



# “Epilogue: Commentaries on the Sentences in Paris around 1370”

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EPILOGUE

*SENTENCES* COMMENTARIES IN PARIS AROUND 1369

MONICA BRINZEI

Quanta vero sit multitudo – aliena dicam exponentium, an aliena vastantium? – hac presertim tempestate, *Sententiarum* liber, ante alios, mille tales passus opifices, clara, si loqui possit, et querula voce testabitur. Et quis unquam commentator non assumptum ceu proprium laudavit opus? Imo eo semper uberius, quo alienum urbanitas, suum opus laudare vanitas atque superbia est.<sup>1</sup>

In *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, composed in 1370, Petrarch expresses his disdain for the contemporary tradition of commentaries on the *Sentences*; the humanist could not suffer the repetition and the tendency to recycle text. Just after 1500 Erasmus would adopt a similar attitude, deploring the style of the *Sentences*.<sup>2</sup> Even in the era of the SIEPM, one finds echoes of the same ‘humanist’ rejection in Louis-Jean Bataillon’s review of the edition of John of Ripa’s *Conclusiones*, in which he deems it regrettable that such a talented historian as André Combes would waste his time editing the *Sentences* commentary of such an unknown theologian.<sup>3</sup> Inspired by Jean Gerson – who preached a

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<sup>1</sup> FRANCISCUS PETRARCA, *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, IV, 64, in PETRAQUE, *Mon ignorance et celle de tant d’autres*, tr. J. BERTRAND, C. CARRAUD, int. O. BOULNOIS, Grenoble 2000, 164. I first encountered this passage during a seminar of Ruedi Imbach, but at that time I was not yet familiar with commentaries on the *Sentences*. Recently, Alexander Baumgarten reminded me of this passage from Petrarch. See an interpretation of this passage and of Petrarch’s ‘derisive characterization’ of the *Sentences* in C.E. QUILLEN, *Rereading the Renaissance: Petrarch, Augustine and the Language of Humanism*, Ann Arbor 1998, 150-53.

<sup>2</sup> See DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, *Enchiridion militis christiani*, in *Collected works of Erasmus LXVI*, Toronto-Buffalo-London 1988, 9. I thank Alexandra Baneu for this reference.

<sup>3</sup> L.J. BATAILLON, “Bulletin d’histoire des doctrines médiévales”, in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 44 (1960), 324-25.

return to the theology of the thirteenth century as a remedy to the crisis of the late fourteenth – Père Bataillon could discern no doctrinal value in the content of such a text from this obscure century:

Il reste à se demander quelle est la valeur intrinsèque de cette doctrine. Sur ce point, je ne saurais partager la sympathie quelque peu admirative de Combes et de Vignaux. Toute cette dialectique, en dépit ou plutôt à cause même de son excès de virtuosité, me semble évacuer toute réelle profondeur métaphysique et surtout un vrai respect du mystère divin en théologie. Finalement, en déconseillant aux étudiants de se laisser séduire par ces subtilités qui risquaient de les égarer à l'instar de Louis de Padou, Gerson se montrait non seulement un pédagogue avisé, mais surtout un vrai théologien.<sup>4</sup>

In his introduction to the edition of the *Prologue* of John of Ripa's commentary on the *Sentences*, André Combes responded to Bataillon, emphasizing that contact with new texts opens historical horizons.<sup>5</sup> In this respect, almost 60 years after the debate between Bataillon and Combes, we are now fortunate enough to have a number of pertinent editorial projects, either accomplished or in progress, notably of Hugolino of Orvieto, John Hiltalingen of Basel, James of Eltville, Henry of Langenstein, Pierre d'Ailly, Peter of Candia, and Marsilius of Ingen. Access to these texts should inspire further research that will contribute to offering a panoramic view of the doctrinal trends in lectures on *Sentences* in the second half of the fourteenth century. This final essay is designed to encourage the investigation of other unedited texts and neglected authors. Rather than present an exhaustive catalogue of this 'Dark Age', I will focus on the rich years 1369-1372 as an illustrative example, since the period is the object of my current research.

## **I. General Trends and Characteristics**

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<sup>4</sup> BATAILLON, "Bulletin d'histoire", 326.

<sup>5</sup> JEAN DE RIPA, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum. Prologi. Questiones I & II*, ed. A. COMBES (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age 8), Paris 1961, xiii-xiv.

The commentaries in question were soon after the first surviving statute from the Faculty of Theology at Paris, issued in 1366.<sup>6</sup> Although statutes provide institutional clues about the academic exercise, they are not very helpful for understanding the scholastic texts that resulted. On the one hand, for example, the statute makes clear that one year would be devoted to a lecture series on the *Sentences*, and this continued to be the case, as it had been since at Paris before 1300 (although at Vienna two years would become the norm);<sup>7</sup> on the other, one would expect that subsequent written *Sentences* commentaries would touch on every distinction in Peter Lombard's original, but the mid-fourteenth century trend of treating only selected issues in writing, even omitting entire books, continued after 1366. The evolution from *distinctiones* to *quaestiones* coincides with the development of more complex divisions of the text, and interpreting the works is risky if one ignores the architecture. Methodically identifying the formal elements is crucial, not simply the rhetorical devices and syllogisms, but the tripartite (or quadripartite<sup>8</sup>) divisions of articles, conclusions, and corollaries, with suppositions, propositions, and *notabilia*. The process of revealing the internal structure often begins when editing the text, and the challenge is how to guide the reader to visualize the complex flow of the argumentation.<sup>9</sup>

John Slotemaker has recently gathered some examples of “the tripartite structure of late medieval *Sentences* commentaries,”<sup>10</sup> and, building on Maarten Hoenen's remarks about Heymericus de Campo,<sup>11</sup> he stressed the idea that the tripartite structure of the

<sup>6</sup> J. VERGER, “La première grande réforme de l’université de Paris (5 juin 1366)”, in *Commentaire* 141 (2013), 147-54. IDEM, “La première réformation générale de l’université de Paris (1366)”, in *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Comptes rendus des séances de l’année 2011 juillet-octobre*, 1229-251.

<sup>7</sup> For Paris, see W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, “Remigio, Scotus, Auriol, and the Myth of the Two-Year Sentences Lecture at Paris”, in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 84.1 (2017), 143-79. For Vienna, W.J. COURTENAY, “From Dinkelsbühl’s *Questiones Communes* to the Vienna Group Commentary. The Vienna ‘School’, 1415-1425”, in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century*, ed. M. BRINZEI (Studia Sententiarum 1), Turnhout 2015, 267-315.

<sup>8</sup> See for a division in 4 articles Z. KALUZA, “La nature des écrits de Jean de Ripa”, in *Traditio* 43 (1987), 257-98, esp. 294-95.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, the figures published by O. HALLAMAA, “On the Limits of the Genre: Roger Roseth as a reader of the *Sentences*”, in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, ed. P.W. ROSEMAN, Leiden 2010, 368-404, at 377-80. The critical edition of the first volume of Pierre d’Ailly’s *Sentences* commentary is accompanied by a fold-out schema for each question to lead the reader through the labyrinth: PETRUS DE ALLIACO, *Questiones super primum, tertium et quartum librum Sententiarum. Principia et questio circa prologum*, édition critique et introduction M. BRINZEI, t. 1 (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 258), Turnhout 2013.

<sup>10</sup> J.T. SLOTEMAKER, “Henry of Gorkum’s *Conclusiones Super IV Libros Sententiarum*: Studying the Lombard in the First Decades of the Fifteenth Century”, in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 3, ed. P.W. ROSEMAN, Leiden 2015, 143-73, at 160-63.

<sup>11</sup> M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Academic Theology in the Fifteenth Century. The *Sentences* Commentary of Heymericus de Campo (+1460)”, in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zenon Kaluza*, éd.

questions expressed theologians' Trinitarian conception of reality. Actually, even before Heymericus, we find a testimony about this *Weltanschauung* in the case of John Regis, who in his *Sentences* affirms that *In quaestione ista, ob reverentiam beatissimae Trinitatis, erunt tres articuli, et in quolibet articulo tres conclusiones principales, et cuilibet principali una lateralis seu corollaria coniungetur*.<sup>12</sup> This general tripartite tendency, which combines a theological form of rhetoric (Trinitarian *Weltanschauung*) with logic (syllogistic partition of arguments), is pervasive in some cases, such as Hiltalingen, who generally divides his questions into three articles, each article with three conclusions, each conclusion with three corollaries, while in other instances it only characterizes the level of the articles. The innovative application that Mihai Maga of the University of Babes-Bolyai in Cluj-Napoca has developed, called NexQuest, which graphically displays the structure of *Sentences* questions, demonstrates the variety of such textual divisions in this period and may help us find clearer ways to present complex structures in critical editions.<sup>13</sup>

The *sententarii* themselves understood the problem and they adapted their citation methods accordingly, in particular in their principal debates. Within the *principia* one finds numerous detailed self-references as well as references to the texts of the *socii*. For example, when Denys of Foulechat had to revoke some of his condemned thesis from his *principia* in front of the chancellor, he reproduced the structural complexity of his argumentation: *tertia conclusio articuli 4, corollarium 1, ex ista conclusione intuli aliud corollarium*.<sup>14</sup>

Foulechat's example reminds us that in the period covered in this volume the university was confronted with a long series of condemnations: William of Ockham, Marsilius of Padua, Nicholas of Autrecourt, John of Mirecourt, Louis of Padua, Jean de la Chaleur, John Wycliff, John Huss, and John Monzon are some of the most prominent authors accused of defending heterodox positions. Often these doctrines were expressed in *Sentences* lectures, especially in principal debates, and fear and danger affected the later

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P.J.J.M. BAKKER avec la coll. de E. FAYE et C. GRELLARD (Texte et Études du Moyen Âge, 20), Turnhout 2002, 513-59, at 539-54.

<sup>12</sup> JOHANNES REGIS, *Circa primum Sententiarum, Prologus* (Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 58ra).

<sup>13</sup> See the examples here: <http://xgent.homelinux.com/nexquaest/>.

<sup>14</sup> His *Principia* are lost, but fragments can be recuperated from the act of his condemnation: C. JOURDAIN, *Index chronologicus chartarum pertinentium ad historiam Universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris 1862, 160. On this condemnation see also L. BIANCHI, *Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l'université de Paris (XIII<sup>e</sup>-XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles)*, Paris 1999.

circulation. Autrecourt's texts did not fare well, but even those of Mirecourt, which survived in some numbers, were cited only tacitly, as in the case of James of Eltville and Pierre d'Ailly, or attributed to Mirecourt only in his capacity as the abbot of Royaumont, in the case of Pierre Ceffons. Indeed, in his seventeenth-century history of the University of Paris, Du Boulay presents the Faculty of Theology as a place of permanent doctrinal conflict.<sup>15</sup>

Parisian condemnations remained important events even among the new universities founded to the east in this period, especially Prague (1348), Bologna (1364), Vienna (1365), Erfurt (1379), Heidelberg (1386), and so on. Many of these new academic centers followed the model of the Faculty of Theology from Paris, with a prominent place for lectures on the *Sentences*. Nevertheless, they add their own specific component to the Parisian tradition, such as a decline in interest in establishing whether theology is a subordinated science, whether practical or speculative, which was so popular in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. One wonders whether the lines of influence went both directions, not only from Paris to her *filiae*, but from the *filiae* to the *mater*. The case of the Augustinian Denys of Modena is illustrative: his Parisian lectures on the *Sentences* were based on those of the Cistercian Conrad of Ebrach recently delivered at Bologna.<sup>16</sup> It is perhaps in the face of the emergence of these new universities that at Paris the Carmelite John Brammart asked in his Prologue how theology should be taught.<sup>17</sup>

Although the new universities increased the number of lectures on the *Sentences*, so far the high percentage of commentaries composed between 1350 and 1450 that survive in just one copy might be interpreted as a decline in the genre. William Duba has recently suggested that, rather than a decay in the intellectual practice, the cause could be the switch from durable parchment to cheaper but more vulnerable paper, especially in the middle decades of the fourteenth century, when paper quality had not yet matured. The use of paper certainly improved the accessibility and circulation of ideas in the short term,

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<sup>15</sup> CESAR EGASSE DU BOULAY, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, Ab anno 1400 ad an. 1500*, 6 vols., Paris 1665-1673, reprint Frankfurt am Main 1966, vol. IV.

<sup>16</sup> See C. SCHABEL, "Tolerating the Greeks? Augustinian Hermits on the *Filioque* from the Black Death to the Great Schism", in *Toleration and Concepts of Otherness in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. M.W. DUNNE, S. GOTTLÖBER, Turnhout (forthcoming).

<sup>17</sup> See also A. ANISIE, "Philosophy and Theology in the Prologue of Johannes Brammart's Commentary on the *Sentences*", forthcoming in the acts of the FIDEM colloquium of 2015.

for example allowing the exchange of written notes among *socii* during their principal debates, but in the long term many exemplars perished.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, the use of paper might explain the survival of an important number of *principia* separate from the commentaries that were produced in the last decades of the fourteenth century.<sup>19</sup> These *principia* enlighten us with details about the practice of reading the *Sentences* and provide an unexpected source for restablishing the network of advanced students in theology. At the same time, the texts of the *principia* are also rich in information on the doctrinal tendencies of the *baccalarii*, which is especially welcome in the case of otherwise unknown authors. In fact, even when their own *principia* are lost, the *principia* of their *socii* often allow us to recover their ideas and even words. Thus Pierre d'Ailly's *Principia* help to reconstruct some of the doctrinal positions that Gilles de Champs defended in his lost commentary.<sup>20</sup>

This is by no means a unique or marginal case. The Dominican John Thomae, who later became the vicar of the general inquisitor of France (*vicarius inquisitoris*),<sup>21</sup> played an important role during the condemnation of his confrère John Monzon in 1389, when Thomae had to read a retraction of his own in public.<sup>22</sup> Thomae's career as a theologian culminated in lectures on the *Sentences*, although no written commentary survives. Luckily, bits of his *Principia* can be found in those of Denys of Modena,<sup>23</sup> since Thomae was one of his *socii* in 1371-72. From Denys' testimony, we learn that Thomae had a special interest in the topic of the beatific vision.<sup>24</sup> Denys debated Thomae on this very topic, remarking that, according to Thomae, the hypostatic union can exist without the beatific vision.<sup>25</sup> Galerand of Penfler, who later on became Pope Clement VII's and also

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<sup>18</sup> W. DUBA, *Varieties of Lectures: Sources and Technology in the Medieval Universities*, Plenary lecture at the FIDEM 2015 colloquium Cluj-Napoca. See a summary of his paper in M. Brinzei's report on the FIDEM colloquium in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 57 (2015), 23-8.

<sup>19</sup> For a general approach on the topic, see *Principia or Philosophical Debates at the Faculty of Theology during the Middle Ages*, ed. M. BRINZEI, W. DUBA (Studia Sententiarum 3), Turnhout (forthcoming).

<sup>20</sup> M. BRINZEI, "Aegidius de Campis et son commentaire perdu des *Sentences*", in *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, ed. C. ANGOTTI, M. BRINZEI, M. TEEUWEN (FIDEM 65), Turnhout 2012, 23-36.

<sup>21</sup> P. KRUPA, O.P., *Une grave querelle. L'université de Paris, les Mendians et la conception immaculée de la Vierge (1387-1390)* (Biblioteka Instytutu Tomistycznego. Teksty I Studia 6), Warszawa 2013, 53.

<sup>22</sup> KRUPA, *Une grave querelle*, 59-60.

<sup>23</sup> More on this text and author *infra*.

<sup>24</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium III*, ed. Paris 1511, 350b: "Secundo ad idem: si ergo foret vera, sequeretur quod talis unio fuisset supremus gradus bene essendi communicabilis generi humano. Sed consequens istud est falsum, per reverendos baccalarios magistros meos fratrem Iohannem Thome legentem in scholis exterioribus fratrum Predicatorum..."

<sup>25</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium III*, ed. Paris 1511, 353b: "Nec est possibile stante tali unione Deum impendere omnem actum anime Christi seu etiam annihilare, cuius tamen oppositum posuit reverendus

Cardinal de la Grange's physician, was also *socius* of Denys of Modena that year, and through Denys' eyes we see that Galeran was interested in the issue of evident knowledge, since all the citations pertain to this topic.<sup>26</sup> Among the *sententiarii* of 1369-70, Richard of Bellomonte was the secretary of the queen of France, Joanna of Bourbon (*Magister Richardus de Bellomonte secretarius domine regine regnantis*, f. 36r), who gave him leave from his secretarial tasks to lecture on the *Sentences*. No trace of any text has survived, but, fortunately, since he was John Regis's *socius*, we can discern some of his ideas.<sup>27</sup>

These examples demonstrate the rich historical potential of the *principia* of bachelors of the *Sentences*, a new philosophical genre of the fourteenth century that arose from the art of the *disputatio*. Damasus Trapp's elegant description of fourteenth-century theological disputation certainly applies to the verbatim traces of the live exchanges from *principia*: "Disputations were expected to sharpen the wits of the contestants, fire their ambition, train them in courtesy while crossing swords, and inspire them to more throughgoing efforts if defeated or badly bruised on the intellectual battleground."<sup>28</sup>

The rise of paper was not the only 'external' factor with an impact on the genre in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, since the Great Schism, consiliarism and the Councils of Pisa, Constance, Pavia, and Basel, and the Church reform movement also left their traces in the tradition of commentaries on the *Sentences*. But the technological innovation of paper impacted their circulation, not only facilitating doctrinal dissemination, but also encouraging the development of personal libraries and more public collections of manuscripts in the convents of the religious orders, such as those of Collège des Bernardins and the Abbey of Saint-Victor.

The *Sentences* commentaries of this era also seem to tell us about trends in the status of the religious orders. Whereas in the last two thirds of the thirteenth and the first third of the fourteenth centuries the doctrinal supremacy of the Dominicans and Franciscans is

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baccharalius et **magister meus frater Iohannes Thome** legens in scolis exterioribus fratrum predicatorum etc. Unde in tertio principio volens probare quod unio ypostatica possit esse sine beatifica..."

<sup>26</sup> J.-L. DEUFFIC, "La confrérie Saint-Yves de Paris en 1368: une liste de membres inédite", in *Pecia* 2 (2003), 55-58; IDEM, "Maître Galeran de Pendref, chantre de Notre-Dame de Paris et médecin réputé († 1404)", in *Pecia* 31 octobre 2011 (<http://blog.pecia.fr/page/16>).

<sup>27</sup> JOHANNES REGIS, *Principium I*, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 43v: "Secundus magister **Richardus de Bellomonte** secretarius regine posuit in secunda conclusione primi articuli sui quod si esset aliqua species Deo immediata, sicut aliqui ponunt, illa a Deo dependeret in esse et in conservari."

<sup>28</sup> D. TRAPP, "The Portiuncula Discussion of Cremona (ca. 1380). New Light on 14th Century Disputations", in *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 22 (1955), 79-94, at 79.



manifest, for example through figures such as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Peter Auriol, and William of Ockham, in the last two thirds of the fourteenth century, based on surviving texts, the Augustinian and even the Cistercians and Carmelites come to the fore, with Thomas of Strasbourg, Gregory of Rimini, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, John of Mirecourt, Paul of Perugia, Hugolino of Orvieto, Pierre Ceffons, Osbert of Pickenham, Michael Aiguani de Malabranca, James of Eltville, John of Brammart, and so on. It is still premature to talk about common doctrinal tendencies in these orders, but future comparative studies might provide interesting insights.<sup>29</sup> For now, we can emphasize what Amos Corbini has proven in this volume: that there is a variety of positions and a free circulation of ideas between, for example, Cistercians and Augustinians.

The rise of the Augustinian Hermits seems to coincide with renewed interest in Augustinian quotations and direct access to the Latin Father's texts, for example, in the spectacular case of Hugolino of Orvieto, who introduces a huge corpus of quotations from Augustine in his Parisian *Sentences* commentary. Later on at the University of Bologna, in his *Principia* and Prologue Augustinus Favaroni de Roma employs extremely long and accurate passages from Augustine as dialectical weapons against the conservative orthodoxy of Hugolino in order to prove that Augustine himself, the spiritual father of their order, had accepted a philosophical approach to the theological truth.<sup>30</sup>

Our corpus of *Sentences* commentaries from the mid- to late fourteenth century also attests to the continuing rise of Anselm as an authority.<sup>31</sup> In the twelfth century Anselm's impact was often tacit, but he rose in stature in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, especially in the eyes of Oxford theologians, culminating in the works of Robert Halifax, Thomas Buckinham, Robert Holkot, and others, before becoming a major figure in mid-fourteenth-century continental theology.

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<sup>29</sup> Chris Schabel has taken a first step in this direction, editing together the texts of all surviving Cistercian commentaries on the topic of the *Filioque*: C. SCHABEL, "Cistercian University Theologians on the *Filioque*", in *Archaeologiae Verbi* 11 (2014), 124-89.

<sup>30</sup> M. BRINZEI, "Theology versus Metaphysics: The Case-Study of Augustinus Favaroni of Roma's *principia* at the Faculty of Theology from Bologna", in *Principia or Philosophical Debates at the Faculty of Theology during the Middle Ages*, ed. BRINZEI, DUBA, forthcoming.

<sup>31</sup> See here for example C. SCHABEL, *Theology at Paris 1316-1345. Peter Auriol and the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents* (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Aldershot 2000; and more recently D. COMAN, "The cistercians and the assimilation of Anselm in the late 14th century – study case of *Questio in vesperis fratrii Chunradi de Ebrako*", in *Anselm of Canterbury: Communities, Contemporaries and Criticism*, ed. M. HEALY-VARLEY, G. YOUNGE, G.E. M. GASPER, Leyden (forthcoming).

The fascination with new passages extracted from Augustine and the rise of Anselm on the continent coincides with a decline of interest in quoting Aristotle. Here we can give two examples. Firstly, there are about 380 references to different treatises of Augustine and only 28 quotations from Aristotle in the Prologue of the commentary of Hugolino of Orvieto.<sup>32</sup> Quantitative considerations aside, Hugolino quite often uses Aristotle's quotations in a negative way. The Stagirite is no longer an authority to serve as the basis for key doctrinal remarks. Hugolino refers to Aristotle to establish a distinction between philosophy and theology, showing the limits of philosophy in dealing with theological topics that cannot be explained rationally. This attitude seems to echo in the camp of the Cistercians. Conrad of Ebrach, a close follower of Hugolino, reveals the extent of Cistercians access to new titles from the Augustinian corpus, quoting Augustine 754 times in all four Books of his *Sentences*, representing almost 49% of all citations in his commentary. In contrast, he quotes Aristotle about 104, a mere 6% of his quotations. The preference for Augustine over Aristotle is also evident in the case of James of Eltville: to produce a less philosophical and more theological text, when Eltville copies passages from his predecessor John of Mirecourt, he deliberately removes the majority of quotations from Aristotle contained in Mirecourt's text.<sup>33</sup>

A partial explanation for – or perhaps consequence of – theological disinterest in Aristotle is the popularity of Henry of Ghent's illumination theory, which promotes the Augustinian model of intellectual enlightenment. Perhaps we can agree with Étienne Gilson that "la philosophie médiévale allait dépasser Aristote après l'avoir assimilé et fonder la philosophie moderne."<sup>34</sup> The influence of Henry of Ghent in the second half of the fourteenth century remains to be investigated, but he certainly shows up in this context in the works of Denys of Modena and Gottschalk of Nepomuk.

Even if Aristotle's presence in *Sentences* commentaries faded in this period, there were certainly important philosophical developments in these theological texts, although theology remained the focus. We even witness a dynamic process via which a doctrine or an author *fait école*. Take for example the fierce reaction against Gregory of Rimini's explanation of the *complexe significabile* as *nihil*. Rimini was rebutted repeatedly since

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<sup>32</sup> HUGOLINUS DE URBE VETERI, *Commentarius in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum*, I, ed. W. ECKERMANN, Würzburg 1980.

<sup>33</sup> Paper of L. CIOCA delivered at the FIDEM 2015 conference, Cluj-Napoca.

<sup>34</sup> Cited in P. VIGNAUX, *De saint Anselme à Luther*, Paris 1973, 193.

his opponents thought that his innovative theory was confusing and could easily lead to an absurd understanding. Basically, since the object of knowledge is complexly signifiable and its ontological status is *nihil*, and since the first object of theology as a science is God, therefore God is a *nihil*.

Contemporary authors also gained in stature. Following in the footsteps of his recent predecessors Thomas of Strasbourg (e.g., for Conrad of Soltau), Gregory of Rimini (e.g. for Henry of Langenstein), Alphonsus Vargas (e.g., John of Wasia), and Hugolino of Orvieto (e.g., for Conrad of Ebrach), the Augustinian John Hiltalingen of Basel's commentary also became a kind of database for a long line of theologians, including James of Eltville, Gottschalk of Nepomuk, and Peter Gracilis.<sup>35</sup> A theologian's authority could be established within his order, as with James of Eltville's use of his elder Cistercian confrère Gottschalk's text, or outside the order, as with the Franciscan John Regis' employment of the same Gottschalk.<sup>36</sup> Often whatever connection with the Lombard remained in the early fourteenth century was substituted by a link to a new authoritative figure. Thus at the new University of Vienna, more precisely with Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's commentary and the 'Vienna Group' that he inspired, we observe the phenomenon of the composition of a *Sentences* commentary based on Gregory of Rimini's text.

Damasus Trapp now classic expression *secundum alium* aptly describes the nature of the composition of these texts on one level, but more advanced studies based on future editions should also focus what is not copied. Why did some particular doctrinal elements not persevere in the reception of a text? We should not forget, moreover, that these texts were not composed to be original or innovative, but to describe the interaction between human beings and the divinity: the metaphysical (how *Deum esse* is the first **being**), the ontological (what the nature of the *complexe significabile* is), the epistemological (how the viator can have evident knowledge about things that exist inside or outside his mind), the psychological (explanations on the acts of faith, belief, or assent), the moral (the understanding of good and evil), the cosmological, the astrological, the practical (presenting the sacraments like baptism and marriage, or life in the community), and so

<sup>35</sup> See V. MARCOLINO, "Zum Abhängigkeitsverhältnis der Sentenzenkommentare der Augustinertheologen Petrus Gracilis († N. 1393) und Iohannes von Basel († 1392)", in *Analecta Augustiniana* 71 (2008), 493-529.

<sup>36</sup> Andrei Marinca from University Babes-Bolyai (Cluj) has identified long passages in Regis's Prologue borrowed *verbatim* from Gottschalk's *Sentences* commentary.

on. These perennial questions were revised and reconsidered in light of the recent emergence of new concepts and new lines of interpretation: a new ontological category (the *nihil* as the *complexe significabile*), *latitudo entium*, intuitive and abstractive knowledge, degrees of evidence and degrees of probability, belief as a personal assesment, etc.

*Faire école* can also reflect the rapid reception of a text and spread of ideas. In what follows I will consider some case studies using unexplored material.

## II. An Autrécourienne School?

There is general agreement among the interpreters of Nicholas of Autrecourt that the scarcity of surviving texts hinders the analysis of his doctrine. Investigation is possible reception may improve the situation. Christophe Grellard has found traces of the reception of Autrecourt outside the corpus of *Sentences* commentaries while examining whether ‘y a-t-il eu une école autrécurienne?’<sup>37</sup> Let us introduce two largely unstudied *Sentences* commentaries from 1369 and 1371 that indicate that Autrecourt’s ideas circulated in the Faculty of Theology.

### (1) The Case of John Regis

The obscure John Regis read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1369-70.<sup>38</sup> His commentary, still unedited,<sup>39</sup> is preserved in one manuscript, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, formerly belonging to

<sup>37</sup> See the example of Nicholas Drukken of Dacia and his commentary on the *Prior Analytics*: C. GRELLARD, “Nicolas Drukken de Dacie, entre Autrécourt et Buridan”, 153-74; IDEM, *Croire et savoir. Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’Autrécourt*, Paris 2005, 77-92.

<sup>38</sup> In his first *Principium* we read, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 34v, *in anno Domini 1369*, while James of Eltville was among his *socii*. We also know that he licensed in 1374-1375, and on 3 September 1375 Regis was present as regent master in the context of the review of the translation of Marsilio of Padua’s and John of Jandun’s treatises from Latin into French: T. SULLIVAN, *Parisian Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373-1500. A Biographical Register. Vol. I. The Religious Orders* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 18), Leiden-Boston 2004, 14, 307, 389, 404. Cf. H. DENIFLE, E. CHATELAIN, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. III, Paris 1891, n. 1403, 225.

<sup>39</sup> André Combes published a question list for this commentary under the name of Jean Gerson: A. COMBES, “Notes sur les ‘Sententiae Magistri Johannis Gerson’ du manuscrit B.N. lat 15156”, in *Archives d’histoire doctrinale de littéraire du Moyen Age* 12 (1939), 381-85. Paul Bakker edited a short fragment of Book IV, q. 2: P.J.J.M. BAKKER, *La raison et le miracle. Les Doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250 - c.1400). Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie*, t. II, Nijmegen 1999, 227-29. I am currently editing the *Principia* and Andrei Marinca is editing the Prologue. On the mis-attribution to Gerson see E. LONGPRE, “Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* de Jean Gerson”, in *Archivum Franciscanum*

the library of Saint-Victor.<sup>40</sup> A self-reference on f. 48r (*ego Frater Johannem Minorum dicit*) identifies him as a Franciscan.

In the first question of his Prologue, Regis focuses on the problem of evidence, of which there are different types according to kind of intellection: the evidence of the things *per se nota*, that obtained by demonstration, or that produced by sensory experience.<sup>41</sup> The first and third types, i.e., for things known *per se* and through experience, correspond to what he calls 'natural evidence', which applies to cases where the intellect cannot doubt its object of intellection in any way. Regis places the evidence of contingent truths in this category, such that I am alive, that I exist, or, more interesting, that there is an appearance.<sup>42</sup> Although these things are contingent, the intellect is absolutely certain about their truth, even when faced with arguments to the contrary. Although Regis does not develop the example 'there is an appearance', the frequency of references in his text to *apparentia* or *apparet*, each time in the context of evidence, reminds one of Nicholas of Autrecourt's concerns.<sup>43</sup>

The presentation of natural evidence is followed by the analysis of the second type, demonstrative evidence, based on the supremacy of the principle of non-contradiction, for Regis repeatedly emphasizes that "many" necessary truths are reduced to the truth of

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*Historicum* 23 (1930), 251-52; G. OUY, "Enquête sur les manuscrits autographes du Chancelier Gerson et sur les copies faites par son frère le célestin Jean Gerson", in *Scriptorium* 16 (1962), 275-300; F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, vol. 1, Würzburg 1947, n. 448, 449, 218-19.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. D. CALVOT, G. OUY, *L'œuvre de Gerson à Saint-Victor de Paris*, Paris 1990, p. 216.

<sup>41</sup> IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 58r: "Quantum ad articulum primum ponitur distinctio de evidenti notitia. Nam quedam habetur de veritatibus per se notis que scilicet sunt sicut ianua in domo et naturaliter veniunt ad habentem, IV Metaphysice; quedam habetur de conclusionibus demonstratis, et hec est scientifica, I *Posteriorum*; quedam habetur ex experienciis humanis, ut 'motum esse est per se notum', per Commentatorem II *Physicorum*, commento 6; et Augustinus XV *De Trinitate*, capitulo 15 dicit quod academici quasdam perceptiones verarum rerum quale est illud 'scio me vivere' nequaquam in dubium revocare potuerunt."

<sup>42</sup> IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 58r: "Prima est quod de multis veris contingentibus habere possumus notitiam evidentem primo et tertio modis, scilicet evidentia naturali. Probatur primo sic: illa sunt evidenter nota quibus habitis intellectus non potest dubitare de illis; sed multa vera contingentia sunt huiusmodi; ergo. Maior est evidens. Et minor patet de istis: 'ego vivo', 'ego sum', 'apparentia est'. Nam de istis non plus dubimus post rationes factas ad oppositum quam ante. Etiam negans istam: 'apparentia est', non negat eam nisi quia apparet sibi esse falsa, ergo negando apparentiam, ponit apparentiam."

<sup>43</sup> See Z. KALUZA, "Voir: la clarté de la connaissance chez Nicolas d'Autrecourt", in *La visione e lo sguardo nel Medioevo. View and Vision in the Middle Ages*, ed. V. PASCHE (Micrologus 5), Firenze 1997, 89-105; D.G. DENERY II, "Nicholas of Autrecourt on Saving the Appearances", in *Nicolas d'Autrecourt et la Faculté des Arts de Paris (1317-1340). Actes du Colloque de Paris 19-21 mai 2005*, ed. S. CAROTI, C. GRELLARD (Quaderni di Paideia 4), Cesena 2006, 65-84.

first principle.<sup>44</sup> It is within this context that Regis asserts that the syllogistic form is *per se nota*, because given a syllogism of a fixed form it is known *per se* that it concludes demonstratively.<sup>45</sup> This view is also similar to what Autrecourt outlines when he describes the properties of evidence in his second letter to Bernard of Arezzo. In his third and fourth corollaries, Autrecourt argues that, aside from the certitude of faith,<sup>46</sup> all certitude and the syllogistic form is reduced to first principle.<sup>47</sup>

More telling, when Regis deals with demonstrative evidence applied to conditional inferences, his argumentation sticks closely to the discussion between Autrecourt and his Franciscan *socius* Bernard. Although Regis will reject the argument, he presents as an objection to his position that the consequent does not provide evidence for the antecedent in the case of causal inference, since it is not possible to deduce *evidenter* the existence of one thing from the existence of another. For Regis' opponent, this type of inference is not valid when applied to two things that can exist independently of each other without entailing a contradiction.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 58v: "Secunda conclusio: quod de multis veritatibus necessariis potest haberi evidens notitia secundo modo, scilicet evidentialia demonstrationis. Probatur primo: sunt multe veritates necessarie quarum evidentialia reducitur in evidentialia primi principii, ergo... Secundo, sunt multe propositiones conditionales et multe disiunctive ex quarum oppositis inferitur oppositum primi principii, ergo... Tertio, multe propositiones cathegorice, tam affirmative quam negative, reducuntur in evidentialia primi principii, ergo..."

<sup>45</sup> IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 59r: "Secundo, quicumque habet dubitare de forma sillogistica non potest esse certus de veritate conclusionis demonstrare per eam; sed intellectus viatoris habet dubitare de huiusmodi forma; ergo. Minor patet, quia data quacumque forma sillogistica, dari posset similis que nichil valeret in divinis. Confirmatur, quia forma sillogistica est per se nota aut non. Si non, propositum. Si sic, ergo proposito quocumque discursu sillogistico, intellectus poterit percipere se habere sillogismum demonstrativum, quod patet esse falsum. <Responsio> Ad secundum negatur minor et eius probatio. Ad confirmationem, dico quod formam sillogisticam esse per se notam potest intelligere dupliciter: aut quod sit per se nota quod est forma sillogistica, et hoc non oportet; aut quod, supposita determinata forma in modo et figura, sit per se notum formam sillogisticam concludere determinate, et hoc est per se notum maxime de primis modis prime figure."

<sup>46</sup> Regis at least asserts that the faith is not contradictory: IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 59r: "Contra conclusionem, si esset evidentialia de quibuscumque, hoc esset maxime de illis ex quorum opposito sequitur oppositum primi principii; sed <ita> [ista] potest esse quod de opposito alicuius falsi concluditur oppositum primi principii sicut de opposito alicuius veri. Patet de opposito istius: 'nulla res est tres res', propter quod multi negaverunt primum principium tenere in divinis. <Responsio> Ad primum negatur minor. Ad probationem dico quod ex opposito illius falsi, scilicet 'nulla res est tres res', non sequitur oppositum primi principii, quia primum principium tenet in divinis."

<sup>47</sup> NICOLAUS D'AUTRECOURT, *Secunda epistola ad Bernardum*, §§ 7-8 (ed. DE RIJK/GRELLARD, 88): "Tertium corollarium quod infero iuxta dicta, est quod excepta certitudine fidei, nulla est alia certitudo nisi certitudo primi principii, vel quod in primum principium potest resolvi. ... Quartum corollarium est istud quod aliqua forma sillogistica est immediate reducta in primum principium, quia hac demonstrata conclusio vel est immediate reducta, et sic <habetur> propositum, vel mediate, et sic erit processus in infinitum vel oportet devenire ad aliquam que immediate sit in primum principium reducta."

<sup>48</sup> IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF lat. 15156, f. 59r: "Tertio, si haberi posset talis evidentialia, maxime videretur de aliquibus conditionalibus – patet per probationem conclusionis. Sed consequens est falsum, quia cum quolibet conditionalis equivalenceat uni consequentie, ut ista: 'si Sortes currit,

Indeed, the thesis of existential inference takes us to the heart of the conflict between Bernard of Arezzo and Nicholas of Autrecourt. It is in his correspondence with Bernard that Nicholas rejects the deduction of the existence of one thing from another. Although the thesis of existential inferences was also criticized by Buridan,<sup>49</sup> who cites it in his commentaries on the *Physics* and on *Posterior Analytics*, Regis' objection to his position seems to be closer to Autrecourt. For Autrecourt, this type of inference depends on the relationship of identity between the antecedent and consequent, since there can be no distinction between them. In order for an inference to be clearly evident according to the evidence of the first principle, it requires that the antecedent and the consequent be identical or that the antecedent and the opposite of the consequent not be simultaneously true.

Nicholas of Autrecourt repeats his rejection of existential inferences in his correspondence with Gilles, stating that, even in the case of correlative terms, the existence of one term does not provide justification for the existence of its correlative term, since one already implies the existence of the other term in its definition. Take the example of the relation between father and son. According to Autrecourt, it is not because of the existence of the father that this inference is certain – the father exists, therefore the son exists – but rather because there is an identity of meaning in the definition of these two terms that assures that the statements are true. A contradiction will occur since the destruction of the quality of being a son will imply the destruction of the quality of being a father. In conclusion, for Autrecourt, the correlative relation between terms is not a 'counterexample'<sup>50</sup> to his rejection of existential inference. For Regis, the correlative terms are used exactly as a counterexample to prove the causal relation that can justify the transference of evidence by which he could defend the existential inference.

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Sortes movetur', equivalent isti consequentie: 'Sortes currit, ergo Sortes movetur', ista consequentia esset evidens: 'causatum est, ergo causa est'; sed ista non est ita; ergo. Maior patet, quia causati ad causam est habitudo correlativa et etiam ratio dependentie causati ad causam in actu. Sed minor probatur, quia nunquam ex una re infertur evidenter alia, quia cum sint res distincte realiter non implicat contradictionem unam esse sine alia, ergo."

<sup>49</sup> IOHANNES BURIDANUS, *In Physicorum*, I, q. 4, ed. Paris 1509, f. 5rb-va: "Non posset fieri notum unum ex alio quia de uno ad aliud non est consequentia evidens propter hoc quod consequentia non est evidens nisi secundum reductionem ad primum principium et talis consequentia non potest reduci ad primum quia primum principium fundatur in contradictione et contradictio debet esse eiusdem de eodem et secundum rem et secundum nomen; unde si a et b sunt alia ab invicem nunquam esset contradictio a esse et b non esse, igitur non est evidens consequentia dicere a est, ergo b est."

<sup>50</sup> M.M. ADAMS, *William Ockham*, Notre Dame, IN, 1987, 613.

When Regis answers the objection of his conclusion in **Autrecourt's condemned article**, he almost repeats Bernard's response: he claims that, when it is possible for one thing to be without another, being distinct from it in a real way, even if the one's being without the other does not constitute a *formalis contradictio*, it sometimes does entail a virtual contradiction.<sup>51</sup> To understand the distinction between the two types of contradiction we find again that Regis follows Bernard.

Although this is just a taste of what is out there, one thing seems obvious: Regis's text was composed in close doctrinal connection with the discussion between Autrecourt and his *socii*, and this opens new path of investigation into the circulation of Autrecourt's ideas inside the corpus of the *Sentences* commentaries.

## (2) The Case of Denys de Montina

When we try to establish the trace of a possible *école autrécourienne* we should also consider Denys of Modena's *Sentences* commentary, read in Paris in 1371-72.<sup>52</sup> The theme of Denys' first *Principium* involves epistemology, claiming that it is possible to have evident knowledge of the divine essence. The three arguments against his thesis belong to his *socii*: John de Aquiana, Galeran of Penfler, and Robert Martini – three theologians with important careers but whose *Sentences* commentaries have not been

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<sup>51</sup> IOHANNES REGIS, *In libros Sententiarum*, Prologus, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 59r: "Ad tertium conceditur consequens illatum, scilicet quod ex una re evidenter inferri potest alia creata vel increata. Ad improbationem, quando dicitur quod non implicat contradictionem unam rem distinctam realiter ab alia esse sine illa, dicitur quod ibi esset contradictio virtualis. Nam si semper ad bonitatem consequentie, ad hoc quod ex opposito consequentis inferretur oppositum antecedentis, requiretur contradictio formalis, iste consequentie non valeret: 'a est gravissimum, ergo non est levissimum', 'Sortes currit, ergo aliquis homo currit', quia ex opposito consequentis non infertur formaliter oppositum antecedentis. Sufficit igitur ad bonitatem consequentie contradictio virtualis.—Sed contra argueretur, quia contradictio virtualis explicari potest per aliquod medium; sed nullum est medium per quod contradictio virtualis possit formaliter explicari; ergo. Probat minor, quia aut hoc fieret per medium commune uni et alteri rei, aut per medium proprium uni, aut per medium proprium cuilibet. Non primum, quia numquam per animal, quod est commune homini et asino, probaretur repugnantia explicita inter hominem et asinum. Si secundo vel tertio modo, contra: oppositum illius medii non plus repugnat antecedenti quam res cuius esset proprium; sed res ex quo sunt distincte realiter formaliter non repugnant; igitur etc." This is also Bernard's objection to Autrecourt. NICOLAUS **D'AUTRECOURT**, *Secunda epistola ad Bernardum*, § 12 (ed. DE RIJK/GRELLARD, 88): "Sed respondet Bernardus dicens quod, licet ibi non sit contradictio formalis propter causam dictam, tamen est contradictio virtualis; virtuale contradictionem appellat ex qua potest evidenter inferri formalis."

<sup>52</sup> About Denys of Modena's *Sentences* commentary, see above **note XX**; A. ZUMKELLER, *Dionysius de Montina, ein neuentdeckter Augustinertheologe des Spätmittelalters* (Cassiciacum XI/2-3), Würzburg 1948, 18-24, and more recently C. SCHABEL, M. BRINZEI, M. MAGA, "The Golden Age of Theology at Prague: Prague *Sentences* Commentaries, ca. 1375-1381, with a Redating of the Arrival of Wycliffism in Bohemia", in *Historia Universitatis carolinae Pragensis* 55 (2015), 21-42, esp. 23-30.



identified – also deal with the topic of the limits of evident knowledge. Denys thus provides us with information about their otherwise unknown doctrinal positions on a key theological question.

Following the classical canon to define the technical terms of the issue,<sup>53</sup> Denys opens his presentation on evidence with a standard definition: evidence is a certain and manifest knowledge of a thing that exists. The requirement of certainty marks the difference between evident knowledge and opinion, and its being manifest eliminates confusing it with *cognitio enigmatica*. The third criterion, the existence of the object, removes any confusion of evident knowledge with 'knowledge' produced by an illusion. This last condition connects us with a common element in the epistemology of this decade, and the requirement of the existence of the object of knowledge (*ut existit*) also returns us to the problem of existential inferences: how it is possible to deduce the existence of one thing from the existence of another and for this to be evidently known? Like Autrecourt and Regis' (imaginary?) opponent, Denys rejects existential inference in his confrontation with his *socii*, emphasizing that the existence of one thing, even God, cannot be demonstrated or inferred in an evident manner from the existence of another thing.<sup>54</sup>

Denys of Modena has nine *socii*, and in his *Principia* his reproduction of extensive passages from his *socii* shows that the topic of evident knowledge and the definition of certitude was by that time a general tendency in Paris.<sup>55</sup> Based on what Denys says, Galerand of Pendref of the Collège de Navarre was the *socius* most focused on the

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<sup>53</sup> See M.B. CALMA, "La définition du *viator* dans les commentaires des *Sentences* au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle", in *Les innovations du vocabulaire latin à la fin du moyen âge: autour du Glossaire du latin philosophique. Actes de la Journée d'étude du 15 mai 2008*, ed. O. WEIJERS, I. COSTA, A. OLIVA (Studia Artistarum 24), Turnhout 2010, 45-59.

<sup>54</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium I*, a. 1, ed. Paris 1511 (not foliated): "Tertia, ad unam rem absolutam esse non sequitur evidenter aliam rem absolutam totaliter distinctam ab ipsa esse. Patet ex immediate dictis, loquendo de evidentia reducibili ad contradictionem. Oppositum posuit reverendus bachalarius magister Valeranus dicens in secundo correlario terciæ conclusionis secundi articuli quod ex quolibet creato esse potest evidenter inferri a posteriori Deum esse. Probat, quia immensum esse est mensurabile representative per quodlibet creatum esse ut per vestigium. <Respondeo> [Responsio] quod etsi ex quolibet vestigio creato inferri possit Deum esse, ex nullo tamen vestigio tali creato sequitur evidenter Deum esse evidentia supradicta, nec hoc probat ratio ista, ideo non plura dico pro solutione sua. Et ex ista infero quod primum principium quod posuit Aristoteles 4 Metaphisice est unum complexum simpliciter primum et per se notum. Probatur, quia istud complexum nullum aliud presupponit et presupponitur a quolibet, sicut alias probabitur, si expediet, igitur est principium unum etc."

<sup>55</sup> We should not doubt the accuracy of Denys' quotations; normally, the authors reproduce the arguments of their *socii* verbatim based on written notes. This can be shown in the case of Pierre d'Ailly, for example, since we have the *Principium* of one of his *socii*, Peter Gracilis and can compare the passages. In the case of Denys we also find this protestatio at the start of his principal question: "Protestor etiam quod dicta reverendorum bacchalariorum, cum quibus licet indignus et immeritus concurro, intendo fideliter recitare et omnibus eis velut patribus et magistris meis reverentiam exhibere."

discussion on evidence.<sup>56</sup> Although Denys and Galerand agree that the principle of non-contradiction introduced by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IV is the most evident principle of our reasoning and that all other *evidentia* should be reduced to it,<sup>57</sup> the two *baccalarii* are not in complete accord. As we have seen, unlike Galerand, Denys denies the validity of existential inference, asserting that it is not possible to deduce the existence of one thing from the existence of another thing in an evident manner, nor can one deduce the existence of God from the existence of a creature, since the negation of the consequent (God does not exist) is not contradictory to the antecedent. Galerand, in contrast, points out that Denys' position is similar to the condemned articles of Nicholas of Autrecourt.<sup>58</sup> Denys attempts to explain to his *socius* that his position is not the same as Autrecourt's condemned article number 6, according to which *ex eo quod una res est, non potest evidenter, evidentia deducta ex primo principio, inferri quod alia res sit*. Denys insists that Autrecourt was wrong, since he considered relative terms or connotative terms that are not completely or partially distinct, such as in the example *pater est, ergo filius est*.<sup>59</sup> He adds that he rejects existential inference in the case of absolute things both totally and partially distinct.<sup>60</sup>

The theological concern about this type of inference was, of course, the main issue in the principial exchange: it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God (*Deum esse*) from the existence of the created being (*creatura*)? The entire discussion is linked to the

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<sup>56</sup> I edited all passages from Galerand in "La faculté de théologie de Paris au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle à travers les lunettes de C.-E. du Boulay", in *Naissance d'une historiographie universitaire: César Egasse du Boulay (ca. 1600-1678), sources et méthodes d'un historien de l'université de Paris*, ed. T. AMALOU, T. KOUAME, Paris (forthcoming).

<sup>57</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium I*, a. 1, ed. Paris 1511: "Secundum quod noto est quod illud principium quod ponit Aristoteles 4 Metaphysice, 'de quolibet esse vel non esse' est primum principium cognoscendi quo ad nos et maxime nobis evidens. Istud patet per Doctorem Profundum parte prima, capitulo 11. Et hoc etiam concessit reverendus bacchalaris et magister meus magister Galerandus de venerabili collegio Navarre. <Tertium> [secundum] quod noto est quod omnis evidentia <evidenter> [evidenter] et proprie dicta quoad nos vel est primum principium vel reducibilis ad ipsum. Istud patet, quia primum principium est maxime evidens nobis, igitur omnis evidentia que non est prima ad ipsum tanquam ad primum habet[ur]t reduci."

<sup>58</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium I*, a. 1, ed. Paris 1511: "Ultimo arguendo dicit magister meus quod propositio mea videtur favere quibusdam articulis Parisiensibus condemnatis. Unus dicit 'ex eo quod una res est, non potest evidenter inferri quod alia res sit: error'. Alius: 'non potest ex una re evidenter inferri [evidenter inferri] vel concludi alia, vel ex non esse unius, non esse alterius: error'."

<sup>59</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium I*, a. 1, ed. Paris 1511: "Articuli autem loquuntur de rebus relativis seu connotativis vel non totaliter et partialiter distinctis et nullum respectum habentibus adinvicem, quia bene sequitur evidenter: 'pater est, ergo filius est'. Similiter sequitur: 'domus est, ergo paries est', et sic de similibus."

<sup>60</sup> DIONYSIUS DE MONTINA, *Principium I*, a. 1, ed. Paris 1511: "Salva reverentia magistri mei, propositio mea non favet istis articulis, quia loquitur de rebus absolutis totaliter et partialiter adinvicem distinctis."

attempt to establish an epistemological principle that can be used as an ontological argument. *Creatura est, ergo Deus est* can function only when B is part of A, and although A is part of B, B is not part of A.

The interest that we find in the circles of the Franciscan John Regis and the Augustinian Denys of Modena and among their *socii* about existential inference is directly linked to Nicholas of Autrecourt's concerns and tribulations from decades before, as is clear from Galerand's explicit citation of the condemned articles is his attack against Denys' position.<sup>61</sup> Regis and Denys thus offer new evidence for reassessing Nicholas of Autrecourt's influence in the Faculty of Theology after 1366. More textual editions and studies will certainly shed new light on the reception of the condemned author from Lorraine.

### III. School of Ripa

As chancellor of the University of Paris, Grimier Boniface was in charge of a long series of condemnations that suggest strict control over academic debates.<sup>62</sup> The case of the condemnation of *Magister quidam Ludovicus theologie professor* in 1362 brings us to the heart of the doctrinal tendencies of the time. André Combes established a connection between Louis of Padua and the Franciscan John of Ripa's doctrine and advanced the hypothesis that this author was a victim of the chancellor of Paris who, at that time, was trying to prevent the emergence of a doctrinal school around Ripa.<sup>63</sup>

Ripa's texts certainly circulated in the Parisian milieu and had a great impact in reshaping metaphysics with such concepts as *latitudo entium*, *immutatio vitalis*, *notitia formalis*, and *beatitudo formalis*. Already in 1925, Cardinal Ehrle stressed the importance of Ripa for later doctors like John Hiltalingen of Basel, Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson, or Peter of Candia, and in 1930 Schwamm pursued this investigation.<sup>64</sup> Combes' critical

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<sup>61</sup> Here is a brief synopsis made by GRELLARD, "Nicolas Drukken de Dacie, entre Autrecourt et Buridan", p. 159: "Nicolas d'Autrecourt présente sa théorie des inférences dans le cadre plus large d'une enquête sur la certitude et l'évidence démonstrative, et dans le but de délimiter les transferts de justification entre deux propositions. C'est à cette occasion qu'il exige une relation de dépendance entre prémisses et conclusions."

<sup>62</sup> J. VERGER, "Grimier Boniface", in *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, ed. ANGOTTI, BRINZEL, TEEUWEN, 179-87.

<sup>63</sup> A. COMBES, *Jean Gerson. Commentateur dionysien. Les Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii De caelesti hierarchia*, Paris 1940, 635-73, at 635.

<sup>64</sup> F. EHRLE, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des*

edition of a portion of Ripa's *Sentences* commentary certainly provided access to some of the Italian Franciscan's ideas, but this has not yet led to a deepened understanding of his doctrine, although studies by Paul Vignaux and Francis Ruello have drawn attention to his originality, and Andrea Nannini is working to complete Combes' edition.<sup>65</sup> Likewise, much remains to be done in order to clearly encapsulate Ripa's impact on the *Sentences* commentaries after the 1360s, but a survey of the explicit quotations in the surviving fragments of Gilles de Champs' *Sentences* commentary and in the commentary of the so-called Vienna Group is undeniable proof of the circulation of his ideas both in Paris and Vienna.<sup>66</sup>

We can also assess the degree of John of Ripa's impact negatively in the intensity of the rejection of his ideas. Just as *sententiarii* after Gregory of Rimini universally denied his claim that the *complexe significabile* is a *nihil*, Ripa's position on the divine essence and the beatific vision was roundly attacked by his *socii* in the principal debates and later by the likes of the Carmelite John Brammart.<sup>67</sup>

In a more positive light, John of Ripa's texts circulated in abbreviated form. Two versions are known, both compiled by Augustinians: one by Paul of Venice and the other by Balthasar of Tolentino.<sup>68</sup> We can add a Franciscan to this list, Francis Toti of Perugia, who is presented in the historiography as a direct disciple of Ripa, since his commentary's manuscript mentions that he read his *Sentences* under Ripa (*regens Parisius in scholis sub praesidentia magistri fratris Johannis de Ripa*). Francis' lecture was just before

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Wegestreites (Franziskanische Studien. Beiheft 9), Münster in Westf. 1925, 268-77; H. SCHWAMM, *Magistri Johannis de Ripa O.F.M. doctrina de praescientia divina. Inquisitio historica* (Analecta gregoriana, 1), Roma 1930.

<sup>65</sup> P. VIGNAUX, *De saint Anselme à Luther* (Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale, hors-serie), Paris 1976; F. RUELO, "Le problème de la vision béatifique à l'Université de Paris vers le milieu du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 47 (1980), 121-70.

<sup>66</sup> For Gilles, see BRINZEI, "Aegidius de Campis", 23-36, esp. 31-32. For Vienna, see for example the case of manuscript Wien, ÖNB 4820, from the Vienna Group in M. BRINZEI, C. SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late Medieval Theology: The Commentary of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 3, ed. P.W. ROSEMAN, Leiden 2015, 174-266, at 215.

<sup>67</sup> See A. ANISIE, "Mediated Knowledge and Beatific Vision in John Brammart's First *Principium* on the *Sentences*", in *Principia or Philosophical Debates at the Faculty of Theology during the Middle Ages*, ed. BRINZEI, DUBA, forthcoming.

<sup>68</sup> PAULUS VENETUS, *Super primum Sententiarum Johannis de Ripa Lecturae Abbreviatio*, ed. F. RUELO (Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi Testi e Studi 15), Firenze 2000. This edition reproduces manuscript Oxford, Bodleian lat. Theol. E 34; a new manuscript of this abbreviation is mentioned by Les enluminures: <http://www.textmanuscripts.com/medieval/peter-lombard-sentences-60624>. For Balthasar of Tolentino, The manuscript is Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 1084: <http://www.mirabileweb.it/manuscript/città-del-vaticano-biblioteca-apostolica-vaticana--manuscript/123505>. On the practice of abbreviation and summarizing, see the paper of Maarten Hoenen in this volume.

Denys of Modena's, since the Augustinian quotes fragments of Francis' book I in his commentary.<sup>69</sup> Francis' Prologue is an interesting example of the way in which Ripa's own Prologue was received. We should note that Francis does not summarize Ripa's entire Prologue and makes a doctrinal selection in limiting his abbreviation to questions 6 and 7:

John of Ripa, <i>Prologi questiones ultime</i> <sup>70</sup>	Francis Toti of Perugia, <i>Prologus</i> <sup>71</sup>
<p>Q. 6, pp. 353-430: Utrum possibile sit intellectum creature rationalis habere notitiam theologicam claram et intuitivam in lumine naturali.</p> <p>Q. 6, a. 2, pp. 366-98: Utrum quodlibet obiectum creatum ad sui intuitivam notitiam cum intellectu creato possit obiective concurrere.</p> <p>Q. 6, a. 3, pp. 399-416: Utrum aliqua entitas creata respectu divine essentie possit aliquo modo dici intuitiva notitia.</p> <p>Q. 7, pp. 431-59: Utrum intellectui viatoris de veritatibus theologicis possit adgenerari habitus proprie scientificus.</p>	<p>Circa prologum primi Sententiarum quero istam questionem:</p> <p>Q. 1, ff. 1ra-4ra: Utrum in aliqua intellectuali essentia generari possit aliqua notitia theologica evidens et intuitiva ex actuali intelligentia luminis naturalis.</p> <p>A. 1, ff. 1ra-2vb: Utrum cum lumine naturali intellectus creati quodlibet ymaginabile citra primum obiectum ad sui ipsius notitiam intuitivam possit obiective concurrere.</p> <p>A. 2, ff. 2vb-4ra: Utrum aliqua ymaginabilis essentia citra primam possit aliquo modo respectu divine essentie esse notitia intuitiva.</p> <p>Q. 2, ff. 4ra-5vb: Secundo quero circa prologum: Utrum creatura rationalis de veritatibus theologicis possit habere aliquam habitualement notitiam proprie scientificam.</p>

<sup>69</sup> See the discussion about these fragments in J. LECHNER, "Franz von Perugia, O.F.M. und die Questionen seines Sentenzenkommentars", in *Franziskanische Studie* 25 (1938), 28-64 esp. 29-30.

<sup>70</sup> JEAN DE RIPA, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum. Prologi questiones ultime*, ed. A. COMBES, F. RUELLO (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age 16), Paris 1970.

<sup>71</sup> FRANCISCUS TOTI DE PERUSIO, *Questiones super Sententias*, Prologus, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8718.

Q. 7, a. 1, pp. 435-47: Utrum eadem res creata possit esse sui ipsius notitia et obiecti, quod in ipsa relucet.	A. 1, f. 4rb-vb: Utrum aliqua res creata ex sui ipsius natura possit esse immediatum obiectum simplicis et iudicialis cognitionis.
Q. 7, a. 2, pp. 448-53: Utrum habitus fidei infusus vel acquisitus sit habitus evidens et cognitivus.	A. 2, f. 5ra-vb: Utrum habitus fidei infusus vel acquisitus possit esse proprie scientificus.

A more detailed comparison shows that Francis Toti of Perugia follows the developement of John of Ripa's text argument by argument and, although Francis does not copy it *verbatim*, he relays each idea that Ripa formulated in a lemmatic commentary. Like Ripa, who uses '*decisio conclusionis*' at the end of each division as a conclusion announcing the solution to a doctrinal problem,<sup>72</sup> Francis employs the formula of '*ymaginatio conclusionis*'.<sup>73</sup>

Regarding doctrine, Francis paraphrases Ripa's discussion on the theory of knowledge, specifically everything that applies to intuitive knowledge. In light of what we know about his contemporaries, Francis' reading of Ripa reflects the philosophical and theological preoccupations among the *sententiarii* of the 1360s and 1370s. Thus Francis did not copy all of Ripa's Prologue, but deliberately cut off the beginning, namely questions 1-5, where Ripa presents some of his most original ideas, his theory of *forma vitalis*, his concept of *latitudo*, his discussion of beatific knowledge as finality *in via*, and so on. This series of sophisticated concepts may have confused the young bachelor, and Francis probably decided to limits his summary to the ideas that most concerned the candidates for the title of master of theology in his time, especially the theory of knowledge centered on intuitive knowledge.

Of course, this is only a first hint at what further editing and study will uncover. The recent publication of the first three volumes of John Hiltalingen of Basel's Sentences commentary, comprising books I and II, gives a good indication of the prospects.<sup>74</sup> For

<sup>72</sup> See the analysis of Combes in the introduction to the volume Jean de Ripa, *Questio de gradu supremo*, ed. A. COMBES, introd. P. VIGNAUX (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age 16), Paris 1964, 67-9.

<sup>73</sup> This rare formula can also be found in Peter of Candia's commentary on the *Sentences*, another text influenced by Ripa.

<sup>74</sup> IOHANNES DE BASILEA OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. V. MARCOLINO, coop. M. BRINZEL, C. OSER-GROTE (Cassiciacum-Supplementband 20.1-3), Würzburg 2016-18.

example, Hiltalingen constantly mentions the doctrinal filiation between John of Ripa Richardus Barba, another author active at in Paris in the 1360s, provisor of Harcourt College in 1369-80, from whom no texts have been identified.<sup>75</sup>

The edition and study of *Sentences* commentaries produced from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-fifteenth is thus not only of historical importance, but this volume has shown that there is much of doctrinal interest, and I hope to have added in this Epilogue that examining this period also enhances our understanding of the authors from the earlier decades, whose reception and hence significance has been neglected because of the historiographical obscurity of the period following their activities. Happily, adopting the false reasoning *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, if the intent of the conference on which this volume is based was to encourage fundamental textual work, the decade since the conference has proven the event to have been a phenomenal success, fostered in part the European Research Council's decision to fund projects THESIS and DEBATE. In addition to the resurrection and almost completion of Marcolino's long dormant Hiltalingen project, witness the real progress on the editions of the *Sentences* commentaries just from the period between the Black Death and onset of the Great Schism: Pierre Ceffons (Alisade, Duba, Kraml, Nannini, Pedersen, Schabel), John of Ripa (Nannini), Andrew of Novocastro (Irimescu), Facinus de Ast (Baumgarten), Bonsemblans Baduar (Utamura), Gottschalk of Nepomuk (Baumgarten, Schabel), Conrad of Ebrach (Brinzei, Coman, Schabel), Conrad of Soltau (Maga), James of Eltville (Anisie, Baneu, Baumgarten, Brinzei, Cioca, Coman, Curut, Marinca, Pantea, Schabel), John Regis (Brinzei, Grellard, Marinca), Henry Totting of Oyta (Berger, Toste), Henry of Langenstein (Toste), Denys of Modena (Brinzei, Schabel), Marsilius of Inghen (Erne, Hoenen), Peter Gracilis (Marcolino, Slotemaker, Witt), John of Wasia (Cioca), Pierre

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<sup>75</sup> IOHANNES DE BASILEA OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, I, q. 1 (ed. MARCOLINO, vol. 1, 217): "Sed secundum opinionem Iohannis de Marchia, quem Barbe sequitur quaestione sua prima, diceretur, quod non ab objecto, sed solum a specie intelligibili." Q. 2 (309): "Secunda pars etiam est contra Richardum Barbe libro 1 quaestione 4, qui sequitur Iohannem de Ripa in hac parte." Q. 2 (315): "Contra primam partem istius corollarii est Richardus Barbe libro 1 quaestione 1 conclusione 4 dicens: Causalitas obiectiva non est libera, sed naturalis. Patet hoc, quia secundum intensionem talis causalitatis sequitur intensio actus; quod non foret, si foret libera. Igitur etc. Concordat cum eo Iohanne de Ripa in pluribus locis." On Richard, see Z. KALUZA, *Thomas de Cracovie. Contribution à l'histoire du collège de la Sorbonne*, Wrocław-Gdansk 1978, 137-38; M. BRINZEI, C. SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late Medieval Theology", 221-22.

d'Ailly (Brinzei, Schabel, Slotemaker), Peter of Candia (Brown, Duba, Etzkorn, Keele, Kitanov, Kringos, Schabel), and John Brammart (Anisie).