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► **To cite this version:**

Aurore Burietz, Loredana Ureche-Rangau. Better the devil you know: Home and sectoral biases in bank lending. *International Economics*, 2020, 164, pp.69-85. 10.1016/j.inteco.2020.08.004 . hal-03132835

HAL Id: hal-03132835

<https://hal.science/hal-03132835>

Submitted on 21 Sep 2022

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Better the Devil you Know: Home and Sectoral Biases in Bank Lending

A. Burietz^{a*}

L. Ureche-Rangau^b

This paper empirically investigates banks' lending and the extent to which they are influenced by specific preferences in terms of geographical location and industry. We study whether banks develop a field of expertise and focus on it, or whether they prefer to grant loans quite evenly among countries and industries. We manually built an original database of syndicated loans for banks in the four major banking systems in the eurozone, to estimate the determinants of loans' amounts between 2005 and 2013. Our findings highlight a domestic bias and a sectoral bias with banks lending larger amounts to their domestic borrowers and to industries they are more familiar with.

Keywords: Credit supply, biases, syndicated loan market

JEL Classification: F34, G01, G21

We gratefully thank Charles W. Calomiris for sharing his expertise and time during the four months that one of the authors spent as a visiting scholar at Columbia University. This period was the opportunity to collect the data necessary to run this analysis. We are also grateful to Giorgia Barboni, Luisa Carpinelli, Hicham Daher, Ralph De Haas, Hans Degryse, Alain Durré, George Kouretas, Jérémie Lefebvre, Paolo Mazza, Camelia Minoiu, Arif Oduncu, Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou, Oana Peia and Daniel Thornton for their insightful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013/ under REA grant agreement No. 608129. All remaining errors are ours.

^a Assistant Professor, Finance Department, IESEG School of Management and LEM-CNRS 9221, 3 Rue de la Digue, 59000 Lille, France. Tel.: +33 320 54 58 92. Email: a.burietz@ieseg.fr. * Corresponding author.

^b Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business, Université de Picardie Jules Verne, CRIISEA, 10 Placette Lafleur, BP 2716, 80027 Amiens Cedex 1, France. Tel.: +33 322 826 803. Email: loredana.ureche@u-picardie.fr.

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1. Introduction

Financial institutions are key players in financial markets. They provide information-based financial services to facilitate trades, improve risk management and contribute to efficient capital allocation. They also benefit from cost and expertise advantages by collecting and processing information to evaluate firms and projects. Financial institutions build their expertise on their ability to interpret subtle signals and to reuse the information through time and across customers. Stomper (2006) argues that banks use their industry expertise to adjust funding rents according to their exposure to industry-specific credit risk. Kamp, Pfingsten, Memmel and Behr (2007) and Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2011), among others, provide evidence that banks' returns increase with loan portfolio concentration. Hence, banks may have incentives to become experts in lending to specific borrowers and thus benefit from economies of scale by re-using the information previously collected and analyzed. However, this is in contradiction with the theory which supports portfolio diversification, e.g. across regions and industries, to reduce the probability of default (Diamond, 1984; Shim, 2013). Diversification is one solution to information asymmetry and allows reducing the exposure of banks to economic downturns. Nevertheless, as argued by Wagner (2008, 2010), if diversification may indeed lead to less risky asset portfolios at the institutional level, at the aggregate level, risks may only be shifted around while previously they were focused on a specific region or industry. As financial institutions become more homogeneous, their inclination to experience financial distress at the same time increases with negative consequences for the stability and the efficiency of the system as a whole. Therefore, the benefits of diversification at the institutional level may be offset by the costs of diversification at the systemic level, thus encouraging portfolio concentration. Another solution to information asymmetry is to opt for relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 2002). From the bank's point of view, relationship lending increases the access to private soft information as well as informational rents (Schenone, 2010). From the borrower's point of view, it improves lending terms (López-Espinosa, Mayordomo and Moreno, 2017) and credit access in distressed times (Beck, Degryse, De Haas and van Horen, 2018). Hence, the question of how banks' level of expertise affects their lending behavior, as well as its consequences, is far from being answered.

Given the strong relationship between banks' lending and economic activity, we underline the importance of investigating the determinants of this process to better understand the role of credit institutions in supporting

economic growth. The main question addressed in this paper concerns how banks' lending behavior changes according to borrowers' characteristics. Do we observe a home bias¹ and/or industry bias in bank lending? This question is important to financial intermediation because it sheds additional light on the determinants of loan supply. It is also crucial for corporate finance as loans are a major source of external funding; borrowers may thus find important insights into potential changes in loan amounts depending on their domiciliation and the industry in which they operate. Finally, regulators also need a deeper understanding of bank lending behavior.

To address these questions, we manually combine seven databases to build a rich and original set of variables for the syndicated loan market in four eurozone countries – France, Germany, Italy, and Spain – between 2005 and 2013. This period, centered on a financial shock, enables us to investigate both normal and crisis times and to examine whether bank lending changed post-Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. In Europe, the collapse of Lehman Brothers is considered the starting point of the subprime crisis. It highlighted the high exposure and involvement of European banks in the trading of subprime mortgage-backed securities (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 2010).

Our results show that when a loan is granted by the banks in our sample, the amount lent is higher if the firm is of the same nationality as the bank. This phenomenon is observed notwithstanding the crisis. We provide evidence of banks' willingness to lend higher amounts to domestic companies. This lending behavior ultimately leads to an increase in the share of domestic loans, typical of a flight-to-home effect. We thus argue that banks may find the assessment of credit risk easier if they operate in geographical proximity.² As such, these banks become experts of their local market, developing a competitive advantage over foreign banks that may result in higher profits (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). Regarding the sectoral bias, our results show that banks remain focused on the same industries, pre and post-crisis, to which they allocate larger amounts. Banks lend higher amounts to industries they are specialized in because they have more incentives and a competitive advantage to collect information and to monitor the loan. This ultimately leads to better credit quality as banks

¹ The term "home bias" is well known in the international finance literature and refers to investors disproportionately overweighting domestic assets in their portfolios relative to weights suggested by optimal diversification models. Carey and Nini (2007) argue that risk neutrality, which stands at the basis of these models, is not obviously applicable for banks, but for the sake of convenience one can use the term "home bias" even in this context.

² Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document that familiarity attributes such as language, culture and geographical distance play a role in explaining investors' portfolios. Thus, home bias may be integrated into a more general phenomenon of preference for familiar companies.

benefit from costs and expertise advantages (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).

Our analysis contributes to the literature on international banking and the syndicated loan market. A large number of papers use this market to investigate diverse topics such as the transmission of financial crises (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013), the impact of new regulations (Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek, 2014), liquidity issues (Gupta, Singh and Zebede, 2008) or the settlement of new accounting standards (Chan, Hsieh, Lee and Yueh, 2015) on cross-border lending. Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) also use this market to analyze how cultural differences between decision-makers affect loan contracts and show that cultural distances not only between the lender and the borrower but also across lenders of one syndicate impact loan terms and risk-sharing respectively. The use of the syndicated loan market is widely popular as it represents one of the major sources of international corporate financing in addition to bonds and stocks. As such, we complement these works by using the syndicated loan market to examine the characteristics of banks' lending behavior in the four most significant banking systems of the eurozone.

Our study also adds to the literature on home bias in bank lending. Previous studies provide evidence on the European banks' increasing sovereign home bias in crisis countries setting forth several arguments explaining this behavior. The financial repression/moral suasion argument states that governments may have conditioned their financial support to banks in their jurisdiction upon favoring domestic sovereign bonds (De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli, 2017; Becker and Ivashina, 2018; Ongena, Popov and Van Horen, 2019). Another potential explanation is that the incentive to default on sovereign debt is much lower if the debt is held by domestic investors rather than foreign ones, because of the costs on the domestic economy (Broner, Martin and Ventura, 2014; Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi, 2014). Finally, an informational advantage in favor of domestic agents may also explain European banks' behavior on the sovereign debt market. Saka (2019) provides evidence that following the crisis, home bias was also observed on private debts granted by European banks. We extend these analyses by combining both the home and the sectoral biases in our analysis to explore deeper whether strategic private borrowers do indeed benefit from the support of the banking system.

Finally, this paper complements the literature that seeks to identify the impact of the financial crisis on cross-border lending (Chui, Domanski, Kugler and Shek, 2010; Kleimeier, Sander and Heuchemer, 2013; Howcroft,

Kara and Marques-Ibanez, 2014). De Haas and Van Horen (2013) argue that funding-constrained banks significantly reduced the volume of loans to companies located abroad after 2008. Cerutti, Hale and Minoiu (2015) find that the stock of syndicated loans increased during the crisis, not because of new issues of loans but rather due to drawdowns on existing loans granted before the crisis. We differ from these analyses by considering banks' lending strategies in terms of borrower's country and industry during both normal and crisis times.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theory and our main hypotheses, section 3 describes our empirical strategy. In section 4 we present our data, and in section 5 we discuss the results and their interpretation. Section 6 provides several robustness checks, while section 7 concludes.

2. Background Theory and Hypotheses

2.1. Biases in banks' lending and informational asymmetries

This paper empirically investigates European bank lending decisions and the extent to which they are influenced by banks' level of specialization. The literature highlights two main biases that may impact portfolio allocation in general and banks' portfolios in particular.

The first one is home bias in portfolio management, mainly due to exchange rate risk, transaction costs, and informational asymmetries (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013). As argued by Saka (2019), given the specific case of the eurozone, characterized by increased financial integration, European common legislation, and exchange rate stability over the past years, the informational asymmetries explanation may be prevailing.

The existence of differences in the informational set of domestic and foreign agents and the associated costs of information acquisition are among the arguments outlined in explaining home bias in portfolio compositions. Investors' better judgment of local conditions and management practices also contributes to exacerbating the share of domestic assets in portfolios, even those of more sophisticated investors such as mutual funds or banks (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009; Dziuda and Mondria, 2012). The informational distance that may induce home bias can be caused by physical or geographical distance (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001) but also by cultural distance (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Hau, 2001). Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) show that investors have an incentive to opt for domestic investments

despite a context of global information access and capital mobility across borders and link this phenomenon to information immobility. Investors prefer learning more about domestic assets for which they already have a small competitive advantage over foreign investors, than learning more about foreign assets for which they have a competitive disadvantage. As such, when domestic investors anticipate an increase in the payoffs of home assets, the resulting increase in home asset prices will only reflect the information known by the average investor. Hence, domestic investors may record higher excess returns as they have more information about the domestic assets than the average investor.

Also, bank loans are heavily dependent on private information; the amount of a loan and its cost are established by a lender based on both “soft” and “hard” information (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 2002; Houston and James, 1996; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith, 2003). Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) argue that more proximate lenders benefit from competitive advantages in gathering soft information about their customers. Information frictions thus affect both terms of a loan. Houston, Itzkowitz and Naranjo (2017) underline that these information asymmetries may be aggravated in the context of cross-border lending. Méon and Weill (2007) focus their empirical analysis on a large number of mergers that have occurred in the European banking sector since the 1990s and highlight significant gains in risk diversification resulting from cross-border mergers. However, they do not find evidence that diversification is the objective pursued by banks. They rather show a strong bias in loan portfolios.

To isolate the informational channel, one has to be aware of other potential factors, even within a quite homogeneous financial space as the eurozone. Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydro (2013) for example show that even if banks belong to the European Monetary Union (EMU) with a unique monetary policy, the transmission of this policy is heterogeneous across members. De Santis and Surico (2013) explain this heterogeneity by a large number of banks in Germany and Italy compared to France, where the banking system is more concentrated. Finally, after the Lehman collapse, several governments intervened to support their banking system, but the measures and their magnitude differed across countries (Ureche-Rangau and Burietz, 2013) with a significant influence on credit supply and the choice of borrowers (Caliendo, Guo and Smith, 2018). All these parameters have to be controlled for if one aims to capture a home bias effect due mainly to informational asymmetries.

Our first analysis tries to investigate whether banks' lending behavior differs according to the borrower's location (Hypothesis 1 – Home bias).

Second, the industry of the borrower also seems to be a significant determinant of banks' lending strategies. Banks, as financial intermediaries, collect information and develop expertise in specific sectors they are used to lending to or that they consider as being strategic. As such, they can build on this expertise to adjust their lending behavior either to focus more on these sectors and benefit from the reduction of information asymmetry or to grant loans quite evenly across industries (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006). Giannetti and Saidi (2019) even show that banks with a high concentration of loans in specific industries are more likely to provide liquidity to industries in trouble, to limit the risk of costly fire sales during periods of distress.

As argued previously, banks are financial intermediaries in the context of asymmetric information and act as delegated monitors in the sense of Diamond (1984). The acquisition of information about the firms and monitoring costs are key factors. Thus, when providing a loan, a bank may select firms in familiar industries to save monitoring costs.

We thus also investigate whether banks' lending behavior differs according to borrower's industry (Hypothesis 2 – Sectoral bias).

The existence of such biases on the syndicated lending market could be seen as puzzling. Indeed, as bank lending activities are mainly domestic, syndicated lending provides an opportunity to capture foreign borrowers for example. Nevertheless, even in this market, banks may continue to privilege particular borrowers, e.g. domestic and operating in specific industries.

2.2. Biases in banking lending and financial crises

Previous literature also suggests that the flight-to-home effect, particularly in the case of banks, seems to be crisis-related and is consistent with the funding risk that banks may experience during a financial institution crisis. Epstein (2001) uses the concept of "ambiguity aversion" when banks allocate more resources to domestic companies because geographical proximity makes it easier for them to quantify the credit risk on domestic assets. This behavior is even more striking during a banking crisis when banks suffer from a confidence problem.

Giannetti and Laeven (2012) use data on the syndicated loan market to analyze the lending behavior of banks in 55 crisis-hit countries. The authors provide evidence that home bias in bank lending is a partial explanation of the credit crunch observed during the 2008 financial crisis. Firms' credit quality is also an important parameter, even if loan origination seems more significant. Besides, the flight-to-home effect seems unconnected either to the relationship a bank may have established with its debtors or to the impact of government intervention. As such, the risk of foreign loans seems to be a significant determinant of banks' credit allocation. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) argue that investors are unable to properly assess the credit risk of foreign assets. Hence, banks that experience a decrease in wealth during a banking crisis tend to reduce the weight of foreign assets in their portfolio (Epstein, 2001).

Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) focus on cross-border lending and examine the transmission of a financial crisis from developed countries to emerging markets. They highlight a flight-to-home effect during the 2008 crisis, both as banks in crisis-hit developed countries reduced their cross-border lending to emerging markets and as branches in those emerging markets also cut their lending volume. However, De Haas and Van Horen (2013) argue that the conclusions developed by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) on cross-border lending cannot be generalized to all banks. They observe that cross-border lending in some countries can remain stable, even if a crisis occurs.

Our third investigation seeks to set forth whether the occurrence of financial crises affects bank lending (Hypothesis 3).

3. Empirical Strategy

We aim to identify whether the borrower's geographical location and industry impact credit supply proxied by the loan amount banks grant. The main challenge is to disentangle credit supply from credit demand effects as both of them can explain the final amount agreed between the borrower and the lender (Gan, 2007; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina, 2012; Amiti and Weinstein, 2018). First, the financial position of the lender may affect its capacity to lend money. De Jonghe, Dewachter and Ongena (2020) show that credit supply varies according to banks' capital level and that an increase in capital requirements lowers the supply of credit to firms. Focusing on a banking crisis, Antoniades (2016) argues that

banks with higher funding risk tighten their credit offer, especially by raising costs or imposing tougher requirements (Panetta, Faeh, Grande, Ho, King, Levy, Signoretti, Taboga and Zaghini, 2009); they reduce risks by favoring domestic companies. However, Gambacorta and Shin (2018) show evidence that higher bank capital is associated with greater lending. The authors explain their result by the cost-advantage for the bank as a better-capitalized borrower, which in turn allows the bank to increase credit. Second, the economic environment strongly impacts firms' investment opportunities and sales, and thus their propensity to apply for loans, i.e. credit demand (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba, 1988; Panetta, Faeh, Grande, Ho, King, Levy, Signoretti, Taboga and Zaghini, 2009). As such, the influence of both the borrower's domicile and the lender's specialization on bank lending can be either supply- or demand-driven.

Regarding the domicile of the borrower, geographical proximity streamlines credit assessment procedures and reduces agency costs. Moreover, loan terms can also be affected by the structure of the national banking system in terms of competition, institutional arrangements, and the existence of credit registries. From this point of view, the impact will be supply-driven only (Behr and Schmidt, 2015). However, the geographical proximity with banks, the largely bank-oriented credit culture in Europe, and the monetary and economic conditions may also impact loan demand. More specifically, changes in firms' net worth, the cost of financing and expectations for investment all impact loan amounts (Xiao, 2011).

Regarding the industry of the borrower, the effect can be supply-driven, influenced by the lending strategy for example. A bank may either decide to adopt a focus strategy by lending more to a specific industry to save agency and monitoring costs rather than diversifying its loan portfolio, or to internalize any spillover effects from negative shocks (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006; Giannetti and Saidi, 2019). Nevertheless, there may be situations where a serially correlated sectoral productivity shock shifts credit demand from firms in that particular industry. The serially correlated nature of the shock implies that higher credit yesterday is followed by higher credit today; therefore, the total amount lent by bank in the previous year would be correlated with how much the borrower is requesting today. In this case, the impact would be demand-driven and could directly affect the amount of the loan because of a change in investment opportunities.

We address this identification challenge using two alternative specifications of our baseline model. First, we control for credit demand using borrowers' observable time-varying characteristics as well as macroeconomic

conditions, borrower, and time fixed effects. We then replace all these variables by borrower \times time fixed effects to capture all borrower's time-varying characteristics, i.e. observable and unobservable (Khwaja and Mian, 2008).

We run a cross-section analysis per loan to investigate the determinants of its amount and study bank lending behavior.³ Our model is specified at the tranche level of a syndicated loan. We manually matched the amount granted by each bank with the associated explanatory variables to estimate the following equation:

$$Amount_{iblt} = \alpha + \theta_1 HB_{iblt} + \gamma_1 SB_{iblt-1} + \beta X_{iblt} + \delta_b + \delta_l + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{iblt} \quad (1)$$

where $Amount_{iblt}$ is the natural logarithm of the amount of loan i issued by borrower b and purchased by lender l at time t . HB_{iblt} is the home bias variable, i.e. a dummy variable equal to one if borrower b is located in the same country as lender l when loan i is issued. We also run the estimation of Equation (1) using an alternative measure of home bias, i.e. the total amount lent by lender l during the year of loan i to all borrowers located in the same country than lender l , as a percentage of the total amount lent by the same lender to all borrowers over the same year. The standalone variable tests for the presence of a flight-to-home effect (Hypothesis 1). SB_{iblt-1} is the sectoral bias variable, i.e. the total amount lent by lender l during the year before loan i was issued to the same industry as that of borrower b , measured as a percentage of the total amount lent by the same lender to all industries over the same year. In line with the home bias hypothesis, the standalone variable tests for the presence of a sectoral bias (Hypothesis 2).

The vector X_{iblt} contains the borrower's observable time-varying characteristics to control for loan demand. We argue that a firm's willingness to apply for a loan is more likely to be influenced by firm-specific factors. As such, we include five yearly determinants to assess the borrower's financial position: the natural logarithm of total assets, the natural logarithm of the borrower's long-term debt, its return on equity, its share of fixed assets (the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets) and its sales growth. We consider data for the year preceding the loan. We also control for the crisis period with a dummy variable equal to 1 post-Lehman, and for the change in economic conditions through the change in the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the

³ A loan-by-loan analysis allows to study each loan separately; time series analysis would have involved aggregating the loans for a specific time-period.

borrower's country. We saturate our model with borrower (δ_b) and time (δ_t) fixed effects.⁴ We argue that the borrower's financial position, as well as accelerator terms such as sales, capture investment demand and motivate changes in capital spending (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba, 1988 among others). We expect these variables to have a positive impact on the amount, except for the long-term debt coefficient and the coefficient of the crisis dummy (Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, 2002; Brick and Palia, 2007; Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009). A borrower with an above-average financial position and benefiting from a good economic environment should be able to obtain a larger loan. However, the pecking order hypothesis formalized by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) stating that internal funding is preferred to the more expensive external sources may mitigate our conclusions. Indeed, as argued by Leary and Roberts (2005) for example, when leverage increases, firms are more likely to issue equity or repurchase debt to avoid bankruptcy costs and preserve future debt capacity but do not do it immediately to avoid the costs of such an adjustment. However, as leverage decreases, firms are more likely to finance their investment opportunities by issuing debt, but refrain from doing so and privilege internally generated funds due to the direct costs of external financing (and additional information costs of risky debt). In the same vein, profitable firms may also be less likely to use external financing and prefer internal funds as reported by Flannery and Rangan (2006) among others.

We also control for bank characteristics. A well-capitalized and liquid bank with high-quality assets, substantial earnings, stable funding sources, and independent managers and supervisors will perform better than its peers and will thus be able to better support lending supply.⁵ We thus use a vector of nine explanatory variables that are consistent with both the CAMEL model and the Basel regulation in addition to bank fixed effects (δ_l). First, to account for the bank's capital, we use the Tier 1 ratio of common equity and retained earnings to risk-weighted assets, in line with a large strand of the literature (Gambacorta, 2008; Acharya and Steffen, 2012; Kapan and Minoiu, 2015; Drechsler, Drechsel, Marques-Ibanez and Schnabl, 2016). For asset quality, we employ the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans, provided by Bankscope.⁶ To measure the management aspects of the bank, we build the variable Total Lending, which is the natural logarithm of the total amount lent

⁴ We also estimate an alternative version of Equation (1) with borrower \times time fixed effects.

⁵ Peek and Rosengreen (2000), Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Altunbas, Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez (2011), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), De Haas and Van Horen (2012, 2013), Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz (2012), Giannetti and Laeven (2012), Popov and Udell (2012), Antoniadis (2016), Beltratti and Stulz (2019).

⁶ Popov and Van Horen (2014) show that banks' exposure to distressed sovereign bonds is also a significant determinant of the issuance of new syndicated loans. However, due to data availability, we are not able to include this control variable in our estimations.

in the previous year. Calomiris and Pornrojngkool (2009) argue that this variable describes the lender's reputation and a potential size effect as it highlights the lender's ability to capture a larger share of the syndicated loan market. The level of earnings is proxied by two variables: interest income as a percentage of total income and the bank's return on assets. Finally, three measures account for liquidity: the interbank ratio of the lender - "due from banks" over "due to banks" -, the liquid asset ratio - liquid assets as a percentage of deposits and short-term funding -, and the ratio of core deposits to total assets (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian, 2011; Antoniadis, 2016). For all these variables, when a loan is signed at time t , we take into account data at time $t - 1$. The vector of bank characteristics also includes a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government intervenes to support the supply of credit of one specific bank during the banking crisis. We expect all coefficients to be positively correlated with the loan amount, except for the asset quality variable (Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, 2002; Gambacorta, 2008). However, zombie lending incentives could also push distressed banks to make more loans. Indeed, Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger and Hirsh (2019) argue that this was the case in Europe following the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program announced in 2012: by continuing to support impaired borrowers banks in distress may engage in a gamble for resurrection hoping either these borrowers regain solvency or, at least, that they could delay realizing losses on their loan portfolios.⁷

We use ten variables to describe the loan's characteristics: (i) the natural logarithm of its spread, (ii) the natural logarithm of its maturity, (iii) a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in euro, its type - (iv) revolving or (v) term loan -, and its objective - (vi) intended for corporate purposes or (vii) for debt repayment -, (viii) a variable to control for the size of the syndicate, (ix) a dummy equal to 1 when the deal issued by the borrower contains more than one facility, and (x) the Value-at-Risk (VaR) to assess the risk of the industry in which the borrower operates (Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, 2002; Calomiris and Pornrojngkool, 2005; Brick and Palia, 2007). We use industry indices produced by Datastream to compute a VaR per industry and per year. Then, we manually match the SIC code of the borrowing company provided by the LPC DealScan database with the indices from Datastream to be able to associate one VaR per loan and also take into account the timing of the loan. Finally, we include three dummy variables to account for the potential influence of a relationship between

⁷ We thank an anonymous Referee for suggesting this alternative argument.

the bank and its customers: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same company has contracted a loan during the year before the loan under consideration was granted, a dummy variable to account for the fact that the previous loan(s) have been contracted with the same bank, and a dummy variable to consider the borrower's opportunity to have more than one credit source. The latter variable is equal to 1 when the company borrows from at least two banks.

We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach with standard errors clustered at the bank level. We start by testing the impact of domiciliation and industry separately, before running the regression with both effects, each time with all the control variables.

We then investigate the impact of the financial crisis (Hypothesis 3) on our conclusions using the following Equation (2):

$$Amount_{iblt} = \alpha + \theta_1 HB_{iblt} + \theta_2 HB_{iblt} \times C + \gamma_1 SB_{iblt-1} + \gamma_2 SB_{iblt-1} \times C + \beta X_{iblt} + \delta_b + \delta_l + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{iblt} \quad (2)$$

where we complement Equation (1) with two interaction terms between HB_{iblt} and SB_{iblt-1} on one side and C , a dummy equal to 1 for the post-Lehman period, on the other side. The collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 15, 2008) is our breaking point as it highlighted the high exposure and involvement of European banks in the trading of subprime mortgage-backed securities (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 2010).

4. Data description

This paper studies how the geographical and sectoral orientation of the borrower affect credit supply. For this purpose, we build a rich set of variables combining seven databases for the four most significant banking systems of the eurozone, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, from 2005 to 2013. We thus contribute to the literature mainly based on U.S. datasets.

4.1. Loan characteristics: LPC DealScan

First, we use LPC DealScan to obtain information on all syndicated loans provided by banks in the four countries under study between 2005 and 2013. A syndicated loan is a financial transaction between a company and a group, or syndicate, of banks.⁸

Following Lim, Minton and Weisbach (2014), we consider bank-type institutions only, commercial banks, investment banks, and thrift institutions,⁹ and leave aside non-bank institutional investors such as hedge funds, due to differences in the cost of providing debt capital. We then assign each bank to one of the four countries under study, using the following procedure. First, we keep only banks with an ultimate parent situated in France, Germany, Italy, or Spain. We develop a unique ID to refer to the ultimate parent bank and assign it to all the banks and subsidiaries belonging to the same holding structure. Second, for each country, we consider the geographical location of each bank and identify three categories of branches: national, European, and international. In this study, we use only the first category, so that national banks and subsidiaries are grouped under the same ID as the ultimate parent. The final sample of banks includes not only lead lenders, who administer and monitor the loan, but also participating lenders, because both groups decide whether or not to participate in the loan, based on specific determinants. As our objective is to highlight these determinants, we need both categories in our sample.

We run our analysis on the full sample of banks. We filter these four national groups, keeping only those which lent on the syndicated loan market between 2005 and 2013 and for which we have information on bank allocation, i.e. the amount lent.¹⁰ From the list of loans in LPC DealScan, we obtain information on the borrowing company, such as its domiciliation and industry, the name of the bank or banks providing the loan, as well as additional loan characteristics. Each loan is associated with one or several national groups of banks according to the nationality of the syndicate members. As such, the same loan may be included in both French and German sub-samples if one French bank and one German bank have participated in the loan. We then

⁸ In a syndicated loan, also called a deal or package, one borrower can receive several loans, also called facilities or tranches. The differences between two tranches depend on the type of the loan, its maturity, spread, etc. We, therefore, decided to run our analysis at the loan level rather than the deal level to integrate the different characteristics and risk level of each separate tranche of one syndicated loan. We might use the LPC DealScan terminology: facility, borrower, lender, to refer to the loan, company, and bank respectively.

⁹ We started by filtering DealScan data to keep only the three categories clearly defined in the database. Then, we manually checked for the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of each remaining financial institution and selected only the appropriate ones (in 6011-6082, 6211, 6712 and 6719 categories).

¹⁰ When comparing the characteristics of loans with and without bank allocation information, we can observe that the two samples remain similar in terms of geographical breakdown (both from the lender's and the borrower's point of view), sector, maturity, and distribution method, with a majority of term loans and revolving lines of credit.

consider each bank's loan participation as a loan itself and control for the characteristics of the syndicate, as described in the next section.

4.2. Bank characteristics: Bankscope

Using the list of banks' ultimate parents, we use the Bankscope database to find their annual financial characteristics. We manually look for each ultimate parent to select only lenders with available data and to update the list of loans according to the new list of banks. The database also provides the financial history of each bank, allowing us to identify any mergers occurring during the period under study and to adjust our sample over time.

4.3. Borrower characteristics: Compustat, Orbis, and Diane

From the updated list of loans in LPC DealScan, we extract the list of borrowing companies. To collect the borrower's characteristics, we combine three different but complementary databases—Compustat, Orbis, and Diane—to obtain the largest sample possible. Compustat mainly provides data on listed companies worldwide, with a significant share in North America. To combine LPC DealScan and Compustat, we start by using the file built by Chava and Roberts (2008), who exploited the GVKEY, the unique ID in Compustat, to match the information available in the two databases. More precisely, each company in LPC DealScan is assigned a unique GVKEY in Compustat. Hence, if a company contracts more than one loan, the same GVKEY will be used. However, the link file is established at one point in time, based on the then-current state of the market. In other words, if two companies merge while the file is being built, they will have the same GVKEY even if they were previously two separate entities. For example, if each of them contracted a loan before the merger, both loans would have the same GVKEY even though the borrowers are two separate companies. Therefore, to ensure a correct match between LPC DealScan and Compustat, we simultaneously combine the borrower IDs from LPC DealScan with the unique GVKEY. We then control for the lending date to obtain the relevant information about the borrower at the time of the loan. If companies cannot be matched automatically with this process, we look for them manually in Compustat, using their name and controlling for the country and sector. For the remaining unmatched companies, we use two other databases, Orbis for European (but not French) firms, and Diane, which mainly focuses on the French market. One advantage of combining these three databases is to limit the selection bias.

4.4. Additional characteristics

According to the literature, the frequency of borrowing on the syndicated loan market as well as the relationship between the company and the bank(s) may impact the credit terms (Brick and Palia, 2007; Jiangli, Unal and Yom, 2008; De Haas and Van Horen, 2013; Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek, 2014, among others). These authors all argue that costs in the syndicated loan market are higher for new borrowers than for existing ones. Besides, in line with Calomiris and Pornrojngkool (2009), when a bank provides more than one loan to the same company over a given time, a relationship can be established. Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2009) use the number of credit sources as a proxy for the lender-borrower relationship. Accordingly, we introduce three variables into our model to control for the relationship between the lender and the borrower as well as for the company's frequency of borrowing.

Also, previous literature underlines the role of government intervention and its impact on bank lending (Laeven and Valencia, 2013; Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek, 2014a, 2014b). Intervention may support bank lending during a confidence crisis, reinforcing the home bias by the political pressure on banks to lend more to domestic companies. To incorporate this information into our model, we use the database developed by Ureche-Rangau and Burietz (2013). In their paper, the authors explain the increase in sovereign debt spreads using capital injections and guarantees from European governments, as well as the liquidity measures implemented by the European Central Bank. Based on their dataset, we extract only explicit financial support given to banks at the nation-state level so that we can control for potential political pressure on their lending activities. We build a dummy equal to 1 over the period during which the government of one of our four countries intervenes to provide one specific bank with liquidity. In our sample of banks, 32% received financial support from their governments through capital injections (EUR 96 billion between August 2007 and October 2011) and guarantees (EUR 332 billion between October 2008 and October 2011). Finally, we use the World Economic Outlook Database provided by the International Monetary Fund to collect data on the change in borrower's GDP and use it to control for the macroeconomic context.

5. Empirical evidence

In our final sample, we have 62 ultimate lenders providing 1,948 borrowers with a total of 3,735 loans between 2005 and 2013. One characteristic of the syndicated loan market is that several banks participate in a single loan albeit investing a different amount. As a result, a loan may appear several times in our database, resulting in a sample of 11,598 observations. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest in our analysis.

Insert Table 1 here.

On average, one bank lends 69.10 million USD to one company while the median is equal to 26.10 million USD. The large difference between the two statistics is explained by several loans of large amounts, up to 7.83 billion USD for example. Regarding our three main explanatory variables (the two proxies for the home bias and the one for the sectoral bias), we observe that one-third of banks' loans are granted to domestic companies over the period under study. These domestic loans represent, on average, 22% of the annual amount lent by banks. In terms of the industry of the borrower, the average annual amount of loans to industries banks are specialized in amounts to 6.21%. On average, the level of specialization in banks' loan portfolios remains relatively small. However, we also notice that some banks dedicate their entire loan portfolio to domestic borrowers and/or to industries they became experts in.

The main results obtained from the estimations of Equation (1) are reported in Table 2. We first focus on the home bias (Hypothesis 1) with the first four specifications, i.e. two with the dummy variable accounting for the geographical positions of both the lender and the borrower and two based on the share of loans granted to domestic borrowers. We then investigate the sectoral bias separately (Hypothesis 2) in the next two specifications. Finally, the last four specifications combine both biases (Hypotheses 1 and 2). The odd specifications gather the borrower's observable time-varying characteristics, the macroeconomic conditions, the borrower, and the time fixed effects while the even specifications consider only the borrower \times time fixed effects.

Insert Table 2 here.

Our first major question investigates whether when a loan is realized, banks located in the four major banking systems of the eurozone lend higher amounts to firms having the same nationality as the creditor. We interpret home bias as a signal of banks' willingness to favor access to credit for domestic companies, for which credit

risk assessment is easier and more profitable (Epstein 2001; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009; Houson, Itzkowitz and Naranjo, 2014). One main result is that bank behavior is significantly domestically oriented. In the first four specifications, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% risk level, independently of the proxy used for the home bias, highlighting that larger credit amounts were granted to domestic borrowers. The second major question we ask in this paper is whether banks apply a particular lending strategy in terms of amounts depending on the industry of the borrower. More specifically, we analyze banks' specializations per industry by using the total amount lent in the previous year to companies in the same industry as the borrower under study, expressed as a percentage of the total amount lent by the same lender over the same year. We show that the sectoral bias is significant, as the coefficient of the proxy we used for the sectoral bias is positive and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Banks in the four major countries of the eurozone tend to grant loans with larger amounts to borrowers that belong to industries these banks know very well. This is in line with the literature highlighting a banks' preference for a strategy that allows them to save monitoring costs and benefit from expertise advantage.

When we jointly assess the role of the two biases, the conclusions remain strictly identical providing evidence that banks tend to lend higher amounts both to domestic borrowers and to industries they are specialized in. To further deepen our analysis, we run our baseline model including an interaction term between the home bias and the sectoral bias variables to investigate whether these biases are present simultaneously or separately. As such, we want to assess if a bank that lends larger amounts to domestic firms is also lending larger amounts to industries it is familiar with or whether this bank grants loans quite evenly among different industries, with no specific preference to one or few specific sectors.¹¹

Insert Table 3 here

The results in Table 3 tend to suggest the latter. Although the conclusions regarding the home and the sectoral biases remain strictly identical when taken individually, we can now mitigate our conclusions, as the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in specifications 5 and 6.¹² Hence, the home bias vanishes when banks are lending to industries they are familiar with. In the same vein, the sectoral

¹¹ We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this idea.

¹² In specifications 7 and 8, the coefficients are negative but not statistically significant.

bias is less important when banks are lending to domestic borrowers. This evidence emphasizes the importance for banks to become experts in information collection and interpretation as their lending behavior will depend on this expertise. A bank will lend a larger amount to a borrower with whom this bank feels closer either from a geographical point of view or because the bank managed to get a certain level of expertise in the industry that borrower operates. These results shed new perspectives for the home bias literature, which seems to be much more complex than usually presented. Indeed, our results seem to point out that *ceteris paribus*, a bank with extensive knowledge in a specific industry will not necessarily privilege domestic borrowers in terms of amounts lent.¹³

We also tried to assess the relationship between lending behavior and the “perceived” quality of the loan portfolio as proxied by the loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio. The correlation coefficient between our proxy for the domestic bias and the loan loss reserves ratio is positive and significant at the 1% confidence level (0.0316 and 0.0755 respectively, depending on the measure used for the domestic bias), while it is significantly negative between the sectoral bias proxy and the same ratio (-0.0761). We could therefore argue that expertise in specific industries, which benefit from larger loan amounts, enforces banks’ sense of stability of their lending base. The conclusions are at the opposite concerning the bias in favor of domestic borrowers which leaves the debate on the reasons behind the preference for domestic borrowers still open.

Finally, Table 4 below provides the results of the estimations of Equation (2) which investigates the impact of the financial crisis on bank lending. We first estimate the crisis impact on the two biases separately, before combining them. The structure of Table 4 is similar to the one of Table 2, with borrower’s observable time-varying characteristics, the macroeconomic conditions, borrower and time fixed effects in the odd specifications, and borrower \times time fixed effects in the even ones.

Insert Table 4 here.

The presence of home and sectoral biases in credit amounts lent by banks remains significant, disregarding the specification. However, no significant changes during the crisis period seem to appear. Indeed, all the coefficients associated with the variables used to proxy the crisis impact are not statistically significant. Our

¹³ These results deserve further investigation as the coefficient of the interaction term is significant at the 10% confidence level and only when using a dummy to capture the home bias effect.

results show that banks' level of specialization strongly influences their lending behavior and there is no adjustment during distressed periods. An alternative explanation lies in the theory of relationship lending which emphasizes the importance of having a good relationship with its lenders, especially in crisis times. Firms that have invested in banking relationships continue to have access to credit at favorable conditions during an economic downturn (Beck, Degryse, De Haas and van Horen, 2018). In line with this conclusion, Schäfer (2019) argues that banks tend to be more compliant with their relationship borrowers when they face financial difficulties.

6. Robustness

In the following section, we run several tests to assess the robustness of our results.

6.1. The Financial Crisis versus the Sovereign Debt Crisis

In our main analysis, we considered the collapse of Lehman Brothers as the breakpoint to study how this event, and the subsequent financial crisis, have impacted bank lending in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Between 2008 and 2013, however, eurozone economies suffered not only one, but two different types of financial turmoil: a financial institution crisis followed by a sovereign debt crisis. Disentangling these two periods may be particularly relevant for banks in the eurozone, as the supply of credit from Spanish and Italian banks might be based on loans that they themselves contracted from banks in the two core countries, Germany and France. Omitting this episode may, therefore, lead to an underestimation of the credit supply in the core countries in our sample, coupled with an overestimation of loan supply in the two peripheral countries.¹⁴ Besides, the two crises may have had different effects on bank lending activities, leading policymakers to implement different solutions depending on the type of crisis. On the one hand, the financial institution crisis may lead to credit rationing, while firms may also refrain from investing because of economic instability. On the other hand, the sovereign debt crisis highlights excessive levels of government borrowing, requiring fiscal consolidation that could potentially amplify the financial institution crisis. The implied rise in tax burdens reduces the income of both households and firms, thus lowering credit demand and increasing the private-sector default risk. A highly

¹⁴ We also run Equation (2) over the period 2005-2010 to remove the potential influence of the sovereign debt crisis. The results remain similar and are available upon request.

indebted government, looking for additional funds, may also exacerbate banks' weaknesses. Indeed, banks may be pressured to increase domestic sovereign bond holdings and thus reduce the credit supply for private borrowers (Lane, 2012; Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014; Saka, 2019). Hence, subdividing the crisis period to estimate Equation (2) allows us to deepen the analysis and provides a better understanding of the determinants of credit supply.

Insert Table 5 here.

Previous conclusions on potential home bias in bank lending amounts remain unchanged when we split the crisis period as explained in the preceding paragraph. The flight-to-home effect is still statistically significant, highlighting that banks prefer to lend higher amounts to local companies. The impact of home bias on bank lending persists during both normal time and crisis periods. We thus confirm the null effect of the crisis on banks' behavior, as the coefficients remain insignificant when considering the interactions with the two different crisis dummies, e.g. financial and sovereign debt crises.

In terms of industry bias, the results reported previously also hold. Banks located in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain offer larger loans to industries in which they specialize, with no specific impact of crisis times and no distinction between the types of crisis. The four groups of banks continue to grant larger amounts to sectors to which they used to lend before the Lehman collapse, taking advantage of their expertise and saving monitoring costs. Having banks granting credit to industries in which they have extensive experience contributes to more efficient monitoring of companies, reduces the risk of adverse selection, and ultimately improves credit quality (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Nevertheless, we notice one exception. The sectoral bias seems to disappear during the sovereign debt crisis and even experiences a reversing trend, with banks lending lower amounts to industries they are specialized in. The negative and significant coefficient signals banks' objective to grant loan amounts more evenly across industries, potentially to reduce their exposure to economic downturns. However, this result does not hold when considering the specification with borrower \times time fixed effects. The latter controls for all borrower's time-varying characteristics, observable and unobservable. We argue that this particular specification is more complete than the model with only some borrower's observable time-varying characteristics, the macroeconomic conditions, borrower, and time fixed effects, which may explain the difference in results.

6.2. Different benchmark rate

The loan spread in our sample is provided as a markup over different benchmark rates, among the most common of which are the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro InterBank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). Altunbas, Gadanez and Kara (2006) argue that several factors, such as spreads and fees, may differ according to the benchmark rate for the loan. More specifically, the authors underline that fees are more significant for loans based on EURIBOR than on LIBOR. This differentiation may potentially impact our results because we use all-in spreads. Hence, following Gaul and Uysal (2013), we estimate our equations on a subsample of loans with a single reference rate, EURIBOR, to assess whether differences in the two base rates influence our results. This choice is justified by our sample of eurozone banks. The results are qualitatively similar, except for a slight decrease in loan amounts during the crisis for loans to specialized industries. However, this exception does not hold when we run the model with borrower \times time fixed effects.

Insert Table 6 here.

6.3. Results are not driven by borrowers in one country

As explained in Section 2, our analysis may suffer from selection bias with a large share of loans to North American companies. Carey and Nini (2007) for example, report that U.S. borrowers' share of the global syndicated loan market is about 67% and that European lenders granted 39% of their syndicated lending volume to U.S. borrowers between 1992 and 2002. We thus check whether our results are driven by these loans, running our estimations on a subsample that excludes U.S. borrowers. Our conclusions remain strictly similar. The only exception is again the decrease in loan amounts to specialized industries during the crisis which holds only for the model with borrower's observable time-varying characteristics, the macroeconomic conditions, borrower and time fixed effects. Otherwise, our conclusions do not change.

Insert Table 7 here.

6.4. Core versus peripheral countries

The result that the occurrence of crises has no effect on the domestic bias could capture a flight-to-quality phenomenon that exceeds the flight-to-home behavior. More precisely, we could suspect that the volume of loans granted by banks in the core countries, e.g. France and Germany, to firms in the peripheral countries, e.g.

Italy and Spain, during the crisis period, experienced a fall, albeit the characteristics of these companies. Consequently, the increase in the domestic bias in core countries would be offset by the opposite phenomenon in the peripheral countries.¹⁵ We therefore run our estimations on the subsample including only French and German banks. Our results, synthesized in Table 8, are very similar to those obtained on the whole sample of lenders.

Insert Table 8 about here.

7. Conclusion

This paper aims to investigate bank lending decisions and the extent to which they are influenced by banks' level of geographic and sectoral expertise. We analyze the credit supply of four eurozone bank samples: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The approach to these issues is innovative; it confirms previous results provided by the literature while also expanding on the potential sectoral bias.

Combining seven databases enables us to develop a rich dataset on the syndicated loans provided by banks in four major eurozone countries for the period 2005-2013. We collected information about the different stakeholders in these financial transactions, namely the bank and the borrowing company, and about their relationship, the loan, and the macroeconomic context. The period under study is centered on the collapse of Lehman Brothers to integrate both a normal and a crisis period. The modeling set-up consists of one estimated equation, describing one credit term of the loan, namely the amount. Our main variables of interest are the domiciliation of the borrowing firm with respect to the domiciliation of the bank, and the industry the company belongs to with respect to industries banks are more familiar with. Two alternative specifications of our model allow us to control for borrowers' observable time-varying and unobservable time-varying characteristics.

The results can be summarized as follows. We argue that the amounts lent by banks are driven by the geographical position and the industry of the borrower in line with several results pointed out by former studies. Moreover, this phenomenon is not influenced by the crisis. In terms of amounts lent, banks favor those companies that are closer geographically and that operate in industries banks became familiar with, both before and after the crisis. They thus allocate larger amounts to such firms. This strategy relies on the expertise banks develop in their activities of collecting and interpreting information about companies, industries, and national

¹⁵ We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this idea.

economies. Moreover, this strategy provides banks with monitoring cost advantages allowing them to save time and money. Finally, we may argue that the sectoral bias could benefit to the banking industry, as the perceived quality of loan portfolios seems higher. This conclusion has several implications for both banks' managers and regulators. It emphasizes the role and the importance of collecting and properly interpreting information about borrowers in reducing portfolio allocation risks within the banking industry. Thus, regulators should take into account these potential positive impacts of sectoral bias when establishing capital requirements for example. However, home bias remains an open debate, as it seems more difficult to capture all the factors explaining the larger amounts of loans provided to domestic borrowers while also being mitigated by other forms of specialization, e.g. industry.

Further developments of this analysis could allow us to enrich further our conclusions. For example, enlarging the sample to include lenders' foreign branches inside and outside Europe could provide additional evidence on the flight-to-home effect. This can be done with access to more detailed information on the stakeholders involved in financial transactions, allowing to obtain even clearer results on the impact of a bank's characteristics on its capacity to lend during crisis times.

Acknowledgements

We gratefully thank Charles W. Calomiris for sharing his expertise and time during the four months that one of the authors spent as a visiting scholar at Columbia University. This period was the opportunity to collect the data necessary to run this analysis. We are also grateful to Giorgia Barboni, Luisa Carpinelli, Hicham Daher, Ralph De Haas, Hans Degryse, Alain Durré, George Kouretas, Jérémie Lefebvre, Paolo Mazza, Camelia Minoiu, Arif Oduncu, Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou, Oana Peia and Daniel Thornton for their insightful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013/ under REA grant agreement No. 608129. All remaining errors are ours.

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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

| Variables | Definition | Unit | Observations | Mean | Median | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|------------------------------|--|-------------|--------------|-------|--------|-----------|------|----------|
| Dependent variable | | | | | | | | |
| Amount | The share of the amount of loan i issued by borrower b and purchased by lender l | Million USD | 11,598 | 69.10 | 26.10 | 222.00 | 0.00 | 7,830.00 |
| Bank lending biases | | | | | | | | |
| | Loan i extended by a lender l to a domestic borrower b | Dummy | 11,598 | 0.33 | 0 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Home bias (HB_{ibl}) | Total amount lent by lender l during the year of the issuance of loan i to the same country as that of lender l , as a percentage of the total amount lent by the same lender to all borrowers over the same year | % | 11,598 | 22.05 | 0.00 | 36.33 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| Sectoral bias (SB_{ibl}) | Total amount lent by lender l during the year preceding the issuance of loan i to the same industry as that of borrower b , as a percentage of the total amount lent by the same lender to all industries over the same year | % | 11,553 | 6.21 | 2.26 | 10.19 | 0.00 | 100.00 |

Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest included in the empirical analysis. The dependent variable, i.e. the amount of the loan, in addition to the two main explanatory variables (i.e. HB_{ibl} and SB_{ibl}) are computed by the authors using data from LPC DealScan database. Our final sample consists of 62 ultimate lenders providing 1,948 borrowers with a total of 3,735 loans. One characteristic of the syndicated loan market is that several banks participate in a syndicated loan, meaning that one loan may appear several times in our database. Hence, a total of 11,598 observations.

TABLE 2
BASELINE MODEL

| | Amount | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Hypothesis 1 | | | | Hypothesis 2 | | Hypotheses 1 & 2 | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| <i>HB_{ibl}</i> (<i>Dummy</i>) | 0.291*** (0.083) | 0.268*** (0.081) | | | | | 0.291*** (0.083) | 0.268*** (0.081) | | |
| <i>HB_{ibl}</i> (%) | | | 0.468*** (0.100) | 0.378*** (0.105) | | | | | 0.471*** (0.101) | 0.379*** (0.106) |
| <i>SB_{ibl}</i> | | | | | 0.457** (0.180) | 0.405** (0.186) | 0.457** (0.181) | 0.406** (0.189) | 0.452** (0.183) | 0.399** (0.189) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank |
| Observations | 10,301 | 10,400 | 10,301 | 10,400 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.766 | 0.816 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.767 | 0.817 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (1). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (*HB_{ibl}* (*Dummy*)), the home bias share (*HB_{ibl}* (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (*SB_{ibl}*) as defined in Table 1. We first estimate the two biases separately (columns 1 to 6) before running the regression with both biases (columns 7 to 10). In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

TABLE 3
HOME AND SECTORAL BIAS SIMULTANEOUSLY

| | Amount | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Hypotheses 1 & 2 | | | | Hypotheses 1 & 2 | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) | 0.291*** (0.083) | 0.268*** (0.081) | | | 0.332*** (0.091) | 0.308*** (0.088) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) | | | 0.471*** (0.101) | 0.379*** (0.106) | | | 0.495*** (0.109) | 0.401*** (0.112) |
| SB_{ibl} | 0.457** (0.181) | 0.406** (0.189) | 0.452** (0.183) | 0.399** (0.189) | 0.804*** (0.253) | 0.774*** (0.189) | 0.621** (0.254) | 0.565** (0.233) |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) * SB_{ibl} | | | | | -0.611* (0.320) | -0.602* (0.322) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) * SB_{ibl} | | | | | | | -0.332 (0.336) | -0.304 (0.333) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes |
| Constant | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank |
| Observations | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (1). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (HB_{ibl} (*Dummy*)), the home bias share (HB_{ibl} (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (SB_{ibl}) as defined in Table 1. In the first four columns, we consider the two biases together while in the last four columns we add an interaction term between the home and the sectoral biases. In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

TABLE 4
CRISIS IMPACT

| | Amount | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Hypotheses 1 & 3 | | | | Hypotheses 2 & 3 | | Hypotheses 1, 2 & 3 | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) | 0.316*** (0.091) | 0.279*** (0.078) | | | | | 0.318*** (0.091) | 0.280*** (0.080) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) | | | 0.469*** (0.110) | 0.340*** (0.108) | | | | | 0.470*** (0.114) | 0.337*** (0.115) |
| SB_{ibl} | | | | | 0.601*** (0.223) | 0.576** (0.226) | 0.590*** (0.218) | 0.572** (0.223) | 0.585** (0.222) | 0.577** (0.228) |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) x <i>C</i> | -0.060 (0.086) | -0.026 (0.092) | | | | | -0.065 (0.084) | -0.029 (0.091) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x <i>C</i> | | | -0.002 (0.105) | 0.086 (0.115) | | | | | -0.002 (0.115) | 0.091 (0.126) |
| SB_{ibl} x <i>C</i> | | | | | -0.493 (0.379) | -0.622 (0.464) | -0.459 (0.366) | -0.607 (0.456) | -0.456 (0.372) | -0.628 (0.469) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank |
| Observations | 10,301 | 10,400 | 10,301 | 10,400 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.766 | 0.816 | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (2). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (HB_{ibl} (*Dummy*)), the home bias share (HB_{ibl} (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (SB_{ibl}) as defined in Table 1 as well as their interaction with the crisis dummy (*C*). We first estimate the two biases separately (columns 1 to 6) before running the regression with both biases (columns 7 to 10). In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

TABLE 5
FINANCIAL CRISIS VERSUS SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

| | Amount | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Baseline Model | | | | Financial vs. Sovereign debt crises | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) | 0.318*** (0.091) | 0.280*** (0.080) | | | 0.323*** (0.091) | 0.282*** (0.080) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) | | | 0.470*** (0.114) | 0.337*** (0.115) | | | 0.477*** (0.113) | 0.344*** (0.115) |
| SB_{ibl} | 0.590*** (0.218) | 0.572** (0.223) | 0.585** (0.222) | 0.577** (0.228) | 0.585** (0.219) | 0.575** (0.225) | 0.578** (0.223) | 0.579** (0.229) |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) x <i>C</i> | -0.065 (0.084) | -0.029 (0.091) | | | | | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x <i>C</i> | | | -0.002 (0.115) | 0.091 (0.126) | | | | |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) x <i>FC</i> | | | | | -0.030 (0.085) | 0.158 (0.117) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (<i>Dummy</i>) x <i>SDC</i> | | | | | -0.109 (0.095) | -0.142 (0.090) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x <i>FC</i> | | | | | | | 0.005 (0.148) | 0.215 (0.178) |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x <i>SDC</i> | | | | | | | -0.046 (0.111) | 0.005 (0.119) |
| SB_{ibl} x <i>C</i> | -0.459 (0.366) | -0.607 (0.456) | -0.456 (0.372) | -0.628 (0.469) | | | | |
| SB_{ibl} x <i>FC</i> | | | | | 0.075 (0.412) | -0.600 (0.457) | 0.062 (0.426) | -0.651 (0.489) |
| SB_{ibl} x <i>SDC</i> | | | | | -1.485** (0.603) | -0.860 (0.792) | -1.427** (0.593) | -0.809 (0.791) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank |
| Observations | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (2). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (HB_{ibl} (*Dummy*)), the home bias share (HB_{ibl} (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (SB_{ibl}) as defined in Table 1 as well as their interaction with 3 crisis dummies (*C*, *FC*, *SDC*). Columns 1 to 4 report the results of the baseline model with one crisis period (2008-2013) while columns 5 to 8 consider two crises (the financial crisis (FC) (2008-2011) and the sovereign debt crisis (SDC) (2011-2013)). In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

TABLE 6
EURIBOR FOCUS

| | Amount | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Baseline Model | | | | Euribor Focus | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| HB_{ibl} (Dummy) | 0.318*** (0.091) | 0.280*** (0.080) | | | 0.252*** (0.078) | 0.244*** (0.076) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) | | | 0.470*** (0.114) | 0.337*** (0.115) | | | 0.263*** (0.093) | 0.219** (0.093) |
| SB_{ibl} | 0.590*** (0.218) | 0.572** (0.223) | 0.585** (0.222) | 0.577** (0.228) | 0.487* (0.266) | 0.538* (0.271) | 0.499* (0.267) | 0.552** (0.270) |
| HB_{ibl} (Dummy) x C | -0.065 (0.084) | -0.029 (0.091) | | | -0.013 (0.078) | -0.023 (0.083) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x C | | | -0.002 (0.115) | 0.091 (0.126) | | | 0.135 (0.124) | 0.148 (0.123) |
| SB_{ibl} x C | -0.459 (0.366) | -0.607 (0.456) | -0.456 (0.372) | -0.628 (0.469) | -0.850* (0.467) | -0.800 (0.495) | -0.881* (0.476) | -0.838 (0.509) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank | Bank |
| Observations | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 4,532 | 4,534 | 4,532 | 4,534 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.808 | 0.824 | 0.808 | 0.823 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (2). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (HB_{ibl} (Dummy)), the home bias share (HB_{ibl} (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (SB_{ibl}) as defined in Table 1 as well as their interaction with the crisis dummy (C). In the first four columns, we consider all benchmark rates while in the last four columns, we focus on loans associated with the Euribor. In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

TABLE 7
U.S. BORROWERS EXCLUDED

| | Amount | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Baseline Model | | | | U.S. Borrowers excluded | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| HB_{ibl} (Dummy) | 0.318*** (0.091) | 0.280*** (0.080) | | | 0.284*** (0.083) | 0.262*** (0.074) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) | | | 0.470*** (0.114) | 0.337*** (0.115) | | | 0.405*** (0.101) | 0.282*** (0.100) |
| SB_{ibl} | 0.590*** (0.218) | 0.572** (0.223) | 0.585** (0.222) | 0.577** (0.228) | 0.577** (0.221) | 0.567** (0.227) | 0.576** (0.223) | 0.574** (0.230) |
| HB_{ibl} (Dummy) x C | -0.065 (0.084) | -0.029 (0.091) | | | -0.027 (0.075) | -0.032 (0.081) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x C | | | -0.002 (0.115) | 0.091 (0.126) | | | 0.054 (0.109) | 0.103 (0.115) |
| SB_{ibl} x C | -0.459 (0.366) | -0.607 (0.456) | -0.456 (0.372) | -0.628 (0.469) | -0.815** (0.377) | -0.735 (0.457) | -0.821** (0.384) | -0.759 (0.471) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank |
| Observations | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 7,400 | 7,475 | 7,400 | 7,475 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.777 | 0.825 | 0.777 | 0.824 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (2). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (HB_{ibl} (Dummy)), the home bias share (HB_{ibl} (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (SB_{ibl}) as defined in Table 1 as well as their interaction with the crisis dummy (C). In the first four columns, we consider all borrowers while in the last four columns, we exclude U.S. borrowers. In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

TABLE 8
CORE VERSUS PERIPHERAL COUNTRIES

| | Amount | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Baseline Model | | | | Core Subsample | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| HB_{ibl} (Dummy) | 0.318*** (0.091) | 0.280*** (0.080) | | | 0.266*** (0.086) | 0.325*** (0.046) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) | | | 0.470*** (0.114) | 0.337*** (0.115) | | | 0.337 (0.199) | 0.433* (0.217) |
| SB_{ibl} | 0.590*** (0.218) | 0.572** (0.223) | 0.585** (0.222) | 0.577** (0.228) | 0.624** (0.279) | 0.475** (0.213) | 0.619** (0.276) | 0.473** (0.208) |
| HB_{ibl} (Dummy) x C | -0.065 (0.084) | -0.029 (0.091) | | | 0.029 (0.155) | -0.162* (0.091) | | |
| HB_{ibl} (%) x C | | | -0.002 (0.115) | 0.091 (0.126) | | | 0.077 (0.232) | -0.083 (0.215) |
| SB_{ibl} x C | -0.459 (0.366) | -0.607 (0.456) | -0.456 (0.372) | -0.628 (0.469) | -0.107 (0.370) | 0.071 (0.511) | -0.124 (0.376) | 0.050 (0.529) |
| Borrower characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Macroeconomic characteristics | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Bank characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Relationship characteristics | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borrower FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Time FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Borrower FE x Time FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bank FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered SE | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank | Bank |
| Observations | 10,288 | 10,387 | 10,288 | 10,387 | 7,016 | 7,110 | 7,016 | 7,110 |
| R-squared | 0.767 | 0.818 | 0.767 | 0.817 | 0.761 | 0.831 | 0.761 | 0.831 |

Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of the syndicated loan taken as a natural logarithm. We run an OLS regression to estimate Equation (2). The main explanatory variables are the home bias dummy (HB_{ibl} (Dummy)), the home bias share (HB_{ibl} (%)), and the sectoral bias variable (SB_{ibl}) as defined in Table 1 as well as their interaction with the crisis dummy (C). In the first four columns, we consider all banks while in the last four columns, we focus the analysis on banks located in core countries. In the odd specifications, we control for the observable time-varying characteristics of the borrower (natural logarithm of total assets and long-term debt, ROE, ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, and sales growth) in addition to the economic environment (crisis dummy, and change in GDP), borrower and time fixed effects while in the even specifications, we use borrower x time fixed effects to control for credit demand. In all specifications, we also control for the lender (Tier 1 ratio, loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, natural logarithm of total lending, interest income, ROA, interbank ratio, liquid asset ratio, core deposits to total asset ratio, and government support), the loan (natural logarithm of spread, natural logarithm of maturity, currency, type, objective, syndicate size, deal, VaR), and the relationship (loan frequency, lender's previous relationship, and number of credit sources). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level; ***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.