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Article Dans Une Revue RAND Journal of Economics Année : 2018

Cross-Licensing and competition

Yassine Lefouili

Résumé

We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived.
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Dates et versions

hal-03263659 , version 1 (17-06-2021)

Identifiants

Citer

Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili. Cross-Licensing and competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 2018, 49 (3), pp.656-671. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12248⟩. ⟨hal-03263659⟩
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