The Mechanisms of Institutional Reforms: Understanding Why Some Reforms Succeed and Others Fail
Résumé
The economic turmoil that struck Western Europe in the last five years makes it inescapable to reflect about the link between economic and political crisis, and institutional reform. It is important to understand in what context reforms are being put on the agenda, but also to understand what determines their final outcome. This paper focuses on what happens after bundles of reform (i.e. several reforms affecting multiple dimensions of the institutional architecture linked together by the reformers) are being put on the agenda, focusing on three sequences of reform: one in France (reduction of the presidential term and reversal of the electoral calendar, 2000-2001), one in Italy (constitutional and electoral reform of 2005) and one in Ireland (the sequence of political reforms starting in 2011). I identify two types of reform according to the level of support at the beginning of the process: consensual, and divisive. Secondly, I distinguish between majoritarian, supermajoritarian, and externalized processes of reform according to their level of inclusion. I argue that the final outcome depends on the interaction between the nature of reform, and the process chosen to conduct it. I show empirically that the paths leading to successful reforms are different for consensual and divisive reforms. Divisive reforms appear to be driven primarily by self-interest and their outcome to depend on the veto player dynamics and on the ability to build a large coalition of reformers. Consensual reforms lead to credit-claiming strategies. Their outcomes depend on the capacity of the majority of actors to feel able to claim benefits for a popular reform.
Domaines
Science politique
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)