# Bisimulations for intuitionistic TEMPORAL LOGICS 

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#### Abstract

We introduce bisimulations for the logic ITLe with O ('next'), $\mathcal{U}$ ('until') and $\mathcal{R}$ ('release'), an intuitionistic temporal logic based on structures ( $W, \leqslant, S$ ), where $\leqslant$ is used to interpret intuitionistic implication and $S$ is a $\leqslant$-monotone function used to interpret the temporal modalities. Our main results are that $\diamond$ ('eventually'), which is definable in terms of $\mathcal{U}$, cannot be defined in terms of $O$ and $\square$, and similarly that $\square$ ('henceforth'), definable in terms of $\mathcal{R}$, cannot be defined in terms of $O$ and $\mathcal{U}$, even over the smaller class of here-and-there models.


[^0]
## 1 Introduction

The definition and study of full combinations of modal [5] and intuitionistic [6, 23] logics can be quite challenging [30], and temporal logics, such as LTL [28], are no exception. Some intuitionistic analogues of temporal logics have been proposed, including logics with 'past' and 'future' tenses [9], or with 'next' [7, 19] and 'henceforth' [17]. We proposed an alternative formulation in [4], where we defined the logics ITL ${ }^{e}$ and ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{p}}$ using semantics similar to those of expanding and persistent products of modal logics, respectively [13], and the tenses $\circ$ ('next'), $\diamond$ ('eventually'), and $\square$ ('henceforth'). ITLe in particular differs from previous proposals (e.g. [9, 27]) in that we consider minimal frame conditions that allow for all formulas to be upward-closed under the intuitionistic preorder, which we denote $\leqslant$. We then showed that ITLe with $O$ ('next'), $\diamond$ ('eventually'), and $\square$ ('henceforth') is decidable, thus obtaining the first intuitionistic analogue of LTL which contains the three tenses, is conservative over propositional intuitionistic logic, is interpreted over unbounded time, and is known to be decidable.

Note that both $\diamond$ and $\square$ are taken as primitives, in contrast with the classical case, where $\diamond \varphi$ may be defined by $\diamond \varphi \equiv \neg \square \neg \varphi$, whereas the latter equivalence is not intuitionistically valid. The same situation holds in the more expressive language with $\mathcal{U}$ ('until'): while the language with O and $\mathcal{U}$ is equally expressive to classical monadic first-order logic with $\leq$ over $\mathbb{N}$ [12, $\mathcal{U}$ admits a first-order definable intuitionistic dual, $\mathcal{R}$ ('release'), which cannot be defined in terms of $\mathcal{U}$ using the classical definition. However, this is not enough to conclude that $\mathcal{R}$ cannot be defined in a different way. Thus, while in [4] we explored the question of decidability, here we will focus on definability; which of the modal operators can be defined in terms of the others?

Following Simpson [30] and other authors, we interpret the language of ITLe using bi-relational structures, with a partial order $\leqslant$ to interpret intuitionistic implication, and a function or relation, which we denote $S$, representing the passage of time. Alternatively, one may consider topological interpretations [8], but we will not discuss those here. Various intuitionistic temporal logics have been considered, using variants of these semantics and different formal languages. The main contributions include:

- Davies' intuitionistic temporal logic with O [7] was provided Kripke semantics and a complete deductive system by Kojima and Igarashi [19].
- Logics with $O, \square$ were axiomatized by Kamide and Wansing [17], where $\square$ was interpreted over bounded time.
- Nishimura [25] provided a sound and complete axiomatization for an intuitionistic variant of the propositional dynamic logic PDL.
- Balbiani and Diéguez axiomatized the here-and-there variant of LTL with $\bigcirc, \diamond, \square[2]$, here denoted ITL ${ }^{\text {ht }}$.
- Fernández-Duque [10] proved the decidability of a logic based on topological semantics with $\bigcirc, \diamond$ and a universal modality.
- The authors [4] proved that the logic ITLe with $O, \diamond, \square$ has the strong finite model property and hence is decidable, yet the logic ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{p}}$, based on a more restrictive class of frames, does not enjoy the fmp.

In this paper, we extend $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ to include $\mathcal{U}$ ('until') and $\mathcal{R}$ ('release'). As is well-known, $\diamond \varphi \equiv \top \mathcal{U} \varphi$ and $\square \varphi \equiv \perp \mathcal{R} \varphi$; these equivalences remain valid in the intuitionistic setting, but many of the tenses are no longer inter-definable as in the classical case. To show this, we will introduce different notions of bisimulation which preserve formulas with $O$ and each of $\diamond, \square, \mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{R}$. With this, we will show that $\mathcal{R}$ (or even $\square$ ) may not be defined in terms of $\mathcal{U}$ over the class of here-and-there models, while $\diamond$ can be defined in terms of $\square$, and $\mathcal{U}$ can be defined in terms of $\mathcal{R}$ over this class. However, we show that over the wider class of expanding models, $\diamond$ cannot be defined in terms of $\square$.

## 2 Syntax and semantics

We will work in sublanguages of the language $\mathcal{L}$ given by the following grammar:

$$
\varphi, \psi:=p|\perp| \varphi \wedge \psi|\varphi \vee \psi| \varphi \rightarrow \psi|\bigcirc \varphi| \diamond \varphi|\square \varphi| \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \mid \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi
$$

where $p$ is an element of a countable set of propositional variables $\mathbb{P}$. All sublanguages we will consider include all Boolean operators and $\bigcirc$, hence we denote them by displaying the additional connectives as a subscript; for example, $\mathcal{L}_{\diamond \square}$ denotes the $\mathcal{U}$-free, $\mathcal{R}$-free fragment. As an exception to this general convention, $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{O}}$ denotes the fragment without $\diamond, \square, \mathcal{U}$ or $\mathcal{R}$. As in the propositional case, $\neg \varphi \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \varphi \rightarrow 1$.

Given any formula $\varphi$, we define the length of $\varphi$ (in symbols, $|\varphi|$ ) recursively as follows:

- $|p|=|\perp|=0 ;$
- $|\phi \odot \psi|=1+|\phi|+|\psi|$, with $\odot \in\{\vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{U}\}$;
- $|\odot \psi|=1+|\psi|$, with $\odot \in\{\neg, \bigcirc, \square, \diamond\}$.

Broadly speaking, the length of a formula $\varphi$ corresponds to the number of connectives appearing in $\varphi$.

### 2.1 Dynamic posets

Formulas of $\mathcal{L}$ are interpreted over dynamic posets. A dynamic poset is a tuple $\mathcal{D}=(W, \leqslant, S)$, where $W$ is a non-empty set of states, $\leqslant$ is a partial order, and $S$ is a function from $W$ to $W$ satisfying the forward confluence condition that for all $w, v \in W$, if $w \leqslant v$ then $S(w) \leqslant S(v)$. An intuitionistic dynamic model, or simply model, is a tuple $\mathcal{M}=(W, \preccurlyeq, S, V)$ consisting of a dynamic poset equipped with a valuation function $V$ from $W$ to sets of propositional variables that is $\leqslant-$ monotone, in the sense that for all $w, v \in W$, if $w \leqslant v$ then $V(w) \subseteq V(v)$. In the standard way, we define $S^{0}(w)=w$ and, for all $k>0, S^{k}(w)=S\left(S^{k-1}(w)\right)$. Then we define the satisfaction relation $\vDash$ inductively by:

1. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash p$ iff $p \in V(w)$;
2. $\mathcal{M}, w \neq \perp ;$
3. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \wedge \psi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \psi ;$
4. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \vee \psi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi$ or $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \psi ;$
5. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash O \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \vDash \varphi$;
6. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ iff $\forall v \geqslant w$, if $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash$ $\varphi$, then $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \psi$;
7. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \diamond \varphi$ iff there exists $k$ s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \varphi ;$
8. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \square \varphi$ iff for all $k, \mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash$ $\varphi ;$
9. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ iff there exists $k \geq$ 0 s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \psi$ and $\forall i \in$ $[0, k), \mathcal{M}, S^{i}(w) \vDash \varphi ;$
10. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$ iff for all $k \geq 0$, either $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \psi$, or $\exists i \in[0, k)$ s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{i}(w) \vDash \varphi$.

As usual, a formula $\varphi$ is satisfiable over a class of models $\Omega$ if there is a model $\mathcal{M} \in \Omega$ and a world $w$ of $\mathcal{M}$ so that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi$, and valid over $\Omega$ if, for every world $w$ of every model $\mathcal{M} \in \Omega, \mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi$. Satisfiability (validity) over the class of models based on an arbitrary dynamic poset will be called satisfiability (validity) for ITLe, or expanding domain linear temporal logic ${ }_{\square}^{1}$

The relation between dynamic posets and expanding products of modal logics is detailed in [4], where the following is also shown. Below, we use the notation $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket=\{w \in W \mid \mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi\}$.

Lemma 2.1. Let $\mathcal{D}=(W, \leqslant, S)$, where $(W, \leqslant)$ is a poset and $S: W \rightarrow W$ is any function. Then, $\mathcal{D}$ is a dynamic poset if and only if, for every valuation $V$ on $W$ and every formula $\varphi, \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ is $\preccurlyeq-$ monotone, i.e., if $w \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ and $v \geqslant w$, then $v \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$.

Proof. The left to right direction is proved by induction on $\varphi$. The case of $\varphi \in \mathbb{P}$ is proved by using the condition on $V$. The rest of the inductive steps are routine. For

[^1]instance, let us consider the case of $\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ and suppose that $v \geqslant w$ and $w \in \llbracket \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \rrbracket$. Then, there exists $k \geq 0$ such that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \psi$ and for all $0 \leq j<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{j}(w) \vDash \varphi$. Since $S$ is confluent, an easy induction shows that $S^{i}(v) \geqslant S^{i}(w)$ for all $0 \leq i \leq k$. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we get $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(v) \vDash \psi$ and for all $0 \leq j<k$, $\mathcal{M}, S^{j}(v) \vDash \varphi$, hence $v \in \llbracket \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \rrbracket$. For the converse direction we assume that $\mathcal{D}=$ $(W, \preccurlyeq, S)$ and $w, v \in W$ such that $v \geqslant w$ and $S(w) \neq S(v)$. Take $p \in \mathbb{P}$ and define $V(u)=\{p\}$ if $S(w) \leqslant u, V(u)=\varnothing$ otherwise. It is easy to see that $V$ is $\leqslant-$ monotone, but $p \notin V(S(v)$ ) (because $S(w) \neq S(v)$ ) and $p \in V(S(w)$ ) (because $S(w) \leqslant S(w)$ ), from which it follows that $(\mathcal{D}, V), w \vDash O p$ but $(\mathcal{D}, V), v \neq O p$.

This suggests that dynamic posets provide suitable semantics for intuitionistic LTL. Moreover, dynamic posets are convenient from a technical point of view:

Theorem 2.2 ([4]). There exists a computable function $B$ such that any formula $\varphi \epsilon$ $\mathcal{L}_{\diamond \square}$ satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) on an arbitrary model is satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) on a model whose size is bounded by $B(|\varphi|)$.

It follows that the $\mathcal{L}_{\diamond \square}$-fragment of ITL ${ }^{e}$ is decidable. Moreover, as we will see below, many of the familiar axioms of classical LTL are valid over the class of dynamic posets, making them a natural choice of semantics for intuitionistic LTL.

### 2.2 Persistent posets

Despite the advantages of dynamic posets, in the literature one typically considers a more restrictive class of frames, as we define them below.

Definition 2.3. Let $(W, \preccurlyeq)$ be a poset. If $S: W \rightarrow W$ is such that, whenever $v \geqslant$ $S(w)$, there is $u \geqslant w$ such that $v=S(u)$, we say that $S$ is backward confluent. If $S$ is both forward and backward confluent, we say that it is persistent. A tuple $(W, \preccurlyeq, S)$ where $S$ is persistent is a persistent intuitionistic temporal frame, and the set of valid formulas over the class of persistent intuitionistic temporal frames is denoted ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{p}}$, or persistent domain LTL.

As we will see, persistent frames do have some technical advantages over arbitrary dynamic posets. Nevertheless, they have a crucial disadvantage:

Theorem 2.4 ([4]). The logic ITL $^{\mathrm{p}}$ does not have the finite model property, even for formulas in $\mathcal{L}_{\diamond \square}$.

### 2.3 Temporal here-and-there models

An even smaller class of models which, nevertheless, has many applications is that of temporal here-and-there models [2]. Some of the results we will present here apply to this class, so it will be instructive to review it. Recall that the logic of here-andthere is the maximal logic strictly between classical and intuitionistic propositional logic, given by a frame $\{0,1\}$ with $0 \leqslant 1$. The logic of here-and-there is obtained by adding to intuitionistic propositional logic the axiom $p \vee(p \rightarrow q) \vee \neg q$.

A temporal here-and-there frame is a persistent frame that is 'locally' based on this frame. We can define here-and-there models using the following construction.

Definition 2.5. Let $T$ be a set and $f: T \rightarrow T$. We define a dynamic poset $\mathrm{HT}(T, f)=$ $(W, \preccurlyeq, S)$, with $W=T \times\{0,1\},(t, i) \leqslant(s, j)$ if and only if $t=s$ and $i \leq j$, and $S(t, i)=(f(t), i)$.

The prototypical example is the frame $\operatorname{HT}(\mathbb{N}, f)$, where $f(n)=n+1$. Note, however, that our definition allows for other values of $T$ (see Figure 1]. In [2], this logic is axiomatized, and it is shown that $\square$ cannot be defined in terms of $\diamond$, a result we will strengthen here to show that $\square$ cannot be defined even in terms of $\mathcal{U}$. It is also claimed in [2] that $\diamond$ is not definable in terms of $\square$ over the class of here-and-there models, but as we will see in Proposition 6.3, this claim is incorrect.

## 3 Some valid and non-valid ITLe-formulas

In this section we explore which axioms of classical LTL are still valid in our setting. We start by showing that the intuitionistic version of the interaction and induction axioms used in [2] remain valid in our setting. However, not all Fisher-Servi axioms [11], which are valid in the here-and-there LTL of [2], are valid in ITLe .

Proposition 3.1. The following formulas:

1. $O \perp \leftrightarrow \perp$
2. $O(\varphi \wedge \psi) \leftrightarrow(O \varphi \wedge O \psi)$;
3. $O(\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow(O \varphi \vee O \psi)$;
4. $O(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow(O \varphi \rightarrow O \psi)$;
5. $\square(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow(\square \varphi \rightarrow \square \psi)$;
6. $\square(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow(\diamond \varphi \rightarrow \diamond \psi)$;
7. $\diamond(\varphi \vee \psi) \rightarrow(\diamond \varphi \vee \diamond \psi)$;
8. $\square \varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi \wedge \bigcirc \square \varphi$;
9. $\varphi \vee \bigcirc \diamond \varphi \leftrightarrow \diamond \varphi$;
10. $\square(\varphi \rightarrow O \varphi) \rightarrow(\varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi)$
11. $\square(O \varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow(\diamond \varphi \rightarrow \varphi)$.
are $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$-valid.

Proof. Let us consider (10) and (11). For (10), let $\mathcal{M}=(W, \leqslant, S)$ be any ITLe model and $w \in W$ be such that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \square(\varphi \rightarrow O \varphi)$. Let $v \geqslant w$ be arbitrary and assume that $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \varphi$. Then, by induction on $i$ we obtain that $S^{i}(w) \leqslant S^{i}(v)$ for all $i$; since $\mathcal{M}, S^{i}(w) \vDash \varphi \rightarrow O \varphi$ for all $i$, it follows that $\mathcal{M}, S^{i}(v) \vDash \varphi \rightarrow O \varphi$ for all $i$ as well. Hence an easy induction shows that $\mathcal{M}, S^{i}(v) \vDash \varphi$ for all $i$, which means that $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \square \varphi$. Since $w$ was arbitrary, we conclude that the formula 10 is valid.

For (11), let $\mathcal{M}$ be as above and $w \in W$ be such that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \square(O \varphi \rightarrow \varphi)$. Let $v \geqslant w$ be such that $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \diamond \varphi$, and let $n$ be least so that $\mathcal{M}, S^{n}(v) \vDash \varphi$. If $n>0$ then from $O \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ we obtain $\mathcal{M}, S^{n-1}(v) \vDash \varphi$, contradicting the minimality of $n$. We conclude that $n=0$, hence $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \varphi$.

The proofs for the rest of formulas are standard.
Some of the well-known Fisher Servi axioms [11] are only valid on the class of persistent frames.

Proposition 3.2. The formulas

$$
\text { 1. }(O \varphi \rightarrow O \psi) \rightarrow O(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \quad \text { 2. }(\diamond \varphi \rightarrow \square \psi) \rightarrow \square(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)
$$

are not ITL $^{\mathrm{e}}$-valid. However they are ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{p}}$-valid.
Proof. Let $\{p, q\}$ be a set of propositional variables and let us consider the ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{e}}$ model $\mathcal{M}=(W, \leqslant, S, V)$ defined as: 1) $W=\{w, v, u\}$; 2) $S(w)=v, S(v)=v$ and $S(u)=u$; 3) $v \leqslant u ; 4) V(p)=\{u\}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{M}, u \not \vDash p \rightarrow q$, so $\mathcal{M}, v \neq p \rightarrow q$. By definition, $\mathcal{M}, w \not \vDash \circ(p \rightarrow q)$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \not \approx \square(p \rightarrow q)$; however, it can easily be checked that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash O p \rightarrow O q$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \diamond p \rightarrow \square q$, so $\mathcal{M}, w \neq(O p \rightarrow O q) \rightarrow O(p \rightarrow q)$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \neq(\diamond p \rightarrow \square q) \rightarrow \square(p \rightarrow q)$.

Let us check their validity over the class of persistent frames. For (11), let $\mathcal{M}=$ $(W, \preccurlyeq, S, V)$ be an ITL ${ }^{p}$ model and $w$ a world of $\mathcal{M}$ such that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash O \varphi \rightarrow O \psi$. Suppose that $v \geqslant S(w)$ satisfies $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \varphi$. By backward confluence, there exists $u \geqslant w$ such that $v=S(u)$, so that $\mathcal{M}, u \vDash \bigcirc \varphi$ and thus $\mathcal{M}, u \vDash \bigcirc \psi$. But this means that $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \psi$, and since $v \geqslant S(w)$ was arbitrary, $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \vDash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, i.e. $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash$ $\bigcirc(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.

Similarly, for (2) let us assume that $\mathcal{M}=(W, \leqslant, S, V)$ is an ITLp model and $w$ a world of $\mathcal{M}$ such that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \diamond \varphi \rightarrow \square \psi$. Consider arbitrary $k \in \mathbb{N}$, and suppose that $v \geqslant S^{k}(w)$ is such that $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \varphi$. Then, it is readily checked that the composition of backward confluent functions is backward confluent, so that in particular $S^{k}$ is backward confluent. This means that there is $u \geqslant w$ such that $S^{k}(u)=v$. But then, $\mathcal{M}, u \vDash \diamond \varphi$, hence $\mathcal{M}, u \vDash \square \psi$, and $\mathcal{M}, v \vDash \psi$. It follows that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, and since $k$ was arbitrary, $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \square(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.

We make a special mention of the schema $\square(\square \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vee \square(\square \psi \rightarrow \varphi)$, which characterises the class of weakly connected frames [14] in classical modal logic. We say that a frame $(W, R, V)$ is weakly connected iff it satisfies the following first-order property: for every $x, y, z \in W$, if $x R y$ and $x R z$, then either $y R z, y=z$, or $z R y$.

Proposition 3.3. The axiom schema $\square(\square \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vee \square(\square \psi \rightarrow \varphi)$ is not $\mathrm{ITL}^{\text {ht }}$-valid.
Proof. Let us consider the set of propositional variables $\{p, q\}, T=\{0,1\}, f: T \rightarrow T$ be given by $f(x)=1$, and let $\mathcal{M}=(W, \leqslant, S, V)$ be the here-and-there model based on $\operatorname{HT}(T, f)$ with $V(p)=\{(0,1),(1,1)\}$ and $V(q)=\{(1,0),(1,1)\}$. The reader can check that $\mathcal{M},(0,0) \not \vDash \square p \rightarrow q$ and $\mathcal{M},(0,1) \not \vDash \square q \rightarrow p$. Consequently, $\mathcal{M}, w \neq$ $\square(\square p \rightarrow q) \vee \square(\square q \rightarrow p)$.

Finally, we show that $\diamond \varphi$ (resp. $\square \varphi)$ can be defined in terms of $\mathcal{U}$ (resp. $\mathcal{R}$ ) and the LTL axioms involving $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{R}$ are also valid in our setting:

Proposition 3.4. The following formulas are ITL $^{\mathrm{e}}$-valid:

1. $\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \leftrightarrow \psi \vee(\varphi \wedge O(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi))$;
2. $\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi \leftrightarrow \psi \wedge(\varphi \vee \circ(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi))$;
3. $\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \rightarrow \diamond \psi$;
4. $\square \psi \rightarrow \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi ;$
5. $\diamond \varphi \leftrightarrow T \mathcal{U} \varphi ;$
6. $\square \varphi \leftrightarrow \perp \mathcal{R} \varphi$;
7. $O(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi) \leftrightarrow O \varphi \mathcal{U} O \psi$;
8. $O(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi) \leftrightarrow O \varphi \mathcal{R} O \psi$.

Proof. We consider some cases below. For (11), from left to right, let us assume that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$. Therefore there exists $k \geq 0$ s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \psi$ and for all $j$ satisfying $0 \leq j<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{j}(w) \vDash \varphi$. If $k=0$ then $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \psi$ while, if $k>0$ it follows that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$. Therefore $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \psi \vee(\varphi \wedge \circ(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi))$. From right to left, if $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \psi$ then $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ by definition. If $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \wedge \circ(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi)$ then $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ so, due to the semantics, we conclude that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$. In any case, $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$.

For (2), we work by contrapositive. From right to left, let us assume that $\mathcal{M}, w \neq$ $\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$. Therefore there exists $k \geq 0$ s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \not \vDash \psi$ and for all $j$ satisfying $0 \leq j<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{j}(w) \not \approx \varphi$. If $k=0$ then $\mathcal{M}, w \not \approx \psi$ while, if $k>0$ it follows that $\mathcal{M}, w \not \vDash \varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \notin \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$. In any case, $\mathcal{M}, w \not \approx \psi \wedge(\varphi \vee \circ(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi))$. From left to right, if $\mathcal{M}, w \not \not \neq \psi$ then $\mathcal{M}, w \neq \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$ by definition. If $\mathcal{M}, w \nexists \varphi \vee O(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi)$ then $\mathcal{M}, w \not \not \neq \varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \notin \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ so, due to the semantics of $\mathcal{R}$, we conclude that $\mathcal{M}, w \nexists \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$. In any case, $\mathcal{M}, w \neq \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$.

For (7), from left to right, let us assume that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash O(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi)$. Therefore there exists $k \geq 0$ s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{k+1}(w) \vDash \psi$ and for all $j$ satisfying $0 \leq j<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{j+1}(w) \vDash \varphi$. It follows from $\mathcal{M}, S^{k+1}(w) \vDash \psi$ that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash O \psi$, and from $\mathcal{M}, S^{j+1}(w) \vDash \varphi$
that $\mathcal{M}, S^{j}(w) \vDash O \varphi$ for all $j<k$. We conclude that $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \bigcirc \varphi \mathcal{U} \bigcirc \psi$. Conversely, if $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \bigcirc \varphi \mathcal{U} \bigcirc \psi$, then there is $k \geq 0$ so that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \vDash \bigcirc \psi$ and, for all $i<k$, $\mathcal{M}, S^{i}(w) \vDash O \varphi$. It follows that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k+1}(w) \vDash \psi$ and, for all $i<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{i+1}(w) \vDash \varphi$, witnessing that $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \vDash \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \vDash \bigcirc(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi)$.

For (8), we proceed similarly, but work by contrapositive. From right to left, let us assume that $\mathcal{M}, w \not \approx \bigcirc(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi)$. Therefore there exists $k \geq 0$ s.t. $\mathcal{M}, S^{k+1}(w) \not \vDash \psi$ and for all $j$ satisfying $0 \leq j<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{j+1}(w) \not \vDash \varphi$. This implies that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \not \vDash O \psi$ and for all $j$ satisfying $0 \leq j<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{j}(w) \not \vDash O \varphi$, hence $\mathcal{M}, w \neq \circ(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi)$. Similarly, if $\mathcal{M}, w \not \approx \bigcirc(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi)$ then any $k \geq 0$ so that $\mathcal{M}, S^{k}(w) \notin \bigcirc \psi$ and, for all $i<k$, $\mathcal{M}, S^{i}(w) \not \vDash \bigcirc \varphi$ yields $\mathcal{M}, S^{k+1}(w) \not \vDash \psi$ and, for all $i<k, \mathcal{M}, S^{i+1}(w) \not \vDash \varphi$, witnessing that $\mathcal{M}, S(w) \nRightarrow \varphi \mathcal{R} \psi$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \neq \bigcirc(\varphi \mathcal{R} \psi)$.

The proof of the remaining items is routine.
As in the classical case, over the class of persistent models we can 'push down' all occurrences of $O$ to the propositional level. Say that a formula $\varphi$ is in O-normal form if all occurrences of O are of the form $\bigcirc^{i} p$, with $p$ a propositional variable.

Theorem 3.5. Given $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$, there exists $\widetilde{\varphi}$ in $\bigcirc$-normal form such that $\varphi \leftrightarrow \widetilde{\varphi}$ is valid over the class of persistent models.

Proof. The claim can be proven by structural induction using the validities in Propositions $3.1,3.2$ and 3.4 .

We remark that the only reason that this argument does not apply to arbitrary ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{e}}$ models is the fact that $(\mathrm{O} \varphi \rightarrow \mathrm{O}) \rightarrow \mathrm{O}(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ is not valid in general (Proposition 3.2).

## 4 Bounded bisimulations for $\diamond$ and $\square$

In this section we adapt the classical definition of bounded bisimulations for modal logic [3] to our case. To do so we combine the ordinary definition of bounded bisimulations with the work of [26] on bisimulations for propositional intuitionistic logic. Such work introduces extra conditions involving the partial order $\leqslant$. In our setting, we combine both approaches in order to define bisimulation for a language involving $\diamond$, $\square$ and $\bigcirc$ as modal operators plus an intuitionistic $\rightarrow$. Since all languages we consider contain Booleans and $O$, it is convenient to begin with a 'basic' notion of bisimulation for this language.

Definition 4.1. Given $n>0$ and two ITL $^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$, a sequence of binary relations $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0} \subseteq W_{1} \times W_{2}$ is said to be a bounded O-bisimulation if for all $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ and for all $0 \leq i<n$, the following conditions are satisfied:

Atoms. If $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$ then for all propositional variables $p, \mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash p$ iff $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash p$. FORTH $\rightarrow$. If $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$ then for all $v_{1} \in W_{1}$, if $v_{1} \geqslant w_{1}$, there exists $v_{2} \in W_{2}$ such that $v_{2} \geqslant w_{2}$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$.
BACK $\rightarrow$. If $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$ then for all $v_{2} \in W_{2}$ if $v_{2} \geqslant w_{2}$ then there exists $v_{1} \in W_{1}$ such that $v_{1} \geqslant w_{1}$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$.
FORTH O. if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$ then $S\left(w_{1}\right) \mathcal{Z}_{i} S\left(w_{2}\right)$.
Note that there is not 'back' clause for O; this is simply because $S$ is a function, so its 'forth' and 'back' clauses are identical. Bounded O-bisimulations are useful because they preserve the truth of relatively small $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{O}}$-formulas.

Lemma 4.2. Given two ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$ and a bounded O -bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0}$ between them, for all $0 \leq i \leq n$ and $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$ then for all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\bigcirc}$ satisfying $|\varphi| \leq \sqrt{2}, \mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \varphi$.

Proof. We proceed by induction on $i$. Let $0 \leq i \leq n$ be such that for all $j<i$ the lemma holds. Let $w_{1} \in W_{1}$ and $w_{2} \in W_{2}$ be such that $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$ and let us consider $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\diamond}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq i$. The cases where $\varphi$ is an atom or of the forms $\theta \wedge \psi, \theta \vee \psi$ are as in the classical case and we omit them. Thus we focus on the following:
CASE $\varphi=\theta \rightarrow \psi$. We proceed by contrapositive to prove the left-to-right implication. Note that in this case we must have $i>0$.

Assume that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \not \neq \theta \rightarrow \psi$. Therefore there exists $v_{2} \in W_{2}$ such that $v_{2} \geqslant w_{2}$, $\mathcal{M}_{2}, v_{2} \vDash \theta$, and $\mathcal{M}_{2}, v_{2} \not \vDash \psi$. By the BACK $\rightarrow$ condition, it follows that there exists $v_{1} \in W_{1}$ such that $v_{1} \geqslant w_{1}$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i-1} v_{2}$. Since $|\theta| \leq i-1$ and $|\psi| \leq i-1$, by the induction hypothesis, it follows that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, v_{1} \vDash \theta$ and $\mathcal{M}_{1}, v_{1} \not \neq \psi$. Consequently, $\mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \neq \theta \rightarrow \psi$. The converse direction is proved in a similar way but using Forth $\rightarrow$.
CASE $\varphi=\mathrm{O} \psi$. Once again we have that $i>0$. Assume that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \mathrm{O} \psi$, so that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, S\left(w_{1}\right) \vDash \psi$. By Forth $○, S_{1}\left(w_{1}\right) \mathcal{Z}_{i-1} S_{2}\left(w_{2}\right)$. Moreover, $|\psi| \leq i-1$, so that by the induction hypothesis, $\mathcal{M}_{2}, S\left(w_{2}\right) \vDash \psi$, and $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \mathrm{O} \psi$. The right-to-left direction is analogous.

Next, we will extend the notion of a bounded O-bisimulation to include other tenses. Let us begin with $\diamond$.

[^2]Definition 4.3. Given $n>0$ and two $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$, a bounded O bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0} \subseteq W_{1} \times W_{2}$ is said to be a bounded $\diamond$-bisimulation if for all $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ and for all $0 \leq i<n$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$, then the following conditions are satisfied:
FORTH $\diamond$. For all $k_{1} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{2} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}, v_{1} \geqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$.
BACK $\diamond$. For all $k_{2} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{1} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \geqslant$ $v_{1}, v_{2} \geqslant S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$.

The reader will notice that the clauses for $\diamond$ involve the intuitionistic partial order, even though this is not involved in the semantics of $\diamond$. However, this will give us more flexibility in designing bisimulations. The reason it works is that if $k_{1}$ is so that $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ witnesses that $\diamond \varphi$ is true on $w_{1}$, then $\varphi$ will also be true on any $v_{1} \geqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ by the monotonicity of intuitionistic truth. Similarly, if $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}$ and $\varphi$ holds on $v_{2}$, then it will also hold on $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$. Thus we do not need $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$ to be directly connected by the bisimulation; rather, it is sufficient for $v_{1}, w_{1}$ to act as 'proxies'. As was the case of Lemma 4.2, if two worlds are related by a bounded $\diamond$-bisimulation, then they satisfy the same $\mathcal{L}_{\diamond}$-formulas of small length.

Lemma 4.4. Given two $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$ and a bounded $\diamond$-bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{i} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0}$ between them, for all $0 \leq i \leq n$ and $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$, then for al ${ }^{3} \varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\diamond}$ satisfying $|\varphi| \leq i, \mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \varphi$.

Proof. We proceed by induction on $n$. Let $0 \leq i \leq n$ be such that for all $j<i$ the lemma holds. Let $w_{1} \in W_{1}$ and $w_{2} \in W_{2}$ be such that $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$ and let us consider $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\diamond}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq i$. We only consider the case where $\varphi=\diamond \psi$, as other cases are covered by Lemma 4.2 .

From left to right, if $\mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \diamond \psi$ then there exists $k_{1} \geq 0$ such that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \vDash \psi$. By FORTH $\diamond$, there exists $k_{2} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}, v_{1} \geqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i-1} v_{2}$. By $\leqslant$-monotonicity, $\mathcal{M}_{1}, v_{1} \vDash \psi$. Then, by the induction hypothesis and the fact that $|\psi| \leq i-1$, it follows that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, v_{2} \vDash \psi$, thus by $\leqslant$-monotonicity once again, $\mathcal{M}_{2}, S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \vDash \psi$, so that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \diamond \psi$. The converse direction is proved similarly by using BACK $\diamond$.

We can define bounded $\square$-bisimulations in a similar way.

[^3]Definition 4.5. A bounded O-bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0} \subseteq W_{1} \times W_{2}$ is said to be a bounded $\square$-bisimulation if for all $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ and for all $0 \leq i<n$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$, then:
FORTH ■. For all $k_{2} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{1} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ s.t. $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}$, $v_{1} \geqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$.
BACK $\square$. For all $k_{1} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{2} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ s.t. $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \geqslant v_{1}$, $v_{2} \geqslant S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$.

The intuition for the role of $v_{1}, v_{2}$ in the clauses for $\square$ is similar to that of $\diamond$, except that now we have to transfer negative information. If $\square \varphi$ fails at $w_{1}$, there will be $k_{1} \geq 0$ so that $\varphi$ fails on $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$; but then, $\varphi$ will forcibly fail on any $v_{1} \leqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$. Similarly, if $\varphi$ fails on $v_{2} \geqslant S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right), \varphi$ will fail on $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$ as well, witnessing that $\square \varphi$ fails on $w_{2}$.

Lemma 4.6. Given two $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$ and a bounded $\square$-bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0}$ between them, for all $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ and $0 \leq i \leq n$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$ then for all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq i$, then $\mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \varphi$.

Proof. We proceed by induction on $i$. Let $i \geq 0$ be such that for all $j<i$ the lemma holds. Let $w_{1} \in W_{1}$ and $w_{2} \in W_{2}$ be such that $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} w_{2}$ and let us consider $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq i$. Note that the cases for atoms as well as propositional and $O$ connectives are proved as in Lemma 4.2, so we only consider $\varphi=\square \psi$.

For the left-to-right implication, we work by contrapositive, and assume that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \not \neq \square \psi$. Then, there exists $k_{2} \geq 0$ such that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \not \vDash \psi$. By Forth $\square$, there exist $k_{1} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ s.t. $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}, v_{1} \geqslant S^{i_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i-1}$ $v_{2}$. As in the proof of Lemma 4.4, by $\leqslant-m o n o t o n i c i t y, ~ t h e ~ i n d u c t i o n ~ h y p o t h e s i s ~ a n d ~$ the fact that $|\psi| \leq i-1$, it follows that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, v_{1} \not \neq \psi$; thus $\mathcal{M}_{1}, S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \not \neq \psi$, and again by $\leqslant-$ monotonicity $\mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \not \not \square \square$. The converse direction follows a similar reasoning but using BACK $\square$.

## 5 Bounded bisimulations for $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{R}$

In this section we adapt the bisimulations defined for a language with until and since [18] presented by Kurtonina and de Rijke [20] to our case. As with bisimulations for $\diamond$ and $\square$, we modify the standard clauses so that witnesses for $\mathcal{U}$ or $\mathcal{R}$ do not have to be directly connected, and, instead, it suffices for suitable 'proxy' worlds to be connected by the bisimulation. Let us begin with bounded bisimulations for $\mathcal{U}$.

Definition 5.1. Given $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and two $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$, a bounded O bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0} \subseteq W_{1} \times W_{2}$ is said to be a bounded $\mathcal{U}$-bisimulation iff for all $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$, and for all $0 \leq i<n$ if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$ :
Forth $\mathcal{U}$. For all $k_{1} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{2} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that

1. $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}, v_{1} \geqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$, and
2. for all $j_{2} \in\left[0, k_{2}\right)$ there exist $j_{1} \in\left[0, k_{1}\right)$ and $\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that $u_{1} \geqslant S^{j_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right), S^{j_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant u_{2}$ and $u_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} u_{2}$.

BACK $\mathcal{U}$. For all $k_{2} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{1} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that

1. $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \geqslant v_{1}, v_{2} \geqslant S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$, and
2. for all $j_{1} \in\left[0, k_{1}\right)$ there exist $j_{2} \in\left[0, k_{2}\right)$ and $\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that $u_{2} \geqslant S^{j_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right), S^{j_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \geqslant u_{1}$ and $u_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} u_{2}$.
As was the case before, the following lemma states that two bounded $\mathcal{U}$-bisimilar models agree on small $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{U}}$ formulas.
Lemma 5.2. Given two ITL ${ }^{\text {e }}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$ and a bounded $\mathcal{U}$-bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subset \cdots \subset \mathcal{Z}_{0}$ between them, for all $0 \leq m \leq n$ and $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{m} w_{2}$ then for all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{U}}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq m, \mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \varphi$.

Proof. Once again, proceed by induction on $n$. Let $m \leq n$ be such that for all $k<m$ the lemma holds. Let $w_{1} \in W_{1}$ and $w_{2} \in W_{2}$ be such that $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{m} w_{2}$ and let us consider $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{U}}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq m$. As before, we only consider the 'new' case, where $\varphi=\theta \mathcal{U} \psi$. From left to right, assume that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \theta \mathcal{U} \psi$. Then, there exists $i_{1} \geq 0$ such that $\mathcal{M}_{1}, S^{i_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \vDash \psi$ and for all $j_{1}$ satisfying $0 \leq j_{1}<i_{1}, \mathcal{M}_{1}, S^{j_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \vDash \theta$. By Forth $\mathcal{U}$, there exist $i_{2} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that 1. $S^{i_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}$, $v_{1} \geqslant S^{i_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{m-1} v_{2} ; 2$. for all $j_{2}$ satisfying $0 \leq j_{2}<i_{2}$ there exist $j_{1} \in\left[0, i_{1}\right)$ and $\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ s. t. $u_{1} \geqslant S^{j_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right), S^{j_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant u_{2}$ and $u_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{m-1} u_{2}$.
 hypothesis, it follows that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, S^{i_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \vDash \psi$. Take any $j_{2}$ satisfying $0 \leq j_{2}<i_{2}$. By the second item, the fact that $|\theta| \leq m-1$, and the induction hypothesis, we conclude that $\mathcal{M}_{2}, S^{j_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \vDash \theta$ so $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \theta \mathcal{U} \psi$. The right-to-left direction is symmetric (but using Back $\mathcal{U}$ ).

Finally, we define bounded bisimulations for $\mathcal{R}$.
Definition 5.3. A bounded $\bigcirc$-bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0} \subseteq W_{1} \times W_{2}$ is said to be a bounded $\mathcal{R}$-bisimulation if for all $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ and for all $0 \leq i<n$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i+1} w_{2}$ then:
Forth $\mathcal{R}$. For all $k_{2} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{1} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that

1. $S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant v_{2}, v_{1} \geqslant S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$, and
2. for all $j_{1}$ satisfying $0 \leq j_{1}<k_{1}$ there exist $j_{2}$ such that $0 \leq j_{2}<k_{2}$ and $\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right) \in$ $W_{1} \times W_{2}$ s. t. $u_{1} \geqslant S^{j_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right), S^{j_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right) \geqslant u_{2}$ and $u_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} u_{2}$.

BACK $\mathcal{R}$. For all $k_{1} \geq 0$ there exist $k_{2} \geq 0$ and $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$ such that

1. $S^{k_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \geqslant v_{1}, v_{2} \geqslant S^{k_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right)$ and $v_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} v_{2}$, and
2. for all $j_{2}$ satisfying $0 \leq j_{2}<k_{2}$ there exist $j_{1}$ such that $0 \leq j_{1}<k_{1}$ and $\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right) \in$ $W_{1} \times W_{2}$ s. t. $u_{2} \geqslant S^{j_{2}}\left(w_{2}\right), S^{j_{1}}\left(w_{1}\right) \geqslant u_{1}$ and $u_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{i} u_{2}$.

Once again, we obtain a corresponding bisimulation lemma for $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}}$.
Lemma 5.4. Given two $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ models $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{2}$ and a bounded $\mathcal{R}$-bisimulation $\mathcal{Z}_{n} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_{0}$ between them, for all $0 \leq m \leq n$ and $\left(w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \in W_{1} \times W_{2}$, if $w_{1} \mathcal{Z}_{m} w_{2}$ then for all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{U}}$ such that $|\varphi| \leq m, \mathcal{M}_{1}, w_{1} \vDash \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}_{2}, w_{2} \vDash \varphi$.

Proof. As before, we proceed by induction on $n$; the critical case where $\varphi=\theta \mathcal{R} \psi$ follows by a combination of the reasoning for Lemmas 4.6 and Lemma 4.6. Details are left to the reader.

## 6 Definability and undefinability of modal operators

In this section, we explore the question of when it is that the basic connectives can or cannot be defined in terms of each other. It is known that, classically, $\diamond$ and $\square$ are interdefinable, as are $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{R}$; we will see that this is not the case intuitionistically. On the other hand, $\mathcal{U}$ (and hence $\mathcal{R}$ ) is not definable in terms of $\diamond, \square$ in the classical setting [18], and this result immediately carries over to the intuitionistic setting, as the class of classical LTL models can be seen as the subclass of that of dynamic posets where the partial order is the identity.

Interdefinability of modal operators can vary within intermediate logics. For example, $\wedge, \vee$ and $\rightarrow$ are basic connectives in propositional intuitionistic logic, but in the intermediate logic of here-and-there [15], $\wedge[1,2]$ and $\rightarrow$ [1] are basic operators while $\vee$ is definable in terms of $\rightarrow$ and $\wedge$ [22]. In first-order here-and-there 21], the quantifier $\exists$ is definable in terms of $\forall$ and $\rightarrow[24]$ while $\forall$ is not definable in terms of the other operators. In the modal case, Simpson [30] shows that modal operators are not interdefinable in the logic IK and Balbiani and Diéguez [2] proved the same result for the linear time temporal extension of here-and-there. This last proof is adapted to show that modal operators are not definable in ITLe. Note, however, that here we correct the claim of [2] stating that $\diamond$ is not here-and-there definable in terms of $\square$.


Figure 1: The here-and-there model $\mathcal{H}_{n}$. Black dots satisfy the atom $p$, white dots do not; all other atoms are false everywhere. Dashed lines indicate $\leqslant$ and solid lines indicate $S$. The $\sim_{i}$-equivalence classes are shown as grey regions.

Let us begin by studying the definability of $\square$ in terms of $\bigcirc$ and $\mathcal{U}$. Below, if $\mathcal{L}^{\prime} \subseteq \mathcal{L}, \varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\Omega$ is a class of models, we say that $\varphi$ is $\mathcal{L}^{\prime}$-definable over $\Omega$ if there is $\varphi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{L}^{\prime}$ such that $\Omega \vDash \varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi^{\prime}$.

Theorem 6.1. The connective $\square$ is not $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{U}}$-definable, even over the class of finite here-and-there models.

Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that $\diamond p$ can be expressed as a $\mathcal{U}$-free formula $\varphi$ with $|\varphi|=n>0$. Let $T=\{0, \cdots, n+1\}$ and $f: T \rightarrow T$ be given by $y=f(x)$ if and only if $y \equiv x+1(\bmod n+2)$. Then consider a here-and-there model $\mathcal{H}_{n}=$ $(W, \preccurlyeq, S, V)$ based on $\operatorname{HT}(T, f)$ and with $V(p)=W \backslash\{(n+1,0)\}$. For $k \leq n$, define $(i, j) \sim_{k}\left(i^{\prime}, j^{\prime}\right)$ if $(i, j)=\left(i^{\prime}, j^{\prime}\right)$ or

$$
\max \left\{i(1-j), i^{\prime}\left(1-j^{\prime}\right)\right\} \leq n-k
$$

(see Figure 1). Clearly, $\left(\mathcal{H}_{n},(0,0)\right) \not \vDash \diamond p$, while $\left(\mathcal{H}_{n},(0,1)\right) \vDash \diamond p$. Let us check now that $\left(\sim_{k}\right)_{k \leq n}$ is a bounded $\mathcal{U}$-bisimulation. It is easy to check that the sequence is increasing under inclusion. Moreover, $\sim_{k}$ is symmetric (indeed, an equivalence relation) for eack $k$, so by symmetry, we only check the FORTH clauses.
Atoms : Assume that $0 \leq k \leq n$ and $x \sim_{k} y$. Since $(n+1)(1-0)>n-k$, either $x=y$ (so the two satisfy the same atoms) or $x, y \neq(n+1,0)$, so the two also satisfy the same atoms (namely, $\{p\}$ ).

FORTH $\rightarrow:$ Let $k$ satisfy $0 \leq k<n$ and let us assume $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \sim_{k+1}\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$ and $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \leqslant$ $\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, j_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. If $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right)=\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$, then $\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right) \stackrel{\text { def }}{=}\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, j_{1}^{\prime}\right)$ witnesses that the clause holds, so we assume otherwise. Let us define $\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right) \stackrel{\text { def }}{=}\left(i_{2}, 1\right)$. Then, $\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right) \leqslant\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right)$ and $\max \left\{i_{1}^{\prime}\left(1-j_{1}^{\prime}\right), i_{2}^{\prime}\left(1-j_{2}^{\prime}\right)\right\}=\max \left\{i_{1}^{\prime}\left(1-j_{1}^{\prime}\right), 0\right\}=i_{1}^{\prime}\left(1-j_{1}^{\prime}\right) \leq n-k$, meaning that $\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, j_{1}^{\prime}\right) \sim_{k}\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, as required.

Forth $O$ : Let $k$ satisfy $0 \leq k<n$ and let us consider $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \sim_{k+1}\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$. If $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right)=\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$, then also $S\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right)=S\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$, so we assume otherwise. We claim that for $\ell \in\{1,2\}, f\left(i_{\ell}\right)\left(1-j_{\ell}\right) \leq n-k$. If $j_{\ell}=1$ this is obvious, otherwise from the definition of $\sim_{k+1}$ we obtain $i_{\ell}<n-k$ so that $f\left(i_{\ell}\right)=i_{\ell}+1 \leq n-k$. We conclude that $\max \left\{\left(f\left(i_{1}\right)\left(1-j_{1}\right), f\left(i_{2}+1\right)\left(1-j_{2}\right)\right\} \leq n-k\right.$, so that $S\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \sim_{k} S\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$, as required.
Forth $\mathcal{U}$ : Let $k$ satisfy $0 \leq k<n$, and let us suppose that $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \sim_{k+1}\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$. Assume moreover that $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \neq\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$, as the other case is easy to check. Fix $k_{1} \geq 0$ and define $\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, j_{1}^{\prime}\right)=S^{k_{1}}\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right)$. Let us define $k_{2}=0, v_{1}=\left(i_{1}, 1\right)$, and $v_{2}=\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$, so that $S^{k_{2}}\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)=\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$. Since $\max \left\{i_{1}(1-1), i_{2}\left(1-j_{2}\right)\right\}=i_{2}\left(1-j_{2}\right)<n-k$, we have that $v_{1} \sim_{k} v_{2}$ and satisfy Condition 1 . Note also that the Condition 2 holds vacuously because of $\left[0, k_{2}\right)=\varnothing$.

Consequently, $\left(\sim_{m}\right)_{m \leq n}$ is a a bounded $\mathcal{U}$-bisimulation. By using Lemma 5.2 and the fact that $(0,0) \sim_{n}(0,1)$ we get that $(0,0)$ and $(0,1)$ satisfy the same $\mathcal{U}$ free formulas $\psi$ with $|\psi| \leq n$. However, $\left(\mathcal{H}_{n},(0,0)\right) \not \vDash \varphi$ and $\left(\mathcal{H}_{n},(0,1)\right) \vDash \varphi$ : a contradiction.

As a consequence:
Corollary 6.2. The connective $\mathcal{R}$ is not definable in terms of $\bigcirc$ and $\mathcal{U}$, even over the class of persistent models.

Proof. If we could define $q \mathcal{R} p$, then we could also define $\square p \equiv \perp \mathcal{R} p$.
Proposition 6.3. Over the class of here-and-there models, $\diamond$ is $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$-definable. To be precise, $\diamond p$ is equivalent to

$$
\varphi=(\square(p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p)) \wedge \square(\circ \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \circ \square \neg p)) \rightarrow(\square(p \vee \neg p) \wedge \neg \square \neg p) .
$$

Proof. Let $\mathcal{M}=(T \times\{0,1\}, \lessgtr, S, V)$ be a here-and-there model with $S(t, i)=(f(t), i)$ (see Section 2.3). Before proving that $\varphi$ is equivalent to $\diamond p$, we give some intuition. Essentially, $\varphi$ contemplates three different ways that $\diamond p$ could hold in $(\mathcal{M}, x)$, where $x=\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$. It may be that $\square(p \vee \neg p)$ holds, in which case $(\mathcal{M}, x)$ behaves essentially as a classical model, at least for formulas whose only variable is $p$. In this case, $\diamond p$ holds iff $\neg \square \neg p$ holds, as in the standard classical semantics. If $\square(p \vee \neg p)$ fails, then $\mathcal{M}$ does not behave classically; for some $n, S^{n}(x)$ falsifies $p \vee \neg p$. For $\varphi$ to be true, we then need for either $\square(p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p))$ or $\square(\mathrm{O}(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \circ \square \neg p))$ to fail. The formula $\square(p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p))$ will fail exactly when there is $m$ such that $S^{m}(x)$ satisfies $p$ (hence $x$ satisfies $\diamond p$ ), and $\mathcal{M}$ does not behave classically after $m$; that is, there is $n>m$ so that $S^{n}(x)$ falsifies $p \vee \neg p$. Meanwhile, $\square(\circ \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow$
$p \vee \neg p \vee \mathrm{O} \neg \neg)$ ) will fail exactly when there is $m$ such that $S^{m}(x)$ satisfies $p$ but $\mathcal{M}$ behaves classically after $m$; in other words, $S^{n}(x)$ falsifies $p \vee \neg p$ only for $n<m$. In this case, $\mathrm{O} \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \mathrm{O} \neg \neg p$ will be falsified exactly at the greatest such $n$.

Now for the proof. Assume that $x=\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$ is such that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \diamond p$. To check that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \varphi$, let $x^{\prime} \geqslant x$, so that $x^{\prime}=\left(x_{1}, x_{2}^{\prime}\right)$ with $x_{2}^{\prime} \geq x_{2}$, and consider the following cases.
$\operatorname{CASE}\left(\mathcal{M}, x^{\prime}\right) \vDash \square(p \vee \neg p)$. In this case, it is easy to see that we also have $\left(\mathcal{M}, x^{\prime}\right) \vDash$ $\neg \square \neg p$ given that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \diamond p$.
Case $\left(\mathcal{M}, x^{\prime}\right) \not \vDash \square(p \vee \neg p)$. Using the assumption that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \diamond p$, choose $k$ such that $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \vDash p$ and consider two sub-cases.

1. Suppose there is $k^{\prime}>k$ such that $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k^{\prime}}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}^{\prime}\right)\right) \not \vDash p \vee \neg p$. Then, it follows that $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}^{\prime}\right)\right) \not$ 申 $p \rightarrow \square p \vee \neg p$ and hence $\left(\mathcal{M}, x^{\prime}\right) \not \vDash \square(p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p))$.
2. If there is not such $k^{\prime}$, then there must be a maximal $k^{\prime}<k$ such that $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k^{\prime}}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}^{\prime}\right)\right) \not \vDash p \vee \neg p$ (otherwise, we would be in $\operatorname{CASE}\left(\mathcal{M}, x^{\prime}\right) \vDash$ $\square(p \vee \neg p))$. It is easily verified that

$$
\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k^{\prime}}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}^{\prime}\right)\right) \not \vDash \circ \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \circ \square \neg p
$$

and hence

$$
\left(\mathcal{M}, x^{\prime}\right) \not \vDash \square(\circ \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \circ \square \neg p)
$$

Note that the above direction does not use any properties of here-and-there models, and works over arbitrary expanding models. However, we need these properties for the other implication. Suppose that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \varphi$. If $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \square(p \vee \neg p) \wedge \neg \square \neg p$, then it is readily verified that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \diamond p$. Otherwise,

$$
(\mathcal{M}, x) \not \vDash \square(p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p)) \wedge \square(\circ \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \circ \square \neg p)
$$

If $(\mathcal{M}, x) \notin \square(p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p))$, then there is $k$ such that

$$
\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \not \vDash p \rightarrow \square(p \vee \neg p)
$$

This is only possible if $x_{2}=0$ and $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \vDash p$, so that $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \diamond p$. Similarly, if

$$
(\mathcal{M}, x) \not \vDash \square(\circ \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee \circ \square \neg p)
$$

then there is $k$ such that $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \nRightarrow \bigcirc \square(p \vee \neg p) \rightarrow p \vee \neg p \vee O \square \neg p$. This is only possible if $x_{2}=0,\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \vDash \bigcirc \square(p \vee \neg p)$ and $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \notin \bigcirc \square \neg p$. But from this it easily can be seen that there is $k^{\prime}>k$ with $\left(\mathcal{M},\left(f^{k^{\prime}}\left(x_{1}\right), x_{2}\right)\right) \vDash p$, hence $(\mathcal{M}, x) \vDash \diamond p$.


Figure 2: The expanding model $\mathcal{E}_{n}$. Notation is as in Figure 1 .

Corollary 6.4. Over the class of here-and-there models, p $\mathcal{U} q$ is $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}^{-}}$-definable using the equivalence $p \mathcal{U} q \equiv(q \mathcal{R}(p \vee q)) \wedge \diamond q$.

Hence, if we want to prove the undefinability of $\diamond$ in terms of other operators, we must turn to a wider class of models, as we will do next.

Theorem 6.5. The operator $\diamond$ cannot be defined in terms of $\square$ over the class of finite expanding models.

Proof. Given $n>0$, consider a model $\mathcal{E}_{n}=(W, \preccurlyeq, S, V)$ with $W=\{0, \cdots, n+1\} \times$ $\{0,1\},(i, j) \leqslant\left(i^{\prime}, j^{\prime}\right)$ if $i=i^{\prime}$ and $j \leq j^{\prime}, S(i, j)=(i+1, j)$ if $i \leq n, S(n+1, j)=$ $(0,0)$, and $V(p)=\{(n+1,1)\}$. For $m \leq n$, define $(i, j) \sim_{m}\left(i^{\prime}, j^{\prime}\right)$ if either $(i, j)=$ $\left(i^{\prime}, j^{\prime}\right)$, or $\max \left\{i, i^{\prime}\right\} \leq n-m$. Then, it can easily be checked that $(\mathcal{M},(0,0)) \not \vDash \diamond p$, $(\mathcal{M},(0,1)) \vDash \diamond p$, and $(0,0) \sim_{m}(0,1)$.

It remains to check that $\left(\sim_{m}\right)_{m \leq n}$ is a bounded $\square$-bismulation. We focus on the $\square$ clauses, and by symmetry, prove only BACK $\square$. Suppose that $\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right) \sim_{m}\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$ and fix $k_{1} \geq 0$. Let $\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, j_{1}^{\prime}\right)=S^{k_{1}}\left(i_{1}, j_{1}\right)$. Choose $k_{2}>n+1$ such that $i_{2}+k_{2} \equiv i_{1}^{\prime}$ $(\bmod n+1)$, and let $\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right)=S^{k_{2}}\left(i_{2}, j_{2}\right)$. It is not hard to check that $i_{1}^{\prime}=i_{2}^{\prime}$ and $j_{2}^{\prime}=0$, from which we obtain $\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right) \leqslant\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, j_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. Hence, setting $v_{1}=v_{2}=\left(i_{2}^{\prime}, j_{2}^{\prime}\right)$ gives us the desired witnesses.

By letting $n$ vary, we see that no $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$-formula can be equivalent to $\diamond p$.

## 7 Conclusions

In this paper we have investigated on ITLe , an intuitionistic analogue of LTL based on expanding domain models from modal logic. We have shown that, as happens in other modal intuitionistic logics or modal intermediate logics, modal operators are not interdefinable.

Many open questions remain regarding intuitionistic temporal logics. We know that $I T L^{e}$ is decidable, but the proposed decision procedure is non-elementary. However, there seems to be little reason to assume that this is optimal, raising the following question:

Question 7.1. Are the satisfiability and validity problems for $\mathrm{ITL}^{\mathrm{e}}$ elementary?
Meanwhile, we saw in Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 that ITL ${ }^{e}$ has the strong finite model property, while ITL ${ }^{\text {p }}$ does not have the finite model property at all. However, it may yet be that ITL ${ }^{p}$ is decidable despite this.

## Question 7.2. Is ITL $^{\mathrm{p}}$ decidable?

Regarding expressive completeness, it is known that LTL is expressively complete [18, 29, 12, 16]; there exists a one-to-one correspondence (over $\mathbb{N}$ ) between the temporal language and the monadic first-order logic equipped with a linear order and 'next' relation [12]. It is not known whether the same property holds between ITL ${ }^{e}$ and first-order intuitionistic logic.

Question 7.3. Is $\mathcal{L}$ equally expressive to monadic first-order logic over the class of dynamic or persistent models?

Finally, a sound and complete axiomatization for ITL ${ }^{e}$ remains to be found. The results we have presented here could be a first step in this direction, and we conclude with the following:

Question 7.4. Are the ITL ${ }^{\mathrm{e}}$-valid formulas listed in this work, together with the intuitionistic tautologies and standard inference rules, complete for the class of dynamic posets? Is the logic augmented with $(\mathrm{Op} \rightarrow \mathrm{Oq}) \rightarrow \mathrm{O}(p \rightarrow q)$ complete for the class of persistent models?

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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ Note that in 4] we used 'ITL' to denote the fragment of this logic without $\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{R}$.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ Although not optimal, we use the length of the formula in this lemma for the sake of simplicity. More precise measures like counting the number of modalities and implications could be equally used.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ We remind the reader that, as per our convention, $\mathcal{L}_{\diamond}$ is the $\square, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{R}$-free fragment. A similar comment applies to other sublanguages of $\mathcal{L}$ mentioned below.

