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# Analysis and Implementation of OVSF Address Decoders

Jack Ou, *Member, IEEE*,, Brendon Palmer, Laurence Hou, and Pietro M. Ferreira, *Senior Member, IEEE*

**Abstract**—Demand for Internet of Things (IoT) devices has generated interest in fault-tolerant address decoders. Address decoders affect the energy required to establish a data link and monitor a wireless channel through metrics such as detection probability and false alarm probability. This brief establishes a framework for calculating detection and false alarm probabilities and shows that limiting the number of correctable errors eliminates simultaneous false alarms, reduces the probability of false alarm, and reduces the maximum normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms by 16.9 dB. The probability expressions are formulated so that the detection probability, the false alarm probability, the energy to transmit, and the power to monitor a channel can be adjusted digitally, yielding a counter-based implementation that reduces the energy consumption of the address decoder to 1.3 pJ/bit for a data rate of 200 bps in 0.18  $\mu\text{m}$  CMOS.

**Index Terms**—Wake-up receiver, detection probability, false alarm probability, and OVSF.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The demand for long-lasting battery-powered Internet of Things (IoT) devices has accelerated research on wake-up receivers (WuRx) [1], which awaken devices on-demand. Energy savings are achieved by placing the main radio (illustrated in Fig. 1(a) as TX/RX) in sleep mode and enabling it occasionally with an always-on wake-up receiver that uses two orders of magnitude less power [2]. The selective awakening is achieved by post-processing the beacon in the baseband with a correlator circuit (also known as an address decoder) [3].

The correlator circuit compares the address embedded in the beacon with that of the node and turns on the node if a match is found. The correlator can be implemented with an analog circuit [4], or a digital circuit requiring synchronization [3], [5]-[6], oversampling [7]-[10], or bit-level duty cycling [11]-[12].

The synchronized correlators use a preamble and are less susceptible than oversampling correlators to false detection of a *non-existent* address (false positives) [3]. Furthermore, by encoding the address with error-tolerant codes such as orthogonal variable spreading factors (OVSF) [6], the detection probability ( $p_s$ )-the probability that a message from node  $k$  is detected by node  $i$  in Fig. 1(b)-is increased.




Fig. 1. (a) A block-level diagram of a wireless node assisted by a wake-up receiver (WuRX). TX/RX is the main radio. (b) Illustration of a detection that occurs when a wake-up packet is decoded correctly by a target node ( $i$ ) and a false alarm that occurs when a node (e.g.  $j$ ) is falsely awakened.

$p_{fa}$  is the probability that a node is falsely awakened by a packet meant for another node.  $p_{fa}$  of an error-tolerant OVSF address decoder is different from that of a pseudo-noise (PN) address decoder discussed in [3].  $p_{fa}$  is a function of the number of sleep nodes ( $N_S$ ); the diverse bit error rate ( $p_{b,ij}$ ); and  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$ , the probability that a node (in this case,  $i$ ) is falsely awakened by another node ( $j$ ). The  $p_{fa}$  derived in this brief differs from that discussed in [13] in three ways. First,  $p_{fa}$  is a function of  $N_S$  and  $p_{b,ij}$ . Second,  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$  is derived by limiting the number of correctable errors. As a result,  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$  is minimized, simultaneous false alarms are eliminated, and the maximum normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms is reduced by 16.9 dB. Finally, expressions for  $p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$  are formulated so that  $p_{fa}$ ,  $p_s$ , and increases in the power consumption of the sleep nodes due to false alarms ( $P_{t,fa}$ ) can be adjusted digitally, yielding a reconfigurable counter-based implementation that reduces the energy-per-bit of similar lengths and data rates in [8] and [12] by 2.96 times.

The rest of this brief is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop the definition of  $p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$  and their relationships to  $E_s$  and  $P_{t,fa}$ . We derive the equations for  $p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$  in Section III. We compare the calculations with the simulations, glean design insights from the results, and explore implementation issues in Section IV. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section V.

## II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION

Figure 1(b) shows a set of wireless nodes operating in the active mode momentarily to conserve energy. Each node is identified by an  $L$ -bit address (e.g.,  $s_k$ ). The transmission starts when a packet, which includes a preamble and an address (e.g.  $s_i$ ), is sent from an active node (i.e., node  $k$ ) to one of the

$N_S$  sleep nodes (i.e., node  $i$ ). The remaining sections of this brief assume that the preamble has been detected and hence that  $p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$  are determined by the address decoder.

### A. Detection

The detection probability ( $p_s$ ) can be formulated mathematically as follows:

$$p_s = \sum_k \left[ \sum_{i \neq k} p(k \rightarrow i|i)p(i) \right] p(k). \quad (1)$$

$p(k)$  represents the probability that one of the  $N_S + 1$  nodes (e.g.,  $k$ ) is chosen to transmit a wake-up message.  $p(k)$  is  $1/(N_S + 1)$  if any node is just as likely as any other node to transmit a wake-up message.  $p(i)$  is the probability that one of the  $N_S$  nodes in the sleep mode is chosen as the recipient.  $p(i)$  is  $1/N_S$  if any one of the  $N_S$  nodes is just as likely as any other  $N_S$  nodes to be designated as the recipient.  $p(k \rightarrow i|i)$  represents the conditional probability that a wake-up message is detected successfully by node  $i$  once node  $i$  has been chosen by node  $k$  as the recipient. It can be shown that

$$\sum_{i \neq k} p(k \rightarrow i|i)p(i) = \frac{1}{N_S} \sum_{i \neq k} p(k \rightarrow i|i) = p(k \rightarrow i|i). \quad (2)$$

Therefore, for a given bit error rate ( $p_b$ ) (or signal-noise-ratio (SNR)) and a set of identically constructed nodes,  $p_s$  is

$$p_s = p(k \rightarrow i|i). \quad (3)$$

$p_s$  is not a function of  $N_S$  and can decrease significantly as the SNR of the receiver deteriorates. Using the approach in [14], the energy consumed by the source node to send a wake-up packet ( $E_S$ ) after  $m$  attempts is

$$E_S = \frac{1 - (1 - p_s)^m}{p_s} E_{s0}, \quad (4)$$

where  $E_{s0}$  is the energy required to transmit a packet, toggle the main radio in the source node between TX mode and RX mode, and monitor the channel for acknowledgment.  $(1 - (1 - p_s)^m)/p_s$  is the average number of retransmissions. Equation (4) shows that the energy consumed by a source node to send a packet increases when  $p_s$  (or SNR, and hence  $p_b$ ) is reduced.

### B. False Alarms

A false alarm occurs when a node is awakened by a wake-up packet meant for another target node. The false alarm probability ( $p_{fa}$ ) is

$$p_{fa} = \sum_{i \neq k} \sum_{j \neq i, j \neq k} p(k \rightarrow j|k \rightarrow i)p(k \rightarrow i), \quad (5)$$

where  $p(k \rightarrow i)$  is the probability that node  $k$  sends a message to node  $i$ .  $p(k \rightarrow j|k \rightarrow i)$  is the probability that node  $j$  receives a message sent to node  $i$  by node  $k$  and is dependent on  $p_{b,ij}$ , the probability that a bit is flipped as it is transmitted from node  $k$ .  $p(k \rightarrow j|k \rightarrow i)$  can be expressed as  $\alpha_{ij}p_{i \rightarrow j}$ , where  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$  is  $p(k \rightarrow j|k \rightarrow i)$  of a set of nodes with an identical  $p_b$  and where the diverse  $p_{b,ij}$  is captured by  $\alpha_{ij}$ .

$$p_{fa} = \sum_{i \neq k} \sum_{j \neq i, j \neq k} \alpha_{ij}p_{i \rightarrow j}p(k \rightarrow i) \quad (6)$$

As there are  $N_S$  nodes,  $p(k \rightarrow i)$  is  $1/N_S$ .  $p_{fa}$  becomes

$$p_{fa} = (N_{S,eff} - 1)p_{i \rightarrow j}, \quad (7)$$

where  $N_{S,eff} = \frac{1}{N_S} \sum_{i \neq k} \sum_{j \neq i, j \neq k} \alpha_{ij} + 1$ . As  $p_{b,ij}$  is not known *a priori*,  $\alpha_{ij}$  is assumed to be 1.  $p_{b,ij}$  and  $N_{S,eff}$  become  $p_b$  and  $N_S$ , respectively. For a given  $p_b$ ,  $p_{fa}$  is

$$p_{fa} = (N_S - 1)p_{i \rightarrow j}. \quad (8)$$

Unlike  $p_s$ ,  $p_{fa}$  is a function of  $N_S$ , because a message intended for  $i$  can be received by  $N_S - 1$  nodes other than  $i$  and  $k$ , whereas for  $p_s$  to be counted as a message received, a wake-up message can be received only by node  $i$ .

False alarms increase the power consumption of a sleep node ( $P_{t,fa}$ ), which is approximately

$$P_{t,fa} \approx \lambda p_{fa} \frac{1 - (1 - p_s)^m}{p_s} E_{fa}, \quad (9)$$

where  $\lambda$  is the rate of packet traffic,  $m$  is the maximum number of retransmissions, and  $E_{fa}$  is the energy spent by the target node to transmit a false acknowledgment and switch the main radio from a transmit mode to a receive mode.  $P_{t,fa}$  is proportional to  $p_{fa}$  and increases as  $p_b$  (and  $p_s$ ) is reduced.

## III. ANALYSIS

### A. Orthogonal Variable Spreading Factor Address Code

The OVSF code is used in 3G wireless communication to minimize interference between different wireless channels [15]. An OVSF sequence of length  $L$  can 1) support  $L$  distinct addresses, with each sequence separated from another by  $L/2$  bits; 2) correct up to  $\epsilon_{max} = L/4 - 1 - T$  bits, where  $T$  is an integer that can be adjusted digitally; and 3) be generated from an OVSF sequence of length  $L/2$ , as shown in (10).

$$[H_2] = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow [H_4] = \begin{bmatrix} H_2 & H_2 \\ H_2 & \overline{H_2} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (10)$$

$\overline{H_2}$  is the inverse of  $H_2$ . The shaded entries in (10) represent the *non-distinguishable positions* ( $N_p$ ) and are occupied by bits *shared* between two OVSF sequences. The non-shaded entries in (10) represent the *distinguishable positions* ( $D_p$ ) and are occupied by bits that distinguish two OVSF sequences.

### B. Detection Probability

$p_s$  is the probability that a wake-up message from node  $k$  is detected by node  $i$ :

$$p_s = \sum_{N_e=0}^{\frac{L}{4}-1-T} \binom{L}{N_e} p_e. \quad (11)$$

$N_e$  is the total number of errors in a sequence.  $p_e$  is

$$p_e = p_b^{N_e} (1 - p_b)^{L - N_e}. \quad (12)$$

$\binom{L}{N_e}$  represents different ways to distribute  $N_e$  errors among  $L$  bits of a sequence.  $p_e$  is the probability that one of the  $\binom{L}{N_e}$  sequences can occur.  $p_s$  is summed from  $N_e=0$  to  $N_e = \epsilon_{max}$ , because OVSF sequences can correct up to  $\epsilon_{max}$  errors.




Fig. 2. (a) Probability of generating simultaneous false alarms.  $\epsilon_{max}$  is  $\frac{L}{4} - T$ . (b) Probability of generating stand-alone false alarm as  $\epsilon_{max}$  is increased.  $L$  and  $T$  are 8 and 0, respectively in (a) and (b).

### C. False Alarms

1) *Definitions*:  $s_i$ ,  $s_j$  and  $s_k$  are the addresses of node  $i$ ,  $j$ , and  $k$ , respectively, in Fig. 1(b).  $s_i^*$  is  $s_i$  with  $N_e$  errors.  $N_{en}$  is the number of errors that  $s_i^*$  has in  $N_p$  (shaded elements in (10)) between  $s_i$  and  $s_j$ .  $N_{ed}$  is the number of errors that  $s_i^*$  has in  $D_p$  between  $s_i$  and  $s_j$ .  $N_{e,ij}$  is the number of mismatched bits between  $s_i^*$  and  $s_j$ .

2) *Observations*: Firstly,  $N_e = N_{en} + N_{ed}$ . Secondly, by closely examining  $s_i$ ,  $s_j$ , and  $s_i^*$ , it can be shown that

$$N_{e,ij} = N_{en} + \frac{L}{2} - N_{ed}. \quad (13)$$

Thirdly, a false alarm occurs when

$$N_{e,ij} \leq \frac{L}{4} - 1 - T. \quad (14)$$

Fourthly,  $s_i$  and  $s_j$  are different in  $D_p$ .  $N_{e,ij}$  is minimized when the number of errors in  $D_p$  is maximized. Fifthly, assuming that  $N_e$  is fixed, moving an error from a  $D_p$  to an  $N_p$  increases  $N_{e,ij}$  by two.

3) *Simultaneous False Alarms*: Increasing  $\epsilon_{max}$  above  $L/4 - 1 - T$  produces simultaneous false alarms. This phenomenon can be demonstrated step-by-step as follows: **1)** Choose  $s_i$  and  $s_j$  from  $N_S$  sleep nodes. **2)** Set  $\epsilon_{max}$  to  $N_{en} - N_{ed} + \frac{L}{2}$ . **3)** Determine  $N_{en}$  and  $N_{ed}$  using  $N_e$ . **4)** Identify  $\binom{\frac{L}{2}}{N_{en}} \binom{\frac{L}{2}}{N_{ed}}$  instances of  $s_i^*$  that generate false alarms. **5)** Choose a different  $s_j$  from the remaining sleep nodes and repeat step 1 through step 4. **6)** Count the number of false alarms generated by each instance of  $s_i^*$ . **7)** Compute the probability of creating  $s_i^*$  for a given  $p_b$ .

No simultaneous false alarm is observed when  $\epsilon_{max}$  is set to  $L/4 - 1 - T$ . Figure 2(a) shows that multiple nodes can be falsely awakened simultaneously when setting  $\epsilon_{max}$  to  $L/4 - T$ . The probability of multiple nodes being falsely awakened increases as  $p_b$  is increased. Figure 2(b) shows that reducing  $\epsilon_{max}$  from  $\frac{L}{4} - T$  to  $\frac{L}{4} - 1 - T$  leads to a lower probability of generating stand-alone false alarms, because sequences of  $s_i^*$  satisfying  $N_{e,ij} = L/4$  can also generate stand-alone false alarms. The probability of generating a stand-alone false alarm increases as  $p_b$  is increased.

### D. False Alarm Probability

$p_{i \rightarrow j}$  is the probability that node  $j$  will be awakened by a wake-up message intended for node  $i$  sent from node  $k$ .

$$p_{i \rightarrow j} = p_{ij,1} + p_{ij,2} + p_{ij,3}. \quad (15)$$

$p_{ij,1}$ ,  $p_{ij,2}$ , and  $p_{ij,3}$  are derived below.

1)  $\frac{L}{4} + 1 + T \leq N_e \leq \frac{L}{2} - 1$ :  $N_e$  is less than  $L/2$ .  $N_e$  errors can fit in some if not all  $L/2$   $D_p$ .  $p_{ij,1}$  is

$$p_{ij,1} = \sum_{N_e = \frac{L}{4} + 1 + T}^{\frac{L}{2} - 1} \sum_{N_{en} = 0}^{\lfloor \frac{N_e - (\frac{L}{4} + 1 + T)}{2} \rfloor} \binom{L/2}{N_{en}} \binom{L/2}{N_e - N_{en}} p_e. \quad (16)$$

$\binom{L/2}{N_{en}} \binom{L/2}{N_e - N_{en}}$  describes the number of ways of introducing errors in  $N_p$  and  $D_p$ . The floor operator ( $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$ ) is used if  $\frac{N_e - (L/4 + 1)}{2}$  is not an integer. The constraint on  $T$  is determined by forcing the maximum index of  $N_e$  to be equal to or greater than the minimum index of  $N_e$ , that is,

$$T \leq \frac{L}{4} - 2. \quad (17)$$

Therefore,  $T$  is less than or equal to 2 for  $L = 16$ .

2)  $N_e = \frac{L}{2}$ : With  $N_e = \frac{L}{2}$ ,  $p_{ij,2}$  is

$$p_{ij,2} = \sum_{N_{en} = 0}^{\lfloor \frac{\frac{L}{2} - 1 - T}{2} \rfloor} \binom{L/2}{N_{en}} \binom{L/2}{N_{en}} p_e. \quad (18)$$

As  $N_e = \frac{L}{2}$ ,  $\binom{L/2}{N_e - N_{en}} = \binom{L/2}{N_{en}}$ .  $\binom{L/2}{N_{en}} \binom{L/2}{N_{en}}$  describes the number of ways of introducing errors in  $N_p$  and  $D_p$ . The maximum index of  $N_{en}$  is obtained by replacing the maximum index of  $N_{en}$  in (16) with  $N_e = \frac{L}{2}$ .

3)  $L/2 + 1 \leq N_e \leq 3/4L - 1 - T$ : Sequences with  $\frac{L}{2} < N_e \leq \frac{3}{4}L - 1$  do not have sufficient  $D_p$  to accommodate  $N_e$  errors.  $p_{ij,3}$  is

$$p_{ij,3} = \sum_{N_e = \frac{L}{2} + 1}^{\frac{3L}{4} - 1 - T} \sum_{N_{en} = N_e - \frac{L}{2}}^{\lfloor \frac{N_e - (\frac{L}{4} + 1 + T)}{2} \rfloor} \binom{L/2}{N_{en}} \binom{L/2}{N_e - N_{en}} p_e. \quad (19)$$

The minimum index of  $N_{en}$  is obtained by allowing errors to fill all of  $D_p$ . As  $N_e > L/2$ , the remaining error (i.e.,  $N_e - L/2$ ) must occupy  $N_p$ . The minimum index of  $N_{en}$  is therefore  $N_e - L/2$ . Equation (13) shows that  $N_{e,ij} = N_{en}$  if all of the  $D_p$  are filled with errors to minimize  $N_{e,ij}$ . The maximum index of  $N_e$  is obtained by setting  $N_{e,ij}$  equal to  $N_e - L/2$  and applying the constraint in (14).

### E. Comparison of $p_{ij}$

$\Delta p_{i \rightarrow j}$ , defined as  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$  (calculated using (15)) subtracted from  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$  (calculated using [13]), is

$$\Delta p_{i \rightarrow j} = \sum_{m=0}^4 \binom{8}{m} \binom{8}{m+4} p_e (N_e = 2m + 4) \quad (20)$$

for  $L = 16$ . Figure 3 shows  $\Delta p_{i \rightarrow j} / p_{i \rightarrow j}$  as a function of  $p_b$  and reveals that the  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$  derived in [13] is higher than that calculated using (15), due to the assumption that  $\epsilon_{max}$  is  $\frac{L}{4}$ .




Fig. 3.  $\Delta p_{i \rightarrow j} / p_{i \rightarrow j}$  as a function of  $p_b$ .

#### F. Sequences That Do Not Turn On Wake-up Receivers

Some sequences of  $s_i^*$  contribute to neither  $p_s$  nor  $p_{i \rightarrow j}$ . They have  $N_e$  within the following ranges.

1)  $\frac{L}{4} - T \leq N_e \leq \frac{L}{4} + T$ :  $N_e$  is less than the number of  $D_p$ . Therefore, all of the  $N_e$  occupy  $D_p$ .

2)  $\frac{3}{4}L - T \leq N_e \leq L$ :  $N_e$  is greater than the number of  $D_p$ . Therefore, some of the  $N_e$  occupy  $N_p$ .

In both cases, neither a detection nor a false alarm is generated because  $N_{e,ij}$  and  $N_e$  are greater than  $\epsilon_{max}$ .

### IV. RESULTS

#### A. Simulation Results

$p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$  are determined using Xcelium simulation and Python post-processing. First, a target node ( $s_i$ ) and a source node ( $s_k$ ) are chosen. Then each sequence arriving at  $N_S$  decoders is classified as a detection, a false alarm, or an invalid sequence. With  $L$  equal to 16, there are 65,536 possible sequences. The Xcelium execution time is approximately 10 seconds. Finally, a python script post-processes the Xcelium log file and calculates  $p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$ .

Figure 4(a) shows close agreement between  $p_s$  calculated using (11) and the simulated  $p_s$ . Figure 4(b) shows the agreement between  $p_{fa}$  calculated using (8) and (15) and the simulated  $p_{fa}$ . The close agreement between simulation and calculation in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) suggest that  $p_s$  and  $p_{fa}$  are accurately modeled by (11) and (8).

Figure 4(c) compares the normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms ( $P_{t,fa}/(\lambda E_{fa})$ ) calculated using  $\epsilon_{max} = \frac{L}{4} - 1 - T$  with that obtained from [13] and shows that the maximum  $P_{t,fa}/(\lambda E_{fa})$  is reduced by 16.9 dB.

Figure 4(d) shows that  $T$  can be increased to improve  $p_{fa}$ . For a given  $p_b$ ,  $p_s$  is reduced as  $T$  is increased. Figure 4(e) shows a slight increase in the normalized energy consumed by a source node in sending a wake-up packet as  $T$  is increased and  $p_s$  is reduced. For a given  $p_b$ ,  $p_{fa}$  is reduced as  $T$  is increased. Figure 4(f) shows that the maximum  $P_{t,fa}/(\lambda E_{fa})$  can be decreased by 16.08 dB by increasing  $T$  to reduce  $p_{fa}$ .

#### B. Implementation Issues

The address decoder is illustrated in Fig. 5(a). During the *error counting* phase, the Bit Compare is enabled while the Activation Logic is disabled.  $D$  is compared one bit at a time to ADDR[INDEX].  $y$  is set to 1 and  $N_{eij}$  is incremented for a mismatch.  $y$  is set to 0 and  $N_{eij}$  is unchanged for a match.




Fig. 4.  $L$  and  $T$  are 16 and 0, respectively. (a) Comparison of calculated and simulated  $p_s$ . (b) Comparison of calculated and simulated  $p_{fa}$ .  $N_S$  is 7. (c) The normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms as a function of  $p_b$ .  $N_S$  is 2. (d)  $p_s$  versus  $p_{fa}$ . (e) The normalized energy consumed by a source node to send a packet versus  $p_b$ .  $m = 3$ . (f) The normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms versus  $p_b$ .  $N_S$  is 15 for (d), (e), and (f).




Fig. 5. (a) Counter-based implementation of an OVFSF address decoder. (b) Post-layout simulation.

During the *evaluation* phase, the Bit Compare is disabled, the Error Counter is disabled,  $N_{eij}$  is not changed, and the Activation Logic is enabled.  $Q$  is set to 1 if  $N_{eij} \leq \frac{L}{4} - 1 - T$  and  $T \leq \frac{L}{4} - 2$ . Otherwise,  $Q$  is set to 0.

[16] defines an equivalent logic gate as having four transistors. It is desirable to minimize uses of  $D$  flip-flops (DFFs), since each DFF uses as many as seven logic gates [16]. The counter-based implementation in Fig. 5(a) reduces the

equivalent gate count, area, and power consumption ( $P_D$ ) by **1**) not shifting bits through DFFs as was done in [8] and [12] and **2**) not requiring oversampling (e.g. [8]) or logic gates for implementing asymmetry in error correction (e.g. [12]).

The OVFSF address decoder is synthesized from its Verilog description as follows. **1**) A synthesized netlist is created using Genus with standard cells from a 0.18  $\mu\text{m}$  TSMC design kit. **2**) The synthesized netlist is placed and routed using Innovus. **3**) The layout is exported to a GDS file and imported into Virtuoso. **4**) The parasitics are extracted with Quantus after checking the layout for DRC and LVS errors using Assura.

With a  $V_{DD}$  of 0.4 V, the subthreshold address decoder is simulated with the layout parasitics at 200 bps. Figure 5(b) shows the output  $Q(t)$  of the decoder as the number of errors in sequences is increased incrementally from 0 to 4. Fig. 5(b) shows that **1**) as  $T$  is changed from 0 to 3, the number of interrupts is reduced. **2**) the address decoder can correct up to  $L/4 - 1 - T$  errors.

Table I shows the comparison with the state-of-the-art designs. The latency of the counter-based design is 80 ms for a data rate of 200 bps. The  $P_D$  is 0.26 nW, compared to 0.77 nW and 0.8 nW reported in [8] and [12]. The energy per bit for each address decoder is calculated at 200 bps. Table I shows that the energy-per-bit calculation for the counter-based design is 1.3 pJ/bit compared to 3.85 pJ/bit and 4.00 pJ/bit reported in [8] and [12].

TABLE I  
COMPARISON WITH THE STATE-OF-THE-ART DIGITAL CORRELATORS.

Ref	This Work	[8]	[12]
Architecture	Synchronized OVFSF	Oversampling	Bit-level duty cycling
Tech.	CMOS	CMOS SOI	CMOS
Process (nm)	180	180	130
Implementation	Post-layout	Measured	Measured
$V_{DD}$ (V)	0.4	0.4	0.6
$P_D$ (nW)	0.26	0.77	0.8
$L$ (bits)	16	16	16.5
Data rate (bps)	200	300	200
Gate count	126.5	543 <sup>1</sup>	167 <sup>1</sup>
Area ( $\mu\text{m}^2$ )	1,341	4,996 <sup>1</sup>	1,748 <sup>1</sup>
Latency (ms)	80	80	82.5
Energy/bit (pJ)	1.30	3.85 <sup>2</sup>	4.00

<sup>1</sup> Determined from post-synthesis reports.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated at 200 bps using  $P_D$  reported in [8] since  $P_D$  is dominated by leakage power.

## V. CONCLUSION

This brief establishes a framework for analyzing the detection and false alarm probabilities of OVFSF address decoders. It also demonstrates that limiting the number of correctable errors reduces the false alarm probability, eliminates the simultaneous false alarms, and improves the maximum normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms by 16.9 dB. The mathematical expressions are presented so that the detection probability, the false alarm probability, and the normalized power consumption of a sleep node due to false alarms can be adjusted digitally, yielding a reconfigurable counter-based implementation that reduces the energy-per-bit of the address decoder by a factor of 2.96.

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