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# Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the University of Vienna on the Eve of the Reformation

A few years ago, the members of a search committee—two Austrian Byzantinists from the University of Vienna, a French medievalist, and an American—were sitting in a Syrian restaurant in Cyprus, discussing the Crusades in Modern Greek, when the conversation shifted to how certain professors in some Greek universities had been accustomed to sitting and reading their own textbooks aloud to their classes, year after year after year. One of the Austrians turned to the American and said (we translate): “Ever hear of Thomas Ebendorfer? He was a big guy in the Faculty of Theology at Vienna, several times the rector, in the first half of the fifteenth century. All he did in his lectures was read his own commentaries on Scripture over and over again every year!”

From a modern standpoint, the early University of Vienna has been taking a beating recently. The latest research, including our own, has shown that, in the fifteenth century, instruction at Vienna seems to have consisted of the repeated reading of a standard text of recent composition or compilation, often with very little variation.<sup>1</sup> Knowing the basics of Viennese doctrine throughout the period often simply requires knowing this standard text, be it in ethics, logic, or biblical studies. This was the case with systematic theology as well, and the American in the conversation noted above was quite familiar with Thomas Ebendorfer’s lack of originality.

Yet this modern perspective does not approximate the late-medieval view of the new university, or of the practice of recycling old material. In 1391, Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, traditionally considered the queen of universities, wrote a brief question entitled *Pro unione Ecclesiae* wherein he showed himself to be quite secure in the continuing prominence and even dominance of the University of Paris within the European intellectual landscape. For this reason, he remarked that it was in his university that one might find the “most famous doctors”: “In no other college are there doctors as famous as those who are in the University of Paris, especially in theology.”<sup>2</sup> Gerson was doubtless unaware that to the east of France, at that exact moment in 1391, Henry of Langenstein (ca. 1325-1397), a famous German theologian educated at Paris, was expressing the opposite opinion when he asked the following rhetorical question in a letter addressed to Duke Ruprecht of Bavaria: “Why is it that the universities of France are breaking up, that the sun of wisdom is eclipsed there? Learning

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., C. FLÜELER, “Teaching Ethics at the University of Vienna: The Making of a Commentary at the Faculty of Arts (A Case Study)”, in I.P. BEJCZY, ed., *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages. Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500*, Leiden 2008, 277-346; U. ZAHND, *Wirksame Zeichen? Sakramentenlehre und Semiotik in der Scholastik des ausgehenden Mittelalters*, Tübingen 2014, 245-392; M. BRINZEI and C. SCHABEL, “The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology: The Commentary on the *Sentences* of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, Vienna, ca. 1400”, in P.W. ROSEMAN, ed., *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. III, Leiden 2015, 174-266; and the contributions by SCHABEL, ZAHND, and W.J. COURTENAY to M. BRINZEI, ed., *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century*, Turnhout 2015.

<sup>2</sup> JEAN GERSON, *Tractatus pro unione ecclesiae*, ed. P. GLORIEUX, *Œuvres complètes. L’œuvre ecclésiologique (253a-291)*, vol. 6, Paris-Tournai-Roma-New York 1965, 14: “Probatur conclusio: quia universitas Parisiensis habet doctores solemnissimos et in fide pertissimos. (...) In nullo collegio alio ab universitate Parisiensi sunt doctores ita solemnnes secundum quod in ea sunt et potissime in sacra Scriptura.”

withdraws to light another people. Are there not now four universities (Prague, Vienna, Heidelberg and Cologne) shining in concert with rays of glorious truth?”<sup>3</sup>

The fact that many texts produced at the University of Vienna were repetitious compilations of previous writings did not diminish the new university's stature in the eyes of contemporaries. The reuse of words and ideas, with or without attribution, was a medieval tradition, the subject of some of our research. In theology, after all, truth is truth, and sound doctrine expressed with clarity was worth copying. What we could call plagiarism today, the use of someone else's text as if it were one's own, was not really a moral issue in the later Middle Ages. The phenomenon in theological faculties of copying from one or more previous authors has come to be known as reading *secundum alium*, or according to another. It existed in the Golden Age of Scholasticism, from ca. 1250 to the Black Death, but it seems to have become more prevalent in the later fourteenth century. Sometimes the borrower was explicit about the person or persons from whom he was taking his ideas and words, but this sort of admission was more a reflection of personal taste than professional ethics. Some of the most famous authors of the period engaged in composing creative and quasi original combinations of old doctrine and text.<sup>4</sup>

The founding fathers of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Vienna were two Parisian secular masters of theology, Henry of Langenstein and Henry Totting of Oyta (ca. 1330-1397).<sup>5</sup> When the Hapsburg Duke Albert III recruited the two Henry's for the new university in the 1380s, they brought with them their commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the standard text in systematic theology at the medieval universities. After their deaths, Oyta's and Langenstein's prestige and status in Vienna meant that their successors in the Faculty of Theology did not wish to depart much from their doctrine, so greatly admired. In the beginning of the fifteenth century a composite text was constructed, blending Oyta's and Langenstein's *Sentences* commentaries with elements from the works of their contemporaries the Cistercians James of Eltville and Conrad of Ebrach and of several others, even copying first-person-singular verbs. Just after 1400, versions of at least portions of the resulting *compilatio* were produced by the secular theologians Nicholas Prunczlein of Dinkelsbühl (1360-1433), John Berwart of Villingen (murdered 1411), and Peter Czech of Pulkau (pre-1370-1425), and the Carmelite Arnold of Seehausen († post 1424). Afterwards, the next generations of Viennese theologians, including Conrad of Rothenburg, George Wetzel of Horaw, Theodoric Rudolf of Hammelburg, Thomas Ebendorfer of Haselbach, John Angerer of Müldorf, Peter Reicher of Pirchenwart, and John Harrer of Heilbronn, also used the *compilatio* as a base text. Recently we demonstrated that the first version of the standard text in theology at

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<sup>3</sup> L. THORNDIKE, *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages*, New York 1949, 257. See also M. SHANK, “Academic Benefices and German Universities during the Great Schism: Three Letters from Johannes of Stralen, Arnolf of Emelisse, and Gerard of Kalkar, 1387-1388”, in *Codices Manuscripti* 7 (1981), 33-47, esp. 33 and 42.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., D. TRAPP, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Book Lore”, in *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 146-274. We have done some work on this: P.J.J.M. BAKKER and C. SCHABEL, “*Sentences* Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century”, ed. G.R. EVANS, *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. I, Leiden 2002, 425-465; C. SCHABEL, “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14<sup>th</sup> Century Scholasticism”, in I. TAIFACOS, ed., *The Origins of European Scholarship. The Cyprus Millenium Conference*, Stuttgart 2006, 163-175; M. BRINZEI CALMA, “Plagium”, in *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, eds. I. ATUCHA, D. CALMA, C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, I. ZAVATTERO (FIDEM – TEMA 63), Turnhout 2011, 320-339. See also the works cited above in note 1.

<sup>5</sup> On the early University of Vienna and its Faculty of Theology, see, e.g., M.H. SHANK, *'Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand'. Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna*, Princeton 1988, esp. cc. 1-2, and BRINZEI, ed., *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl*.

Vienna was compiled by Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl around 1400, as contained in his autograph in manuscript 269 (274) of the “Scottish Abbey” or Schottenstift in Vienna.<sup>6</sup>

Most scholars of medieval thought have probably never even heard of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl. Yet in his famous repertory of commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, Friedrich Stegmüller devoted more space to Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl than to all other university theologians except Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and John Duns Scotus.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, a half century ago, Alois Madre counted over 1400 manuscripts containing works by Dinkelsbühl, including about 200 witnesses to parts of his *Sentences* commentary.<sup>8</sup> We have been able to identify many more manuscripts, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where Stegmüller was less active, and the actual number is closer to 300.<sup>9</sup>

For various reasons, Dinkelsbühl’s commentary on the *Sentences* received very little attention from earlier scholars: late medieval scholastic theology is considered a decaying movement, to be overtaken by Renaissance Humanism, the Protestant Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution; the fragmentation of tertiary education with the founding of numerous new universities on the ‘periphery’ after 1350 is understood to entail little intellectual development of pan-European importance before the advent of printing; and the extreme complexity of distinguishing the innovative from the derivative in late medieval texts deters scholars from an investment of time and energy that might prove fruitless. Nevertheless, this investment is justified by what Dinkelsbühl’s commentary on the *Sentences* can tell us about the past, present, and future of late-medieval theology from the perspective of Vienna, ca. 1400.<sup>10</sup>

For the past, the study of Dinkelsbühl’s *Sentences* commentary is parallel to Franz Ehrle’s still classic *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V.* did in 1925:<sup>11</sup> the use of one of the most popular *Sentences* commentaries of the later fourteenth century, in his case from ca. 1380, as a mirror for the history of later scholastic thought. Dinkelsbühl’s commentary, from two decades later, provides a different, complementary mirror, but one that is more difficult to use. For while Peter of Candia conveniently cites explicitly almost everyone who inspired him, negatively or positively, Dinkelsbühl often borrows silently from his predecessors. As part of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale’s new commission to update Stegmüller’s repertory of *Sentences* commentaries, we are heading teams covering the periods 1300-1330 and 1360-1400.<sup>12</sup> Using our familiarity with earlier texts, we have found through our preliminary textual analysis of parts of each of the four books of Dinkelsbühl’s commentary that he employs, explicitly or tacitly, the works of a greater number of medieval university theologians than did

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<sup>6</sup> See BRINZEI and SCHABEL, “The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology” and BRINZEI, ed., *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl*.

<sup>7</sup> F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, vol. I, Würzburg 1947, 274-284, with the others on 56-67, 203-215, and 393-410.

<sup>8</sup> A. MADRE, *Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl: Leben und Schaffen: ein Beitrag zur theologischen Literaturgeschichte*, Münster 1965, esp. 72-125. On Dinkelsbühl, see also K. BINDER, *Die Lehre des Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl über unbefleckte Empfängnis im Lichte der Kontroverse*, Wien 1970.

<sup>9</sup> BRINZEI and SCHABEL, “The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology”. See also the paper by A. DINCA in BRINZEI, ed., *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl*.

<sup>10</sup> BRINZEI and SCHABEL, “The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology”. See also the papers by SCHABEL, ZAHND, and COURTENAY in BRINZEI, ed., *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl*.

<sup>11</sup> F. EHRLE, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V.*, Münster 1925.

<sup>12</sup> The commission is chaired by W.J. Courtenay with P.J.J.M. Bakker, and our teams include W.O. Duba, R.L. Friedman, and R. Keele (1300-1330) and C. Angotti, A. Irimescu, O. Pavlicek, J. Slotemaker, and J. Witt (1360-1400).

Peter of Candia.<sup>13</sup> Given that the text is several hundred folios in length, Dinkelsbühl's citations and sources shed new and unique light on the reception of the previous 150 years of scholastic thought.

For the present, Dinkelsbühl's *Sentences* commentary does not simply represent his own thought as an individual theologian at the University of Vienna, but that of many of his contemporaries and successors – what has been dubbed the “Vienna Group” – who share much or even all of his text. Exactly what Dinkelsbühl is responsible for beyond the first redaction is unclear. The ongoing study of the commentaries attributed to these Viennese theologians attempts to explain how this complex situation evolved,<sup>14</sup> a situation paralleled in other genres at Vienna and elsewhere in the new Central European universities. Regardless of the mechanism, the result is the same: Dinkelsbühl's *Sentences* commentary represents practically official doctrine at what was arguably the most important Central European university in the early fifteenth century.

For the future, Dinkelsbühl's *Sentences* commentary was in fact the most popular of that genre produced after the Black Death. We have identified about 300 manuscripts containing part of this work in catalogues from libraries all over Central Europe and even as far east as Romania, but we also hope to find previously unknown witnesses to the text in the uncatalogued libraries of Eastern Europe, where we have already had some limited success in Latvia and Lithuania.<sup>15</sup> What this means is that this work was extremely influential throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in the same general regions that gave birth to the Lutheran Reform and the Copernican Revolution. Getting to the specific topic of the remainder of this paper, it is perhaps no coincidence that, inspired by the Augustinian Hermit Gregory of Rimini (fl. 1345), Dinkelsbühl emphasized the role of the Bible in the study of theology in his Prologue, or that he adopted wholesale and explicitly the position on predestination developed by Rimini, the only later medieval theologian whose stance another famous Augustinian Hermit, Martin Luther, endorsed in the early sixteenth century.

In what follows, we will treat these two issues, focusing on the treatments in two manuscripts formerly attributed to Dinkelsbühl himself, but now recognized to be redactions modified by his followers: Wien, Schottenstift 254 (230) (for the Prologue) and Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4820 (for predestination). Editions of these texts are included in appendices.

### *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's Prologue on the Sentences*

Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's Prologue on the *Sentences* is composed of two questions,

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<sup>13</sup> Candia's citations can now more easily be found in the online edition: PETRUS DE CANDIA, *Lectura in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. P.J.J.M. BAKKER, S.F. BROWN, W.O. DUBA, G.J. ETZKORN, R. KEELE, S. KITANOV, A. KRINGOS, and C. SCHABEL (2004-): <http://www2.ucey.ac.cy/isa/Candia/index.htm>.

<sup>14</sup> See the works of BRINZEI, SCHABEL, and ZAHND cited above, note 1. Earlier scholars edited materials without solving the issue of authorship: J. AUER, “Die aristotelische Logik in der Trinitätslehre der Spätscholastik. Bemerkungen zu einer Questio des Johannes Wuel de Pruck, Wien 1422”, in J. AUER and H. VOLK, eds., *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart Michael Schmaus zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht von seinen Freunden und Schülern herausgegeben von Johann Auer und Hermann Volk*, München 1957, 457-496; K. BINDER, *Die Lehre des Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl*, 151-223; A. MAIERU, “Ymaginatio manuductiva: logica e teologia trinitaria in Pietro di Pulkau”, in J.F. MEIRINHOS, ed., *Itinéraires de la raison. Etudes de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco*, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, 347-365 (cf. modified English version in ed. P. KÄRKKÄINEN, *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, Helsinki 2007, 226-255).

<sup>15</sup> C. SCHABEL, “Note. A ‘New’ Manuscript of a Commentary on the *Sentences* Found in Latvia”, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 45 (2003), 217-219; idem, “Note. Another Small Baltic Find: A Commentary on the *Sentences* in Lithuania”, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 49 (2007), 239-240.

“Whether theology is a science in the proper sense” (*Utrum theologia sit scientia proprie dicta*) (around five folios) and “Whether theology is a practical or speculative [science]” (*Utrum theologia sit practica vel speculativa*) (around three folios). The first question is the focus of our analysis here. Codicological and palaeographical evidence shows that in Dinkelsbühl’s autograph, Schotten 269, this first question underwent considerable development, with text added in the margins and on an inserted folio, the present folio 2. At some point the text was further developed in a different direction, resulting in the common text in the three other manuscripts that contain the question: those attributed to Dinkelsbühl’s near contemporaries John Berwart of Villingen (Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 41) and Peter of Pulkau (Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4668), as well as in Schotten 254, formerly thought to be by Dinkelsbühl himself, but now assigned Andrew Waytra, Urban of Melk, or the Dominican John Nider, dating to the early 1420s. (The edition below gives the wording in Schotten 254.) The following chart traces the evolution of the question, giving the paragraph numbers as in the edition in Appendix I:

Schotten 269	Later Text
<p>Titulus quaestionis</p> <p>Arguitur primo [§§1-2]</p> <p>Arguitur secundo [§3]</p> <p>In oppositum [§5]</p> <p>Notabilia:</p> <p>Notandum primo [§6]</p> <p>Notandum secundo [§§16-18]</p> <p>Notandum tertio [§ 19]</p> <p>Vincentius Belvacensis</p> <p>Notandum quarto [§§ 21-22]</p> <p>Conclusiones:</p> <p>Prima [§§23-24]</p> <p>Secunda [§25]</p> <p>Contra:</p> <p>Primam conclusionem [§§38]</p> <p>8 propositiones [§§41-48]</p> <p>Responsiones [§§49-64]</p> <p>Ad rationes principales [§§80-82]</p>	<p>Titulus quaestionis</p> <p>Arguitur primo [§§1-2]</p> <p>Arguitur secundo [§3]</p> <p>Confirmatio [§4]</p> <p>In oppositum [§5]</p> <p>Notabilia:</p> <p>Notandum primo [§6]</p> <p>6 propositiones [§§7-15]</p> <p>Notandum secundo [§§ 16-18]</p> <p>Notandum tertio [§ 19]</p> <p>Corrolarium [§ 20]</p> <p>Notandum quarto [§§ 21-22]</p> <p>Conclusiones:</p> <p>Prima [§§23-24]</p> <p>Secunda [§25]</p> <p>Correlaria 1-3 [§§26-29]</p> <p>Tertia [§§30-31]</p> <p>Propositio annexa [§32]</p> <p>Quarta [§§30-33]</p> <p>Propositiones 1-4 [§§34-37]</p> <p>Contra:</p> <p>Primam conclusionem [§§38]</p> <p>8 propositiones [§§39-48]</p> <p>Responsiones [§§49-64]</p> <p>Secundam conclusionem [§§65-68]</p> <p>Responsiones [§§69-73]</p> <p>Tertiam conclusionem [§§74-75]</p> <p>Responsiones [§§75-78]</p> <p>Quartam conclusionem [§79]</p> <p>Ad rationes principales [§§80-83]</p>

The main element that has dropped out of the later text is in fact the material in Dinkelsbühl’s inserted folio 2, which contains primarily an extensive passage from Vincent of Beauvais’ prologue to his *Speculum historiale*. In Schotten 269, just after the second *notabile* in the middle of folio 1v, Dinkelsbühl draws a line to the top of the inserted folio 2. Since this folio was insufficient to accommodate the added text, the addition continues on the upper margin of folio 3r before a symbol leads the reader back to folio 1v. In this section, Vincent of

Beauvais explains the different levels of authority of various sacred texts. Whereas most other later editorial decisions in Schotten 269 are retained in the later text, whether marginalia added or lines struck out, the material from Vincent of Beauvais was eliminated. Given what happened in other contexts, it is unlikely that Dinkelsbühl inserted the new folio with the Vincent of Beauvais text after Schotten 269 had already served as the basis for another redaction. Instead, either another author or, more probably, Dinkelsbühl himself was unsatisfied with the Vincent of Beauvais section and removed it in revising the question. In what follows, we will concentrate on the revised text and assume that Dinkelsbühl is responsible, but the remarks apply to the common Viennese text in any case.

Dinkelsbühl begins with four *notabilia* summarizing his theological understanding and providing the conceptual framework of his Prologue: (1) the two meanings of theology (*pro habitu* and *pro assensu*) [§6]; (2) the definition of theological discourse [§§16-18]; (3) the definition of the *principia theologiae* [§19]; (4) the different meanings of a science [§§21-22]. After the four *notabilia* follows the presentation (*pro-contra-responsio*) of conclusions that structure the question, two from Schotten 269: (1) theology is not *stricto sensu* a demonstrative science [§§23] and (2) theology is a science based on firm assertive knowledge [§§25-29]; and two added in the later redaction: (3) theological knowledge is the first in dignity among the forms of knowledge [§§30-32] and (4) theology as wisdom [§§33-37].

In the first *notabile*, Dinkelsbühl announces, in the wake of Gregory of Rimini, the double sense in which theology may be understood: as a declarative or as an assertive habit [§6]. According to the first meaning, which actually follows the *via Petri Aureoli*, the theological *habitus* is descriptive (*quid vocat declaratorium*) and brings an understanding of the Bible by explaining and depicting the contents of Holy Scripture. It might be distinguished from deductive theology, for to prove the truths contained in the Bible it makes no use of deduction or inference. In other words, it is not demonstrative and does not allow for the justification of certain truths as conclusions drawn from premises or true principles.

Against Peter Auriol's definition of theology as a declarative habit, Rimini points to the fact that theology is an assertive *habitus*, and this is also Dinkelsbühl's second definition. In line with this conception, theology must be associated with a deliberate commitment to the Christian faith based on the assent that someone can give to the meaning of the Bible.

At this point, the later redaction inserts a series of six propositions that gather together some *pro* and *contra* arguments related to these two definitions without betraying to the reader which definition will be adopted [§§7-15]. For example, if theology is a declarative habit, then any pagan or infidel, by studying the content of Holy Scripture, could explain it even while totally rejecting what he described. At the same time, a strong commitment to the biblical truth cannot arise, if the pagan or infidel is unaware of the meaning of the Bible or if he is unable to defend its contents.

By exploring these two positions, the Viennese theologians are actually in some way taking part in a well-known tradition concerning the subject of theology shared by the likes of Thomas Aquinas (theology as a *scientia subalternata*), Durand of St. Pourçain (theology as a deductive science), Peter Auriol (theology as a declarative science), and Gregory of Rimini (*habitus alius a fide*).<sup>16</sup> Around 1380, two decades before the later redaction began to take shape, Peter of Candia already provided an overview of these positions in the Prologue of his

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<sup>16</sup> For a clear overview of these discussions, see S.F. BROWN, "Declarative Theology after Durandus: Its Re-presentation and Defence by Peter Aureoli", in S.F. BROWN, T. DEWENDER and T. KOBUSCH, eds., *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Leiden-Boston 2009, 401-421, IDEM, "Declarative and Deductive Theology in the Early Fourteenth Century", in J.A. AERTSEN and A. SPEER, eds., *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin 1998, 648-655, and IDEM, "The Intellectual Context of Later Medieval Philosophy: Universities, Aristotle, Arts, Theology", in J. MARENBOON, ed., *Medieval Philosophy (The Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. III)*, London-New York 1998, 188-203.

own *Sentences* commentary.<sup>17</sup> A similar spirit of synthesis can be found in the background of the later redaction of the Prologue. Since Dinkelsbühl copies a large portion of the base text from Rimini, one might expect that Dinkelsbühl will follow Rimini in his criticism against Auriol, but it appears that his project is to put them together, not for the sake of reconciliation, but in order to formulate a more comprehensive definition of theology that combines the two habits. It is only in the second conclusion [§25] of his question that he affirms more clearly that “from theological study one not only acquires beyond the faith of simple people a declarative habit or theology taken in the first way, but also an adhering habit without fear.”<sup>18</sup> This need to join the two kinds of habits might be justified by the fact that “in theology one finds a multifold process,” but also by Dinkelsbühl’s intention to focus on the important role played by the Bible in the constitution of theology. From the fact that theology is based on the habit of understanding and explaining the Bible and even on assent to the Bible, Dinkelsbühl can conclude that theology is a habit of Holy Scripture. This perception is actually at the heart of Dinkelsbühl’s theological conception, for in his eyes scriptural exegesis must be the final goal of any theological act. The authority of the Bible allows the theologian to defend the articles of faith [§12], to explain the subject of his faith [§13], and to find the right law [§14] to follow.

Once Dinkelsbühl states the nature of the habit upon which theology is founded, he proceeds to his second *notabile*, which aims to define what a theological discourse is. The answer permits Dinkelsbühl to insist again on the pivotal role of Scripture, for any theological discourse is articulated around propositions contained in the Bible (*Secundo nota quod discursus proprie theologicus est discursus qui constat ex propositionibus in canone Bibliae contentis vel saltem ex altera huiusmodi* [§16]). All truth is demonstrated in theology by basing oneself on Scripture. Aside from the propositions contained in the Bible, theological discourse embraces other statements, for example, problems such as ‘the consubstantiality of persons’ or ‘the eternity of the world’, which are not found in the Bible, but the validity of which can be proven through the Bible in the context of faith. In support of this central idea, Dinkelsbühl sets forth a series of examples, borrowed from Rimini, as one can see from this table:

Gregory of Rimini, <i>Prologus</i>	Nicholas of Dinkesbühl, <i>Prologus</i>
p. 18-19, l. 20-30, 1-6: Unde, si verbi gratia quaeratur, utrum Deus sit aeternus, et unus probet quod sic ex aeternitate motus, sicut processit Philosophus 12 <i>Metaphysicae</i> , alius autem probet ex eo quod scriptum est Iohannis I: “in principio erat verbum,” sicut probat Augustinus <i>De fide ad Petrum</i> , capitulo 6, vel, si quaeratur, utrum Deus sit aliquo modo mutabilis, et probet aliquis quod non per rationem sumptam ex motu, sicut incessit Philosophus 8 <i>Physicorum</i> , alius vero per illud quod scriptum est Exodi 23: “Ego sum qui sum,” et in Psalmo “Tu autem idem ipse es, sicut probat Augustinus 5 <i>De Trinitate</i> capitulo 2 et <i>De fide ad Petrum</i> capitulo 7, aut per illud Apostoli 1 <i>Ad Timotheum</i> 6 “qui solus habet immortalitatem” sicut Augustinus probat	[§17] Unde, si quaeratur utrum Deus sit aeternus, et an unus, et probet quis quod sic ex aeternitate motus, \ut processit Philosophus XII <i>Metaphysicae</i> /, alius autem probet ex eo quod scriptum est Iohannis 1: “In principio erat verbum” etc., sicut probat Augustinus in <i>De fide ad Petrum</i> , capitulo 6, vel si quaeratur utrum Deus aliquo modo sit mutabilis, et probet quis quod non \per rationem sumptam ex motu./ sicut processit Philosophus VIII <i>Physicorum</i> , alius vero per illud quod scriptum est <i>Exodi</i> 3: “Ego sum qui sum,” et in Psalmo: “Tu autem idem ipse es,” sicut probat Augustinus V <i>De Trinitate</i> , capitulo 2, et <i>De fide ad Petrum</i> , capitulo 7, aut per illud Apostoli 1 <i>Ad Timotheum</i> 6: “Qui solus habet immortalitatem,” sicut Augustinus probat

<sup>17</sup> S.F. BROWN, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role”, in *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), 156-190. For a recent analysis of this Prologue, see S.F. BROWN, “Peter of Candia’s Commentary on the *Sentences*”, in P.W. ROSEMAN, ed., *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. II, Leiden-Boston 2010, 439-469.

<sup>18</sup> The same idea is to be found in [§73].



Contra Maximinum libero 3, non est dubium quod omnes consentient primas utrisque quaestionis probationes non esse theologicas et similiter quaslibet alias, quae ex propositionibus sumptis ex humanis scientiis procederent, reliquas vero et similes dicerent esse theologicas.	<i>Contra Maximinum</i> , libro III, non est dubium quin omnes consentiant primas probationes non esse theologicas, et similiter quaslibet alias quae precipue ex propositionibus sumptis ex humanis scientiis procedunt, reliquas vero et quascumque similes dicerent esse theologicas.
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Dinkelsbühl does not limit himself to the passage copied from Rimini, but shows his erudition by adding another example, also taken from an uncited source. At this level, it is difficult to discern Dinkelsbühl's source with precision. Nevertheless, the same aim can be found in the *Dialogue* of William of Ockham and, in the same intellectual milieu as Dinkelsbühl's, Henry Totting of Oyta uses it to a similar end, to defend the opinion that in theological discourse there are truths not taken from the Bible, but whose foundation (their truth) is justified by the authority of the Church, authority which is itself vindicated by the Bible (*oportet firma fide tenere ex auctoritate Ecclesiae, cuius Ecclesiae auctoritas sufficienter fundata est in scriptura Bibliae* [§18]). This view is proven via a reference to Pope Innocent III that Oyta frequently employs in Ockham's wake. Indeed, the Church recognizes as theological truths many propositions whose source is not the Bible, but which are proven by the apostles:

William of Ockham, <i>Dialogus</i> , Part 1, l. 2, cap. 3 <sup>19</sup>	Henry Totting of Oyta, <i>Quaestio de Sacra Scriptura</i> . I <i>Sentences</i> , q. 2 <sup>20</sup>	Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, <i>Prologus</i> , [§18]
Hoc enim Innocentius tertius, ut habetur Extra, <i>De celebratione missarum</i> , capitulo <i>Cum Marthae</i> , testari videtur. Ait enim, "Multa tam de verbis quam de factis dominicis invenimus ab evangelistis ommissa, quae apostoli vel supplevisse verbo vel facto expressisse leguntur." Et infra, "Credimus igitur quod formam verborum, sicut in canone reperitur, et a Christo apostoli et ab ipsis eorum acceperint successores." Ex his verbis colligitur quod quamvis forma conficiendi sacramentum eucharistiae nequaquam reperitur secundum se totam in Scriptura Divina, tamen quod illam formam Christus tradiderit est credendum.	Primo quoad genus secundum per illud Innocentii tercii, quod habetur Extra, <i>De celebratione missarum</i> , capitulo <i>Cum Marthae</i> , ubi dicitur: "Multa tam de verbis quam de factis dominicis invenimus ab ewangelistis obmissa, quae apostoli vel supplevisse facto vel expressisse verbo leguntur." Et infra ibidem, "Credimus igitur quod formam verborum, sicut in canone ponitur, et a Christo apostoli et ab ipsis eorum acceperunt successores." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod, licet forma conficiendi sacramentum eucharistiae non reperitur secundum se totam in Scriptura, credendum tamen est illam Christum tradidisse apostolis et ab ipsis ad ecclesiam pervenisse.	ut habetur per illud Innocentii III, Extra, <i>De celebratione missarum</i> , capitulo "Cum Marthae," ubi dicitur: "Multa tam de verbis quam de factis divinis invenimus ab evangelistis obmissa quae Apostoli vel supplevisse vel facto expressisse leguntur," et subditur de forma conficiendi sacramentum Eucharistiae ut in canone ponitur, quae, licet secundum se totam in Scriptura non reperitur, credendum tamen est illam Christum tradidisse Apostolis, et ab ipsis ad Ecclesiam pervenisse.

<sup>19</sup> Drafts of the edition of the *Dialogus* are found here: <http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/ockdial.html>.

<sup>20</sup> HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Quaestio de Sacra Scriptura et de veritatibus catholicis*, ed. A. LANG, Münster 1953, 63.

Having first affirmed that theology is a combination of declarative and assertive habits of the Bible, then that theological discourse has as its first goal to explain the meaning of the Bible, Dinkelsbühl introduces another remark aimed at defining theological principles. Regarding this topic, his understanding according to which Scripture is the main object of theology is repeated, for “the principles of theology... namely that are acquired through theological discourses, are above all the truths of the Holy Canon” [§19]. Therefore we can summarize his position as follows: the Bible assures the legitimacy of all theological discourse while remaining the source and the foundation of its principles.

It now remains to advance the position of Dinkelsbühl on whether theology is a science or not. It is not a science according to the Aristotelian model of natural science, which is to say a science based on the demonstration of obvious truths according to principles *per se nota*. It is not a science in the genre of natural sciences, for the certitude of its truths is not acquired through the light of human reason, which can be deceiving, but rather through the divine light, which is always true. If it is not a science similar to the others, we must join Dinkelsbühl in asking what exactly it is. He finds his solution in the Aristotelian description of science as wisdom put forth by in the Prologue to the *Metaphysics*,<sup>21</sup> a solution that was already proposed by Auriol and which is absent from Rimini.

The explanation of science as wisdom can also be found in Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,<sup>22</sup> but this reference is not surprising, since this type of commentary represents the normal place for such an analysis. In the context of the *Sentences* tradition, we find before Dinkelsbühl a few theologians who emphasize in the same way that theology is wisdom: Giles of Rome<sup>23</sup>, Humbert of Preuilley,<sup>24</sup> and Thomas de Strasbourg,<sup>25</sup> who in fact is following Giles. Dinkelsbühl asserts positively that theology is a science given the fact that the six criteria for wisdom can be properly applied to theology. Thus, theology is wisdom, for it considers all things as its subject matter; it deals with God, who represents the ultimate subject matter; it knows with certitude; it considers its own cause; it is self-generating; and it orders things and is not ordered by them [§33]. Still, in the wake of Giles of Rome or even of Aquinas (since one can also find this idea in Aquinas<sup>26</sup>), Dinkelsbühl adds that, as wisdom, theology is an architectonic wisdom, for like all architectonic civil or political science, it also serves to govern the community of all *viatores* [§34].

In the structure of the question the entire discussion about theology as wisdom is developed in the context of the fourth conclusion. The difference between this conclusion and the others is that Dinkelsbühl does not present any objections and *responsiones*, saying only that they are not necessary, which remark provides a new proof concerning his conviction about the validity of this thesis [§79].

By defending the idea that theology is wisdom, Dinkelsbühl also finds a solution to the problem of the subordination of theology as a science, on which he touches briefly, probably because in copying several excerpts from Rimini he indirectly follows the Augustinian doctor's reasoning. In conclusion, in addressing this common question in the medieval discussion on the relation between theology and other sciences, especially philosophy, Dinkelsbühl insists once

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysica* 1, 1, 982a-b.

<sup>22</sup> THOMAS AQUINAS, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, lec. II, 36-41, ed. M.-R. CATHALA, Marietti 1964, 12-13.

<sup>23</sup> M. OLSZEWSKI, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and a Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis* (*Archaeologiae Subsidia* 2), Münster 2010, 178-199.

<sup>24</sup> M. BRINZEL, “Le premier commentaire cistercien sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard par Humbert de Preuilley (†1298)”, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 53 (2011), 81-148.

<sup>25</sup> THOMAS DE ARGENTINA, *Scripta super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Prologus*, q. 2, art. 1, Strasbourg 1490.

<sup>26</sup> THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup> I<sup>ae</sup>, q. 1, art. 5.

again that theology is not a demonstrative science, but rather a form of wisdom.

Concerning Dinkelsbühl's understanding of theology in his Prologue, then, when it comes to the specifics of his position, it is clear that he defends a pure and Augustinian biblical perspective, certainly inherited or imported from Rimini. The Bible is the authority, the foundation, and the source of all theological truth. For this reason it is not necessary to demonstrate it; it is enough to believe in it and to freely assent to it. The central role held by the Bible in this discourse liberates Dinkelsbühl from the necessity of citing Aristotle's definition of science when discussing theology. Moreover, the insistence with which he defends the role of the Bible in the articulation of a theological concept makes us wonder whether he might not even be one of the scholastics who set the stage for Luther and the Reformation.

With regard to his Augustinian position, the study of sources provides a *clef de lecture* for the Prologue and allows us to better understand the scholarly environment to which it belonged. In other words, what seems to be innovative about the University of Vienna when we analyze Dinkelsbühl's sources? The authors Dinkelsbühl copies in his Prologue are Aquinas, Ockham, Rimini, and Oyta, but the only ones he names outright are Aquinas and Rimini. The mosaic Dinkelsbühl creates by combining arguments taken from Rimini and Aquinas calls to mind the commentary of James of Eltville.<sup>27</sup> However, his use of Rimini is the most spectacular. We have already suggested when we analysed the doctrinal aspect of his theological thinking that Rimini contributes the primary substrate of the doctrine Dinkelsbühl espouses. This in itself is no news, of course, as the Vienna Group's overwhelming admiration for the Augustinian doctor has been demonstrated elsewhere.<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless, the study of the Prologue may shed new light on the issue. The relationship with Rimini is complex, given that much of Dinkelsbühl's text is copied from him: to be exact, the first question is made up of around 7000 words, of which probably half are copied from Rimini; the second question, composed of 4000 words, presents the same particularity since more than half is copied *verbatim* from Rimini. Identifying this 'plagiarism' is the modern historian's simplest task; what remains more complicated is explaining the mechanism and the method behind this practice. Faced with such a case of plagiarism<sup>29</sup> or 'bricolage textuel', the question to ask is not only what he copied, but also to analyze what he did not copy from Rimini's Prologue.

At first glance, it is striking to note that Dinkelsbühl did not pay attention to and did not copy philosophical or even epistemological fragments from Rimini. For example, he completely ignores the whole discussion of the *complexe significabile*, a concept that attracted the attention of numerous authors in the second half of the fourteenth century and made Rimini famous in Paris. Moreover, Dinkelsbühl copied nothing from the theory of knowledge about the possibility for the *viator* to achieve certitude. What interests him about Rimini is his apology for the Bible and his fideism. Beyond that, Dinkelsbühl is in no way tempted by Rimini's philosophical profile; he follows Rimini only for his theological ideas. Dinkelsbühl's search for a theological model is totally comprehensible, for his commentary is not a simple lecture on the *Sentences* in the context of the University of Vienna, but rather encompasses a complete pedagogical project, whose ambition is to initiate a practice of reading the *Sentences* in the new Vienna school of theology. Apparently, Peter Lombard's model is here replaced by Rimini. The phenomenon is also explained by the fact that Rimini was the best-known and most fashionable master in Paris. From Dinkelsbühl's critical and selective reading of Rimini, we may conclude that 'the Rimini'

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<sup>27</sup> For the relation between James of Eltville and Thomas Aquinas see M. BRINZEI, "La théologie comme science selon Jacques d'Eltville", in *Actes of the IVth Annual Symposium of the FIDEM: Coexistence et coopération au Moyen Âge / Coesistenza et cooperazione nel Medioevo*, held in Palermo in 2009 (forthcoming).

<sup>28</sup> C. SCHABEL, "Henry Totting of Oyta, Henry of Langenstein, and the Vienna Group on Reconciling Human Free Will with Divine Foreknowledge", in P.J.J.M. BAKKER, M. BRINZEI, and R. FRIEDMAN, eds., *Philosophical Psychology and Late-Medieval Sentences Commentaries*, Turnhout (forthcoming).

<sup>29</sup> See [note 4](#) above.

in circulation in the milieu of the University of Vienna was no longer the same ‘Rimini’ who was known in Paris, and we must insist on this point in seeking out what is new in late-medieval Central and Eastern Europe.

Dinkelsbühl’s method of working and his ‘bricolage textuel’ lead us to ask the following question: is Dinkelsbühl’s commentary on the *Sentences* really a commentary, or is it rather a summary or an abbreviation of Rimini’s commentary? If we take a close look at Rimini’s Prologue, we may note that in the modern edition<sup>30</sup> it takes up 186 pages and is divided into five questions. Dinkelsbühl’s own Prologue, considerably shorter at 00 pages in Appendix I, condenses all of Rimini’s theological theses into its two questions. Moreover, it does so according to the sequence of Rimini’s arguments, for the first passage taken from Rimini is exactly its first paragraph; likewise, the last passages copied are found near the end of Rimini’s Prologue. By identifying each passage copied, it becomes clear that Dinkelsbühl copied Rimini’s text in order. This systematic and gradual method makes manifest his intention to summarize Rimini’s theological doctrine thesis by thesis, while leaving out the philosophical content.

If this hypothesis is correct—that is, if Dinkelsbühl’s Prologue is indeed an abbreviation of Rimini’s—we may thus explain that Dinkelsbühl’s procedure is less plagiarism than an intentional act motivated by the ambition of a pedagogical project: Dinkelsbühl summarizes Rimini because he needs a text on which to found his theological teaching at the University of Vienna. A comparable phenomenon is Henry Totting of Oyta’s summary of Adam Wodeham’s commentary<sup>31</sup> or Simon of Cremona’s abbreviation of Alphonsus Vargas.<sup>32</sup> This tendency to summarize and gloss the masters in favor in Paris is certainly a transfer of knowledge justified by the need to help postulants achieve the title of master of theology through this practice, for where there is no tradition, one must be started, if not to say invented. We can explain this practice more clearly when analyzing it in the historical context of the practice of commenting on the *Sentences*. For example, we may remark along with Philipp Rosemann that the first reaction to Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* was to summarize or gloss the master’s text in order to bring into common use this type of discourse. As Rosemann concludes: “The early reception of the authoritative text (or texts) is characterized by a slow process of familiarization in which the works are approached by means of simplifying study aids (such as paraphrases and abbreviations).”<sup>33</sup>

We can conclude from Dinkelsbühl’s Prologue that what is thus new at the University of Vienna is the intention to familiarize oneself with the reading of the *Sentences*. This ‘becoming accustomed’ with a specific type of text takes place through summarizing and reading confirmed masters from the Parisian milieu. This effort is only the first step of the process, for the “sun of wisdom” evoked by Langenstein “is shining in concert with rays of glorious truth.” This new light illuminates more brightly the path through new types of theological discourse, such as that of the Reformation.

### *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl on Predestination*

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<sup>30</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super I Sententiarum, Prologus*, vol. I, Berlin 1981, 1-186, in GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, OESA, *Lectura in I et II libros Sententiarum*, eds. A.D. TRAPP, V. MARCOLINO, W. ECKERMANN, M. SANTOS-NOYA, M. SCHULZE, W. SIMON, W. URBAN, and V. VENDLAND, Berlin-New York 1979-84.

<sup>31</sup> P.J.J.M. BAKKER, *La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250 – c. 1400). Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie*, Nijmegen 1999, vol. II, 95-111.

<sup>32</sup> D. TRAPP, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century”, 213-215.

<sup>33</sup> P.W. ROSEMAN, *Peter Lombard*, Oxford 2004, 203.

It is widely known that one of the main doctrinal differences between Martin Luther and the supporters of the Roman Church concerned predestination. In the sixteenth century, Catholics and Protestants agreed that God has foreknowledge and in some sense predestines humans. Whereas Luther stressed that a human's salvation ultimately stems from God's gift of faith alone, however, his opponents left more room for a contribution from human free will through good works. Few scholars have noted that Luther's position actually fits into the wide spectrum of acceptable later medieval opinions on the subject, very close to that of his fourteenth-century confrere Gregory of Rimini, an Augustinian Hermit who lectured on the *Sentences* at the University of Paris in the 1340s before taking over as head of the Augustinian Order. The extent of the Young Luther's direct awareness of Rimini's ideas is a subject of debate. We assert that Rimini's theory of predestination was the *opinio communis* at what was arguably the main German university of the early fifteenth century, the University of Vienna, and that it therefore seems unlikely that the young Augustinian and future reformer could have been ignorant of the stance of such a giant of his own religious order.

As in his Prologue, Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's main inspiration in his commentary on books I and II of the *Sentences* is none other than Gregory of Rimini, although this was often through the filter of Dinkelsbühl's teachers, Henry of Langenstein and Henry Totting of Oyta, along with one of their masters, James of Eltville.<sup>34</sup> Distinctions 38-41 of book I cover divine foreknowledge and predestination. For the question on foreknowledge, corresponding to distinctions 38 and 39, the first redaction of Dinkelsbühl's *Sentences* commentary follows the corresponding commentary of Henry of Langenstein, while the later versions of what became the common Viennese commentary replace much of this text with lengthy passages from Henry Totting of Oyta's commentary. The end result is mostly a cut-and-paste effort from the two Henry's. Nevertheless, perhaps the most important influence on Oyta and Langenstein in book I, and certainly for the problem of foreknowledge, was Gregory of Rimini, and this is clear in the compilation.<sup>35</sup>

In the later fourteenth century, however, the more specific theological problem of predestination, treated in distinctions 40 and 41 of book I, faded in relative importance, especially compared to the broader issue of foreknowledge, which in some commentaries came to occupy the equivalent of more than a hundred pages of text in modern editions. Neither Oyta nor Langenstein asks a question on predestination. But Dinkelsbühl does, and therefore so do many other Viennese theologians of the fifteenth century. Despite the fact that Oyta and Langenstein do not cover the problem of predestination directly in their *Sentences* commentaries, however, Dinkelsbühl nevertheless follows their lead in that Gregory of Rimini is again by far the most important inspiration in this question.

Whether Dinkelsbühl was following some sort of oral tradition from his professors, or whether Dinkelsbühl or his Viennese successors are responsible for the later versions of the question, makes little difference for the present paper: when it came time to write the first redaction of the commentary, Dinkelsbühl's autograph, Wien, Schotten 269, he had Gregory of Rimini's text before his eyes. In the question on predestination, we see Dinkelsbühl beginning to copy something from Rimini, changing his mind, and crossing it out. In all later versions, only what Dinkelsbühl retained in Schotten 269 remains, proving that his autograph is the origin of the other versions.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> See M. BRINZEI, "Erreur et évidence selon Jacques d'Eltville et Jean Régis", and W.J. COURTENAY, "James of Eltville, O.Cist., his fellow *sententiarii* in 1369-70, and his influence on contemporaries", in BAKKER-BRINZEI-FRIEDMAN, *Philosophical Psychology and Late-Medieval Sentences Commentaries*, forthcoming.

<sup>35</sup> See C. SCHABEL, "Henry Totting of Oyta, Henry of Langenstein, and the Vienna Group."

<sup>36</sup> See parallel passages and a full discussion of the redaction issue in BRINZEI and SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology".

Dinkelsbühl's question title in Schotten 269 matches that of Rimini, "Whether every rational creature was eternally predestined or reprobated by God,"<sup>37</sup> as do the three articles into which the question is divided, the longest being article two, "Is there any cause of their eternal predestination or reprobation in those who are predestined or reprobate?" Article one, dealing with the *de facto* question, and article three, on whether someone predestined can be damned or someone reprobate can be saved, are treated and answered along the lines of the foreknowledge question. Here the focus will be on article two. Aside from minor variants and elisions, Dinkelsbühl's article two contains verbatim about 65% of Rimini's corresponding article two,<sup>38</sup> in sequence, except that the titles of the five *conclusiones* that Rimini lists together at the beginning of the article Dinkelsbühl presents more sensibly before each *conclusio*. The only other difference is that Dinkelsbühl adds two short arguments and their refutations at the end of the article.<sup>39</sup> At the end of the article in Schotten 269, Dinkelsbühl has added in the margin a brief section from James of Eltville, along with a ^ indicating where it is to be placed in the text. Accordingly, this passage is included in the other witnesses of the Schotten 269 redaction and in all later redactions as well.

Although there is considerable restructuring and some abbreviation in the later redactions, the Rimini core and the Eltville addition remain the same. Dinkelsbühl's text in Schotten 269 is thus representative of Viennese doctrine in the century leading up to the Protestant Reformation. Nevertheless, the later versions insert two condemned articles from Paris [§14 in the edition below]. One redaction formerly attributed to Dinkelsbühl, but probably by George Wetzel of Horaw, that in Wien, ÖNB 4820 (and Wien, ÖNB 4369), also adds a substantial section taken primarily from Thomas Bradwardine, Rimini's Oxford contemporary from the 1340s, whose doctrine on predestination is similar to that of Rimini [§§34-41, 47-51]. It is Wetzel's more complicated text in ÖNB 4820 (and 4369) that we publish in Appendix II.<sup>40</sup>

Predestination probably would not have become a major doctrinal issue in the Reformation debates had it not been for developments in western theology after 1300, although in the end it might have been Martin Luther's behavior and way of speaking in the debate that most disturbed the Roman Church. As James Halverson has outlined,<sup>41</sup> by 1350 three major solutions to the causal problem were current: according to the first, traditional solution, Single Particular Election, God chooses to save certain individuals purely out of mercy, so that there is

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<sup>37</sup> NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *I Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41 (MS Wien, Schotten 269, f. 76v): "Circa distinctiones 40 et 41 quaero utrum quilibet homo fuerit ab aeterno praedestinatus vel reprobatus a Deo."

<sup>38</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super I Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41, a. 2, vol. III, 325-348. Dinkelsbühl does not copy the so-called *Additiones* 152 and 153 in the article. For the *Additiones* in Rimini's edition see P. BERMON, *L'assentiment et son objet chez Grégoire de Rimini*, Paris 2007, 21-24.

<sup>39</sup> The first and its refutation were incorporated into the text published in Appendix II (§§46 and 56). The second is in NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *I Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41, a. 2 (MS Wien, Schotten 269, f. 80v): "Item, Beatus Ambrosius, in glossa Ad Romanos 9, super illo verbo: 'Miserebor cui misereor et misericordiam praestabo cuius miserebor,' dicit: '*Misericordiam praestabo*, id est, illi misericordiam dabo quem praescio esse ex toto corde ad me reversurum,' quod non esset verum nisi causa praedestinationis quantum ad adultos sit bonus usus liberi arbitrii"; (f. 81r): "Ad ultimam, concedendum est cum Ambrosio quod Deus dat illi misericordiam quem praescit toto corde reversurum ad se. Sed illud non est causa praedestinationis, sed fructus. Non enim est aliquis praedestinatus quia reversurus, sed ideo reversurus quia praedestinatus, quia nullus electus est a Deo quia talis futurus erat, sed ex electione talis est factus, ut multociens dictum est."

<sup>40</sup> For a chart detailing the differences between Schotten 269 and ÖNB 4820/4369 in this context, see BRINZEI and SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology", 217-218. Citations to the edition in the appendix will be to paragraph number in square brackets.

<sup>41</sup> J. HALVERSON, "Franciscan Theology and Predestinarian Pluralism in Late-Medieval Thought", *Speculum* 70.1 (1995), 1-26; idem, *Peter Aureol on Predestination. A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought*, Leiden 1998. See also P. VIGNAUX, *Justification et prédestination au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle: Duns Scot, Pierre d'Auriose, Guillaume d'Occam, Grégoire de Rimini*, Paris 1934.

no cause of their predestination in them, while the others are justly damned because of their sins. In the 1310s the Parisian Franciscan Peter Auriol proposed an alternative, General Election, whereby God sends out his saving grace in general; those who place an obstacle to or resist this grace are justly damned via this positive cause in them; those who do not place such an obstacle or offer resistance are saved, via a negative or privative cause. We have found that others, perhaps encouraged by Auriol, even went on to posit the good use of free will as a positive cause of predestination.<sup>42</sup> There were adherents to these solutions in the 1340s, when Gregory of Rimini responded with Double Particular Election, an extreme Augustinian theory, whereby God saves some and damns others without any positive or negative cause in the predestined or reprobate. Rimini's position was paralleled in Oxford by Thomas Bradwardine, although less clearly.

Having dealt with the general problem of divine foreknowledge in his lengthy question on distinctions 38 and 39, Dinkelsbühl turns to predestination in distinctions 40 and 41, asking "Whether every rational creature was eternally predestined or reprobated by God,"<sup>43</sup> 'reprobation' being the term used for those destined to damnation and hell rather than salvation and heaven. Rather disingenuously, recognizing how extreme his opinion was, Gregory of Rimini began his own treatment thus:<sup>44</sup> "But because this investigation is the highest and is unexaminable for us mortals, and to err in this is very dangerous, therefore I do not intend to say anything of my own on this matter, but rather the opinions that I consider to be of the saints, especially that of blessed Augustine." In his autograph, Dinkelsbühl copies this passage but replaces the last phrase with the following:<sup>45</sup> "... therefore I only intend to recite the opinions of the doctors, especially that of Gregory of Rimini." The entire passage, along with the revealing admission about Rimini, is dropped from the other redactions.

Article two of Dinkelsbühl's question presents the main solutions, but this is accomplished by copying the core of Rimini's question, that is, five conclusions that refute the elements of all versions of opposing theories of Single Particular Election and General Election. The specific issue is "whether on account of anything in those who are predestined or reprobate God has predestined or reprobated such people from eternity, so that it could be said of anyone, 'Because of this or because of that he is predestined', or expressing it some other way through causal propositions" [§1]. Without naming names, Dinkelsbühl, quoting Rimini, relates that some have claimed that there is a positive cause of predestination in those who have been predestined, connected in some way to the good use of free will, and three versions of this stance are presented [§2]. Then another theory is explained, whereby there is only a privative or negative cause of predestination in the predestined, namely the absence of a final obstacle to God's grace. According to this position, there is a positive cause of reprobation in the reprobate, in that they place an obstacle in the way of God's grace. In not placing this obstacle, the predestined have a privative or negative cause of their predestination [§3]. Although anonymously, this last opinion is presented by a lengthy quotation from Peter Auriol. The view that free will is somehow a positive cause of predestination is found in theologians such as the

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<sup>42</sup> C. SCHABEL, "Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination," in EVANS, *Mediaeval Commentaries on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard*, vol. I, 221-265.

<sup>43</sup> NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *I Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41 (MS Wien, Schotten 269, f. 76v): "Circa distinctiones 40 et 41 quaero utrum quilibet homo fuerit ab aeterno praedestinatus vel reprobatus a Deo."

<sup>44</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super I Sententiarum, Prologus*, dd. 40-41, vol. III, 321.16-19: "Verum, quia haec perscrutatio altissima est et imperscrutabilis nobis mortalibus, et in ipsa errare nimium est periculosum, idcirco nihil ex me in hac materia loqui intendo, sed simpliciter sententias, quas puto esse sanctorum, et maxime beati Augustini..."

<sup>45</sup> NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *I Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41 (Schotten 269, f. 76v): "... incirco in ea tantum recitare intendo sententias doctorum, ex maxime Gregorii de Arimpno."

Augustinian Thomas of Strasbourg who were active after Auriol and before Rimini. That is, the opinions against which Dinkelsbühl will argue date from the early fourteenth century.

Dinkelsbühl begins his reply to these positions in this way: “But following Gregory, five conclusions will be posited, and the truth of each of the aforesaid positions is incompatible with the truth of all these conclusions” [§4]. Thus the audience would be in no doubt about the source of these five conclusions—Gregory of Rimini—or about their general gist. Dinkelsbühl devotes one fifth of his article, via Rimini, to explaining to his students and readers just why “no one is predestined because of the good use of free will that God has foreknown that he would exercise, no matter how its goodness is understood” [§4]. This is the first of the five conclusions. One can see how the Viennese students in theology would have been left with little uncertainty about the lack of causal connection between predestination and good works. Here the later redactions, while abbreviating some of the Rimini present in Schotten 269, add at the end two condemned articles in the process against John of Mirecourt in the 1340s: “God predestined someone from eternity because of future good works—error,” and “Someone has been predestined by God from eternity because of the good use of free will that God foreknew that he would exercise—error” [§14].

In the same way, the second conclusion argues at some length against what was Peter Auriol’s opinion about predestination: “No one is predestined because he has been foreknown to be without a habitual obstacle to grace in the end” [§15]. The third conclusion, in contrast, is defended quite briefly. While it was entirely orthodox, especially before 1300, nevertheless one probably will not hear it at Mass very often today: “Whomever God has predestined, He has predestined merely by grace and mercy.” This is because predestination is “neither because of good works, nor because of the good use of free will, nor because of a lack of sin or the lack of anything at all that would render a man undeserving of eternal life” [§24].

What sets Rimini apart from most of his later medieval contemporaries, in expression at least, if not in actual doctrine, is found in the final two conclusions that Dinkelsbühl puts forth. The fourth is that “no one is reprobated because of the bad use of free will that God has foreseen that he would exercise” [§26]. Indeed, after giving scriptural examples, Dinkelsbühl concludes:

From this it manifestly follows that it is not on account of their future disbelief or evil deeds that they were not predestined, and consequently not reprobate either, but rather the reverse, not indeed that God imposed disbelief on them or malice or something through which they would become disbelieving or evil, but because the grace through which they would believe and be good had not been conferred on them, grace which, of course, was not conferred because they had been eternally reprobated [§29].

The fifth and final conclusion merely argues against what was Peter Auriol’s version of this: “No one is reprobate because he was eternally foreseen to have in the end an obstacle to grace, whether actual or habitual” [§30].

Having left no doubt about Gregory of Rimini’s double predestinarian doctrine, and presumably about their own adherence to this doctrine, the Viennese have to explain to their students and readers why God does what He does. Here Dinkelsbühl and his followers depart somewhat from Rimini’s text, presenting objections to his doctrine and solutions to the objections, only some of which is from the Augustinian. In the redaction printed below, probably by George Wetzels of Horaw, we find added lengthy passages taken from or inspired by Thomas Bradwardine, beginning with two corollaries inserted rather awkwardly, both in their presentation and in the context of what has just been said. The first corollary is that, “although someone’s merits or demerits are in some way the cause of eternal salvation or damnation, no one who is predestined is in any way the cause of his eternal predestination.” The second part of this corollary, that no one causes his own eternal predestination, merely restates what Rimini’s conclusions have already repeated several times, and the wording of Wetzels’ additional proof, that “nothing temporal is the cause of anything eternal,” is rather odd given the first part of the first corollary, that “in some way” someone causes “his eternal salvation or



damnation” [§34]. What Wetzel means is that eternally God predestines or reprobates, as a result people have merits or demerits, and these are *sine qua non* causes of their being saved or damned *ever after*. Wetzel even uses the term *sine qua non* in explaining the second, parallel corollary, “that although someone can be in some way the cause of his hardening, no one can be the cause of his eternal reprobation” [§35].

It is interesting that the 1300 divide is apparent even in this text. Wetzel defends the second corollary via Peter Lombard himself, the twelfth-century author of the *Sentences*, and via Dinkelsbühl Wetzel had completed the Rimini section of his question a few lines before, even copying Rimini’s first-person-singular verb: “Therefore I conclude in agreement with the Master [i.e., Peter Lombard], distinction 41...” [§33]. Likewise, the inevitable objections to the second corollary Wetzel prefaces as follows:

This corollary is against Peter Auriol, Scotus, and others. They say that there is a cause of reprobation in the reprobate, because no impiety is to be attributed to God; but if God reprobated without cause, there would be impiety and cruelty in Him, namely giving to man such a bad thing without cause [§36].

After giving Thomas Bradwardine’s response, Wetzel presents a series of objections taken from Bradwardine and Rimini, in the latter case sometimes originating in Peter Auriol. The question ‘why’ also shows up here.

Bradwardine’s response in Wetzel does not really make sense in the light of Rimini’s consistent statements in Dinkelsbühl’s original. Wetzel chooses Bradwardine’s statement that “not all punishment that is reasonably done to a man by a man is applied because of fault, but sometimes as a warning.” In the case of a public punishment, for example, this is done so that onlookers fear doing evil and are confirmed in good. So, again quoting Bradwardine’s defense of deterrence, “why not temporal and eternal punishment for the temporal and eternal welfare of the elect, namely so they choose more the good and avoid evil in the present and, in the future, so they rejoice more, love God more ardently, and praise Him more widely.” “Nor is there cruelty in God if He predestines and makes one creature for the service of another creature, and both of them for His own service, praise, glory, and honor” [§37]. Despite the notion that God does things that are fitting according to “His immense wisdom” and “for the perfection of the universe, the utility of others, and His own honor,” Bradwardine does admit that, from the same lump of clay the potter makes different things, “as it pleases him,” alluding to chapter 9 of Paul’s letter to the Romans [§38].

Wetzel offers two other explanations, one based vaguely on God’s immense goodness, but the other explicitly attributed to the teaching doctors of the Dominicans and Augustinians, the thirteenth-century theologians Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome: “Although one cannot give a reason in particular why this man has been predestined and that one has not, except for the divine will, there is indeed a general reason, namely so that divine mercy and justice shine out in those men” [§49].

Many average Christians would find this perplexing, as Wetzel’s Viennese students probably did. Dinkelsbühl’s original text in Schotten 269, based almost exclusively on Gregory of Rimini, is much more consistent, as are most of the later versions of this text. Nevertheless, Dinkelsbühl himself tacks on a short bit at the end, the “question of the very simple”, which remained in the later redactions: “Why does He create so many souls that He knows are to be perpetually damned and which would be better off if they had not been created?” [§58]. Dinkelsbühl responds, and concludes the entire article, with the words of James of Eltville, whom he cites explicitly:

Perhaps this [complaint] would follow if He created those souls principally for damnation and mercy. But this is not the case. Rather He did this for justice and the perfection of the universe, or because He does not want the act of generation to be in vain, and therefore He creates a soul for this body. Nor is He obliged to will him beatitude... [§59].

And so on.

We find it perplexing that certain Reformation textbooks give as a partial explanation for Martin Luther's success that his audience found his doctrine of predestination "comforting." Be that as it may, there does not seem to be much in Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's text that Luther would have found objectionable, nor was Dinkelsbühl's doctrine unorthodox at the time, although it was certainly not the only position defended by fifteenth-century Latin university theologians.

What was his role in the dissemination of a double-predestinarian doctrine, especially Gregory of Rimini's brand, in the lead-up to the Reformation? Twenty manuscripts survive containing all of book I of Rimini's *Sentences* commentary, which includes his treatment of predestination, and by the time Luther lectured on the *Sentences* in 1509, Rimini's book I had been printed four times. Although none of the editions was printed in Germanic lands, and only four or five of the manuscripts are preserved in libraries in that linguistic area, this is quite an impressive general circulation.

Dinkelsbühl's overall circulation is more impressive, the most popular commentary composed after 1350, with some 300 manuscript witnesses of sections. Even if the number of surviving manuscripts of the various redactions of the commentary on book I of the *Sentences* is much more limited, although at least ten witnesses, the section on grace and human free choice in Dinkelsbühl's commentary on book II, the redactions of which are preserved in at minimum another fifteen codices, contains three crucial questions:<sup>46</sup> "Whether a human in the present state, given God's general influence, can through free choice and his natural abilities do any morally good act without God's special assistance," "Whether a human in the present state can from his own natural powers avoid any sin without God's special assistance," and "Whether a human, before the fall, through free choice and his own powers of nature alone, without any other assistance from God, was capable of doing any morally good or truly right or virtuous act." For the first of the three, Dinkelsbühl states:<sup>47</sup> "In the present question, in which the doctors oppose each other, I will only recite their sayings, and in the first article those of Master Gregory of Rimini." In fact, all three questions are verbatim abbreviations of those of Rimini,<sup>48</sup> whom Dinkelsbühl cites explicitly a dozen times, ending the third thus:<sup>49</sup> "Look in Gregory in this question and there you will find the opinion of another doctor," meaning a 35-page debate

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<sup>46</sup> NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *II Sententiarum*, dd. 26-28, q. 1 (Schotten 269, f. 122v): "Utrum homo secundum praesentem statum, stante Dei generali influxu, possit per liberum arbitrium et naturalia eius absque Dei speciali adiutorio agere aliquem actum moraliter bonum"; q. 2 (f. 130r): "Utrum homo in praesenti statu possit ex suis viribus naturalibus absque Dei auxilio speciali quodlibet peccatum actuale vitare"; d. 29 (f. 133v): "Utrum homo ante peccatum per liberum arbitrium et suae naturae vires praecise absque alio adiutorio Dei fuerit sufficiens ad agendum aliquem actum moraliter bonum seu vere rectum sive virtuosum."

<sup>47</sup> NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *II Sententiarum*, dd. 26-28, q. 1 (Schotten 269, f. 122v): "In praesenti quaestione, in qua doctores sunt adinvicem contrarii, solum recitabo dicta ipsorum, et primo articulo Magistri Gregorii de Arymno." The other ten citations are as follows: "Ex his infert Gregorius" (dd. 26-28, q. 1, f. 123v); "Post hoc adducit Gregorius innumerabiles auctoritates sanctorum et doctorum pro probatione suae conclusionis, quas causa brevitatis praetermitto." (f. 124r); "Et ideo dicit Gregorius de Arym." (f. 125r); "Sed quo ad secundum articulum ostendendum est secundum intentionem Gregorii" (f. 125r); "Dicit Gregorius" (f. 125v); "Consequenter addit Gregorius alias rationes contra sua dicta" (f. 125v); "Contra illas responsiones arguit Gregorius" (f. 126v); "Dicit Gregorius" (f. 126v); "Dicit Gregorius" (f. 127r); "Dicit Gregorius" (d. 29, f. 134v).

<sup>48</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, dd. 26-28, qq. 1-2, et d. 29, ed. TRAPP et al., vol. VI, 22-173.

<sup>49</sup> NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, *II Sententiarum*, d. 29 (Schotten 269, f. 135r): "Vide in Gregorio in illa quaestione et ibi invenies cuiusdam alterius doctoris opinionem."

with a Dominican named Albert inserted into Rimini's question.<sup>50</sup> Dinkelsbühl even inserts into his text what he found in the margins his manuscript of Rimini. As in the case of the question on predestination in book I, in the questions on grace and free will in book II we see Dinkelsbühl beginning to copy something from Rimini in his autograph, changing his mind, and crossing it out, which again demonstrates that manuscript Wien, Schotten 269, is the source for all later redactions.<sup>51</sup>

In accordance with Dinkelsbühl's doctrine of predestination expressed in book I, he answers all three questions in the negative: humans could not and cannot do any good or avoid any sin without God's help in each particular case, even before the fall. Thus, Dinkelsbühl's book II also transmits Rimini's double-predestinarian doctrine. It will suffice to translate the conclusions that Dinkelsbühl borrows from Rimini and defends to get an idea of what Dinkelsbühl's students would have understood.

Dinkelsbühl adopts the following three conclusions from the first question:<sup>52</sup> (1) "No human in the present state, even with God's general influence, can do any morally good act without God's special assistance." (2) "No human [in the present state, even with God's general influence,] can know sufficiently what to will, what not to will, what to do, and what to avoid, without God's special assistance in those things that pertain to the moral life"—that is, we don't even know what is right without God's help. (3) "No human [in the present state, even with God's general influence,] even having sufficient knowledge about what to will, not will, do, or avoid in those things that pertain to the moral life, can will or act in conformity without God's special assistance."

Then Dinkelsbühl copies four conclusions from the second question:<sup>53</sup> (1) "It is not possible for a human in the present state to avoid every sin without God's special help." (2) "No human in the present state is or was able to avoid any of his sins on his own power without God's special assistance." (3) Not verbatim: Even someone in a state of grace cannot avoid all sin without additional special help from God! (4) "A human existing in grace cannot avoid any sin without other special assistance from God."

Finally, Dinkelsbühl takes four conclusions from the third question:<sup>54</sup> (1) "The first human, i.e., Adam, before his fall was not able to do any good act through his own powers

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<sup>50</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, dd. 29, ed. TRAPP et al., vol. VI, 22-173.139-173.

<sup>51</sup> See again the text in parallel columns in our chapter in ROSEMAN, *Mediaeval Commentaries*, vol. II.

<sup>52</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, dd. 26-28, q. 1, a. 1 (24.11-19): "Quarum prima est quod nullus homo in statu praesenti, Dei etiam generali influentia stante, potest absque speciali auxilio eius agere aliquem actum moraliter bonum. Secunda, quod nullus homo etc. potest absque speciali auxilio Dei in his quae ad moralem vitam pertinent sufficienter cognoscere quid volendum vel nolendum, agendum vel vitandum sit. Tertia, quod nullus homo etc., habita etiam sufficienti notitia de aliquo volendo vel nolendo, agendo vel vitando ex his quae ad moralem vitam pertinent, potest absque speciali auxilio conformiter velle vel agere"; NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, Schotten 269, f. 122v, 124r, 124v.

<sup>53</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, dd. 26-28, q. 2, a. 1 (89.5-9): "Prima est quod non est possibile homini in statu praesenti absque speciali adiutorio Dei vitare omne peccatum... Secunda, quod non quodlibet peccatum suum potest homo aliquis in praesenti statu aut potuit propria virtute sine speciali auxilio Dei vitare"; NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, Schotten 269, f. 130r, 131r; GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, dd. 26-28, q. 2, a. 2 (102.3-5 et 104.8-9): "Prima est quod nullus iustus seu habens habitalem gratiam gratum facientem potest sine auxilio Dei alio speciali vitare omne peccatum"; "Secunda conclusio est quod non quodlibet peccatum homo existens in gratia poterit sine alio Dei auxilio speciali vitare," NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, f. 131r.

<sup>54</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, d. 29, a. 1, 116.18-20, 117.18-21, 130.12-15: "Prima est quod primus homo, id est Adam, ante suum lapsum non fuit sufficiens per suas vires sine auxilio generalis influentiae Dei agere aliquem bonum actum"; "Secunda conclusio est quod Adam ante lapsum non fuit per suas vires naturales praecise, etiam cum Dei generali influentia, sufficiens ad agendum aliquem actum moraliter bonum seu vere virtuosum; quinimmo ultra praedicta fuit sibi

without the help of God's general influence." (2) "Before the fall Adam was not able to do any morally good or truly virtuous act through his own natural powers alone, even with God's general influence, but rather beyond those things other special assistance from God was necessary." (3) "Before sin," Dinkelsbühl admits, "Adam was able to do a morally good act without other special assistance from God through his free will, his natural powers, *and* the superadded assistance of grace that he had along with God's general influence." (4) "After his fall, Adam was not able to do any morally good act through his natural powers without God's special assistance."

In both books I and II, therefore, Dinkelsbühl was explicit about whose conclusions, and doctrine, he was presenting. Almost all of Dinkelsbühl's manuscript witnesses are now held in libraries in towns that were in Germanic lands around 1500. Finally, as we have seen, Dinkelsbühl's doctrine could be considered 'official' Viennese doctrine throughout much of the fifteenth century. In sum, it would have been almost impossible for a student of theology at the main German university of the fifteenth century not to be exposed to Rimini's doctrine of predestination, and in fact he would have been encouraged to adopt it. The spread of manuscripts and former students from Vienna would have brought his ideas to neighboring *studia* and universities as well.

One of these *studia* would have been the Augustinian convent at Erfurt, which Luther entered in 1505, having studied at the University of Erfurt since 1501. Moving to the University of Wittenberg, he read the *Sentences* there in 1509-1510 and joined the Faculty of Theology as master in 1512. In 1519, after his revolt had already begun, Luther famously remarked:

It is certain that the so-called 'Modern Theologians', in this point of grace and free will, agree with the Scotists and Thomists except for one whom all condemn, Gregory of Rimini (...) Also these theologians made it absolutely and convincingly clear that they are worse than the Pelagians.<sup>55</sup>

Obviously not all condemned Gregory of Rimini—far from it. But while some scholars have claimed that Rimini was not alone in his opinion, nevertheless, considering the major theologians active after 1250, except for Bradwardine, Luther may have had reason to think that Rimini alone was completely anti-Pelagian. Thus Luther wrote of his opponent John Eck that he "rejected Gregory of Rimini as one who alone supported my opinion against all other theologians."<sup>56</sup>

Yet this was the mature Luther, not the younger Luther, and Luther scholars would prefer to claim that he developed his theory more on his own and only afterwards approved of Rimini's opinion. But there is plenty of evidence that Luther knew some of Rimini's ideas already when acting as bachelor of the *Sentences*. The Young Luther is often called an 'Ockhamist' in his leanings, and this has been reinforced by the knowledge that Luther is known to have used, besides Lombard's own *Sentences*, the commentaries of William of Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, and Gabriel Biel. Both d'Ailly and Biel were known as followers of Ockham, but recent scholarship, while reinforcing this view of Biel, has gone in the other

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necessarium aliud Dei auxilium speciale"; "Tertia conclusio est quod Adam ante peccatum per liberum arbitrium et vires naturales suas ac adiutorium gratiae superadditum, quod habebat simul cum generali Dei influentia, potuit absque alio speciali auxilio Dei agere actum moraliter bonum", NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, Schotten 269, f. 133v, 134r. GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super II Sententiarum*, d. 29, a. 2 (132.26-27): "Adam post suum lapsum non potuit per suas vires naturales absque speciali auxilio Dei facere aliquem actum moraliter bonum," NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, f. 134v.

<sup>55</sup> Quoted in H. OBERMAN, *Forerunners of the Reformation. The Shape of Late Medieval Thought Illustrated by Key Documents*, Philadelphia 1966, 124.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted in H. OBERMAN, *Forerunners*, 124. See generally *ibid.*, ch. 3, and A. MCGRATH, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation. Second Edition*, Oxford 2004, ch. 3.

direction with d'Ailly, who was much more independent and eclectic.<sup>57</sup> In studies from the 1950s, Louis Saint-Blancat pointed out that Pierre d'Ailly often followed and even copied extensively verbatim Rimini's *Sentences* commentary. Since none other than Philip Melanchthon asserted that Martin Luther knew Pierre d'Ailly's *Sentences* commentary by heart, following this thread, Saint-Blancat went on to show that, via d'Ailly, Luther himself knew and even adopted some of Rimini's views already in 1510.<sup>58</sup>

One can now question some of the details of Saint-Blancat's analysis, as well as his suggestion that in one context Luther seems to have read Rimini directly, but it seems clear that Luther would have known Rimini via d'Ailly. Pierre d'Ailly's question on divine foreknowledge is mostly a cut-and-paste rearrangement of Rimini's treatment, and, more importantly, James Halverson notes that in his question on predestination d'Ailly both quotes almost verbatim and explicitly endorses Rimini's position.<sup>59</sup>

Historians have doubted Heiko Oberman's assertions about the existence and importance of a *via Gregorii* in late medieval thought, but Gregory of Rimini's overwhelming influence in this and similar contexts on some of the main German theologians of the later fourteenth century, such as Eltville, Oyta, and Langenstein, and the adoption of Rimini's Double Particular Election as more or less the official doctrine at early fifteenth-century Vienna, suggest that in German-speaking lands the *via Gregorii* was indeed prevalent. Given his close reading of Pierre d'Ailly, his membership in the Augustinian Order, and his later enthusiastic endorsement of Rimini's doctrine, Martin Luther could hardly have been ignorant of his predecessor's soteriology during his advanced theological studies in Wittenberg.

The case of Dinkelsbühl and the University of Vienna at least demonstrates that trained theologians throughout the region would have been receptive to Luther's predestinarian doctrine. The ultimate fate of Gregory of Rimini's teaching is thus tied to external factors. On the one hand, as with the unfortunate Gottschalk of Orbais in the ninth century, Luther carried a complex and, for some, potentially provocative theological message to people who, according to the authorities, were in no position to understand it properly, even if it was within the bounds of medieval orthodoxy.<sup>60</sup> On the other, it was guilt by association, and Saint-Blancat reminds us that Gregory of Rimini's *Sentences* commentary enjoyed much more success in print than did Thomas Aquinas' own commentary, until the "Triumph of Thomism at the Council of Trent,"<sup>61</sup> after which Rimini's work, printed seven times until then, was not edited again until the twentieth century.

## Appendix I

Appendix I contains an edition of the first questions of the Prologue of the *Sentences*

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<sup>57</sup> See now M. CALMA, "Pierre d'Ailly: Le commentaire sur les *Sentences*", *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 49 (2007), 139-194.

<sup>58</sup> L. SAINT-BLANCAT, "Recherches sur les sources de la théologie luthérienne primitive (1509-1510)", *Verbum Caro* 8 (1954), 81-90, and idem, "La théologie de Luther et un nouveau plagiat de Pierre d'Ailly", *Positions Luthériennes* 4 (1956), 61-81. For new research on Luther and the Scholastics, see P. BÜTTGENT, *Luther et la philosophie*, Paris 2011, 155-191.

<sup>59</sup> HALVERSON, *Peter Aureol on Predestination*, 164; BAKKER-SCHABEL, "Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century", 442.

<sup>60</sup> On Gottschalk's troubles, see J. PELIKAN, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)*, Chicago 1978, 80-105, and G. STUCCO, *God's Eternal Gift. A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance*, St. Louis 2009, 213-419, which is an exhaustive survey of medieval views. C. SCHABEL, "Providence, Foreknowledge, and Predestination", in J. WAWRYKOW and T. PRÜGL, eds., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Theology*, forthcoming, provides a brief survey.

<sup>61</sup> SAINT-BLANCAT, "La théologie de Luther", 76.

commentary of Nicholas of Dinkesbühl. According to Stegmüller,<sup>62</sup> Dinkesbühl's Prologue is contained in Wien, Schottenstift 269 (274) (q. 1, ff. 1r-5r; q. 2, ff. 5r-7r; autograph), Wien, Schottenstift 254 (q. 1, f. 37r-42v; q. 2, f. 42v-45v), and Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4820 (*Reportatio* A). In fact, ÖNB 4820 contains a different Prologue, similar to that in Wien, ÖNB 5067. Moreover, a later redaction of the Schotten 269 text is contained in Schotten 254, which is also preserved in Wien, ÖNB 4668 (q. 1, ff. 1-11r; q. 2, ff. 11r-14v) and Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 41 (q. 1, ff. 1-5vb; q. 2, ff. 5vb-7va). Although these three manuscripts are now attributed to different authors, as discussed above, we believe that Dinkelsbühl himself first redacted the text.

Below we print the common text of the first question in these three manuscripts, following Schotten 254 (f. 37r-42v = S). Passages marked in italics represent the material that Dinkelsbühl copied verbatim from Gregory of Rimini, Henry Toting of Oyta, or Thomas Aquinas, which is indicated after the paragraph number in square brackets. \x/ = x is in the margin or above the line. \* = *lectio incerta*.

## Appendix II

Appendix 2 contains an edition of article 2 of distinctions 40-41 of the commentary on book I of the *Sentences* contained in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4820, ff. 116v-120r (= D) and in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4369 (ff. 141v-145v) (= E), formerly attributed to Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach respectively, but probably a version of Dinkelsbühl's commentary modified by George Wetzels of Horaw.<sup>63</sup> Passages in the critical edition of Gregory of Rimini are noted after the paragraph numbers and verbatim quotations from Rimini of four words or more have been put in italics. There is no critical apparatus, since E stems from D: on the 25 occasions in passages from Rimini where D and E disagree, D always agrees with Rimini, except on two occasions where E corrects D in the margin, i.e., an omission *per homoeoteleuton* at "Nihil prodesset" in §8 and the words "ab aeterno" at the end of §27. Otherwise, E has omissions *per homoeoteleuton* of 13 or 14 words in §§11, 35, and 43, and several other variants that must be errors.

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<sup>62</sup> STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium*, n° 560-586, 272-284; cf. MADRE, *Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl: Leben und Schriften*, 72-125.

<sup>63</sup> For parallel passages between Dinkelsbühl's original in Schotten 269 and Wetzels' text printed here, see BRINZEI and SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology", 217-218.

## Appendix I

### Nicolai de Dinkelsbühl *Prologus*

Circa prologum libri Sententiarum quaeritur utrum per discursum theologicum acquiratur scientia proprie dicta.

[1:R1.1-15] Arguitur primo quod sic: *per discursum theologicum acquiritur notitia superior fide*, igitur *notitia scientifica*. Tenet *consequentia*, cum *nulla notitia alia a scientia sit superior fide*. *Antecedens probatur*, quia *alias fidelis huiusmodi theologicos discursus inutiliter exerceret*, quia *non plus postquam ante cognosceret*.

[2:R1.15-19] *Confirmatur*, quia *alias theologus doctus non haberet maiorem notitiam de veritatibus theologicis quam simplex fidelis*, contra Augustinum IX *De Trinitate*,<sup>64</sup> *capitulo primo*, dicentem quod hac “*scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum*.”

[3:R1.20-25] *Secundo arguitur* sic, *ex intentione Augustini Contra epistolam fundamenti*<sup>65</sup> *dicentis*: “*ego namque catholicam fidem profiteor, et per illam ad certam scientiam me perventurum esse praesumo*,” igitur *secundum ipsum habenti fidem convenit pervenire ad scientiam eorum quae creduntur*. Hoc autem non est nisi *per theologicum exercitium et theologicas probationes*, igitur.

[4:R1.26-27] *Confirmatur* illud per beatum Augustinum IX *De Trinitate*<sup>66</sup> dicentem, “*theologia est scientia quae est de rebus quae ad salutem hominis pertinent*.”

[5:R2.1-4] *In oppositum arguitur*: *per nullum discursum non demonstrativum acquiritur notitia scientifica proprie dicta*. Sola enim “*demonstratio est sillogismus faciens scire*”;<sup>67</sup> *sed nullus discursus theologicus est demonstratio, cum quilibet constet ex utraque vel altera premissa credita*.

#### <Notabilia quatuor>

[6:R68.3-9] **Notandum primo** quod *theologia accipitur uno modo pro habitu vel habitibus, quo vel quibus quis novit sensum Sacrae Scripturae exponere, et unum eius dictum per aliud probare, et alia quae non formaliter continentur in ipsa tanquam condiciones ex principiis per viam artis deducere et inferere, et talem habitum quidam vocat declaratorium. Penes hunc modum potest accipi theologia etiam pro actu vel actibus praedictorum habituum*. Secundo modo accipitur theologia pro assensu vel habitu assertivo, vel pro aggregato ex assensibus vel habitibus assertivis per discursus theologicos generatis, eo modo quo totalis geometria dicitur esse una scientia, non unitate simpliciter dicta, sed per aggregationem propter unitatem subiecti ad quod habent attributionem.

[7:R56.3-9] *Propositio prima*:<sup>68</sup> *possibile est quod simpliciter infidelis, qualis est purus gentilis vel paganus, nulli parti Sacrae Scripturae dans fidem, habeat vel acquirat theologiam primo modo dictam*. Probatur, quia staret quod talis studeret sensum Sacrae Scripturae exponere et unum eius dictum per aliud probare etc. et quod tamen toti Scripturae Sacrae dissentiret; igitur etc.

[8] *Propositio secunda*: *theologia primo modo sumpta non est vera scientia theologica, nec per ipsam denominatur quis concretive verus theologus*. Patet, quia illa theologia stat cum

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<sup>64</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 14, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, 424, 61-62).

<sup>65</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *Contra epistolam fundamenti*, 14, 17 (CSEL 25/1, 210, 14-16).

<sup>66</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 14, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, 423-424, 55-57).

<sup>67</sup> ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Posteriora*, 1, 2, 71b18-19.

<sup>68</sup> The list of *propositiones* 1 to 6 is missing in Wien, Schottenstift 269.

dissensu principiorum et conclusionum theologalis scientiae. De isto ergo habitu imaginandum est sicut multi dicunt<sup>69</sup> esse de logica utente.

[9] Propositio tertia: non stat quod in simpliciter infideli acquiratur theologia secundo modo sumpta et hoc de communi cursu et lege. Patet propositio, quia ad hoc quod in aliquo acquiratur theologia illo modo sumpta, de communi lege requiritur quod in eo per discursum theologicum generetur assensus respectu conclusionis; hoc autem non stat nisi per prius assentiat principiis; igitur non est simpliciter infidelis.

[10:R56.7-8] Propositio quarta: quilibet verus et perfectus theologus est utraque theologia praedictis modis sumpta adornatus et habitatus. Patet propositio, quia de communi lege non acquiritur in aliquo perfecte theologia secundo modo sumpta nisi concomitetur vel praecedat habitus quo talis theologus *scit sensum Sacrae Scripturae exponere et unum eius dictum per aliud probare* etc., igitur propositio vera.

[11:R23.24-26] Quinta propositio: verus et perfectus theologus ultra fidelem logicum et fidelem philosophum non theologum habet de credibilibus alteram et certam notitiam. Patet, quia ipse ex articulis fidei, quibus assentit, potest illis qui Scripturas recipiunt etiam infidelibus eosdem articulos persuadere, non quidem immediate inferendo ex per se notis illis, sed vel ex illis quibus ipsi consentiunt ostendendo quod tam vel magis rationabile est consentire nostris sicut his quae ipsi credunt vel concedunt, vel etiam ex probabilibus [S 37v] scilicet ostendendo quod utique magis rationabile sit sic esse quam aliter, et forte hoc non scit *inquantum theologus*, videlicet ex probabilibus procedendo, sed *<in>* quantum *aliae scientiae ancillantur et subserviunt Sacrae Scripturae*.

[12] Confirmatur, nam theologus scit ex Scripturis Sacris articulos fidei defendere, non quidem sophistice, sed fundamentaliter et clare, igitur etc.

[13] Confirmatur secundo, nam theologus scit distincte intelligere et explicare modos quibus se habent ea quae creduntur, ut patet de articulo Trinitatis et corporis Christi, et ex Scripturis potest talia deducere, igitur etc.

[14] Confirmatur tertio, nam theologus ex Scripturis potest ostendere quomodo possit homo distinguere inter legem qua iuste vivitur et illam qua iusticia deseritur et quae sit lex optime regulans hominem in moribus et in tota vita, et quae scitae\* quae opiniones sint vitandae et quae amplectandae, et sic ex Sacra Scriptura docemur adhaerere et consentire multis de quibus parum distincte constat logicis seu philosophiis non theologis, qui tamen habent bonam fidem.

[15:R68.3-9] Propositio sexta: in nullo fideli stat habitus theologalis primo modo dictus sive theologia secundo modo sumpta. Patet, quia non stat quod aliquis sit fidelis et quod sciat *sensum Sacrae Scripturae exponere, et unum eius dictum per aliud probare, et non formaliter contenta in ipsa* ex formaliter contentis tanquam conclusiones ex principiis via artis deducere, et Scripturae non assentire nec fidem dare, igitur etc.

[16:R18.2-4] **Secundo nota quod discursus proprie theologicus est** discursus qui constat ex propositionibus in canone Bibliae contentis vel saltem ex altera huiusmodi, vel ex ea vel his quae in veritatem vel veritates Bibliae tanquam in suum principium vel sua principia, intrinsecum seu extrinsecum vel intrinseca vel extrinseca, resolvi potest vel possunt. [13:R16.21-31] Patet notabile ex intentione beati Dionysii *De divinis nominibus*,<sup>70</sup> capitulo 2. Ibi enim, cum probasset consubstantialitatem trium personarum ex auctoritatibus Sacrae Scripturae, ait: “Si enim est aliquis prorsus divinis eloquiis insurgens, longe erit omnino a sapientia quae apud nos est, et nisi ei curae sit divinae sapientiae eloquiorum, quomodo nos currabimus ei manum porrigere ad theologiam scientiam?” Et sequitur: “Si autem ad eloquiorum veritatem mentem adhibet, isto nos et canone et lumine utentes, ad responsionem potentes sumus et ibimus.” [R18.5-11] Vocat ipsam Scripturam et canonem et lumen. Vocat

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<sup>69</sup> Cf. GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super I Sententiarum, Prologus*, pp. 61, 27-31 et 62, 1-6.

<sup>70</sup> PS-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De Divinis nominibus*, 2, 1 (PG 3, 635C-636C; Dionysiaca I, Bruges 1937, 57-68).



*ergo Dionysius quod non assentienti Sacrae Scripturae eloquio non potest manu ductio fieri ad theologicam scientiam. Cum igitur non aliud sit manu ductio ad theologicam scientiam quam discursus gignitivus theologiae, qui solus proprie dicitur theologicus, sicut et iste proprie dicitur geometricus quo acquiritur geometria, sequitur quod nullus discursus non procedens ex dictis sacri canonis vel illis quae deducuntur ex eis est theologicus.*

[17:R18.21-24] *Secundo patet notabile ex communi animi<sup>71</sup> conceptione. Nam omnes arbitrantur tunc solum aliquid theologicè probare cum ex dictis probant veritatibus. Unde, si quaeratur utrum Deus sit aeternus, et an unus, et probet quis quod sic ex aeternitate motus, \ut processit Philosophus XII Metaphysicae/, [R18.21-30, 19:1-6] alius autem probet ex eo quod scriptum est Iohannis 1<.1>: “In principio erat verbum” etc., sicut probat Augustinus in De fide ad Petrum,<sup>72</sup> capitulo 6, vel si quaeratur utrum Deus aliquo modo sit mutabilis, et probet quis quod non \per rationem sumptam ex motu,/ sicut processit Philosophus VIII Physicorum,<sup>73</sup> alius vero per illud quod scriptum est Exodi 3<.14>: “Ego sum qui sum,” et in Psalmo <101.28>: “Tu autem idem ipse es,” sicut probat Augustinus V De Trinitate,<sup>74</sup> capitulo 2, et De fide ad Petrum, capitulo 7, aut per illud Apostoli 1 Ad Timotheum 6<.16>: “Qui solus habet immortalitatem,” sicut Augustinus probat Contra Maximinum,<sup>75</sup> libro III, non est dubium quin omnes consentiant primas probationes non esse theologicas, et similiter quaslibet alias quae praecipue ex propositionibus sumptis ex humanis scientiis procedunt, reliquas vero et quascumque similes dicerent esse theologicas. Et dixi in notabili “vel ex altera huiusmodi,” quia aliquando in discursu theologico assumitur propositio in lumine naturali evidens.*

[18:Oyta 325.3-15] Et dixi “vel ex his quae in veritates Bibliae tanquam in suum principium vel in sua principia resolvi possunt,” [S 38r] quia aliquando in discursibus talibus ponuntur propositiones quae non formaliter ponuntur in Biblia, sed ex eis quae in Biblia continentur inferri possunt, et aliquando in eis ponuntur propositiones quae nec formaliter in canone Bibliae continentur, nec praecise ex contentis in Biblia formaliter secuntur, principaliter tamen eiusdem Scripturae veritatibus tamquam suis principiis innituntur, ut sunt multae veritates quas oportet firma fide tenere ex auctoritate Ecclesiae, cuius Ecclesiae auctoritas sufficienter fundata est in Scriptura Bibliae. Sunt autem huiusmodi veritates istae quae ab Apostolis ad nos per successorum revelationem vel scripturas fidelium pervenerunt, et consimiles, licet scripturis sacris non inveniuntur insertae, nec ex eis possint necessario argumento concludi, quas tamen Ecclesia recipit traditque nobis credendas, ut habetur per illud Innocentii<sup>76</sup> III, Extra, De celebratione missarum, capitulo “Cum Marthae,” ubi dicitur: “*Multa tam de verbis quam de factis divinis invenimus ab evangelistis obmissa quae Apostoli vel supplesse vel facto expressisse leguntur,*” et subditur de forma conficiendi sacramentum Eucharistiae ut in canone ponitur, quae, licet secundum se totam in Scriptura non reperiatur, credendum tamen est illam Christum tradidisse Apostolis, et ab ipsis ad Ecclesiam pervenisse.

[19:R20.1-16] **Tertio nota quod principia theologiae** praedicto secundo modo *sumptae, quae scilicet per theologicos discursus acquiritur, sunt praecipue veritates Sacri Canonis. Patet, quia ad ipsas stat ultimata resolutio discursus theologici et ex eis primo conclusiones theologiae deducuntur et in eis auctoritas ceterarum veritatum quae etiam ex Ecclesiae auctoritate tenentur fundata est. Conclusiones vero theologiae praedictae voco omnes veritates ex prius dictis veritatibus de necessitate sequentes tanquam ex suis principiis, sive tales sint articuli sive non, sive sint determinatae per Ecclesiam sive non. Ex quo patet quod non solum veritates non secundum se in Sacra Scriptura contentae, ex contentis tamen in ipsa de*

<sup>71</sup> Rimini’s edition has *omnium*, but probably we need to read *animi*.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 6, 49 (CCSL 91A, 745, 1004).

<sup>73</sup> ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, 8, 1-10, 250b11-267b26.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 5, 2, 3 (CCSL 50, 270); FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 7, 50 (CCSL 91A, 745, 1012 et 1016).

<sup>75</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Maximinum*, 1, 4 (PL 42, col. 746).

<sup>76</sup> INNOCENTIUS III, *Cum Marthae*, IV, c. 5 (PL 217, col. 858).

*necessitate sequentes*, sunt conclusiones theologicae, sed etiam multae veritates quae in eadem Scriptura formaliter continentur dicendae sunt theologicae conclusiones, cum multae tales sunt deducibiles ex aliis in Sacra Scriptura contentis tanquam ex suis principiis. Sic enim doctores articulum Trinitatis deducunt ex veritatibus veteris testamenti quas ita intelligunt quod dictam conclusionem in eis noscunt virtualiter contineri, tanquam in suis principiis intrinsecis, ex quibus sciunt eam deducere. Ceterarum autem veritatum ex dictis veritatibus non sequentium, nulla dicenda est conclusio theologica. Patet ista per beatum *Augustinum*, *XIV De Trinitate*,<sup>77</sup> *capitulum 1*, ubi dicit se huic scientiae tribuere “non quicquid ab homine sciri potest in rebus humanis, sed illud tantum quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, et roboratur.” Sed constat quod quodlibet tale vel expresse secundum se continetur in dictis veritatibus vel ex contentis in eis deducitur.

[20:R17.16-23] Ex praedictis sequitur corollariae quod non solum propositiones creditae et determinatae ut credantur sunt propositiones vere theologicae. Probatur: *omnis conclusio sequens vel deducibilis ex propositionibus vere theologicis in discursu theologico est conclusio theologica*, cum praemissae et conclusio debeant esse unigenia. Sed aliqua conclusio non determinata ut credatur est huiusmodi. Multae namque conclusiones ex praemissis theologicis sunt vere theologicae deducibiles quarum oppositae licite tenentur scolastice, sicut etiam fuit de illa: ‘*Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio*’, quae, antequam esset determinata per Ecclesiam, ex eisdem Sacrae Scripturae veritatibus sequebatur, ex quibus nunc postquam est determinata similiter ista: ‘essentia divina non generat necque generatur’.

[21:R325.3-15] **Quarto nota** quod scientia multis modis accipi potest, ut patet per dictum Lincolniensem super *I Posteriorum*.<sup>78</sup> Quidam enim scientiam in genere sic describunt: ‘Scientia est notitia propositionalis adhaesiva cum certitudine penitus formidinem excludente’, et isto modo fides ‘scientia’ dicitur, et notitia/ adhaesiva principiorum per se notorum etiam sic dicitur ‘scientia’. Sed in proposito accipere volo scientiam pro notitia assertiva firma conclusionis vere genita in discursu per notitias assertivas praemissarum et consequentiae [S 38v] necessitantes intellectum ad sic assentiendum, et sic fides sine discursu theologico generata non est scientia. Similiter notitia adhaesiva principiorum per se notorum non est scientia.

[22] Scientiarum secundo modo captarum, ut in proposito accipere volo, quaedam est notitia assertiva firma conclusionis vere genita in discursu per notitias assertivas consequentiae et principiorum, non primorum nec immediatorum, necque in prima et immediata per nos reducibilium, necessitantes intellectum ad sic assentiendum. Alia vero est notitia assertiva firma conclusionis vere genita in discursu per notitias assertivas consequentiae et principiorum <primorum> et immediatorum, vel in prima et immediata per nos reducibilium, necessitantes intellectum ad sic assentiendum. Et scientia illo ultimo modo sumpta dicitur ‘scientia demonstrativa’. Sed modo immediate praecedenti sumpta distinguitur contra demonstrativam scientiam, et communius accepta complectitur utramque, videlicet prout sumitur pro notitia assertiva firma conclusionis vere genita in discursu per notitias assertivas premissarum et consequentiae necessitantes intellectum ad sic assentiendum.

#### <Conclusiones quatuor>

[23] Tunc sit **prima conclusio** ista: theologia non est scientia demonstrativa proprie dicta. Probatur, quia scientia illo modo accepta solum generatur per discursus procedentes ex principiis primis et immediatis, ut patet primo *Posteriorum*.<sup>79</sup> ex definitione demonstrationis strictae acceptae; sed nullus discursus theologicus est ex talibus, cum principia ex quibus constant processus theologici sint credita; igitur etc.

<sup>77</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 14, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, 424, 57-61).

<sup>78</sup> ROBERTUS GROSSETESTE, *Commentarius in Posteriorum analyticorum libros*, Lib. 1, 1, ed. P. ROSSI, Firenze 1981, 94, l. 26-31.

<sup>79</sup> ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Posteriora*, 1, 2, 71b20-22.

[24:R53.7] Hanc conclusionem voluit Gregorius de Arimino,<sup>80</sup> prima quaestione Prologi, articulo 4, ubi dicit *quod ex discursu theologico non acquiritur per se scientia*, sed habitus quidam creditivus et fides acquisita. Ipse namque accepit scientiam stricte, ut in conclusione accipitur conformiter ad strictam acceptionem demonstrationis in primo *Posteriorum*.<sup>81</sup>

[25] Cum quo tamen stat **illa conclusio secunda**: quod theologia est scientia quolibet aliorum modorum praeexpressorum, videlicet accipiendo scientiam pro notitia assertiva firma etc., ut in definitione scientiae dicitur. Probatur: omnis assensus firmus conclusionis vere genitus per notitias assertivas consequentiae et praemissarum necessitantes intellectum ad sic firmiter assentiendum est scientia; *theologia est huiusmodi; igitur*. Maior nota est ex ultimo notabile. Et minor *probatur, quia si theologice probetur conclusio non formaliter posita in Biblia nec per Ecclesiam ad credendum determinata, cui etiam ante huiusmodi probationem non assensisset fidelis, necessitatur talis intellectus ad assentiendum* tali conclusioni. Non enim possibile est quem *assentire* praemissis et consequentiae quin assentiat conclusioni. Et quod necessitetur ad firmiter assentiendum patet, cum nihil obstat unde parveniret formido, cum praemissis supponitur firmiter adhaerere fide et consequentiam noscat esse bonam.

[26] Corollarium: ex studio theologico non solum acquiritur ultra fidem simplicium habitus declarativus seu theologia primo modo sumpta, sed etiam habitus sine formidine adhaesivus. Probatur: ex tali studio, una cum adiutorio luminis fidei, acquiritur habitus assentiendi pluribus conclusionibus ex credentis illatis, igitur.

[27] Corollarium secundum: theologus ex multis propositionis Sacrae Scripturae potest elicere et inferre plures conclusiones quas nec philosophus in lumine naturali nec aliquis ex sola fide sciret elicere. Patet, quia theologus tam de terminis incomplexis talium propositionum quam etiam de ipsis propositionibus habere potest conceptus alterius speciei quam sint conceptus qui de ipsis haberi possunt in solo lumine naturali vel per solam fidem, igitur.

[28] Corollarium tertium: in theologia multiplex reperitur processus requirens notitiam fide simplicium altiore. Probatur: in theologia invenitur processus fidei gignitivus, nutritivus, roborativus, et defensivus, et quilibet eorum ultra fidem simplicium requirit intellectum veritatum theologiarum, igitur corollarium verum.

[29] Consequentia nota, et minor probatur per beatum Augustinum, ut prius allegatum est IX *De Trinitate*,<sup>82</sup> capitulo 1, dicentem “quod huic scientiae tribuendum est illud tantummodo <in> quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur, qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis plurimum polleant ipsa fide.” Sed minorem probat Augustinus<sup>83</sup> ibidem assignando differentiam inter scire per solam fidem et per notitiam altiore fide, dicens: “Aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non est nisi aeterna, aliud autem est scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur, et contra impios [S 39r] defendatur.” Et intelligitur illud corollarium de fide simplicium acquisita et non infusa, cum infusa sit paerfectissimus habitus ipsius intellectus in hac via sibi possibilis.

[30 Thomas, ST, pars 1, q. 1, a. 1] **Tertia conclusio**: theologalis scientia est inter ceteras dignitate prima. Patet, nam una scientia altera dignior probatur ex tribus, scilicet ex obiecto nobiliori condicione, ex mirabiliorum circa obiectum consideratione, ex certiori consideratorum ostensione; sed haec tria theologiae respectu aliarum scientiarum conveniuntur. Maior patet per illud Philosophi in prohemio *De anima*:<sup>84</sup> “Bonorum honorabilium notitiam opinantes magis autem alteram altera, quae est secundum certitudinem, aut ex eo quod

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<sup>80</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super I Sententiarum, Prologus* (vol. I, 42).

<sup>81</sup> ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Posteriora*, 1, 2, 71b23-25.

<sup>82</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 14, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, 424, 59-61).

<sup>83</sup> Ibidem, 14, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, 424, 63-66).

<sup>84</sup> ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, 1, 402a1-2. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *De anima*, lec. 1, n. 6, ed. Marietti 1925, 1a.

meliorum aut mirabiliorum est.” Sed minor probatur, primo quod sit de obiecto nobiliori, quia ipsa Sacra theologia pro obiecto habet Deum. Sed quod etiam excedat alias scientias ex mirabiliorum circa obiectum consideratione patet, quia ipsa est de his quae sua altitudine transcendunt rationem naturalem, aliae vero scientiae considerant sua obiecta tantum quantum rationem subduntur. Sed quod excedat alias exteriori consideratorum ostensione *patet, quia aliae scientiae certitudinem habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanae, quae potest errare, haec autem scientia certitudinem habet ex lumine divinae scientiae, quae decipi non potest.*

[31] Confirmatur, nam quod theologia certissimis utatur processibus constat ex altissimo magistro doctoris Christi, qui, eam quasi per experientiam fundans, simul ‘coepit facere et docere’,<sup>85</sup> cum fecit caecum videre, claudum currere, mortuum resurgere, et consequenter apostoli plurima nostra fidei mysteria et principia ceperunt per experimenta in Christi transfiguratione, in ipsius resurrectione et ascensione, et Spiritus Sancti missione. Igitur patet conclusio.

[32] Propositio annexa: quamvis omnia opera miraculosa quae umquam apparuerunt exterius ultra influentiam generalem Deus decrevisset esse de communi cursu huius mundi/, adhuc non sufficeret huiusmodi generalis influentia ad inveniendum omnes theologicis veritates. Patet, quia ex his non potuisset quis scivisse personarum trinitatem et ipsarum ad intra emanationes.

[33] **Conclusio quarta:** nostra theologia vere est et dici debet sapientialis notitia seu sapientia. Probatur, quia sibi conveniunt condiciones sapientiae proprie dictae, igitur etc. Maior probatur, quia Aristoteles prohemio *Metaphysicae*<sup>86</sup> ponit sex condiciones sapientis: prima est quod ipsum contingit omnia scire, et illa convenit theologiae, quia de omnibus habet considerare, scilicet de Deo et creaturis, de rebus et signis, ut apparet per Magistrum,<sup>87</sup> libro primo, distinctione prima. Secunda condicio, quod contingat ipsum difficilissima scire, et hoc convenit theologiae, quae altissima divinitatis mysteria considerat. Tertia, quod sciat ea certe, et quod illa condicio theologiae conveniat patet ex probatione praecedentis conclusionis. Quarta, quod consideret causas causarum, et illa sibi competit, quia considerat causam primam efficientem et omnium finalissimam. Quinta, quod sit sui gratia, et illa sibi convenit, cum ipsa non sit propter alias, sed omnes aliae propter ipsam. Sextam, quod ordinet et non ordinetur, et illa etiam sibi conveniet, quia ipsa omnes scientias alias habet ordinare et in usum suum attrahere et non e converso.

[34] Propositio annexa: theologia respectu omnium aliarum scientiarum est architectonica. Probatur: scientia civilis seu politica est architectonica, quia ipsa omnibus aliis scientiis humanis quae vigere debent in civitate imperat circa quamlibet earum studium debitum et operationes debitas, prout est communis rei publicae praeceptive ordinando; sed ipsa theologia est scientia politica seu civilis, quo ad universalem regimen civitatis omnium viatorum; igitur ipsa inter ceteras est architectonica.

[35] Propositio secunda: quemadmodum obiectum proprium sacrae theologiae est Deus omnium, ita et ipsa proportionali modo est domina et divina scientiarum. Patet ex dictis.

[36] Propositio tertia: quamvis theologia nostra inferior sit scientia demonstrativa, quae de eisdem obiectis haberi potest, vel forte de facto habetur a beatis in patria, non tamen oportet quod ipsa propter hoc sit inferior scientia demonstrativa naturali vel metaphysica. Patet propositio ex dictis, nec obstat dictum Hugonis dicentis ‘fidem mediare inter opinionem et scientiam’,<sup>88</sup> quia dictum suum debet intelligi quando ista habent esse circa idem.

[37] Quarta propositio: theologia propriissime est et dici debet notitia divina. Probatur: talis scientia propriissime dici debet notitia divina quae est de Deo, quo ad veritates et modum

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<sup>85</sup> ACT. 1, 1.

<sup>86</sup> ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, 1, 1, 982a-b.

<sup>87</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, d. 1. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *In I Metaphysicae*, lec. 2, n. 51sq.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, II<sup>a</sup> II<sup>ae</sup>, q. 1, a. 2, s. c.

docendi naturalem industriam excedentem; sed sic est de theologia; igitur. [S 39v] Maior nota, sed minor patet, quia ipsa est a Deo et de Deo et ductiva ad Deum modo quodam divinitus revelato omnem modum humanae investigationis mere in naturali lumine, tam in speculativis quam in practicis, excedente, igitur.

<Argumenta contra primam conclusionem>

[38: ~23:R42.12-19] Contra primam conclusionem et dicta de principiis theologiae arguitur sic: *Omnis habitus qui innititur medio necessario est proprie scientificus; sed theologia est huiusmodi; igitur etc.* Maior nota, sed minor probatur, *nam theologia innititur huic medio: omne revelatum a Deo est verum; sed omne contentum in Sacra Scriptura est revelatum a Deo; igitur omne contentum in Sacra Scriptura est verum.* Maior nota, et minor probatur, quia omne tale contentum *revelatum est ab illo qui opera faciebat supernaturalia, quae necessario arguebant causam supernaturalem, sicut effectus naturales arguunt causam naturalem. Causa autem supernaturalis Deus \est/, ut notum est.* Ex hac autem conclusione: ‘*omne contentum in Sacra Scriptura est verum*’, quae praedicto modo probata est, concluditur quilibet articulus fidei esse verus, immo et quodlibet in Biblia assertive positum. Ex quo consequenter concluditur: talis articulus vel aliud contentum in Scriptura Sacra et demonstrative probatur, cum ei assentiatur propter talem argumentationem. Exemplum: quia Iudaei vetus testamentum accipiunt, si ergo Iudaeo neganti articulum Trinitatis sic arguitur: ‘*omne assertive positum in Veteri Testamento est verum; sed articulus Trinitatis est ibi positus assertive; igitur est verus*’, tunc conclusione firmiter assentiet et consimiliter maiori. Et si eo modo quo doctores articulum Trinitatis ex Veteri Testamento deducunt sibi minor declaretur, in tantum quod ei firmiter assentiret, tunc etiam simul assentiret firmiter conclusioni quae est de terminis secundae intentionis, ex qua sine ulteriori rationatione reflecteretur super articulum Trinitatis, ei assentiendo firmiter propter talem argumentationem. Et sic extendendo nomen demonstrationis sicut et nomen scientiae, esset sibi articulos Trinitatis demonstrativus ex principiis extrinsecis.

[39:Oyta, Paris, BnF 15987, f. 2v.3-15] Pro quo consequenter notandum quod ad demonstrandum aliquam conclusionem possunt haberi duplicia principia, scilicet intrinseca et extrinseca. *Intrinseca sunt ex quibus concluditur propositio per causas vel proprietates vel habitudines intrinsecas rei per conclusionem significatae. Exemplum: ut ad concludendum quod triangulus habet tres etc., inventa sunt principia intrinseca, scilicet definitiones, petitiones, et communes animi conceptiones, et alie propositiones sumptae ex habitibus angulorum extrinsecorum trianguli rectilinei ad angulos intrinsecos eiusdem, ut patet primo Euclidis.*<sup>89</sup> Sic similiter si quis istam: ‘*Deus est trinus et unus*’, concluderet ex propositionibus formatis de Deo significantibus determinate Deum, et proprietates seu habitudines divinas ex quibus necessario sequitur ‘*Deum esse trinum et unum*’, ut forte aliquis Beatus sciret facere, talis concluderet hoc ex principiis intrinsecis. Et si assentiret praemissis, etiam assentiret conclusioni firmiter tanquam sibi probate extrinsecis principiis.

[40] Extrinseca vero principia sunt ex quibus aliquid concluditur per causas vel proprietates vel habitudines extrinsecas, ut si quis aliquando ex principiis intrinsecis scivit demonstrare quod triangulus habet tres etc., et si modo est oblicus, tamen recordatur se scivisse, talis potest sic arguere: ‘*omne demonstrabile est verum; triangulum habere tres etc. est huiusmodi; igitur.* Ex quo statim assentit isti: ‘*omnis triangulus habet tres*’, sibi sic demonstratae per extrinseca principia. Et sic suo modo demonstratur ista per principia extrinseca: ‘*Deus est trinus et unus*’, ut in exemplo posito de Iudaeo. Et similiter omne positum assertive in Sacra Scriptura potest demonstrari per principia extrinseca, eo modo quo procedit argumentum virtute talis medii: ‘*omne revelatum a Deo est verum*’.

[41:R49.12-19] Secundo sic: *omnis habitus procedens ex principiis sibi creditis, notis autem in lumine superioris scientiae, est proprie scientia, licet subalternata. Patet de musica, quae est scientia proprie subalternata, quia procedit ex principiis sibi creditis et notis in*

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<sup>89</sup> EUCLIDES, *Geometricorum elementorum libri XV*, Lib. 1, prop. 9-10 (ed. Paris 1516, f. 8v-9r).

*arithmetica, et idem est de perspectiva, quae credit principia quae nota sunt in geometria. Sed theologia procedit ex principiis in ea tantum creditis, qualia sunt articuli et alia contenta in Sacra Scriptura, notis autem in lumine superioris scientiae, scilicet Dei et beatorum. Igitur etc.* [S 40r].

[42:R49.25-28] Tertio: *perspectiva est scientia distincta a geometria, et tamen ut sic non habet notitiam suorum principiorum. Igitur si aliquis haberet perspectivam non habens geometriam, iste tantum crederet sua principia, et tamen esset vere sciens. Sic est in proposito de theologia nostra, igitur.*

[43:R49.29-32] Confirmatur: *Deus posset conservare in intellectu alicuius habitum perspectivae non conservando in eo habitum geometriae; sed in tali intellectu scientia perspectiva esset mere subalternata, et tamen de suis principiis iste non haberet notitiam, sed fidem tantum.*

[44:R40.22-24; 41.1-8] Quarto: *omnia quae continentur in Sacra Scriptura sunt per se nota vel ex per se notis deducta, igitur discursus ex eis constituti sunt vere demonstrativi et assensus geniti proprie scientia. Antecedens probatur, quia nullus tenetur dubitanter credere aliquid quod non est sibi per se notum, vel sibi ex per se notis deductum; sed quilibet catholicus tenetur indubitanter credere articulos fidei et alia in Sacra Scriptura contenta; igitur illi sunt sibi per se noti vel sunt sibi ex per se notis deducti. Minor est nota, quia qui dubitat in fide, infidelis est et peccat. Non peccaret autem si non teneretur eos indubitanter credere. Maior probatur, quia nullus tenetur firmitus adhaerere propositioni quam sit certitudo notitiae propter quam adhaeret ei. Hoc patet, quia conclusio non debet excedere certitudinem principii. Sed nulla notitia non per se nota nec ex per se notis deducta est certa infallibiliter. Igitur nullus tenetur credere infallibiliter quod non est sibi per se notum vel ex per se notis deductum.*

[45:R41.11-14] Quinto: *“propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis”; sed quicumque credit, ideo credit quia constat sibi antecedenter; ergo notitia qua constat sibi debet esse certior ipsa fide. Nulla autem notitia est certior ipsa fide, nisi per se nota aut ex per se notis deducta; igitur.*

[46:R41.25-31] Sexto: *nullus habitus neuter ad utrumque oppositorum determinatur ad unum illorum, nisi mediante habitu determinate respiciente alterum illorum, nisi a casu determinetur; sed fides est habitus neuter ad verum et falsum sicut et opinio, et fides nunc determinata est ad verum et non a casu; ergo mediante habitu. Talis autem habitus non est opinio, igitur est scientia proprie dicta.*

[47:R41. 32-34 et 42.1-10] Septimo sic: *non est procedendum in infinitum in creditis, igitur oportet devenire in unum primum creditum vel plura primo credita. Tunc de primo credita quaero: cur sibi assentis\*? Aut enim assentis sibi propter se vel propter aliud creditum. Non propter aliud creditum, quia ipsum ponitur primum creditum. Si propter se, ergo est per se notum. Nullum enim non per se notum, cum sit inferioris ordinis, potest causare assensum alicuius per se noti quod est superioris ordinis. Si vero assentis propter per se notum, tunc ipsum est deductum ex per se noto, quod sufficit ad propositum.*

[48:R21.1-8] Octavo contra hoc quod dictum fuit in notabilibus, quod principia theologiae sint contenta in Sacra Scriptura, arguitur sic: *nulla scientia procedit ad sua principia concludenda, sed potius ex eis ad alia. Theologia procedit ad concludendum articulos et similiter alia quae expresse in Sacra Scriptura ponuntur. Unde omnes doctores theologi formant quaestiones de articulis fidei, ut utrum Deus sit tantum unus, utrum omnipotens et immensus, et sic de aliis articulis et contentis in Sacro Canone, et ad eos declarandum et concludendum procedunt. Igitur contenta in Sacra Scriptura non sunt principia, vel saltem theologia non est scientia, quod erit contra secundam conclusionem etc.*

<Responsiones ad argumenta contra primam conclusionem>

[49: ~38:R42.15] Ad rationes istas respondetur. Ad primam dicit Gregorius de Arymino<sup>90</sup> negando maiorem, quia requiritur etiam quod sit ex primis veris et immediatis, vel ex his quae ex primis veris et immediatis per nos sunt deducibilia, et si hoc additur in maiore, negatur minor. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur “*theologia innititur* [S 40v] *huic principio: ‘omne revelatum a Deo est verum etc.’*,” [R 45.5-15] respondetur quod, licet illa consequentia sit bona, tamen praemissae non sunt nobis evidentes, immo solum creditae, immo maiorem negarent forte philosophi qui dixerunt ‘Deum nihil extra se intelligere’. Non ergo est per se nota. Aliqui etiam *tenent quod Deus posset alicui falsum revelare. Minor etiam non est per se nota, nec ex per se notis nobis deducta, quia mere creditum est quod contenta in Sacra Scriptura sint a Deo revelata. Per nullam enim viam hoc scimus, nisi quia hoc Ecclesia credit, et sic audivimus a patribus nostris, et sic in praedicta Sacra Scriptura continetur. Sed constat quod illud non reddit nobis hoc per se notum nec ex per se notis deductum.* Et cum dicitur quod “*contenta in Sacra Scriptura sunt revelata per illum qui facit miracula*” etc., dicitur quod etiam illa non est per se nota nec ex per se notis notificabilis nobis, sed mere manet credita.

[50: ~41:R51.1-12] Ad secundam dicitur quod ad generandam scientiam in uno non sufficit principia esse alteri nota, quoniam per nullam notitiam existentem in alio potest immediate et naturaliter acquiri scientia in mente mea. Cum igitur principia theologiae non sint nec fuerint nobis per se nota, constat quod theologia quae acquiritur de communi lege in theologis non est proprie scientia. Etiam si scientia subalternata potest acquiri suis principiis non evidenter notis acquirenti, sed tantum creditis, notis autem habenti superiorem scientiam, eadem ratione scientia non subalternata poterit acquiri ab aliquo, esto quod non noverit eius principia, dummodo credat illa et alius novit. Non enim ratio potior est hinc quam inde. [R51.21-30] Nullus autem diceret habitum sic acquisitum esse scientiam proprie dictam. Et quod addebatur de musica respectu arithmeticae, dicitur quod si aliquis ignorat arithmeticae et nisi principia musicae per experientiam vel alio modo nosceret, sed tantummodo crederet, non acquireret musicam, quae esset scientia proprie dicta, sed tantum habitum creditivum vel scientiam communiter dictam. Et sic est de nostra theologia, cuius principia non sunt nobis evidenter, igitur etc.

[51:R52.20-22] Ad tertiam dico quod non omnis perspectiva est scientia proprie dicta, sed ista dumtaxat quae est evidens notitia ex evidente notitia suorum principiorum immediate vel mediate genita. Si autem aliqua acquireretur et non ex principiis, ista non esset scientia proprie dicta, sed tantum creditivus habitus vel scientia communiter accepta; sic de theologia.

[52: ~43:R52.28-32] Ad confirmationem dicitur quod, si aliquam perspectivam, quae nunc de facto est scientia, Deus conservaret absque geometria, adhuc ipsa esset scientia apta nata in actus similes in quos nunc potest, si cetera pariter concurrerent. Non autem ex hoc sequitur quod perspectiva quae acquireretur in aliquo carente geometria esset scientia.

[53: ~ 44:R47.29-32, 48.1-14] Ad quartam negatur assumptum. Ad probationem negatur maior – et merito, cum expresse dicat Apostolus<sup>91</sup> quod fides est “argumentativa\* non apparentium” et quod “sine fide impossibile est placere Deo.” Igitur secundum eum tenemur credere non apparentia, et per consequens non per se nota aut ex talibus deducta. Augustinus quoque XIII De Trinitate,<sup>92</sup> capitulo 1, inquit: “Propterea credere iubemur quia id quod credere iubemur videre non possumus.” Ad probationem, cum dicitur quod nullus tenetur firmitus adhaerere propositioni quam sit certitudo notitiae propter quam illi adhaereret, ista concedetur cum tali condicione, scilicet si ille teneatur adhaerere propositioni praecipue propter certitudinem notitiae. Ubi autem non subest dicta condicio, propositio est simpliciter neganda. In proposito autem non subest, quoniam non praecipue propter certitudinem notitiae proprie loquendo sive conclusionis sive principiorum tenetur catholicus adhaerere talibus, quin

<sup>90</sup> GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super I Sententiarum, Prologus* (vol. I, 42).

<sup>91</sup> HEB. 11, 1 et 11, 6.

<sup>92</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 13, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, 383, 76-77).

*immo quicquid sibi proponitur per scripturam vel Ecclesiam credendum, nulla alia notitia habita, tenetur credere.*

[54: ~45] Ad quintam, cum dicitur in minore, “sed quicumque credit ideo credit quia constat sibi ante” etc., si ista sic intelligitur: ‘quicumque credit aliquid, ipsi constat illud per aliquam notitiam evidentem quae se sola inductiva est fidei necessitando intellectum ad sic assentiendum’, tunc neganda est minor, quia aliquis credit aliquid, scilicet Deum esse trinum et unum, quod nullomodo constat sibi sic anteceder, licet [S 41r] quandoque ad generationem fidei anteceder concurrant apparentiae aliquae vel notitiae assertivae causantes apparentiam aliquam de hoc quod talis articulus sit verus, ut quod merito credendum est praelato vel Ecclesiae iubenti talem articulum credere. Talis autem apparentia non sufficit per se et sine aliis ad causandum firmum assensum de talibus. Si autem alio modo intelligitur minor praedicta, tunc non est contra conclusionem, vel non ad propositum.

[55: ~46] Ad sextam, cum dicitur, “nullus habitus neuter” etc., negatur maior, quia aliquis habitus formaliter neuter determinari potest per apparentias supervenientes de novo, vel per revelationem, vel per alium concursum divinum etc. Cum dicitur in minori, “fides est habitus neuter ad verum et ad falsum,” si intelligitur hoc de fide nostra, negandum est, quia fidei nostrae subesse falsum non est possibile. Si autem intelligitur de fide universaliter, prout extendit se ad omnem credulitatem, prout II *Metaphysicae* dicitur quod “fides vulgi fortior est fide philosophorum,”<sup>93</sup> tunc admissa illa negatur ista consequentia: ‘fides nostra determinata est et non a casu, ergo mediante habitu’, intelligendo consequens de habitu qui non est fides. Non enim requiritur talis habitus distinctus ab habitu fidei, qui determinet ipsum ad verum, cum ipse sit determinatus in se ad verum.

[56: ~55] Sed dicit\* aliquis, quare habitus fidei nunc inclinatur ad credendum ‘Christum incarnatum esse’? Consimilis in specie inclinavit plus ad credendum ‘Christum incarnandum esse’, cum sit agens mere naturale et irrationale. Et per consequens semper movere debet eodemmodo.

[57: ~56] Respondetur quod hoc ideo est quia prius fuit coniunctus apparentiis et considerationibus quibus verisimiliter apparuit ‘Christum incarnandum’. Nunc vero coniunctus est apparentiis et considerationibus quibus verisimiliter apparet Christum esse incarnatum.

[58] Et si quaeras, ‘quae fuerunt illae considerationes et apparentiae tam diversae, propter diversitatem temporis praeteriti et futuri?’ respondetur quod pro tempore veteris legis apparentiae et considerationes fuerunt prophetaicae locutiones et divinae revelationes respectu futuri; nunc in lege nova sunt testimonia apostolorum quibus revelavit Christus personaliter secreta fidei nostrae, clariori et altiori modo quam umquam antea fuerunt revelata alicui prophetae. Istis autem prophetis et apostolis inducimur ad credendum propter vitae sanctitatem, miraculorum operationem, et alia quae concurrere debent ad hoc ut ipsis tamquam authenticis fidei nostrae promulgationibus credatur.

[59] Et cum dicitur, “fides est agens naturale et irrationale,” respondetur quod, licet fides sit agens naturale et irrationale, tamen est instrumentum spiritus sancti, quod ipse dirigere potest ad cuiuslibet veritatis inclinationem.

[60] Sed dicis: ‘ex hoc sequi videtur quod habens fidem infusam cum apprehensione articulorum statim produceret actum creditivum, eo quod fides est instrumentum Spiritus Sancti, quod ipse dirigere potest ad cuiuslibet veritatis cognitionem, quod tamen experimur in nobis esse falsum’.

[61: ~60] Respondetur quod de communi lege habitus fidei infusus cum actuali apprehensione articulorum credendorum non sufficit ad causandum assensum creditivum, sed ultra hoc requiritur aliquid, scilicet aliqua apparentia, et cum hoc imperium voluntatis.

[62: ~47] Ad septimam concedo primum a me creditum et illi assentio non propter se tamquam per se notum vel ex per se notis mihi deductum, nec propter aliud creditum, nec

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<sup>93</sup> AVERROERS, *Prol. III Physica*. Cfr THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 3, ad. 3.



propter aliud per se notum ex quo mihi sit evidenter deductum, sed propter apparentiam quam habeo de ipso una cum aliis causis dictis.

[63: ~48] Ad octavam, cum dicitur, “nulla scientia procedit ad probandum sua principia” etc., ista maior non est universaliter vera, quia aliqua principia alicuius scientiae possunt esse \non/ prima, sed conclusiones respectu primorum et per ista probari. Sed si intelligitur de simpliciter primis principiis alicuius scientiae, tunc verum est quod non probat\* talia sua principia ex propriis, cum quo stat quod recipienti aliquam scientiam ostendatur veritas istorum principiorum ex contentis in ista scientia, scilicet exponendo passus eius in quibus principia ipsius exprimuntur vel innuuntur esse vera. Et assumptis aliquibus aliis veris eiusdem scientiae vel alterius, possunt principia alicuius scientiae concludi ut ipsa magis explicite possint intelligi et contra infideles et haereticos defendi, et hoc potissime fit in theologia, cuius principia non sunt ex se evidenter, sed fide credita. De hoc quaere ante in prima obiectione ad hoc signum !8!<sup>94</sup> usque ad secundam rationem.

[64: ~48] Et tunc ulterius,<sup>95</sup> cum dicitur, “omnes doctores theologi formant quaestiones <de> [S 41v] articulis fidei,” dicitur quod de aliquo potest quaeri dupliciter: uno modo quia de ipso dubitatur, et sic dicitur I *Topicorum*<sup>96</sup> quod quaestio est dubitabilis propositio, et sic non formant doctores theologi quaestiones de articulis etc. Alio modo quaeritur de aliquo non quod de ipso dubitetur, sed ut, inductis aliorum rationibus et opinionibus, dubia eorum quae ipsi habebant circa illud dissolvantur, et ita magis appareat veritas, et etiam ut modi falsi intelligendi quos aliqui habent de quo quaeritur excludantur et veri modi exprimantur, ut patet de articulo Trinitatis circa quem erraverunt haeretici, et etiam incarnationis et pluribus aliis. Illo modo non est inconveniens aliquam scientiam quaerere de suis principiis, et ita theologi etiam formant quaestiones de suis principiis.

<Argumenta contra secundam conclusionem et responsiones ad ea>

[65: ~25:R53, 14-23] Contra secundam conclusionem, in qua dicitur quod theologia sit scientia, arguit Gregorius primo sic: «*omnis discursus per quem per se acquiritur scientia est ex propositionibus primis et immediatis vel ex his quae per tales immediate vel mediante notae sunt*; sed processus theologicus non est ex talibus, cum sit ex creditis; igitur. Maior patet ex I *Posteriorum*,<sup>97</sup> ubi Philosophus dicit quod “*sine his est utique syllogismus*,” sed “*non faciet scientiam*.”

[66] Confirmatur: *omnis discursus “per se faciens scire est demonstratio”; sed discursus theologicus non est demonstratio; igitur.* Maior nota, sed minor patet, quia *alias etiam infidelem in naturalibus bene dispositum faceret scire et assentire conclusioni theologicae, quod est falsum.*

[67] *Secundo, nullus discursus primo innitens auctoritati generat intelligenti scientiam; sed omnis discursus theologicus est huiusmodi; igitur. Minor patet, quia ex auctoritate sola fides gignitur*, ut patet per beatum Augustinum<sup>98</sup> in *De utilitate credendi*.

[68] Confirmatur, quia vel praemissae in discursu theologico sunt magis notae quam conclusio vel non. Si secundum, non est processus scientificus. Si primum, tunc, cum praemissae solum sint creditae, sequitur quod conclusio non sit scita.

[69: ~65] Ad primam istarum, “omnis discursus” etc., nego maiorem. Ad Philosophum dico quod ipse loquebatur de scientia strictissime capta, et per consequens solum de una specie

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<sup>94</sup> Vide supra [§38].

<sup>95</sup> PETRUS AUREOLUS, *Scriptum in I librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. E.M. Buytard, St. Bonaventure New York 1952, 139, 21-32).

<sup>96</sup> BOETHIUS, *In Topica Ciceronis*, I (PL 64, 1048D) et etiam BOETHIUS, *De differentiis topicis* (PL 64, 1177C, a new edition D.Z. NIKITAS, *De topicis differentiis kai hoi buzantines metafraseis tou Manouel Holobolou kai Prochorou Kudone*, Athens-Paris-Brussels 1969).

<sup>97</sup> ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Posteriora*, 1, 2, 71b23-25.

<sup>98</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De utilitate credendi*, 11, 25 (PL 42, col. 83).

ipsius scientiae, et non de scientia communiter sumpta. Sed quod solum de una specie locutus sit patet, quia ipse conformiter ad strictam acceptionem demonstrationis accipit scientiam. Constat autem quod ibi Aristoteles describit demonstrationem propter quid, et per consequens etiam secundum eum scientia quia est non esset scientia, quod reputo falsum.

[70: ~66] Eodem modo respondetur ad confirmationem negando maiorem, et hoc si demonstratio capitur stricte. Si autem caperetur large correspondentem ad largam acceptionem huius nominis ‘scientia’, tunc negaretur minorem. Et quando dicitur, “tunc etiam simpliciter infidelem faceret scire,” nego consequentiam, quia dico quod oportet praecedere fidem. “Nisi enim *credideritis, non intellegitis*,” scribitur in Isaia <7.9>.

[71: ~67:R53.24] *Ad secundam*, “*nullus discursus primo innitens auctoritati*” etc., distinguo maiorem, quia vel ly ‘primo’ dicit ordinem vel adaequationem. Si dicit ordinem, negatur maior, quia stat aliquem discursum primo inniti auctoritati sic quod ordine temporis aut naturae auctoritatem praesupponat, propter quam assentiatur illis sine quibus talis discursus fieri non potest, et tamen talis discursus scientiam generat.

[72: ~67] *Ad probationem* dico quod, licet ex auctoritate praecedente sine adiuncto sola fides gignatur, ipsa tamen praesupposita, per rationem quam studiosa mens illustrata fide invenit generatur scientia. Si vero ly ‘primo’ dicit adaequationem, ut sit sensus ‘nullus discursus adaequate seu praecise innitens auctoritati generat scientiam,’ tunc concessa maiore negetur minor. Unde dico quod omnis talis discursus innititur auctoritati sic quod neganti Scripturam sacram non posset a theologo ostendi vel probari veritas theologica. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod praecise innitatur auctoritati et nullo modo rationi.

[73: ~68] *Ad confirmationem* dico quod praemissae in discursu theologico sunt magis notae theologo assentiendi Scripturae Sacrae quam conclusio. Et quando arguitur, “praemissae solum sunt creditae,” nego, et dico quod ultra simplicem fidem sunt amplius intellectae, cum theologus habeat de credibilibus notitiam fide simplicium altiore. Et ergo habitus ille acquisitus—non loquor de infuso, quem Gregorius de Arimino vocat creditivum—potest esse maior respectu unius credibilis quam respectu alterius quod ex illo theologice deducitur et cum notitia consequentiae necessitare intellectum [S 42r] credentis ad assentiendum conclusioni, et per consequens generare scientiam de qua hic est mentio. Ex quo sequitur quod theologiam dicentes esse scientiam et Gregorius negans ipsam esse scientiam solum discordant in quid nominis, quia hoc nomine ‘scientia’ non praecise eodem modo utuntur, sed ipse strictius et alii communius. Sed ponentes ex studio theologico solum acquiri habitum declarativum et non sine formidine adhaesivum respectu veritatum theologicarum in re discordant a praedictis et falsum ponunt, ut patet ex corollario primo secundae conclusionis.

<Argumenta contra tertiam conclusionem et responsiones ad ea>

[74: ~30] Contra tertiam conclusionem, in qua dicitur quod est dignitate prima, arguitur sic: scientiae humanitas inventae certiores sunt theologia nostra, igitur ipsa non est aliis dignitate prior. Tenet consequentia ex prohaemio<sup>99</sup> *De anima*, ut pro conclusione allegatum est. Antecedens probatur: scientiae humanae innituntur principiis evidentibus, de quibus nullus dubitare potest; sed nostra theologia innititur articulis fidei, qui dubitationem bene recipiunt, immo de facto multi eos negant; igitur humanae scientiae principia habent certiora quam nostra theologia, et per consequens ipsae sunt certiores.

[75: Thomas: Ia, IIe, Q. 1, art. 5] *Secundo, nostra theologia multas veritates recipit a philosophicis disciplinis, igitur ipsa est inferior eis. Consequentia tenet, quia inferioris scientiae est a superiori accipere, sicut musica accipit ab arithmetica. Et antecedens est de intentione beati Hieronymii in epistola Ad magnum oratorem urbis Romae,*<sup>100</sup> *dicentem quod doctores antiqui in tantum philosophorum doctrinis refarserunt libros, ut nescias quid in illis prius admirari debeas, eruditionem saeculi, an scientiam scripturarum.*

<sup>99</sup> Vide supra, n. 89.

<sup>100</sup> HIERONYMUS, *Epistula ad Magnum*, ep. 70, (PL 22, col. 668).

[76: ~74:Thomas:Ia, IIe, Q. 1, art. 5] *Ad primum istorum dicendum quod certitudo dupliciter potest considerari, ut dicit Sanctus*<sup>101</sup> *Thomas, IIa, IIae quaestione 4, articulo 8: uno modo ex causa certitudinis, et sic fides est certior sapientia, scientia, et intellectu per humanam inventionem habitis, quia fides innititur divinae veritati, tria autem praedicta innituntur humanae rationi. Alio modo <potest> considerari certitudo ex parte cognoscentis seu subiecti recipientis, et tunc dicitur esse certius illud quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis. Et ex hac parte fides est minus certa, saltem quo ad aliquid, quia est de his quae sunt supra intellectum hominis. Sed quia unumquodque iudicatur simpliciter secundum causam suam, secundum dispositionem autem quae est ex parte subiecti iudicatur secundum quid, inde est quod fides est simpliciter certior. Per hoc ad formam argumenti, cum arguitur “scientiae humanitus inventae” etc., negatur argumentum.*

[77:Thomas Ia, IIe, Q. 1, art. 5, ad. 1] *Ad probationem, cum arguitur, “quia scientiae humanitus inventae innituntur” etc., negatur consequentia, scilicet quod “igitur scientiae humanitus inventae habent principia certiora quam nostra theologia et hoc simpliciter loquendo.” Nihil enim prohibet illud quod est secundum naturam et simpliciter certius esse quo ad nos minus certum propter debilitatem intellectus nostri qui se habet manifestissima naturae sicut oculus nocticoracis ad lumen solis, II Metaphysicae.*<sup>1</sup> *Item, cum certitudo notitiae\* possit considerari et attendi ex firmitate consideratorum, iterum theologia est ceteris quo ad hoc certior. Non tamen propter hoc oportet quod ea quae in theologia considerantur sint nobis evidentiora singulis in aliis scientiis consideratis.*

[78: ~75:Thomas Ia, IIae, q. 1, art. 5] *Ad secundam, “nostra theologia multas veritates recipit” etc., negatur consequentia. Ad probationem concedo quod inferioris scientiae est a superiori accipere, et hoc praecipue sua principia. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod omnis scientia ab alia recipiens sit inferior ea, nisi tunc recipiat ab ea sua principia quibus necessario indiget ad probandas suas conclusiones. Sed sic non est in proposito, quia theologia non accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem, nec etiam accipit veritates ab aliis tamquam sibi necessariis in se propter defectum vel insufficientiam suam, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui per tales veritates naturaliter cognitae facilius manuducitur ad ea quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur, et ita ista scientia utitur aliis tamquam inferioribus, sicut architectores utuntur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari.*

[79] **De materia quartae conclusionis**, ultra ea quae dicta sunt non apparet esse necessarium, quia argumenta [S 42v] moveantur, igitur supersedeo.

#### <Ad rationes principales>

[80: ~1:R56, 12-20] *Ad rationes principales, ad primam, “theologia est notitia superior fide, igitur est scientifica notitia,”* dicitur quod, si intelligitur de scientia communiter accepta, secundum conclusionem secundam, conceditur consequentia et consequens. Sed si capitur scientia stricte, secundum primam acceptionem, tunc negatur consequentiam.

[81: ~1-2] *Et ad probationem dicitur quod, licet non acquirat scientiam proprie dictam, acquirit tamen habitum probandi ex Sacra Scriptura theologicam veritatem et illi assentiendi, et per consequens defendendi et roborandi fidem contra impios et nutriendi in fidelibus, necnon et novam scientiam de his veritatibus quae non sunt expresse contentae in Biblia nec determinatae per Ecclesiam et quas antea explicite non credebatur. Iste autem magnus est profectus. Similiter dicatur ad confirmationem.*

[82: ~3:R56. 32-34] *Ad secundam rationem conceditur argumentum totum. Procedit enim secundum secundam conclusionem, et hoc intendebat Beatus Augustinus. Potuit etiam Beatus Augustinus per certam scientiam intelligere claram visionem, quae fidei succedit in patria. Propter quod IX De Trinitate,*<sup>102</sup> *capitulo 1, dixit: “certa enim fides utramque inchoat*

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<sup>101</sup> THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup> II<sup>a</sup>, q. 1, art. 5.

<sup>102</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 9, 1, 1 (CCSL 50, 292-293, 24-26).

*cognitionem, cognitio vero certa non perficitur nisi post hanc vitam, ubi videbimus facie ad faciem.*”

[83: ~4] Ad confirmationem respondetur quod ipse loquebatur de scientia secundo modo sumpta et non demonstrative, et hoc intelligendo de cognitione viae.

## Appendix II

### In primum librum *Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41, a. 2 Nicolai de Dinkelsbühl quaestio de causa praedestinationis

(D = Wien, ÖNB 4820; E = Wien, ÖNB 4369)

*Quantum ad secundum articulum*, videndum est utrum in praedestinis vel reprobis sit aliqua causa suae aeternae praedestinationis vel reprobationis.

[1:R325.3-15] Pro quo sciendum quod non est intentio doctorum hoc modo loquentium quaerere utrum in praedestinato sit aliquid quod sit causa illius entitatis quae est praedestinatio, quae non est nisi deitas ipsa, sed intellectus doctorum est utrum propter aliquid praedestinatorum vel reprobatorum Deus ab aeterno tales praedestinavit vel reprobavit, ita quod possit dici de aliquo, ‘Propter hoc vel propter illud ipse est praedestinatus’, aut aliter qualitercumque per causales exprimendo.

#### <Opiniones aliorum>

[2:R325.20-30] Et secundum istum modum quidam<sup>103</sup> dicebant quod propter bona opera vel bonum usum liberi arbitrii, quem Deus praescivit aliquos habituros, praedestinavit eos, et propter malum usum in aliis futurum alios reprobavit. Et in hoc fuit diversitas. Quidam<sup>104</sup> dixerunt propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii quo ad actum credendi, aliqui<sup>105</sup> quo ad istum et alios a libero arbitrio procedentes. Rursus alii<sup>106</sup> dixerunt quod usus bonus liberi arbitrii dupliciter considerari poterat, scilicet in quantum procedit partialiter etiam a gratia et est bonus bonitate gratuita vel meritoria, et ut sic non est secundum eos causa praedestinationis, sed effectus; alio modo prout procedit ab ipso libero arbitrio [D 117r] et est bonus bonitate morali, et sic est causa praedestinationis de congruo, licet non de condigno, ut isti dicunt.

[3:R326.1-15] Demum alii<sup>107</sup> dixerunt quod praedestinationis nulla est in praedestinis causa positiva, sed privativa tantum, scilicet absentia finalis obicis per culpam originalem vel actualement respectu gratiae Dei, reprobationis vero est causa positiva in reprobis, scilicet talis obex peccati respectu gratiae. Unde dicunt “quod in primo instanti quo offertur divino conspectui omnis homo, vult illi Deus gloriam et salutem—immo et omnes creat ad hunc finem—nisi cum obice gratiae reperiatur, per quem homo reddatur indignus. Tunc igitur, subsumendo sub ista generali volitione, offeruntur aliqui in Dei praescientia cum obice gratiae et indignitate, vel habituali, sicut in parvulis in quibus est originale peccatum, vel actuali, ut malus usus liberi arbitrii in adultis. Alii vero offeruntur non quidem cum aliqua dignitate seu dispositione positiva, nec illud oportet, sed sufficit quod sine indignitate et obice offerantur. Et tunc concluditur pro istis finalis gratia et salus aeterna, pro illis vero subtractio gratiae et praeparatio paenae. Et per consequens illi sunt reprobati iusto iudicio, et isti sola misericordia liberati, non tamen sine causa negativa.”

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<sup>103</sup> THOMAS DE ARGENTINA, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Venezia 1564, f. 112va).

<sup>104</sup> Position proposed and later retracted by Augustine.

<sup>105</sup> HENRICUS GANDAVENSIS, *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 5 (ed. Paris 1518, f. 308-309H).

<sup>106</sup> THOMAS WYLTON, *Quaestio ordinaria* ‘Utrum praedestinatus possit damnari’, a. 4 (ed. C. SCHABEL, “Parisian Secular Masters on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents in the Early Fourteenth Century, Part II”, *Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 78.2 (2011), 417-479, 468.646-654, although Rimini has it as reported by PETRUS AUREOLUS, *Scriptum in I librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Rome 1596, 937bF-938aA).

<sup>107</sup> PETRUS AUREOLUS, *Scriptum in I librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 941bB-D).

<Gregorii Ariminensis conclusiones quinque contra opiniones aliorum>

<Conclusio prima>

[4:R326.17-21] Sed secundum Gregorium, ponentur *quinque conclusiones cum quarum omnium veritate non stat veritas alicuius modi de praedictis. Quarum prima est illa: quod nullus est* [E 142r] *praedestinatus propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii quem Deus praescivit eum habiturum, qualitercumque consideretur bonitas eius. Probatur conclusio* [R326.28-327.3]: *aliqui praedestinati fuerunt non habituri ullum bonum usum liberi arbitrii, igitur nullus fuit praedestinatus propter talem usum. Consequentia patet, quia, si uni proposuit Deus dare vitam aeternam sine bono usu liberi arbitrii futuro, sequitur quod alteri non proposuit dare propter talem usum futurum, sed libere et gratis, aut propter aliam causam. Antecedens patet de pueris baptizatis morientibus ante usum rationis. Et per hoc argumentum dicit Beatus Augustinus*<sup>108</sup> *maxime convinci quoscumque construentes homines fuisse praedestinos ex futuris operibus, et eodem modo ex futuro usu liberi arbitrii.*

[5:R327.4-7] *Ad hoc tamen conati sunt aliqui*<sup>109</sup> *respondere, dicentes quod, licet parvuli tales non fuerint praedestinati propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii quem habituri fuerunt, tamen praedestinati sunt propter eum quem habituri fuissent si ad aetatem debitam pervenissent.*

[6:R327.8-21] *Sed illa responsio omnino nulla est. Unde arguitur contra eam ex intentione Augustini in De praedestinatione sanctorum,*<sup>110</sup> *ubi eam in propria forma refellit, primo sic: nullus praemiabitur a Deo propter merita quae nec eius aut alterius sunt, fuerunt, aut erunt, ergo nec propter talia quis fuit praedestinatus; sed merita quae pueri habuissent si vixissent nec eorum nec alterius sunt, erunt, aut fuerunt, ut patet; igitur. Consequentia prima patet. Et antecedens cuilibet habenti rationem est notum, quoniam talia merita non sunt ulla merita, nec praemianda, cum omnino nulla sint. Unde Augustinus, hanc responsionem admirans, ait:*<sup>111</sup> *“Unde hoc talibus in mentem venerit nescio, ut futura quae non sunt futura puniantur aut honorentur praemia parvulorum.” Et infra:*<sup>112</sup> *“Quia hominum,” inquit, “futura quae non sunt futura procul dubio nulla merita sunt, et hoc videre facillimum est, ideo nec Pelagiani hoc dicere poterant, et multo magis nec isti dicere poterunt.”*

[7:R327.22-29] *Praeterea, ut ait Augustinus ibidem:*<sup>113</sup> *“Apostolus limitem fixit, quem transgredi non” debemus. “Ait enim, ‘Omnes astabimus ante tribunal Christi ut ferat unusquisque secundum ea quae per corpus gessit,’ id est, eo tempore quo in corpore vixit, “sive bonum sive malum gessit,” inquit, non adiunxit ‘vel gescurus fuerit.’” Est igitur determinatio Apostoli quod praecise secundum ea quae fecit quis merita et simili modo secundum eum usum quem habuit praecise dum vixit praemiabitur. Non igitur secundum eum quem si vixisset habiturus fuisset.*

[8:R327.31-328.7] *Praeterea, arguit Augustinus:*<sup>114</sup> *“Si iudicarentur homines pro meritis suae vitae quae non habuerunt, morte praeventi, sed habituri essent si viverent, nihil prodesset ei qui ‘raptus est, ne malitia immutaret intellectum’” suum, sicut scribitur Sapientiae 4<.11>. Similiter, “nihil prodesset eis qui lapsi moriuntur si ante morerentur, quod nullus dicere Christianus audebit,” et subdit. Nam quis Christianus non confiteatur quod bonum fuisset Iudae si suscepto baptismo mox decessisset, et idem de quolibet baptizato damnato? Et tamen oppositum sequitur, si cum eo tunc actum fuisset secundum usum liberi arbitrii quem habiturus fuisset si vixisset. Sic e contra posset argui quod Beato Paulo nihil obfuisset si*

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<sup>108</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 13, 25 (PL 44, cols. 978-979).

<sup>109</sup> Response reported by Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol.

<sup>110</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 12, 23-24 (PL 44, cols. 977-978).

<sup>111</sup> *Ibidem*, 12, 24, (PL 44, col. 977).

<sup>112</sup> *Ibidem*, 13, 25 (PL 44, col. 979).

<sup>113</sup> *Ibidem*, 12, 24 (PL 44, col. 977); II Cor 5.10.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibidem*, 14, 29 (PL 44, col. 981).

mortuus [D 117v] fuisset dum persequabatur Ecclesiam, ex quo iudicandus fuisset secundum usum quem habuisset si vixisset.

[9:R328.11-19] *Praeterea, etiam sequeretur quod quilibet parvulus baptizatus moriens tantum praemium reciperet quantum si vixisset mille annis in gratia et cum bono usu liberi arbitrii, posito quod ita contigisset si vixisset. Nam sicut dicunt unus doctor,<sup>115</sup> et bene, non solum Deus praedestinat quemquam ad aeternum praemium, sed etiam ad determinatum praemii gradum. Et ideo, si propter talem condicionalem usum quemquam praedestinasset, etiam propter gradum bonitatis illius usus praedestinasset ad certum gradum praemii, et illum utique consequeretur si moreretur, quod nullus diceret. Et sic patet quod responsio praedicta nulla est.*

[10:R328.24-329.5] *Secundo principaliter idem probatur de adultis. Nam quicumque fuit habiturus bonum usum liberi arbitrii qualis requiritur in salvandis, ideo fuit istum habiturus quia fuit praedestinatus, igitur nullus fuit praedestinatus [E 142v] quia habiturus fuit bonum usum liberi arbitrii, etiam finaliter. Consequentia tenet, quia in causis non est circulatio. Et antecedens probatur auctoritate Beati Augustini in libro De fide ad Petrum, capitulo 3, ubi ait:<sup>116</sup> “Illi cum Christo regnabunt quos Deus gratuita sua bonitate praedestinavit ad regnum. Quia enim eos tales praedestatio praeparavit ut in regno Dei essent, praeparavit utique secundum propositum vocandos ut obediant, praeparavit iustificandos ut accepta gratia recte credant et bene vivant, praeparavit et glorificandos ut Christi coheredes effecti regnum caelorum sine fine possideant.”*

[11:R329.5-20] *Ex hac auctoritate apparet manifeste quod, quia praedestatio praeparavit aliquos ad regnum aeternum, ideo etiam praedestinavit eos vocare et iustificare etc. Soli autem sic vocati et iustificandi sunt salvandi, sicut patet per eundem iam tactum Apostoli Verbum exponentem in libro De praedestinatione sanctorum, ubi sic ait:<sup>117</sup> “Quos enim praedestinavit, illos vocavit, ista scilicet vocatione secundum propositum. Non ergo alios, sed quos praedestinavit, ipsos vocavit,” “ipsos et iustificavit, nec alios, sed quos praedestinavit, vocavit, iustificavit ipsos et glorificavit, vocavit istos utique fine qui non habet finem.” Igitur soli sic vocandi et iustificandi fuerunt habituri talem bonum usum liberi arbitrii qualis reperitur in salvandis. Constat autem ulterius quod talis vocatio et iustificatio est causa talis boni usus et non e converso, quod in prima auctoritate tetigit Augustinus cum dicit quod “praeparavit ut obediant” et “ut accepta gratia recte credant et bene vivant.” Obedire enim vocationi et recte credere et bene vivere sunt illi boni usus liberi arbitrii.*

[12:R329.25-330.6] *Secundo probatur antecedens principale ratione sic: quicumque fuit habiturus talem bonum usum, ille fuit habiturus eum a Deo, et nullum Deus praedestinavit quia fuit talem usum ei daturus, sed e contra, quia illum praedestinavit, fuit ei daturus talem usum; igitur quicumque fuit habiturus talem usum ideo fuit habiturus quia fuit praedestinatus. Consequentia patet. Et prima pars antecedentis innumeris auctoritatibus scripturae probatur, quales sunt illa Apostoli I Ad Corinthios 4<.7>: “Quid enim habes quod non accepisti?” Et illa Ad Philippenses 2<.13>: “Deus operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate.” Et illa eiusdem Ad Ephesios 2<.10>: “Ipsius sumus factura creati in Christo,” id est, per Christum, “in operibus bonis, quae praeparavit nobis Deus ut in illis ambulemus.” Secunda autem pars satis patet ex se, nam, ut in praecedenti articulo dictum est,<sup>118</sup> non est aliud praedestatio quam divinum propositum alicui dandi vitam aeternam. Constat autem quod nulli Deus proposuit dare vitam aeternam quia proposuit illi dare bonum usum liberi arbitrii, sed e contra, quia proposuit dare vitam aeternam, ideo consequenter voluit dare illi taliter uti libero arbitrio sine quali usu neminem potentem uti libero arbitrio voluit admittere ad vitam aeternam.*

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<sup>115</sup> PETRUS AUREOLUS, *Scriptum in I librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 938aB-C).

<sup>116</sup> FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 3, 42 (PL 40, col. 767; CCC 91A, 740.867-874).

<sup>117</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 17, 34 (PL 44, col. 986).

<sup>118</sup> I.e., in a. 1 of both Rimini and Dinkelsbühl.

[13:R332.8-13] *Tertio principaliter arguitur ad conclusionem ex praemissa determinatione Apostoli Ad Romanos 9<.12-13>, quae sola, ubi omnis alia probatio deficeret, debet convincere quemlibet fidelem ad tenendum hanc conclusionem, ubi determinat quod non ex operibus bonis et futuris, ut exponunt omnes glosae, Iacob fuit praedestinatus, et idem vult sentiendum de omnibus ne quis de meritis operum gloriatur.*

[14] Pro ista conclusione etiam est articulus Parisiensis 38 inter novos articulos, “quod propter futura bona opera Deus aliquem praedestinavit ab aeterno—error.” Similiter articulus sequens 39 dicit “quod aliquis sit praedestinatus a Deo ab aeterno propter bonum usum liberii arbitrii quem Deus praescivit ipsum habiturum—error.”<sup>119</sup> Ex quibus patet clare veritas conclusionis.

<Conclusio secunda Gregorii>

[15:R332.15-25] *Secunda conclusio est ista: nullus est [D 118r] praedestinatus quia praescitus fore finaliter sine obice habituali gratiae. Probatur primo sic: quia quod aliquis est sine obice culpae originalis et actualis taliter quod non impediatur a consecutione salutis aut sit eius indignus est effectus praedestinationis divinae, igitur non quia quis praevideatur futurus sine obice tali salutis vel gratiae est praedestinatus. Consequentia tenet. Et antecedens probatur, primo expressa auctoritate Apostoli, dicentis Ad Ephesios 1<.4>: “Elegit nos ante constitutionem [E 143r] mundi ut essemus sancti et immaculati in conspectu eius,” id est, sine macula peccati, ubi, ut dicit glossa,<sup>120</sup> Apostolus loquitur de electione qua praedestinavit nos. Et sicut non praedestinavit nos eo quod sancti essemus aut immaculati, sic nec quod futuri eramus, sed quia nos praedestinavit ideo futuri eramus per eius gratiam sancti et immaculati.*

[16:R332.26-29] *Praeterea, iustificatio electorum est praedestinationis effectus, ut dictum est, iustificatio autem includit vel exigit remissionem peccatorum et puritatem ab omni labe originalis et actualis culpae mortalis. Unde glossa:<sup>121</sup> “Iustificavit,” scilicet “remissione peccatorum et bona operatione.”*

[17:R333.8-15] *Secundo, parvuli morientes post baptismum sunt sine obice peccati originalis, quia sunt baptizati, et ideo sunt baptizati quia sunt praedestinati, igitur ipsi non quia sunt sine culpa originali sunt praedestinati, sed e contra, quia sunt praedestinati, sunt finaliter sine culpa tali. Consequentia patet. Et prima pars antecedentis conceditur communiter a Catholicis. Et secunda probatur per Apostolum Ad Titum 3<.5>, dicentem: “Non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis,” id est, per baptismum.*

[18:R333.16-25] *Ad hoc respondent qui<sup>122</sup> tenent oppositum, dicentes quod puer non habet a praedestinatione quod baptizetur, sed “hoc potius est secundum cursum naturae. Nam si puer ex complexione mori debeat statim natus, non perveniet ad baptismum, nec erit hoc ex aliqua reprobatione, sed quia non vult Deus propter ipsum facere novum miraculum, immo ipsum relinquit cursui naturali. Similiter, si natus fuerit ex parentibus infidelibus, non baptizabitur, si autem ex fidelibus, baptizabitur; hoc autem non debet alteri imputari nisi ordini naturali, secundum quem ille nascitur ex istis et ille ex illis. Nec propter hoc ut ille baptizaretur debuit Deus ordinare ut ex aliis parentibus nasceretur.”*

[19:R333.26-32] *Ista solutio non continet veritatem. Primo quidem quia contradicit manifestae auctoritati Apostoli iam inductae <Ad Titum 3.5>, dicentis quod “secundum suam misericordiam salvos fecit” per baptismum, et per consequens ex eius misericordia est quod sumus baptizati. Non ergo hoc provenit ex opere tantum et cursu naturae.*

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<sup>119</sup> F. STEGMÜLLER, “Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt”, *Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 5 (1933), 192-204, at 203-204 (nos. 39-40 = CUP II, 613, nos. 47-48).

<sup>120</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Collectanea in epistolam ad Ephesios* 1.4 (PL 192, cols. 171D-172A).

<sup>121</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Collectanea in epistolam ad Romanos* 8.30 (PL 191, col. 1450D).

<sup>122</sup> PETRUS AUREOLUS, *Scriptum in I librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 942bA-C).



[20:R334.1-4] *Item, contra hoc est manifesta auctoritas Beati Augustini in De praedestinatione sanctorum, ultra medium,*<sup>123</sup> *ubi ait quod gratia Dei “maxime apparet in parvulis quorum tamen alii baptizati, alii non baptizati vitae huius terminum sumunt, satis praedicant misericordiam et iudicium, misericordiam quidem gratuitam, iudicium debitum.”*

[21:R334.5-10] *Item, paulo post:*<sup>124</sup> *“Apparet,” inquit, “nobis in nostro capite ipse fons gratiae. Unde secundum uniuscuiusque mensuram semper in cuncta eius membra diffundit. Ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque Christianus qua gratia ille homo ab initio suo factus est Christus de Spiritu Sancto et homo renatus, de quo ille natus; eodem Spiritu fit in nobis remissio peccatorum, quo Spiritu factum est ut nullum haberet ille peccatum.”*

[22:R334.21-25] *Ex quibus patet evidenter quod, sicut humana natura in Christo ex aeterna gratuita praedestinatione divina unita est Verbo et absque peccato concepta et nata, sic quicumque baptizati sunt, sive antequam crederent, ut pueri, sive postquam crediderint, ut adulti, hoc ex gratuita eorum praedestinatione consecuti sunt.*

[23:R336.30-337.4] *Item, quid dicetur de sanctis innocentibus quos constat per martyrium fuisse ab originali culpa mundatos, si qui eorum non fuerunt circumcisi, sicut forte plures eorum non fuerant, utpote interfecti ante octavum diem, quo secundum legem circumcidendi erant? Non enim potest dici quod ex cursu naturali fuerunt interfecti propter Christum, et per hoc nec quia naturaliter fuerint ab originali mundati. Unde oporteret hoc reducere solum in impietatem Herodis, quod insanissimum est, vel, quod verum est, in divinam providentiam quae eos hoc modo salvare disposuit et ab originali culpa mundare, et per consequens talis mundatio est divinae praedestinationis effectus.*

#### <Conclusio tertia Gregorii>

[24:R337.6-12] *Tertia conclusio: quemcumque praedestinavit Deus, gratis tantummodo et misericorditer praedestinavit. Patet primo ex praecedentibus, quibus ostensum est quod nec propter bona opera, nec propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii, [E 143v] nec propter carentiam culpae aut cuiuscumque reddentis hominem indignum vita aeterna quae Deus praevideret futura quisquam est praedestinatus, sed quod potius eius praedestinationem talia consequantur. [D 118v]*

[25:R337.13-24] *Secundo probatur auctoritatibus scripturae. Unde Apostolus, Ad Ephesios 1<.5-6>: “Praedestinavit,” inquit, “nos in adoptionem filiorum per Ihesum Christum in ipsum secundum propositum voluntatis suae in laudem gloriae et gratiae suae.” Et Ad Romanos 9<.23> vocat praedestinos “vasa misericordiae.” Et multa alia possent induci quibus manifeste probatur quod quicumque praedestinatus est ex sola gratia et gratuita Dei bonitate est praedestinatus. Et ideo Beatus Augustinus, in De fide ad Petrum, capitulo 35:<sup>125</sup> “Firmissime,” inquit, “tene et nullatenus dubites omnes quos ‘vasa misericordiae’ Deus fecit electos vel praedestinos gratuita bonitate ‘ante mundi constitutionem in adoptionem filiorum Dei praedestinos’ esse.”*

#### <Conclusio quarta Gregorii>

[26:R337.28-338.14] *Quarta conclusio: nullus est reprobatus propter malum usum liberi arbitrii quem istum Deus praevidebat habiturum. Probatur ex determinatione Apostoli manifesta et ex intentione Beati Augustini ipsum exponentis, libro primo Ad Simplicianum multipliciter.<sup>126</sup> Primo quidem quia Apostolus, loquens Ad Romanos 9<.11-13> de praedestinatione Iacob et reprobatione Esau, et per hoc quid de ceteris sit sentiendum nos edocens, ait quod, “cum nondum nati essent, aut aliquid egissent boni vel mali, ut secundum electionem Dei propositum*

<sup>123</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 14, 29 (PL 44, col. 981).

<sup>124</sup> *Ibidem*, 15, 31 (PL 44, col. 982).

<sup>125</sup> FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 3, 42 (PL 40, 767; CCC 91A, 740.867-868); RM. 9.23; EPH. 1.4-5.

<sup>126</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I, 2, 4-7 (PL 40, cols. 113-115).

maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: quia ‘maior serviet minori.’” Per hoc autem quod dicitur, quia ‘maior serviet minori,’ signatur reprobatio Esau et praedestinatio Iacob, sicut declarant sequentia verba <13>: “Sicut,” inquit, “scriptum est ‘Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui.’” Hoc autem odium seu reprobationem aequae sicut in Iacob dilectionem vel praedestinationem dicit Apostolus “non ex operibus eorum esse, sed ex Deo vocante, ut secundum electionem Dei propositum maneret.” Unde sicut non potest dici quod ex operibus praeteritis, praesentibus, vel futuris sit Iacob praedestinatus, ut supra probatum est, sic, secundum intentionem Apostoli pariter et Augustini, non vere dicitur quod Esau sit ex futuris operibus reprobatus, de utroque namque ait quod “non ex operibus.”

[27:R338.26-339.6] Secundo, idem probatur ex sequentibus verbis Apostoli <Ad Romanos 9.16>: “Non est,” inquit, “volentis necque credentis, sed Dei miserentis.” Et statim concludit <9.18>: “Igitur cuius vult, miseretur, et quem vult, indurat,” id est, “non miseretur,” ut exponit Augustinus.<sup>127</sup> Per quorum verborum consequentiam secundum Augustinum colligitur quod, sicut Apostolus dixerat “non est volentis necque credentis, sed Dei miserentis,” sic etiam dici debeat secundum intentionem Apostoli, “non est volentis necque credentis, sed obdurantis,” id est, non miserentis Dei, ut, secundum quod dicit Augustinus,<sup>128</sup> reprobatio Dei “sit nolle misereri, non ut ab illo aliquid irrogetur quo sit homo deterior, sed tantum quo sit melior non erogetur.” Non ergo quia quis bene vel male vult aut currit, id est, operatur, ideo Deus ab aeterno eius miseretur vel non miseretur.

[28:R340.20-29] Item, evidentissime probatur idem iuxta intentionem Augustini in De bono perseverantiae, circa medium libri,<sup>129</sup> ex verbo Christi dicentis, Lucae 10<13>: “Vae tibi Corozaym, vae tibi Betzaida, quia si in Tyro et Sydone factae essent virtutes quae factae sunt in vobis, olim in cilicio et cinere paenitentiam egissent.” Ubi expresse determinat quod ideo Tyri et Sydonii non crediderunt coram quibus non sunt factae virtutes quia praedestinati non fuerunt.

[29:R340.29-341.2] Ex quo sequitur manifeste quod non propter incredulitatem eorum futuram aut opera eorum mala fuerunt non praedestinati, et per consequens nec reprobati, sed potius e converso, non quod a Deo fuerit eis irrogata incredulitas vel malitia, aut aliquid aliud per quod fierent increduli et mali, sed quia non fuit eis collata gratia per quam crederent et essent boni, quae utique ideo collata non est quia fuerunt aeternaliter reprobati.

#### <Conclusio quinta Gregorii>

[30:R342.6-16] Conclusio quinta: nullus est reprobatus quia praevisus fore aeternaliter cum obice gratiae actuali vel habituali. Probatur, primo ex intentione [E 144r] Apostoli dicentis <Ad Romanos 9.1>: “Cum nondum nati essent, aut aliquid boni vel mali egissent,” per quae verba non est dubium quin velit signare quod nec Iacob propter aliquod eius bonum factum est praedestinatus, nec Esau propter aliquod eius malum est reprobatus, sed constat quod in omnibus adultis et baptizatis non potest esse obex respectu gratiae nisi respectu alicuius mali et culpae mortalis. Confirmatur iuxta modum arguendi Augustini praetactum in prima ratione praecedentis conclusionis [§26], quia, si propter praesentiam talis obicis dicatur Esau reprobatus, sic propter eius absentiam dici poterit Iacob praedestinatus, et tunc non concluderet Apostolus quod “ex vocante” praecise etc.

[31:R342.18-21] Secundo, quia multi, si fuissent vocati, fuissent sine obice gratiae, iuxta praeallegatum Salvatoris verbum: “Vae tibi Corozaym,” igitur non quia fuerunt praevisi [D 119r] habituri finalem obicem ideo Deus proposuit eos non vocare vel eos reprobavit.

[32:R342.22-26, 29-31] Tertio, quaerendum est unde quis habeat quod in fine vitae suae careat obice gratiae, id est, peccato. Et certe vel oportet dicere quod a voluntate et libero arbitrio et propria virtute, et sic labi in Pelagianum errorem, vel a Deo gratis convertente eum

<sup>127</sup> Ibidem I, 2, 16 (PL 40, col. 120).

<sup>128</sup> Ibidem I, 2, 15 (PL 40, col. 120).

<sup>129</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De dono perseverantiae*, 9, 23 (PL 45, cols. 1005-1006).

*ad se per paenitentiam et peccatum remittente. Et tunc restat quaerere cur non et alium sic convertit, cum aequè faciliter possit si vellet, et non potest aliter responderi nisi iuxta sententiam Apostoli <Ad Romanos 9.18>: “Cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat,” id est, non miseretur.*

[33:R343.1-4] *Concludo ergo una cum Magistro, distinctione 41,<sup>1</sup> quod Deus quem voluit ab aeterno reprobavit, non propter demerita futura. Ex quo sequitur quod etiam non propter obicem aliquem gratiae.*

<Corollaria>

[34] Ex dictis sequitur quod, quamvis alicuius merita vel demerita sint aliquo modo causa aeternae salutis vel damnationis, nullus tamen praedestinatus est aliquo modo causa suae aeternae praedestinationis. Primum patet, quia Deus nullum adultum damnat nisi suis demeritis exigentibus, nec aliquem salvat habentem usum rationis nisi bene faciat, igitur. Secundum patet ex dictis. Et probatur, quia nullum temporale est causa alicuius aeterni; igitur etc.

[35] Sequitur ulterius quod, licet aliquis possit esse aliquo modo causa suae obdurationis, nullus tamen esse potest causa aeternae suae reprobationis. Prima pars patet, quia homo demeritorie agendo dignus fit ut obduretur vel gratia privetur, ut patet per Magistrum in textu, distinctione 41,<sup>130</sup> et sic potest dici ‘causa sine qua non’ de communi lege, licet non absolute.<sup>131</sup> Secunda pars patet ex dictis, quia Deus aeternaliter praescivit et proposuit reprobis non dare vitam aeternam finaliter; igitur.

[36] Hoc corollarium est contra Petrum Aureoli, Scotum, et alios<sup>132</sup> qui dicunt quod in reprobatis est causa suae reprobationis, quia nulla impietas est Deo attribuenda; sed si Deus reprobareret sine causa, esset in eo impietas et crudelitas, scilicet dare homini tantum malum sine causa.

[37] Sed istud non est verum. Unde dicit Bradwardinus, parte prima *Summae* suae, capitulo 47,<sup>133</sup> “quod non omnis paena rationabiliter illata homini ab homine propter culpam suam infertur, sed aliquoties ad cautelam.” Sic enim aliquis punitur paenitentia publica ut alii inspicientes timeant et declinando a malo confirmentur in bono. Cum igitur quis punitur temporaliter “pro temporali commodo aliorum, cur non temporaliter et aeternaliter pro temporali et aeternali commodo electorum, ut scilicet in praesenti magis eligant bonum et fugiant malum, et in futurum magis laetentur, artius diligant, et amplius Deum laudent?” Non igitur est “crudelitas apud Deum si praedestinet et faciat unam creaturam ad servitium alterius creaturae, et utramque ad suum servitium, laudem, gloriam, et honorem, praesertim cum nullum aeternaliter puniat nisi dignum aeterno supplicio, scilicet suo peccato,” exigente. Quem tamen infinite citra condignum puniet, ut videbitur circa quartum librum.

[38] Item, non est crudelitas lutifigulus, qui de eadem massa facit unum “vas in honorem et aliud in contumeliam,”<sup>134</sup> sicut sibi placet. Nec potest dicere, “Cur me ita facis?” Igitur nec Deus [E 144v] agit impie aut crudeliter circa reprobatum gratiam suam et gloriam sibi non impertiendo, cum ad nihilum sibi teneatur. “Cur tales,” dicit Bradwardinus,<sup>135</sup> “Deum non arguunt ex eo quod punit bestias innocentes?” Rursum Deus non impie vel crudeliter egit dum Filium suum innocentissimum paenis crudelissimis et tormentis tradidit? Ergo nec ipse qui est “Dominus totius creaturae, cuius mera voluntas est lex iustitiae” inobliquabilis, posset redargui, si etiam “puniret innocentem aeternaliter, praesertim si hoc cederet ad perfectionem universi et utilitatem aliorum et honorem ipsius” Dei ultimate.

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<sup>130</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris*, d. 41, c. 1, n. 2 (ed. cit., 288.20-22).

<sup>131</sup> In the margin: et sic potest dici causa sine qua non de communi lege, sed non absolute.

<sup>132</sup> This was the *opinio communis*, what James Halverson labels SPE.

<sup>133</sup> THOMAS BRADWARDINE, *De causa Dei, contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres* I, c. 47 (ed. London 1618, 440D-E).

<sup>134</sup> ROM. 9.21.

<sup>135</sup> THOMAS BRADWARDINE, *De causa Dei* I, c. 47 (ed. cit., 441A).

<Rationes contra conclusiones et corollaria>

[39] Contra dictas conclusiones et corollaria primo arguunt Pelagiani,<sup>136</sup> dicentes praedestinationem et reprobationem esse secundum merita personarum sic: quia vel est aliqua causa vel ratio quare Deus hunc praedestinat vel reprobatur, et non illum, vel non est causa. Si primum, igitur, cum nulla possit esse causa nisi differentia meritorum, sequitur propositum. Si secundum, igitur aut quemlibet praedestinat aut nullum, cum non sit causa quare potius unum praedestinet quam alium. Propter hoc Ioachim abbas,<sup>137</sup> ut dicit Bradwardinus ubi supra, duas causas assignavit praedestinationis, scilicet aptitudinem ad bonum et ad salutem [D 119v] et bonam actionem.

[40] Secundo, Iohannis primo <.12> scribitur: “Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri,” et hoc non nisi per bona opera.

[41] Tertio, “si Adam non peccasset, nullus fuisset reprobatus, sed quilibet praedestinatus, igitur utrumque est propter meritum.”

[42:R343.9-13] Quarto,<sup>138</sup> arguunt alii, quia “*praedestinatio includit electionem*,” secundum illud *Ad Ephesios primo* <.4>: “*Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem*,” “*sed electio non est inter aequales omnino, ergo oportet inter electos et non-electos reperiri diversitatem*” propter quam illi eliguntur, illi vero reiciuntur.

[43:R343.14-22] Quinto,<sup>139</sup> “*agens universale agit in omne quod non habet impedimentum*,” sicut patet de sole, qui in omnem partem aeris diffundit suos radios, nisi sit impedimentum; sed “*Deus est ex sua bonitate agens universale volens omni creaturae gratiam et salutem, offert enim quantum ex se gratiam suam omnibus ‘qui solem suum facit oriri super bonos et malos’*”; igitur omnibus dat gratiam et salutem, nisi in ipsis sit impedimentum; igitur quod aliquis careat salute et sit reprobatus, “*causa est positio impedimenti ab aeterno praevisa*.” Quod vero alius sit praedestinatus, causa est negatio talis impedimenti.

[44:R343.23-30] Sexto,<sup>140</sup> arguitur auctoritate Beati Augustini, 83 quaestionum quaestione 68, dicentis:<sup>141</sup> “*Prorsus ‘cuius vult misereatur et quem vult indurat’; sed haec voluntas Dei non potest esse iniusta. Venit enim de occultis meritis, quia et ipsi peccatores, cum propter generale peccatum unam massam fecerunt, non tamen inter illos nulla est diversitas. Praecedit igitur aliquid in peccatoribus quo nondum iustificati digni efficiantur iustificatione. Et ita praecedit in aliis peccatoribus quo digni sunt obduratione.*” Ex quibus patet Augustinum sensisse quod ex meritis et demeritis sit obduratio et iustificatio.

[45:R344.17-20] Item, ad hoc est auctoritas Magistri, distinctione 41, dicentis quod,<sup>142</sup> “*si meritum quaerimus obdurationis et misericordiae, obdurationis invenimus, misericordiae non invenimus*”; igitur saltem reprobationis est aliqua causa ex parte reprobatorum.

[46] Item, *Ad Romanos* 8<.29> dicit Apostolus: “Quos praescivit, hos praedestinavit”; igitur praescientia alicuius boni se tenentis ex parte praedestinati videtur fuisse causa vel ratio praedestinationis.

<Responsiones ad argumenta>

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<sup>136</sup> §39-41: cf. THOMAS BRADWARDINE, *De causa Dei* I, c. 47 (ed. cit., 436A-B).

<sup>137</sup> IOACHIMUS DE FIORE, *Dialogi de prescientia Dei et predestinatione electorum* I, ed. G.L. PODESTÀ (*Opera Omnia* IV, *Opera Minora* I, Rome 1995, reprinted with Italian translation in GIOACHINO DE FIORE, *Dialoghi sulla prescienza divina e la predestinazione degli eletti*, ed. and trans. G.L. PODESTÀ, Rome 2001, 38).

<sup>138</sup> PETRUS AURIOLUS, *Scriptum in I librum Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 937bC-D).

<sup>139</sup> Ibidem, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 941bD-F); MT 5.45.

<sup>140</sup> Ibidem, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 942bC-D).

<sup>141</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, 68, 4 (PL 40, col. 72); ROM 9.18.

<sup>142</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris*, d. 41, c. 1, n. 1 (ed. cit., 288.7-9).

[47: ~39] Ad primum dicit Bradwardinus<sup>143</sup> quod est ratio in Deo non obligans vel praeponderans, sed congruens et concomitans, quia ex immensa sapientia sua Deus praevidit ab aeterno hoc congruum esse ut Iacob salvaretur etc.

[48] Alii<sup>144</sup> tamen dicunt quod omnipotens voluntas Dei liberrima non habet causam nisi finem suae voluntatis, quae est immensa sua bonitas. Unde cum quaeritur quare Deus vult hoc vel illud, convenienter dicitur propter bonitatem suam.

[49] Thomas et Aegidius<sup>145</sup> dicunt quod, licet non possit in speciali dari ratio quare sit hic praedestinatus et hic non nisi divina voluntas, tamen est bene ratio generalis, videlicet ut in eis reluceant divina misericordia et iustitia.

[50: ~40] Ad secundum<sup>146</sup> dicitur quod illud non debet intelligi quasi potestatem haberent ut noviter [E 145r] fierent filii Dei, sed magis sonat ad contrarium, ut non ex se nec ex voluntate carnis, sed ex Deo essent filii Dei, ut sit sensus: dedit eis potestatem etc., id est, dedit eis “animam rationalem et liberum arbitrium, libere receptivum gratiae in praesenti, et consequenter gloriae in futuro, ut sic tam hic quam ibi filii Dei fiant” adoptivi. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur nec habetur quod ex eorum meritis sit quod sint vel fiant praedestinati.

[51: ~41] Ad tertium, dicitur quod non valet consequentia, ‘si Adam non peccasset, nullus fuisset reprobatus, ergo demerita sunt reprobationis causa’, sicut non sequitur, ‘si Christus non fecisset opera bona, non fuisset praedestinatus Filius Dei, igitur propter opera bona fuit sic praedestinatus’.

[52: ~42:R344.22-345.7] Ad quartum, respondetur *quod de electione possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo specialiter, scilicet prout sequitur deliberationem et sententiam consilii. Et talis non cadit inter penitus aequalia ante consilium scita esse aequalia. Sic praedestinatio non includit nec exigit electionem, quinimmo talis electio nullatenus competit Deo, ut dicit Damascenus, libro secundo, capitulo 23.*<sup>147</sup> *Alio modo possumus loqui de electione communiter et large prout quaelibet libera praeacceptatio unius prae altero vocatur electio. Et haec adhuc est duplex, quaedam praeveniens quasi causaliter bonitatem electi, quaedam vero consequens. Hoc est dictu[m] quod aliquid eligitur ut sit bonum et aliquid quia iam est bonum. [D 120r] Primo modo praedestinatio includit electionem, vel potius est electio, sed non secundo modo. Talis autem electio utique potest esse inter aequales, sicut patet in exemplo Apostoli de figulo qui ex eadem massa penitus uniformi pro libito partem unam eligit ut perfectam recipiat formam, reliquam dimittit informem.*

[53: ~43:R345.8-11] Ad quintum, dico quod, si illa prima propositio accipitur pro universali, falsa est. Et habet instantiam de agente libero. Artifex namque non agit in quamlibet partem obiectae materiae, sed in aliquam, et in aliquam non, ut sibi placet. Deus autem liberrimus est in agendo; igitur.

[54: ~44:R345.27-346.3] Ad sextum, dicit Magister<sup>148</sup> quod credendum est Augustinum voluisse ista verba retractasse in libro Retractationum, ubi prius quaedam alia circa illam materiam retractavit. Sed illud aliis non videtur verum propter tria: primo, quia non est simili sententia priorum verborum quae retractat et illorum, sicut patet diligenter consideranti. Secundo, quia primo Retractationum, capitulo 26,<sup>149</sup> recitat seu potius declarat quoddam immediate consequens verba nunc allegata, et ita non est verisimile ipsum tacuisse si voluisset

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<sup>143</sup> THOMAS BRADWARDINUS, *De causa Dei* I, c. 21 (ed. cit., 231E-232A).

<sup>144</sup> E.g., BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* II, pars II, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (*Opera Omnia* II, Quaracchi 1885, 43).

<sup>145</sup> THOMAS AQUINAS, e.g., *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 23, q. 5, and AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *Primus Sententiarum*, d. 41, q. 2, a. 1 (ed. Venice, 1521, f. 217ra).

<sup>146</sup> THOMAS BRADWARDINE, *De causa Dei* I, c. 47 (ed. cit., 437B).

<sup>147</sup> DAMASCENUS, *De fide orthodoxa* II, 22/36, 13 (ed. E. BUYTAERT, St Bonaventure NY 1955, 138.114-139.119).

<sup>148</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris*, d. 41, c. 2, n. 4 (ed. cit., 291.3-7).

<sup>149</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *Retractationes* I, 26 (PL 32, col. 628).

*illa retractare. Tertio, quia si praedicta verba ad intentionem Augustini capiantur, non continent sententiam rationabiliter retractandam, necque proposito praesenti contrariam.*

[55:R346.4-17] *Unde sciendum, sicut communiter dicunt doctores, quod obduratio potest capi dupliciter, uno modo pro ipsa reprobatione, quae non est aliud quam propositum non miserendi seu non dandi vitam aeternam. Alio modo capitur pro obstinatione seu induratione mentis in peccato, et sic non est proprie reprobatio, sed potius sequela eius, quia cui gratiam suam Deus non confert, a peccato surgere non potest. Augustinus ergo obdurationem ibi accipit secundo modo, sicut etiam debet accipi in secundo corollario superius posito [§35], scilicet pro induratione cordis, non pro aeterna Dei reprobatione. Quod manifeste patet per exemplum pharaonis quod introduxit ad illud propositum.<sup>150</sup> Cum igitur dicit Augustinus<sup>151</sup> quod “in peccatoribus aliquid praecedit quo sint digni obduratione,” non accipit obdurationem pro aeterna reprobatione, et per consequens etiam non dicit quod in aliis praecedit aliquid quo sint digni praedestinatione, sed bene “iustificatione.”*

[56: ~45: R348.20-25] *Ad septimum dicendum quod Magister non accipit obdurationem pro aeterna reprobatione, sed pro temporali obstinatione vel induratione cordis, cuius meritum est frequenter praecedens peccatum, sicut patet in pharaone, qui, ut dicit Augustinus, 83 quaestionum quaestione 68,<sup>152</sup> propter crudelitatem quam “exercuit in eis quibus humanitas et misericordia debebantur, meruit paenam ut induraretur illi cor.”*

[57: ~46] *Ad ultimum, concedo quod Deus “quos praescivit, hos praedestinavit,” ut dicit Apostolus, quia [E 145v] praedestinatio sine praescientia esse non potest, secundum Magistrum.<sup>153</sup> Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod praescientia alicuius boni se tenentis ex parte alicuius praedestinati sit causa vel ratio praedestinationis.*

[58] *Sed adhuc diceret quis, et est quaestio simpliciter, sequitur quod Deus esset invidus et immisericors. Quare enim ipse creat tot animas quas tamen scit esse perpetue damnandas et melius eis esset si creatae non fuissent?*

[59] *Respondet Iacobus de Alta Villa<sup>154</sup> “negando consequentiam. Ad probationem, dicit quod, si principaliter propter damnationem et misericordiam animas istas crearet, forte bene sequeretur consequens. Nunc autem hoc non est, sed est propter iustitiam et perfectionem universi, vel quia non vult actum illum generationis frustrari, ideo creat animam illi corpori. Nec tenetur illi velle beatitudinem. Ex quo sequitur ipsam damnandam esse necessitate cuiusdam sequelae non causalis.”*

[60] *“Et potest huic solutioni addi quod provisor communis et universalis ad vitandum malum particulare, cuius ipse non est causa totalis vel principalis, et propter bonum particulare, non debet negligere bonum commune principaliter intentum. Nunc autem Deus est auctor naturae, ergo propter privatum bonum huius animae non debet cursum naturae impedire, ut scilicet tali dispositioni materiae animam non infundat,” cui tamen dare beatitudinem non tenetur. Et tantum de secundo articulo principali.*

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<sup>150</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, 68, 4-5 (PL 40, cols. 72-73).

<sup>151</sup> See above, §44.

<sup>152</sup> AUGUSTINUS, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, 68, 5 (PL 40, col. 73).

<sup>153</sup> PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris*, d. 35, c. 1, n. 2 (ed. cit., 255.3-14).

<sup>154</sup> [§§58-60]: IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, dd. 40-41 (MS Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 593, f. 165vb).