. As mentioned by Johnston et al. (2011), harvest regulations may alter the attractiveness of a fishery if they are perceived to constrain anglers' opportunity to harvest fish. Only anglers interested in catching trophy-size ${ }^{8}$ fish favoured restrictive harvest regulations. Lew and Larson (2015) show that anglers value the possibility of keeping one fish and then releasing subsequent catches. Lew

[^2]and Larson (2014) estimate separate economic values for catch which is kept and which is released using a choice experiment. They exploited the interaction between catch and bag limit attributes in the CE to construct variables for catch and keep fish, catch and release fish and potential catch as a fish released may be caught again and generate additional value. Their estimates indicate that anglers value much more the fish they keep and less those they are required to release and potential catch, but these last values are still positive. Carter and Liese (2012) found also that keeping a fish was worth more than the value of releasing the fish due to a bag limit. For most of the studied species, angler WTP did not differ much between a fish released due to a bag limit and a fish released due to size limit. According to Curtis and Breen (2017), C\&R is one of the most important site attributes to game anglers with lower angler trip duration in C\&R fisheries. However, for fishing tournament, anglers strongly favour tournaments where catch-and-release behaviour is promoted and where there is no bait restrictions (Chi-Ok et al., 2006).

As mentioned by Arlinghaus et al. (2007), much of research on catch and release has focused on North America fisheries but attitudes concerning catch and release may differ in other countries. In France, no studies have been conducted to elicit angler preferences for catch-andrelease. Therefore, parallel to the conducted experience on the River Léguer and not directly related to it, we wanted to understand how anglers respond in France, especially in Brittany, to catch and release angling opportunities, and question about anglers' perceptions of catch and release across angler subpopulation. Then, the purpose of this article is to assess whether the recreational anglers in Brittany valued catch and release. For this, we chose to use the choice experiment (CE) method for our study. We were unable to obtain enough observations of angler behaviour from the catch-and-release experiment in progress on the River Léguer to statistically measure anglers' satisfaction with management measure such as catch and release and, in particular, analyse their preference for catch and release. This method has the advantage to allow for presenting a management measure which is very little used on French rivers. As mentioned before, CE is useful for eliciting preferences in the absence of revealed preference data, and thus for new regulations or attributes not available or not existing (Carlsson, 2011; Lew and Anderson, 2014). Moreover, CE allows to understand how anglers make trade-offs between fishing site attributes. Therefore, we felt this method to be more suitable, and it enabled us to look beyond the experiment on this river and collect more data. The survey has been conducted in the summer 2017 among Breton salmon anglers.

This article presents the choice experiment design in section 2, followed by the survey and sample description in section 3 and the theoretical model to reveal anglers' preferences in section 4 . Section 5 presents the results of the estimates and the interpretation, including the willingness-to-pay estimates. Conclusion and discussion are presented in section 6 .

## 2. The choice experiment design

### 2.1. Choice of attributes

The purpose of the study is to measure the satisfaction of salmon fishing anglers. The choice experiment method was chosen to identify the determinants of respondent anglers' preferences for salmon fishing and their relative weight. To do this, respondent anglers were placed in a situation of choosing between salmon fishing day trips. The experiment's design was therefore vital, since it would steer the development of hypothetical scenarios. These scenarios were built from the different combinations of chosen attributes and attribute levels. The choice of attributes was hence crucial and needed to lead us to propose sufficiently realistic, albeit hypothetical, choice alternatives if respondents were to answer coherently. The number of attributes could not be too high, since that would have prevented respondents from really making a choice. They needed to be sufficiently understandable and relevant to avoid confusing respondents (Sanko, 2001). And they needed to be representative of salmon fishing day trips to be realistic and meaningful to respondents (Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000; Bennett and Adamowicz, 2001).

The attributes we chose needed to reflect the relevant characteristics of a fishing destination while including the possibility of introducing a new regulation such as catch and release. Salmon anglers' satisfaction depends, among others, on the regulations in place to manage fishing (level of access to the public, quota, size limit on fish caught, constraint on fishing methods, etc.), the state of the fished resource, the period of the year, the fishing area and access to that area (level of congestion on the river, quality of the environment and the water, and distance from place of residence). Discussions with the Côtes d'Armor Fishing Federation and salmon anglers in focus groups (two meetings with six persons in March and April 2017) led us to select the attributes associated with salmon fishing regulations or regulation such as authorised fishing method, total allowable catch of salmon for the river and compulsory release of catches back into the water, since this is the area of particular interest to us. The fishing season during which the fishing trip is made and the level of river use were also selected as
attributes that could affect the quality of the fishing experience. Indeed, fisheries that require space, such as salmonids, are particularly sensitive to congestion. In a survey, Breton salmon anglers (Salanié et al., 2005) reported excessive use of some rivers.

We did not introduce a monetary attribute, as is often the case in recreational activity valuation methods (Adamowicz et al., 1997; Boxall and Macnab, 2000; Rulleau et al. 2011), since anglers in France do not usually pay an entrance fee for a day's fishing on a river. Access to the resource is virtually free of charge aside from the payment of an annual fishing permit (between $€ 75$ and $€ 100$ per year) and a supplement "migratory fish" angling fee of $€ 50$ for the year. These prices are modest in the light of the tariffs practised abroad and the data in the literature on the willingness to pay to practice fishing (Le Goffe and Salanié, 2004). If we had introduced a cost attribute, this attribute would not have been realistic and would not have made sense for the anglers surveyed. Yet we did need a monetary attribute to measure the anglers' valuation of the other attributes characteristic of the fishing trip. In keeping with Hanley et al. (2002), Adamowicz et al. (1997), Boxall and Macnab (2000), Rulleau et al. (2011) and Ropars-Collet et al. $(2014,2017)$, the choice was made to use the distance by car to the river for the fishing trip. The distance attribute was then converted into a travel cost to estimate willingness to pay for each of the attributes. This attribute's categories had to be balanced (same deviation between the different categories), and the deviations between categories had to be large enough to be explanatory. Following discussions and consultations, three categories were selected at 30kilometre intervals ( $10 \mathrm{~km}, 40 \mathrm{~km}$ and 70 km ). Table 1 presents the chosen attributes, their description and the levels chosen. All these attributes were selected following discussions (focus group) with the Côtes d'Armor Fishing Federation and recreational anglers.

Table 1: Chosen fishing trip attributes

| Attributes | Description | Levels |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Season | Fishing season during which the fishing trip is made | - Spring (mid-March to mid-June) <br> - Summer (mid-June to July) <br> - Autumn (September-October) |
| TAC | Total allowable catch of spring salmon and grilses for the river | - 80 spring salmon and 640 grilses <br> - 30 spring salmon and 240 grilses |
| Fishing method | Fishing method authorised on the river | - Fly <br> - Fly and spin <br> - Fly, spin and bait |
| Distance | Travel distance to the river | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline & 10 \mathrm{~km} \\ \text { - } & 40 \mathrm{~km} \\ \text { - } & 70 \mathrm{~km} \end{array}$ |
| Compulsory catch and release | Fishing with compulsory release of catches back into the water | - Yes <br> - No |
| Level of river use | Level of river use | - High <br> - Low |

### 2.2.The choice sets

For each proposed set of choices, the respondent angler could choose fishing trip A or fishing trip B, with each of these fictitious fishing trips defined by different attribute levels. A third alternative was also introduced in the form of the possibility of choosing neither of the proposed trips, an opt-out alternative subsequently called statu quo ${ }^{9}$, which means that they would not go fishing. We chose to introduce this opt-out alternative as the non-participation is a relevant alternative. From the value of the opt-out alternative, we can calculate afterwards the value of the option to go on a "fishing trip", of any sort, which we can consider as a basic value.

A factorial design was used to construct the sets of choices proposed to respondents. In the case of three attributes with two categories and three attributes with three categories, $\left(2^{3} \times 3^{3}\right)$ combinations are possible, i.e. 216 choice sets for a full factorial design. However, it is not possible to propose that many choices in turn to an individual. We therefore used an orthogonal fractional factorial design in order to reduce the number of possible choices (using SAS macro \%MktEx). The final design contained 36 choice sets excluding the dominant alternatives and otherwise impossible or unrealistic alternatives (Sanko, 2001). It was split into six blocks

[^3]corresponding to six versions of the questionnaire. Lastly, six sets of salmon fishing trip choices were presented to each respondent angler Table 2 presents a choice set proposed to respondents.

For each choice set, we asked respondent anglers which fishing trip they preferred of the two or whether they preferred none. For all the trips presented, they were told that the proposed TAC for spring salmon and grilses was considered to not yet have been reached on the river. The statu quo alternative avoided the issue of respondents having to choose a scenario they did not actually prefer and/or not finishing the questionnaire (Lee et al., 2014).

Table 2: Example of a choice set proposed to respondent anglers

|  | Trip A | Trip B | None |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fishing season | Spring | Spring |  |
| Salmon TAC | 30 spring salmon <br> 240 grilses | 80 spring salmon <br> 640 grilses |  |
| Authorised fishing method | Fly | Fly and spin |  |
| Distance | 40 km | 10 km |  |
| Compulsory catch and release | No | Yes |  |
| Level of river use | High | Low |  |
| Which trip do you prefer? | $\square$ | $\square$ | $\square$ |

The questionnaire contained other parts than the choice experiment section. Following the presentation of the choice sets, we asked respondents to assess how hard they found it to choose their preferred fishing trip (from 1 for "not at all hard" to 10 for "very hard). Additional questions were asked to gain an idea of the respondent anglers' profiles in terms of salmon fishing and other recreational activities. Lastly, we collected their socioeconomic characteristics. We used this additional information to refine the interpretation of the choices made by respondents and elucidate our results on the anglers' valuation of the attributes.

## 3. Survey administration and sample description

One of the difficulties with the choice experiment method can be found in the administration of the survey questionnaire. In the case of recreational fishing, some surveys may be conducted in the field, at the fishing spot or in angling competitions (Hanley et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2014; Lawrence, 2005), or otherwise by approaching anglers in specialised shops without any
particular sampling. Time and resource constraints prompt some studies to use postal surveys (Carson et al., 2009; Olaussen, 2016; Arlinghaus et al., 2014; Carter and Liese, 2012), telephone surveys (Mkwara et al., 2015), e-mail surveys (Beville and Kerr, 2009) or a combination of these (Adamowicz et al., 1994; Lew and Larson, 2015). For reasons of geographic scale and time and budget constraints, we chose to conduct our survey by e-mail with an online questionnaire and by post when we did not have the anglers' e-mail address. The online questionnaire was put together using the "Lime Survey" software program.. We built six online questionnaires representing the six versions of our choice sets. We sent two reminders to the e-mail survey anglers at two-week intervals. For the postal survey, a stamped addressed envelope was enclosed with the questionnaire to facilitate returns and hence increase the response rate. The online and postal surveys had the advantage of being able to survey a maximum number of salmon anglers in the départements of Côtes d'Armor, Finistère and Morbihan. However, the disadvantage was that there was no possibility of assisting respondents in the event of difficulties answering or understanding the choice experiment method. Some anglers started filling in the questionnaire, but did not finish, possibly for this reason. However, respondents did have the possibility of contacting us, which some did, mainly by e-mail regarding the online survey.

Our sample comprises all angler members of theAAPPMAs affiliated with the Département Fishing Federations of Morbihan, Côtes d'Armor and Finistère who have paid the "highly migratory fish" angling fee to be able to fish salmon Then, a total of 859 anglers were surveyed in summer 2017 ( 351 in Morbihan, 265 in Côtes d'Armor and 343 in Finistère). We contacted 290 anglers by e-mail, the others by mail. The six versions of the questionnaire were distributed randomly to respondents.

Of the 859 anglers contacted by e-mail and post, 220 anglers responded to the questionnaire, for a response rate of $25.61 \%$. The online response rate was higher than the postal response rate ( $41 \%$ versus $15 \%$ ). Beville and Kerr (2009) obtained a much lower online response rate ( $12.7 \%$ ) to their online survey of anglers, whereas Olaussen (2016) achieved a response rate of $62 \%$ to a postal survey, but after sending two reminders. Tables 3 and 4 present our sample's descriptive statistics. Some anglers did not fully complete the questionnaire, especially the question on the household's net monthly income to which we only obtained 188 answers.

The vast majority of the respondent anglers were men with an average age of 53 years. Over $40 \%$ of respondents were over 60 years old and less than $8 \%$ were under 30 years old. Over $60 \%$ of the sample was made up of working individuals, with over one-third retired. One-
quarter were company heads, executives, or in a higher intellectual or self-employed profession. These socioeconomic groups, especially the company heads ( $22.14 \%$ versus $7.32 \%$ in the French working-age population), are overrepresented in our sample compared with the French population. ${ }^{10}$ Conversely, manual and non-manual employees are underrepresented in our sample. Over half of the respondents had a higher education qualification, while nearly onethird had an occupational proficiency certificate or vocational certificate (CAP/BEP). Over half of the respondent anglers had a net monthly household income of over $€ 3,000$ (average monthly income per household in France), while just $10 \%$ had less than $€ 1,500$.

The respondent anglers had an average 20 years of salmon fishing experience. Over $40 \%$ had been fishing salmon for less than ten years, while nearly $40 \%$ had been fishing salmon for over 20 years. Nearly $10 \%$ had only been fishing salmon for one year. Lastly, nearly $8 \%$ started fishing salmon in 2017.

In 2016, nearly $17 \%$ of respondents went on a salmon fishing trip abroad. The length of these trips was just over two weeks on average and over half of the trips were to Ireland.

The respondents were members of 42 AAPPMAs. Seven of these AAPPMAs accounted for over half of the respondent memberships. Nearly $80 \%$ of respondents fished in seven rivers in the main. Over half frequented mainly the rivers Ellé, Léguer and Blavet for salmon fishing. Nearly $13 \%$ of respondents had signed the commitment to good catch-and-release practices charter.

In 2016, half of the salmon fishing trips were in the spring. Irrespective of the fishing season, the average number of salmon caught in 2016 was 0.5 per respondent angler. Over $40 \%$ of respondents said they practised mainly or exclusively fly fishing. Over one-quarter did not practise this fishing method. The respondents fished other types of fish than salmon. Over 80\% targeted trout and over $40 \%$ targeted carnivorous fish. Nearly $60 \%$ also practised sea angling. Lastly, among the other outdoor recreational activities, nearly $40 \%$ hunted and over half hiked.

[^4]Table 3: Socioeconomic characteristics of the sample

| Variable | Average | Standard deviation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Household size | 2.51 | 1.26 |
| Number of dependent children | 0.69 | 1.03 |
| Age | 53.33 | 15.36 |
| Variable |  | Proportion |
| Gender (male \%) |  | 99.03 |
| Age (\%) Less than 20 years |  | 0.97 |
| 20-29 years |  | 6.32 |
| 30-39 years |  | 16.04 |
| 40-49 years |  | 15.55 |
| 50-59 years |  | 19.41 |
| 60-69 years |  | 26.21 |
| Over 70 years |  | 15.50 |
| Status (\%) Company head or self-employed profession |  | 14.22 |
| Executive or higher intellectual profession |  | 10.29 |
| Intermediate profession |  | 15.20 |
| Non-manual employee |  | 9.80 |
| Manual employee |  | 9.80 |
| Retired |  | 34.31 |
| Student |  | 1.47 |
| Unemployed |  | 2.45 |
| Other (inclusion benefit recipient, freelance entrepreneur. etc.) |  | 2.45 |
| Net monthly household income (\%) <€1,000 |  | 2.20 |
| $€ 1,000-€ 1,499$ |  | 8.79 |
| $€ 1,500-€ 1,999$ |  | 14.29 |
| $€ 2,000-€ 2,999$ |  | 21.98 |
| $€ 3,000-€ 3,999$ |  | 23.63 |
| $€ 4,000-€ 4,999$ |  | 14.84 |
| $>€ 5,000$ |  | 14.29 |
| Level of education (\%) No qualifications |  | 4.02 |
| CAP/BEP |  | 31.66 |
| Baccalauréat |  | 14.57 |
| Bac +2. +3. +4 |  | 30.65 |
| Bac +5 and more |  | 19.10 |
| Number of observations |  | 188 or 220 |

Table 4: Descriptive statistics on the sample's salmon fishing activity

| Variable | Average | Standard deviation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of years of salmon fishing experience | 20.49 | 12.29 |
| Length of fishing trips abroad (days) | 16.02 | 15.40 |
| Number of salmon fishing trips in 2016 In spring | 14.86 | 15.00 |
| In summer | 9.16 | 12.85 |
| In autumn | 5.10 | 7.87 |
| Number of salmon caught in 2016 In spring | 0.5 | 0.89 |
| In summer | 0.56 | 2.17 |
| In autumn | 0.49 | 1.24 |
| Variable |  | Proportion |
| Signed the River Léguer catch-and-release charter (\%) |  | 12.68 |
| Fished salmon for the first time in 2017 (\%) |  | 7.77 |
| Fishing trip abroad in 2016 (\%) |  | 16.91 |
| Destination of fishing trips abroad in 2016 Ireland |  | 57.50 |
| (\%) Norway |  | 17.50 |
| Scotland |  | 10.00 |
| Others |  | 12.50 |
| Main river for salmon fishing (\%) Ellé |  | 18.83 |
| Léguer |  | 18.83 |
| Blavet |  | 14.35 |
| Trieux |  | 10.76 |
| Scorff |  | 7.62 |
| Aulne |  | 5.83 |
| Elorn |  | 5.83 |
| Main membership AAPPMAs (\%) Lannion |  | 10.89 |
| Quimper |  | 8.91 |
| Lorient |  | 7.41 |
| Pontrieux-La Roche Derrien |  | 7.43 |
| Elorn |  | 6.93 |
| Plouay |  | 6.44 |
| Guingamp |  | 5.94 |
| Morlaix |  | 3.96 |
| Ellé |  | 3.96 |
| Salmon fishing methods (\%) Fly |  | 63.46 |
| Spin |  | 68.75 |
| Bait |  | 50.48 |

Table 4: Descriptive statistics on the sample's salmon fishing activity (cont.)

| Fly salmon fishing (\%) Exclusively | 18.45 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Mainly | 24.27 |
| Occasionally | 29.13 |
| Not at all | 28.16 |
| Means of transport used (\%) Own car | 94.23 |
| Car pooling | 15.87 |
| Other | 4.46 |
| Owns a craft (\%) Boat | 22.34 |
| Kayak | 9.14 |
| Other (float tube, paddle board) | 4.57 |
| None | 63.96 |
| Other fishing practised? (\%) River trout | 80.77 |
| Reservoir trout | 14.42 |
| Carnivorous | 43.27 |
| Sea angling | 58.17 |
| Other (shore fishing, etc.) | 5.79 |
| None | 3.85 |
| Other outdoor recreational activities? (\%) Hunting | 38.42 |
| Hiking | 53.20 |
| Canoe-kayak | 10.84 |
| Cycling | 26.11 |
| Other (gardening, etc.) | 22.73 |
| None | 10.84 |
| Number of observations | 188 |

There is a possibility that not all of the results are representative of the population of recreational anglers of interest. But we have no information on this population of interest as there are no data collected about anglers, except their address, when they take their fishing card. The way our survey was administered may have induced a self-selection bias. This is often the case when survey participants are contacted online or by post. Certain recreational angler profiles may be overrepresented. Some socioeconomic groups or younger anglers might be less apprehensive of or find it easier to answer the online questionnaire. Some more concerned about the state of the resource or with experience of catch-and-release fishing were probably more inclined to take part in the survey than others.

## 4. The theoretical model

In CEs, each surveyed individual is offered several choice sets so that the dataset forms a panel. For each choice set, an individual faces three mutually exclusive alternatives. As standard with CE data, we used the random utility model developed by Mac Fadden (1974). And based on the consumer theory of Lancaster (1966), we assume that the individual utility gained from choosing alternative $j$ in choice set $t$ is a linear function of parameters and observed variables (the attributes of the alternatives) and of a random error term. Individual $i$ prefers alternative $j$ to alternative $j$ ' in choice set $t$, if the utility entailed by alternative $j$ is greater than that entailed by alternative $j$ '. Assuming the random term to be independent and identically distributed (IID) with an extreme value, distribution type I leads to the standard conditional logit model. This assumption underlies the particular property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Some more flexible specifications such as random parameter logit models (RPLM) enable this limitation of a standard logit model to be avoided. Moreover RPLM allows for random taste variation not related to observed characteristics of the respondent. Thereby we account for unobserved preference heterogeneity between individuals for all attributes (Revelt and Train 1998; Train 2003). Unlike Logit model, RPLM can handle the fact that unobserved factors that affect the choice in one period would persist into the next periods, including dependence among the choice over time. Whereas Logit cannot handle situations where unobserved factors are correlated over time (Train 2003). In our CE, respondents have to make several choice over time.

We assume a sample of $N$ individuals with the choice of $J$ alternatives on $T$ choice sets. The utility that individual $i(i=1, \ldots, N)$ derives from choosing alternative $j$ on choice set $t$ is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{i j t}=V_{i j t}+\varepsilon_{i j t}=\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}^{\prime} \mathbf{x}_{i j t}+\varepsilon_{i j t}, \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}$ is a vector of specific parameters varying over individuals, $\boldsymbol{x}_{i j t}$ is a vector of observed attributes related to individual $i$ and alternative $j$ on choice set $t$. Error terms, $\varepsilon_{i j t}$, are supposed to be IID extreme value distributed. $f(\boldsymbol{\beta} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta})$ is the density function for $\boldsymbol{\beta}$, where $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ are the parameters of distribution. The probability (conditional on knowing $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}$ ) of individual $i$ choosing alternative $j$ on choice set $t$ is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
L_{i j t}\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}\right)=\frac{\exp \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}^{\prime} x_{i j t}\right)}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \exp \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}^{\prime} x_{i j t}\right)} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

This is the logit formula. The probability of the observed sequence of choices conditional to knowing of $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}$ is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
S_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}\right)=\prod_{t=1}^{T} L_{i j(i, t) t}\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}\right), \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $j(i, t)$ corresponds to alternative $j$ chosen by individual $i$ on choice set $t$. The probability (unconditional on knowing $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}$ ) to observe the sequences of choice is the conditional probability integrated over the distribution of $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{i}(\boldsymbol{\theta})=\int S_{i}(\boldsymbol{\beta}) f(\boldsymbol{\beta} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}) d \boldsymbol{\beta} . \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

When the distribution of $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ is continuous, models are random parameter models (which belong to mixed logit models). The log likelihood for these models, $L L(\boldsymbol{\theta})=\sum_{i=1}^{N} \ln P_{i}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, is approximated using simulation methods (Train 2003).

Estimates of consumer surplus associated with attribute changes can be derived from the estimated model following Adamowicz, Louviere and Williams (1994). The specification of the utility function is usually linear in the alternative attributes:

$$
\begin{equation*}
V_{i j t}=\beta_{0 i}+\beta_{1 i} \cdot x_{1 i j t}+\cdots+\beta_{K i} \cdot x_{K i j t}+\beta_{p i} \cdot x_{p i j t} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\beta_{k i}$ is the parameter for attribute $k$, and $\beta_{p i}$ is the parameter for the price attribute. The parameter $\beta_{p i}$ represents the marginal utility of income for $i$ as the parameter $\beta_{k i}$ is the marginal utility of attribute $k$. The WTP for a marginal change in the level of attribute $k$ can be calculated as the negative ratio of parameter $\beta_{k}$ to parameter $\beta_{p}$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
W T P_{k}=-\frac{\beta_{k}}{\beta_{p}} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

We assume a Normal distribution for the parameters which is frequently used. This implies no restriction on the sign of the coefficient estimate. The coefficient can have not the same sign for every decisions makers (Train, 2003). Both positive and negative values for the coefficient may exit in the sample. Then, WTP is the ratio of two normal random parameters, and we cannot calculate moments for the distribution of WTP. Fixing the price parameter and assuming homogeneous preferences for this attribute solves this problem. It implies that the distribution of the WTP for attribute $k$ follows the same distribution as the attribute parameter (Revelt and Train, 1998).

## 5. Determinants of the salmon anglers' fishing trip choices

In the proposed choice experiments, respondent anglers were asked to choose between different fictitious fishing trips defined by different attributes and their levels. After presenting the choice
sets, we then asked anglers how hard they found it to choose their preferred fishing trip ( 1 for "not at all hard" and 10 for "very hard"). The perceived average level of difficulty equals 4.9 with no significant differences between respondent anglers answers (socioeconomic group or other). Statistical analysis of respondents' trade-offs between the different fishing trip attributes reveals how they value these attributes of interest. For this, we estimated discrete choice models (using Stata).

### 5.1. Estimate results of a Conditional Logit and a Radom Parameter Logit models

We first estimated a basic conditional Logit model entering the fishing trip attributes in the regression, including the distance attribute, as model explanatory variables. We also introduced a constant specific to the statu quo alternative as an explanatory variable in order to capture the effect of the unobserved variables on the choice of statu quo. The results were then examined in greater detail, looking into whether any valuation differences by individual characteristics were identified by introducing interactions between attributes and individual characteristics as individual characteristics do not vary over the repeated choices of a respondent. With the exception of the distance attribute, all the attributes included in a fishing trip were qualitative. We used effects codes rather than dummy variables to describe the levels of the qualitative attributes (Boxall and Macnab, 2000; Bech and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005; Daly et al., 2016) in order to avoid parameters identification and interpretation problems and to assess directly the effect of the attribute levels on the utility. Consequently, our model's alternative specific constant (ASC) captures solely the effect of the statu quo alternative on the individual's utility. Appendix 2 presents the coding used for each of our attributes.

The results of the logit model estimations (basic and with interactions) based on the data collected are presented in Table 5. The models present low MacFadden's $\rho^{2}$ (slightly higher for the logit model with interaction) but the likelihood ratio tests (LR test) indicate that the models are significant overall. The statu quo alternative specific constant is significant and negative whatever the model, which suggests that, for the respondent anglers, choosing any fishing trip provides more utility than the opt-out option of statu quo. They hence prefer going on a fishing trip to doing nothing. All the estimated attribute coefficients of the CL models are significant (at the $1 \%$ and $5 \%$ error levels), except the "Season2" and "Method2" variable coefficients. A fishing trip in the summer and authorisation of both fly and spin fishing have no impact on the respondent anglers' well-being. However, the other parameters estimated and calculated suggest that respondents prefer to go on fishing trips in spring, whereas their well-being
decreases in the case of autumn trips. Moreover, respondents prefer fishing trips on less frequented rivers with a low TAC. They also prefer it when all the fishing methods are authorised and there are no compulsory catch-and-release regulations. However, perceived congestion on a river reduces the respondent anglers' satisfaction. This is also the case when the only fishing method authorised is fly fishing and when C\&R is compulsory. These results are consistent with Hunt et al. (2019)'s findings that regulations and congestion were more often significant determinants in the choice of fishing trips in stated preference methods than in revealed ones. Lastly, as expected, we find that the anglers surveyed prefer trips to rivers nearby, other things being equal.

Table 5: Estimate results of condition logit model

|  | Parameters |  |
| ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | CL basic | CL interactions |
| ASC (statu quo) | $-0.175^{*}(0.100)$ | $-0.202^{* *}(0.104)$ |
| Season1 (Spring) | $0.349^{* * *}(0.066)$ | $0.377^{* * *}(0.069)$ |
| Season2 (Summer) | $-0.081(0.066)$ | $-0.105(0.069)$ |
| TAC1 (30 Spring salmon, 240 grilses) | $0.111^{* *}(0.049)$ | $0.101^{* *}(0.051)$ |
| Method1 (Fly) | $-0.217^{* *}(0.073)$ | $-0.188^{* *}(0.076)$ |
| Method2 (Fly and spin) | $-0,001(0.066)$ | $0.011(0.069)$ |
| RiverUse1 (Low level) | $0.372^{* * *}(0.048)$ | $0.401^{* * *}(0.050)$ |
| Distance | $-0.009^{* * *}(0.002)$ | $-0.009^{* * *}(0.002)$ |
| C\&R1 (Yes) | $-0.223^{* * *}(0.048)$ | $-0.678^{* *}(0.289)$ |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Intermediate Profession |  | $0.399(0.302)$ |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Employee |  | $0.313(0.329)$ |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Unemployed |  | $0.507 *(0.314)$ |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Student |  | $0.381(0.323)$ |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Retired |  | $-0.382(0.451)$ |
| C\# Manual Employee | $-0.193(0.494)$ |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Executive or Higher |  | $0.840^{* * *}(0.324)$ |
| Intellectual Profession |  |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Company Head or Self- |  | $0.791^{* * *}(0.315)$ |
| Employed Profession |  | 3204 |
| N (Nb. Ind. X 3 alt X 6 choice sets) | 3384 | -1173.32 |
| Log Likelihood Lo | -1239.23 | -1093.44 |
| Log Likelihood L | -1166.86 | $159.75(0.00)$ |
| Test LR | $144.75(0.00)$ | 0.07 |
| McFadden $\rho^{2}$ | 0.06 |  |

$* * *, * *, *$ denote significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels respectively. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

Preferences for the attributes describing the fishing trips are not necessarily homogeneous across all respondent individuals. We therefore subsequently considered the surveyed anglers' individual characteristics - such as socioeconomic group, income, qualifications and fishing practices - and interacted them with the fishing trip attributes in the regression, on the assumption that they could have an influence on the choice of trips. Not all of these interactions were significant for all the attributes. They were significant mainly for the compulsory catch-and-release attribute and the authorised fishing method, especially fly fishing. This suggests that the surveyed anglers' preferences are heterogeneous with respect to this type of regulation. We also tested interactions with age, the number of years of salmon fishing experience, etc. As they did not appear to be significant, we did not retain them. Significant differences are hence found for the alternative specific constant depending on the respondent angler's socioeconomic group (Appendix 3) with, in particular, much higher values for company heads and executives and higher intellectual professions (in absolute value).

On average, the probability of the angler choosing a trip decreases when C\&R is compulsory on the river. However, we observe differences by respondent socioeconomic group, as this probability increases for company heads, for intermediate profession and for executives and higher intellectual professions (Table 5). Moreover, the higher the surveyed anglers' level of education, the more they will choose a fishing trip on a river where catches are required to be released (Appendix 5). On average, a river on which only fly fishing is authorised attracts fewer anglers. But, an angler practising exclusively fly fishing has a greater probability of choosing a trip on a river where $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ is compulsory (Appendix 5). Indeed, compulsory $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ is closer to the real situation of fly anglers. Aas et al. (2000) uncovered these differences in preferences for fishing opportunities between fly-only anglers and others. Anglers who have signed the River Léguer catch-and-release charter have also a greater probability of choosing a trip on a river where $C \& R$ is compulsory (Appendix 5). Differences are also found in the valuation of $C \& R$ by respondent angler qualifications (Appendix 5), with a gain in well-being from catch-andrelease regulations for the most qualified anglers (Baccalauréat + two or more years of higher education), other things being equal. The anglers practising exclusively fly fishing value the catch-and-release regulations, while those who never or occasionally practise fly fishing do not value them at all. This makes sense because the release of catches is compatible solely with this type of fishing. Lastly, a low value is placed on fly fishing for the "authorised fishing method" attribute, except by those anglers with the highest incomes. Hummel (1994) analyses fly-fishing
as an elitist process of social distinction. Finally, we found no significant differences between mail and internet surveys.

The conditional Logit model assumes that the IIA hypothesis holds. This hypothesis was tested using the Hausman-McFadden test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). The "Trip A", "Trip B" and "Statu Quo" choices were removed in turn from the sample. The results of the test are presented in the table in Appendix 1. They show that the IIA hypothesis does indeed hold, which results in consistent estimations.

According to the result of the test of the IIA hypothesis, the Logit model is appropriated. But we used a RPLM in order to represent random taste variation and to capture unobserved factors correlated over time. We estimated a RPLM using a normal distribution function for the random parameters in order to account for unobserved preference heterogeneity between anglers for each attribute. We assumed that parameters of all attributes have a random component, except the distance attribute. Indeed, we before estimated a RPLM with the distance coefficient random but the standard deviation was not significant implying homogenous preference for this attribute. The model we retained is estimated by maximum likelihood using 100 Halton draws. Estimate results are presented in Table 6. The estimated means of the attributes random parameter are significant at $1 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, except for summer and the fishing method "fly and spin" as in the conditional logit models. Standard deviation of the random parameters are all significant at $1 \%, 5 \%$ or $10 \%$ levels. The mean ASC is significant and negative meaning that choosing a fishing trip provides utility for the respondents but this standard deviation indicates that this is not the case for some part of the sample. The great value of the standard deviation compared to the mean of the random parameter for the authorised fishing methods, for the TAC, for compulsory $C \& R$, for summer and spring seasons indicate that these attributes' levels do not have the same effect on the probability to choose a trip among the anglers of the sample. But based on the parameter distribution, a fishing trip in spring provides utility for all anglers of our sample, in the same way as fishing in a less frequented river.

Table 6: Estimate results of the random parameter logit model

| Variable | Mean of parameter | Standard Deviation of parameter |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ASC (statu quo) | $-0.631^{* * *}(0.240)$ | 2.656*** (0.280) |
| Season1 (Spring) | 0.569*** (0.109) | $0.460 * *$ (0.195) |
| Season2 (Summer) | -0.136 (0.113) | 0.575*** (0.173) |
| TAC1 (30 Spring salmon, 240 grilses) | 0.140* (0.078) | 0.274* (0.165) |
| Method1 (Fly) | $-0.500 * * *(0.149)$ | $1.467 * * *(0.193)$ |
| Method2 (Fly and spin) | 0.104 (0.126) | 0.841*** (0.200) |
| RiverUse1 (Low level) | 0.689*** (0.102) | 0.486*** (0.166) |
| C\&R1 (Yes) | $-0.453 * * *(0.107)$ | 0.978*** (0.141) |
| Distance | -0.016*** (0.004) |  |
| N (Nb. Ind. X 3 alt X 6 choice sets) | 3384 |  |
| Log Likelihood Lo | -1166.86 |  |
| Log Likelihood L | -995.18 |  |
| McFadden $\rho^{2}$ | $0.15$ |  |
| LR (8) | 343.49 (0.00) |  |

***, **, * denote significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels respectively.
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
Number of Halton draws for the maximum likelihood for the RPLM: 100.

### 5.2. What is the willingness to pay for a fishing trip?

The estimations of the parameters associated with the attributes, including the distance attribute, can be used to calculate the willingness to pay for each attribute level, and then, working back up, to calculate the willingness to pay for a fishing trip (irrespective of the trip's characteristics) and the value of standard fishing days combining a number of attribute's levels. The distance is used as a proxy for the cost of fishing trip. Then, we approximated the marginal utility on income by converting the distance parameter to a cost parameter as in Adamowicz et al. (1997), Boxall and Macnab (2000), Hanley et al. (2002), Timmins and Murdoch (2007), and Rulleau et al. (2011). The WTP results are contingent on the hypotheses selected to measure the anglers' travel cost. A number of possibilities are put forward in the literature to convert distance into cost. Here, solely the fuel cost was used, excluding the cost of vehicle wear-and-tear, assuming that anglers place importance solely on the fuel costs when choosing a fishing day trip, especially when the distances are relatively short as is the case with the proposed choices. A cost of $€ 0.103$ per kilometre was used as the average fuel outlay per kilometre for 5 to 7 horsepower vehicles, ${ }^{11}$ considering that $75 \%$ of French vehicles on the road run on diesel. This value is similar to that used by Rulleau et al. (2011) and Ropars-Collet et al. $(2015,2017)$ and

[^5]the Anglo-Saxon literature. The distance attribute was converted into a return trip travel cost by the following formula: Distance in kilometres x $2 \times € 0.103$. We could have included the vehicle's depreciation and the opportunity cost of time ( $€ 0.10$ per km if time is valued at the minimum wage) in the vehicle cost in addition to the fuel cost. We chose to set "floor" values, considering that anglers who car pool share the fuel and that travel time is not necessarily seen as a cost when relating to a leisure activity.

Based on the estimate results (Tables 5 and 6), we can estimate the anglers' average valuation of the different characteristics of a fishing day trip and calculate some moments of the WTP distribution of each attribute's level (Table 7). The ASC captures the loss of utility resulting from choosing the statu quo alternative. Based on the ASC, we can then calculate the value of the option to go on a "fishing trip", of any sort, which we can consider as a basic value that can rise or fall depending on the level of the attributes and their valuation. On average from the basic CL model, this basic value is less than $€ 5$. But based on estimates results in Appendix 3, significant differences are found by respondent angler socioeconomic group (Appendix 4). For example, the basic value of a fishing trip for company heads and self-employed professions, and executives and higher intellectual professions is relatively high (at around $€ 17$ and $€ 23$ respectively), while it is very low for student and negative for retirees and manual employees. From the RPLM, the mean basic value of a fishing trip is around $€ 8$ but we observe a great dispersion as it varies, starting at $€-26$ and rising to over $€ 40$ for some anglers of our sample.

With respect to the valuation of the characteristics of the fishing trip, the surveyed anglers place a high value on fishing in spring compared with autumn (deviation in mean of approximately $€ 13)$. There is a much higher preference heterogeneity between anglers for fishing in autumn. The effect of season as a significant attributes of fishing sites choice has been rarely highlighted in literature. Only Mkwara et al. (2015) show that recreational fishing destinations vary in their attractiveness in different season and Swallows (1994) argues that seasonality in fishing leads to demand shifts within sub-seasons. Respondents also place a high value on fishing in less frequented rivers (deviation in mean of $€ 18$ ). This brings into play the hypothesis of a congestion externality that reduces the anglers' satisfaction. Other things being equal, a very low value is placed on a highly frequented river around $€ 0$ ). According to Le Goffe and Salanié (2004), fishing effort is probably too high at the best and easy to access fishing sites in France, which can lead to welfare losses due to overcrowding. Fisheries that require space, such as salmonids, are particularly sensitive to congestion. For example, Western French salmon anglers surveyed by Salanié et al. (2005) report excessive use of certain rivers. Overcrowded
fishing spots is moreover the main argument put forward by anglers who no longer want to go salmon fishing in France and who make the choice to go abroad to fish at a price per day. In France, once the annual fishing permit has been purchased, river access is not regulated. Turning to the fishing methods, the anglers' satisfaction decreases when only fly fishing is authorised. We find quite the same results in Johnston et al. (2011). The anglers also prefer rivers on which it is not compulsory to release the catch back into the water, as found by Olaussen (2016). The deviation in mean well-being between a compulsory catch-and-release regulation and authorised removal is over $€ 12$ per fishing trip. We found a great dispersion in well-being for compulsory C\&R between anglers as $25 \%$ of the WTP for this attribute are on the positive part. Lastly, a low TAC on a river is valued more highly than a high TAC. This result is not the expected finding, but it may reflect the anglers' concerns about the state of the resource, which moreover prompted comments on some questionnaire returns. It could also be due to a poor interpretation or misunderstanding of the definition of TAC. But according to Hunt et al. (2019), anglers may choose fishing sites characterized by low stock size and then low catch rate, if other attributes such as low crowding level provides enough compensatory welfare.

There are significant differences between the anglers' valuations of a fishing trip's characteristics, especially for compulsory C\&R. Such regulations decrease the anglers' wellbeing on average. Yet this loss of well-being is highest for the unemployed, and is also relatively high for retirees and manual workers. Conversely, company heads and self-employed professions, and executives and higher intellectual professions value more these regulations.

The WTP calculated for each attribute level can be used to estimate the mean and the standard deviation of standard fishing trips' value (Table 8). The value of Trip 1, which could be called ideal for the angler since it presents the most highly valued levels for each attribute, is around $€ 38$ in mean excluding travel, but with a great standard deviation. Conversely and regarding the mean of the distribution, Trip 2 presenting the lowest valued levels for each attribute does not have a positive value. According to the significant standard deviation, it provides disutility for most anglers of our sample. Figure 1 shows Kernel density plots of the distribution of the individual-level value of the four fishing trips, derived from our model, following Greene and Hensher (2003), which approximates the density function from observations on our sample. For trip 1, almost $90 \%$ of the value are positive whereas less than $30 \%$ are positive for trip 2 . However, the anglers seem to value more and consequently prefer a fishing trip in spring (Trip 3 ), even if the regulations require the compulsory release of catches, to a fishing trip in autumn
when removals are authorised (Trip 4), other things being equal. The value in mean of Trip 3 is slightly higher than that of Trip 4. There is a greater preference heterogeneity between anglers for Trip 4 than for Trip 3. As we can see on Figure 1, kernel density plots of the distribution of the individual-level value of the fishing trip 3 and 4 are quite similar.

Table 7: Estimate WTP from CL and RPL models

| WTP ( $€$ per fishing trip and per angler) | $\text { er) } \quad \mathrm{CL}$ | CL interactions |  | PLM |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | basic |  | Mean | Standard deviation |
| Based value of a fishing trip | 4.01** | 4.82*** | 8.23*** | 34.26 *** |
|  | (1.69) | (1.73) | (2.60) | (8.07) |
| Spring | 8.00*** | 9.01*** | 7.42*** | 6.00 ** |
|  | (2.37) | (2.74) | (2.14) | (2.72) |
| Summer | -1.86 | -2.51 | -1.77 | 7.50*** |
|  | (1.61) | (1.79) | (1.57) | (2.70) |
| Autumn | -6.14*** | -6.50*** | -5.64*** | 13.50*** |
|  | (1.98) | (2.17) | (1.90) | (4.48) |
| Low TAC | 2.55** |  |  | 3.58* |
|  | (1.25) | (1.33) | (1.08) | (2.20) |
| High TAC | -2.55** | -2.40* | -1.83* | 3.58* |
|  | (1.25) | (1.33) | (1.08) | (2.20) |
| Fly | -4.98** | -4.48** | $-6.52 * * *$ | 19.14*** |
|  | (2.13) | (2.22) | (2.52) | (4.51) |
| Fly and spin | -0.02 | 0.26 | 1.35 | 10.97*** |
|  | (1.52) | (1.65) | (1.72) | (3.65) |
| Fly, spin and bait | 5.00 *** | 4.22** | 5.17 ** | $-30.11^{* * *}$ |
|  | (1.84) | (1.90) | (2.25) | (7.37) |
| Low level of river use | 8.55*** | 9.58*** | 8.98*** | 6.34*** |
|  | (2.27) | (2.67) | (2.27) | (2.42) |
| High level of river use | -8.55*** | -9.58*** | -8.98*** | 6.34*** |
|  | (2.27) | (2.67) | (2.27) | (2.42) |
| Compulsory C\&R | -5.12*** | -16.19** | -5.91*** | 12.76*** |
|  | (1.47) | (7.85) | (1.77) | (3.29) |
| Compulsory C\&R for Retired |  | -6.66*** |  |  |
|  |  | (2.48) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Manual Employee |  | -8.72** |  |  |
|  |  | (4.26) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Intermediate |  | -4.09 |  |  |
| Profession |  | (3.07) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Employee |  | -7.09* |  |  |
|  |  | (3.80) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Unemployed |  | -25.31*** |  |  |
|  |  | (10.30) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Student |  | -20.79** |  |  |
|  |  | (10.77) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Executive or Higher Intellectual Profession |  | 3.85 |  |  |
|  |  | (3.62) |  |  |
| Compulsory C\&R for Company Head or Self-Employed Profession |  | 2.69 |  |  |
|  |  | (3.08) |  |  |

[^6]Table 8: Value of standard fishing trip per day per angler (from RPLM estimates)

|  | Trip 1 | Trip 2 | Trip 3 | Trip 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Season | Spring | Autumn | Spring | Autumn |
| Level of <br> river use | Low level of <br> river use | High level of <br> river use | High level of <br> river use | High level of <br> river use |
| TAC | Low TAC | High TAC | Low TAC | Low TAC |
| Fishing | Fly, spin and | Fly | Fly and spin | Fly and spin |
| method | bait |  |  |  |
| Catch | Authorised <br> removal | Compulsory <br> C\&R | Compulsory <br> C\&R | Authorised <br> removal |
| Mean (€) | $\mathbf{3 7 . 6}$ *** | $\mathbf{- 2 0 . 7 * * *}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 9 *}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 7 *}$ |
| Stand. Dev. (€) | $\mathbf{6 8 . 3 7 * * *}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 . 6 * * *}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 . 4 * * *}$ | $\mathbf{3 9 . 9 7 * * *}$ |

*** $*$ denote significance at the $1 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels.

Figure 1: Kernel density functions of standard fishing trips' value


## 6. Discussion of the results and conclusion

Our results show that a salmon fishing trip (irrespective of the trip's characteristics) provides well-being to the surveyed anglers. However, we observe a wide variation in the value of the fishing trip by socioeconomic group and income. The choice of a fishing destination depends on all the attributes and the levels used to define the fishing trip. Yet not all of them have the same weight in the angler's decision to choose a trip. The fishing season and especially the congestion level of the river have a strong impact on the angler's satisfaction. Based on our RPLM estimates, the gain in well-being is approximately $€ 13$ in mean between a fishing trip in spring and one in autumn, and $€ 18$ if the river is less frequented (other things being equal). On average, the anglers prefer unrestrictive regulations, where $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ is not compulsory and fly fishing is not the only fishing method authorised. In our sample, C\&R reduces the angler's wellbeing per fishing day. On average, we observe that $C \& R$ has a depressive effect on the valuation of a day's fishing, at $€ 14$ per day if removal is authorised and $€ 2$ per day if $C \& R$ is compulsory. However, we observe a great heterogeneity of preferences between anglers for a compulsory $C \& R$ regulation. Here, the valuation of $C \& R$ increases with qualifications and the practice of fly fishing, and can even become positive. It is moreover a characteristic valued by certain socioeconomic groups, such as company heads and self-employed professions, or executives and higher intellectual professions. We also show that a fishing trip in spring where $C \& R$ is compulsory is worth more than a fishing trip in autumn with authorised removal. Like Mkwara et al. (2015), we can mention that fishing sites attractiveness vary in different seasons because of variability within season in water quality and fish weight. Spring fishing is very attractive as spring salmons are larger, measuring more than 70 cm and weighing from 3 to 10 kg and more. Moreover spring salmons go up rivers when water levels are high. Compared with closing fishing areas once the TAC has been reached, extending the fishing period in spring in the form of C\&R increases the number of fishing days and the anglers' overall well-being. For a constant TAC (provided there is zero mortality), $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ increases the value of the river's fish resource. $C \& R$ could allow fishing to continue after the TAC has been reached without decreasing the collective value provided that the salmon resource does not suffer damage (mortality, altered reproductive capacity, stress, etc.). C\&R may be an interesting instrument to prevent the fishing season from being too short and the collective value truncated. If $C \& R$ was put in place throughout the fishing season, then all the anglers whose well-being is reduced would no longer practice, so we would have a decrease in the number of fishermen and certainly the overall well-being. But if, as in the experiment set up on Le Léguer, removals were allowed until the

TAC was reached and then C\&R was set up to allow fishermen to continue to practice this activity until the end of the season, then it would in no way diminish the well-being that existed before the prolongation of the season with no-kill. On the contrary, it would increase well-being for some. C\&R is therefore one of the parameters that could be brought into play to manage the resource. What we find is only for salmon anglers, as salmon is known as a very edible fish unlike other white river fish, but the experience could maybe extend to other species.

Yet $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ does not prevent a certain level of congestion, whereas regulating the level of river use appears to be a decisive element in recreational anglers' well-being, especially in terms of salmon fishing. This problem of congestion of fishing areas before the TAC is reached, is encouraged by a global TAC and too large individual quotas leading to a race to fish. Nevertheless this crowding externality may appear also in the C\&R period. This affects the quality of the fishery and consequently the collective welfare of anglers. Kerkvliet and Nowell (2000), Schuhmann and Schwabe (2004), Beardmore et al. (2015), Kainzinger et al. (2015) show clearly the negative impact of congestion on the individual welfare of fishermen, beyond a certain level of collective effort. There are other solutions to manage congestion and to make the fishing season last, such as putting in place instruments to limit fishing effort. A system combining a flat-rate days quota, acquired when the fishing card was purchased, and/or a margin payment for additional fishing days (a day fishing card), would also make it possible to encourage rational use of the resource, control individual effort and limit congestion by allocating visits to those who value them most. But this question is taboo in the French associative fishery where paid access is considered inequitable by the population of fishermen. It would lower the anglers' well-being if they have to pay fees as with day fishing card. Moreover, such a management system limiting fishing effort entails associated transaction and control costs, but this is also the case with $C \& R$. Of course, $C \& R$ as proposed in the experiment on the river Léguer does not take away rights from fishermen while adding value, unlike measures that restricts these rights. Moreover, C\&R is a much easier measure to implement politically and more easily accepted, provided that animal welfare advocates do not take up this issue.

Adding a period of $\mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{R}$ increases well-being, in terms of the fishing season, but there would be another solution with an effort control, and that is to ensure that the TAC is reached less quickly. This would allow to have a higher quality of fishing and a higher individual welfare per day of fishing and therefore a better valuation of the day of fishing. The whole question is whether overall well-being would be better in this situation compared to a situation where we
would lengthen the season but with $C \& R$. The question of the quality of the fishing is also acute for tourist attractiveness of non-local anglers whose travel can be large and who are likely to generate significant economic benefits.

Finally, it would be interesting to measure and compare the well-being of anglers, and even beyond in society, in the two management systems, $C \& R$ and limitation of fishing effort, in order to provide insights to inform decision-makers.

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## Appendix 1: Results of the Hausman-Mc Fadden test for the IIA hypothesis

The IIA assumption requires that the inclusion or exclusion of alternatives does not affect the relative risks associated with the regressors in the remaining alternatives. The IIA HausmanMc Faden test compares the estimated parameters of the model including all alternatives with models excluding each alternative.

|  | Khi $^{2}$ | p-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Exclusion of «Trip A» | 11.13 | 0.267 |
| Exclusion of «Trip B » | 9.95 | 0.354 |
| Exclusion of «Statu Quo» | 14.59 | 0.068 |

The tests say that excluding the alternatives "Trip A", "Trip B" or "Statu Quo" does not affect the relative risks of the remaining alternatives. The IIA property has not been violated.

Appendix 2: Effects coding for qualitative attributes

| Saison | Season1 | Season2 | Season3 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Spring | 1 | 0 | 0 | $\alpha_{1}$ |
| Summer | 0 | 1 | 0 | $\alpha_{2}$ |
| Autumn | -1 | -1 | 1 | $-\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2}$ |
| Associate parameter | $\alpha_{1}$ | $\alpha_{2}$ | $\alpha_{3}=0$ |  |
| TAC | TAC1 | TAC2 |  |  |
| 30 Spring salmon and 240 grilses | 1 | 0 |  | $\beta_{1}$ |
| 80 Spring salmon and 640 | -1 | -1 |  | $-\beta_{1}$ |
| grils |  |  |  |  |
| Associate parameter | $\beta_{1}$ | $\beta_{2}=0$ |  |  |
| Fishing methods | Method1 | Method2 | Method3 |  |
| Fly | 1 | 0 | 0 | $\gamma_{1}$ |
| Fly and spin | 0 | 1 | 0 | $\gamma_{2}$ |
| Fly, spin and bait | -1 | -1 | 1 | $-\gamma_{1}-\gamma_{2}$ |
| Associate parameter | $\gamma_{1}$ | $\gamma_{2}$ | $\gamma_{3}=0$ |  |
| Compulsory C\&R | C\&R1 | C\&R2 |  |  |
| Yes | 1 | 0 |  | $\delta_{1}$ |
| No | -1 | -1 |  | $-\delta_{1}$ |
| Associate parameter | $\delta_{1}$ | $\delta_{2}=0$ |  |  |
| Level of river use | RiverUse1 | RiverUse2 |  |  |
| Low | 1 | 0 |  | $\eta_{1}$ |
| High | -1 | -1 |  | $-\eta_{1}$ |
| Associate parameter | $\eta_{1}$ | $\eta_{2}=0$ |  |  |

Reference's level in grey

Appendix 3: Estimate results of the CL model containing interactions between ASC and socioeconomic group

| Variable | Parameter |
| :---: | :---: |
| ASC (statu quo) | 0.566** (0.230) |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Retired | -0.321 (0.244) |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Manual Employee | -0.440 (0.300) |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Intermediate Profession | $-1.102 * * *(0.275)$ |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Employee | $-0.708^{* *}(0.293)$ |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Unemployed | $-1.145^{* *}(0.502)$ |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Student | -0.538 (0.548) |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Executive or Higher Intellectual Profession | $-1.324 * * *(0.305)$ |
| ASC (statu quo) \#\# Company Head or Self-Employed Profession | -1592*** (0.294) |
| Season1 (spring) | 0.349*** (0.067) |
| Season2 (summer) | -0.086 (0.067) |
| TAC1 (30 spring salmon and 240 grilses) | 0,114** (0.050) |
| Method1 (Fly) | $-0.223 * *(0.074)$ |
| Method2 (Fly and spin) | 0.004 (0.067) |
| C\&R1 (Yes) | $-0.229 * * *(0.048)$ |
| RiverUse1 (Low level) | 0.378*** (0.049) |
| Distance | $-0.009 * * *(0.002)$ |
| N (Nb. Ind. X 3 alt X 6 choice sets) | 3384 |
| Log Likelihood | -1135.78 |
| Test LR | 206.91 (0.00) |

***, ** denote significance at the $1 \%$ and 5\% levels respectively.
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses

Appendix 4: Based value of fishing trip depending on the respondent angler's socioeconomic group (from estimate results in Appendix 2)

| Socioeconomic group | Based value in $\boldsymbol{€}$ |
| ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Retired | $-5.58^{* *}$ |
| Manual Employee | $-2.88^{* *}$ |
| Intermediate Profession | $12.21^{* * *}$ |
| Employee | $3.24^{* *}$ |
| Unemployed | $13.19^{* *}$ |
| Student | $-0.63^{* *}$ |
| Executive or Higher Intellectual Profession | $17.24^{* * *}$ |
| Company Head or Self-Employed Profession | $23.35^{* * *}$ |

***, ** denote significance at the $1 \%$ and $5 \%$ levels respectively

## Appendix 5: Estimate results of the CL model containing interactions between compulsory C\&R and individual characteritics

| Variable | Parameter |  |
| ---: | ---: | :---: |
|  | ASC (statu quo) | $-0.138(0.182)$ |
| Season1 (spring) | $0.387 * * *(0.068)$ |  |
| Season2 (summer) | $-0.115^{*}(0.069)$ |  |
| TAC1 (30 spring salmon and 240 grilses) | $0.122^{* *}(0.051)$ |  |
| Method1 (Fly) | $-0.237 * * *(0.076)$ |  |
| Method2 (Fly and spin) | $0.010(0.069)$ |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) | $-1.145 * * *(0.162)$ |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Signed the C\&R charter | $0.604 * * *(0.148)$ |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Education level Bac+2.+3.+4. | $0.291 * * *(0.113)$ |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Education level Bac+5and more | $0.424 * * *(0.136)$ |  |
| C\&R1 (Yes) \#\# Fly fishing practises exclusively | $0.0399 * * *(0.128)$ |  |
| RiverUse1 (Low level) | $0.394 * * *(0.050)$ |  |
| Distance | $-0.008 * * *(0.002)$ |  |
| N (Nb. Ind. X 3 alt X 6 choice sets) | 3258 |  |
| Log Likelihood | -1094.73 |  |
| Test LR | $196.71(0.00)$ |  |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ A grilse is a young salmon that has only spent one year at sea and is returning to freshwater for the first time in the summer.
    ${ }^{2}$ The "Fédération Nationale de la pêche en France et de la Protection des milieux aquatiques » (FNPF) is the institution representing freshwater fishing and the protection of the French aquatic environment. It coordinates the actions of more than 3700 Accredited Fishing and Aquatic Environment Protection Associations (AAPPMA), gathered in 94 departmental federations of fisheries and aquatic protection (FDDAPPMA). The Côtes d'Armor Fishing Federation is one of these 94 departmental federations.
    ${ }^{3}$ The Côtes d'Armor Fishing Federation, the Bretagne Grands Migrateurs observatory, the Lannion-Trégor district committee and the Vallée du Léguer watershed committee.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ Commitment to good catch-and-release practices charter: release salmon catches; fly fishing, a single barbless hook, the strongest line possible, a rubber mesh or knotless mesh landing net; hook removal using pliers; no handling the fish out of the water, sufficient time for the fish to recover before releasing it back into the water; catch declaration; cooperate with experiment monitoring; and inform the coordinator/officer in the event of problems.
    ${ }^{5}$ The value placed on the resource is so high that it is a shame not to catch it once. As much pleasure is derived from the catch itself as from removal for consumption.

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ A bag limit is a law imposed on fishermen restricting the number of fish within a specific species or group of species they may catch and keep.
    ${ }^{7}$ The size and the number of fish caught are always included as a quality variable in recreational fishing (Anderson, 1983).
    ${ }^{8}$ A length-categorization system exists to evaluate fish size comparing the fish length to the one of the worldrecord length listed by the International Game Fish Association. A trophy-size fish is a fish that is no less than 74$80 \%$ of the world-record length (Gabelhouse, 1984).

[^3]:    ${ }^{9}$ If we don't allow individuals to opt for a statu quo alternative, this may distort the welfare measure for nonmarginal changes (Carlsson, 2011).

[^4]:    ${ }^{10}$ INSEE statistics (https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2569937?sommaire=2569957)

[^5]:    ${ }^{11}$ Source: French tax scale: http://bofip.impots.gouv.fr/bofip/2095-PGP.html

[^6]:    *, ** and $* * *$ denote significance at the $10 \%, 5 \%$ and $1 \%$ levels respectively.

