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Who Drives if No-one Governs? A Social Network Analysis of Social Protection Policy in Madagascar

Jean-Philippe Berrou, Alain Piveteau, Thibaud Deguilhem, Leo Delpy, Claire Gondard-Delcroix, Katya Long

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
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of Social Protection Policy in Madagascar



directed by

Jean-Philippe Berrou & Alain Piveteau

authors

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L. Delpy, C. Gondard-Delcroix



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Translated from French
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The growing interest in social protection in Africa over the past two decades has led to a renewal of academic research and institutional literature, ranging from technical and evaluation approaches to political economy studies. The latter have the analytical singularity of linking the outcomes of social protection policies to their modalities of political insertion and appropriation rather than to their original conception and the manner in which they are implemented.

As such, this report is an original contribution to the analysis of public policies in countries under foreign aid regimes. Considering the 'political construction of public policies' as a determinant of their success, we present here an empirical analysis of the elaboration of Madagascar's new social protection policy. The study of the relationships between stakeholders reveals the coalitions of actors involved and their role in the ongoing changes in orientation.

The empirical strategy we have chosen combines and applies the policy network and advocacy coalition framework (ACF) approaches by testing them with the tools of social network analysis. It is in line with the research on developed or emerging countries that is rare or non-existent in low-income countries. The inter-organisational network data is drawn from a sociometric and qualitative survey carried out in 2018 and 2019 among the member organisations of the *Groupe de travail sur la protection sociale – GTPS* (Social Protection Working Group). Under the auspices of the Ministry of Population, this group is responsible for drafting social protection policy in Madagascar.

Joining the ACF and Policy Network methodological approaches, two complementary steps support our original empirical strategy. The first step deals with a structural analysis of social protection networks, using three cumulative criteria to identify coalitions of political actors. Foremost, a coalition necessary brings together structural equivalent actors within the network of collaborations (we applied one of the most relevant blockmodeling algorithm). Afterward, the coalition's subnetwork has higher within-clique density than between-clique density on collaboration, sharing information and agreement ties. Finally, the coalition's subnetwork has higher between-clique density than within-clique density on disagreement ties.

The second step explores the resource circulation within the network and the cognitive consistency of each political coalition (closeness of values between actors). This then makes it possible to identify the co-

alition of power, with a strong capacity for mobilisation and influence, that is at the heart of the new social protection policy.

Our results show that Madagascar's approach directly reflects the paradigm shift that took place in the international political arena at the turn of the 2000s. The five relational spaces under study reflect the singular way in which this has been translated in the Malagasy institutional and political context. That of a fragile, liquefied state, with a chronic inability to resolve the redistributive conflict, particularly in a phase of economic growth.

Social protection policy is dominated by a 'pro-vulnerable' or, in other words, a 'pro-cash' coalition, which is much more decisive than the second, 'pro-rights' coalition. Composed mainly of actors from the relief sector, the leading coalition has a view of economic security issues based on the understanding of individual risks and market integration. Its organization is based on the centrality of UNICEF and includes the two ministries historically in charge of social protection in the country: the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Protection.

The over-determining role of international donors is confirmed on analysis. In a position to control the content of social protection policy statements and of the related policy tools, negotiations with national public actors remain limited. In this configuration, where the failure of politics is reflected even in the marginalization of civil society actors, the external global offer tends to be hegemonic.

However, this conclusion calls for some nuance. Although they do not occupy central positions, government institutions (ministries and agencies) often act as brokers. They build bridges between the separate worlds of social protection. Even if they do not govern social protection policy, the state and its administration disseminate its principles and ideas. This role as an interface between the central international organizations and the population, which is characteristic of a country under foreign aid regime, places the government institutions in the position of a "development-broker". This encourages the reproduction of resource accumulation strategies.

Due to a lack of a dense internal social and political construction, social protection policy can only count on the accuracy and relevance of a comprehensive offer of protection and its financing through aid. From this point of view, the development of a new Malagasy social contract that would create solidarity is not on the agenda.

Key Words: public policy, social protection, Madagascar, ideas, political networks, advocacy coalitions, complete social network analysis, inter-organizational relations.

L'intérêt croissant pour la protection sociale en Afrique depuis deux décennies entraîne un renouvellement des recherches académiques et de la littérature institutionnelle, entre approches techniciennes et évaluatives et travaux d'économie politique. Ces derniers ont pour singularité analytique de relier la performance des politiques de protection sociale à leurs modalités d'insertion et d'appropriation politique plutôt qu'à leur conception initiale et à la façon dont elles sont mises en œuvre.

Dans cette perspective, ce rapport est une contribution originale à l'analyse des politiques publiques dans les pays sous régime d'aide. Considérant la « fabrique politique des politiques publiques » comme un déterminant de leur succès, nous proposons ici une analyse empirique de la construction de la nouvelle politique de protection sociale à Madagascar. L'étude des relations entre les parties prenantes conduit à identifier les coalitions d'acteurs en présence et leur rôle dans les changements d'orientation en cours.

La stratégie empirique retenue croise et matérialise les approches de *policy network* et d'*Advocacy coalition framework* en les testant à partir des outils de l'analyse des réseaux sociaux. Elle s'inscrit dans la lignée de travaux sur les pays développés ou émergents, rares ou inexistantes dans les pays à faible revenu. Les données de réseau inter-organisationnel sont issues d'une enquête sociométrique et qualitative réalisée, en 2018 et 2019, auprès des organisations membres du Groupe de travail sur la protection sociale (GTPS). Sous l'égide du ministère de la Population, ce groupe est en charge de la fabrication de la politique de protection sociale à Madagascar.

Nous recherchons les coalitions d'acteurs politiques au sein du GTPS en étudiant la position de chaque organisation dans les réseaux de collaborations, de partage d'informations, d'adhésions, de désaccords et d'influences. Nous posons pour cela trois conditions multiplicatives : l'équivalence structurale au sein du réseau de collaborations qui permet d'identifier des cliques par l'application d'une méthode algorithmique de *blockmodeling* ; la plus grande densité des liens intra-cliques (vs inter-cliques) dans les réseaux de collaborations, de partage d'informations et d'adhésions ; la plus grande densité inter-cliques (vs intra-cliques) des liens de désaccords.

En complément, nous analysons la circulation des ressources au sein du réseau et la cohérence cognitive de chaque coalitions (proximité de valeurs entre acteurs). La démarche permet alors d'identifier la coalition de pouvoir, à forte capacité de mobilisation et d'influence, au cœur de la fabrique de la nouvelle politique de protection sociale.

Nous montrons que la conception qui s'impose à Madagascar traduit directement le déplacement de paradigme qui a eu lieu dans l'arène politique internationale au tournant des années 2000. Les cinq espaces relationnels étudiés rendent compte de la forme singulière de cette traduction dans le contexte institutionnel et politique malgache. Celui d'un État fragile, liquéfié, d'une incapacité chronique à régler le conflit redistributif, particulièrement en phase de croissance.

La politique de protection sociale est dominée par une « coalition pro-vulnérable », autrement dit « pro-cash », bien plus décisive que la seconde coalition « pro-droit ». Composée principalement d'acteurs issus du monde de l'urgence, la coalition dominante porte une vision relevant d'une problématique de sécurité économique, fondée sur l'appréhension de risques individuels et l'intégration marchande. Elle est organisée autour de la centralité de l'UNICEF et associe les deux ministères historiquement en charge de la protection sociale dans le pays ; le ministère de la santé et celui de la protection sociale.

L'analyse confirme le rôle surdéterminant des bailleurs de fonds internationaux. En position de contrôler le contenu des énoncés de la politique de protection sociale et les dispositifs d'action afférents, les négociations avec les acteurs publics nationaux demeurent faibles. Dans cette configuration où la défaillance du politique peut se lire jusque dans la marginalisation des acteurs issus de la société civile, l'offre globale externe tend à être hégémonique.

Ce résultat mérite pourtant la nuance. S'ils n'occupent pas de positions centrales, les acteurs gouvernementaux (ministères et agences) apparaissent souvent en position de *brokers*. Ils établissent des ponts entre des mondes séparés de la protection sociale. À défaut de gouverner la politique de protection sociale, l'État et son administration en relaient les principes et les idées. Cette fonction d'intermédiaire entre les grandes organisations internationales et la population, caractéristique d'un pays sous régime d'aide, confère à l'État un rôle de « courtier » propice à la reproduction de stratégies rentières.

Sans construction sociale et politique interne dense, la politique de protection sociale ne peut compter que sur la justesse et la pertinence d'une offre globale de protection et de son financement par l'aide. De ce point de vue, la formation d'un nouveau contrat social malgache créateurs de solidarités n'est pas à l'ordre du jour.

Mots Clefs : politique publique, protection sociale, Madagascar, idées, réseaux politiques, coalitions de causes, analyse de réseaux sociaux complets, relations inter-organisationnelles.

Introduction

Social protection without development

Actually, the labor market was allowed to retain its main function only on condition that wages and conditions of work, standards and regulations should be such as would safeguard the human character of the alleged commodity, labor.

K. Polanyi, 1944 (2001: 185-186)

Social protection includes all the collective mechanisms and provisions that allow a society to protect itself against the effects of social risks such as sickness, old age, disability, unemployment, maternity and social exclusion. In high-income countries, national social protection systems have a long political history beginning with the first Poor Laws in early seventeenth-century England. The changes introduced over time to adapt the principles of insurance, assistance, and solidarity to contemporary economic and political constraints have shaped different systems of protection reflecting the pace and modalities of each national context (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Sharpf & Schmidt, 2000; Barbier, 2002; Gilbert & A. Van Voorhis, 2017; Barbier & Théret, 2018).

In the economically poorest countries, a category to which Madagascar unquestionably belongs, social protection remains beyond the reach of the vast majority of the population. Without profound change, the models and mechanisms inherited from colonial administrations cannot reflect the actual economic conditions for the reproduction of resources and, more specifically, the strong segmentation of labour markets. In Madagascar, where 92% of jobs are unsalaried (46% of which are unpaid), only 4% of the employed workforce benefits from some form of social protection (United Nations - UNECA 2016). The inclusion of insured persons in the social security system (through premiums and entitlements) only applies to the very small, mainly urban, part of the population that is employed in the civil service, state-owned companies or large corporations in the formal private sector. Without a revised protection policy, the structure of employment, that of an economy that has not undergone structural transformation, results in the reproduction of the dual social protection system characteristic of the colonial situation in Africa, highly inegalitarian and excluding most of the population (Destremeau, 2003).

Out of the question, out of reach: social protection in the absence of structural transformation

The banal, even tautological, observation that poor countries generally lack social protection reflects two considerations on the topic, which, although rejected or outgrown at the dawn of the millennium, should in principle give new authority to social protection policies in developing countries, and in Madagascar in particular. The analysis of these considerations is the main objective of this report.

The first consideration, inspired by Karl Polanyi, attributes the emergence of national systems of social protection to the development of the wage-earning sector in contemporary capitalist economies and to the welfare activities of modern states. At the theoretical level, social protection can be defined as 'that which ensures the economic conditions for the reproduction of the 'primary' natural resource that is, for both economic activity and political power, the population and its 'life capital' (Théret, 1997: 204). Lautier (1995: 483), considers it as part of the definition of what is social as 'a set of mediations between the economic, political, and domestic order'¹. Historically, welfare is seen as a societal response to the vain but very real attempt to disembed the economic order from society - to establish self-regulating markets - and as the very condition, because of its humanity, for the functioning of new real markets, especially the emerging labour markets². As Lautier (2013: 189) points out, beyond a moral imperative, there are two fundamental objectives underpinning any social protection policy: the economic objective of improving productivity and the political objective of social control and/or pacification.

In non-industrialized economies the expansion of market-based transactions has not yet reached the labour sector. Thus, they remain far removed from the institutional conditions that historically led to the implementation to social protection policies. Although there has been a robust growth of social protection in large emerging economies according to the data of the International Labour Organization (Collombet, 2014: 25-26), this is not the case in the poorest countries. One may consider that, as protection relations remain domestic and family-based, just as a large part of the economic activity, welfare has not been reinstated in the framework of relations between the welfare state³, families, and

¹ Quoted by Théret (1996: 3).

² In the 'Great Transformation' published in 1944, Polanyi defended the thesis that, for a century, the dynamics of modern society were the result of a dual movement 'driven by class conflicts'. Indeed, the extension of self-regulated markets faced a counter-movement aimed at protecting society. 'Actually, the labor market was allowed to retain its main function only on condition that wages and conditions of work, standards and regulations should be such as would safeguard the human character of the alleged commodity, labor' (Polanyi, 2002: 185-186). Incompatible with the principle of the self-regulation of markets consubstantial with the liberal utopia, social protection is its reactive social mechanism and condition of possibility. In modern industrial societies, it is the solution, promoted and guaranteed by the central state, to the tension between two competing institutions within capitalism: the 'right to live' and the 'wage system' (*op. cit.*).

³ This is not the place to enter into the debate on whether the two concepts should be assimilated (Barbier, 2002 ; Merrien, 2017).

social protection organisations. This relationship exists because of the need to rebuild ‘the social bond that was destroyed by freeing the market forces’ and the requirement to shrink the gap between the economic and domestic spheres brought about by wage-based labour (Théret, 1997).

The second consideration is a logical consequence of the first. It deems the development of formal wage-earning and of the welfare state that underpin both the Bismarckian (contributory principle, logic of insurance, joint governance) and the Beveridgian regimes (non-contributory principle, logic of solidarity, republican governance) that prevail in developed economies, to be the two central drivers of the expansion of social protection. In Africa, and even more so in Madagascar, where the economic dynamic ‘has been steadily regressing since independence’ (Razafindrakoto et al., 2017), these institutional conditions for development do not exist. Bismarckian-style social protection mechanisms never managed to extend beyond the limited scope of formal employment, despite adjusting contributions to the characteristics of self-employed agricultural, commercial or artisanal activities, or transferring funds from ‘employee insurance funds to the self-employed and the inactive’ (Lautier, 2013: 197). The contributory social protection system, whose institutional arrangements were set up under colonisation was then taken over and continued by the newly independent state⁴. However, it has not expanded despite the support and technical assistance provided by the ILO since 1962 (ILO, 2005). Non-contributory social protection, based in industrialized countries on a solidarity mechanism funded through taxation and administered directly or indirectly by the state, remains fragile⁵ just as the latter and, to date, includes a multiplicity of targeted assistance programmes, financed mainly by international aid.

The story of social protection in poor countries could have ended there, awaiting economic development. Indeed, the inability to cross a threshold could have rendered illusory and utopian any attempt to implement a social protection policy liable to bring about a considerable and lasting improvement in social protection practices. Organised, for the most part, outside this type of active public policy framework, social protection practices are primarily implemented locally by families, based on kinship,

⁴ Extending the Overseas Territories Labour Code of 1952, a social security system was introduced by Ordinance No. 62-078 of 29 September 1962. This created the National Fund for Family Allowances and Work-related Accidents for workers in the private sector, which was replaced with Law No. 68-023 of 17 December 1968 establishing a pension scheme by the National Social Welfare Fund (*Caisse nationale de prévoyance sociale* - CNaPS), which is still in operation (Razafimaharo, 2014).

⁵ We refer here to the classification drawn up according to the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) method of the African Development Bank, which, since 2012, has ranked Madagascar as a ‘fragile’ state (UNICEF, 2017: 11); a post-9/11 concept that has become part of the shared language of the Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) and which is supposed to reflect the inability of states and public policies to guarantee the safety and well-being of populations.

through transfer mechanisms, reciprocal donations, agreements, rules of sharing and multiple transactions that mainly fall within the realm of a domestic economic order (Rakotonarivo, 2010; Sandron, 2008; Gondard-Delcroix & Rousseau, 2004; Blanc-Pamard, 1998).

Dilution and re-emergence of an idea: forming an international ‘pro-protection’ forum

The idea of social protection as a full-blown and deliberate development public policy⁶ re-emerges after the economic crisis in East Asia (Holzmann & *al.* 1999/2000; Holzmann & *al.* 2003; Merrien, 2013) and the risk of a systemic crisis in 2008 (Polet, 2014) both underscored the failure of conventional policies.

During the era of structural adjustment which brought structural transformation policies to an end, social protection was meaningless. Standard economic theory (Favereau, 1989) sees it as inefficient spending and it is no longer considered useful, all the more so when the focus is on public spending and international aid, and loans are granted contingent on the implementation of fiscal stabilization programmes designed to address the dual institutional and economic failure of states.⁷

The ‘prevailing wisdom’ that followed the one on structural adjustments in the 1990s diluted social protection into ‘ultra-targeted’ anti-poverty strategies (Lautier, 2013b). It is then only envisioned in the ‘pragmatic and minimalist’ form of social safety nets targeting the ‘true poor’ (Polet, 2014: 14). These pro-poor strategies, made possible by economics-inspired methods of government⁸, focus on individuals and individual behaviours, ruling out, from the outset, any intervention on ‘structures’ (Lautier, 2002: 142). Social protection is hidden by the moral imperative, that of lowering the numbers of those in poverty. In the era of neo-liberalism, this is part of the trend of depoliticizing government methods (Darbon, 2009; Lautier, 2002; Hibou, 1998) or, in other words, of depoliticising the means of legitimation of public policies.

It is only in the early 2000s, after being dormant for three decades and in light of the realization of the inefficacy of ‘ultra-focused’⁹ pro-poor programs, that the debate on social protection changes course and is once again open to developing countries. The economic and institutional impossibility of sustaining and extending the ‘old’ systems of protection that had been raised against it up until then disappears through the political work of re-conceptualizing social protection programs. This is only made

⁶ Or as ‘its own form, i.e., present as a set of new institutions designed to rebuild the social bond dissolved by the liberation of market forces’. (Théret, 1996 : 167).

⁷ The World Bank at the time ‘denounced’ workers’ social protection as economically inefficient and socially unjust. (Merrien, 2013).

⁸ Focused on identification and classification, it replaces the analysis of social relationships with a social taxonomy.

⁹ This is precisely what Lautier (2013b) analyses in the case of Latin America.

possible by having it dovetail with anti-poverty strategies. It is fundamentally based on the heightened perception, after September 11, 2001, of the global threat of mass poverty and the timely rediscovery of the 'productive virtues' of social spending¹⁰ (Polet, 2014: 15). This possible late 11th hour conversion to the Polanyian truism of an indefectible, and now globalised, relationship¹¹ between societies (protection) and markets (economic development), may be the warning sign of a new model of Welfare Capitalism (Hanlon et al., 2010) or just a concession to the economic articles of faith of international donors (Hibou, 1998) without any perspective of Great Transformation – provided 'the economic system ceases to lay down the law to society and the primacy of society over that system is secured' (Polanyi, 2002: 259). One may hypothesize the following: the hint of such a transformation, one in which even the progressive implementation of a public policy that allows society as a whole to protect itself¹², is seen in the fact that this policy covers the social or collective risk that is known to be irreducible to the sum of individual risks (Théret, 2018).

Madagascar considered rethinking its approach to social protection for the first time in 2002 when revising its Strategic Document on Combatting Poverty with the help of the World Bank among other international organisations¹³. This illustrates precisely the change in perspective mentioned above. Social protection continues to fall within the 'scope of a targeted government of the poor'. However, it fully becomes a public policy when 'ultra-targeting' is replaced by a 'broad targeting' (Lautier, 2013b). This change coincides with the move from the 'fight against poverty' rhetoric to the broader one on

¹⁰ The World Bank is part of an instrumental justification for social protection. It sets the limits of social protection in terms of its effects on economic development: 'Social Risk Management [...] may support it through the encouragement of risk taking [...] but it may also hamper it through the elimination of risk and introduction of incentives to change individual behavior. [...] insufficient risk management instruments impede efficient decisions and economic growth. [...] Risk taking is productive and risk can be seen as a factor for production. [...] On the other hand, however, the provision of Risk Management instrument may also modify individual behavior in ways that have detrimental effects on economic development. [...] This may be compounded by pervasive income redistribution that is often part of public welfare systems, and there is empirical evidence from OECD countries that an increase in social risk insurance in the welfare state reduces entrepreneurship' (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2000, 23-24).

¹¹ A relationship whose tragic consequences history teaches us when, upon taking power, the liberal utopia purports to abstract itself from it (Polanyi, 1983).

¹² Almost a literal definition of 'social protection' as stated by B. Théret (2018).

¹³ Please refer to the document entitled 'National Social Protection Strategy' available online (<https://docplayer.fr/17759736-Strategie-nationale-de-protection-sociale-madagascar.html>) and more specifically, chapter 18 of the *Recueil de notes de politique pour Madagascar* (Banque mondiale, 2014: 318-319).

'vulnerability' or on 'managing social risks' which have become the new theoretical framework of social protection for the World Bank¹⁴.

Indeed, an international 'forum'¹⁵ emerged from the work of experts, the public positions of professional actors of development as well as state-led and private initiatives in favour of the implementation of social protection policies. In turn, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) took the initiative to extend social protection to developing countries¹⁶ before adopting, in June 2012, Recommendation 202 on national social protection floors. In addition to these two protagonists, other international development organisations have become involved, such as the UNDP or the UK Department for International Development (DFID), UNICEF and the OECD Development Assistance Committee. International conferences are organized, international NGOs such as Oxfam, as well as bilateral cooperation agencies and emerging countries, with Brazil and South Africa in the lead, all position themselves (Merrien, 2013: 74-80). The issue of social protection, the fact that the subject appears to be a political priority, thus re-emerges at the international level, within and between international organizations, before it is eventually embraced or reshaped by local stakeholders.

External pressures, internal circumstances: the role of national political economies

At the heart of the concerns and principles of this 'coalition of complex causes' are three cornerstones on which the gradual formation of a new approach to social protection is based. The first is the conception of social protection as a comprehensive and permanent policy, rather than as a serial and transitory strategy (Voipio, 2007). To a large extent, this leads to the second point, which recognizes social protection as a privileged tool for reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Finally, the third cornerstone of the emerging advocacy agenda is based on the 'relevance [or celebration] of a new generation of non-contributory mechanisms'. Polet (2014: 15-18) classifies them into three main distinctive types, all of which are far from the initial philosophy of ultra-targeting. Conditional cash transfer programmes such as *Progressa* in Mexico (1997), *Familias en Accion* in Colombia (1999), *Bolsa Família* in Brazil (2003) or Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India (2005). Non-contributory pension schemes such as the *Beneficio de Prestação Continuo* allowance indexed to the Brazilian minimum wage and paid on a means-tested basis. Programmes to increase the access of the

¹⁴ Working Paper No. 0006 on Social Protection published in 2000 by the director and deputy director for social protection of the Human Development Network of the World Bank outlines this theoretical framework (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2000). Also of interest is the article co-published by the director two years later in the *Revue Tiers Monde* to present the concept of social risk management and its usefulness in assessing risk and vulnerability (Holzmann & al., 2003).

¹⁵ In reference to the notion of forum developed by Jobert (1994) in his analysis of the neo-liberal turn. See Bousaguet & Muller (2005) and Darbon et al (2018b: 14).

¹⁶ *Social Protection Floor Initiative* (ILO & WHO, 2009), cf. Merrien (2013: 71).

poor to health care such as, for example, the development of non-contributory health coverage combined with a package of guaranteed benefits.

The objective alliance emerging on the international scene is, however, limited in scope. It is less a consensus than a compromise (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991). Considerations on social protection ‘continue to pit epistemic communities and organizations against each other’ on the basis of two major perspectives (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). Competing according to Merrien, who describes the path of their convergence (2013: 71-76), they are inseparable according to Lautier (2013b: 187-188), for whom the goal of universalizing rights is inescapably linked to the idea of social protection, whereas it remains alien to the fight against poverty. The first, instrumentalist, perspective, underpinned by economic orthodoxy, is articulated in terms of efficiency. It brings together the proponents of an approach focused on vulnerability and social risk management, spearheaded by the World Bank. The second perspective frames protection in terms of social rights. It focuses on structural inequalities and stresses the transformative potential of a social protection policy that goes beyond pro-poor technical and operational measures to target both status and rights (legislative measures). *Department for International Development* (United Kingdom – DFID), the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and then the ILO are known for their commitment in this direction in the international arena and for their ability to effectively influence the international agenda (Merrien, 2013: 76).

As outlined above, the paradigm shift in question is based on social programmes designed and adopted by Latin American countries, starting with Mexico and Brazil. Although they are quickly spread by ‘academic’ networks, such as IFPRI¹⁷, and development banks, one finds the reasons for their dissemination in the domestic conditions of their adoption and development (Lautier, 2013b: 177). In Latin America, they are primarily defined by the failure of social policies, including the introduction of targeted assistance programmes. Governments’ quest for new assistance tools involved a broad coalition of actors and was electorally successful (*op. cit.*). The dominant consensus around *Conditional Cash Transfer* (CCT) was a coherent and conform help according to¹⁸ Lautier (2013b) while also being unexpected.

¹⁷ The *International Food Policy Research*, a private non-profit organisation headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a central player in the global expertise on agricultural policies.

¹⁸ Among the elements that explain this compliance, the author highlights its low cost, improved ex-post targeting (few non-poor beneficiaries), little disincentive to work, and empowerment at the heart of cash transfers.

In Africa, except for North African countries and rentier economies, this movement was belated. The diversity of social protection mechanisms¹⁹ illustrates a reality in which, once again, domestic and political conditions weigh heavily. Indeed, in countries under an aid regime the transnational nature of governance and the weight of logic of transfers are undeniable (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010). But it is just as undeniable that the actions of the state are the result of much more complex negotiations in which domestic political and electoral considerations, the relationship between the state and society as well as the pressure of public opinion all play a role (Darbon & *al.*, 2018b: 20). Matters of political economy which are specific to each national context cannot be solely the result of unilateral external pressures and incentives. Indeed, Hickey et *al.* (2018) give more consideration to national political imperatives than to external pressures in their account of countries' various engagement in favour of social protection.

Madagascar before implementation: analysing a public policy in the making

To analyse Madagascar's social protection, one must understand the impact of the international paradigm shift addressed above on the process of elaboration of the new public policy in this area. Although Madagascar became involved relatively early on in the formulation of new principles, it is only very recently, in 2015, with the drafting of a National Social Protection Policy document, made official on 15 September of the same year (MPPSPF²⁰, 2015), that one can reasonably confirm the launch of the process in the country. This national policy document is a capstone coming at the end of an erratic process, driven by external incentives and subjected to domestic political crises. The 2017-028 Act and its associated decrees 2017-327 and 2017-844 followed two years later. These set up a structure coordinating social protection actions, the *Groupe thématique sur la protection sociale – GTPS* (Social Protection Working Group) as well as a directory of interventions and a register of vulnerable families in the framework of social protection actions within the non-contributory regime (Gondard-Delcroix & *al.*, 2019). In the rest of this report, the study of social protection policy in Madagascar focuses on the singular stage at which it still finds itself: the definition of the problem and the identification of new solutions by multiple actors.

This report therefore seeks to answer a simple question. Is this indeed a new public policy as suggested by the nominative reality prevailing after 2015? Answering this question in the affirmative requires local elites to take ownership of the issue, both in their proposals for action and in the transition from

¹⁹ This can be seen, for example, in the chapter 'Monitoring progress in social protection' in Africa of the World Social Protection Report published by the ILO (2017: 121-131) or, on another level, Otoo & Osei-Boateng's (2014) critical analysis of social protection systems in Africa.

²⁰ Ministère de la population, de la protection sociale et de la promotion de la femme.

the fight against poverty to the institution of social protection, in other words, for them to back this new frame of reference (Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012: 174). Public policy analysis thus places emphasis on the discourses, representations, symbolic and technical repertoires mobilized in the debate as well as (and above all) on the coalitions of actors that carry them. This leads to a second question: what are the influential coalitions of causes and actors in the ongoing process of developing and harmonizing the national social protection policy? This question guides our empirical work on the construction of social protection policy in Madagascar, even more closely than the first one.

The public policy analysis framework we have chosen for this study favours the Policy Network and Advocacy Coalition Framework approaches (Laumann & Knoke, 1987; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Ingold, 2011; Varone & al., 2016; Knoke & Kostiuhenko, 2017; Weible & al., 2019). These are materialized and tested using Social Network Analysis (SNA), as they allow us to grasp and highlight 'the complexity and non-hierarchical and non-linear nature of the public policy development process' (Bousaguet & Muller, 2005).

In the methodological perspective outlined in Deliverable No. 1 of the FaPPA project (Darbon & al., 2018a), our main objective, starting from the list of stakeholders of the GTPS and based on an inter-organizational network analysis, is to: identify the key collective actors in the current public policy sequence, whether from the public or private sector or civil society; map and measure the intensity of their relationships and interactions through the construction of six relational networks (collaborations, information sharing, agreements, disagreements, influences, interpersonal relationships); account for the various communities of ideas, values, and rationales for action (cognitive frameworks) that underpin these relationships; and analyse the dominant coalitions and representations.

The first part of this report places the contemporary issue of social protection in Madagascar within the African context (Chapter 1). The second part explores the conceptual framework of a policy network and then presents and explains the method chosen to account for the networks, alliances, conflicts, interests, and possible sticking points in the ongoing process of social protection policy (Chapter 2). The third part outlines and examines the transitional results of the survey data collected in 2018 (Chapter 3).

The conclusion revisits the transversal hypothesis of the FaPPA project. The 'political fabric of public policies' (Zittoun, 2013) is a forgotten determinant of their success - particularly in Africa where evidence-based policy analyses tend to write off the logic of social construction (politics) in the name of a possibly objective knowledge of the social policies that 'work'. Nevertheless, the analysis of the current configuration of the coalitions of actors in the field of social protection in Madagascar suggests that international aid organisations still carry disproportionate weight and that this sectoral issue is

poorly integrated into the national political landscape. The structure of the network, dense and closed, points to a genuine governance challenge that echoes the general failure of the Malagasy state and the absence of alternative mechanisms of coordination. While the dominant coalition includes public and national power actors, in particular the Ministry of Population, Social Protection and the Advancement of Women, it seems to be, like a Hermit Crab, slipping quite naturally into the institutions of emergency relief and the fight against poverty without undertaking, except at the margin, any significant change in the frame of reference. In this regard, cash-transfer operations, whether conditional or not, are most emblematic of the current balance of power. In the field of protection, the issues of lack of coordination and the relevance of time-limited external aid remain central. The path towards universalization could, however, find the reason for a rebound in the limited implementation of Universal Social Coverage (USC).

Chapter 1

The renewal of social protection policies in Africa and Madagascar

Social protection is not a new instrument in Africa. Many African countries implemented a range of social protection measures after independence, including the provision of free health care and pensions for government employees, as well as food and agricultural subsidies. However, following the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 80s, domestic expenditure on these items was reduced, and many programmes were scaled down or terminated.

Slater & McCord (2009: 10)

Are countries in sub-Saharan Africa about to embark on a rapid expansion of social protection as has been the case in South Asia and Latin America? Or is social protection a(nother) donor fad likely to peter out and be quietly forgotten when donors move to the next new game in town?

Niño-Zarazúa & al. (2012: 163)


For years, the ILO has been developing a set of international standards that have consolidated the normative framework of the right to social security. To date, it includes 16 norms that are intended to guide national social protection policies. The most recent, which we shall return to later, Recommendation 202 on a social protection floor, contains a commitment to a basic level of universal social security, in favour of an increasingly wide range of benefits and of a higher level of protection. This commitment is now included in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda as well as the SDGs. Social protection is progressing both in terms of international law and of recommendations. The ILO defines it as including child and family allowances, maternity protection, unemployment assistance, work-related accident and disease compensation, as well as old-age, disability, and survivors' benefits. Social protection systems may or may not cover all these policy fields by combining contributory and non-contributory schemes (ILO, 2017: 1).

In spite of this, 71% of the world's population has little or no access to a comprehensive protection system. The right to social security is not yet a reality although there has been a worldwide significant and general increase in the overall number of fields legally covered (op. cit.: 6). As will first be seen for Africa, and then for Madagascar, major gaps remain in the level of legal coverage and, even more so, in the level of effective coverage.

The development of social protection in Africa: between external pressures and local political economies

The comparative state of social protection in Africa leaves no doubt as to its level of development despite efforts to invest in non-contributory protection schemes and a high average annual growth rate over the past two decades, which had seemed to be slowing down, the post-Covid economic situation on the continent being unclear at this point. Although the region may benefit from the potential offered by the demographic dividend, which declined in sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s after the collapse of public services (Giraud et al., 2019), it seems to be facing a decrease in its financial capacity that may further complicate the development of social protection systems (ILO, 2017: 133).

Figure 1
SDG indicator 1.3.1
Percentage of population covered by at least one social protection benefit (effective coverage, 2015)



Source: ILO (2017: 10, 135)

This regional overview (figure 1) must not obscure important differences in coverage between countries (figure 1b) and their heterogeneous trajectories. In all countries there are compulsory schemes which offer very limited coverage only to those in formal employment. In these circumstances, one of the common challenges is to design and implement protection schemes that extend coverage to informal workers on a permanent basis. Some countries, such as Algeria, Cape Verde, Mauritius, and South Africa, have managed to achieve universal coverage by combining contributory and non-contributory programmes. Others have been able to develop a non-contributory universal pension system (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, etc.)²¹. Many countries, with the help of international aid, have initiated, and sometimes experimented with, various cash transfer programmes (Mkandawire, 2015; Deacon, 2013).


²¹ Cf. ILO (2017: 121-131)

The increasing and manifest interest in social protection in Africa over the past two decades has led to a renewal in academic work and institutional literature that oscillates between approaches that are technical and evaluative and those with a political economy focus. The latter have the analytical singularity of linking the performance of social protection policies to modes of insertion and political appropriation rather than to the strict conception and implementation of public actions and policies.

The recent expansion of social protection in Africa: international context and internal dynamics

Over the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in social protection issues in Africa. This dynamic is observed both in the rise of academic and institutional debates and in the increase of programmes and projects for social assistance from the 2000s onwards (figure 2). By 2015, the SAPI database records more than 60 million people, about 15% of the population living in extreme poverty in Africa, receiving cash transfers through 86 programmes in 37 countries (Hickey & al., 2018: 2).

Figure 2
Number of social assistance programmes in sub-Saharan Africa by start date



Source: Social Assistance, Politics and Institutions (SAPI) Database, UNU-WIDER (accessed 25 July 2019)

This movement is driven both by external factors related to transformations in the landscape or paradigms of international aid as well as by internal dynamics specific to the continent (Hickey & al., 2018; Hickey and Seekings, 2017; Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012).

At the international level, this reorientation of development aid towards social protection is in line with a ‘more inclusive liberalism’ (Hickey, 2009) which has led to a shift from Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Merrien, 2013; Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012; Slater & McCord, 2009). Promoted in the late 1990s by the World Bank and the IMF under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, these reputedly rigid macroeconomic plans are

drawn up by governments. They combine structural and poverty reduction objectives and play a decisive role in the economic and financial programs of low-income countries backed by these two institutions. Social protection programs were not necessarily included in these documents.

It has only been since the mid-2000s that a 'second generation' of PRSPs has focused on the conditions that push households into poverty. Accordingly, the aim is now to identify the ways of lifting them out of poverty by alleviating their vulnerability. Evidence of this paradigmatic shift is provided by two consecutive documents, produced and circulated by the Social Protection Unit of the World Bank, in English, then in both French and English for the reference document for the year 2000 (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 1999; Holzmann & Jorgensen 2000). One can also see it in practice in Madagascar, where the Bank created a national technical group in April 2002, for which it provided training seminars aimed at triggering a process that would lead to the elaboration of a social protection strategy. Various studies were carried out to assess existing programs, analyse vulnerability and risks, evaluate the situation of vulnerable children and conduct a cost-effectiveness study. This process lasted two years. It led to the inclusion of a strategic focus on social protection (Focus Area No. 3) in Madagascar's PRSP.

The definition of social protection by the World Bank as being based on social risk management is derived from a 'broader' conception. It emphasizes the double role of risk management tools: protecting people's livelihoods while encouraging them to take risks. The Bank's Social Risk Management approach 'targets poor segments of the population because they are more vulnerable,' and as such, it remains explicitly connected, if not tied, to the goal of lowering the number of poor people. In a disclaimer in footnote 6, the two authors point out that the misplaced term 'social' refers to the form of risk management and not to the type of risk being addressed. The social management of risks (and not the management of social risks), if one rectifies the expression, exceeds the historical role of the state in the traditional approaches to protection. It can therefore be carried out outside the framework of public and state action, by the informal or the private sector. It involves many actors, including individuals, communities, NGOs, the state, and international institutions. More than just another policy among others, social protection, as was the case with SSPs and then PRSPs in the past, is defined as a set of public policies to which this new repertoire imposes the same neoliberal coherence, based here on an understanding of risk at the level of the individual alone.

Against the backdrop of recurring crises in global capitalism - financial, political, food, etc. - and of the reshaping of the MDGs - the shift to SDGs -, the international agenda has grown significantly since 2010. In 2012, ILO Resolution No. 202, emphasizing that social protection is a human right - as stated in article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - focused on promoting a universal social protection floor (ILO, 2012). The organization had changed tack a few years previously when it realized

that social protection contingent on an employment contract was not very effective. Following the report by Bachelet (2011), former and future president of Chile, the ILO opted for a vision based on the promotion of a universal social protection floor. A vision less dependent on wage-based labour and promoting the idea that ‘social protection has not been the consequence but rather the condition for economic development’²². In 2015, the joint statement by the President of the World Bank Group and the Director General of the ILO captures this evolution²³. The World Health Organization (WHO) introduced Universal Health Coverage (UHC) during the same period (WHO, 2010). By signing these resolutions, countries commit to providing their whole population with basic levels of protection, meaning guarantees in terms of health and income security. In a broader sense, social protection is portrayed as a decisive instrument for the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015): it is identified as an effective tool for reducing poverty (Target 1.3)²⁴, promoting access to healthcare through universal health coverage (Target 3.8), fostering decent employment (Target 5.4) and reducing inequalities (Target 10.4).

Despite a seemingly overall consensus in favour of developing social protection instruments as major tools of anti-poverty policies, international actors' positions on the issue are far from unified. They cover a broad spectrum ranging from the ‘inclusive liberalism’ of the World Bank to the ILO's welfarist approach based on human rights (Hickey & Seekings, 2017). This movement in favour of social protection is explained in two different ways across the literature. On the one hand, some see it as the perpetuation of an ‘anti-politics machine’ rearmed by neo-liberal thinking that seeks to correct market imperfections to reduce poverty without any real attempt at rethinking the redistribution of wealth and power in Southern societies that would be necessary to recreate a model of ‘welfare capitalism’ (Hickey and Seekings, 2017; Peck, 2011; Hickey, 2009; Li, 2007). On the other hand, some authors see it as a quiet revolution coming from developing countries, opening up potential alternatives to both liberal modes of economic development and the Western model of social protection (Hanlon et al., 2010).

²² Cf. Cosme (ILO France), 25 oct. 2019 : “L’OIT opte pour une vision universelle de la protection sociale”. ILO.


²³ ‘For the World Bank Group and the ILO, universal social protection refers to the integrated set of policies designed to ensure income security and support to all people across the life cycle – paying particular attention to the poor and the vulnerable. Anyone who needs social protection should be able to access it. [...] We are proud to endorse the consensus that has emerged in the early 21st century that social protection is a primary development tool and priority. Since the 2000s, universality has re-entered the development agenda’.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/06/30/joint-statement-world-bank-group-president-ilo-director-general-guy-ryder>

²⁴ ‘Nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable’.

Apart from the changing landscape of international aid and the shifting discourses of international organizations, the success of the social protection theme can also be explained by the transformation in internal economic and social conditions. Since the early 2000s, the African continent has been undergoing major socio-economic and political changes. Despite a slowdown over the period 2010-2017, the continent remains the second fastest-growing region, behind Asia, with annual real GDP growth rates averaging around 5% (figure 3a). In the wake of this growth, many developments have attracted attention and generated debate: population growth, urbanization, movements out of poverty and the emergence of small (middle class) prosperity, democratization processes and new relationships between the State and civil society, the digital revolution, etc. Despite this, a number of structural vulnerabilities remain. Furthermore, the contrast with the rate of economic growth per capita is striking (figure 3a and 3b).

Figure 3
Sub-Saharan Africa, the second region with the strongest economic growth



Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, our calculations.

In a context in which growth is still insufficiently shared and structural vulnerabilities are high, the issue of risk protection finds a favourable reception on the national political scene. According to the ILO (2018: 134-135), African countries share six common priority actions in the area of protection: extending social protection to informal workers; developing social assistance schemes for people unable to work; improving institutional capacity to increase the effectiveness of social protection, particularly in fragile states; resilience to climate shocks; and social protection for migrant workers.

Social protection is presented as a mechanism of compensation for the many poor and particularly the rural populations who are still largely deprived of the benefits of economic growth. Since the early

2000s, there have been various initiatives and commitments by different governments on the continent, particularly under the auspices of the African Union, to make social protection a key element of their growth and poverty reduction strategies (Slater & McCord, 2009; Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012, table 1.1.). In 2006, 13 African governments signed the ‘Livingstone Call for Action’ in which they pledged to implement national strategic plans for social protection targeting the elderly and vulnerable.

Table 1
Recent African Social Protection Policy Developments

<p>2002 <i>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)</i> Drafted by NEPAD & FAO, argued that targeted safety nets are required to complement activities to promote regional food production in order to safeguard households against hunger.</p> <p>2004 <i>Ouagadougou Summit of African Union’s Heads of States and Governments on Employment and Poverty</i> Called for direct action to enhance social development.</p> <p>2005 <i>Commission for Africa’s report ‘Our Common Interest’</i> Highlighted the central role of social protection interventions in long term poverty reduction</p> <p>2006 <i>Livingstone African Union Conference</i> Call for action on the extension of social protection provision</p> <p>2008 <i>African Union Ministerial Conference on Social Development</i> Follow up to Livingstone and endorsement of the African Social Policy Framework</p>
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Source: Slater & McCord (2009: 13)

Of course, these strategic documents by no means preclude the influence of external actors, in particular that of international donors (Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012). Such plans result from a political negotiation between stakeholders: national, international, public, private, civil society actors, etc. Additionally, the fact that countries clearly take social protection issues into consideration should not overshadow the fact that the continent is still very much lagging behind other developing regions in terms of the social protection of their population.

For Africa as a whole, spending on welfare, excluding healthcare, amounts to 5.9% of its GDP, a slightly higher figure for North Africa (7.6%) and lower one for sub-Saharan Africa (4.5%). While there is a real trend towards the expansion of social assistance programs, for the time being, here too, many countries are spending no more than 0.5% of their GDP on them (Hickey & al., 2018; SAPI-UNU WIDER data).

In 2012, a regional network of experts was created in Southern Africa to address these issues: the Southern African Social Protection Experts Networks (SASPEN). Supported by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)-Zambia Foundation, this non-profit organization brings together academics and consultants committed to the theme of social protection in the region. It provides a forum for exchange (con-

ferences, workshops, publications) to help raise awareness and disseminate knowledge on social protection, offer technical expertise, interact with institutions, etc. This type of initiative is a good illustration of the internal dynamics of social protection institutions and the ambivalence of their relationship to transnational governance. At this stage, however, it does not indicate that African governments' actions in the area of social protection are moving away from the formalist and follow-my-leader modes that have, with few exceptions, been known to exist until now.

The political economy of social protection reforms in Africa

Getting the politics right may be as important, or even more important than getting the initial technical design of programs right.

(Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012: 174)

Cash transfers have certainly been presented as the “practically feasible solution” to an “ideologically framed consensus” regarding poverty alleviation, but what we found striking is rather the highly and deliberately politicized approach that this has often involved.

(Hickey & Seekings, 2017: 23)

In the last two decades, as the issue of social protection in developing countries and in Africa has been put on the political agenda, a vast body of institutional and academic literature has emerged in its wake. Institutional literature adopts a perspective of relatively technical expertise in a rather classic process of monitoring and evaluation of development programs/projects (Hickey & al., 2018). Leading this production of reports²⁵ are the World Bank, the ILO and, more recently, UNICEF, which has become an influential player in the field of social protection focused on strengthening the resilience of children, families, and communities (UNICEF, 2012).

An important field of academic work is devoted to evaluating the impact of specific programmes on household welfare by examining, more specifically, the technical modalities of each operation's design, implementation, and targeting (Davis & al., 2016; Saavedra & al., 2012; Coady & al., 2004).

However, over the past decade or so, several studies carried out within the framework of research projects with an international scope have highlighted the importance of a political economy approach to social protection, including at the evaluation level. In this regard, the article by Niño-Zarazúa et al. titled ‘Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Getting the Politics Right’, published in *World Development* in 2012, is emblematic. Noting the growing interest in social assistance and social protection issues in Africa, the authors question the political nature of such processes. In line with the three

²⁵ World Bank annual reports *The State of Social Safety Nets* along with the use of the ASPIRE database; the *World Social Protection Report* of the ILO which, incidentally, show that almost 70% of the social assistance programmes identified between 2000 and 2015 are unconditional cash transfer programmes.

streams of Kingdon's theory (1995)²⁶, they consider the internal political game as one of the three central determinants for understanding, analysing, and evaluating the dynamics underway: the other two determinants being financial sustainability and local institutional capacities. The authors identify two main model-types of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. While they indeed reflect different levels of development there is more to them than that (table 2):

The Middle-Income Country Model (MIC) is characteristic of the social protection models implemented in several Southern African countries since the mid-1990s. These have been expanding rapidly since the 2000s. Social protection is rather based on age-related social transfer programs (old-age and disability pensions, family allowances) as is the case in South Africa, Namibia, and Mauritius. This model, managed by public agencies and institutions, financed through taxation and integrated into national legislation, can be found in states with significant organizational and fiscal capacities.

The second model, the 'Low Income Country Model' (LIC), prevalent in many East, Central, and West African countries where institutional capacity is weak, is based on a variety of social transfer programs aimed at reducing extreme poverty and is part of the new wave of social protection programs that have been in operation since the mid-2000s, under the leadership of the World Bank. It includes social safety nets, food subsidies, cash-for-work programs, and a whole range of measures to alleviate vulnerability. This model, present in countries under aid regimes, is marked by its weaker local political involvement. It is comprised of numerous short- and medium-term programs and projects, offering little coverage to the population as a whole and relying on a weak institutionalization of technical and organizational mechanisms. Therefore, these authors wonder about the twofold shift that this movement in favour of social protection programs could reflect: (i) in terms of mechanisms, could it be a shift from food aid to cash transfers? (ii) and on a more paradigmatic level, a shift from emergency aid to sustainable and reliable models of social protection. There remains room for doubt. Nothing suggests that a movement largely driven by a project logic, financed by external aid, and piloted by development actors such as NGOs and international organizations can form the basis for a process of institutionalizing a national social protection system (Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012: 168).

'There is much discussion about whether the emergence of social protection as a policy framework in Africa responds to domestic demand or is simply a new donor fad. On the one hand, the Livingstone Process suggests a strong measure of support for social protection from national governments in the region, although even this

²⁶ Kingdon seeks to understand why one policy emerges and others do not. According to this theory a policy opportunity is created by the simultaneous presence and successful combination of three interacting streams: problems (from multiple sources), solutions (involving the role of experts) and a favourable political context that allows the integration of the solution and the problem.

process was driven to some extent by external agencies. On the other hand, the proliferation of pilot social protection projects supported and financed by multilaterals and bilateral suggests the influence of the development industry’.

In a context where many countries on the continent are still in the early stages of formulating national social protection strategies, understanding how these could be converted into national social protection policies is crucial. The answer implies paying serious attention to politics, in particular by questioning the articulation between donor logics and national politics, making a public policy analysis approach essential:

‘The key point here is that national, regional, and international political dynamics are shaping the evolution of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa, but that most often it will be national level politics that holds the key, particularly in terms of the actions or inactions of powerful players in government.’ (Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012: 171)

Table 2
Middle income and Low income ‘models’ of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa

	Before mid-1990s	Dynamics	After mid-1990s	
	Pure income transfers		Pure income transfers	Income transfers plus services
MIC Africa “model” age-based vulnerability transfers	Old age and disability grants in South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles	Extension of coverage ----->	Removal of racial discrimination; Adoption of social pensions in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland; 1998 CSG in ZA	
	Categorical universal transfers, means tested in South Africa		<i>Politics:</i> Equity politics in ZA and Namibia; electoral politics in Lesotho; Sub-regional “demonstration effect” <i>Finance:</i> tax financed	
LIC Africa “model” extreme poverty-based transfers	Racially segregated in eligibility and benefits <i>Politics:</i> Domestically driven by settler elites <i>Finance:</i> tax financed		Mozambique FSP	Ethiopia PNSP; Kenya OVC; Malawi Social Transfers; Ghana’s LEAP
	Few countries with public welfare programs (Zambia, Zimbabwe) but emergency food aid dominant	Shift from food aid to social transfers ----->	Zambia pilot categorical transfer programs	
	<i>Politics:</i> food aid externally driven, but exploited by local political elites <i>Finance:</i> donor financed		<i>Politics:</i> donor driven <i>Finance:</i> donor financed in Zambia; joint donor-government financed in Mozambique	<i>Politics:</i> donor driven, but rising government engagement <i>Finance:</i> largely donor financed but domestically financed in Ghana

Source: Niño-Zarazúa & al. (2012: 165)

Several research projects are in line with this perspective and explore the politics of policy reform and non-reform in several countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. Three projects in particular are in close dialogue: (i) the Politics of Social Protection project led by Hickey and Lavers at the University of Manchester is part of a larger DFID-funded program, the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID)

program; (ii) the Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms (LIWPR) project led by Jeremy Seekings at the University of Cape Town; (iii) the Economics and Politics of Taxation and Social Protection project developed at UNU-WIDER and led by Miguel Niño-Zarazúa. This last project is also the one that has worked to establish a dialogue between the first two. It also led to the creation of the aforementioned SAPI Data Base (Social Assistance, Politics, and Institutions database)²⁷. These three projects have produced numerous articles and working papers (Hickey & al., 2020; Hickey & al., 2018; Chemouni, 2018; Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Lavers, 2016; Lavers & Hickey, 2015)..

The analytical starting point for all these studies is the evidence of a variety of national experiences in the field of social protection in Africa, even though they all respond to the same international impetus. For these authors, this is explained by politics and, in particular, by the way in which local political economies and transnational influences interact. From this perspective, understanding the way in which social assistance programs are adopted and adapted, or even extended, involves examining how social protection policy fits into the specific 'distributive regime' of the country under study. At the theoretical level, this work relies heavily on the 'political settlements' approach developed by Khan (2010). Following, complementing, or even criticizing neo-institutionalism in development economics (North, 2007; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012), these studies are very similar to those developed in the analysis of public action and of the production of public policies in both the North and the South.

In spite of definite nuances, this research trend emphasizes the part played by idiosyncratic institutional configurations in economic development, institutional configurations resulting from political power relations and struggles between elite and non-elite factions over the distribution of resources and rents. According to Khan (2010: 4), 'political settlements' are defined as: 'a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability'. Political-economic equilibriums are based on social groups supporting the ruling coalition in return for rent distribution. The convergence or divergence of interests, both political and economic, thus conditions the success or failure of economic policies. Within this rational framework, public policy analysis implies focusing on the formation and role of political coalitions and the distribution of resources. Social protection is understood as a resource whose distribution is subject to negotiation and competition, particularly within the framework of the strategies used by political elites to hang on to power. However, the research carried out within these projects, in particular within the Effective States and Inclusive Development project²⁸, goes beyond this theoretical approach. It considers that

²⁷ UNU-WIDER (2018) Social Assistance, Politics, and Institutions (SAPI) database [online] Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). Available here <https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/sapi-social-assistance-politics-and-institutions-database>

²⁸ Esid : <http://www.effective-states.org/>

political trade-offs not only reflect the balance of power between competing factions but are also based on shared cognitive frameworks and political ideas (Lavers & Hickey, 2016). In this sense, as Chemouni (2018) reminds us, this work is part of the 'discursive institutionalism' or 'ideational turning point' (Blyth, 1997) in political science.

The fields of study covered in these research projects mainly include eight countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. Emphasis is on the analysis of social assistance programs (such as the Community-Based Health Insurance - CBHI - in Rwanda or the Productive Safety Net Programme - PSNP - in Ethiopia). To this end, the methods used are based on process tracing and involve identifying the key moments and factors in government decisions crucial to the policy under study (Collier, 2011; Chemouni, 2018; Hickey & al., 2018). This requires a detailed analysis of the historical process of reform. Systematically matching this process of public policymaking with the economic and political context in which it takes shape relies on meticulous investigations of the grey literature, national and international institutional documentation, as well as in-depth semi-structured interviews with key individuals involved in negotiating the reforms of social assistance programs in the countries at hand.

A number of important findings from this work should be highlighted.

- In general, the authors find that the countries that have made the most progress in the area of social assistance policies have mostly done so for internal policy reasons, more than under external pressure from donors alone.
- The influence of transnational actors seems stronger during the agenda-setting stage, whereas it seems less so at the adoption and implementation stages (Hickey & al., 2018; Lavers & Hickey, 2020).
- While internal factors are key determinants, they may not necessarily reflect social demand. They are much more often the result of the political will to promote the regime's legitimacy and foster stability or social pacification.
- Therefore, this work underscores the extent to which these externally driven models are only accepted and adapted when they align with the 'value system' or 'policy ideas' of the dominant coalition.
- The way in which external models are reclaimed can be quite unexpected and paradoxical. For instance, the countries most committed to implementing far-reaching reforms of social assistance programs are those that have adopted an ideology that is rather developmental, like the Ethiopian or Rwandan governments, ultimately far removed from the liberal doxa propagated by external actors such as the World Bank (Lavers, 2016; Lavers & Hickey, 2015).

The success and effectiveness of the actions undertaken, particularly during the always delicate transition from formulating solutions to their implementation by administrative departments or other stakeholders, also depend on the way coalitions of ideas or representations are formed as well as on the potential role played by individual or collective ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who wield influence in discussions with national decision-makers (Sabatier, 1988; Lavers & Hickey, 2015).

As noted above, authoritarian regimes can undertake ambitious welfare reforms just as much as democratic governments can. A multi-party system and regular elections seem to be positive factors in bringing social protection issues to the forefront, but they are not an essential driver. However, the political processes that have been analysed clearly reflect the influence of the historical trajectories and specificities of social protection regimes in Africa, with a body of arguments, ideas, and stories (Radaelli, 2010) closely linked to merit, employment, the role of the state, and the status of agriculture.

Putting social protection policies in Madagascar into perspective

Madagascar is one of the typical examples of the ‘socially insecure countries’ category used in the comparative and classification approaches to national systems and the state of social protection (Wood & Gough, 2006; Clément, 2017). However, beyond belonging to this category, the Malagasy economy appears above all as a unique case of cumulative long-term decline, in other words, of economic envelopment²⁹. Although the close interdependence between economics and politics operates in a remarkable way, it does so by reversing the expected causal relationship. This makes Madagascar an empirical case that refutes the standard economic literature on development or, in this case, the process of economic decline it has suffered (Razafindrakoto & al., 2017: 11). To such an extent that, since the mid-2000s, even the most reluctant international institutions, led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have come to recognize the effect of a counterintuitive interweaving of economic growth and political crises. However, at the same time, they have been careful not to question the models with which they have attempted, without any real success, to make sense of the repeated situations of political crises and non-development (op. cit.). Nevertheless, considering the country's involutory trajectory from a political economy perspective highlights a long-term feature of Madagascar that is difficult to ignore when examining public policy and, even more so, social protection policy. This is the weak capacity of the Malagasy state and society to build a political consensus that will resolve the redistributive conflict over a sufficiently long period of time to allow for economic


²⁹ A terminology proposed by Hugon (2011: 4) to describe ‘an involutory process that translates into indices of marginalization, declining productivity, vicious circles, and poverty traps’.

growth. We will then see that the trajectory of social protection policies since independence illustrates this structural impasse.

The curse of growth or the impossible resolution of the redistributive conflict

Since independence, when reliable growth data has been available, Madagascar seems to be under a continuous growth curse (figure 4a.). Periods of economic recovery, mainly driven by exogenous factors such as improved terms of trade, greater foreign direct investment or increased foreign aid, give rise to internal socio-political tensions that systematically lead to popular uprisings and political crises that are profoundly destabilizing for the economy (Hugon, 2015).

Figure 4
Malagasy public policies faced with the repeated failures of social regulation



It is not our aim here to undertake a historical and empirical analysis of the chains of endogenous and exogenous factors that lead to such a cycle of crises, any more than it is to analyse the inexorable economic decline that results from it. These two dimensions of the Malagasy experience (figure 4a.) have been studied in detail in the collective work 'L'énigme et le paradoxe' to which we refer our readers (Razafindrakoto & al., 2017). From this analytical framework and from comparable approaches concerned with multi-level and dynamic explanations, an image emerges of a long-term political economy in which social regulation is all the more lacking when faced with a significant improvement in the economic climate (Razafindrakoto & al., 2015; Hugon, 2015 and 1982; Roubaud, 2003; Pourcet, 1978). In Madagascar, where rentier regimes dominate, the inability to broaden the socio-political redistribution trade-offs in line with the transformation of rents resulting from phases of economic growth - and, more crucially, with the transformation of state rents managed within small but unstable elite coalitions (Razafindrakoto & al., 2017: 50; Galibert, 2011) - appears to be characteristic of an economy

mired in poverty traps despite its well-known assets. Thus, research indicates a scarcity of violent and armed conflicts linked to a cultural taboo around violence³⁰, a proven capacity for institutional change, relative linguistic unity, the age of the state, the land and underground resources, the touristic resources, biodiversity, low labour costs, the potential of free trade zones (FTZ), appealing taxation. These assets are offset by structural weaknesses such as insularity, territorial fragmentation, and the economic disjointedness worsened by the limited extent and poor state of the transportation network, recurring natural disasters (cyclones, crickets), the cost of trade, and corruption (Hugon, 2015: 9; Razafindrakoto & *al.*, 2017).

Since independence in 1960, GDP per capita has been divided by three. In two panels of comparison, the economy has become poorer and has even declined sharply in the past two decades (figure 4b.). Per capita income, which was higher than that of LDCs in the mid-1990s, is only 60% of that in 2017. At the same time, it goes from 60% to 40% of the per capita income of Sub-Saharan African countries. The national poverty rate has been chronically over 70% since the 1990s (World Bank, 2015) and strong inequalities persist, particularly between urban and rural areas. In 2013, the rate of people living in extreme poverty was 79.6% in rural areas and 50.3% in urban centres (ADB, 2015). In 2012-2013, according to the latest survey data provided by INSTAT, the proportion of people living below the national poverty line was 71.5%. Those with less than 2\$ in PPP per day reached 91%. This regressive path is all the more surprising given that, unlike some of its sub-Saharan neighbours, the island has not experienced war or major conflict.

Madagascar has a highly segmented and atomized society. The caste system, although officially abolished, continues to dominate social relations that are based, overall, on verticality and hierarchy: 'Respect for leaders and the hierarchical order appears to be essential' (Razafindrakoto & *al.*, 2017: 235). On the basis of these changeable social and political fundamentals, as revealed by the 2009 crisis, a narrow elite shares the power it has won and maintained using the clientelist and corruptive practices characteristic of a neo-patrimonial state. However, the system of redistribution of rents associated with it is limited to the small group of those directly connected to the power in place (*op. cit.*). Narrow elite alliances and coalitions quickly form and collapse at the whim of members' private interests, competition between rival factions, and the goal of rapid wealth accumulation dictated by the perceived very low probability of remaining in power, in view of Madagascar's modern political history.³¹

³⁰ Cf. Kneitz (2014).

³¹ Cf. the expression PFR ('*position de fuite rapide*' - quick flight position) describes a Malagasy elite ready to leave the country if necessary, reported by Razafindrakoto & *al.* (2017: 231).

Nevertheless, the 'liquefied'³² state, in addition to being 'fragile', displays an 'administrative façade' that is reassuring because it conforms to the prerequisites of public action. Providing and controlling the formulation of official policies, decision-making administrative services with high-ranking, individually effective officials are able to contribute relatively effectively to the negotiation process with external actors. However, with very weak institutional and financial capacities, the state is subsequently unable to cover the entire national territory and guarantee that decisions are followed up. Alongside a world of 'official' public policies, represented by speeches, the symbolism of launches and official records, a 'myriad of worlds of ethos' operates during the actual implementation of public policies, giving rise, more than in other situations, to intense negotiations and practical reworkings of policies that change over time and space³³.

In this particular context of elaboration, decision-making and implementation of public policies, redistribution and social policies have so far remained limited in scope. The share of social expenditure in GDP represents 2.4%, while this rate has reached 5.3% in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2017). Social protection is poorly developed both in terms of social insurance (10% of employment is formal and entitles the holder to social insurance, INSTAT, 2013) and in terms of social assistance (less than 2% of the population is covered according to the World Bank (2018)). Malagasy society, like most countries caught in the poverty trap, suffers from a low level of market risk coverage. Actors face a double disadvantage since they also act 'in an environment where the state and the plurality of rights do not operate to reduce uncertainty', which explains the reproduction, adaptation, and continued importance of reciprocal community logics (community of belonging and membership) in the way society protects itself (Hugon, 2015: 10).

Madagascar's social protection experience since the 1960s: push and shove.

At this stage of the analysis, there is a clear perception of what is at stake in a social protection public policy operating as an efficient means of reducing risk and uncertainty and contributing to an institution that is more supportive of society. At the same time, however, the difficulty of this undertaking is obvious, insofar as it inevitably involves a substantial change and restructuring of the mechanisms of integration (market-centred, distributive, reciprocal) and of the institutions at work in the country's political economy. These are probably the difficulties that arise from even a cursory reading of the course of social protection since independence.

³² We refer here to the FAPPA deliverable '*Madagascar : l'État néo-patrimonial absorbe-t-il les politiques publiques ?*', Darbon & al. (2018c).

³³ This passage is very directly influenced by the content of the exchanges and cross-proposals between Darbon and Galibert during the FaPPA seminar held at Sciences-Po Bordeaux on 19 December 2018.

The foundations of a social insurance system were laid in the wake of the 1952 Overseas Territories Labour Code (Crom & al., 2017). A series of legislative and regulatory texts started to build a system of workers' protection. The first gains in social insurance were made four years before the country's independence. They provided for family benefits to be paid subject to the payment of employer contributions. The *Caisse de Compensation des Prestations Familiales* (CCPF), created by decree to this end³⁴, collected contributions from employers and paid out benefits.

After independence, a series of laws and decrees³⁵ laid the foundations for the current social insurance system. It is worth pointing out that social insurance refers to benefit mechanisms offered on the basis of a pooling of social risks defined by law. The system is based on the contributory principle, whereby a worker acquires a vested right through the payment of contributions related to his or her work for the employer (ILO, 2005: 7). In 1963, work-related accidents and occupational illnesses were included in the risks covered by the social insurance scheme. A new institution, the National Fund for Family Allowances and Occupational Accidents, was created by ordinance³⁶. Social insurance based on salaried employment and the civil service thus covered the pension and welfare system of the public (CRCM - Caisse de Retraite Civile et Militaire and CPR - Caisse de Prévoyance et de Retraite) and private sectors (CNaPS - Caisse nationale de prévoyance sociale created in 1969). These laws and decrees only apply to workers in the modern sector (private and public). They exclude those in the so-called 'traditional' informal and rural sectors, which account for almost all of the economy. The largest part of the Malagasy population is not included. The eligibility criteria for social security, designed by and for industrial and payroll companies, excludes agricultural work, small-scale family farming and all workers in the urban and rural informal sector (small-scale market production, trade, and service activities) from the scope of national protection. The inequality of this inherited dual protection system is reflected in contemporary statistical data on the coverage levels and rates of the population. The numbers highlight the consequences of a double deficit: the lack of structural transformation and the absence of social protection programs tailored to the realities of labour and economics.

Until the early 2000s, nothing fundamentally changed in principle, in spite of surveys, diagnostics and technical assistance aimed at improving and extending the social insurance system.

Admittedly, the legal arsenal was reinforced, providing additional elements of protection in the area of workplace health and safety rights. For the record, one may cite Law No. 94-027 of November 17,

³⁴ Décret n° 336-IGT du 17/02/1956.

³⁵ Loi n° 68-023 du 17 décembre 1968 instituant la Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale (CNaPS).

Décret n° 69-145 du 08 avril 1969 portant Code de Prévoyance Sociale

Décret n° 62-144 du 21 mars 1962 portant création de la Caisse de Retraite Civile et Militaire (CRCM)

Décret n° 61-642 du 29 novembre 1961 portant création de la Caisse de Prévoyance et de Retraite (CPR).

³⁶ Ordonnance n°62-078 du 29 September 1962

1994 on the Code of Health and Safety and the Working Environment. In force until 2004, this law was abrogated by Law No. 2003-044 of July 28, 2004 on the Labour Code. The limitations of this legislation are less due to the inclusion of new labour standards than to the weakness of their effective implementation for the employees affected and, above all, to the fact that non-salaried workers in the informal and rural sectors, according to this Code, are not covered by the social security system. While Madagascar has signed several international agreements since the 1960s, it should be noted that the main ILO instruments relating to health and safety have not been ratified³⁷. Such a distancing from international labour standards can be linked to the lack of a suitable social protection policy.

However, this is not for lack of support from the main international organizations through aid and technical assistance. Since the country's independence, the ILO has helped successive governments with various technical studies on all aspects of social security, except for the health system. So-called 'large-scale' missions were carried out in the early 1980s and early 1990s. Complementary work was undertaken in 1993 and 1998. After the 2002 crisis, in a then confidential report to the government on the governance of the national social insurance system, the international organization stressed that the challenges of social protection remain similar to those 10 and 20 years ago. 'It is clear that the social protection system has changed little' (ILO, 2005: 5). The succession of political shocks and economic crises, coupled with the chronic inadequacy of state revenue, considerably hinders the implementation of major social security reforms, in particular the establishment of 'a safety net for all Malagasy citizens' (op. cit.: 4). The overall assessment of the state of social welfare policy and social protection in the mid-2000s is then unequivocal:

- 'only the picture of public social insurance schemes can be identified more precisely, whereas the overview of social assistance programmes can only be gained by consulting a large number of scattered studies on the subject³⁸ ;
- In general terms, 'there appears to be a lack of coordination in the formulation and implementation of national social protection policy' and 'the lack of a comprehensive perspective and the required protection of the vested interests relating to the multiple existing social assistance measures, organized within government institutions and NGOs, discourage decision-makers from addressing the overall social protection system' ;

³⁷ Convention n°155, recommendation n°164 and annex to the recommendation on occupational safety and health, 1981; Protocol of 2002 to the convention n° 155 on occupational safety and health, 1981; Convention n° 187, recommendation n° 197 and annex to the recommendation on the promotional framework for occupational safety and health, 2006. Cf. Razafimaharo (2014).

³⁸ In this regard, it should be noted that in 2012, the World Bank drew up a list of social protection programmes including the public social security system, health insurance in formal private companies and the full range of safety net programmes in education, health, nutrition, labour-intensive work, responses to natural disasters and support to specific vulnerable groups (World Bank, 2012: 312-317).

- it is unlikely that the state will be able to ‘develop adequately its social protection system as long as more resources are not made available through taxation’ while social insurance that is not adapted to ‘current needs, particularly in terms of personal coverage’ remains ‘almost exclusively offered to workers in formal economic activity sectors through the CNaPS and OSIES and to state officials through specific social security funds’ ;
- regarding social assistance programmes financed from public funds (non-contributory scheme), which the ILO considers to be the other pillar of social protection for population groups in need and without the financial means to meet those needs’, again, ‘ as the resources of the state are very limited, a very small proportion of the population of Madagascar receives social assistance benefits of any kind from the social protection system’.

The three levels of recommendations which the ILO once again reiterated in its 2005 report summarize fairly well the prevailing paradigm for social protection at the time. The first level is establishing a universal minimum base for old age and health protection on the principle of national solidarity, then, at the second level of compulsory social insurance, consolidating and improving the existing mechanisms based on the CNaPS and, at the complementary level, setting up an optional insurance or savings program according to the capacities of the groups of contributors through private or public organizations. The institutional extension of social protection to the uninsured populations of the informal and rural sectors is thus envisioned from the perspective of a universal minimum threshold coupled with the combined development of compulsory and complementary insurance (op. cit.: 6).

In practice, the unreformed social protection system contributes to widening the gap between modern and traditional forms of labour. The prevalence and impact of social risks could not be reduced. In certain regions of Madagascar, such as the far south, it is the emergence of new risks (security conditions, cattle theft, climate impact on crops) along with the aggravation of social risks that heighten the uncertainty faced by populations that are particularly deprived. At the beginning of the 2000s, the conditions were ripe in Madagascar for the paradigm shift taking place at the international level in favour of social protection organized around risk management, assistance, and the principle of safety nets (cash type) to take place. The economic and political crisis of 2002 (Razafindrakoto & al., 2017) made this change even more auspicious.

The discursive and semantic register of expertise on social protection has thus changed and is now carried by a new actor, the World Bank, within the framework of negotiations on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (see below). The first social safety net programs are established. These tools are developed in order to ‘fight extreme poverty and protect vulnerable households from the growing number of shocks related to disasters such as droughts, floods, epidemics and disease, international

price shocks and conflicts. '(Beegle & al., 2018: 13). As early as 2000, UNICEF decided to set up a transfer conditionally linked to children's schooling³⁹. The program's objective is to guarantee schooling for the largest possible number of children while ensuring a regular income for households. Other similar approaches were developed during this period with the common objective of reducing household vulnerability to various risks. Project-based aid driven by a wide variety of actors (NGOs, international organizations, bilateral organizations) is then an integral part of the action mechanisms now integrated into the debate on social protection.

Consequently, the making of social protection policy has to deal with two new dimensions. The first involves the integration of interventions that are limited in time and space (projects and programs), whereas, by its very nature, social protection can neither be discontinuous, nor can it flow in a linear time frame. The second, more problematic, establishes a protective alliance through development aid that exceeds the territory of national sovereignty. Finally, one may add, as an epiphenomenon, the fact that the state, at the centre of the insurance scheme that it is supposed to guarantee, is marginalized or reduced to a coordinating role in this new system based on assistance and aid.


The initial impulse or the shaping of a new conception of social protection comes from the outside, with no direct connection with any domestic social construction. The prevailing view is to establish an effective system of social safety nets to 'reduce extreme poverty and strengthen the resilience of the poor' (World Bank, 2014: 323). Thus, at this stage, the World Bank will have played a crucial role, in line with the LIC model identified by Niño-Zarazúa and most of the findings of the studies on policy transfers in this type of state.

However, there is still a gap between initiation and completion. The weakness of the institutional framework combined with a new economic and political crisis in 2009 continued to impede the implementation of a social protection policy. During the period from January 2007 to March 2009, the Ministry of Population and Social Affairs (MPAS), then in charge of government policy in the area of social protection, was downgraded to a general directorate within the Ministry of Health and Family Planning. This also resulted in a reallocation of tasks between different ministries. Re-established in 2009, its role remains limited according to the World Bank. This translates into a clear lack of coordination at the national level, in spite of its critical importance in a multisectoral and multi-actor system (2014: 318-319). As an alternative, discussion groups are then set up by donors to monitor and coordinate certain programs. As of 2014, however, Madagascar still did not have a social protection policy or strategy to guide coordination. Although a national strategy for risk management and social protection was indeed developed as early as 2007, the document was never validated politically. From 2007 to

³⁹ The 'Let Us Learn' program set up in 2000 is entirely funded by the UN agency.

2011, only a few social protection policy orientations were set out in the MAP (Madagascar Action Plan) and in the annual implementation reports of government programs.

It was not until 2015 that the impulsion of the World Bank, whose first action dated back to 2002, led to clear changes in the area of social protection. These developments are visible both at the institutional level, with the creation or reinforcement of organizations through legislation, and at the policy orientation level. Relative to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, Madagascar is one of the last countries to adopt such a strategy (figure 5.).



Source: from Beegle & al. (2018).

A very first National Social Protection Policy document is published in 2015 (PNPS, 2015). This policy's main objective is to coordinate the interventions of national and international actors (International Organizations, NGOs, Development Intervention Fund) in the area of social protection. The Law on Non-Contributory Social Protection and the related decrees clearly mark this direction by providing for the creation of bodies to coordinate non-contributory social protection actions, as foreshadowed by the creation of the GTPS (Social Protection Working Group). 'In the absence of these structures with legal status, social protection is coordinated at the technical level by the Social Protection Working Group (GTPS). The GTPS is chaired by the MPPSPF. According to Decree 2015-1034, the MPPSPF is responsible for establishing a general policy framework for social protection for vulnerable households' (SNPS, 2018). The GTPS is composed of the Ministries involved, technical and financial partners (TFPs) and NGOs. It comprises four sub-groups aligned with the priorities of the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS). The Working Group's mission is to coordinate the 'non-contributory' and contributory elements (op. cit.: 14). However, the texts already show how they are disconnected. The

GTPS, co-led by the MPPSPF and UNICEF, met regularly between 2017 and 2018 and the actors involved attended several of these meetings (see above).

The National Social Protection Policy (2015) is structured along four strategic axes of social protection in Madagascar, which are logically reflected in the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS, 2018): (i) raise the incomes of the poorest; (ii) improve access to basic social services; (iii) build the capacities of vulnerable persons with a view to their gradual integration into the development process; (iv) progressively consolidate the contributory system.

Most of the programs implemented to date fall under the priority area. The primary mechanism is the extension of social safety net programs, financed largely by the World Bank and UNICEF, and coordinated by the MPPSPF. Implementation is entrusted to the Development Intervention Fund (DIF). These are mainly programmes of conditional cash transfer (CCT), unconditional cash transfer (UCT), human development cash transfer (HDCT), cash for productive work (CPA), cash for work (CFW)⁴⁰, focused on geographical and resource criteria and, in some cases, as part of a post-disaster response. The 2015 NSPP is therefore a continuation and articulation of the 'fight against poverty' with 'social protection'. It testifies to the hegemony of assistance as the preferred method of non-contributory social protection and of aid as a means of financing.


A more universal ambition runs parallel to these various assistance programs: universal health coverage. Set up by the Ministry of Health, this program guarantees access, on the basis of voluntary contributions, to a basket of healthcare goods and services. In other words, it is a social health insurance system. If implemented, such a project offers the possibility of going beyond the boundaries of formal employment since the contribution is not based on employment status. However, this system relies on volunteerism, which can significantly limit its impact on the poorest populations. The pilot project's ongoing evaluation in three districts should make it possible to fine-tune the practical modalities for greater effectiveness.

Typically, Madagascar is currently trying to combine into a coherent whole a variety of principles and protection mechanisms that are meant to address the diversity of situations when faced with risks. Figure 6 below, drawn from official documentation, offers a representation of the overall picture. In addition to social security for salaried employees, the massive development of social assistance and social action services, which are very closely linked to the aid regime, is expected to bolster the existing framework. The system is rooted in a double divide: that of needs, chronic protection needs (health, welfare, etc.) and exceptional needs (poverty, disasters, etc.); and that of the population, the people

⁴⁰ Cf. FID (2018) for more details.

at the top, civil servants and employees, and, at the bottom, the rest of the population. The new approach, tailored to different situations, should make it possible to significantly improve the impact of social protection where the previous, undifferentiated approach covered only a very small minority of the population.

Figure 6
Social protection system in Madagascar (2015)



Source: PNPS (2015)

Financially, the few available data reflect the scale of the challenge, especially since the aim is to make social assistance a new pillar of social protection. On average, the share of the national state budget devoted to social spending is about 5%, and in 2017 nearly 20% of this spending came from foreign aid. As for the budget of the MPPSPF, between 2015 and 2017, it was mainly funded by external aid (UNICEF, 2018). Another indicator that reflects the quantitative leap that needs to be made to move from a series of projects and experiments to the institution of a safety net: social safety nets cover 3.2% of the population according to the ASPIRE database.

Alongside the essential issue of financial sustainability, crucial without a sufficiently developed economic base, the path of social protection in Madagascar reveals a chronic inability to address this issue internally, regardless of its design or conception. This observation refocuses the analysis of social protection policy on two other high-stakes aspects, identified by Niño-Zarazúa & al. for LICs (2012): the shift from a multiplicity of actions per project involving external actors to a national public policy and

the related issue of the governance of a complex system. The difficulty stems from the need to make the three modes of coordination involved in the social protection system coherent, namely the state, civil society, and the market. It also arises from the nature of the contractual arrangements involved in providing social protection which, in an aid regime, has a unique global dimension. Historically designed within the national framework, the regulation of social protection policy in a country such as Madagascar involves 'the orderly arrangement of different territorial and regional scales and sustainable socio-political compromises ensured by [international] transfers and redistributive mechanisms' (Hugon, 2004: 12). It is these dimensions of the social protection policy making process in a developing country under the aid regime that we will now focus on.

Chapter 2

A *policy network* approach: conceptual and methodological framework

The purpose of this second chapter is to specify the conceptual, analytical, and methodological framework of our empirical study on the network of actors involved in the elaboration of social protection policy in Madagascar. In order to do so, we must first review the literature in social sciences, and particularly in political science, involving policy network and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) approaches. Special attention will be given in this context to the recent development of this work in Southern countries, particularly in Africa. Understanding how this literature has been constructed and how it relates to the corpus of social network analysis and, in particular, to the analysis of inter-organizational networks, will then help avoid any misunderstanding and clarify our conceptual, analytical, and methodological positioning.

Reviewing the development of policy network approaches in the study of public policies in Africa

The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the state of the art on policy networks, particularly within political science, and how this work relates to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's 1993 Advocacy Coalition (ACF) model. While these approaches had mainly been applied to fields of study in Northern countries, the next section reviews the recent use of policy networks to study public policies and development projects in Southern countries. After defining the main tools of these approaches in different development contexts, in the third point we will define our conceptual and analytical approach, both with regards to this field of research and to the studies on the political economy of social protection in Africa.

The policy networks approach: studying the fragmentation of the policy making process

The fertility of social network analysis for political sociology has long been recognized, especially for the study of elites, power, organizations, and public policies (Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012; Thatcher, 1998, 2014). In the 1970s, the starting point of the research using the policy network theory was the observation that the policy-making process was demonstrably open to a wide variety of actors⁴¹. In a

⁴¹ According to Le Galès (1995: 14), policy networks 'are the result of a more or less stable, non-hierarchical cooperation between organisations that know and recognise each other, negotiate, exchange resources and may share norms and interests'.

context of profound institutional change, the analysis of this fragmentation, and in particular the relationships between private and public actors, became key. In the United States, the relations between private interest groups, state agencies, and Congress are the focus of attention. Domhoff (1967) develops the notion of 'policy-planning network' through which he seeks to articulate the analysis of the policy-making process with that of the network of power elites⁴². The 'policy-planning network' is a network of foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups (i.e., ad hoc forums created and financed by foundations) which allows the economic elite to influence public policies upstream, which are then adopted by the federal government' (Genieys and Hassenteufel, 2012).

There are two opposing perspectives. On the one hand, Lowi's work (1969) describes an 'iron triangle' of relationships described as 'symbiotic' that unite representatives of these different groups of actors (state agencies and interest groups in particular). The policy network here is closed and very cohesive, often dominated by private sector actors and quite opaque in the eyes of citizens. This is known as a 'public policy community' (Thatcher, 1998; 2014). On the other hand, Hecló (1978) introduces the notion of an 'issue network'. These are formed around specific issues in a particular area of public policy. They thus bring together a wide variety of actors who are specialists or competent in the field in question and who share common interests: government authorities, legislators, businessmen, pressure groups, consulting firms, academics, journalists, etc. The networks can also be used as a forum for the exchange of information and experience (Le Naour, 2012). Here the game seems more open and the network less closed and more fragmented. Later, other typologies of policy network were put forward. They highlight intermediate situations between these two ideal types, namely the most loose-knit networks (issue-based networks) and those that are the most integrated (public policy communities)⁴³.

⁴² This rapprochement should be viewed in a context where studies linking the sociology of elites and the analysis of networks are increasing. While the first studies using networks to study elites are relatively ancient and can already be found in the work of authors working on local elites, such as Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1961), the methodological corpus of SNA was used more systematically in the 1970s to address various issues relating to the political sociology of elites (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Marsden and Laumann, 1977): the social cohesion of 'elite' groups, access to and use of power, etc.


⁴³ For example, Rhodes (1990) identifies three other types of networks: (i) professional networks which, as their name suggests, are dominated by a given professional field (such as doctors in national health policy, for example); (ii) intergovernmental networks based on ties between organisations representing local authorities; (iii) producer networks, in which public and private sector interests combine and dominate policy-making.

Box 1
Social Network Analysis (SNA)

SNA can be defined as ‘a set of methods, concepts, theories, models and surveys, (...) consisting of studying not the attributes of individuals (their age, profession, etc.), but the relations between individuals and the patterns they display, in order to describe them, account for their formation and transformations, and analyse their effects on individual behaviour’ (Mercklé, 2004: 3). The unit of analysis, or of modelling, is therefore no longer the individual, but an entity consisting of a set of individuals and their relations. In this respect, a social network is defined as a set of social relations, a social relationship that can itself be defined as ‘reciprocal acquaintance and commitment based on interactions and permitting the flow of resources’ (Grossetti & Barthe, 2008: 587). It is therefore a form of social interaction that puts actors in contact and implies specific references relating to the reciprocal acquaintance between actors and their mutual commitments.

SNA aims to describe the social network and study its properties, both relational and structural, as well as their influences on the actors. Summarized and formalized in the 1960s and 1970s at Harvard under the direction of Harrison White, contemporary SNA brings together three traditions of network analysis (Scott, 2000): (i) Gestalt theory in social psychology (sociometry, analysis of group dynamics, graph theory-including the work of Jacob Levy Moreno and Kurt Lewin); (ii) the work of sociologists W. Lloyd Warner and Elton Mayo at Harvard in the 1930s (based on Radcliffe Brown's structural-functionalist anthropology); (iii) the social anthropology of the Manchester School, whose principal representatives were James Clyde Mitchell, John Barnes, Elizabeth Bott and Siegfried Nadel (also part of Radcliffe Brown's legacy).

Generally speaking, there are two main ways of understanding social network analysis, depending on whether it focuses on ‘whole networks’ (or sociocentric) or ‘ego-centered networks’ (or "personal") (Borgatti et al., 2009). The first approach, which is that of the Harvard group and is generally referred to as structural analysis, focuses on the analysis of observable connections within an institution, a group, or any finite social entity (Borgatti et al., 2009). We therefore refer to a sociocentric or whole network when there is data on the presence or absence of connections for all pairs of actors in the pre-defined social group under study (a company, a school class, a village, etc.). Typical issues addressed by this approach are those of power, collective action and cohesion.



The second approach, which is more directly related to the pioneering anthropological work of the Manchester School, focuses on "ego-centred (or personal) networks". An ego-centred network consists of a focal actor, called the ego (individual, organization, etc.), a set of alters directly tied to the ego, and the links between these alters (Marsden, 2014; Crossley & al., 2015). The issues of solidarity and social support are particularly relevant here.

Source: authors.

At this stage, the use of the network concept often remains metaphorical and descriptive. It is only from the late 1980s and in particular in the 1990s that a more systematic rapprochement with the methodological corpus of social network analysis occurred within the framework of policy network approaches in terms of inter-organizational network analysis.

‘Rather, public decisions and policies are conceived here as resulting from interactions between the public and private sectors [Knoke et al., 1996; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988]. Actors are then linked by horizontal relations, and do not belong to a single organisational hierarchy; they are partly interdependent but also partly autonomous; their relations are based on exchange, thereby creating public policy networks, and combine elements of conflict and cooperation [Marin and Mayntz, 1991]. Inter-organisational studies map the structure of networks, using qualitative and quantitative methods based on indicators such as the intensity of communication, the reputation between participants in a network and the resources available, in order to identify the links between actors. This makes it possible to highlight the interrelationships and interdependence between public and private actors’ (Thatcher, 2014: 574).

The analysis of inter-organizational networks accounts for a significant part of the literature on social network analysis (Lazega, 1994; Bergenholtz & Waldstrom, 2011; Kapucu & al., 2017). It covers different objects and fields of research: from relations between companies to improve the understanding of the actual functioning of markets, to the relations between public and private actors involved in policy making. The ties between organizations are as numerous as the types of resources that can flow between them: financial, informational, and material. The analysis of inter-organizational networks therefore focuses mainly on understanding the articulation between these exchange relations and the positions of dependence or power of the organizations in question in a given system or sub-system. It aims to go beyond a simple description of the architecture of an inter-organizational system in order to test hypotheses on the relationships between network structure, access to resources, positions of power, behaviour of actors, etc. (Lazega, 1994).

Two American sociologists, Laumann and Knoke, pioneered the convergence between policy networks and the analysis of inter-organizational networks. Two analytical orientations are noteworthy in their work. On the one hand, their approach views the state as an organizational system with an analytical entry by organizational state model of national policy domains. On the other hand, they rigorously incorporate a whole set of concepts, methods and techniques stemming from the analysis of social networks (Box 2).

Box 2


The Social Network Analyst's Toolbox

Beyond the diversity of objects of study, methodological inputs (ego-centred or whole network) and data collection methods, SNA has a common core of concepts and metrics, essentially derived from graph theory in mathematics, for describing and analysing networks.

Definitions and graphical and matrix representations of a network

A social network is defined as a finite set of actors (nodes or vertices in graph theory language) connected to one another by social ties (edges). The actors, like the ties that bind them together, can be of various sorts. A dyad is a network consisting of two actors (hence one tie), a triad is made up of three actors. The visual representation of a network is done in the form of a graph in which the distance between the actors reflects their (relational) proximity. In this way, actors who are strongly connected to each other will appear clustered together in the graph. Figure A illustrates three types of networks depending on whether the tie between two actors is directed or not, or whether the tie is valued (measure of the strength or intensity of the bond).

Figure A Three ways of representing a network as a graph




A graph's mathematical translation is a matrix (figure B).

Figure B Transformation of an unvalued graph into a matrix

Analytically, the direction of a link allows one to translate reciprocity, a significant dyadic mechanism. A tie is reciprocal if both actors have cited each other and have effectively acknowledged an interaction and a form of mutual commitment. Reciprocity significantly influences the formation and maintenance of a relationship over time. It is an important mechanism in explaining the actors' behaviours. Another important mechanism is homophilia ("birds of a feather flock together").

The introduction of a third actor (triad) allows us to explore the transitivity hypothesis: if A is connected to B and B is connected to C, then there is a high probability that A is connected to C ("my friend's friend is my friend"). Transitivity is an important mechanism for determining the overall shape, the structure of a network.



	Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3	Actor 4
Actor 1	0	0	0	1
Actor 2	1	0	0	1
Actor 3	0	1	0	1
Actor 4	0	0	0	0

Describing the overall shape or topology of the network ('global' measures)


Social networks can vary considerably, both in terms of size (number of actors, number of ties and in the complexity of the arrangement of relations and actors). These shapes have important consequences on social processes, whether at the level of the overall functioning of the network (efficiency of information flow, coordination) or at the local level of the actors, who may be more or less constrained or autonomous depending on the structure of the network.

Different measures exist to describe the overall shape of a network. The size of a network is often measured by the number of nodes and the number of ties. The diameter of a network measures the longest distance between two actors (the longest path). Conversely, the geodetic distance measures the shortest path between two actors. The density indicates the number of potential ties in the network relative to the number of ties actually observed. This is a first measure of connectedness. The fragmentation of the network into several related components (sub-groups of actors densely connected to each other and separated from the others) is another. A network's centralization reflects its degree of hierarchy around an actor or a group of actors.

Generally speaking, there are two ideal-types in terms of network shape or topology (figure C): (i) networks that are rather centralized (also called 'open' or 'brokered') and structured around a central actor linked to all the other actors who are themselves unconnected; (ii) networks that are rather closed and highly connected ('closed', 'shared'), and therefore

decentralized, networks based on a large number of actors who are all highly connected to each other. Between these two typical configurations, various intermediate ones may exist.

Figure C Topology types of networks



The shape of a network has important implications for governance and the coordination between actors. In particular, it provides insight into how information flows. A centralized network is often assumed to be more efficient for coordination because information can be quickly transferred from the central actor to the rest of the network. A more closed and densely connected network, on the other hand, can be more resilient because it is less dependent on a dominant actor.


Describing the position of individuals in the network ('local' measures)

Often, the importance of actors within the network can be understood from so-called local measures. These measures represent a vertex (or a link) but can express a local centrality (in relation to neighbouring vertexes or ties) or a global centrality (in relation to the graph as a whole). Centrality measures are most commonly used. There are different possible measures of centrality, generally the following distinctions are made: (i) degree centrality, a local measure that refers to the number of ties that arrive (in-degree) and/or leave (out-degree) from each actor; (ii) betweenness centrality, a global measure calculated over the entire network that reflects the extent to which an actor finds himself on the shortest path (geodetic distance) between two actors taken at random; (iii) closeness centrality, also a global measure that reflects how close an actor is to all the other actors (average geodetic distance between a given actor and all the other members of the network).

Analysing the centrality of the actors in the network makes it possible to identify the 'key players', to quantify their power or influence with regard to different dimensions. Actors with high degree centrality generally enjoy a strong reputation. The betweenness centrality allows instead to identify the 'brokers' that connect subsets that are not directly connected to each other. They derive their power from this situation (informational rent) (Burt, 1992).

Synthesis diagram: anatomy of a network

Source: Social Network Analysis Inforte course on Big Social Data Analytics 2017 Dr. Jari Jussila; <https://www.slideshare.net/jjussila/big-social-data-analytics-social-network-analysis>



Source: auteurs, adapted from OECD/SWAC (2017)

'As the model's name implies, the relevant actors are all organizations; people appear only as agents acting on behalf of their organizations, whose interests they represent in policy contests. In policy domains — such as energy, health, and labour — both private and public sector organizations with interests in specific policy issues

and policymaking events exchange political resources and form coalitions to collaborate on lobbying campaigns. These actors seek to influence the outcomes of policy events in the decision-making institutions of national government.' (Knoke & Kostiuhenko, 2017: 97).

Their early work focused on the influence of inter-organizational lobbying networks on the definition of public policy in the fields of health and energy in the United States (Laumann & Knoke, 1987). The literature combining policy network and the analysis of inter-organizational networks has since grown widely, particularly in English-speaking countries, and has covered many areas of public policy, such as employment policy, environmental policy, transportation policy, etc., in a variety of contexts and on several different local, national, and international scales (Knoke & al., 1996; Pappi & Henning, 1999; Varone & al., 2016; Knoke & Kostiuhenko, 2017).

Policy network approaches have thus broadly been credited with emphasizing the importance of the collective and interactive dimension of the policy making process, its fragmented nature that includes actors who do not necessarily belong to the central state and, more generally, the transformation of governance and of the state (through the challenge to traditional hierarchical modes of government). Secondly, in their articulation with the tools of network analysis, these approaches have helped better identify patterns of relationships that are too complex for the naked eye to see. As a result, they have revealed specific modalities of resource flow and the key players in these subsystems. In this respect, they provide new keys for understanding issues of coordination and governance of public policies that societies face. However, as Le Naour (2012: 5) points out:

'As a concept, the network claims to shed light on the reshaping of public action, but it lacks because of its descriptive and vague character. As a method, the structural analysis of social networks reveals relations and interactions invisible to the naked eye but is not in itself sufficient to be a concept. The term 'public action network' coexists with other analytical tools: systems of actors, advocacy coalitions, fields, etc.'

The conceptual scope of network analysis for the study of political processes has in fact been repeatedly criticized, as has been the failure of this approach to consider the importance of policy ideas (Le Galès & Thatcher, 1995; Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012). More recently, in order to overcome these limitations, some studies have sought to combine policy network, inter-organizational network analysis, and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) model (Ingold, 2010; Ingold, 2011; Ingold & Varone, 2011; Varone & al., 2016; Weible & al., 2019).

Within the field of cognitive approaches to public policy, the advocacy coalition model (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) also strives to articulate the dimension of ideas with that of actors and their position in the structure of the political subsystem in order to analyse change in public policy

(Genieys and Hassenteufel, 2012). This approach '(...) assumes that the process of policy-making occurs primarily among (policy) specialists who regularly attempt to influence policy-making decisions within a particular policy subsystem. Its basic principle is that actors are grouped into one or more advocacy coalitions, whose members share a set of normative beliefs and worldviews, and that they act together to translate their beliefs into public policy' (Sabatier, 2019: 46). The notion of coalition refers in the first instance to the existence of mechanisms by which groups of actors participating in policy processes aggregate their resources, expertise, and skills to increase their influence and assert their preferences on public policy (Weible & al., 2019). The actors under consideration can be individuals, collectives of individuals or organizations, governmental or non-governmental, that have, or seek to have, an influence on the political decision-making process.

The ACF theoretical framework combines two primary and complementary analytical dimensions. The first focuses on analysing the belief system that unites (or not) actors around a given problem or area of public policy. Three separate levels of belief are considered (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Weible & al., 2019): (i) deep core beliefs, which are fundamental normative convictions (such as political ideologies, for example); (ii) policy core beliefs, which are normative and empirical beliefs about what the specific policy subsystem should be and which then provide vision and guidance for the strategic behaviour of actors; (iii) secondary beliefs, which are preferences for specific public policy tools or targeted policy proposals for a given problem within the subsystem (they are often a means of achieving the objectives inherent to the policy core). The ACF places particular emphasis on the policy core, which is seen as a key determinant of coalition-building. It also stresses the importance of learning mechanisms based on the confrontation between belief systems and the evolution of available knowledge. The second analytical dimension relates to the coordination between the actors of the subsystem under consideration. This is where the articulation with the tools of network analysis is particularly fruitful. The ties between actors can be of various types, ranging from collaboration and information sharing to divergent or convergent policy orientations. In this context, the ACF stresses the importance of intermediary actors, policy brokers (both individual and collective) who can be within or outside coalitions. They have an important role in disseminating ideas and can mediate between opposing coalitions thereby contributing to the emergence of a compromise and a learning process between coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

With respect to policy output, this analytical framework allows mainly the analysis of 'minor' policy changes and not so much of major overall shifts (Ingold, 2011; Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012). On the other hand, with regard to the process of policy making, it offers the possibility of in-depth deciphering of the current set of actors and of identifying possible scenarios for future political compromises by determining existing coalitions and their stability, policy brokers, and the points of discussion that can

tip the balance from one scenario to another. There is now a great deal of research that falls within this fruitful articulation between ACF and policy networks (Elgin, 2015; Henry, 2011; Ingold, 2010, 2011; Ingold and Varone, 2011; Ingold and Fischer, 2015). Ingold's (2010, 2011) work on Swiss climate policy is a good example. The author tries to explain the output of the CO2 law (fuel tax and gas cent) through an analysis of the network and of the preferences of the actors who participated in drafting this legislation. She then shows that the end compromise resulted from a complex process involving two opposing coalitions (pro-economy and pro-ecology), policy brokers outside these coalitions, and contextual factors leading to the shifting of lines within the coalitions. The development of this type of approach to studying public policy in developing countries is more recent.

The recent development of *policy networks analysis* in Southern countries

The policy network approach has proven to be a particularly suitable analytical tool for the study of public policies in the South, particularly in Africa. The fragmentation and transnational aspect of governance is all the more pronounced in countries, which, like Madagascar, are heavily dependent on foreign aid. The design and implementation of public policies then relies on a multitude of actors operating at different levels (state, political, private, 'civil society', international organizations, donors, etc.).

Nevertheless, using methods relying on the tools of network analysis is ultimately quite recent in academic publications on developing countries. There are two types of studies, those that focus primarily on issues of project governance at a local or community level and those that deal more directly with national-scale public policies.


Over the past ten years, international organizations, notably the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute, have used SNA tools in a participatory approach to project monitoring and evaluation. The purpose of these studies is both to report on the actual operation of the multi-actor governance of a project and to generate valuable information for improved governance and the empowerment of marginalized actors within these projects, particularly in the areas of agriculture, commons and natural resource management, and health. Largely driven by E. Schiffer, the Net-Map tool developed for this purpose has been used in several study-projects (Schiffer & Waale, 2008). This methodological tool allows the collection of detailed information, often in a participatory manner, through focus groups, on the networks between the actors participating in a project, their power, and their influence. To do so, this method combines network analysis tools with influence and power mapping tools. One of the research projects carried out in this way focused on the governance of a hydraulic project in northern Ghana (Schiffer & al., 2010). Studying the network between the various project

stakeholders (public agencies, NGOs, and traditional authorities) whose interests and characteristics vary, has raised several difficulties that may affect the project's objectives. Overlapping governance systems clearly limited the project's effectiveness. The exchange of information and advice proved to be essential determinants of influence between stakeholders. More generally, this study allowed the different stakeholders to better understand their objectives, the ways in which they could be in contradiction or complementarity with those of others and how each stakeholder influenced the others in the network. This method was also used to analyse the governance of a Save the Children project combatting child and maternal mortality in Katsina State in Nigeria (Schiffer & al., 2012). The analysis focused specifically on the processes that lead or fail to lead to state funding for a number of maternal health interventions. The network of some 15 organizations involved in planning, budgeting or paying out funds for these new-born survival and maternal health activities was collaboratively recreated. The results highlighted a significant gap between policy design and the implementation of actual activities. The network analysis revealed that this gap was the result of an opposition between two groups of actors with conflicting objectives and strategies: on the one hand, representatives from the Ministry of Health were responsible for drawing up the budget, and on the other hand, political leaders from outside the healthcare sector handled the actual disbursement of funds.

More recently, Rudnick et al (2019) carried out a policy network analysis of 14 community agricultural development projects in 11 countries in West Africa, East Africa, and South Asia. In their paper, the authors build on Provan and Kenis' (2008) networked governance modes. Their typology identifies two types of networks according to their degree of density and centralization: (i) highly centralized networks, which are therefore not very dense and can be led by a single organization or just a few ('brokered networks'); (ii) decentralized networks with a high level of density and extensive interaction between all actors and which can accommodate a larger number of central actors ('shared networks'). Positioning the projects under study within this spectrum of governance networks makes it possible to identify localized and contextualized forms of coordination of agricultural development projects. It also allows the identification of the central actors who can play a leadership role and have a strong influence in the conduct of projects (be they local actors, international NGOs, etc.). The results confirm that both types of governance networks exist but also reveal the existence of a third type of network described as fragmented and characterized by low density, low centrality, and a large number of isolated components or clusters (figure 7).

Figure 7

Core network graphs grouped by form and type of governance



Source: Rudnick et al. (2019 :118)


These types of networks are distributed differently from one country or project to another, underscoring the existence of contextualized modes of coordination. According to the authors, fragmented networks reflect a mode of governance that is quite specific to contexts in which communities lack resources and capacity. They reveal flaws in coordination and projects that are therefore inefficient. Moreover, contrary to a commonly accepted hypothesis, the authors show that the organizations that are the most central in these networks are not international NGOs but government agencies and local or regional NGOs.

Among the studies on public policy issues on a broader scale are those carried out by Walther at the OECD (Walther & Renk, 2017; Walther, 2017; OECD/SWAC, 2017). His work aims to understand how the governance of cross-border cooperation in West Africa actually works. To this end, an unprecedented sociometric survey was conducted face-to-face with 137 actors involved in cross-border cooperation at the scale of West Africa as a whole, but also at the scale of three micro-regions under specific study: the Senegal River Valley, Liptako-Gourma, and the Lake Chad region. These interviews were used to draw up a map of the ongoing relations between 738 actors spread over 40 countries. The relationships studied concerned the ties of information exchange (with whom each actor exchanges information on cross-border cooperation) and of influence and power (who each actor believes is the most important actor in the field of cross-border cooperation).

The analysis of these two networks (information exchange network, power network) then helped identify the central actors involved in cross-border cooperation, the type of relations they have with each other, and the impact of national borders on the shape of these networks. The results highlight, among other things, the predominance of intergovernmental organizations in the governance of cross-border cooperation. Moreover, the information exchange network is fairly decentralized (centre-periphery

type structure), which seems adapted to the flow of information between partners with very diverse statuses and competences. While there are many intermediaries in this network, the most brokers are to be found within ECOWAS (figure 8). Finally, while these networks appear to be highly structured on a national basis in the West African region, this is less the case in the micro-regions in the study.

Figure 8
Brokers of the information network on West African cross-border cooperation



Source : OCDE/CSAO 2017. Note : seuls les codes et l'appartenance des dix acteurs les plus centraux sont représentés. Les acteurs impliqués dans la coopération transfrontalière sont représentés par des cercles proportionnels à leur rôle d'intermédiaire (broker) au sein du réseau. Acronymes : Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), Union africaine (UA), Comité permanent inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), Groupe de recherche et de réalisations pour le développement rural (GRDR), Association des régions frontalières européennes (ARFE), Global Local Forum (GLF).

Source: taken from Walther (2017: 14).

In Nigeria, Wonodi & al (2012) also used network analysis tools to understand the decision-making process regarding the introduction of new vaccines into national immunization programs. Many stakeholders are involved in this process at different stages (production of technical information, fundraising, program implementation, etc.) and with varying levels of interest. The authors then defined the network of these stakeholders by considering all the actors involved or influential in the process. Twenty-nine organizations were selected in total (government actors at the federal or national level, international donors, actors from the private commercial and associative sectors in the field of health). Interviews with key informants from these organizations allowed the authors to map out the network between these 29 actors along several dimensions (information exchange, lobbying, financing, influence). The results show a fairly strong commitment from all stakeholders. However, although the hypothesis of a more important role for economic actors and actors responsible for the implementation of programs at the federal level was put forward, they do not appear to be particularly central in the

network at this stage of the process. According to the authors, this result can bring about challenges if, for lack of a better integration of these actors, political decisions taken at the central level do not enjoy solid support for their local implementation.

More recently, two papers clearly followed a similar approach to the work associating policy network and policy ideas, notably through the ACF framework (Ingold, 2010, 2011; Ingold & Varone, 2011; Ingold & Fischer, 2015).

Howlet et al (2017) studied the relationship between policy network and policy learning in the context of palm-oil biodiesel production policy in Indonesia over the past two decades. Various actors, ranging from agricultural producers to biofuel end-users and policy makers, became involved and influential in this policy subsystem. Under the leadership of the Presidency, from 2006 onwards, many round tables, conferences, forums, and ad hoc committees have been organized on the development of biodiesel and the environmental sustainability of intensive palm oil cultivation. These events were the methodological starting point for the identification of key actors, key informants, and the establishment of a list of 47 actors particularly involved in this policy. Different types of linkages between these actors were then studied: collaborations, conflicts, knowledge sharing, perceived influences, perceived agreements, and disagreements. Coalitions were then identified based on a set of three complementary hypotheses: (i) the actors in the same coalition must be structurally equivalent (i.e., have the same relational profile with regard to the network of collaborations and disagreements); (ii) the collaborative ties between members of the same coalition must have a positive density; (iii) the relationships between members of opposing coalitions must be marked by relationships of disagreement. The authors of the study show that the core of the network is mainly made up of government actors and of a few industries and academic or research organizations. No international organization, no multilateral donor, no NGO is at the centre of the network; they are clearly found on the periphery. The dominant coalition identified through the network analysis is composed of four governmental actors and two private industrial actors. The collaborative ties between these actors are important and facilitate the flow and sharing of information. The four government actors in particular appear to be the most central in the information-sharing network but also the most influential. These findings highlight the fact that in this policy sub-system, policy brokers tend to be located among government officials and that they are key players in the 'technical' learning of policies. This also means that they are in a position of power to facilitate or limit the learning process, depending on the direction of policy orientations.

Lastly, Ramcilovic-Suominen & al (2019) analyse the network of actors of the European Union Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT: Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) within the framework of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the Laos People's

Democratic Republic. The paper questions the influence of international actors in the decision-making processes within the VPA-FLEGT. To do so, it analyses power relations as well as actor preferences on several political aspects covered in the program. The network considered here is an inter-organizational network (Laumann & Knoke, 1987). Policy preferences reflect the level of agreement or disagreement on the importance of pursuing and/or introducing specific policy issues into the VPA-FLEGT. Fifty-two organizations (operating at the central, provincial, district and even village levels) and 13 policy issues were selected after a detailed review of institutional reports, interviews with key informants, minutes and attendance sheets from various meetings and workshops. The network of power relations between these 52 actors was then scrutinized⁴⁴. This study shows that power in this political process is held by the political actors who are typically the most powerful, central government agencies of course, but also international donors. Civil society organizations, the private sector, and sub-national actors are much less powerful. Subsequently, the distribution of policy preferences among actors shows that certain issues dominate, such as aspects related to the application of international rules, environmental transparency, and accountability, while issues related to the rights of forest communities, the impact of regulations on the livelihoods of smallholders, or the participation of civil society organisations in the process are less favoured. There is thus an obvious imbalance with the most central actors exerting their power through their direct participation in policy making but also through their influence in the dissemination of ideas.

This review of the literature on policy networks provides a sufficiently broad overview to grasp from the outset the full potential of this analytical approach when it comes to analysing public policy in developing countries, particularly in Africa, where the transnational dimension of governance is particularly important. Our analytical framework has therefore been built on the foundation of this literature as well as on research on the political economy of social protection in Africa.


Conceptual and methodological positioning: from analytical input by the policy network of social protection actors to data collection

Figure 9 schematically outlines the general framework for the analysis of social protection public policies covering the different stages of the policy process, from problem-solving to monitoring implementation and impacts. The analysis of the national political landscape plays a central role in this framework. It reveals first of all the balance of power at the local level (as a function of the socioeconomic situation and of the population's capacity to mobilize) and at the international level (the role of international donors and the evolution of international aid) and then determines the shape of the public

⁴⁴ The question asked was: *'To what extent is your organization resource dependent on organization X?'*

policy. In turn, the form taken by this policy and its effects or impacts condition national politics. After presenting our conceptual and analytical position with regard to this general framework, we will outline the method of data collection.

Figure 9
General framework for the analysis of social protection policies in Africa



Source: authors, inspired by Hickey (2008)

The GTPS policy network as an analytical entry point

Regarding the general analytical framework presented in figure 9, research on the political economy of social protection in Africa (see below) is largely neo-institutionalist and relies, in particular, on approaches in terms of ‘political settlements’ (Hickey & al., 2018). In this context, national politics are frequently studied by using the implementation of social protection policy reforms and, in particular, the introduction of social assistance programs as an object of analytical observation. These reforms are observed empirically through ‘process tracing’, which allows a detailed analysis of their key moments over time. These methods rely mainly on the analysis of institutional reports, meeting minutes, and semi-structured interviews. In the same vein, other qualitative studies also focus on observing political parties and their discourse, electoral cycles, political institutions and state structures, elites, and redistributive conflicts.

Although the role of networks of social relations is not at the heart of these analyses, it is not completely absent either. In fact, the importance of network games among the various actors involved in

the political process, and particularly those between international and local actors, is widely emphasized (Niño-Zarazúa & al., 2012; Lavers & Hickey, 2015). Moreover, one of the conclusions of this work is that the commitment of national authorities to social assistance programmes driven from the outside by donors depends to a large extent on influencing and disseminating ideas based very largely on the logic of networks, particularly the flow of information.

'In many cases, successful ideational influence is dependent on the actions of policy entrepreneurs who lead domestic debate, advocate for change and build advocacy coalitions (...). Such policy entrepreneurs might be individuals within the ruling coalition; multilateral or bilateral donor representatives who exert influence through discussions with national policymakers, financial incentives or technical assistance; or civil society actors, including INGOs, that campaign for policy changes' (Lavers & Hickey, 2015: 15).

The proximity with the conceptual framework of policy networks and the ACF is obvious here, in spite of the fact that the network and brokers are only considered from the perspective of relations between individuals and not between groups. Furthermore, these approaches have in common their focus on the 'ideal turning point' in the policy making process. Indeed, this cognitive dimension is addressed in a similar way to that which has been found since Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) within the ACF.


'Discursive institutionalism, and the literature on ideas in political analysis more broadly, identifies three main types of idea: policy ideas that provide potential solutions to pre-defined social problems; problem definitions that provide ways of framing and understanding particular social issues, in doing so favouring certain types of policy solution and foreclosing the possibility of other types of intervention; and overarching paradigms that serve as road maps, providing "a relatively coherent set of assumptions about the functioning of economic, social and political institutions' (Lavers & Hickey, 2015: 12).

However, for the time being, none of the studies on the political economy of social protection in Africa have yet undertaken a network mapping exercise that uses the conceptual framework of the literature on policy networks and the methodological framework of social network analysis. We believe that this analytic approach is quite useful and relevant for understanding, at least in part, the interplay of actors at different stages of public policy.

In the case of Madagascar, social protection policy is in the phase of concerted reformulation between actors. It is a 'new public policy' that is based on a wide variety of existing programs (contributory and non-contributory) and involves a negotiation process between multiple actors. As mentioned in the previous section, following the 2015 adoption of a '*Plan National de Protection Sociale*' (PNPS — 'National Social Protection Policy') (PNPS, 2015), the country adopted a '*Strategie Nationale de Protection Sociale*' (SNPS — 'National Social Protection Strategy') for the period 2019-2023 in November 2018

(SNPS, 2018). As pointed out by Niño-Zarazúa et al (2012), the existence of such documents cannot conceal the complexity of the political processes taking place in the background and the compromise that underpins them. This strategy document is the outcome of deliberations carried out within the Social Protection Working Group (GTPS), which brings together different national and international actors. Created in 2017 at the initiative of the Ministry of Population, Social Protection and Promotion of Women (MPPSPF) and co-led with UNICEF, this think tank met regularly between 2017 and 2019. We believed that analysing the network of actors starting from this forum was a relevant analytical input in order to shed light on the interplay of actors, identify and specify possible coalitions that influence future social protection policy, highlight potential points of ongoing and impending conflict, and identify brokers and power actors.

Figure 10
Analytical framework for the development of social protection policy in Madagascar:
an entry by the GTPS policy network



Source: authors

The diagram in figure 10 depicts how the previous general framework has been adapted to our analytical approach focused on the analysis of the policy network of actors involved in developing social protection policy in Madagascar. National politics is explored on the basis of this policy network built from the observation of the GTPS, which brings together a range of both international (international donors, international NGOs) and national players (government actors - ministries and agencies), civil society actors and the private sector). In this sense, they carry with them the international and national balance of power. Relationships between these actors can be of various types. Drawing on the research

mentioned above, we will focus on six particular types of relationships sustained between actors in the context of activities or exchanges relating to social protection over the five years preceding the survey:

- i) Collaborative relationships (covering different types of partnerships such as joint participation in social protection project-programs, relations of financial support, technical partnership, etc.);
- ii) information-sharing relationships (information sharing between actors regarding social protection activities);
- iii) the relationship of agreements with the position of other actors regarding social protection in the country.
- iv) Relationships of disagreement with the position of other actors regarding social protection in the country.
- v) relationships of influence (the extent to which the decisions of one actor in the area of social protection depend on that of another actor); and
- vi) the interpersonal relationships between the representatives of these organizations within the GTPS.

In academic research, the analysis of the position of actors in these different networks is not sufficient in itself. To give meaning to these positions and identify potential coalitions, the network analysis needs to be supported by information allowing the perception of the actors and the ideas they promote to be characterized. Using the ACF brought down to two dimensions, we will try to qualify the positioning of actors with regard to their vision of the ideal of social protection in Madagascar and its main objectives (policy core beliefs) as well as the instruments and areas of intervention favoured in this field (secondary beliefs). Out of the tripartite structure of belief systems put forward by the ACF, we selected and tested the two dimensions that refer to social protection, the public policy sub-system under study. Deep core beliefs, as has been seen, are the deepest and broadest level of beliefs that include the normative and ontological assumptions common to all public policies (Sabatier, 2019). In line with the most recent empirical work (Weible & al., 2019), we only look at them from the perspective of policy core beliefs, when they apply to the field under study, by asking each organization an open-ended question about the ideal of social protection.

Data collection methodology: from network boundaries to actors' policy preferences

The data collected and used to implement our analytical framework are varied in nature. The approach relies mainly on the collection of comprehensive network data. This requires, on the one hand, a precise definition of the boundaries of the network, in other words, the list of selected actors, and, on the other hand, an explanation of how the sociometric questionnaire was constructed. This is the purpose

of the first two following points. The third point presents the additional data needed for our suggested method. They were collected by questionnaire at the same time as the network data. Others, more qualitative, are based on the analysis of institutional reports, the websites of the organizations involved, and the Malagasy press, but also on participant observation⁴⁵.

Determining the actors under study: the GTPS as object of observation

Although networks are considered flexible, informal or pragmatic, they nevertheless rely on logistics: material organizations and resources. Permanent and periodic commissions, congresses, coordination committees, working groups, journals, newspapers, etc. For knowledge to circulate, it requires the development of a whole range of tools, supports without which it cannot be circulated. These are then the primary sources of a methodology known as network methodology.

Le Naour (2012: 5)

Delineating or closing the boundaries of a network is the focal point of any network analysis. Ego-centred (or personal) network methods define the network based on the direct ties between an actor (ego) and other actors (alters) (Box 1). Sociocentric (or whole) network methods require an initial identification of a social group and a list of actors belonging to it (Eloire & al., 2011). Within this framework, Laumann et al. (1983) distinguish two main approaches and five strategies. One approach is called 'nominalist' because researchers and analysts impose a conceptual framework tailored to their objectives and resulting in including or excluding certain individuals or organizations from the network according to predefined criteria (official list, relevant geographical area,). The second approach is said to be 'realistic' in that this time researchers and analysts adopt the viewpoint of the stakeholders and respondents to define the network (perception of important stakeholders).

In practice, it is best to combine both approaches and use different 'empirical' strategies in order to identify the actors in a network:

- the '**positional strategy**' – an actor's belonging to a network depends on his position within a group and the characteristics that stem from it;
- the '**reputational strategy**' – based on information gathered from 'experts' of the environment under study, these experts being individuals or lists and reference guides, reports and internet websites, media references, etc;
- the '**relational strategy**' – relationships between interviewees, snowballing strategy.

⁴⁵ This work is part of the PROTECT research project led by C. Gondard-Delcroix (IRD - UMI Résilience; University of Bordeaux - UMR GREThA). This project aims to study the variety of forms of social protection in Madagascar, analyse their adequacy with the needs of the population and identify the actors involved, their logics and their interactions. C. Gondard-Delcroix's long presence in the field has provided access to numerous resources (experts, key informants, participation in various meetings and workshops, etc.).

- the **'interlock strategy'** – participation in common events (forum, meetings etc.) or membership in a common organisation (association, executive board, etc.);
- the **'geographic strategy'** – the social boundaries of the network are defined by a physical boundary (street, city, neighbourhood, etc.).

Our empirical approach takes the GTPS as the starting point for our analysis. As Le Naour (2012: 5) suggests, this type of working group is a particularly relevant object of observation for carrying out a network analysis. To begin with, we adopted a nominalist approach based on a reputational strategy. Launched in 2017, this working group, co-piloted by the Ministry of Population, Social Protection and Women (MPPSF) and UNICEF, convened several times between 2017 and 2019 in meetings open to the entire list or by thematic sub-group, each of the four thematic sub-groups covering the four axes of the PNPS and then the SNPS (see below). The long-term presence in the field of a member of the team and his inclusion in the national debates on social protection made it possible to compile the official list of actors invited to participate in the deliberations of the WGPS when it was launched in 2017. The initial list includes no less than 100 actors⁴⁶: 17 government actors, 5 government-related structures, 20 technical and financial partners, 50 civil society organizations (associations, NGOs) and 9 private sector actors. A list such as this addresses multiple policy issues. For example, the presence of 50 associations and NGOs is a fairly good reflection, in line with the PRSPs, of the willingness to embrace a participatory approach open to civil society. Therefore, this first 'strategy' had to be refined or completed in order to identify the actors who truly and actively participate in this process of national deliberation. Access to minutes and sign-in sheets and the presence of a member of the research team at some of these meetings gave us a better understanding of the actors who were actually present and active (interlock strategy), as well as several interviews and informal exchanges with representatives of the MPPSF and UNICEF in charge of steering the GTPS (reputational strategy).

⁴⁶ List available upon request in the annex.

Table 3

List of the 41 actors present and active in the GTPS

Government (10)	ID
Ministry of Population, Social Protection, and the Promotion of Women	Min_POP
Ministry of Economy and Planning	Min_Eco
Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry	Min_Agri
Ministry of Health	Min_Sant
Ministry of Civil Service, Administration Reform, Labor and Social Laws	Min_Fpubli
Ministry of Employment, Technical and Vocational Education	Min_Emploi
<i>Ministry of Finance and Budget</i>	
Ministry of Education	Min_Educ
Ministry of Interior and Decentralization	Min_Int
<i>Office of the Prime Minister</i>	
Government-related structures (6)	ID
National Reserve Fund of Social Protection (CNaPS)	CNaPS
Support Committee for Universal Social Security Coverage (CA CSU)	CA_CSU
Intervention Fund for Development (FID)	FID
National Office of Risk and Disaster Management (BNCRG)	BNGRC
National Office of Nutrition (ONN)	ONN
National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT)	INSTAT
International/multilateral donors (7)	ID
UNICEF	UNICEF
WORLD BANK	BM
WFP	PAM
GIZ	GIZ
<i>WHO</i>	
ILO	BIT
AFD	AFD
Civil Society / Associations / NGO (12)	ID
Catholic Relief Service (CRS)	CRS
Département pour le Développement de l'Eglise de Jésus Christ à Madagascar (SAF/FJKM)	SAF_FJKM
Freidrich Eibert Stiftung (FES)	FES
Welthungerhilfe (WHH)	WHH
GRET	GRET
Humanités et Inclusion	HUM_INC
<i>Croix Rouge Madagascar</i>	
Sendika Kristianina Malagasy (SEKRIMA)	SEKRIMA
CARE	CARE
Action contre la faim (ACF)	ACF
Positive Planet	POS_PLANET
Collectif des citoyens et Organisations Citoyennes à Madagascar (CCOC)	CCOC
Private sector (6)	ID
TELMA (telecommunications operator)	TELMA
Plateforme Humanitaire du Secteur Privé (PHSP)	PHSP
Groupement des Entreprises Malagasy (GEM)	GEM
<i>Caisse d'épargne et de crédit agricole mutuel (CECAM)</i>	
OTIV-TANA (National network –micro-financing institution)	OTIV
Organisation Sanitaire Tananarivienne Inter-Entreprises (OSTIE)	OSTIE

Finally, during the sociometric questionnaire, respondents were asked an open-ended question at the close of the interview about the actors they considered to be important in the process of national deliberation on social protection and who were not listed (relational strategy). Any organization cited by five respondents was automatically added to our list. However, this open-ended question only resulted in the addition of one actor, the office of the Prime Minister. It was mainly the three other strategies (sign-in sheet, attendance at meetings, expert opinion) that considerably thinned out the initial list, resulting in 41 actors (Table 3).

Of these 41 actors, 10 are from the government, 6 from related structures, 7 from international donors, 12 from civil society and 6 from the private sector⁴⁷. The greatest drop occurs in civil society actors thus confirming the intuition mentioned above regarding a probable willingness to show a participatory approach. This also corroborates the weakness of civil society in this type of political process in Madagascar (Razafindrakoto & al., 2017). Moreover, out of the 12 remaining civil society organizations, only three are national : SAF/FJKM (Département pour le développement de l'Eglise de Jésus Christ à Madagascar, an NGO operating in social and economic development) ; SEKRIMA (Confédération Chrétienne des Syndicats Malgaches, a trade-union confederation that is affiliated the International Trade Union Confederation) and the CCOC (Comité des Citoyens et des Organisations Citoyennes), a collective of citizen organisations that monitor, control and disseminate information on state actions.

The disappearance of national civil society actors is an initial finding of our empirical analysis and supports a first conclusion. We are in the presence of 'silent' public policies (Darbon, 2019) supposedly driven by actors who are mobilized but who are in fact absent. This results in the production of a public policy lacking a foundation of actors and in all the future effects this will have on the project's impacts. However, an alternative interpretation is possible: the absence of civil society organizations can also be explained by their lack of interest in these spaces of deliberation that they consider to be controlled by large international organizations and political elites. Afraid or conscious of being unheard, they focus their energy elsewhere. This interpretation, plausible as it may be, deserves a few observations. Indeed, this behaviour could also be indicative of the lack of local appropriation of this political instru-

⁴⁷ Summary and analytical presentation sheets of each of these 41 actors are available on request in the appendix volume. They have been constructed from secondary data (institutional reports, information on their websites) which we have been able to cross-reference with our first-hand information. They provide a summary of information on the organisation (status, management, length of experience in the country), its role in Madagascar and in particular with regard to social protection, the ideal of social protection that it promotes (through its communication), and the actions already implemented in this field. Analytically, these sheets also position the actors with regard to different typologies concerning the nature of the organisation, the resources it has at its disposal and its interests vis-à-vis social protection policy (Hassenteufel typologies) (cf. Darbon & al., 2018b).

ment. Our qualitative observations have shown that some of the remaining NGOs have been particularly involved in the GTPS even though nothing would have predicted it; however, their involvement in this group is what brought certain themes to the forefront.

We therefore have a list of 41 actors who have played, and surely continue to play, an active and significant role within the working group over the 2017-2019 period in building Madagascar's social protection policy.

The sociometric questionnaire: a study of six types of relationships

The data were collected from October 2018 to April 2019. This research period included two significant electoral moments for the country which, although they did not prevent the collection of data, forced us to make choices. In particular, whether or not to continue to include in our panel of individuals representing the organizations surveyed those who, in ministries or public agencies, may have changed functions and roles as a result of the election. When this was the case, the choice was made to keep them in our study for two reasons: because they remained the best informed and, therefore, the most legitimate to respond on behalf of the organization - in this case, legitimacy was informational and not institutional; and also because the period covered by the study was prior to the presidential election. Organized in two rounds (first-past-the-post), the elections were held from December 7 to 19, 2018, followed by legislative elections on May 27, 2019. They brought Andry Rajoelina to power against incumbent President Marc Ravalomanana. The confrontation between the two men a few years earlier had triggered a deep political and social crisis in the country from January 2009 to December 2013, with the current president forcibly challenging the legitimacy of the current incumbent who had been elected to power at that time.

Two points are worth mentioning with regard to the data on the inter-organizational network. First of all, in order to reconstruct the ties between organizations, we needed to identify the key informants within each organization who could provide us with answers. The respondents must therefore be in management or senior management positions within the organizations while at the same time being in charge of, or having a very precise knowledge of, the social protection 'case'. Along with the list of GTPS members, we also had a list of two to ten names of people (with their contact details - email and phone number) per organization and, for each of them, their position within that organization - chief executive officer, program director, project coordinator, social protection program or study officer, monitoring and evaluation officer, etc. From our own knowledge, information available on the internet, and various public documents, we were able to select a first list of names. We then consolidated this list based on the opinions of the GTPS coordinators at the Ministry of Population and UNICEF to

make certain that our choices were relevant and that those selected effectively participated in the working group meetings.

Once the respondents had been identified, the collection of data on relations between organisations was based on a so-called 'sociometric' questionnaire (Eloire & al., 2011), module 4 of our survey protocol.⁴⁸ Generally speaking, this involved presenting each respondent with the list of actors and asking them whether or not there were certain relationships between their organisation and others. These various relationships all fall within the framework of activities or exchanges in the field of social protection over the 5 years prior to the survey (2014-2019; 2014 being the starting point of the NSPP). As mentioned above in our conceptual and analytical framework, six types of relationships were examined. The following questions were asked:

- **Collaboration relationships** – *'In the framework of your actions in the field of social protection, who among the organisations listed below do you collaborate with? (a collaborative relationship can refer to the implementation of a joint project, project funding, technical support, etc.);*
- **Information-sharing relationships** – *'In the framework of your actions in the field of social protection, with which of the organisations listed below do you share information?';*
- **Relationships of agreements** – *'In the framework of your actions in the field of social protection, with which of the actors on the list do you agree or share a similar position?';*
- **Relationships of disagreements** – *'In the framework of your actions in the field of social protection, with which actors in the list do you disagree or find yourself on opposite, different positions (visions)?';*
- **Relationships of influence** – *'In the framework of your actions in the field of social protection, which actors on the list may directly influence the decisions of your own organisation?';*
- **Interpersonal relationships** – *'Do you know the representative of the organisation listed below within the GTPS and, if so, how do you get along with this person?'*⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ The average time taken to complete the questionnaire was one hour. The questionnaire consisted of four modules: (i) identification of the organization; (ii) characterization of its approach - activities - to social protection; (iii) the organization's perception of social protection issues and policy in Madagascar; (iv) sociometric module (relationships between organizations). Placing the sociometric module last allowed the respondent's memory to be stimulated beforehand with the other modules. Questionnaire available on request in the appendix volume.

⁴⁹ As far as this dimension is concerned, 6 answers are still missing at the time of writing this report. They are currently being collected. Therefore, this report will focus on the first five relationships.

For each existing relationship, respondents were given the opportunity to rate the intensity of the connection on a scale of 1 to 5⁵⁰. As the questionnaire was handed out, the context (the field of social protection) and the period (past 5 years) were recalled each time for every question. Information obtained through the questionnaire was also compared with other sources of information whenever possible (expert opinions, reports, press) (triangulation).

In total, we were able to carry out 36 full interviews, with some missing information on interpersonal relationships. The five actors missing are so for different reasons (in italics in table 3). The Malagasy Red Cross was embroiled in an embezzlement scandal which, on the one hand, kept it away from the GTPS group and, on the other hand, made it impossible to get an appointment⁵¹. Despite numerous follow-ups, the WHO never responded favourably. The same was true for the Ministry of Finance and Budget (which under the new presidency was merged with the Ministry of Economy and Planning) as well as for the CECAM. Finally, access to the office of the Prime Minister was, of course, extremely difficult and to date we have not been successful. Nevertheless, we do not believe that these five missing actors would be likely to considerably modify the structure of the inter-organisational networks between the 36 remaining actors that we will present later on.

Measuring policy preferences (policy core and secondary beliefs)

Our questionnaire included three other modules, before the sociometric questions, to collect information on the perceptions of the actors.

The first modules mainly help define the identity of the organisation and the scope of its actions in the field of social protection. Module 3 deals specifically with perceptions and political ideas. It takes example on the ACF (Weible & al. 2019) by distinguishing between policy core (fundamental political convictions) and secondary beliefs (preferences for specific instruments). Policy core is addressed in particular by an open-ended question on how each actor describes the ideal of social protection in Madagascar (through three words or expressions) and an affirmative question with only one possible answer on the objectives of social protection in Madagascar (fight against poverty, redistribution or expansion of access to social rights). Other questions focused on actors' diagnosis of the state of social protection in the country and on the type of institutions that should be responsible for developing

⁵⁰ 1 = 'Very rarely', 2 = 'Rarely', 3 = 'Sometimes', 4 = 'Often', 5 = 'Very often'. The scale is different for interpersonal relationships, it measures the degree of agreement between the two people.: 1 = 'Very bad', 2 = 'Bad', 3 = 'Average', 4 = 'Good', 5 = 'Very good'.

⁵¹ 'Madagascar : détournements de fonds à la Croix-Rouge malgache', *Rfi Afrique* :

<http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180929-madagascar-detournements-fonds-croix-rouge-malgache>

social protection today. Secondary beliefs are explored through questions on their preferred instruments and areas of intervention for social protection in Madagascar.

Regarding the data on influence, in addition to the bilateral and systematic assessment made possible by the sociometric questionnaire, another question was asked of each representative of the organisations surveyed. We asked them to identify, from the list of 41 actors, the 4 organisations they considered as key actors in the setting of the main orientations and principles of social protection policy in Madagascar today. This selective and closed measure of each actor's reputation within the GTPS group can be compared to the position of each actor in the network of influence.

After reviewing the literature, setting the conceptual, analytical, and methodological framework, and in light of the contextualisation of social protection in Madagascar, five research hypotheses were then used to conduct the analysis (Box 3.). The hypotheses formulated at this stage cross-cut all the networks under consideration. The findings will, however, allow each of them to be discussed in relation to the different types of ties studied.

Box 3

Five hypotheses about the making of social protection policy in Madagascar

H1.	Given the institutional context in Madagascar and the great diversity of actors within the GTPS, and the likely diversity of points of view this implies, the overall form of the network is more likely to be 'centre-periphery' (OECD/SAWC, 2017) or 'brokered' (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rudnick & al., 2019), that is with a strong centralisation around a few actors interacting a great deal with each other and the rest of the actors in a more peripheral position.
H2.	In the context of the Malagasy 'liquefied state' (Darbon & al., 2018c) and a country heavily dependent on international aid, the most central actors in the networks in terms of degree (number of connections) are expected to be international actors (donors in particular) (Rudnick & al., 2019).
H3.	On the other hand, government actors may be brokers between international and local actors (betweenness centrality) (Howlett & al., 2017).
H4.	The transposition of the international power relations around the broad orientations of social protection policies at the Malagasy level is expected to result in the coexistence of two coalitions, one rather 'pro-vulnerable', favouring the development of assistance mechanisms, especially cash-transfer; the other 'pro-rights', promoting the extension of social protection rights through contributory systems based on work (Hickey & Seekings, 2017).
H5.	In light of the socio-economic and productive context in Madagascar, which is dominated by family farming, informal employment, and a high level of exposure to risks (of all kinds, climatic, health, etc.), the 'pro-rights' coalition is expected to have less influence and power in the ongoing process.

Chapter 3

Social protection policy-making in Madagascar: networks and coalitions of actors

This third and final chapter is focused on analysing and interpreting the results of the survey data. Two major findings structure this discussion. The first describes relationships between social protection actors marked by a lack of true hierarchy or leadership but structured by a 'shared networks' governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rudnick et al., 2019) in which all stakeholders engage in very dense interactions. The underlying question is then the degree to which the issue of social protection is a constituted 'political object' and the influence (or centrality) of international organizations in the process under way in Madagascar. In this light, the question of who steers the social protection policy making process in Madagascar when no one governs is central to our thinking. This finding is detailed, clarified, and even nuanced in the first part of this paper, with the help of original statistical observations (indicators and network graphs, box 4) and qualitative observations (interviews and participant observation in particular). The second finding confirms the initial impression of a near-absence of endogenization or domestic political activity around the production of social protection policy. It points, at this stage of public policy, to a transposition of the dominant international compromise that was identified and characterized in the first chapter and whose specific form in Madagascar is studied in the second point. Indeed, the statistical analysis of the coalitions (see box 6) reveals two main political and discursive coalitions, referred to as 'pro-vulnerable' and 'pro-rights', which largely match the two 'epistemic communities' present at the international level (Meriem, 2013; Hickey & Seekings, 2017). However, beyond their mere identification, the analysis of their internal consistency and coherence and of their interrelationships confirms a power imbalance leading, through the failure of domestic political mediation, to the temporary and relatively undeliberate 'victory' of the statements and solutions of the 'pro-vulnerable coalition'. This coalition advocates for an approach in terms of 'social safety nets' and 'cash-transfers', and finds in the productive virtues of improving the human capital of the poorest the main justification for implementing a social protection policy targeting the most vulnerable.

Box 4

The four global indicators used to describe the form of networks⁵²

Indicators	Definition
Average degree	Corresponds to the average number of edges per node without distinction between inbound and outbound edges. For example, in a network composed of 3 nodes (A, B and C), the directed edges are as follows: A-B, B-A, A-C, C-A and B-C. Thus, there are 5 edges for 3 nodes, so the average degree of the network is 5/3. In this way, the indicator of average degree is a first measure of cohesion within a network, since the higher the degree, the more actors maintain connections with each other.
Density	Equivalent to the proportion of ties in a network relative to the set of ties theoretically possible. For example, in an oriented network with three nodes (A, B and C) the total number of possible edges is 6 (A-B, B-A, A-C, C-A, B-C, C-B). However, in this particular triad, B and C do not know each other. The density is therefore 2/3 as 4 edges are observed compared to the possible 6. In this way, the higher the density, the stronger the social cohesion between the actors of the network, as each one maintains relations with all the others.
Geodesic Distance	Corresponds to the length of the shortest path between two nodes in a network. The global indicator used here is the average of the geodesic distance between each pair of nodes for the whole graph. For example, in a network of 3 nodes (A, B and C), there is no edge between A and B and the only way to bring them together is through C. There is therefore a first edge between A and C and then a second one between C and B, so the total distance is 2. This is therefore an alternative measure of social cohesion insofar as a short average distance in a network means that each actor is connected to all the others. Conversely, a high average distance indicates that actors need intermediaries to connect to all the others.
Fragmentation	This is the proportion of node pairs that cannot connect, it is calculated by removing the average reciprocal distance between all node pairs at 1. For example, in a network of 2 nodes (A and B) there are no edges connecting A and B, so the indicator is 1 (1-0). Thus, the higher the fragmentation indicator, the more the network is composed of a multitude of disconnected subgroups. This indicator is therefore the opposite of the previous ones and reveals the extent to which the actors do not maintain relationships with each other.

Source: authors.

‘Decentralised’ governance: leadership and ownership of the ‘social protection’ object in the public policy-making process

We study here the overall form (box 4) and positions of the actors within the inter-organisation network for the construction of social protection policy (GTPS actors) through 5 dimensions of the relationships between actors identified through the sociometric survey: collaboration, information sharing, disagreements, agreements, influence. The aim is to test the first three working hypotheses (box 3)⁵³.


⁵² Calculations were made on the basis of all the ties without considering the value of the ties - as a reminder: the relationships were qualified on a scale ranging from 0 to 5 where 0 equals the absence of ties and 5 equals the existence of a strong tie.

⁵³ In order to directly test hypothesis H1, we will use four so-called global measures describing the topology of the networks (Box 4). To test hypotheses H2 and H3, we will use three so-called local measures (degree of entry, centrality of proximity and betweenness) (cf. box 2), describing the “top actors” defined as the 10% of actors presenting the highest values.

To do so, the statistical results as well as the very nature of the relationships under study lead us to distinguish the networks of actors relating to the connections of collaboration, information sharing, and agreement⁵⁴, from the ties of disagreement and influence which relate to a more conflictual expression of the relational properties that constitute the political relationship (divergence and verticality). This distinction leads us first to question both the form of governance and the issue of leadership within these networks. Second, the mistrust of governmental actors is raised.

Who governs? A network with a weak hierarchy and a leadership deficit

As mentioned above, the form or structure of the networks of collaboration, information sharing and agreement is, by the nature of the ties being studied, quite distinct from the other two. These three networks are particularly dense and organisations interact extensively with one another. Graph 1, which shows all the collaborative relationships between the 36 actors in our policy network, is a good illustration of this. Clearly, the form that emerges does not, of course, reflect a 'centre-periphery' or 'brokered' type of governance, to use the terminology of Rudnick et al (2019), but a 'decentralised' type of governance.



⁵⁴ Actors adhere more closely to the positions of other actors when they collaborate or share information with them. Statistically, this theoretical association can be found through the strong correlation of the indicators identified at the global and local levels between the three networks of resource circulation.

The statistics presented in Table 4 show that the average degree and average density in the first three networks are quite high; significantly higher than for the other two networks. Simultaneously, their internal fragmentation as well as the geodetic distance are rather low.

Table 4
Overall statistical indicators by type of network

	Network of collaborations	Network of Information sharing	Network of agreements	Network of dis-agreements	Network of influence
Degree	17,306	15,472	16,333	8,556	10,389
Density	0,494	0,442	0,467	0,244	0,297
Fragmentation	0,239	0,083	0,083	0,902	0,390
Geodesic Distance	1,512	1,563	1,543	2,015	1,779

Source: auteurs.

The form of these three networks warrants several observations. It is worth remembering that the official list of the GTPS initially includes close to 100 actors, of whom only 40 actually attend the meetings and are active in the process. It turns out that it is primarily civil society organisations that are absent, thus confirming the weak capacities of Malagasy organised civil society (Razafindrakoto et al., 2017); a factual observation that must be linked to the proven key role of (disappointed) citizen aspirations in the economic dynamic and above all in the triggering of crises (op. cit.: 146). Malagasy civil society is increasingly regularly taking up public policy issues under the ultimate shape of popular protest and mobilisation. Therefore, this two-fold reality precludes concluding that there is a missing link and does not explain the relative absence of the population and its civil society representatives in shaping social protection policy. As highlighted above, this is a significant analytical result. Social protection public policy seems indeed to be doing without the social and political building process which, perhaps more so in this area than in others, is known to be a driver of sustainability and performance.

One could argue that the statistical density of social protection networks is the mechanical outcome of the list being narrowed down to fewer than 40 actors. However, this is by no means certain. Other work, carried out in other contexts but using the same methodology and with lists of actors in similar proportions, finds networks of collaboration or information sharing that are much less dense (Ingold, 2011, Howlett & al., 2017, Ramcilovic-Suominen, 2019). This is therefore a specificity of the political process at work in Madagascar with regard to social protection policy. Our qualitative observations, interviews and participant observations, also point in this direction, even confirming the initial impression of a ‘confusing’ magma of actors and operations. There are a variety of organizations involved at different levels and in different programmes in a variety of areas more or less removed from social protection. It is clear that no two organizations really speak the same language. This problem of a

shared understanding of social protection is well known and recognized within the GTPS. It was mentioned extensively during a round table we attended⁵⁵. Our interviewee at the ILO also stresses that 'despite recent plans, there is no real concerted agenda, no common agenda, no real coordination'. The very high density of interactions in the three networks in question probably reflects this situation, in other words that of a 'hyper collective' action that is characteristic of the transformations in development aid and the difficulties in governing it effectively (Sévérino & Ray, 2012; Sévérino & Charnoz, 2008), rather than the very chaotic emergence of a shared construction of the problems and solutions necessary to produce a public policy. This result is consistent with the literature on SNA and is worrying since it demonstrates that this type of network is less effective in terms of coordination and information transfer, notably due to the possible redundancy of resources since the average distance separating all the actors is relatively small (Burt, 1992).

The shape of these three networks also reveals a deficit of leadership. This lack of steering and leadership organisations is acknowledged by the actors of the GTPS themselves, including those who are supposed to play this role. A respondent from one of the NGOs on the list pointed out off the record that the representatives of the Ministry (MPPSPF) vent their frustrations to her with regard to their problems coordinating the GTPS and getting their messages across. The institutional leadership deficit was clearly discussed at the roundtable on 13 February 2019.

On this point, it can be particularly useful to examine the position of the actors in terms of centrality in the networks (Table 5). An initial observation can be seen almost immediately upon analysis. Whatever the indicator selected, the trio 'UNICEF - Min Pop - Min San' is systematically, or almost systematically, the most central in the three networks. This result is rather expected insofar as UNICEF and the MPPSPF are the two coordinators of the GTPS. But the national leadership of the MPPSPF is in fact diluted with another actor as central in the network as the Ministry of Health. The latter's position in this trio is most probably due to the important issues relating to the implementation of universal health coverage. But more than that, this leadership 'war' is not new, indeed between 2007 and 2009, what was then the Ministry of Population and Social Affairs became merely a general directorate within the Ministry of Health.

⁵⁵ Roundtable on social protection in Madagascar (Antananarivo, 13 February 2019), organized at the initiative of the Ministry of PPSPW, the World Bank, and UNICEF. Report by C. Gondard-Delcroix.

Table 5

Top 10% most central actors according to the type of network

	Network of col-laboration	Network of information sharing	Network of agreements
IN-DEGREE	UNICEF (27)	UNICEF (31)	UNICEF (30)
	Min Pop (32)	Min Pop (31)	Min Pop (31)
	Min San (29)	Min San (29)	Min San (28)
	ONN (25)	BM (25)	BNGRC (27)
CLOSENESS	UNICEF (45)	BNGRC (47,5)	PAM (45,5)
	Min Pop (39)	Min Pop (41)	Min Pop (43)
	Min San (38,5)	Min San (38,5)	Min San (39)
	ONN (45,5)	PAM (47)	BNGRC (41,5)
BETWEENESS	UNICEF (30,9)	CNAPS (34,5)	BNGRC (90,5)
	Min Pop (79,6)	Min Pop (94,7)	Min Pop (58,3)
	Min San (113,3)	Min San (158)	Min San (118,8)
	ONN (33)	Hum Inc (35)	Min Agri (39,1)

In any case, it must also be noted that the actors that one might have expected to see at the centre of the network are not there. The Ministry of Employment and the CNAPS are marginalised, or even relegated to the periphery of the network (Graph 1). The CNAPS appears only as a central intermediary in the information exchange network, which it owes in part to its role in the provident scheme for the employees of the organisations in the network. In other words, we note a relative sprawl or a kind of dilution of state actors from the centre to the margins of the networks for resource circulation. This result contrasts sharply with the findings of Howlett et al (2017) on public biodiesel policy in Indonesia. With the same methodology, the authors show exactly the opposite, that government actors are at the centre of the public policy-making network.

This result should be compared with the previous one. Without leadership and a strong ‘vision’ from the highest levels of government on what social protection is or should be in Madagascar, it is difficult to observe a concentration of state actors at the centre of the networks. Moreover, it is the impression of competition that sometimes prevails. Beyond the ‘leadership war’ mentioned above between the MPPSPF and the Ministry of Health, several of our respondents also mention significant tensions between actors in the ‘contributory system’ (social welfare) and actors in the ‘non-contributory system’ (even emergency, risk and disaster management). The MPPSPF's ambiguous position on this point became apparent on a number of occasions during the interviews, where the Ministry sometimes defines itself as being in charge of the non-contributory system, with the contributory system remaining the prerogative of the CNAPS. During the round table, several speakers, particularly those from the private sector, denounced the lack of synergy and complementarity between the two ‘systems’: ‘social protection is not only intended for the poorest people. Therefore, it is necessary to take the entire system

into account, including the contributory system, and to create synergies between the contributory and non-contributory systems'. On this point, it should be noted that, apart from the trio mentioned above, the other most central actors belong to the world of 'emergency', which usually provides non-contributory solutions (BNGRC, ONN, WFP).

At this point, a final question arises to which we should provide some initial answers. The statistical centrality of administrative and governmental actors clearly invalidates the H2 hypothesis. But does it reflect their centrality within the political system, and therefore a political appropriation of the issue in a way? Or does it reflect a betweenness that is constrained because it is required in a technical and institutional system that is part of the day-to-day management of development aid and state sovereignty? The quasi-systematic position of UNICEF as the most central actor, a leading international player on the issue of cash-transfer and social assistance, tends to point towards the second option. Closer attention to the form and position of actors in networks of conflict (disagreements) and influence will help consolidate this interpretation.


Who disagrees, who is influential? From mistrust of government actors to brokers

A network, especially when it is an inter-organisational network of public policy-making, is not merely a means of accessing the resources of the various actors. It also produces differences that can lead to real conflicts between actors. This important dimension of policy networks is particularly captured through the network of disagreements reflecting the oppositions between different organisations. A policy network is not a simple horizontal space where all actors are at the same level. Some actors, depending on their position or role, may have greater power and their decisions are more likely to influence those of others. This dimension is captured through the network of influence. These last two networks are more directly related to the political relationships within the arena of the GTPS in Madagascar.

Within the network of actors, the statistical recording of a disagreement and its interpretation is sensitive to the *Fihavanana*⁵⁶. Expressing a conflict or disagreement should be rooted in the emphasis on social peace and the Malagasy vision of a peaceful society (Razafindrakoto & al., 2017). In this respect, it is not surprising that this network is the most singular from a statistical point of view: lowest degree and density, highest fragmentation and geodesic distance (table 4; graph 2).

⁵⁶ Defined by Kneitz (2014: 16) as 'a norm charged with an enormous historical and cultural weight of consensus and mutual assistance in Madagascar, adapted to and lived in very different social units, and perceived as a unique experience', the Malagasy *Fihavanana*, can be understood as Malagasy solidarity, stands out as a "normativity of mutual understanding".

Graph 2
Network of disagreements (all ties)



A first observation must be made. The very high degree of fragmentation of the network of disagreements is illustrated by the fact that the disagreements are centred on a few actors, in this case mainly ministerial: Ministry of Population, Social Protection and Women; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Economy and Ministry of the Interior. Thus, of the central trio previously identified, ‘UNICEF - Min Pop - Min San’, only the two ministerial actors remain. Protected from criticism or, more precisely, the expression of dissent against it, UNICEF never appears among the 10% most central actors in the network of disagreements, whatever statistical indicator is used (table 6).

Distrust within the network is clearly directed towards ministerial and government-related structures (yellow squares, graph 2). The ties of disagreement primarily concern the relationship of state actors with international organisations. A strong translation of this relationship based on a divergence between institutional blocks from the North and the South, is the reciprocal nature of the disagreement between the two GTPS coordinators, UNICEF on the one hand and the Ministry of Population on the other. The previously mentioned complexity of coordinating this network, which is inherent to the multiplicity and variety of actors involved, is naturally reinforced by this lack of agreement between the two heads of the GTPS leadership. Under these circumstances, the likelihood that this two-headed governance will undermine the very effectiveness of the working group and, with it, the collective capacity of the network to face the challenges of social protection seems high.

Table 6
Top 10% most central actors
(networks of disagreements and influence)

	Network of disagree- ments	Network of influ- ence
IN-DEGREE	Min Pop (24)	UNICEF (24)
	Min San (18)	Min Pop (26)
	BNGRC (18)	Min San (25)
	PAM (15)	BNGRC (22)
	FID (15)	
	CNAPS (15)	
CLOSENESS	Min Eco (61,5)	PAM (56,5)
	Min Pop (58)	Min Pop (50)
	Min San (62)	Min San (43,5)
	ONN (62,5)	BNGRC (51)
BETWEENESS	Min Eco (91,8)	BIT (71,5)
	Min Pop (97,9)	Min Pop (101,6)
	Min San (88,1)	Min San (292)
	POS_PLANET (87,5)	BNGRC (109,1)


On the other hand, although more marginal, international organisations also give rise to disagreements, albeit more localised, such as the differences of opinion between the World Food Programme and certain NGOs such as ACF, CARE, Humanity and Inclusion. International organisations, while not central to this network of opposition, hold an important place that oscillates between marked institutional opposition and more circumscribed disagreements. As such, they are part of a political game of contradictory relationships.

Comparatively and remarkably, graph 2 places three national actors on the periphery of the network. Initially, we expected these to be among the first to take up the subject, to be active in debates and, in the end, to be at the centre of more conflictual relations and the network of disagreements: two trade unions, one for employers (GEM) and one for workers (SEKRIMA), and a civil society organisation representing Malagasy citizens (CCOC). The peripheral position of the CCOC confirms the remoteness or marginalisation of civil society in the process. As for the position of the trade unions, it is probably the direct consequence of a silo approach to social protection policy, which amounts to acknowledging the joint presence of two watertight segments, the contributory one and the non-contributory one, without imagining that they can be articulated in any way other than by simply juxtaposing their mechanisms (figure 6). Thinking about social protection in Madagascar focuses primarily on the conditions and ways in which protection can be extended to the self-employed, thus effectively isolating the ‘traditional’ actors in the first segment.

The network of influence is less fragmented than the network of disagreements, but still more so than the first three networks (Table 6). Each actor is influenced on average by 10 other actors.

The shape of graph 3 is particularly striking when compared to that of the previous network (graph 2). Here government actors are again more fragmented and diffused when moving from the centre to the periphery. In the centre, we find the 'UNICEF - Min Pop - Min San' trio, with a return of UNICEF confirming the interpretation made when the H2 hypothesis was refuted (Box 3). When looking at relations of influence and how they are distributed and flow through the network, identifying the brokers (centrality of betweenness) is important. Table 6 demonstrates the brokering role of the two ministerial actors, the MPPSPF and the Ministry of Health, unlike UNICEF. These two indicators (centrality of degree and centrality of betweenness) confirm indeed that these two actors are probably more UNICEF's essential 'intermediaries' than they are leading the social protection policy making process. Two other brokers are also identified by the analysis: the ILO and the BNGRC. Clearly, these two actors connect two different worlds: that of emergency for the BNGRC (with an important role for the WFP, whose proximity centrality is the highest) and that of labour and social protection for the ILO.

Graph 3.
Network of influence (all ties)



Finally, the results presented at the end of the previous point and which raised the question of 'Who governs' are generally confirmed here, and therefore consolidated. Box 5 summarises these intermediate results and the first appraisal, both global and local, of the different types of inter-organisational relations that emerge from the analysis.

Box 5

Results with respect to the H1, H2 and H3 hypotheses

<p>H1.</p>	<p>Invalidated. The shape of the networks involving collaboration, information sharing, and even agreement indicates a mode of governance that can be described as non-hierarchical or decentralised (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rudnick et al., 2019). In other words, it reflects the fact that all these actors interact with each other to a great extent (high degree and density of networks vs. low fragmentation and geodesic distance) as a result of their participation in various programmes in different aspects of social protection. However, this is not part of a widely shared or coherent vision of social protection and reflects a degree of ‘confusion’ that is largely confirmed by our qualitative data.</p>
<p>H2.</p>	<p>Somewhat confirmed. First of all, there is one international actor that is in a position of leadership and strong centrality in almost every field, UNICEF. As co-coordinator of the GTPS with the MPPSPF, this seems only logical. Alongside UNICEF, this central trio includes the MPPSPF and the Ministry of Health. The joint presence of these two ministries at the centre of the networks is already an illustration of the dilution of the MPPSPF’s leadership, despite the fact that it is the GTPS’s co-coordinator. Furthermore, this lack of institutional leadership is largely supported by qualitative observations. Finally, the centrality of government actors in the network of disagreements clearly reflects the high level of mistrust they face.</p>
<p>H3.</p>	<p>Somewhat confirmed. Government actors are often in the position of ‘brokers’ (centrality of betweenness). This finding also supports the result relating to hypothesis 2 (the degree of centrality of the MPPSPF and the Ministry of Health is more a reflection of centrality in a technical mechanism rather than of centrality in the political system and ownership).</p>

However, the forms of the graphs as well as the position of the actors in the different networks, although they provide a few clues, intuitions and subsequent hypotheses, cannot in themselves precisely identify the existence or not of coalitions of actors, the particular power relations at stake and the political preferences at work in the process of building social protection policy in Madagascar. In order to do this, a more in-depth empirical analysis based on the theoretical frameworks of advocacy coalitions and policy network is necessary.

Translating the international compromise on social protection: a dominant ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition and a marginalised ‘pro-rights’ coalition

To put the last two working hypotheses (H4 and H5) to the test, one needs to identify the possible coalitions in place, the principles, values, and representations of social protection they hold and the state of the power relations between them that constitute the process of developing social protection policy in Madagascar within the framework of the GTPS. From this perspective, the results of the SNA reveal two coalitions that are imperfectly symmetrical to the international forum described above but characterized, as is the latter, by the temporary victory of the ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition over another more marginalized and less coherent one, described as ‘pro-rights’.

After identifying four groups or cliques of actors, including two coalitions in the first point that follows, the coherence of these coalitions is discussed, in particular from the point of view of their preferences with regard to social protection policy (policy core and secondary beliefs).

The identification of two political coalitions and their respective positions in the relational realm of the GTPS

The first step is to identify the presence of coalitions within the GTPS based on an analysis of its relational properties. To do this, we suggest an original method (box 6) based on the seminal work of Ingold (2011) and Howlett et al (2017).

Box 6

Coalition identification method

Building on the work of Ingold (2011) and Howlett et al (2017), articulating policy network and ACF, we posit three 'reticular' conditions so that a clique can be considered as a coalition of actors. There are therefore three steps in the identification procedure.

Condition 1

Members of the same coalition must be 'structurally equivalent' in the network of collaborations, i.e., they must have the same profile in terms of ties and collaboration partners.

Two nodes are said to be structurally equivalent if they have the same ties and the same 'non-ties' (or structural holes) with the same nodes within a graph. In the field of SNA, since the work of Lorrain & White (1971), this structural equivalence between two nodes is measured in two main ways: the Euclidean distance and Pearson's correlation coefficient. The Euclidean distance is used to calculate the distance between two actors. It is a measure of dissimilarity because the greater the distance, the less structurally equivalent the individuals will be. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient is a measure of the correlation between two variables. In our case, the coefficient identifies the structural proximity of two nodes. Starting from the adjacent matrix of our basic network (we have chosen the collaboration network), we try to group together by 'blocks' the organisations which are the most structurally equivalent. We first calculate the structural equivalence between each pair of organisations following the Euclidean distance using an adjacency matrix (we have also constructed the structural equivalence matrix using Pearson's correlation coefficient and it confirms the relationships we have identified). Next, the optimisation method used for the classification is the 'Tabu-Search Method'. This supervised algorithm (integrated into the UCINET 6 software, Borgatti & al., 2013), which requires the ex-ante definition of the number of clique, will bring together the most equivalent actors over the course of each iteration by minimising the within-clique variance and maximising the between-clique variance (Busco & Steinley, 2011). It is worth noting that the analysis of variance on which this algorithm is based makes it possible to produce an R2 in order to compare the quality of the various typologies of equivalent actors. In our case, the classification into 4 cliques proved to be the most robust.

Condition 2

Members of the same coalition must collaborate and share information much more with each other than with other organisations belonging to other cliques (density of ties within the clique is greater than the density of ties outside the clique).

From an analytical angle, we test this dual hypothesis based on the idea that a clique meets this dual criterion when the valued density (weighting of each tie by the score obtained on the scale of 1 to 5 characterising the strength of the tie) of the ties within is greater than the valued density of the ties outside of the clique. In other words, if three actors A, B, C in a network that also includes D, E, F are structurally equivalent, they only form a coalition when the density of ties in the subnetwork composed of A, B, and C is greater than the density of ties with the other actors in the network (D, E, F).

Condition 3

Members of a same coalition should have greater agreement relationships within a coalition than with organisations outside the coalition. Conversely, members of a same coalition should have fewer relationships of disagreement with each other than with actors belonging to other cliques.

This double hypothesis is tested again by measuring the densities valued within and between cliques. Thus, for the first criterion (greater within-clique agreement), the idea is as follows: a clique meets the first criterion when the valued density of internal ties is greater than the valued density of external ties. For the second criterion, we propose to reverse the procedure for the network of disagreements: a clique respects the second criterion when the valued density of links external to the clique is greater than the valued density of ties within the clique. In other words, if three actors A, B and C have a lower internal density than that observed outside the clique, then A, B and C have more disagreement ties with actors outside the clique than with those within it.

Source: authors.

Implementing this first stage results in the identification of four groups. The first clique (clique 1) is made up of eight actors, including the leading trio of UNICEF, MPPSPF, and the Ministry of Health, plus several emergency and crisis management organisations (BNGRC, CARE, FID, ONN, WFP) which, also, have regularly been central in the previous results. Table 7 thus highlights the pro-emergency orientation of Clique 1. It is also characterised by the strong presence of public institutional actors, with only one private sector actor and CARE as the only international NGO (figure 11).

Table 7
The four cliques identified based on their structural equivalence

Cliques	Number of actors	Name of the organisations within the cliques
Clique 1	8	BNGRC CARE FID Min_POP Min_Sant ONN PAM UNICEF
Clique 2	10	ACF AFD CA_CSU CCOC GIZ Min_Agri Min_Eco OTIV POS_PLANET WHH
Clique 3	10	BM CRS GRET HUM_INC INSTAT Min_Educ Min_Int PHSP SAF_FJKM TELMA
Clique 4	8	BIT CNaPS FES GEM Min_Emploi Min_Fpubli OSTIE SEKRIMA

Clique 2 consists of 10 organisations and is institutionally more heterogeneous than Clique 1 (figure 11). It is also more oriented towards development actions (figure 12). This second clique brings together international donors such as AFD or GIZ, international NGOs such as Action Contre la Faim, POS-PLANET and WHH, national government actors, the Ministry of Agriculture and Economy, CA-CSU, Malagasy associations, OTIV and CCOC. Clique 3 is also heterogeneous. It consists of 10 organisations and brings together private actors such as TELMA and public actors such as the Ministry of Education. Clique 3 is characterised by the surprising presence of a key player in social protection in the world and in Madagascar, the World Bank, which one could more easily imagine being in the first clique. Finally, Clique 4 has 8 actors. It is unique in its composition. Compared to the other cliques, it is the one with the most private sector organisations (figure 11) and the most national actors (figure 13). Clique 4 also has an essentially pro-development orientation (figure 12). This clique includes historical actors in the contributory scheme, such as the CNAPS, the Ministry of Employment, the ILO, the GEM, SEKRIMA, and OSTIE.

Figure 11

Cliques composition according to the institutional status of the organisations (public, private, associative)




Figure 12

Cliques composition according to the type of primary action (Emergency vs. Development)





Figure 13

Cliques composition according to their relationship to the international level



After this first stage of analysis, an important point to remember is that while coalitions are necessarily cliques (structural equivalence), the reverse is not true. Not all cliques are coalitions. Two additional steps are needed to move from identifying a clique to identifying a coalition (Box 6).

Implementing these last two steps results in only two of the four identified cliques actually being coalitions: clique 1 and clique 4.

Tables 8 and 9 show that organisations belonging to cliques 1 and 4 collaborate more with members of their cliques (internal) than with member organisations of other cliques (external). The density of internal ties in both cliques is higher than the overall density of the network. It is also higher than the density of their ties with other cliques. The same result can be observed for the information sharing network: organisations in cliques 1 and 4 share more information with members of their cliques than with organisations in other cliques⁵⁷. According to the pre-defined criteria, this result can also be observed on the agreements network of agreement ties (Table A 4.2. and graph 4)⁵⁸: Clique 1 and 4 organisations share more agreement ties with members of their clique than with organisations in other

⁵⁷ Additional data tables and graphs are available upon request in the appendix volume.

⁵⁸ But less about the network of disagreements, which we will come back to later. Cf. appendix volume upon request.

clique, unlike cliques 2 and 3. Graph 4 illustrates this important finding: the strong and reciprocal ties of agreement in the agreements network are all found within the two coalitions.


Table 8
Global assessed density and density assessed within the four cliques of the network of collaboration

Cliques	Number of ties between the clique's organisations	Density valued only between the organisations in the clique	Overall Valued Density without the ties within the clique
1	236	4,214	2,024
2	114	1,267	2,335
3	194	1,764	2,329
4	102	2,429	2,267

Table 9
Valued density within and between four cliques of the network of collaboration

Cliques	1	2	3	4
1	4,214	2,175	3,023	0,893
2	1,813	1,267	0,991	0,557
3	3,455	1,018	1,764	0,844
4	0,929	0,514	0,753	2,429

Graph 4
Four distinct cliques of actors within the agreements network



■ Clique 1 → Coalition 'pro-vulnerable'
 ■ Clique 2
 ■ Clique 3
 ■ Clique 4 → Coalition 'pro-droit'


Note: graph representing all the ties of agreements valued from 1 to 5. The ties in red and blue represent the reciprocal agreement relations of force 4/5 within the same clique.

In view of this result, a specification of these two coalitions can now be made, as the two cliques of actors seem, at first glance, to transpose to the Malagasy national level the international configuration described above (introduction and Chapter 1, cf. the work of Hickey & Seekings, 2017 or Merrien, 2013). We therefore propose that Clique 1 be called the 'pro-vulnerable coalition' since it is a local expression of the strength of the internationally dominant coalition based on refining and broadening the 'government targeted at the poor' towards the management of social, but also natural, climatic, agricultural, etc. risks that cause economic insecurity for individuals. This individualised and security-oriented approach to social protection is mainly implemented through a non-contributory, assistance-based system, known as cash-transfer. The composition of clique 1 confirms this characterization. It includes UNICEF, the international organisation leading the way on this vision of social protection in the country, and the MPPSPF, which supports this conception and therefore seeks to focus solely on the non-contributory scheme. In fact, we have observed that this position is a source of tension between the GTPS actors, particularly during the 13 February 2019 round table. The coalition's coherence is also rooted in the fact that its members share a common sense of belonging to the world of emergency relief (figure 13). Clique 4 is then referred to as the 'pro-rights coalition'. It also represents one of the two competing visions at the international level, one that has been supported by the ILO in particular from the outset. In this approach to social protection, the focus is more on enforceable social rights and how they can be extended and activated through contributory schemes and insurance mechanisms linked to work and employment in all its forms. This is reflected in the composition of Clique 4, which includes the ILO, the CNAPS, trade unions and employers' organizations, as well as the Ministry of Labour, all of which, historically, have had this view of social protection.

Beyond simply identifying the two coalitions, our methodological approach makes it possible to question their relational position vis-à-vis the other two cliques and their internal relational 'solidity'. Graph 5 represents the 4 cliques within the network of collaborations. It clearly shows a stronger proximity between the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition and clique 3, whereas the 'pro-rights' coalition is more isolated, in the north-eastern periphery.

Graph 5


The four cliques within the network of collaborations



Note: graph representing only the strongest ties of collaboration (4 and 5 on the scale of 1 to 5). The shape of the nodes represents the types of institutions. The position of the organisations and their size depend on their degree of centrality.

Graph 6

Information sharing: clique 3's dependence on the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition



Note: graph representing the reciprocal ties (in red) among the strongest information sharing ties (4 and 5 on the scale of 1 to 5). The pro-vulnerable coalition is in red and clique 3 is in yellow.

Similarly, of interest is the fact that members of cliques 2 and 3 share much more information with members of clique 1 than with each other (Table A4.1 upon request). If one looks at these relationships merely between coalition organisations in clique 1 and clique 3 (graph 6), taking only the most demanding (valued 4 and 5), the relative lack of information sharing within clique 3 underlines its relative dependence on the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition.

This position of the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition in relation to the other two cliques places it more directly at the heart of the political game. As for the 'pro-rights' coalition, it is obviously more isolated in the network. Moreover, the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition is clearly the one that displays the greatest internal relational coherence, which is an obvious asset in the ongoing debates.

The situation in the network of disagreements confirms the relative homogeneity of this coalition: it presents fewer relations of disagreement internally than it does with other cliques (Table 10). However, this condition is not met by the 'pro-rights' coalition (clique 4), which appears to be more unstable regarding this same criterion.


Table 10
Valued density within and between cliques in the network of disagreements

Cliques	1	2	3	4
'Pro-vulnerable' coalition	0.911	0.387	0.575	0.094
2	1.125	0.433	0.710	0.488
3	1.350	0.470	0.544	0.325
'Pro-right' coalition	0.984	0.313	0.262	1.304

The visualisation of the strongest ties of disagreement within and between coalitions (graph 7) shows that there are effectively no major disagreements within the dominant coalition, which indicates a genuine coherence in the normative perspective held by this subset. Conversely, the 'pro-rights' coalition is divided by a dual internal opposition between, on the one hand, the GEM and the ILO and then the CNAPS and, on the other hand, between the Ministries of Employment and Civil Service themselves. These disagreements tend to weaken the potential coherence within this sub-group and marginalize its constituent organizations from the rest of the network. It should also be added that disagreements are obviously strong between the two coalitions. In particular, they crystallise around one actor, the FES which provides strong support for a regional initiative, the SASPEN - Southern African Social Protection Experts Networks (Chapter 1). As such, this actor has very quickly positioned itself on social protection in Madagascar with a critical approach to the 'pro-vulnerable' perspective.

Graph 7

The two coalitions in the network of disagreements



Note: graph representing only the strongest ties of disagreement (4 and 5 on the scale from 1 to 5), the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition is in red and the 'pro-rights' coalition in blue.

This finding of a more coherent and solid 'pro-vulnerable' coalition in terms of relationships is also corroborated by our qualitative information. The members of this coalition belong to the GTPS's thematic sub-group on 'cash transfer', referred to by the stakeholders themselves as the 'cash' sub-group. According to all the representatives of the organisations surveyed, this sub-group is currently the most active and dynamic within the GTPS. It clearly benefits from significant institutional and financial resources, given the institutions within it.

Besides this local dynamic in the field of social protection, this sub-group is also a stakeholder in an international platform (The Cash Learning Partnership - based in London at OXFAM's head office) which, on the one hand, provides capitalisation and technical support for cash transfer projects and, on the other hand, plays an advocacy role in this field. The platform's website publishes the minutes of the meetings of the cash sub-group in Madagascar⁵⁹. These are all concordant indications of a permanent interaction between the global and local levels of the relationships between the actors of the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition. Driven by the technical expertise developed at the global level, one can even surmise that it contributes to an unexpected form of deterritorialization and depoliticization of public protection policies by helping to dilute endogenous conflicts in favour of expertise-based solutions that are partly external, partly locally anchored.

⁵⁹ Website : <http://www.cashlearning.org/>.

This thematic sub-group has several missions: (i) *'the sharing of its considerations and resolutions with other structures (GTPS, TFPs, Government)'* ; (ii) *'finding strategies to ensure the sustainability of cash transfers as an instrument of social protection by the government'* ; (iii) *'contributing to the activities of the Social Protection Working Clique, particularly the drafting of the five-year action plan for social protection, which requires advocacy and partnership development'*. The practical implementation of this policy work is also reflected in the discussions observed during the round table on 13 February, where explicit reference is made to the need to develop the 'social safety net culture' in Madagascar in general and within the government in particular. With this in mind, a memorandum of understanding between the MPPSF and the BNGRC is being drawn up in order to *'implement a communication strategy to support advocacy'*⁶⁰.

This work of identifying coalitions in terms of their relations with one another confirms that the international balance of power on social protection has been transposed to the Malagasy level (hypothesis H4). The results have thus made it possible to identify a 'pro-vulnerable' coalition, favourable to the development of assistance and cash-transfer mechanisms, and a 'pro-rights' coalition favourable to the extension of social protection rights through contributory systems tied to employment. The empirical work on the identification and composition of the coalitions, and on the relations within the different networks, has helped to describe precisely the shape of this transfer within the Malagasy political context. Rather than a simple and mechanical dissemination of the expert consensus around social protection by the local representatives of the major development institutions that promote it at the global level, our results show a 'negotiated' transposition, albeit very weakly so. In fact, the dominant 'pro-vulnerable' coalition fundamentally includes Malagasy public institutions, and more particularly, institutions familiar with humanitarian crisis and emergency management. This national translation of the international compromise seems to work all the more easily because the vision of protection it conveys readily accommodates actors who are familiar with aid practices. The shift to 'cash transfers' does not seem to upset the interests in this field, including those of the ministries in charge of implementing social protection. As for the historical players in the field of social protection, who are partly removed from a process of segmentation, they manage to avoid being genuinely challenged within the narrow and yet conflictual territory of the contributive sector.

At this stage of the analysis, the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition thus holds the political leadership in the elaboration of the new social protection public policy. The second coalition, although older in terms of the trajectory of social protection in Madagascar, is marked by internal conflicts that contribute to its marginalization in the ongoing negotiation process. However, beyond the relational coherence of


⁶⁰ Extract from the minutes of the GTPS cash thematic sub-group meeting.

these two coalitions, and the first in particular, the question remains as to their capacity to disseminate their statements (solutions/problems pair) within the arena formed by the GTPS.

Reputational power and political preferences of actors

Two complementary angles of analysis are developed in order to assess the capacity of a coalition to impose its political preferences. First, we discuss the reputational power of coalitions: the greater this power, the easier it is for a coalition to impose its policy preferences (Ingold, 2011). However, this potential for power requires a relative coherence of preferences with regard to social protection policy (policy core and secondary beliefs) if it is to weigh in conclusively. Moreover, focusing on the distribution of political preferences within coalitions and groups is also a way of identifying actors in a position to facilitate or block the dissemination of ideas or the building of a compromise between actors who share the same preferences but who are outside the dominant coalition, for example.

In order to study the reputational power of the 4 cliques, we constructed a score based on a question put to all the organisations: ‘For your institution, which are the key actors in Madagascar who define the main principles of social protection (construction)?’. Each organisation representative was asked to name four actors without ranking them in order of importance. Every time an actor was mentioned, we gave him or her a point. The distribution of the scores obtained by each clique (total of the scores of all the organisations in the clique) in relation to the possible total of points is shown in figure 14.



The first observation is obviously the strong concentration of this reputational power within the ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition. Indeed, it concentrates a power that is almost six times greater than that of the opposing coalition (only 12%). This ‘pro-rights’ coalition even has a lower concentration of reputational power than that of clique 3 (16%). The power of reputation of this last clique is essentially carried by

the World Bank, which totals nearly 65% of the score of its clique. Moreover, within this 'pro-rights' coalition, the ILO contributes less than 1% of the score, far behind the Ministry of the Civil Service (42%), the CNAPS and the GEM (25%) each. This not only attests to a loss of influence and power of the ILO in the process at work in Madagascar, but also confirms the national and historical roots of this coalition. If we now delve into the distribution of the score within the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition, we can see, quite unexpectedly, that more than 80% of this score is based on the central trio 'UNICEF-MPPSP-Min health'. Within this trio, the MPPSPF contributes 45% of the total score, UNICEF 25%, and the Ministry of Health 14%. The reputational power held by the MPPSPF is ultimately somewhat paradoxical in view of the leadership problem within the GTPS and which the MPPSPF seems to be aware of and to recognise. Although it acknowledges difficulties in ensuring its leadership within the GTPS and is often criticised for its position centred on the contributory regime, the fact remains that many actors consider that it is up to the MPPSPF to provide this leadership; in keeping, one might add, with the responsibilities entrusted to it by law in this area of public action.

In any case, these results confirm that the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition is in a very favourable position to disseminate ideas within the GTPS and, more broadly, in the social protection policy-making process in Madagascar. Nevertheless, this coalition still needs to share a solid foundation of values and convictions around social protection.


Following the framework of the ACF analysis, a distinction is then made between policy core (fundamental political beliefs that provide a vision guiding the strategic behaviour of actors in a public policy area) and secondary beliefs (preferences for specific public policy instruments or targeted policy proposals) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Weible & al. 2019). The results of even a cursory analysis of the greater or lesser cognitive proximity between actors within the cliques attest to the fact that the 'pro-vulnerable' coalition has a greater homogeneity of representations and conceptions of social protection than that observed in the other cliques. Once a greater relational proximity has been observed within this coalition, its power of influence within the social protection network is increased.

The policy core is addressed through two questions. An open-ended one asks how each actor describes the ideal of social protection in Madagascar using three words or expressions that are left to the respondent's own choice. The second one is an affirmative question with a single possible answer on the objectives of social protection in Madagascar: fight against poverty, redistribution or widening access to social rights.

Recoding the open-ended question resulted in a classification into three broad normative categories or registers of justification aimed at qualifying the ideal of social protection in Madagascar (figure 15).

These registers are as follows: (i) that of governance (improved governance, funding model, participatory approach, sustainability of social protection, etc.); (ii) that of the fight against poverty and its effectiveness (eradication of situations of poverty, better targeting and coverage, response capacity in emergencies, improved resilience, etc.); (iii) that of universality (fairer social contract, equity, solidarity, access to social rights for all, etc.). The distribution of the number of citations for each item is weighted by the number of actors in each clique. For the ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition, the ideal is first and foremost pragmatism. The aim is to establish a minimum and effective social protection that works, that is well governed, in order to address the emergency and reduce or eliminate poverty. The ‘pro-rights’ coalition, on the other hand, emphasises an ideal of social justice based on the universality of rights, relegating the practical conditions for its implementation (governance) and more immediate objectives (the fight against poverty) to a secondary focus.

Figure 15
 Social protection ideal by clique
 (ratio of the number of citations per number of actors)



The two other cliques have more heterogeneous profiles which balance the different registers of values. It is noticeable that clique two places the ideal of social protection more significantly in the register of poverty eradication. This orientation is confirmed when looking at the distribution of responses with regard to the main objective of social protection (Table 11). The ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition, for its part, clearly positions itself on the main objective of combating poverty. In contrast, the ‘pro-rights’ coalition considers the main objective of social protection to be the widening of access to social rights and increased redistribution.

Table 11
Breakdown of actors by clique
according to the main objective of social protection in Madagascar

SP objective	Cliques				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Fight against poverty	6	6	4	1	17
Increased redistribution		3	1	3	7
Widening access to social rights	2	1	5	4	12
Total	8	10	10	8	36

Secondary beliefs are grasped through two questions. The first relates to the type of instrument or mechanism that the actors consider to be the most adapted to Malagasy reality for developing social protection: social insurance, assistance, private transfers, universal mechanism, etc. The second focuses on the priority areas for the development of social protection in Madagascar: old age, illness, poverty, work, natural disasters, education.

Table 12
Breakdown of actors by clique
according to the preferred instrument in the Malagasy context


Instruments	Cliques				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Social insurance		2	2	3	7
Private insurance		1	1		2
Assistance	1	2	2		5
Universal mechanism	1	1		1	3
Hybrid mechanism	6	4	3	3	16
None of the two			2	1	3
Overall Total	8	10	10	8	36

First of all, it is important to mention how difficult it is to associate each clique with a single instrument, as 44% of the actors retain the principle of a hybrid mechanism to implement social protection in Madagascar. This overall result reflects a relatively well shared awareness of the fact that there is probably no single mechanism adapted to institutional realities and with the capacity to cover the wide range of situations experienced by the population. In a way, this representation echoes the fragmentation of the social protection system as it has officially existed since 2015. Another interesting overall result is the low number of responses choosing the item 'universal mechanism'. The horizon of social protection based on the principle of universality seems very distant, underscoring the pragmatic attitude of the actors.

If we now compare the two coalitions present in the GTPS, a clear distinction emerges. The 'pro-vulnerable' coalition shows the highest coherence of all the cliques with 75% choosing a 'hybrid mechanism' and being the only clique that never mentions insurance as one of the preferred instruments in

the Malagasy context. As for the ‘pro-rights’ coalition, the responses are more heterogeneous while reflecting a higher attachment to the principle of insurance, with the highest score of the four cliques, 37.5%, and a rejection of assistance as an instrument adapted to the Malagasy situation (0 response). Only one actor in this coalition retains universality as a relevant instrument even though it was more significantly reflected in the policy core. There is apparently a long way to go from reality to the ideal.

Figure 16
Social protection priority areas by clique



The ACF analysis ends with a graphical presentation of the answers to question Q14: ‘For your institution, what are the priority areas for social protection in Madagascar?’ (figure 16). The results confirm and detail the existence of distinctly different conceptions of social protection in the two coalitions (cliques 1 and 4). There were six areas proposed as possible answers, and the respondent was asked to rank them from 1 to 6 in order of increasing importance. To identify the trend within each clique, we calculated an average score per clique⁶¹ and per area. The order of priority areas for the GTPS is shown by the bars in black. A systematic comparison with the average score per clique gives a representation of the priority areas per clique. For all stakeholders, the order is as follows: disease, poverty,

⁶¹ This average score is obtained by adding up the answers from 1 to 6 per clique and dividing by the number of organisations within the clique that provided an answer (2 organisations out of 36 failed to rank the areas). To facilitate the reading of the graph, the inverse of the average score per clique is presented. The score given per clique for a domain is necessarily between 0.16 (1/6) and 1.

education, disaster, work, and old age. Unsurprisingly, the ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition puts poverty-related risks at the top of the social protection policy agenda, ahead of illness, education, work, disasters, and old age. In almost the exact reverse, the ‘pro-rights’ coalition puts disease at the top of the list, followed by work, poverty, old age, education, and then disasters at the bottom of the list. Comparing the average scores of the coalitions by area only accentuates this result: the highest score for poverty is given by clique 2, followed by coalition 1. The ‘pro-rights’ coalition gives poverty the lowest score.

Box 7 summarises the results of the research carried out in this final section, which aims to identify the coalitions involved in the process of developing social protection policy in Madagascar within the framework of the GTPS, and to analyse their coherence in terms of both relationships and policy ideas (principles, values, and representations of social protection).

Box7
Results regarding hypotheses H4 and H5

H4.	Confirmed. We can clearly observe the transposition of the international balance of power around the major orientations of social protection onto the Malagasy level, albeit in a singular form. The results have made it possible to identify a ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition, favourable to the development of assistance mechanisms, particularly cash-transfer, and a ‘pro-rights’ coalition, advocating for the extension of social protection rights through contributory, labour-based systems.
H5.	Confirmed. The ‘pro-vulnerable’ coalition is clearly in the best position to disseminate its policy ideas within the GTPS. It is the most coherent in terms of relationships, the most connected to the other two cliques of actors that are not coalitions (cliques 2 and 3) and shares a very homogenous vision and order of priorities. The recent decisions on the direction of social protection in Madagascar towards a ‘social protection that is responsive to shocks’ can be explained by the political strength of this coalition.

CONCLUSION

This conclusion sets out to summarize the main findings from the analysis of social protection policy making in Madagascar. This work was structured around two initial questions which, given the current state of research on the dissemination and effectiveness of social protection policies in Africa, determined the general approach and the method of empirical investigation.

The first question pertained to the reality of a 'new public policy' described as the National Social Protection Policy (PNPS) by official Malagasy documentation and was as follows. What does this frame of reference for public action represent? How did the specific problems of the population covered by social protection come about? Who, what actors, formulated these problems? To provide factual answers to these questions, the first part of this report used two scales of observation, African and Malagasy, the latter being emblematic of the paradigm shift that occurred at the turn of the new millennium: protection without development, protection for development.

The new frame of reference that is first developed between international organisations now includes contexts and situations of extreme poverty. In line with anti-poverty strategies, it shifts the issue of social protection towards the more instrumental one of the social management of individual risks. Its dissemination in Africa, where, from the mid-2000s onwards, more and more countries adopt national social protection policies, is thus by no means spontaneous. It is made possible by the emergence of coalitions of international and national actors whose political work, included in international aid and technical assistance, is proving decisive. In Madagascar, the history of social protection since independence attests to this general pattern. However, despite strong impetus from the ILO, then the World Bank and UNICEF, the institution of a social protection policy has so far always come up against one of the long-term features of the country's political economy: the chronic inability of the Malagasy state and society to reach a consensus that would resolve the redistributive conflict over a sufficiently long period of time for growth.

Understanding whether and how an external push for a new social protection framework translates into national social protection policy is crucial. Answering this second question meant paying serious attention to politics, and more specifically to the articulation between donor logics and national politics. Is the issue of SP being promoted or restructured by local actors? What are the actor and advocacy coalitions that are influential in the ongoing process of developing and implementing the new public policy? To answer this second set of questions, we formulated an approach based a public policy analysis focused on the study of the relational properties of the network of actors involved in social pro-

tection policy. This original methodology is inspired by the recent development in Africa and in developing countries of studies on policy networks and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Chapter 2). The analysis of five complete networks (collaboration, information sharing, agreements, disagreements, influence), constituting the relationships between the active members of the Social Protection Working Clique (GTPS), made it possible to empirically identify, on the basis of objective criteria, the coalitions in place and the dominant representations. After having identified the key players in the ongoing public policy sequence, we measured and mapped the intensity of the relationships between actors and reported on the communities of values, ideas, and diversified logics of action (cognitive framework - policy core and secondary beliefs) that now underpin these relationships.

First of all, it turns out that the public, private, international, and national actors who compose the network interact a great deal through regular participation in different aid programmes relating to the various contemporary issues of social protection. However, these collaborations are not based on a strongly shared or convergent vision of social protection. They operate in a 'confusion' of meanings and 'divergences' over the perception of the problem at hand and the appropriate solutions. This clear lack of shared understanding as to what national social protection policy ultimately involves is largely confirmed by our additional qualitative observations.

The shape of the network of collaborations (its high density or low centralisation) also reveals a leadership deficit or, in other words, a problem of governance that cannot logically be dissociated from the previous finding. Three organisations are at the centre of this network. UNICEF, first of all, is in a position of strong centrality in almost all areas. The logical result ultimately reflects its role as a leader among the other technical and financial partners and, even more so, as co-coordinator of the GTPS with the Ministry of Population (MPPSPF). The latter, together with the Ministry of Health, forms the rest of the trio. The joint presence at the centre of the networks of two ministries with historically competing roles in the field of protection is indicative of a weakening of leadership, in principle attributed solely to the Ministry of Population.

This finding is confirmed by the analysis of the network of disagreements. This time, it reflects a general mistrust of the parties involved towards state and parastatal actors, and even more so in the case of the two ministerial actors at the centre of the public social policy process. Of the previously identified trio, only UNICEF escapes mistrust. As for the employers' and workers' unions, they are the focus of a number of disagreements along with civil society, whose sole representative is ultimately on the fringes of the network of actors. The study of the relations of influence, their distribution and circulation within the network helped clarify the role of the three central actors. The two ministerial actors are thus shown to be more like 'brokers' of a social protection policy under influence than they are at

the top of the structure of social protection policy. Two other brokers play an essential role in the process of making social protection policy. These two actors clearly connect two different worlds to protection issues: that of emergency for the BNGRC and that of labour and social protection for the ILO.

The next step focused on identifying coalitions of actors within the GTPS. Starting from the structural equivalence of each of the members in the network of collaborations we identified four distinct cliques (cliques) of actors. Two of these cliques also meet three more restrictive relational conditions that are necessary for them to be deemed to be stakeholder coalitions: a greater density of ties within the clique than outside it; internal agreement relationships that are more important than external ones; and, in turn, weaker relationships of disagreement between members than with external stakeholders. The first coalition, made up of 8 organisations including UNICEF and the two 'relay' ministries, the Ministry of Population, and the Ministry of Health, brings together institutions involved in emergency aid such as the WFP or the BNGRC. The second brings together Ministries, trade unions, and international NGOs active in labour relations such as the ILO, CNAPS or the Ministry of Civil Service. A measure of reputational power indicates that the first coalition and, within it, UNICEF, have the greatest influence on other actors, apparently reflecting the international compromise described above.

Identifying the advocacy issues defended by each coalition then leaves no doubt about the nature of the coalitions involved and the power dynamics at play. The first one, the so-called 'pro-vulnerable' or 'pro-cash' coalition is obviously hegemonic and defined by a general, albeit revised, objective of fighting poverty, whereas the second, 'pro-rights' coalition is more clearly identified with a goal of increasing redistribution and broadening access to social rights.

Social protection policy thus remains to this day an 'import product' for which the modalities of entry and the standards of implementation on the ground remain largely undiscussed while being promoted by national public authorities.

The long process that led the country to adopt a National Social Protection Policy document for the first time in 2015 is clearly a product of the 'travelling model' defined by the social anthropology of development (Rottenburg, 2007; Behrends et al., 2014; Sardan et al., 2017). All indications are that Malagasy social protection policy is primarily a matter of global governance, from the formulation of the problem (where social protection is conceived as part of a disconnection between economic development, employment, and protection and is therefore limited to a social management of individual risks), to the design of the model (where the choice of primary mechanism to address the problem is cash-transfer oriented), to the networking that organizes its dissemination.

The supply-side approach dominates this field for two cumulative reasons. The first one refers to the unprecedented convergence of global social protection offers. A reminder was thus made of the foundations of the consensus between international institutions reached at the turn of the new millennium and reflected in the SDGs of 2015. This consensus, post-9/11, asserts the need to establish universal social protection in all countries regardless of their level of economic development and institutional configurations. From this perspective, the new social protection paradigm offers an inverted and simplified causality with regard to a Polanyian reading of the labour-protection relationship, which makes it possible to consider it today as a condition for the economic development of poor countries and not the other way round. The second reason for the dominance of international supply, which is less often mentioned in a unilateral criticism of the domination of imported models of public policy, refers this time to the weakness or lack of requests from the Malagasy authorities, as well as to the more general failure of policy, both of which contribute to the hegemony of external supply.

As it stands, Madagascar's social protection policy can only rely on the adequacy and relevance of a global protection offer and the success of a transfer. However, the sociology of translation into innovation, like the socio-anthropology of development interventions, tell us that such a public policy is only likely to be effective and efficient - whatever the quality of the initial expertise - when local situations reclaim it, negotiate, and carry out the necessary political work of transformation and adaptation. In Madagascar, where this is only very partially the case, it may well be that we are witnessing the 'derealization' of public social protection policy more than its 'realization' – in the sense given to the term by Latour & Porter (1996) –, as with other development policies before it, leaving people at work once again without real protection.

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