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# **From family advocacy to women advocacy: New Right-Wing Women against Gender politics in France (2010-2020)**

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This paper is based on the observation that feminisms are in tension. If feminism has never been a unified movement, today, technological and cultural possibilities have made the very subject of feminism explode. Not only is the feminist political project the object of struggles within the space of the cause, but the very subject of feminism is uncertain. Once confined to the margins, non-binary and labile identities question the category of "woman" based on a supposedly shared experience of domination and sexuation. Any coalition, any social movement, made up of diverse organisations (Social movement organisation SMO) is subject to tensions over the political project, the objectives, the strategy, the tactics and, sometimes, the political subject. The question I wish to ask today is the specificity of contemporary tensions. Contemporary feminist struggles are being transformed by globalisation, which is transforming the intensity and temporality of the links between groups that define themselves as feminists. Organisations that pose a collective definition of the feminist political subject, bringing people together around an egalitarian political project - liberal or socialist - were born at the end of the 19th century. At that time, the legal norms of most states were marked by different inequalities and defined the contours of a gendered and hierarchical social and political order according to status. Today, as a result of past mobilisations, the reference framework for international public policies is egalitarian, even if the national or local versions of these norms are not always egalitarian. This has an effect, in France, on the way in which the generations born from the 1970s onwards have been socialised in a political regime and a symbolic order that is egalitarian between men and women. Nevertheless, gender relations remain structuring, even if changes in the labour market, the family and the political field have euphemistically enhanced their scope. On the basis of this postulate, this egalitarian socialisation must be taken into account in order to grasp how, today, women who oppose feminists by claiming to be feminists, gain access to the public space and shape a conservative pole in the space of the women's cause. In particular, how those who, implicitly, are the heirs of the women's movements hostile to the equality policies of the last century, make themselves the spokespersons for women and attempt to define the feminist political subject from the category of woman, partly integrating the liberal feminist legacy in order to better oppose contemporary feminists.

My suggestion is that of the emergence of a conservative pole in the space of the women's cause. From the perspective of apprehending the social world as a space for struggles around legitimate definitions of group interest, the space of the women's cause allows us to think about the diversity and antagonisms of the actors who invest the public space to claim a political project on behalf of women. The common point of the actors - organisations or individuals - is their explicit opposition to feminists and their ambivalent relationship to feminism both in the framing of their demands and in the actions implemented. For this reason, their position is a counter-movement, but not necessarily antifeminist. How, in this context, this conservative pole

emerges and is consolidated. My first hypothesis is that there is a conjunctural effect linked to gender equality policies. In reaction to the laws passed by the socialist majority between 2011 and 2017, dormant conservative and religious networks have been reactivated and have led in their wake to a decompartmentalisation in different political spaces and within the Catholic Church. This conjunctural effect is linked to a more structural effect of opportunity: the ecological crisis, because it raises the question of nature, gives new legitimacy to naturalist or essentialist arguments disqualified by most feminist currents.

### **Methodology: a plea for mixed methods and comprehensive analysis**

This research assumes a dual use of the genre. Gender is used here as an analytical tool: it will examine the sexual division of labour of activists in protest groups, and the way in which the female and, to a lesser extent, male identities of activists are brought to the fore. In other words, how gender structures the movement and organisations. Among Catholics, there is a gender mix: women are the spokespersons of the main organisations - LMPT, the "Printemps français" - which have been carrying the protest in 2012-2013. The "Veilleurs" or the "Sentinelles" do not seem to make any distinction between the sexes. In the "Sentinelles", the organisation of daily work is divided equally between men and women, due to the absence of a spokesperson and hierarchy in the group. The "Sentinels", which are at the origin of Human Ecology and the magazine *Limite*, propose militant practices that do not distinguish between men and women. Among the nationalists and in the dissent, men are in the vast majority. The "Identities" are also predominantly young men, but the question of the place of young girls is raised and the movement focuses its communication by underlining the mixed nature of the movement. The "Antigones" are a non-coed group which is not the female branch of a political group.

Gender is both an analytical tool, which focuses on the way in which sexual difference is designated and represented, on the distribution of roles and functions in mobilisation, and on militant practices; it is an object of investigation that puts the construction of female and male political identities at the heart of the investigation; and finally, it is a struggle issue for the groups studied, who have taken a stand against "gender theory" and equality policies, as we have seen above.

Martina Avanza, a specialist in the extreme right and anti-IVG movements in Italy, advocates an emic approach to "ugly movements" (Avanza 2018). A comprehensive approach allows one to think and see the complexity of social relations within a protest group (R. Klatch 1988), which a strictly relational approach in terms of counter-movement does not allow one to grasp. Kathleen Blee, historian of the Ku Klux Klan and specialist in contemporary radical rights in the United States, for her part, speaks of the need to question certain methodological principles relating to the relational and emotional dynamics between the researcher and the respondent. She thus invites us to take on board the place of emotions, of the researcher and the respondent in the investigative relationship and, in particular, the fear that marks these relationships in hate or violent movements. In her book on women in racist movements in the United States, she recalls this sociological evidence: "a successful interview requires conversational commonalities. Each party must feel understood, if not completely accepted by the other". She manages to create this "conversational commonality" with even the most trivial common experiences or values in order to create the bond of trust necessary for the investigation. But how do we draw the line between understanding and acceptance, between connivance and complacency? The bias of the open-ended survey was assumed for reasons of scientific integrity and to establish the 'right distance' between the respondents and the interviewer. Indeed, the position of a professional working on an object of research - mobilization -, by surveying participants, avoids the temptation of proselytism and connivance. It also sets the limits of

emotional involvement for the interviewer, such as at the respondent's home. This posture is nothing specific, in my opinion, to this field of enquiry. It is part of a desire to capture these movements, which are "unloved" by most academics, with the usual tools of political sociology.

*Diversifying sources to get around the pitfalls of a field that is resisting : a plea for mixed methods*

In their book on methods for investigating social movements, Staggenborg and Klandermans discuss the different tools available to the researcher to apprehend collective action from different prisms (Staggenborg and Klandermans 2002). Varying the focal points and methods makes it possible to reconstruct as well as possible the configurations in which the action takes place, by articulating the context - past and present frameworks - and the protagonists' capacity for action. This comprehensive approach was based on a diversified corpus of data - ethnographic material consisting of observations (n=35) of the different groups and sites (Paris, Ville du Sud-Ouest), in-depth interviews conducted after the 2012-2013 mobilisation sequence (n=20), informative interviews (n=9), supplemented by informal exchanges during the vigils. The low number of interviews is due to the many failures encountered, particularly unsuccessful attempts after Caryatids and members of Belle et Rebelle. In order to get around the obstacle of the terrain that resists and the people who evade, I have therefore diversified the sources. This allowed me to obtain information on the framing, quantitative data was collected online on Facebook pages and sites. The survey was conducted from 2013 to 2020.

Family and professional constraints limited the comparative ambition of the survey reduced to a local site for the "Sentinels" and an intergroup comparison was carried out with the "Antigones" in Paris. The scale games focused more on the scenes of mobilization.

The national dimension, examined in the first chapter, is carried out on the basis of an event analysis based on the analysis of the national press and - the regional daily press at certain events using the Factiva and Europresse databases. This type of analysis has thus made it possible to determine the "episodes" of the protest, their spatialisation and temporality.

According to an approach at the meso-organisational level, the "Manif pour tous", central actress of the conservative Catholic coalition, initiator of the social movement, was the subject of cross-investigations based on observations, interviews and various documentary sources (press, television news, online video, Facebook sites and pages). At the micro and individual level, informative interviews were carried out informally with members of the "Sentinels", the "Manif pour tous" and the "Antigones". In-depth interviews were conducted with "Antigones", "Sentinels", "Identities" and informants. This method made it possible to reconstruct, in part, the biographical and activist paths of the people. Its secondary objective was to report on political representations. The interviews with the "Antigones" thus included a section on the relationship with feminism.

These groups and individuals have largely invested social networks. Analyses of the press and the internet completed this ethnographic material. The Facebook pages of the groups studied were favoured.

Finally, the viewing of online media - television and radio - complemented this information. Martial Bild's "Bistro liberté" programme, Alain de Benoît's "Les idées à l'endroit" on TV libertés were the occasion for debates and meetings between representatives of the different groups. The youtube channels, recently gathered on the fachosphere.net website were viewed by selecting videos related to feminism.

These different materials made it possible to account for the recomposition of political sham, with a unifying effect of the rights around gender: on the one hand, as an ideology, it becomes a common adversary; on the other hand, the cause of equality between women and men allows the rights to reappropriate an egalitarian rhetoric to define national and cultural identity in a context of putting the migration crisis and the fight against Islamic terrorism on the agenda.

The patrimonialisation of equality between women and men constitutes an opportunity for the visibility of women hostile to feminists who are considered too favourable to gender and to the overcoming of gendered identities and liberal policies.

## **1. The unexpected effects of the Manif for All: decompartmentalisation of gender rights**

### *1.1 A conservative protest coalition*

The first months of the five-year term of Socialist President François Hollande (14/05/2012-15/05/2017) were marked by mobilisations on a scale that struck many observers of French political life. Wearing pink and blue hooded sweaters, the demonstrators marched in Paris and the provinces in defence of the family and children. Gathered on Sundays as a family under the banner of the "Manif pour tous" (LMPT), they inaugurated a new kind of street protest that has given rise to contradictory interpretations. Seen from the left - to put it trivially - the "Manif for All" refers to a uniform, bourgeois, conservative, homophobic and sexist movement summed up in these Vatican-inspired "ultra-right" groups. Seen from the right, the "Manif for All" is a conservative movement of resistance to an ideology harmful to the social, political and symbolic order, referred to as "gender theory". Under this banner, which is the name of the association that organised the first processions, various collectives and individuals have rallied together who are far from sharing a common vision, as we will show in this work.

These organisations and individuals converge in a coalition to challenge the gender equality policies pursued since the 1980s (Jacquot 2014). More specifically, this contestation is part of a dynamic of reaction to public policies and social movements, thus resembling a counter-movement (Lo 1982; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Eszter Kováts and Maari Põim 2015). Over the past forty years, under pressure from feminist movements and with the support of "femocrats" within institutions (Revillard 2016), international bodies and states have adopted public policies on gender and sexual equality. These are referred to as gender policies. These policies include measures to promote equality between women and men. On the other hand, legal norms and frameworks recognise the equality of rights between homosexual and heterosexual couples and are reflected in the possibility of being able to marry civilly and to found a legally recognised family. The presidential and legislative elections of 2012 are an opportunity for different associations of the homosexual cause to put this demand for equality on the agenda.

The institutional context is favourable for this because the French State must translate into French law commitments made at European and international level to eliminate discrimination based on sex, gender or sexuality (Prearo 2014). The Socialist Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault, appointed on 15 May 2012, has made the fulfilment of the 31st election campaign promise to open civil marriage and filiation to same-sex couples a priority. A bill was drafted in the summer of 2012, just a few weeks after the election.

As Simon Persico and Stéphanie Abrial point out, keeping this promise "also opens a window of opportunity for citizens and networks opposed to the promise - Catholics in particular - who find with medically assisted procreation (MAP) and gestational surrogacy (GPA) an opportunity to publicize a negative and all-encompassing view of the initial measure. The French Episcopate reacted on 30 July 2012, by issuing a national prayer text urging governments to be prudent, insisting on the need to protect children and recalling the foundations of the family. This stance in the public debate gives the impression of an essentially clerical mobilisation. The call to prayer for France (Petit 2015) revives old forms of Church intervention in the political field. The argument against the reform is based on a rhetoric that

has been developed over a long period of time in different areas of the Roman Curia. However, it is not the clergy that is in the vanguard of the mobilisation. The initiative comes from the laity, who deploy a militant know-how specific to Catholicism. Thus, the "Manif pour tous" designates both an association, which opportunely became a "political party" in 2015, and, by metonymy, all the actors who have been mobilised, with varying intensity and duration, since the autumn of 2012. The media personality Frigide Barjot, the crazy muse of the first processions, who became Virginie Tellene again after her departure from the "Manif pour tous" on 26 May 2013, has given way to a personality better known in observant and conservative Catholic circles (Raison du Cleuziou 2016), Ludovine de La Rochère. The association brings together individuals and groups - of more or less recent constitution - around the cause of the family and childhood.

The organisers, experienced in communication, manage to access the public and media space through a political, secular and festive dramaturgy (Della Sudda 2020). These protest performances aim to make a conservative claim audible and legitimate (Tilly 2008). Within Catholicism, the "Manif for All" seems to attest to a shift in favour of conservative groups, formerly on the margins of the institution. These 'observant' Catholics, attached to a regime of truth based on dogma and certainties (Lagroye 2006), more practising than their progressive co-religionists, formed the hard core of the mobilisation. This conservative social movement (Tricou and Stambolis 2017) is a mobilisation linked to the status of social groups marginalised in the liberal symbolic and political order - because of their type of economic, social and cultural capital; invested with a dimension of reconquering cultural hegemony.

### *1.2 A meeting of the rightists around the ideological opposition to gender theory*

Alongside these faith-based organisations, led by Catholics of identity who captured the attention of the media, other political groups have engaged in challenging the Taubira law. While the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) has been divided since 2011 on this issue, political parties more to the right of the political spectrum have been expressing themselves since the summer of 2012. The Christian Democratic Party (PCD) is clearly committed against the bill. The National Front (FN) announced its opposition to the bill in a press release in September 2012. The arguments relate to the inappropriateness of this issue on the political agenda and the need to re-found the social order on the traditional family. The position of *Debout la République* is close to that of the National Front: the societal debate diverts attention away from the more important issues. Its president, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, sets out his opposition to marriage and filiation for same-sex couples and pleads for a civil union giving the right to fiscal, inheritance and social equality between married couples and couples united by this contract. The major right-wing political parties have been divided. Activists and elected representatives of the UMP and the National Front took an active part in the processions, spoke on the podiums, signed platforms, and elected representatives committed themselves by signing the Charter of Municipal Councils (19/11/2013) and the Charter of Regional Councils (2015). On the side of the radical right-wing political formations, the processions were mobilising. The nationalist formations, such as the *Renouveau français* (RF) founded in 2005, are taking part in the first demonstration on 18 November 2012, organised by Civitas. The French Nationalist Party is represented by its president, Yvan Benedetti, Pierre Sidos' successor, alongside Alain Escada, president of Civitas. The French Work and the Nationalist Youth will demonstrate in 2013 on 26 March and 13 May. The French Dissidence, a nationalist movement founded in 2011 by Vincent Vauclin, is present in the processions in 2013 and occasionally takes part in vigils. On the royalist side, the *Action française* (AF) took part in the movement fairly quickly, devoting the November-December 2012 issue to the defence of the traditional family. *Dextra*,

a dissident group of AF founded in 2009, is challenging the marriage bill but does not call for demonstrations before 2013.

Nevertheless, the group invites Béatrice Bourges, President of the Collectif pour l'Enfance and spokesperson for "Printemps français", to a conference on 18 April 2013. The "Identitaires" joined the processions later. In November 2012, their action on the roof of the mosque in Poitiers occupies the main part of their communication on the web (internet). The "Identity Block" (BI) is calling for a demonstration on 13 January 2013 on its online media site Novopress at the beginning of January. Its president, Fabrice Robert, is present in the processions and the organisation is taking an active part in the demonstration on 24 March 2013. "Génération identitaire", the youth organisation of the "Bloc identitaire", only calls for a demonstration in January 2013. The movement is distinguished by symbolic outbursts such as when militants climb onto the terrace of the headquarters of the Socialist Party (PS), rue de Solferino in Paris, on the fringes of the demonstration on 16 June 2013, or when they demonstrate in front of the headquarters of the UMP on 11 October 2014, to demand a clear party position on marriage for all.

These groups on the right and far-right of the spectrum are far from sharing the same political, social, economic or cultural projects. The faithful who took part in the protest belong for many to a Catholicism of identity (Dumons, Gugelot, and Béraud 2017), observant and integral, but not reduced to it. Some claim to belong to Catholicism as the faithful, others present themselves as defenders of a Christian identity of France, without excluding the pagan roots of the national culture. The organisations differ both in the sociology of their members and in the age of the activists and their organisation. Embedded in different social worlds, cultures These different protagonists, who are politically distinct and even antagonistic, found themselves on the streets during the demonstrations in 2012 and 2013. In the course of the mobilisations against gender equality and marriage policies for homosexual couples, the various radical right-wing groups are thus forging closer links, the cement of which is opposition to the Taubira law. In the wake of the mobilisations, new figures of protest emerge, with specific modes of action: "Veilleurs", "Sentinelles", "Gavroches" and "Salopards" (Balas and Tricou 2019), but also non-mixed groups. "Veilleurs" and "Sentinelles" gather during vigils. The former are the occasion for readings and conferences on the founding texts of political thought. The latter are held in silence, spaced out from each other. The "Hommes", are anonymous young people who carry out spectacular actions (Tricou 2016). The "Antigones", some of whose activities are reserved for women, while the conferences are open to men, the "Caryatides" created in Lyon in connection with the French Work, are women's groups. The "Mères veilleuses" organise specific vigils and actions by making motherhood an anchor for collective action. The Christian protests around sexual issues are based on detailed ethnographies of these mobilisations (Morabito 2011; ; Gauglin in progress; Cheynel, n.d.; Déjeans 2019). Marie Labussière devoted her dissertation specifically to the "Antigones" (Labussière 2016). Partisan oppositions to gender politics are essentially apprehended through the National Front in Margherita Crippa's thesis and, more marginally, "Identitaires" by Marion Jacquet-Vaillant.

## 2.1 Gender, a new cleavage

The thesis put forward here is that the sequence that begins in 2012, with the announcement of the opening of civil marriage and filiation to homosexual couples, will result in a recomposition of right-wing partisan and political forces around gender issues. These "sexual issues", hitherto confined to specific areas of the political field, are becoming central to the agenda of the right and offer meeting points around the defence of the heterosexual family and the child. However, they did not necessarily translate into electoral preferences in the subsequent elections (Morabito and Réguer-Petit 2017). If the appointment of François Fillon, former prime minister of Nicolas Sarkozy, during the primary of the Right and Centre may have given the illusion of

a victory for *Sens commun*, a political movement that emerged from the "Manif pour tous", it should be borne in mind that he was not the favourite candidate of the opponents of the Taubira law. The undertaking to convert demonstrators' resources into votes did not therefore meet with the expected success (Raison Du Cleuziou 2017).

It is as if the politicisation of gender issues takes place mainly outside the conventional forms of political activity (Agrikoliansky et al. 2016). It is therefore necessary to look outside the electoral arenas to grasp as closely as possible the logic behind this recomposition of the gender divide. The public space, both physical and virtual, has become the stage for a political dramaturgy in which old and new repertoires of action have been deployed. The Catholic Right has re-invested in the media arena at a new cost, as evidenced by the emergence of organic intellectuals around various magazines (Raison du Cleuziou 2019). Apart from the media, the web and social networks have been means of action and spaces for mobilisation and staging of the movement, with their specific rhetoric (Julliard 2016; Julliard and Cervulle 2013). In addition to these modes of intervention, usual among the elites, the occupation of the street on a regular basis by social and political groups unfamiliar with this repertoire of action has been added. Right-wingers are not new to this repertoire of action. And Catholics have a tradition of protest in the public space. On the other hand, this exceptional mode of action becomes common between 2012 and 2016. The routinisation of protest practice and transformations in the repertoire of collective action are part of the recomposition of the Right and Catholicism around causes and modes of action formerly associated with the Left.

Gender is not just an issue contested as an ideology to be fought or as an object of public policy to be challenged. It is also, in its minimal understanding of the relationship between men and women, a distinctive element in the space of rights. The way in which the different groups view the place of women in their organisations and put forward egalitarian rhetoric testifies to their degree of integration into the political field. It is also an indication of the adherence of groups and individuals to egalitarian norms, which are supposed to govern relations between men and women in Western societies. In this respect, the mixed nature of the "Manifesto for All" and the preponderant place of women in the organisation of the movement and in its leadership is worthy of note. In particular, it contrasts with the very strong male hegemony characterising the nationalist and Catholic fundamentalist groups that took part in the protest. Farris defines the concept of "femonationalism" to address the political economy of the discursive formation that brings together the heterogeneous anti-Islam and anti-(male) immigrant concerns of nationalist parties, some feminists, and neoliberal governments under the idea of gender equality (Farris 2012, 187). Since the 1990s, the French political field has been structured by partisan strategies aimed at capturing the popular electorate supposedly committed to the theses of the *Rassemblement National*. In the run-up to the presidential elections, different parties and the media put themes such as Islam and immigration on the agenda in order to win votes and, in the event of a duel, to pose as a democratic paragon in the face of a demonised political party. The novelty of the 2012 and subsequent elections is the role of gender in these dynamics. From a perspective of opposition to non-Western cultures or Islam, a rhetoric of egalitarian gender is thus being put forward without the identity, nationalist or conservative groups that take advantage of it supporting equality policies. By using gender as a criterion for distinguishing between the different protagonists, we take a common look at the way in which right-wing groups take up the women's cause - between those who display an adherence to this norm and those who challenge it - and what these same groups do to the space of the women's cause by giving visibility to "right-wing women".

The notion of women's space refers to groups formed around the struggle for women's rights (Mathieu 2012; ; the notion of space is strongly inspired by the notion of fields, but leaves more room for Crozier and Friedberg 2014). In the 1990s, parity played a unifying role in this space (Bereni 2007), while Islam and prostitution fragmented it around new dividing lines (Taraud

2005). The questions raised by marriage for all and homoparenthood open up new divides by once again posing the question of reproductive rights. If, in 2012, medically assisted procreation is relatively consensual in the space of the women's cause, surrogate motherhood is the subject of radically divergent positions among feminists (Roman 2012).

The repertoire of actions and demands of FEMEN that appear in the public space divide. From 2013 onwards, when the protest repertoire is abandoned in favour of spectacular actions, other women's groups appear and gain visibility through social networks and media coverage of the "Manif for All". Although little studied and little known, they nevertheless bear witness to a transformation of the women's cause and to the resistance to liberalism that underpins current gender policies.

One of the difficulties for those interested in them is to find concepts that adequately describe them without taking a normative approach. While interest in conservative and religious women's activism is in the minority in France (Della Sudda 2014; for the recent period, Gauglin's ongoing thesis is noted), with studies focusing on the extreme right (Lesselier and Venner 1997), other research traditions have given prominence to conservative women's commitments. "Right-wing women" were thus the subject of the first feminist research in the United States (Blee and Deutsch 2012; Burkett 1998; Dworkin 1983; R.E. Klatch 1987). These include struggles over women's right to control their bodies (Avanza 2018; see also Avanza and Della Sudda 2017), and the influence of religious groups on the partisan sphere (Johnson 2019). In the United States in particular, where the Tea Party and the Christian Right now have a strong influence on the Republican Party, the role of faith-based organisations has been extensively discussed in relation to the partisan sphere (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Deckman 2016). Recently, the issue of conservative feminism has been documented by Ronnee Schreiber (Schreiber 2008), who shows how conservative women challenged the Equal Right Amendment in the 1970s and 1980s, articulating militant biographies with discursive analyses. It continues the pioneering work of Judith Stacey (Stacey 1983). This work highlights the conservative rhetoric of "pro-women" conservative movements that rely on the feminist frame around law and autonomy to oppose the feminist coalition's demand for gender equality (Ferree, Gamson, and Gerhards 2002), such as the legalization of abortion and contraception or gender equality in the workplace.

## *2.2 The five trends of the "right-wing women's" space*

From the point of view of their conservative contemporaries, two specificities seem to distinguish the women's movements that emerged after the "Manif pour tous" in France. Alterfeminism and "integral feminism", inspired by Christianity, partly assume the heritage of feminism. The centrality of ecology in their demands also differentiates them from the identity activists who had invested the "Manif pour tous". They thus differ from other nationalist or conservative women's groups. The emergence and consolidation of this feminine pole in the space of the women's cause is based on different axes. The shift from the family to women's causes shows different ways of opposing contemporary feminisms, modes of organisation and arenas of intervention. The "anti-gender" framework, in other words, opposed to gender equality policies, sexuality and the transformation of "gender social relations" (Dunezat 2016; Kergoat 2010), has led to the crystallisation of gender difference and the highlighting of a natural basis for social roles, while at the same time displaying a commitment to gender equality. In doing so, and in the context of the affirmation of a media feminism of women and public policies of equality, right-wing women have emerged in the space of the women's cause. This new visibility is linked to the specific social properties of these activists and their repertoire of action.

Based on the discourses, actions and organisation of the groups, I have identified five currents that distinguish "right-wing women". This concept, taken from that of Andrea Dworkin, avoids the pitfall of the anti-feminist label and nevertheless recalls the attachment to a female political subject, to the complementarity of the sexes and to a political project based on a civilisational or even ethno-racial community.

Female nationalist, through two modes of organisation, includes the women's section of the "Caryatides" at the PNF (2013) and the Cercle Fraternité at the FN (2016). Women only organization or mixed, they gathered on specific section or circle within political party to claim the specific role of women as procucers and reproducers of the nation. They explicitly refer to Christian identity and oppose reproductive rights.

Identitarian women and feminism : The "Identitaires" are not to be outdone, the movement assumes gender diversity but remains shaped by gender, which determines differentiated symbolic retribution around a "feminine but not feminist" framework of Belle et Rebelle and of which the Collectif Nemesis is today the heir. They could use feminist frames such as gender equality, violence against women to claim the superiority of Europeans civilization. Solveig Mineo's Occidentalism Feminism is today linked to the Occidentalism Party, which distinguishes itself from the first four groups by its attachment to secularism and even its anticlericalism and by its explicit feminism. But it clings to nationalist or identity-based currents by its defence of Western civilisation because of the place of women.

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The "Antigones", this group of women born in 2013 and which acts as a crucible for alterfeminism. This only-women group oppose current feminism as FEMEN, the Femocrats and more broadly feminists groups that do not refer to women identity but rather queer politics. Their political project is based on men and women complementarity, their crucial role as primary cel of society within the family and ecology. As consequence they oppose reproductive technology as techno-medical power over women's body. They cautiously avoid to be associated to political parties or religion, though considering Christianity and Pre-Christian philosophies as central for Western civilization and women empowerment.

Christian alterfeminism and integral feminism, at the crossroads of Pope Francis' human ecology, conservative feminism and ecology.

All of these groups oppose liberal and radical feminism, as well as gender politics. Some of them explicitly refer to nationalism and western culture supremacy while other tend to refer to Nature as the core of their political project. By so doing, they provide new frames for essentialism and differentialism.

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At the end of the 2011-2013 protest sequence around the cause of the family, the politicisation of gender issues is accompanied by an explicitation of the politics of gendered identity. Some conservatives, who were once advocates of parity, see this stabilisation of gendered identities as a - short-lived - bulwark against gender equality policies. To counter an ideology that is considered harmful and undermines the foundations of human anthropology, the organisations and individuals mobilised in the processions will reinvest gendered identities in an assertive manner. In a context where the parity norm is imposed, the extra-parliamentary right-wing partisan formations will promote a feminine political subject. The nationalist formations, like the traditionalist groups - French Renewal - recreate the women's sections of the leagues that preceded them. At the National Front, "femotionalism" is based around a think tank and extends a "pro-women" strategy that accompanied the presidency of Marine Le Pen. The cause

of "women" is articulated around a political project of restitutionist politics of a Catholic France, with a homogenous and white population, rooted in its soil and traditions, in which the family and the complementarity of the sexes are central. The reactionary rhetoric of turning the progressive argument around to defend a conservative political project<sup>1213</sup> now integrates the cause of women against gender equality policies. Among identity activists, who are younger and come from the petty bourgeoisie or the working classes, the egalitarian norm is integrated according to a positive vision of co-education and can be seen through the presence of women in spectacular actions. For this ethno-differentialist political current, valuing women means differentiating itself from other cultures in which women do not enjoy the same rights as men. Having women activists also means making electoral agreements possible in the context of strengthening parity obligations. In 2014, it is notably thanks to these identity-based activists that the National Front will be able to present women candidates in the municipal elections. Nevertheless, gender remains an operating principle in the movement, as evidenced by its organisation and the disappearance of these women's structures for several years. Identity rhetoric is thus rearmed in the light of gender, charged with a "pro-woman" discourse closely articulated with the defence of European civilisation against internal threats - feminism - and external threats - the presence of Islam and extra-European immigration.

Apart from political organisations, the "Antigones", dressed in antique white robes, represent a melting pot of rights united around a political project of autonomy. The group appropriates the modes of action that make up empowerment techniques in order to better challenge the spokesperson of feminist organisations in the space of the women's cause. The background of environmental concerns gives ecology a central place in these radical women's commitments which lead these young urban women, most of whom are graduates and well-born, to break with the social destinies expected in their environment in order to put into practice their political project centred on the home and the construction of autonomous communities. In this way, they participate in the emergence of an alter-feminist, restitutionist and conservative current where former protagonists of the spring 2013 vigils meet. Clearly assuming their Catholic roots, the Limite team is applying the notion of integral ecology in various fields and, in particular, is working to reload the arguments of the opposition to abortion and contraception with a secular, secular and ecological framework. Marianne Durano thus develops an ecofeminist, restitutionist and conservative thinking critical of contemporary liberal feminisms. Revaluing women's experience, she assumes a point of view situated to define women's autonomy through withdrawal from consumer society, sobriety and liberation from medical and state power. Finally, social networks have given visibility to a small current of Western feminists who assume this label and mobilise a register centred on the cause of women and the defence of civilisation. We can thus see how, after the breathlessness of the protest phase, the groups engaged in challenging gender equality policies have been recomposed, favouring the emergence of a conservative pole in the space of the women's cause.