Exploring the New in Politics at Work:
A Temporal Approach of Managerial Agencies

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Introduction: everyday managerial agency as producing new public policies

In the context of on-going work transformations (e.g. generalization of entrepreneurship, end of traditional frontiers between work and private practices or consumer and producer practices, increasing mobility, digital transformation of work practices), it seems that, more than ever, “managerial agency” transforms society and our way of life (Aroles et al. 2019; Barley 2010; Daskalaki et al. 2015; Farias et al. 2019; Pennel 2015). By managerial agency, we do not mean the usual sense of managers’ ability to get things done. Agency refers to the ‘transformative capacity’ to induce movement, both symbolically and materially (see Schatzki 2010 for the difference between agency and action). It relies on a set of activities (teleological set of behaviours) and practices (meaningful patterns of behaviours such as ‘introducing oneself’, ‘giving a phone call’, ‘asking a question’...), that are articulated in such ways that agency recombines elements of practices through activities to create new practices. Managerial agency is thus mainly about an ‘acting together’ teleologically, generally conducted in a competitive environment (with a scarcity of resources), including other teleological activities reflexive about their environment.

The political effect of management and organization is far from new. A long time ago, founding Management and Organization (MOS) scholars (e.g. Burnham 1941; Drucker 1945; Follett 1918, 1919) already noticed that in a world increasingly constituted by organizations and management, politics and societal transformations originate more and more from the latter. As recognized by Hickson et al. (1980, pp. 1-2) in their inaugural Organization Studies editorial, organizations are conceived of as ‘both the implements of societies and institutions which shape the societies that use them’.

Nowadays, both digital infrastructures and globalization, coupled to the development of new ways of working (Aroles et al. 2019; Kingma 2018), have put this trend further, granting managerial agency a highly transformative political power in society. Recently, managers have started to purposefully justify their evolving status in alternative self-descriptions as “entrepreneurs”, “professionals”, and “project leaders” (Brocklehurst et al. 2009; Locke and Schone 2004), thus emphasizing their potential for action and change. In this vein, entrepreneurial agency (as a widespread act of setting up one’s job and pushing forward explicitly a business model) (Matlay and Westhead 2005), digital nomads (Makimoto and Manners 1997), everyday users of digital technologies (as feeders and consolidators of global digital infrastructures), and new collaborative communities and movements (as new spaces for social activism sometimes catalyzed by the two previous trends) (Garrett et al. 2017; Hjorth and Holt 2016), increasingly mould their environment (Barley 2010), in ways that deeply transform politics and the experience of politics in Western countries (Cerny 2000; Lallement 2015). Uber, Facebook and Airbnb

for example offer business models that deeply and globally transform societies. They also change the modalities of deep political processes such as the legitimation of collective activities, the sense of representativeness (which is more and more global) and even the sense of democracy, in increasingly continuous and direct ways (Häkli and Kallio 2014; McGregor 2011). In contrast, usual political agencies (e.g. of governments and national policies) appear weaker and weaker in our global and liquid world, in particular compared to the rise of participative democracy (Bacqué et al. 2005).

Surprisingly, both the changing nature of work and management, and its underlying political dimensions remain largely neglected phenomena in MOS. While Parsons (1965) considered in his seminal book the analysis of the way organizations influence the larger sociocultural context in which they are embedded as one of the most important mandates for organizational theory, MOS scholars have paid little attention to this phenomenon for decades (Barley 2010). On the one hand, with few exceptions (Aroles et al. 2019; Cappelli and Keller 2013; Dale 2005), they deal weakly with on-going work transformations as part of organizational phenomena and organizing processes. They also rarely explore this new relationship between managerial agency and political agency. On the other hand, while political sciences stress numerous new modalities of political agency in society (e.g. new social activism and the role of digital infrastructures in the emergence of radical or more incremental changes in political structures), and explain the role of corporate structures (such as multinational corporations, MNC) in this move, they do not fully capture the relationship between managerial and political agencies, nor changes in managerial agency itself (see e.g. Barley 2010; Cerny 2000; Epstein 1969).

We contend in this chapter that managerial agency has the potential to transform society and the sense of togetherness at a scale and depth that used to be that of political agency in the 30s, 40s and 50s (in the golden age of Keynesian and ‘stop and go’ policies). New digital (the Internet) and physical infrastructures (third places and an increasing connectivity inside and between cities) favour reflexive managerial agency in ways that continuously reinvent society and our way of life. In a way, public policies (as setting up reflexively an agenda for the future of society and the sense of togetherness) are more and more outsourced to private, managerial agencies. We call ‘co-politicization’ this growing isomorphism between managerial and political agencies, implying an increasing convergence between those endorsing the roles of manager (e.g. entrepreneurs) and those endorsing the role of politicians (as explicitly elected and with a specific mandate to participate in everyday democracy).

In the analysis of this growing isomorphism between managerial and political agency, we emphasize a deep ontological rupture. While MOS founders called for an exploration of the wide implications of a society constituted by formal organizations seen as ‘building blocks’ (see Barley 2010; Hunter 1953; Parsons 1965; Selznick 1949), our discourse goes beyond the mere ‘managerialization’ of politics. On the one hand, the ‘corporatization of politic’ (Epstein 1969) and the ‘managerialization of politics’ are more about the intrusion of managerial ideology into political debates and political activities; on the other hand, the ‘politicization of corporations’ corresponds to a growing transformation of the political field and public policies (Barley 2010), through lobbying and influence strategies of governments and political institutions (Epstein 1969). Critical perspectives in MOS research have already drawn attention to the social consequences of corporate power (Clegg 1989; Clegg and Dunkerly 1980; Courpasson 2008; Courpasson and Clegg 2006; Perrow 1972, 2002). However, such an issue, which has received far more interest in Europe than in US, largely focuses on the organization’s internal life, thus limiting our understanding of the power and influence of managerial agency on wider society, politics, markets and law (Barley 2010).

In this essay, we defend a more diffuse and pervading view of political dimensions as constitutive of the myriad of managerial agencies constituting emergently the political dimensions of our world (beyond the structures, dispositives, decision processes and instances of medium or large corporations
as institutional actors). Our focus is on managerial agency and managerial activities themselves, conceived of as an “acting together”. Thus, we do not mean that there are no interesting analytical dimensions that could be common for both phenomena (i.e. ‘managerialization of politics’ and ‘politicization of corporations’). The collapse of the legitimacy of usual political agencies, which seems sometimes to be compensated by an increasing use of managerial rhetoric and managerial techniques to convince of the rigor and effectiveness of the management of the city, country, and administration, is probably the other side of the coin. And the decrease of usual political agency in a global world (making national budgets or monetary policies less effective) also requires rethinking the necessary theories and categories to conceptualize political agency (Cerny 2000).

As a result of these evolutions, Politics seems, more than ever, to be in crisis. The appropriation of political infrastructures by managerial agencies creates a crisis of politics itself, such that we have never produced so few commons (Dietz et al. 2003; Mattei 2012; Ostrom 2002) and meaningful collectives. If each individual can now express his/her individual voice, collectivity becomes a mere sum aggregated of voices by search engines, algorithms and Artificial Intelligence. Thus, we ask: how can we make sense of this crisis of the politics in the abovementioned context of “co-politicization”? In particular, how can we understand the gradual move of democratic infrastructures from the context of institutions (with representative democracy rituals such as votes and agoras such as parliaments) to management (with more and more communicative infrastructures that produce political protests and political movements or more simply, direct individual expressions)?

To address these questions, we contend that a temporal approach can help understand the crisis of the politics in the context of new ways of working, where managerial and political agencies increasingly merge. To that end, we introduce Paul Ricoeur (1985)’s temporal and narrative thought on the ‘crisis of the present’ in which our society could remain stuck. The past, present and future no longer flow. The past is ‘museified’ (i.e. fossilized, mummified, reified and non-resonant) and the future is linked to a set of utopian thoughts in the present. This results in the manifestation of a strange form of presentism, a temporalization that appears disconnected from the emotions and affects prone to make temporalities flow in narratives. If the past is dead and the present is filled with utopia, then the present becomes an eternal move towards the future. After describing this temporal and narrative crisis, we explore the temporal breaks at stake in new forms of organizing. We conclude by suggesting that new modes of organizing may be missing managerial practices likely to produce the extra-temporality needed to re-create meaningful resonance in contemporary ways of working and living.

This essay is organized as follows: after presenting new ways of working as drivers of political transformations and introducing the concept of ‘co-politicization’ to refer to the growing isomorphism between managerial and political agencies, we address the issue of ‘politics in crisis’ through the development of a Ricoeurian temporal approach of the “crisis of the present” observed in new ways of working.

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2 And we see in the increasing interweaving of management and politics a major phenomenological aspect of the ‘new’ in “new ways of working’. A novelty that makes sense mainly from a longue durée perspective.
1. ‘Co-politicization’ and the transformative political power of managerial agency

1.1 A long durée view on work transformations: the end of enclaves and the shift to a new semiosis

How has managerial agency become a key component of contemporary politics? To understand this, we need a long durée perspective. In most Western countries, the Middle Age has been a time of major closures and enclosures, solidifications, entifications and oppositions (de Vaujany 2010a, b; Kieser 1989). This is in the Middle Age period that communities, guilds and corporations take shape and expand in Europe. These proto-bureaucracies are constitutive of enclaves. Etymologically, enclave comes from the vulgar Medieval Latin expression inclavare, derived from clavis, with ‘key’ as a prefix and ‘in’ emphasizing a result. An enclave is what is closed with a key, an inside, an individual or communitarian home. Such a place and dispositive of closure (lock, key, and walls) could not be widely accessed in the Middle Age. Monastic organizations, castles and fortified cities were among the first places in Europe to systematize closures at such a massive level in Western countries. With them, territories, everybody’s space gradually opens the way to private property, enclosures and a clarification of private ownership.

The monastery (to focus on this important enclave) is surrounded by emptiness or (let’s use this paradoxical expression) a particular emptiness: forests. Forests of the Middle Age were immense non-regulated areas, areas of non-right that robbers and outlaws of all kind, but also more and more, commercial flows, inhabited and crossed. In contrast, inside the enclave and the vast deforested areas depending on it, rules are gradually established, along with new forms of collective rationality. Collective activity constructs simultaneously unique time and spaces, a totality. We are involved in an eschatological time, which will be interrupted some time by an apocalypse. An outside exists, it is reified by an enclave. It is first of all a spatial and temporal emptiness. From the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries, universities have gradually become enclaves as well. More generally, after the Middle Ages (or at the end of a long Middle Age to use Le Goff, 1957’s expression), the world has been gradually covered by enclaves. More generally, with the explosion of the number of bureaucracies from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the world has been gradually covered by enclaves, which are more and more enclaved into each other materially, socially (legally) and temporally (sharing the same temporalities locally and more and more globally). Forests, on their side, have kept decreasing and disappearing.

But at the turn of WWII (with the rise of a new semiosis, see de Vaujany and Mitev 2017) and in an accelerated manner since the late 80s, the tendency seems to reverse itself. We are, again, surrounded

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3 The notion of conclave appears at the same time (thirteenth century) and is also interesting. It corresponds to a room which can be closed with a key. For the Catholic Church, the conclave is also a strong decisional time: that of the nomination by the collectivity of cardinals locked of the successor of San Peter: the new pope. In this strong archetypal setting (for most Western countries and their imagery), the process of decision requires a spatial closure, but not necessarily a spatial closure (there is no deadline for the decision, even if this locked space is not favorable to a very long decision process). It is nonetheless necessary to be in a locked space to decide. Closure and obligation are both internal (the collective, stabilized through the closure, decides alone) and external (the rest of the world, the forest, does not decide).

4 See or rather listen to Serres (2007) on this issue.
by large forests, but that are, this time, invisible (Serres 2007). The web, its infrastructures and different layers, are an area of non-right for traditional enclaves, which do not manage to ‘enclave’ and regulate these new areas. The vast liberalization of our world (described namely by Fukuyama’s 2006 provocative thesis about the end of History), the emergence of a market and a time both deeply (globally) integrated, make regulations more and more (and obviously) heterogeneous and difficult. As a result, work is depicted as increasingly novel, flexible, disembodied, autonomous, collaborative, entrepreneurial, platform- and project- based (Aroles et al. 2019), as recognized by managers themselves in self-descriptions of their status, who prefer to identify themselves to the alternative mentality of the entrepreneur, which is positively contrasted with the ‘back-covering, ‘jobsworth’ mentality of the bureaucratic manager’ (Brocklehurst et al. 2009, p. 9).

Furthermore, in this context, the number of independent workers and entrepreneurs (Locke and Schone 2004) is exploding. It has been predicted that in 2020, there would be more independent workers in the US than waged employees in the US (MBO 2014). As a tendency, crossed evolutions of waged employment and entrepreneurship and all kinds of independent activities are largely in favour of independent work (see e.g. Pennel 2015). In most western countries, economies have created between three times and 10 times more independent workers since the mid-2000s. Work increasingly takes the form of an externalized, independent activity, organized by and through platforms. Work and organizing processes are thus more and more decentred (Introna 2019), in that the crowd, the market and the complex agency of digital infrastructures, instead of visible dominant stakeholders (i.e. organizations), are at the heart of these modern forms of productive value creation.

In this context, it seems that individuals become or re-become more of a simple working force (intellectual or physical) that vast numerical, juridical and capitalistic assemblers assemble and de-assemble (more and more from afar and by involving situations of mobility), depending on the needs of products and financial markets (largely performed by digital infrastructures themselves) (de Vaujany et al. 2019). All this is done of course far beyond usual frontiers and boundaries of collective activity (‘firms’ and ‘organizations’), the States surrounding it and the legislations applying to it. Again, new spaces (at the heart of assemblage and its adjustments) make it possible to host entrepreneurial activities; for example employees from more traditional structures may be ‘excubated’ into these places, and even people in precarious situations may find there a position of social reinsertion (in particular for collaborative spaces subsidized by public structures). These new modes of value production and innovation are increasingly conducted in the context of collaborative and third-places (fab labs, makerspaces, hackerspaces) (Lallement 2015). The latter orchestrate new network-based logics of auto-production (Anderson 2012) that interest classical companies, which try to fight there against a kind of law of the tendency towards decline in the rate of innovation, in particular relevant innovations (i.e. meaningful at some points for a customer).

http://www.union-auto-entrepreneurs.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2014-MBO_Partners_State_of_Independence_Report.pdf This strong statement and the general move towards a self-employed society has been the subject of numerous discussions (see e.g. this great critical HBR post by Justin Fox https://hbr.org/2014/02/where-are-all-the-self-employed-workers/). What remains is a clear increase of self-employment in most western countries, with a stronger increase for some categories (i.e. artists, creative works, communication, IT and digital jobs).
1.2 A key consequence of work transformations around communities: A growing isomorphism between managerial agency and political agency

In this context marked by the end of enclaves and work transformations, we want to emphasize three interrelated trends that lead to a growing isomorphism between managerial agency and political agency. We see three trends at the heart of the growing isomorphism between managerial agency and political agency: a new openness and connectivity (trend 1), a new semiosis (trend 2) and a new political consciousness (trend 3).

The first trend (new openness and new connectivity) reflects the end of enclaves and the greater connectivity between managerial agencies. More and more, enclaves disappear, both temporally and spatially. From a temporal perspective, the boundaries between work and home, consumers and producers collapse, as well as the specific practices corresponding to them. From a spatial perspective, the advent of mobility as a new sociological paradigm (Urry 2007), the development of mobile technologies, and of new forms of work (e.g. teleworkers, digital nomads, the generalization of virtual and distributed modes of collective activities, Bosch-Sijtsema et al. 2010; Messenger and Gschwind 2016) have paved the way to new, more opened forms of collective activity. In addition, the connectivity of these apparently fragmented activities keep increasing. The infrastructure of the Internet at large, and the network technologies around it (e.g. Wi-Fi) or the new informational platforms inside it (e.g. Google) make it possible to draw on amazing resources and connecting globally without accumulating the amazing capital that would have been necessary 40 years ago. New physical forms such as third places at large (Oldenburg 1989) and collaborative spaces in particular (e.g. coworking spaces) (de Vaujany and Aroles 2019; Fayard 2019; Garrett et al. 2017; Petriglieri et al. 2019), but also the new transport infrastructures make it possible to connect and reconnect to a community of employees and/or customers very easily. This trend towards openness and connectivity has ‘desenclaved’ dramatically managerial agency and the usual perimeter of its effect, which become potentially more global, more public, more tightly bounded into everyday activities of the employee and customers involved in it.

The second trend (new semiosis), which is largely imbricated to the first one, is about the way we give a meaning to what we do (de Vaujany and Mitev 2016; Peirce 1978). Semiosis is both about the meaning and the material conditions of its production and reproduction. A semiosis is historically situated. The process of sensemaking we are involved in (i.e. semiosis) have dramatically changed since the late 90s. More and more, we outsource information and cognitive routines (de Vaujany and Mitev 2016; Serres 2012). The digital world is much more than a big set of tools and data. It is also a set of routines. We do not remember precisely a piece of information, but the way to find it (e.g. the keywords we typed) on Google. Most of all, part of our routines of socialization are also changed virtually by these tools. Even when they do not use Facebook, teenagers develop friendships in a Facebook like manner and in the context of parties, think about the fact that ‘potentially’, pictures can be taken during the event and be put on line on Facebook, WhatsApp or Snapshat. Most of all, the media itself is not expected to be meaningful in the interpretation (in contrast to the Middle Age, see de Vaujany and Mitev 2016), which makes that more than ever, information flows globally, beyond any private or public distinctions, and is likely to be part very quickly of the public or political debates as part of a collective, open expression of individuals (Besley and Burgess 2001). In this context, again, managerial agency is likely to blur the line and enter into public and political debates, liking the ‘acting together’ with the ‘living together’.
Lastly, the third trend (new political consciousness) is about an increasing political reflexivity, in particular of the young generation, and beyond usual political categories such as class or professions. Class and access (or not) to private properties do not seem to be a boundary anymore, in particular with the emergence of the so-called “sharing economy” (Botsman and Rogers 2011) (which seems to be very compatible with the capitalist system, de Vaujany et al. 2019). And the political discourse is not the prerogative of politicians themselves or a political class anymore, as it seems that more and more activities ‘hack’ political debates (Häkli and Kallio 2014; McGregor 2011). Interestingly, individuals reflexively discuss political topics, often in the context of more or less stabilized communities, which meet virtually and/or physically. Each individual feels s/he has something to say, and is legitimate to do it. This political consciousness is probably less theorized and ideological than in the 60s, but it is political in the sense that it relates to society at large and the sense of togetherness mainly based on connectivity. Contemporary managerial agency both relies on and favours this political context: It relies on it in the sense that it increasingly sells products and services taking into account this new political consciousness and sense (or need) of community. It favours it in the sense that it creates new vocabularies, buzzwords but also ecosystems (with new labels, new cooperatives or new infrastructures inside the infrastructures inside the web) that encourage this new political consciousness.

As an example, by surfing on the three aforementioned trends, Uber is clearly transforming society, favouring a move from contract to revenue-based capitalism, breaking the privileges of some corporations, changing the nature of society and the sense of togetherness inside the city… Has anybody voted for or against it? No. This political transformation is there. Ford also had a political agency in the 20s and 30s: mass production was more than a managerial choice, it was a new society based on mass consumption and this is particularly obvious from a Marxist perspective. However, today’s connectivity, new semiosis and new political consciousness have radically changed the scale and nature of the relationship between managerial and political agency. Political consequences of managerial agency are more unforeseeable, pervading and brutal than in the 20s and 30s. They are maybe closer to temporality from the Leninist view of events and revolutions, i.e. his approach of the revolutionary crisis, spontaneity of the crowd and of the revolutionary movement (Coombs 2013).

More invisibly, thousands of smaller entrepreneurial projects and structures in Paris, London, New York, Shanghai, Delhi or elsewhere in the world do the same in a much more emergent manner. The web and numerous physical forums or mobilities inside the city give an amazing infrastructure to do it. Digitality provides new routines to do it. The dynamics of emergent communities structure a collective envy as well.

1.3 “Co-politicization” as a recognition of the political power of managerial agency

Our thesis is also not about the influence strategies (e.g. lobbying activities) of (large) companies in the context of legislative processes. It is neither to insist on the social responsibility (in relationship with business ethic or corporate social responsibility). The thesis defended here is more radical than that of...
other discourses (more strategic than political): we contend that managerial actions (in particular entrepreneurial ones) have the potential to become more and more political by themselves.

By ‘political’, we mean the convergence of three political dimensions of managerial actions:

- Communication towards citizens and society at large (more than immediate customers)
- Modes of representativeness of a collective, a discourse or an action, as incorporated in communicative infrastructures
- Systems of legitimacy

Communication towards citizens corresponds to a specific phenomenon. Big companies have for a long time started to address to an audience that goes far beyond their effective customers base (e.g. Coca-Cola in the United States). Since the 90s, companies more and more have ‘talked’ to citizens (as potential consumers or influencers) and society at large. They endeavour to be actors in and of the city, talking inside the Agora to everybody, as other citizens. Facebook, Google, Amazon but also numerous start-ups are now in this grey area that goes far beyond usual categories such as ‘prospective’ or ‘potential’ customers. In the context of their extended value co-creation processes, they address today citizens and citizen consciousness as much as our instincts for consumptions. And this is probably in the worlds of the city and the citizenship today that the highest fences and barriers to their development exist.

The modes of representativeness of a collectivity, a discourse or an action correspond to the issue on which the rupture is particularly radical. The legitimate processes through which an actor or a technology can ‘talk’ for a totality (a nation, an occupational community, an industry...) are largely institutionalized and legalized in most western countries. Institutions and institutional procedures make it possible to identify legitimate spokespersons and to open public spaces to movements of protestation. The Internet, and more recently, social networks such as Facebook, have made it possible to gather quickly and massively opinions from an aggregation of heterogeneous opinions, reviews, likes and re-tweets, which are particularly visible and traceable. Modes of representativeness and existence of reflexive collectivities about their identity (class for themselves) and projects have been disrupted and are not really questioned by old institutions; (the role of Facebook has thus been important in recent social movements and human quest for freedom and democracy, such as during the Arabian Spring, the Yellow vest movement, or 2019 Hong Kong protests). Everybody’s voice can express itself among the noise of the multitude, and can be isolated and valorised very quickly. The representative and the illustrative (as the quantitative versus qualitative divide in data and data treatment) are only a question of degree in the exploration of spokespersons and strategic traces by a collectivity. It was probably not among Facebook, Google or Amazon’s ambitions to become true political infrastructures, but this is clearly what happened. Facebook is on the verge of minting its own money (Andriotis et al. 2019), Google is participating in the management of smart cities (sidewalk project), Airbnb is concerned about collecting tourism taxes, tactics to ensure the right to be forgotten have been delegated to Google, and Facebook is taking the lead on identity issues (Faravelon and Grumbach 2016). Likewise, in the context of more commercial third-places, it was probably not in the objective of WeWork to reinvent socializations and new ways to gather and aggregate social entities (workplaces and home for numerous entrepreneurs), but this is what they are starting to do. WeWork agencies and others coworking actors’ agency is transforming macro-dimensions of political and
societal life. The co-living trend and its use in the political sphere epitomize this emergent transformation.

Lastly, this is the whole system of production of legitimate actors and legitimate discourses in and about the City and its management that is disrupted. Through a new focus on digital infrastructures, it is tempting to give a more systemic aspect to the convergence between managerial and political agencies described here. Beyond traditional media and political institutions (their elective and consultative processes), Facebook settle norms, new legitimate channels for political claims (from those of hackers to those of terrorists) and new processes to identify and constitute legitimate entities. The bulk of digital actors, local as global, contribute to give an unprecedented visibility to desires, expectations, trends, which are at the heart of our societies. In a way, they make more than they constitute the actors and discourses that will be potentially legitimate (as grounded into the crowd itself).

Management thus becomes political in the strongest sense of the term. If the distinction between consumers and producers becomes more and more obsolescent (with the idea of ‘co-creation’ or ‘value co-creation’) (Kane and Ransbotham 2016), that between citizens (e.g. citizens entrepreneurs) and politicians (in the sense of people with a ‘mandate’ to produce a political discourse) also becomes more and more obsolescent. We would like to call this long-term process of blurring and interweaving “co-politicization”.

Yet, in this context marked by the prevalence of the “politics”, the latter has simultaneously entered into crisis. The political consequences of management today, in particular those of entrepreneurship and so-called new (collaborative) ways of working foster a deep crisis in our sense of togetherness. Management does not contribute to (or avoid damaging) the emergence of communities in our present, a process which would like to call here “communalization”. This is the issue we would like to explore in our second part.

2. Politics in crisis, or a ‘crisis of the present’

2.1 Failures of managerial agency: the communalization process is out of order...

New ways of working, such an entrepreneurship, obviously have a deep transformative political power. Recent research in MOS suggests that that entrepreneurship is inherently political (Daskalaki et al. 2015), and invite scholars to recognize the importance of “entrepreneurial politics” (Hjorth and Steyaert 2009). As highlighted by Daskalaki et al. (2015, p. 420), the availability of new resources, such as social media, have enabled individuals and their networks to “enhance their collective capacity by assembling active forces and directing them via new organization”. Entrepreneurial initiatives thus nurture the emergence of bottom-up social transformations, create new institutional orders and ultimately, new models of citizenship (Daskalaki et al. 2015). Similarly, Farias et al. (2019, p. 555) consider that the process of organizational creation opens new spaces of action and of attention, through which entrepreneurs are able to express their voice and shape the (re)distribution of

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7 See the support given by former mayor of London (Boris Johnson) to the Fish Island Village project: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adi-gaskell/londons-leading-role-as-a_b_9367478.html

8 The Internet itself is nothing more than a technical infrastructure upon which other (compatible) layers will emerge, closer to contents.
resources and attention, further ‘altering what it is to say and do things meaningfully, legitimately and with authority’.

The joint emergence of a higher connectivity, a new semiosis and a new political consciousness thus deeply transforms the agentic power of management, which has become political, more than mere societal. Thus, while politicians and activists, managers and entrepreneurs have long been considered as distinct categories of actors, the boundaries between their roles have become increasingly blurred and porous, as a result of growing co-creation and co-production processes of value, leading to what we call “co-politicization.” “Co-politicization” implies that our democracies’ infrastructures and political discourses can increasingly be produced by entrepreneurs. In particular, as mentioned above, three dimensions of contemporary societies appear as deeply transformed by “co-politicization”: public communication, modalities of representativeness, and systems of legitimacy.

Yet, beyond such effects, or the potential for such a transformative political power, this prevalent approach remains very ‘spatial’ and at the surface of the phenomenon. New ways of working, such as entrepreneurship, develop products and services that may constitute as many political opportunities, and that can be appropriated by various stakeholders as such. But they increasingly fail in their core political ambitions and accomplishments in that they end up missing the point. MOS research already highlighted, in well-known critiques of the human capital model and neo-liberalism, that the ideal of entrepreneurialism could serve as an ‘ideological alibi for the radical responsibilization of the workforce’ (Fleming 2017, p. 702), prompting growing economic insecurity, lower productivity, diminished autonomy and worrying levels of personal debt (p. 691).

In this context, we contend in this chapter that as managers/entrepreneurs/freelancers/intrapreneurs have started to play political, liberal roles, their (artificial) appropriation of political infrastructures has tended to create, in turn, a crisis of the politics. For example, we have never expressed so much politics at the level of society, while, paradoxically, producing so few commons (Dietz et al. 2003; Mattei 2012; Ostrom 2002). More than ever, everybody can express their voice, all the more that new mediators (such as the Internet, Facebook and Twitter) exist and can aggregate such voices in new collectives. But such collectives are built in ways that are not meaningful or resonating anymore, as if there was no collective voice to be expressed and heard, and no collective activity in which people, constituted as a community, could get again their bearings.

To illustrate this view, let’s take the example of recent social protests: as shown by the Yellow vest movement in France, each individual, as a citizen, now has the possibility to express their own, autonomous individual voice, but without building, in turn, any meaningful or resonant collective and community (Rosa 2019). For the first time in French history, a government is unable to listen to its citizens and to each individual voice, and, in turn, each individual voice is unable to be expressed in an audible and clear manner, and thus, to be heard. There is no envy for a collective project. Through Internet mediations, people do not know who they really are (as anonymous subjects), nor to whom they really address (who are their enemies or allies). Latour (2019) sees in this transformation the production of a new form of liberalism, where atomistic elements of a society (including yellow vest themselves, considered as neoliberal actors) express a multitude of individualistic, autonomous and egoistic opinions, leading to a deeper crisis of the politics. Similarly, the recent protests in Hong Kong highlight the contradictory effects of the use of social media on political movements (Friedman 2019). While social networks such as Facebook and Twitter have made it much easier to orchestrate the social revolt, it has also become increasingly difficult for this collective to be heard – as recognized by Friedman (2019), ‘when everyone has a digital megaphone, it is much harder for any leader to aggregate enough authority not just to build a coherent set of demands but, more important, to make compromises on them, at the right time, to transform street energy into new laws’.
In the same vein, as regards new work practices, network technologies have provided contemporary managers/entrepreneurs/workers with an increasing political transformative power. However, with such technologies, and the information age more broadly (Castells 1996), coupled to new forms of entrepreneurial activities (Matlay and Westhead 2005), work has become more mobile, distributed, untethered, entrepreneurial and autonomous, such that its nature has changed from a collective, shared experience to an increasingly individualized and highly personalized experience. The collective experience of work has been lost in this move (Gregg 2018), leading to the development of more fragmented work relationships, networked constellations, including zero hour contracts, and unstable relationships (Fleming 2017) marked by neither long-lasting relation nor emotional attachment, better summarized under the term ‘gig’ or platform economy (Friedman 2014). We thus contend that new ways of working, and entrepreneurship in particular, can have political effects and have a potential political transformative power, but that these effects are less and less obvious because of a ‘temporal’ crisis that the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1985) helps us understand.

2.2 Back to Ricoeur’s thesis: temporality is community and togetherness

In his famous triptych Temps et récit, Ricoeur (1985) explores the intricate relationship between time, temporality and narratives. In particular, in the conclusion of Time and Narrative, volume 3, he develops the idea of a present in crisis in which our society could remain stuck. The past, present and future no longer flow. For Ricoeur, the present is in crisis when the experience of the past in the present is ‘museified’ (i.e. fossilized, mummified, reified and non-resonant), dead, closed, and when our future (our “horizon of expectations”) is too open and grounded into distant utopias that will never materialize. A museified experience of the past thwarts any reminiscence or meaningful engagement with that which was. Somehow similarly, utopias detach the future from the lived experience of the present. Anticipations are disconnected from hermeneutics processes that are then outsourced ‘out there’. In a way, our main experience of the present is made of eternal futures, i.e. continuously outsourced anticipations of what will happen next, mainly new enthusiastic and promising becomings. We see consultants, management gurus, experts, opinions and trends both aggregated and performed by social media as playing a key role in this process, as the main producers of this futurist narratives, and in that sense, becoming more and more political.

This new managerialist politics results in the manifestation of a strange form of presentism, a temporalization that appears disconnected from the emotions and affects prone to make temporalities flow in narratives. At the end, the present is not rooted anymore in the past, and is continuously driven towards ‘new’, ‘innovative’, ‘disruptive’ futures enacted by utopia. Present becomes an eternal future, an ever-reformulated promise, an horizon out of reach and continuously re-put at a remote distance. According to Ricoeur (1985, p. 422), we are involved in relations to the world that ‘at least situate the present of this action, indivisibly ethical and political, at the point of articulation of the expectation’s horizon and the space of experience’. The epoch ‘is characterized both by the remoteness of the expectation’s horizon and a narrowing of the space of experience’ (Ricoeur 1985, p. 422). Indeed, the ‘present is entirely in crisis when expectation takes refuge in utopia and when tradition turns into a dead deposit’ (Ricoeur 1985, p. 422). The historical present is threatened by the fragmentation through which the space of experience and expectation of horizons results in schisms.

Ricoeur (1985) thus develops an insightful reflection on the crisis of the present, and offers a perspective that sets out to re-assemble the past, the present and the future, stretched out in time, emphasizing the structural reciprocity between temporality and narrativity (Sarpong et al. 2019). Ricoeur’s thought is all the more relevant that, without this ontological presence of an open past and
a lived future in the present, the very possibilities of becoming a collective, a community, with a transformative political power, simply vanish. Individuals cultivate a place between society and community precisely through a shared lived past and a projected identity nurtured in a fluid narrative. Otherwise, forms of organizing become dead, still, closed, and even alienating narratives (see Rosa 2019). In the end, Ricoeur (1985) highlights a very interesting situation in society that we see as key in new ways of working, namely the crisis of the present.

2.3 A crisis of present in new ways of working

We link the phenomenon described by Ricoeur (i.e. the crisis of the present) to new ways of working, in particular contemporary entrepreneurship, which is more and more expected to be ‘collaborative’. In a managerial world where workers are more and more individualized, where collaborative techniques and practices become central precisely because inter-individual relationships become key. But collaboration simply means following collaborative utopia and applying extra-layers of collectivity which are removed when the technique or the platform is removed. Collectivity and togetherness is not desired and even felt. It keeps vanishing to be replaced by another utopia or projects.

We contend that the generalization of collaborative entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship as well as the rise of remote, mobile and digital work and their modes of management foster and cement the crisis of the present, and, consequentially, the crisis of the politics described above. Platform capitalism and the associated new work practices imply the dissolution of traditional organizations and a corrosion of the collective aspect that has long characterized organizing. They enact technology in ways that increasingly personalize and individualize work, and even make the long-lasting collective experience of labour impossible. While they enable new forms of flexibility, value creation and productivity, technological developments simultaneously contribute to a loss of the experience of labour as a collective activity (Gregg 2018). In particular, by applying Ricoeur’s concept of the crisis of present to new modes of organizing (such as collaborative entrepreneurship), we explain how an overemphasis on the present is grounded into practices and processes linked to new forms of organizing that foster individuality and inter-individuality, thus preventing any political, transformative power in the end.

How to describe contemporary modes of organizing? Let us imagine thousands of people with their eyes closed, practicing mindfulness in a big stadium. They are all seated together, next to one another, in a place full of noises and movements that nobody cares about. Each individual feels her/his breath and is deeply connected to present time, the “moment” passing. As nobody talks, the stadium does not become a public space or an agora. If we imagine at some point that a speaker tells them loudly what will happen next in their lives, the beautiful new things that are waiting for them outside the stadium, we will be close to the “present in crisis” described by Ricoeur (1985). The present becomes a fragile instant passing or, for those that are still open to the world, an eternal future made of the voice of the speaker. The stadium is not a shared space, a public space, an agora devoting to sharing speech in Arendt (1998)’s sense. It is merely a common space. The past is not cultivated nor is it narrated. Maybe we can feel that at this moment we have a long history, but it is not really part of the experience. Contemporary forms of organizing are more and more stuck in the epoch described by Ricoeur (1985, p. 422) as characterized by ‘the remoteness of the expectation’s horizon and a narrowing of the space of experience’. This implies a weak communalization process. New forms of organizing, and collaborative entrepreneurship in particular, can be described through the lack of resonances they produce, which tend to be increasingly ‘mute’,
‘repulsive’, or even ‘alienating’ (Rosa 2019), as they are increasingly embedded in a vision of ‘present in crisis’, in contrast with a vision of ‘present that flows’.

While in a ‘flowing/resonating present’, past, present and future are melted in the narration, the situation of a ‘present in crisis’ is characterized by the dis-junction of past, present and future from/in the narration, as observed in situations marked by excessive presentism, overemphasis on the ‘here and now’ beyond any memory, reminiscence and anticipation. While in the first situation (flowing/resonating present), the narration describes and co-produces solidarities (temporally and beyond), the ‘present in crisis’ scenario is characterized by narration as a mirror of individuality and inter-individual relationships. Some new work practices are prime examples of this crisis of the present in new forms of organizing: mindfulness, the idea of promoting “well-being” at work, holacracy (Robertson 2015), individual entrepreneurship, and collaborative entrepreneurship (Miles et al. 2005, 2006; Rocha and Miles 2009). They are increasingly characterized by an overemphasis on the present grounded into practices and processes that foster individuality and inter-individuality. In contrast, more meaningful and resonating practices (such as cooperative, solidarity, common writing, or cooperative entrepreneurship), could allow us to join past, present and future in the narration in new forms of organizing while producing solidarities.

Following Ricoeur, we thus argue that time and temporality are key dimensions of new ways of working and that the latter produce today problematic communalization, sense of belonging and ways to relate and respond to each other (Cunliffe and Locke 2019), which can be described as a ‘crisis of the present’ (Ricoeur 1985). Indeed, new forms of organizing produce narrative and temporal ruptures that are dangerous for our sense of belonging and society, that are yet essential to political action. We see in new modes of organizing exaggeratedly narcissist and individualistic experiences of the present of work. Immediate senses are not felt anymore, but connected to a large set of mediations themselves extending and pushing further a perception that becomes decentred at some point (de Vaujany 2019; Introna 2019). Interestingly, all the narratives produced by contemporary managers/entrepreneurs/workers reflecting upon themselves are becoming reversible for themselves. The narcissist force produced by the aggregation of individuals and the contents they produce on line and off line keeps narrating for and about itself in a circular way. The reflection is immediate (no real memory of past reflection, too much energy and attention is caught in the numerous reflections offered in the present) and just ‘here’. The past, in particular the remote past, is not really part of the story. And the future is abundantly part of lived experience as what appears now the sphere of digital media and the world of organizations which pervade all aspect of our lives is made of the utopia, scenarios, numbers, indicators, visions of management. Interestingly, we all feel (wrongly) that we are in a way the manager telling the story we read or live about our future that is co-constructed. In a way, the present of work becomes an eternal future made of the numerous innovations, novelties, disruptions, visions we read and live.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, this essay calls for prudence about the supposed transformative political power of managerial agency expressed in new ways of working, and collaborative entrepreneurship in particular. “Co-politicization” implies a growing isomorphism between managerial and political agencies, and suggests a transformation of the agentic power of management, which has become, more than ever, political. However, this essay highlights that new ways of working (and entrepreneurship in particular) has undeniably contributed to put the present in crisis...and by doing
so, has fostered the resurgence of a renewed form of liberalism that they paradoxically denounce with the collaborative utopia.

Thus, in line with recent research that explore ways of relating and responding to others, for example through ‘anticipational fluidity’ (Cunliffe and Locke 2019), and research that recognize the importance of time in organizations as a force (Holt and Johnssen 2019), this essay invites future research to explore the numerous organizational attempts at producing solidarities and true communalization processes. In particular, future research could explore how past and future are re-located at the heart of the present experience of community, in ways that enhance our social notion of collective reflection in organisations (Gutzan and Tuckermann 2019), and in society. Other research could explore broader social movements (hackers, cooperativism, third-places, DIIT...) and alternative methods of knowledge (co)-production (e.g. citizen sciences), in order to understand how they could contribute to new shared narratives that are essential to the political transformation of our society.

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