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


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— STUDYING IDEAS —

A conversation from the South
about the life of ideas and the
reconfiguration of a
disciplinary space

Eduardo Devés
Andrés Kozel



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INTRODUCTION

ANDRÉS KOZEL

This book presents a series of discussions about the life of ideas. There is, as is well known, a generational gap between the two authors and protagonists. There is also a difference in what could be named as their coefficient of centrality within this scope of study. It must be clear from the beginning, that the question related to eidetic studies belongs to Devés. My personal role in this adventure has been of an empathetic and critical reader who, having the opportunity to talk on several occasions with the author, wants to better understand his proposal, so as to eventually help with its clarification and development.

The conversations began in Buenos Aires in 2011, on the occasion of the intellectual journey through 100 Latin American cities taken by Eduardo Devés. They continued in Talca (Jornadas de las Ideas), in Vienna (54th International Congress of Americanists), in Santiago de Chile (2016) and again in Buenos Aires and in Santiago (2017). Of course, they flowed through emails throughout this period.

Our exchanges turned out particularly rich during the preparation of my review article about the current research on Latin American thought commissioned by *Prismas* for its anniversary edition (Kozel, 2015a). To develop those notes I interviewed some specialists, including Devés. This experience began at the end of 2014 and took a couple of months. During the conversations, I noticed that when insisting on the notion “eidetic studies”, Devés was somehow proposing a sort of reconfiguration of the disciplinary space, seeking to access new perspectives beyond the conclusions of his best known books. Immediately thereafter we agreed to expand on the conversations, transcribe, print, and turn them into a small volume. Devés thought that the conversational format would help him better organize the unpublished materials he had been collecting and producing in recent years.

Therefore, the conversations have a central theme: the history, realities, and perspectives of diverse approaches to the study of

thought and ideas, focusing on Latin America but not exclusively, as will be demonstrated.

It is worth noting that this volume does not simply contain the transcription of a series of talks. Though there are some parts that maintain their original spontaneity, there are many others that were reviewed and refined multiple times. On many occasions we included written materials by Devés –composed ahead of time as well as ad hoc–, highlighting several definitions, classification proposals and illustrative enumerations. Finally, a specific stylization process was made at the time of the edition, aimed at reaching a degree of argumentative coherence that, though removed from the systematic treatise, cannot precisely be characterized as conversational. During that process, redundancies were eliminated, points and references were clarified, and passages were relocated. In sum, although the colloquial atmosphere is maintained, the result is more a series of conversations that have been re-worked, rearranged and enriched, as opposed to being a mere transcription. Therefore, it is closer to a kind of essay than the traditional interview.

As I anticipated, one of the innovations that are introduced here is the notion “eidetic studies”. A good part of the conversations revolves around clarifying this proposal, how it relates to preexisting traditions, its similarities and differences with respect to other approaches, as well as how to understand their connections to other disciplines. It is important to clarify that the notion “eidetic studies” is offered both to characterize what has happened and still happens in this field of studies as well as to shape discussions on the future of this field. Thus, the proposal has a dual dimension: along with describing and analyzing, it outlines a heuristic and a program.

I have found multiple elements of Devés’ work quite interesting, since I read his *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX*, whose three volumes I went through during my years in Mexico (2000-2010), using them to organize my courses then and after (Devés, 2004b, 2003, 2000).

The first element is his respectful relationship with the intellectual legacy of Latin America and, more particularly, what is commonly referred to as the study of the history of the Latin American thought and ideas. On several occasions. Devés has situated himself in the channel opened by the contributions of figures like Leopoldo Zea and Arturo Andrés Roig. As will be

demonstrated, Devés proposal outline a critical rediscovery of that legacy, but not a *tabula rasa* operation, so inconvenient in cultural mediums such as ours, where it has always been difficult to accumulate and enhance dialogic densities.

Another valuable element of Devés' work, which simultaneously connects with the pursuits of Zea at his best, is its focus on Latin America, in particular its eidetic dynamic, as a part of the peripheral world. His book *Pensamiento periférico* has provided important contributions to this field, as the notion of peripheral thought itself is a bold and exciting work hypothesis (Devés, 2017a, 2014). Devés studies intellectual networks and the phenomenon of the circulation of ideas, while being a notably active protagonist in both areas. Apart from being the co-founder of the *Corredor de las ideas* and the *Internacional del Conocimiento*, he is also an avid traveler.

Another element of interest is Devés' willingness to honestly question himself over the meaning of these studies, understanding the idea of meaning in every respect, even the one related to practical utility. Devés cares about history, of course, but he also cares, maybe more so, about helping our societies "to think more and better". The introduction of the concepts "eidetic development", "applied eidology", and others related notions, emerged from this concern, which is not exclusive nor primarily historiographical. Closely related to this, it must be stated, is his insistence on working in the delineation of "our own (South-American) agenda" and the consolidation of a "self-sustained intellectuality". His willingness to go deep into fields related to the "eidetic futures" should also be enumerated here.

Another stimulating element has to do with Devés openness to think about eidetic studies in relation to what happens within other disciplines, both the most proximate, such as philosophy, history, literary and cultural studies, social sciences, linguistics, cognitive sciences; as well as those in principle more distant, whose development, in his opinion, may aid a better formulation and comprehension of a series of crucial problems. That's the case of biology, for instance, which is mentioned several times throughout these conversations about the life of ideas. His desire to venture into the abysmal fields related to human origins, his predilection for the delineation of analogies between what happens in the eidetic realms and what happens in other vital areas, his knowledge and recovery of elements of the work of thinkers such as Francisco

Varela and others, who may be mentioned more times than it would be expected in an attempt of this nature, are demonstrative of this Devesian opening.

The current overview of studies related to Latin American thought is vast and variegated. There is an almost incomprehensible profusion of works, approaches, and spaces. The eidetic studies proposal aspires to, as mentioned previously, participate in the debates related to the subject by contributing elements to rethink legacies, to understand what is happening and also, to orient at least part of our efforts in some specific directions, focusing in the delineation of a personal agenda that helps to think “more, and better”.

The talks include various levels of discussion: What are the ideas or eidetic systems, how to characterize their “life”, how to study them, how to classify them, and how they have lived in South America and in other places. Also, what has been, what is, what could be the role of the intelligentsias, in what type of environments do ideas tend to thrive, what is expected to happen in the eidetic levels and eidetic studies in the coming years.

The organization of the volume does not solicit further comment. It is stated in the contents and in the typographic design of the chapters.

In a context such as this one, so polyphonic and exuberant, distant from tunes and harmonies, it is interesting to hear Devés’ voice. The Chilean professor has earned this right, among other things, because of what the Argentinian writer Roberto Arlt called, in a flamboyant and remembered prologue: *prepotencia de trabajo*.

ITINERARIES, TOPICS, RELATIONSHIPS

1.1 It is legitimate to assume that those who know your work have all read the volumes of *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX*¹. They may have also checked on your later contributions, where you study the intellectual networks and widened the focal point in order to explore the vast territory of the peripheral thought.

Something that I have wondered is why and when did you “become” a Latin Americanist? When did you get to know the works of Zea, Roig...? And more particularly, how did you come to conceive of *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX*? Or, in other words: What were, in terms of a personal intellectual journey, the factors that led you to plan and concretize that work? Of course, I’m aiming at your academic training, readings and interests. More broadly, to your “circumstance”, to your positioning within the culture of Chile under the dictatorship and the period post-dictatorship.

I’ve gotten closer to Latin American thought because of my concern to link philosophy (my studies at the beginning of the 1970s) with our history, our socio-political reality, and the fight against dictatorships that was annihilating our peoples. As I grew distant from the classic authors of the European philosophy, I came closer to some Latin American figures and to question about what it meant to philosophize in South America and, more widely, what was the intellectual task beyond philosophy as a discipline.

In this framework two lines were simultaneously developed: thinking about the regional social-political reality from the history of our thought, while understanding the precise trajectory of this thought and its specificities vis à vis the European tradition, from which position, like it or not, this Latin American trajectory was

¹*The Latin American Thought in the Twentieth Century*, T.N.

dismissed. It was important, then, to detect specificities, contributions, major topics, relevant concepts, and important figures. In other words, it was key to study the history of our thought and the criteria from which to understand that history. That is, not to simply hark back to it, but to pay attention to the ways of understanding the Latin American eidetic trajectory: schools, periods, and denominations. Thus, we can build and question a theoretical apparatus. This process led me to believe that the study of the ideas was far more than just to recall them, that instead it could offer potentialities to the specific thinking of the region and of the world.

At the same time, the question of what “had not been done yet” in the studies on our thought began to emerge: countries that were not studied, disciplinary areas that were not considered, underserved social sectors, matters that weren’t detected, theoretical issues not revealed, etc. This is how the formulation of what is known as the study of ideas, or eidetic studies, was created on one hand and on the other, the desire to go beyond the ways this endeavor had been historically outlined.

In a way, this has identified me as a specialist in Latin American, Native American, Afro-American, Our-Americans and South American matters, and also as a specialist of the circulation of these thoughts in the world, and also regarding the similarities with other regions in the South. It’s from there that my concern for thinking of the peripheries and the world from their perspectives is derived, so to speak. For this to happen, we had to innovate, trying to travel along roads not so well trodden by other people.

1.2 When thinking in the years prior to the creation of *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX*, it is difficult for me not to remember your book *Escépticos del sentido*, published in 1984. Taking inspiration from Descartes and introducing a certain level of formal experimentation (in the tradition of the philosophical dialogues, but also of certain literature), you scrutinized the experience of your generation, both Chilean and Latin American, skeptical “by shock” after the great onslaught pushed by reality.

To what extent did your immersion in the study of Latin American thought have to do with the diagnosis outlined in that book, with its conclusion that rejects, not the skepticism

of common or “truly existent” sense, but its alleged philosophical foundation? Was the ascertainment of the statement “not everything doesn’t matter” an impetus to continue after the shock and the post-shock and to tackle a project of such scope? Do you see some sort of link between the characteristic sensitivity of the generation of skeptics of meaning and the proposal of the eidetic studies and, more particularly, the eidetic development?

I don’t think there is any link. Those subjects are quite varied and they have nothing to do with one another. However, I could say that after the dictatorship, continuing to writing on Chilean matters as I had in the previous decade lost part of its meaning. Also, it was necessary for me to entice challenges of greater scope, not limited to the Chilean space. Though it may sound like pedantry on my part, I thought back then, and still do think, that there weren’t many people in my area who could write at a Latin American scale in, and that doing so could make sense.

1.3 On more than one occasion you have acknowledged Leopoldo Zea and Arturo A. Roig as inspirational figures of your work. We could consider both of them representatives of the tradition related to the history of the Latin American ideas or to the history of the Latin American thought. Is that tradition alive today? In what ways? To what degree? What is your relationship with it?

Of course it’s alive, and let’s add: Arturo Ardao, Francisco Miró-Quesada, Abelardo Villegas, Ricaurte Soler, José Luis Romero. For me it is fully alive, though I don’t mean to say that all its subjects are up-to-date, nor all its procedures, concepts, or ways of acting.

The most out-of-date issue, in my opinion, is the lack of women thinkers and indigenous intelligentsia. Something else that is obsolete is this quasi-synonymy of thought with the practice imagined as “philosophy”, leaving out the production of so many disciplines or fields (economics, gender studies, international affairs) that were already present when these authors wrote, and leaving behind others fields that are new (environmentalism, globalization). Another thing that is no longer relevant is to identify eidetic studies

exclusively as part of historiography, to consider eidetic studies as the history of ideas [1.5, 2.1 and 2.9 to 2.11].

What I most claim from authors such as Leopoldo Zea or Arturo Roig is the ability to innovate the opening of spaces to study our thought, especially in the early days of their careers. Then, when they were already mature, their ability to be inspired by the path of the South American thought to think of reality.

I say it is alive because there is a vast school of thought that continues to work that is inspired in that path, taking ideas from there as well as wrestling with it. It would be completely inappropriate to deny this relevancy by using the argument that the history of the ideas of Arthur Lovejoy has lots of weaknesses. These authors received some influences of Lovejoy, but in no way did they work with the notion of the “great chain”, which is the most contested of the US-American.

1.4 Would you say then, that the proposal of the eidetic studies is situated in the tradition of studies that are often epitomized by the names of José Gaos, Leopoldo Zea, Arturo A. Roig, Arturo Ardao?

Of course, but not in a servile way, but creatively and projectively. Nor could it be strictly servile or repetitive, because each of them had a series of specificities... I wrote an article about master Zea, where I mentioned some of the inheritance I owe him; it can be found on the internet (Devés, 2010a).

1.5 I have that article in mind. We will speak throughout these talks on your emphasis; for example, on Zea’s ability to develop intellectual agendas aimed to “extract” each country of Latin America and the region from their self-absorption in order to start thinking decidedly about themselves as part of Latin America first, and then as part of the peripheral world. Also, and closely related, on his ability to promote meta-national intellectual networks.

A couple of decades ago, intellectual history emerged as a renewing initiative in this field of studies in Latin America. The renewal implied a gesture of dismissal regarding the works, styles and procedures related to the “traditional” history of ideas. None of this has erased that other legacy,

even though the impulses related to the history of intellectuals and the intellectual history cannot be ignored. In Latin America, the notion of traditional history of ideas alludes to, not exclusively but above all, to the tradition we just referred, the Mexican historicism and particularly Zea's work and its ramifications.

In a few words: Does the difference between your proposal and the intellectual history simply refer to a matter of canon formation or does it also involve matters related to the analytical approach, the epistemological perspective, a certain type of Latin-Americanist militancy?

My proposal is that when we talk about eidetic studies, various expressions of the work of those who are interested in the studies of ideas and the intellects that hold them come together, and that their relationships with the societies with which they act in symbiosis, from perspectives such as historical or a current, basic or applied, or from a perspective making more reference to the content of the ideas or in whom these are expressed.

Why call these studies "eidetic"? In an interesting and suggestive text, Antonio Ariño Villarroya (2007) argues that the notion of "ideology" would refer to both the study of ideas and the content of ideologies, the way "psychology" is used to name both the science and the psyche. For my part, I think that might be the case in Destutt de Tracy. However, as time went by the first sense of ideology was lost forever. It is precisely for this reason that we need another name for the study of the great plurality of existing eidetic entities which, moreover, cannot be reduced to the kind of accepted definition of "ideologies" that are specific eidetic systems aiming at the organization of a national society, and that are expressed in groups related to various social sectors [2.1; 2.7; 3.12-3.14; 3.30; 4.15; 9.30-9.31; 10.12].

I think the constitution of a discipline is key or, better yet: the constitution of a disciplinary field with sufficient strength and theoretical identity to generate reasonable degrees of consensus within the categories. In other words, a discipline capable of collecting the different expressions of those who are devoted to these issues. When it comes to creating the disciplinary field of eidetic studies, it is crucial to achieve independence from its identification with historiography. This is a key issue, yet it is not

highlighted enough. Eidetic studies may be performed, among other ways, as the studies of intellectual history or as the history of ideas in general, such as the sociology of knowledge. There are also other ways, but in no way should eidetic studies be taken as a branch of Historiography [2.1 and 2.9 to 2.11].

Eidetic studies belong to a specific disciplinary field that, as it happens in many cases, can and actually does establish associations with other specialties in order to better explore a problem. But eidetic studies should not necessarily assume the diachronic perspective, but also the synchronous one. Don't let it alone be restricted to the study of the past. Nor could they be understood as only "intellectual" history, nor the version of it related to the "intellectuals" history. It is necessary to focus on ideas rather than those who hold them, in the dynamics of ideas rather than the bearers. On the other hand, eidetic studies also must deal with the eidetic development.

Additionally, there are those who classify South American thought as a "political thought", and thus bias and impoverish it. It is not only an "operational thought", let alone simply a roadblock.

Eidetic studies take ideas and their holders, as well as the ways in which they hold them, seriously. In this sense, there is a certain "Latin-Americanist militancy". Militancy is to take our eidetic trajectory seriously and not reduce it to influences, apologies, justifications, or much less to spurious fruit of petty interests, while also assuming that all of this exists and does so among those of us who conduct the studies of ideas.

1.6 What do you mean by eidetic development?

A key to thinking about this is that eidetic studies does not set its task as only knowing the eidetic intellectual past or any other kind of past, but it also seeks to ensure the development of ideas and of thought. This is essential to shift the subject area, since it associates the discipline with economy, engineering, life sciences, linguistics and, in particular, with cognitive science, without the need to cut off the traditional associations: philosophy, history and literary studies.

Studying thought cannot be understood as being always separate from the objective of thinking better, although I do not believe that this objective should literally inspire all studies about

thought.

The analogy with economic science seems to be the most successful in this case: this discipline seeks not only to understand how the economy works but also to make it work better. Similarly, eidetic studies should seek, in some way, to make people to think more and better.

1.7 It is likely, however, that someone who studies history of thought, or intellectual history, or the history of intellectuals or of concepts, thinks of himself more as a practitioner of a branch of history than as a scholar of the ideas or as someone willing to have a direct impact on the eidetic development. It is also probable that among the reasons one would have for practicing the study of history is that special form of neurosis mentioned by Georges Duby (1980): people who take refuge in the past, in the imprints of the past, get distance from a present that is experienced as overwhelming, suffocating...

In this respect, I believe that the perspectives (and I take these perspectives more like approaches than as immeasurable paradigms, which would be presumptuous) are more complementary than alternative. Various approaches show different dimensions of the topics that are of our interest and it seems to me that we must take advantage of these potentialities. Procedures that reveal various aspects are being invented over and over, including studies regarding those who study the issue.

It would be regrettable to imagine that one approach should eliminate all the others. It would be almost like assuming that reality is best studied from physics than psychology and therefore we should eliminate the later. That broad and vague thing we call "reality" can be studied from multiple perspectives. Something similar happens with ideas. They can be studied from multiple approaches, approaches that have legitimate accents and perspectives. It would be ridiculous to claim that only one particular approach can give a full account of a certain phenomenon, much less of all reality. To put it another way: If what interests me is the speech of the rightwing in the press of Porto Alegre, the contributions of Teun van Dijk will be more interesting or relevant than the ones of María Luisa Rivara Tuesta, but if I am interested in the contributions of Jose Acosta to the thought of his time, Maria Luisa will be notoriously more relevant than Teun. It would be sad

to think that we must choose between one or the other. And let us not construe this as relativism, but as a search for an adjusted and relevant knowledge, on one hand, and a search for how to fight against the arrogance of the intellectual fashion, on the other.

I'm going to be stronger about this issue, dear friend. As we have talked before on other occasions, these disputes are not about the approaches and their validity but are aiming to position themselves in the field, pretending to raise a sort of legitimacy by disqualifying the work of other people. And probably neither you nor I are completely free of this either.

1.8 In a recent article, I tried to take stock of the current studies of Latin American thought. I proposed an outline in which I basically distinguished four major constellations: 1) The history of ideas or of the Latin American thought, where I was inclined to establish your proposal of eidetic studies as an instance of renewal. 2) The intellectual history and the history of the intellectuals. 3) The history related to post-colonial/ de-colonial studies. 4) The history of Latin American critical thinking from a Marxist lens (Kozel, 2015a).

In the text itself I noticed that the proposed outline was not fully satisfactory because, among other things, there were figures and works that could be part of more than one category. I also pointed out that there wasn't much dialogue among the groups, and gestures of renewal abounded, appeals to various revolutions ("Copernicus syndrome"), etc. I would like you to comment on this panoramic outline. For example, I'd like you to communicate your impressions on the works of Santiago Castro-Gomez, Enrique Dussel and Pablo Guadarrama, among others...

I think that Castro-Gómez and Dussel are more thinkers than scholars of ideas. I understand that both dimensions overlap at times, but what I know about their works do not aim at studying the thought of other people as happens in *Positivism in Mexico* written by Zea or in *Esquemas para una historia de la filosofía ecuatoriana* written by Roig.

For my part, I prefer the geographical-institutional perspective for mapping the community of those of us who deal with eidetic studies, mentioning groups such as Mexico-UNAM,

Mexico-El Colegio de México, Mendoza, Quilmes, Chile, Rio Grande do Sul, etc. I found this perspective simpler, though less profound than yours. Above all, it's a way of avoiding the problem of having people who fit in more than one classification: In fact, my small contributions on intellectual networks would put me in two of your groups, and I seem to remember that's actually the way I appear there.

What I must say in favor of a perspective like yours is that you are able to incorporate people who work in relatively isolated places and do not constitute a group, while the perspective I use has attempted to describe the major recognizable groups in the intellectual geography of the region, acknowledging that there are people in Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Cuba and Costa Rica, among other places, who are working on these matters but are not mentioned. By the way, there are also people outside the region who works on our Latin American thought, as well as people who do not classify in any of your four possibilities. I am thinking in particular about people who have worked the Latin American thought more related to literature: Bernardo Subercaseaux and Ana Pizarro, for example, are close to cultural studies.

1.9 Agreed. In his *Crítica de la razón latinoamericana*, Castro- Gomez charged against the proposals of Zea and Roig. I think that a proposal for a philosophical renewal with such claims and scope must have “effects” on how to address the study of thought or of ideas. On the other hand, Zea and Roig made history of ideas, but they were also thinkers. Could you elaborate on this distinction in general, and also in particular, I mean, considering your own itinerary, the meaning and scope of your proposal?

I also agree, but then we could talk more about the approaches and theoretical discussions than about the groups who study the ideas, because if Castro-Gomez has criticized them, he did it in order to propose alternative issues, though he hasn't presented an alternative work, that I know of. Among those who have tried a theoretical discussion, besides myself, I could mention Horacio Cerutti, Elías Palti; Ángel Rama, Miró Quesada and even Antonio Cándido.

1.10 What do you think of Paul Guadarrama's proposal? Would you agree in placing it as a hybrid between the traditions 1) and 4) I mentioned earlier?

Paul Guadarrama, in addition to being a thinker, is also the most important current scholar of Cuban thought. I know part of his work, I know him, we have shared in the *Corredor de las ideas* and he is regarded as a specialist among the majority of the community of those who work on these matters in the region. I do not believe, however, that the community acknowledges the other two authors as scholars of our ideas. Within your classification, it seems pertinent to locate Guadarrama between 1 and 4.

1.11 Talking about another key figure, what do you think of Horacio Cerutti's output?

I've known Horacio Cerutti for about twenty-five years and, thanks to many connections, we belong to the same networks. I find his doctoral thesis and book on liberation philosophy to be a very important work and it has inspired me in how to address this trend. His scholarship also brings us closer to Zea and Roig, although he was around longer and was closer to both masters. I think he is a pioneer for South American eidetic studies, thanks to both his work as for his scholarship. I find his work on theoretical issues and his lexicon to be relevant. I would like to use this question to expand on my answer about other figures who have dealt with these matters. Horacio Cerutti has focused more particularly to the confluence of philosophy and essay in our lands so, in this sense, I think he is close to Pablo Guadarrama, Clara Jalif, David Sobrevilla, Adriana Arpini, Yamandú Acosta, Hugo Biagini and Mario Magallón among other figures, who have mainly focused in this confluence, being less interested in the production of the social-economic sciences, international studies, political and theological thought. However, Yamandú has shown vast interest in South American and Uruguayan political thought, and Cerutti wrote in his early years on Lacunza. The essay has been a favored space for these authors and when it comes to this occupation let me add the works of Liliana Weinberg, Javier Pinedo and Fernando Aínsa.

1.12 What do you think about the collective work of *El*

pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano del Caribe y 'Latino' (1300-2000),
coordinated by Dussel, Mendieta and Bohórquez?

I think is an admirable work, although I have not studied it in great detail. It seems to me that it is a grain of sand in an immense beach, where works over works are been added and settled over one another. It should be mentioned, with its pluses and minuses, along with Carlos Beorlegui's work, which is also relevant. I don't know if you know about this blooper. It has been said, alluding to the manias of certain South American brothers, that if you want to make a successful business you should do this: buy them for what they are worth and then sell them for what they believe they are worth.

1.13 I know that you have connections to several Brazilian spaces. What is your assessment of the studies of ideas in Brazil? Do you know of Brazilian initiatives at a Latin American scale that are worth mentioning? In fact, one of the spaces that does not appear in my attempt to take stock is Brazil...

I know of numerous attempts, but they are self-conceived as studies of the Brazilian social thinking, whether the Brazilian philosophy, the Brazilian social sciences, or those who have forged a Brazilian thought, but they are not dealt with as part of Latin America, in their connections or parallels. That is the case of works such as the study of philosophy in Brazil by Antonio Paim, or the one by Sergio Miceli regarding social sciences, or the formation of Brazilian thought by Otavio Ianni.

1.14 Who are the colleagues/disciples who you currently feel closer to in approach, style of work, definition/assessment to a particular canon?

I believe that we should make a distinction between affective-labor closeness and closeness of approach. For example, I felt closer by work and affectively to Roig, though in approach I felt closer to the master Zea.

I think it is important to distinguish that when it comes to making networks cartographies. The person closest to me is Javier

Pinedo, for many reasons such as our long friendship and affection, the organization of meetings, the ongoing discussion, the flow of information, the attendance of congresses, the similarity of our contacts and friendships, and the affinities of awareness both intellectual and ideological. However, there are many topics, concepts or methods that I find interesting and he doesn't, and vice versa. On the other hand, there are works by Fernanda Beigel that I particularly cherish, though we barely meet and talk, in spite of the admiration I have for her. Pinedo and I talk weekly about work, programs, methods, trends, and other things. Less often, though with sufficiently frequency, I chat with Bernardo Subercaseaux, Carlos Ossandon and Ricardo Salas.

Regarding the work on intellectual networks I feel closer to Marta Casaus, Ricardo Melgar-Bao and Claudio Maíz. In relation to the circulation of ideas from South America to Africa and Asia I should highlight my colleague and friend César Ross. In the environmental study of ideas I have joined my path with that of my other colleague and friend Fernando Estenssoro. On ideas about international issues, ranging from Latin American production toward other regions such as the United States, Western Europe, China and the Pacific, I feel close to Raul Bernal Meza and César Ross, in addition to the young Constanza Jorquera. In Mendoza, I must also highlight Adriana Arpini, Clara Jalif, Marisa Muñoz, Marcela Aranda and Dante Ramaglia, people with whom I talk every year or two, at a good number of meetings. In Brazil, my closeness with Maria Elena Capelato and, above all, with Claudia Wasserman have been relevant. In Mexico, I am close to some heirs of Zea, such as Alberto Saladino García, Mario Magallón and Horacio Cerutti and also with others that are not heirs of Zea, such as Carlos Marichal. In Uruguay, I am close to Yamandú Acosta.

1.15 What topics have you been working recently?

I have worked for years on aspects of the circulation of our thinking in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and how they have been reworked here and there. I have tried to take the thought of the Caribbean seriously, above all the non-Spanish speaking. With this I wanted to cut the umbilical cord of the exclusive and receptive reference to Europe, also to make a contribution with the intention of breaking that naturalized affective dependence with Europe.

This has been combined with the desire to move the understanding of the large spaces and major processes forward, which I call “think big” and which I feel is in the same vein as Leopoldo Zea, in some ways, though not in others. I can also bring Dussel and Mignolo closer, as well as other figures of our region and to the peripheral world such as Gandhi, Fanon, Ali Mazrui and Vandana Shiva, in order to break or, better, to supplant the notion of “modernity” as a way of characterizing the history of the last centuries.

I’m trying to add knowledge to various fields of thought, to inspire new ways of thinking about the global space-time from the point of view of the periphery. It is, moreover, an ambitious project, I haven’t attempted project so difficult and abstract before. At the same time, I research matters that are more theoretical-methodological than empirical. The most important has been how to establish a discipline on the studies of ideas, understood as eidetic entities.

1.16 We will return to these questions soon... But I would love to ask you the following: Could it be that progress on these issues (“think big”) ends up framing you as more of a thinker than as a scholar of ideas? You have talked about supplanting the notion of modernity as a way of characterizing the history of the last centuries, to rethink the global space-time: Is this still part of eidetic studies or is it already part of another agenda? Are you planning to follow the sequence that you noticed in the case of Zea and Roig –studying thought first in order to think about reality later?

What better fate would a dwarf have than to stand on the shoulders of giants? And if so, good for me. Having said that, my intellectual activity has not been limited to the study of ideas, though it has been my main occupation, it is not exclusively. Numerous works have been oriented toward social and workers’ movements, the edition of anthologies, the agenda and the management of networks, toward regional integration, and toward the history of the present, though not by that name, and toward some philosophical problems, among other issues.

1.17 What conclusion have you arrived at regarding your tour

of Latin American cities? Did it have any relation with the research interests you've just listed or was it another kind of experience?

Although it was meant to be an intellectual journey, it went beyond my pursuits relating to eidetic studies. It was a lived experience, a militancy, a coexistence, but in no way was it a research trip on eidetic studies in the strict sense. Be that as it may, I wrote a report (Devés 2012), rather than a “conclusion” as you say. It was a “report” because it only informs and does not evaluate that experience, which is in fact, quite hard to assess in the short term. I still have to write something more, precisely in the field of evaluation, even though I don't yet have the inspiration to do it. Correspondingly, perhaps it's still not the time to say some things.

1.18 Things that have to do with...?

You're constantly trying to make me speak about things, of the most varied things, and even about my personal motivations, which are of little interest. I want to make you talk about a single subject: Ideas.

To put it in a somewhat pedantic manner: for me it has been a systematic effort of epoché and epoché to get to speak about ideas themselves, as substance and not just as accidents, precisely in the line of understanding their entity. For the vast majority of people, even in our field, ideas are sort of accidents attached to human beings the way height, color, shirts or TV programs are. I think most of these people know about the existence of linguistics, as a science that studies languages, and assume linguistics are specifically responsible for languages. Those same people, however, struggle terribly when it comes to assume that ideas can be studied as such. Maybe because of a lack of the capacity for abstraction, they just cannot understand the *raison d'être* of eidetic studies as the study of eidetic entities, but they imagine the use of ideas as if they were gimmicks, lies, means, and accidents –therefore, as things that do not deserve specific studies, since they are “nothing”. They accept sociology of ideas as well as the psychology of ideas, among others. They are not proposing to annul linguistics by merging it with anthropology, as they sometimes wish to nullify the study of ideas by merging it with sociology or with historiography. And they

are mistaken when they say that there would be no ideas without people, which is as obvious in a sense as saying that there would be no humans without vegetables and minerals. And yet, they conduct more and more versions of anthropology, though they never speak about carbon or lettuce.

1.19 A moment ago the word “militancy” was mentioned. I believe it was intended in two different ways. First, you talked about “taking our eidetic trajectory seriously”. Then, when you talked about your trip you mentioned that the journey was more of a “militant” experience than anything else. For what cause are you a militant today?

I’m a militant for the constitution of a sustainable and organic intelligentsia of South America and peripheral regions that could acknowledge and recognize each other. I’m an advocate for the affective independence regarding euro-centrism. I’m a militant for the affirmation of an autonomous thinking and its multiple interconnections and variety; I’m a militant for an intelligentsia more self-critical than critical and more purposeful than critical.

But how can all these limited formulations be of any importance when we are dealing with how to study ideas. Much less important are other militancies in favor of the dilution of power, militancies against consumerism and all neo-Machiavellianism of the worldwide “big governments”, and militancies in favor of anarchy, peace, or any good cause such as love, in the first place.

1.20 How do these elements connect with your project of “supplanting” the concept of modernity, to rethink the global...?

These questions you ask are very difficult and they would take us down very different roads than that of these discussions. I have always wanted to work at different levels and although they have degrees of interlocking, they do not give a full account of one another. To talk here about rethinking “globality” distracts us from the affairs of this volume. But I would say that developing a general theory of circulation is to overcome and deny the theory of modernity as the interpretation of the world in recent centuries.

1.21 You say “overcome and deny the theory of modernity as the interpretation of the world” and at the same time you ask me to leave the matter out of these conversations... it is not easy to accept your suggestion, but we can try and focus in a disciplined fashion on the subject matter of this book, although I’m sure this huge and challenging issue will reappear some way or another.

How do you see the present and future of the studies of Latin American thought in regards to the prevailing approaches and lines, and the pending agendas? What would be desirable?

I see several elements that are not very systematic, and I know I could answer you in broad terms because I have thought, rethought and written extensively regarding the tension among present/future and thinking/studies of thought. Some years ago I published an article where I tried to systematize some ideas (Devés, 2005). Also, in the third volume of my *Pensamiento latinoamericano* I attempted to assess some of the groups working on the Latin American thought. Another approach is the one that I have done regarding Zea, which I mentioned a moment ago.

Something that I must say from the beginning is that we are facing a problem that perhaps will make the category “Latin American thought” explode, a category that I am trying to replace with “South American” (*Suramericano*). When it comes to studying the thinking of the indigenous intelligentsia, the term “Latin American thought” is treacherous. I understand that this “Latino” is something more conventional than “essential”, but it is hard to say that sumak-kausay is “Latino” thought. Even if in the United States those who are called Latinos are more ethnically americans or afrodescendants, they are little or nothing properly European or Latin. In relation to this and other pending matters, a few years ago we created the project “Emerging intelligentsia”, in IDEA-USACH, with Pedro Canales Tapia and Alejandra Ruiz, among other people. We are also working to assemble a collection of volumes we named “Studies of the Ideas” which will possibly contain these conversations at some point in the future.

Another key issue is generating my own agenda (not isolated). I am against the Europeanized agenda of those who arrive with the latest thing, for example: “conceptual history”, and try to

convince us that this recipe explains almost everything. That is so provincial or villager (a person who believes his village gives the world its measure) as it is “epocher” (a person who believes his time measures history). I say that while respecting the contributions of Koselleck. In addition, positions such as these only ignore the different genres, levels of entities, and eidetic systems, which must not be confused or treated rashly as “political speech”. Because it is not the same when we speak, for example, about the *Iliad*, about the Islamic world view, or the last *speech* of the main agent of the Empire, nor is the word “ideology” the same for all the parties concerned, or the cheap *deus ex machina* “context”.

The topics that are currently being discussed are numerous: the theoretical status of the schools of thought that have been deployed among us, the problem of the out of place ideas, the intellectual networks, the establishment of a South American thought, the flow of ideas, the value of certain classical notions such as “influence”, the production of eidetic cartographies, and the relationship of our speciality with other disciplines, among several others.

As to the rest, the most important contributions of eidetic studies of this region are some of the following: first, to have our thought settled on the world map; second, to establish the study of the intellectual networks as a very relevant factor in the work of ideas; third, to reopen the debate about out (or not) of place ideas; fourth, to consolidate the notion of Latin (South) American thought, and being able to project it toward the notion of peripheral thought.

It will certainly be said that it is not much and there may be some more contributions. In the last few years, I have been very interested in introducing a conceptualization from other disciplines like linguistics, life or economic sciences, to enrich, challenge and subvert the eidetic studies. Issues that should also be addressed by those who deal with these matters and that we should include in these talks are, for instance, the issue of imports and exports, the environments and ecosystems, the sensitivities, the issue regarding circulation, the subject of cycles, the mutations and intersections, the hybridizations, the broadening of the object toward a social-economic sciences, toward the international studies, toward ecological thought, toward the indigenous intelligentsia, and toward the impact in other regions, the issue of the usefulness of eidetic

studies for the development of thought, and, finally, the alignment between eidetic and cognitive studies.

1.22 I wouldn't want for this first part of our conversation to end without returning to the question about the current Latin American thought, although now in another clef. I remember the cyclic thesis that presides over your *Pensamiento Latinoamericano*: identity phases followed by centralizing phases (this, of course, with its nuances and complexities). I also remember that in the third volume you mentioned that post-colonial and decolonial studies constituted one of the most active groups, and that their preaching could be characterized as neo-arielist, or better, neo-calibanic. The question has to do with the relationship between thought and political project: How do you understand the attachment and detachment of the cultural and political arenas? Can there be identity thought under centralizing political projects, in other words: Can there be a neo-liberal policy with neo-calibanic academics, and vice versa? What implications does it have for your conceptualization? And, beyond that: Would you agree that, in recent years, there is a kind of schism in Latin America, in the sense that political projects, cultural identity and centralizing orientations coexist tensely? Have you ever tried to conceptualize this situation based on the interpretative matrix of your *Pensamiento latinoamericano*?

Of course there could be decouplings and coexistences. There has always been tension between the eidetic field and the political field, bearing in mind that neither are completely homogeneous, and less so if we refer to the region as a whole. What I tried to do was to highlight a simple alternation in the figures that emerged in the thinking of the region, but the ones that emerged and were then recognized, did not erase what was previously thought, or what would be thought after. For example, Martí and Rodó wrote their work when much of politics was inspired by guidelines associated with positivists and social Darwinism. My aim was to understand the dynamics of ideas and the ups and downs of their emergencies, not political projects and even less so the actions of governments. I think it is interesting to develop interpretations for the eidetic field itself, as well as to clarify its connections with

the ecosystems in which that area develops.

2

EIDETIC STUDIES AS A PROPOSAL FOR DISCIPLINARY RECONFIGURATION

2.1 How are eidetic studies defined? How are they positioned in relation to disciplines such as the history of ideas, intellectual history, and the sociology of knowledge, disciplines that also take ideas as their object of study, with their respective specificities?

Expressions such as “eidetic studies”, “eidologic studies” and “eidology” were created from the Greek notion “eidos,” which means idea; these expressions were created with the purpose of naming studies whose subject matter involved eidetic entities. As time went by, I started to prefer the first expression in order to avoid the confusion that may arise due to the resemblance the other two expressions have with the classic concept of “ideology” [1.5]. In 2017, during the *Jornadas de Talca*, our colleague and friend Cecilia Sanchez noted that the notion of eidetic/eidetics might lead to confusion to the degree that it recalls Husserl, the second phenomenological reduction, where there is clearly another meaning. However, I feel this risk is very low. It is clear that we are talking about very different things. In this disciplinary space Husserl’s ideas are little known; in addition, we are dealing here with extensions.

Eidetic studies consist of those disciplines that have traditionally been called “the history of ideas,” “the history of philosophy,” “the history of science,” and “intellectual History,” all of which are considered tributaries of historiographical work, even if on numerous occasions their content has not effectively conformed to the temporal dimension.

A very important aspect of this proposal is the fact that the historiographic paradigm is a relevant paradigm, but by no means the only one. Studies on eidetic entities are not limited to the historical dimension which, on the other hand and almost intrinsically, has become basic science, thus inhibiting their applied nature, something they could also develop. Other subdisciplines have been, for example, the “sociology of knowledge” and “cultural studies.” When studying myths, subjects such as anthropology and religion sciences also partially focus on the study of eidetic entities. In fact, in addition to inventing their own elements, eidetic studies extract elements from many disciplines without forcing a divorce from historiography; however, they are bound to multidisciplinary polygamy or polyandry, as one wishes to call it [1.3; 1.5; 2.11].

Eidetic studies emphasize the study of ideas rather than the study of intellectuals and their objective is to study eidetic entities as such, that is to say in a manner similar to how linguists study languages.

Eidetic studies are interested in understanding many things related to eidetic entities such as how they are composed and articulated, how they mutate and how they intersect. In addition, they are interested in understanding how eidetic entities can be classified, what their characteristics are according to their type, as well as how and which ones enter into symbiosis with societies. This does not detract them from practicing forms such as psychoeidology or socioeidology and does not claim that one specialty is better than another as each one of them exercises a niche. It would be like stating that biology, zoology and botany are superior to ecology or vice versa. Long live discipline as well as interdiscipline! Let it be clear that this statement is not eclecticism but rather pragmatism and common sense. Our ability to think is very broad and we are in the process of developing many ways to do it.

2.2 So, eidetic studies would be defined primarily by their

object, eidetic entities...

In fact, three approaches come to mind which overlap and complement each other. I do not believe a single definition is necessary or much less a definition that is intended to be closed and exclusive. I reiterate, intellectual work has such vitality that it shatters closed definitions. That's why I am speaking of a disciplinary field where work methods are intertwined rather than a discipline and much less a science in the strict sense.

The first approach focuses its attention on the object. According to it, eidetic studies deal with eidetic entities in relation to their immediate realities.

But if eidetic studies are obliged to give us a privileged field of occupation, it wouldn't be their objects that define them, but rather a specific approach to symbolic work, smart behavior, and even material culture, a view to be analyzed from the question regarding the ideas they express.

On the other hand, eidetic studies can also be characterized as the field dealing with the set of studies that is practiced, has been practiced and will be practiced by the community of those who consider themselves, as well as being considered by others, proponents of this area of studies.

Some people believe that the formulation "eidetic studies" is sophisticated or cryptic so they have suggested that I summarize it in terms of "Eidetics," which is homogeneous with linguistics and chemistry.

2.3 Object, view, work/community, it is interesting to think about this triple definition of an area that seems to be constitutively open. In your opinion, what are the disciplines with which eidetic studies establish or should establish significant links?

The answer would be too long, so throughout this discussion we will be making clarifications. For now, it can be said that commerce with historiography must continue, but without jealousy. It must also be stated that the relationship with the economy and sociology is indisputable, and that contact with literary studies, which has been equally traditional as well, should continue. Interestingly enough, literary studies and linguistics, its

close relatives, have assumed several concepts that come from or are also used in life sciences: generations (José Ortega y Gasset), generative linguistics (Noam Chomsky), and genetic structure (Lucien Goldmann), among others. However, even in eidetic studies themselves, genetic expressions have been used for the study of African ideas (Boele van Hensbroek, 1999).

In order to interpret or explain their objects, eidetic studies have been linked to sociology, economics, political science, historiography and even ecology. In their quest to find a proper language and formulations, they have also been inspired by linguistics, philosophical and literary studies, cultural studies, and even geography and biology, without prejudice to adjustments and adaptations. One of the main potentialities of the discipline is its ability to hybridize languages and even use and hybridize paradigms and approaches that come from quite distant sources.

The expression “eidetic studies” suggests a large space of disciplinary intersections which were lacking a title and where furrows cultivated by various specialties intersect. Conceptualizing all of this may enable the better synergistic encounter among those who cultivate various specialties in a better way, while organizing an institutional framework that mutually enhances them and, above all, considers the development of broad work agendas with a common concept that are relatively easy to come up with.

On the other hand, this can be understood better, in the light of what has happened, on a greater level with the notion of “cultural studies,” which was key in enhancing said area of knowledge. Without this notion, it was not possible to coordinate people who were working on media and those who were studying dance; it was also not possible to coordinate people who were working on art support foundations and those who were working on the history of books, and so on.

The different approaches within eidetic studies are equivalent to subdisciplines whose objective is to obtain different types of responses. Just as physics is not superior to chemistry, the history of ideas is not superior to intellectual history. There could be a discussion, however, about which of these might respond better given a certain problem. A better way to put it, however, would be the following: in the face of such a problem, one of the histories would offer one type of answer and the second would offer another without necessarily being better or worse; one takes

into account certain elements that the other doesn't and vice versa.

2.4 It often happens that when designing a course program or a seminar, many issues “find their place” and, by organizing them in relation to others, they are clarified. Do you have a proposal for an eidetics or eidetic studies course prepared? What would be its characteristics?

I have several points that I have been introducing throughout my own teaching that could be along the lines of an “Introduction to the Study of the Ideas” course:

- Fundamental concepts used by the disciplines that intersect in this area of work.
- Work methods within the field: trends and figures.
- Definition of eidetic entities.
- Classification of eidetic entities (eidetic systems and others) and comparativism: myths, systems, ideologies, devices, etc.
- Classification of schools and eidetic trends in various regions of the world (100 “Names”).
- Methodologies: the ways and conditions in which to work on eidetics and its connections: definitions, conceptualizations, subspecialties methods, interdisciplinary-discipline.
- Mutation, Crosspoint, adhesion, and symbiosis in/of eidetic entities.
- Circulation, dissemination of eidetic entities.
- Relationships between eidetic and non-eidetic (what people call “reality:” neurons, brains, organizations, states, societies, people...).
- Pending issues and agendas for the discipline.

2.5 We are going to cover several of the points that you've mentioned recently over the course of these discussions...

If I had to draw up an “applied eidetic studies” program, I would start more or less in the following manner: (I've never done a course on this; I have scarcely touched upon some of these elements in courses dedicated to other matters) the overall objective would be to contribute to the generation of ideas that enables people to think better by using “programming” and

“artificial acceleration” of what intellectuals or society “naturally” but slowly carry out. The specific objectives would be the following:

- To discuss in what sense the studies of ideas and their immediate realities can be regarded as “applied” when it comes to such an abstract area.
- To promote the transfer of concepts and paradigms among disciplines.
- To study the circulation of ideas.
- To contribute (through geneidetic engineering procedures) to the development of “translating” or “Esperantic” concepts that work as “assembly points” among several discourses.
- To contribute to the development of paradigms and methodologies for the study of eidetic phenomena (particularly oriented toward the capitalization of existing paradigms and concepts in other disciplines).
- To establish opportunities for dialogue among several discourses: disciplines, ideologies, theologies-religions.
- To contribute to the development of procedures for the decoding of geneidetic codes and their possible application.
- To make eidetic cartographies (according to geographical regions, geocultural areas, times, schools, etc.).
- To provide “artificial” ideas to be tested.
- To contribute to the creation of criteria to develop “eidetic reports” and actually make them.
-

2.6 We will come back later to the eidetic studies applied dimension [7]. Now I want you to continue introducing your proposal in the broadest sense possible. What lines of reflection have you been developing lately in relation to its strengthening?

I would mention four main lines. First of all, I’ve been working on something regarding the notion of *intellectual environment*, which I stated in the Jornada de las Ideas (Talca, 2013), an event in which you were present. This notion wants to give account of the intellectual communities dynamic, where the participants take roles that gain meaning and develop skills that

become comprehensible within this ecosystem, something that could not occur in other ecosystems. Let me see if I can explain myself better: ecosystems develop dynamics involving agents that are not explained solely by their biographical, individual or social backgrounds, nor by their intellectual formation. This same issue of intellectual ecosystems has interested me regarding the emergence of creativity within them. I try to work on the issue of creativity, although in a very slow manner and, worse, with little creativity myself. It is a matter of thinking about in which ways creative thinking can be enhanced in South America. My perception is that during these first decades of the 21st century, South American thinking has not experienced its greatest amount of creativity, although numerous innovations can be taken into account. I have been reading Randall Collin's monumental *The Sociology of Philosophies* (2005) to refine my vision on this matter. Why are there intellectual ecosystems where a high degree of creativity emerges in some, while it does not emerge in others? What complex sets of causes are needed to produce it? We will talk about this later. In any case, I insist that, in a way, those who study thought must contribute to "improving" it, something that can be understood in various ways [7.4].

Thirdly, in the *Jornadas de Talca* in 2014, which you did not attend, I presented studies on intellectual networks and the criteria that makes them functional in regard to the improvement of the work of the intellectual networks themselves. This refers to what I mentioned a moment ago about applied eidetic studies or applied eidology. We are attempting to generate a rapprochement between intellectual studies and the science (or techniques) of administration. The issue of intellectual networks is important because its study seems to be the greatest Latin American contribution to the study of intellectuals [6.16-6.18].

Another issue that I am pursuing is the rapprochement between eidetic studies and cognitive sciences, where I am trying to demonstrate that some eidetic systems have prospered according to evolutionary principles; that is to say, they are functional in the development of the species, or rather, those who have facilitated the development of the species have prospered, including the process of "Hominization." Even more radical, I dare to venture a hypothesis: we have reached homo sapiens status due to eidetic systems that challenged us to think better and which

acted as mechanisms of natural selection. Eidetic systems existed that facilitated the increase of certain skills of our brain and our body and which acted as selection agents. I mean this in two ways: they called upon the brain to develop and they encouraged the elimination of those who could not accept such an eidetic system for being too sophisticated. On the other hand, conceiving some eidetic system genres as entities in symbiosis with societies of human beings allows eidetic studies to be brought closer to life sciences and it invites them to do so as well.

2.7 Someone might wonder about the meaning behind introducing another (different) new name, as is the case with the eidetic studies formula, in a field that is somehow saturated by programmatic proposals and foundational gestures. What would be the epistemological “benefit” if we reached a consensus, so to speak, on your proposal? Wouldn’t we be faced with a new manifestation of the Copernicus syndrome to which I referred earlier [1.8]?

The eidetic studies notion’s objective is, on the one hand, to improve the accuracy of the field of study. It’s about a formulation that alludes to a disciplinary field, not to just one discipline, and much less a science. This is preferable to the notion “ideological” studies because ideologies are just one of the forms taken by eidetic entities, even though they are the best known.

When focusing the discussion on ideas, these studies distinguish themselves from other disciplines (without avoiding the overlaps and interconnections) and they can focus their study on various levels or expressions: languages, myths, world views, philosophical systems, ideologies, legal bodies; in addition, they can focus on various disciplinary cuts, as is the case in legal, economic, social, and international affairs ideas, as well as mentalities and sensibilities, or according to the agents involved (peoples, ethnic groups, associations, groups, tiers, classes, etc.). If we think about myth, we find a wide family of legends, popular tales, stories of supernatural characters, as well as traditions and beliefs, just to name a few of its relatives. The plurality and variety of the eidetic is immense and it would be nonsense to uniquely identify it with one or some of its manifestations such as political concepts, for example. Given the circumstances, the historiography of concepts

may be a very interesting way of studying 1% or 5% of the eidetic universe. However, for the remaining 95% it has very little value. This does not invalidate it, but it positions it as a method for achieving only certain objectives. The above takes us towards omnicidetism which states that ideas are everywhere and it is about assessing them and, in many ways, enhancing their development. Needless to say, on the other hand, we can pose several questions to a single eidetic corpus and according to these, we can dialectically move towards one kind of procedure or another, as each procedure allows us to see some things but not others.

2.8 Therefore, I understand that with the introduction of the expression “eidetic studies” you are proposing to assemble already existing initiatives. As with any proposal of this nature, it has a coefficient of controversiality. Here I see two problems. One is that eidetic studies are something that undoubtedly exist, although not under that name, not exactly with the meaning and scope that you propose. This would be indicative of tensions between the description of a state of things and the profiling of a heuristic and a kind of utopia.

The other problem is how could an initiative such as this relate to the existing complicated institutionality, the diversity of perspectives, as well as work methods. To put it another way: an option no less legitimate is to admit the radical and unsurpassed heterogeneity in this field of studies and advocate, for example, for a type of minimalism. The eidetic studies proposal seems to seek a sort of relative communion and reach a broad consensus, a kind of order endowment for the quasi-prevailing chaos, in addition to seeking a grouping and capitalization of achievement, and access to higher levels of density. In this sense, it is difficult not to see it as an encompassing construction which could be acknowledged as a megalomaniac, hegemonizing, and even imperial(ist) vocation...

I think when we talk about eidetic studies various expressions of those who have an interest in the studies of ideas, in the intellectuals that host them and in their relationships with the societies which they come into symbiosis are assembled, whether in a historical or present perspective, in a basic or applied

perspective, or in a perspective referring more to the content of ideas or in whom these ideas are expressed.

I think the establishment of a disciplinary field that groups these expressions, as well as the community of us who is dedicated to this issue, is truly important, while at the same time promoting the maturation of a language, among other things. This disciplinary field is not well constituted, which allows people to speak with the same relevance about several areas. For example, if we were to speak about cosmos, we could consider ufologists, Ptolemaic, astrological, theological, and astronomic perspectives, among others. As you see, if on the one hand I move toward the expansion of the disciplinary field, on the other hand I seek to highlight the need to constitute it as well with more precise definitions.

I think the emphasis on different “approaches,” as well as the emphasis on “crossroads,” and the notion of “field or discipline area” prevents us from seeing this proposal as hegemonizing precisely because it proposes coexistence and not exclusion. On the other hand, this can be said about any proposal; it doesn’t concern me much. From an epistemic point of view, I like the notion of “meeting point.” This refers to understanding a discipline as an encounter between lines of work or approaches that intersect at a point. That point, and its nearby regions constitute an area of discipline. As they diverge, there are points of confluence on the other end of the spectrum which are other disciplinary areas.

I am concerned, however, that my proposal will become a proposal that fertilizes work instead of inhibiting it, and correlatively, will offer a certain status of professionalization, thus increasing the level of discussions and removing them from the level of “opinions.” In this case, any person can deliver on the context and confuse ideologies with original myths or refer to people who were born 100 years apart as members of the same generation.

I’ll tell you in a way of a story. Recently, I heard a person who made a contrast between what he called “the generation of Bolivar, Sarmiento and Rodó” and decolonial authors, or something like that.

2.9 It is clear, then, that the difference between the proposal of eidetic studies and the one of intellectual history refers to a

matter of approach as well as a set theory, in the sense that, for eidetic studies intellectual history is similar to one of its subsets...

Intellectual history (normally understood as history of the intellectual rather than the intellective) is a subfield in more than one sense. Eidetic studies are interested in history (because of the past and the historicity of thought and its hosts) but also in the present; they are interested both in the intellectual and other social areas, and above all they are interested in ideas as such.

To study eidetic phenomena in the synchronous dimension and in the present is key. It is about renouncing the historiographical formulation as the only one. In addition, if eidetic studies want to conduct applied studies, this is scarcely compatible with an exclusively historiographical perspective.

In truth, eidetic studies have always worked, so to speak, with various disciplines, but for some reason they have been called “History of...,” without having made any true historiography in numerous opportunities. The diachronic or evolutionary dimension has not always been present. On numerous occasions, synchronous studies have been carried out, even studies about the past, such as photographs.

2.10 This point of the non-historiographical or diachronic restriction seems to be something crucial in your proposal, and yet it is something that is not very clear for a lot of colleagues. In the 2017 *Jornadas de Talca*, where we presented a version of this proposal, Dante Ramaglia requested further details in this regard. Can you give examples of non-diachronic eidetic studies?

There are different types of eidetic research that come to mind. The first type that comes to mind is anything regarding theoretic discussions, such as discipline and its environment, as well as the definitions of its objects of study and relevance and its conceptual tools. Secondly, we have all matters regarding the study of ideas in the present. Thirdly, there are all of the matters related to projective agendas (towards the future) in various eidetic fields. Fourthly, we have everything related to consultancy work and the last example is everything that is developed in the eidetic

engineering field.

As examples for each of the types I mentioned I suggest:

1. Discussions about whether we should make intellectual or conceptual history or history of ideas. Discussions on the meaning of this work or some of its expressions. For example, proposals for a better historiography of ideas, as well as many other things such as studies on how to conceptualize eidetic ideas or entities, systems of ideas, ideologies, intellectuals, intellectual networks, studies about conceptual tools of the disciplines which relate it or distinguish it from other close disciplines, for example, the distinctions between school of thought and trend.
2. Studies, such as “Últimos desarrollos del pensamiento neoliberal,” “Las ideas en Chile en la actualidad,” “Tres maneras de pensar el desarrollo económico hoy,” “Análisis de los discursos del presidente de turno” and “Estado de la cuestión en las teorías antropológicas contemporáneas.”
3. The projective or prospective work is often carried out within various disciplinary areas and it is very close to the “states of affairs” or “state of the art,” which are often made without method or craft, but rather in an impressionistic and amateur manner. One example of this is: *“Tareas y desafíos para el pensamiento sobre democracia.”*
4. An assignment from a publishing house: *“Estudio acerca de las tendencias futuras en las ciencias sociales”* in order to develop an editorial policy.
5. A Project: *“Puntos de encuentro entre el pensamiento islámico progresista y el socialismo para la elaboración de una agenda común.”* A Laboratory research: *“Introducción de genes del pensamiento ácrata en el pensamiento integrista católico.”*

The above examples do not refer to the past and do not necessarily consider the temporal dimension. They also are not carried out under historiography methods, do not require the historiography purpose, and are not carried out in historiographical institutions. In addition, the people who write these studies have not studied historiography, nor do they regard themselves as historians.

All of this seems very clear, except for the people who hold “pan-historiographical” positions, such as the person who called

their mother an historian because when they asked her where she came from, she told her that she had gone to buy bread at the bakery around the corner. “Ultimately, my mother is an historian,” she stated. She was excited during her first semester of studies.

In fact, this conversation between you and I could be considered as part of the tradition of eidetic studies even though it is not a book about the history of ideas. Maybe in the future, those who work in the discipline of ideas can use it as an historical book. Of course, that is if we are lucky enough for this book to make its mark in history.

It is worth noting that several of these tasks have already been done, but they are not even considered part of eidetic studies, to the extent that the field is not sufficiently regarded. It’s not uncommon; it has happened everywhere. In the past, jurists worked as sociologists, political scientists and economists, among other professions.

2.11 In summary: does the proposal of eidetic studies aim to reformulate this disciplinary field as a “meeting point,” a sort of a broad umbrella that clearly establishes the non-historiographical monopoly and enables progress toward a better approach and a better definition of the plurality of approaches, emphasis, and work styles involved?

I think that is worded very well. Eidetic studies can have as many expressions as engineering, economics or psychological studies do. In fact, those already involved in this process do it in very different ways: they work on a wide variety of areas of the eidetic reality (regions, times, species) and also with different methods, approaches, and paradigms. The existing disciplines that would be placed into eidetic studies are: the history(s) of ideas, of philosophy, of science, of mentalities, the conceptual history, the study of discourse, the sociology(s) of knowledge, of intellectuals, of science, sciences of religion, several expressions of anthropology that refer to myths and ways of thinking of ancestral and indigenous peoples. It overlaps with gnoseology and epistemology. It links with life sciences and other sciences of knowledge, such as social sciences and philosophy and historiography. From here it emerges as one of many disciplines that find their own identity, thus gaining independence from their mother disciplines. As for

the science of knowledge, it links with life sciences, on the one hand, and with human science on the other.

The field can be very extensive; almost any intelligent production can be seen as an expression of ideas, just as chemical science has the ability to study all of reality in its chemical dimension.

2.12 What are the objectives of eidetic studies when they are understood in this manner?

I think we could state the following objectives:

- To study eidetic entities, as well as their components, relationships and developments. The objective is to study them in their specificity as eidetic entities, that is to say we do not want to conceive ideas as psychic or neural products even if there were border areas.
- To study eidetic entities/systems in their connections with non-eidetic realities (neurons, brains, societies), always being able to distinguish one from the another. To put it in another way: to study the ways in which eidetic populations are articulated (how they negotiate their symbiosis) with intelligent populations in ecosystems in motion;
- To understand how eidetic entities have constituted humans and comprehend how humans became mammals capable of developing eidetic entities. Humans have become mammals with a brain capable of containing complex entities and a brain in which these entities can be implemented, entities that demand that same brain “to hold its feet to the fire”, as a sweet teacher would, or maybe as a rigorous coach, or as a relentless tyrant...
- To build or repair eidetic entities that contribute to the increase and improvement of life.
- In relation to all of the above, the aim is to constitute a discipline that considers eidetic entities in their specific nature and manages to establish itself as a new discipline without isolating itself. The objective is also to be capable of having a dialogue with other disciplinary fields, especially with human and social sciences, as well as cognitive and life sciences.

2.13 Have you thought about moving towards a

systematization of the internal variety of eidetic studies?

The following outline of approaches and schools within eidetic studies comes to mind; however, I am surely forgetting a few options:

The “Historiographies” of:

- Mentalities.
- The conceptual.
- Ideas.
- Science.
- Philosophy.
- The intellectual.

The “sociologies” of:

- Knowledge.
- Intellectuals.
- Science.

The “anthropologies” of

- Religion.
- Myth.
- Ancestral peoples.
- Native peoples.

Other forms of the sphere:

- Speech Analysis and the contents of the media.
- The study of world views.
- Classic and even archaeological studies, from their approaches to myths, thought and culture of ancient people.
- Studies on the institutional organization of intellectual work.
- The epistemological work over the disciplinary area.
- Eidetic engineering, prospective and applied studies.

I’ve also thought that within the area of eidetic studies there are subdivisions of two types: paradigmatic and subject-disciplinary. The name paradigmatic is given because ideas are discussed in various paradigms. Furthermore, in its broad sense, not many people study ideas, save intellectuals or literary genres

such as essays or the history of science or other works that, as we may say, are not strictly eidetic studies, as they do not properly tackle the study of ideas although they are on the border of studying them. But among those who properly study ideas, there are also paradigms: just as conceptual history and the sociology of knowledge address ideas from various points of view, we could add or invent the socio-eidetic or psycho-eidetic (I'm inspired by the following linguistic schools: socio and psycholinguistics).

In the same way and partly coming across the issue of paradigms, we must look at the issue of subject matter. There are people who study political thought or ideologies; there are people who study the history of scientific paradigms; people who study mentalities, while other people study great world views; there are people who study the particular thought of some region of the world, and people who study the thought of some social class, group or trade guild, among many other subdivisions. This, of course, may be linked to the disciplinary training of the specialist.

We also have people who conduct basic research and other people who conduct applied research. In addition, there are people who are interested in periods or broad geocultural fields. Other people are dedicated to very specific or monographic questions.

2.14 Would you say that eidetic studies should have a language of its own?

Eidetic studies have historically developed a language that has constituted the discipline, although it was not always meant to be this way, much less with this purpose. The main elements of this language are constituted by the designation of:

- Schools: Cepalism, idealism, Arielism, pragmatism, functionalism, Pan-Islamism, negritude...
- Historical periods: pre-Socratic period, Hellenic period, medieval...
- Geographical Areas: German Philosophy, Arabic Philosophy, Latin American thought...
- Eidetic genres: Ideology, mentality, scientific discipline, thought, world view, thought trend, school...
- Disciplinary fields: Social sciences, Humanities, Philosophy, Physics...

- Conceptual Instrumental: Paradigm, concept, category, system, structure, History of ideas, conceptual History...
- Groups, generations and intellectual networks: Generation of 1837, the Prague Circle, Young Ottomans, International Network of Knowledge.

This language has not always been created ad-hoc and, on several occasions, it was introduced without any academic intention or much less an intention regarding the discipline itself. But this is nothing new; this is the way it happens in all spheres of knowledge. The discipline takes concepts from wherever it can and then gives them an academic tone.

This language, which is also found in other disciplines and, for the time being, also in the mother disciplines (philosophy and historiography) is key to the constitution of eidetic studies. Furthermore, eidetic studies consist of the confluence of this language, its maturation and density as well. It couldn't be stated that eidetic studies are created at some point in time and they then "create" a language. On the contrary, language exists and its density forms eidetic studies which, in turn, gradually continue to advance in the elaboration and creation of this language. For example, in studies of thought in the peripheral regions, I have encountered a lot of defining concepts of thought trends that are unknown among those who cultivate the discipline in our region and display the emergence of concepts inside this disciplinary field: Pan-Asianism, Turquism, Pan-Negritudism, Minjung Theology, Slavophilia, the Water buffalo Theology, and Salafism, among so many others.

By the way, this language is not always consensual; it depends on schools and paradigms. It can be collected and better constituted through the creation of a dictionary that unites, synthesizes and criticizes it.

The matter of appropriate concepts is very important for several reasons: one, because to understand reality we must use concepts that "account for" it. Another reason is because, to a large extent, the constitution of a discipline depends on the creation of a specific conceptualization.

Another area that makes up a specific language is the self-reflection of the discipline itself. This very book accounts for it, particularly in the broader dimensions, which is reflected in the discussions on the meaning or scope of the discipline, as well as in

its tasks, objectives and history.

2.15 In your answers you made several references to other disciplines and you have even borrowed images and words from them. Some of these disciplines are, at least at first sight, very distant from that which would shape the scope of eidetic studies. Could you explain the reasons that have led to you to establish analogies of this nature? What do you expect to obtain from this type of operation?

There are two very important matters that I would like to highlight regarding this point. First of all, the transfer of concepts from various disciplines to eidetic studies is key. Secondly, there is the fact that eidetic studies may be proposed as uniquely active agents in conceptual transfers through disciplines.

By the way, the transfer of concepts and methods among disciplines is not exclusive to eidetic studies. The work of some people inspires others and sometimes some concept or a certain conception, even among quite distant disciplines, works metaphorically to illuminate or illustrate a point. More deeply, there are disciplinary overlaps and topics where several disciplines are found. Even more, the work of some disciplines inspires others. All this allows us to understand said transfer.

However, there is a prudent position and a timorous one. The prudent position states that transfers must be useful and reasonable. The timorous one states that disciplines should not be contaminated; in addition, disciplines are immeasurable and everything that comes from an unaffiliated one destroys the specificity of its own.

For this reason, to speak wisely on conceptual transfers, the notion of “model” is key as it allows us to make these transfers without addressing conceptual anthropological or ontological matters while maintaining the instrumental level. This does not eliminate the discussion on the relevance of the concepts or the validity of the models used.

With these transfers I want to make eidetic studies more fruitful by giving them air and exogamy. In this way, we will not be so exclusively attached to liberal ideologies, the history of positivism within one’s own country, studies on 1950’s essays, or the work of Sarmiento... I accept of course, that research on these

issues is completely legitimate in my view, although somewhat trite. I also intend to illuminate problems which, I think, are better viewed within some of the categories from other disciplines, such as eidetic exports, eidetic crosses and eidetic cartographies, among many others. Obviously, I want to lay out new challenges, such as the origin of eidetic systems among sapiens prior to their existence. I'd also like to generate dialogues, such as the one I have reiterated between eidetic studies and cognitive sciences. And finally, I want to set up the discussion on synchronous matters, for which the inspiration in linguistics has been key [10.26].

2.16 A moment ago, you mentioned the notion of “model” in the center of your argument. What do you mean, exactly, by “model?”

The word “model” is perhaps somewhat flawed. I say “model,” as a scale model, an analogy or even a metaphor as a construct that is used to graph something in a better way without claiming to be real. A model of a building, the drawing of an atom, the analogy of the body with a social organization all allow certain things to be illustrated. Taken to literalism, they distort the same thing they were trying to clarify. When we bring concepts of a disciplinary field to another, the understanding should be improved; if we do it incorrectly, they will confuse more than they clarify.

2.17 What role do you give to the methodological issue? Do eidetic studies have a methodology that we could consider their own or characteristic of them?

In the strict sense, they do not. Eidetic studies do not have a proper methodology because they consist of a field where several disciplinary and methodological perspectives meet: studies of myth, studies of philosophical systems, studies of ideologies and other eidetic system expressions, studies with a historical meaning, studies that are interested in current events, studies of a descriptive nature, studies of an operational nature, theoretical studies, empirical studies focused on the intellectual and studies dealing with individuals. Thus, multiple disciplinary perspectives intersect and cross over and over, but they are not able to claim a single

methodology.

When I say “theoretical” studies, I am referring to questions regarding the following: what we call eidetic systems, how ideas circulate, mutate, and implement themselves in societies, how various eidetic entities are articulated with non-eidetic realities, how to move forward in the constitution of conceptualizations in order to study ideas and their messengers, etc.

What is then that grants unity to the various expressions of eidetic studies? This unity is gained due to the fact that these expressions are significant works for a group of people who are recognized in this area of cross discipline. These are people who read each other’s works, quote each other, understand related studies and people who could participate in the same discussion or academic meeting. In this sense, eidetic studies do not constitute a paradigm, at least not in a very clear sense. They also do not have a methodology, but within eidetic studies there are people who converge and use very different methodologies; what constitutes them is a field of conversations and shared interests. In this sense there are subspaces of greater and lower convergence where some of the expressions of eidetic studies converge with other disciplines such as sociology, history, philosophy, cognitive science, science of religions, etc...

2.18 What are the risks and dangers faced by those who cultivate eidetic studies?

One must guard against people of “suspicion” and “extreme distrust.” This is an attitude that is biting its own tail. It is very easy to reduce their approaches to absurdity to the degree that they seek to study all the others according to a criterion that does not apply to those who live in the kingdom of suspicion and mistrust.

Another risk is uncritical and untimely extrapolation. For example, the contributions of Van Dijk regarding the study of the press and the political-media discourse applied simply to the work of Martí, who wrote a great amount in the press, is disproportionate. This is even less suitable if you wish to study the work of L. Senghor on negritude or study the works of Van Dijk themselves.

On the other hand, over-theorizing can be distressing. I would like to copy a text from Jacques Guilhaumou (2004, 50):

“On the purely theoretical level, and beyond the disagreement between a hermeneutic approach that favors ‘the interpretation movement’ within ‘the split unit’ of all historically proven discursive formation (Michel Foucault), and a more ‘dialectic’ approach, which puts the accent on ‘Interdiscourse’ (Michel Pecheux), that is to say, in interrelated discursive formations by what can and should be stated in a certain situation. It involves highlighting the ‘transvaluating’ nature of one historic moment to the other, of the concept-notion of discursive formation.”

I would ask for the passage to be carefully read and also to think about who could handle these dilemmas and practice something such as this. All we need is Guilhaumou to add a pinch of Lacan and sprinkle it with Derrida so readers can go directly to a mental hospital, on the one hand, and to the delight of Alan Sokal, on the other.

2.19 Alright. However, a good number of disputes within the field of discipline has occurred precisely because of differences in method.

When explaining a field of discipline, we must position controversies in relation to subfields. Controversies and the most innovative contributions in recent times come from the subfield of “discourse” studies (more than “thought studies”) of the 18th and 19th centuries. The contributions of R. Koselleck, Q. Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock and those who have focused on these authors, such as J. Fernández Sebastián, refer to that period and take only a few Western European countries into account which were very influential in other parts of the world. It is as if a linguist assumed that the political language is the only language to be addressed, and although he didn’t explicitly state it, it’s as if he never made comparisons or contrasts with other types of languages in order to clarify the specificities of his field of interest.

However, it is true this discussion has little meaning for

other periods in history (though it's not completely without interest), as well as little meaning for other geocultural spaces and other ways of "thinking." These types of thinking include the following: orality, the Islamic world, the trajectory of Chinese, Korean and Japanese thought, the indigenous intellectual in America and the South Pacific, the essene, cathar, and katarista thought, the 'Abd al-Wahhab followers' thought, or the Papua New Guinea identitarian.

2.20 Faced with this, what do you propose?

I propose the methodology of multiple-consecutive approaches. It is more simple, pragmatic and feasible. It consists of reading the works of the same person, and the literature data regarding those works, so we can observe and understand them. It is a simple methodology, and because of that, it is feasible and honest. Oversophistication often serves as a cover for low-quality work.

Thus, this methodology ensures the work will not receive an overload of theorist vices and sophistications that will make it impracticable. It also ensures that the critical stance will not be transformed into suspicion, and that these theoretical frameworks, which seem to have reached prior conclusions, will not try to supplant the empirical experience, which in this field consists of the reading of texts and contact with works.

2.21 I have the impression, however, that the simplicity you speak about is not the same as saying that working in this manner involves "little effort" or "automatic" relevant results...

My objection to over theorization or over methodologism lies in the fact that they give rise to claims that, above all, seek to be consistent with the principles. If we are coming to these types of conclusions, the study of the reality (of things) has almost no importance. On the contrary, to produce a single relevant proposal about anything, several hours, days, and months of empirical work are necessary. This is by no case a denial of the need to think, hypothesize, or imagine. Good ideas are not simply born from

empirical work, but rather from developing good questions and good conclusions. The point is those who lean towards over theorization do not want to investigate or research, but simply want to provide evidence that reaffirms their preconceptions.

Once I called the manner of working that I propose “hover,” not in the superficial sense, but rather in the observant sense, observing things over and over again in their relationships. This hovering or recurrence allows for a perspective and an in-depth look. From this it is possible to understand, comprehend, and formulate good questions and good conclusions that I spoke of a moment ago. Hover and recurrence –that is what it is all about.

To present a case, let’s use the study of the incidence of travelling on the ideas of certain intellectual figures, a subject to which I dedicate a course in the American Studies Doctorate program at the University of Santiago de Chile. It can be assumed that traveling has an impact on ideas. However, it would be frivolous to simply state that a trip “changes” ideas. There are many ideas that do not change with a trip; only some idea is changed in relation to new experiences, new contacts, and new readings. To accurately determine the scope of changes is a long process of research (biographical research, networking, the study of “source” and “destination” ecosystems), that entails establishing in which sense and to what extent this new experience initiated specific eidetic reconstructions.

However, in addition to these general considerations, I intend to propose the development of specific methods to solve specific issues.

2.22 For example?

I can offer you two possibilities that I have worked on regarding this issue. One refers to the issue of reception and what the methods are in order to determine how a work has been received and reprocessed in a different environment from which it emerged. In this I wanted to go beyond the proposals of H. R. Jauss. The second refers to intellectual networks.

2.23 In what ways did you want to go “beyond” Jauss? What is your main difference with this author?

Jauss thinks about the readership, which seems to me to be quite legitimate; however, he does not think about the intellectual communities who read to work intellectually and produce knowledge and not just to seek aesthetic pleasure, even if the people in these communities may also read for aesthetic pleasure. That's why I have distinguished five modes of reading, one of which is the readership which Jauss has in mind...

When I was writing an article on Liberation Theology and its reception in Sri Lanka, I wanted to develop a model for the reprocessing of an eidetic system imported from another intellectual ecosystem. In this respect, I was interested in itemizing this movement and eidetic reprocessing in five moments and, at the same time, each moment in several operations. It would take too long to expose that now. I should point out that the moments that I have distinguished are the following: external selection, internal selection, simple reprocessing, complex reprocessing, and the birth of the new eidetic system [5.13]. I believe that this should substantially improve the somewhat naive observation of copy, appropriation and other concepts that have been handled without sufficient precision.

2.24 You spoke of modes of reading or types of readers. You said there were five. One is the readership of Jauss, another are intellectual communities who read in order to produce knowledge. There are three others still to be mentioned.

Yes. Students do not read for pleasure, nor to produce knowledge. Technicians who read manuals do so to operate machines or to understand procedures, while teachers, competition judges and auditors do so in order to understand/appreciate works. There you have the five modes. Let us add "reading interest" or "reading mode" to the "expectations horizon." In addition to the reading audience, I would add, as an extreme, infants who do not know how to read but listen to the stories read to them, and who are the aesthetic pleasure seekers par excellence, so radically, that they almost break the schema from the other end. To all this we could add another category: the "levels of agency" people have when they read. The intellectual reads with a greater level of agency than infants, who can get mad when you change a comma in the story that someone has read to them on other

occasions.

Precisely in order to go beyond the approach of R. Jauss and W. Iser, it is necessary to add the notion of “readers figure” in relation to “reading perspectives” and for which purpose people read because the nature of reading horizons will depend on it. In other words, without devaluing the “expectations horizon” notion, the notion “reading objective” must be added; it does not refute it, but rather complements it since different types of people get close to a work from their respective functions, especially when they aren’t literary works but rather a prose of ideas (thought, conceptual, scientific, and academic work). The question in this case is how the works were received by a group of people who were not only “readers” but rather idea producers who read these works in order to gain input for their own work. Therefore, these works were not read as a hobby, nor for enjoyment, curiosity or aesthetic pleasure, but rather as part of a professional activity; we must understand that these dimensions are not completely closed to one another, as all human beings are simultaneously “consumers” and “creators” of thought. This has something to do with the agency level of who is facing a reading, a text.

2.25 Later, when we talk about the changes at the eidetic level, we shall return to aspects of that contribution [5.13]. Regarding intellectual networks, it is an issue which we will spend a full chapter on, the sixth one. But it may be useful now to recall the broad outlines of your theoretical-conceptual proposal on networks.

It is a simple method that allows a lot of information to be gathered concerning how ideas circulate and how they relate with certain intellectual and social environments. I developed the notion of “intellectual networks” during multiple conversations with so many people... I must particularly acknowledge Marta Casauís and Ricardo Melgar Bao, with whom I have thoroughly discussed these issues on Aprismo, on Centro-Americanism, Theosophy, on Vasconcelos, Gabriela Mistral, Joaquín García Monge, Haya de la Torre and other important figures in the establishment of a South American intellectuality, and who see each other as such.

2.26 A question that I want to ask you before closing this part of our conversation has to do with inquiring who the cultists of the disciplinary field of eidetic studies are and whom you think are the core. We have talked about some of the Latin American authors, but little about other sources. Who are and have been your “bedtime authors,” if we could call them such?

I don't think we could. But I can tell you a huge number of things on this issue that can also be approached from many points of view. Some names have already been mentioned and many more will appear when we reach other topics.

I can only answer in part, in part for what has been my own trajectory. As the founder of this area: Arthur Lovejoy. As a systematizer of a line of work: Mircea Eliade. As innovators on the study of the classic European political discourse: Q. Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock. As the inventor of conceptual History: R. Koselleck. Addressing the issue of reception: H. R. Jauss. About ideas circulation as a concept: Pierre Bourdieu. On speeches: On social discourse and ideologies: Teun Van Dijk and Marc Angenot.

Teun Van Dijk. For their contributions to draw parallels among regions of the world: David Curtin and E. Górski. On mentalities: Georges Duby and Roger Chartier. On the Sociology of knowledge: Karl Mannheim. Dictionaries that helped me to develop are: José Ferrater Mora and Nicola Abbagnano. On the notion of organic intellectual: Antonio Gramsci. Great comprehensive studies: Michele Federico Sciacca and Randall Collins. On Arab Thought: Anouar Abdel Malek, José Antonio Pacheco, Mohamed Arkoun and Nazib Ayubi. On south-Saharan African thought: Robert July and Pieter van Hensbroek. On Chinese thought: Lucien Bianco, Anne Cheng and Wang Hui. On Slavic thought: Isaiah Berlin and Andrzej Walicki. On the intellectual networks in the Pacific: Marius Jansen. On ideas and cognitivism: Francisco Varela and Yuval Harari. We have been talking here about several of these authors, and about some others, too.

3

ENTITIES AND EIDETIC SYSTEMS: DEFINITIONS AND WAYS TO CLASSIFY

3.1 In the previous chapter we established that eidetic entities are the object of study for eidetic studies. This latter notion is key in your proposal. For this reason, it is necessary to ask you

what is understood as an eidetic entity, so we can form, as much as it is possible, a definition.

In principle, I understand an eidetic entity to be a set of articulated notions such as sentences, which have the possibility to articulate among themselves and aim to describe, explain, analyze and schedule. The eidetic entity notion comprises a great variety of forms, such as myths, doctrines, philosophies, world views and ideologies. The parts that make them up and the ways in which they are articulated comprise a great variety of forms as well. The privileged manner in which eidetic entities are formulated is “in” and “through” languages, but not exclusively. The language of gestures, unvocalized sounds, plastics and material culture also allow or contribute to the expression of eidetic entities, although in a less suitable manner.

Eidetic entities are seen in *The life of Juan Facundo Quiroga* and the *Koran*. Almost any intelligent production can be “conceived as an eidetic entity,” in the same manner that chemical science is able to study all of reality in its chemical dimension; this was mentioned in the second definition of eidetic studies when we visualized them as an approach or specific view [2.2]. With these notions I am seeking to distance myself from the notion or “idea” as it is understood in psychology, neurology, Platonism, and everyday speech, without denying the broad overlaps. The fact that almost any intelligent production can be “conceived as an eidetic entity” means that eidetic studies are able to study concepts, such as agronomy in its theoretical construction, the ideas found in rock paintings within caverns, the Dead Sea scrolls and Octavio Paz’s essays, the narrations of the original myths and deputies’ speeches. Beyond this, eidetic studies may also examine the ideas that sustain practices; they do not just study agronomy as a discipline or the discourse of the people who exercise it, but rather the agricultural practice itself as an expression of a specific world view.

Be careful, however, as this does not mean that eidetic studies intend to imperialize and turn into something resembling an omnicomprehensive discipline that governs or excludes other disciplines. In a way, “everything is an idea,” just as otherwise “everything is economy” or “everything is politics;” more than a question of territories, it is a matter of perspectives. Reality can be seen from different perspectives and you must remember that some people

have tried to study the ideas of gods in their designs to create the universe. This ultimately involves studying eidetic entities wherever they may be and doing it by taking ideas as they are.

3.2 You mentioned the Koran and the life of Juan Facundo Quiroga. Would any speech or any book be an eidetic system?

In the strict sense, no, although speeches and books do express eidetic entities and are almost always tributaries of eidetic systems. A dictionary does not express an eidetic system, nor does a history book about the Roman Empire; a cookbook doesn't express an eidetic system either, although all of these display concepts which constitute eidetic entities.

I understand an eidetic entity to be a set of words articulated in judgments that in turn are systematically articulated. They are phrases or propositions of the type "x" is "y", to the extent that they make up a collection where it is not only a matter of descriptive phrases, but where they also simultaneously point towards an explanation, regulation or prospective. Eidetic entities aim to distinguish right from wrong and what should and shouldn't be done in a certain field of existence by recognizing two basic poles: the yes and no poles, in a broad normative sense, which explain "why" and "why not."

I define "a broad normative sense" as both the ethical dimension of what is good, as well as the pragmatic dimension, i.e. what should be done if you aspire to reach a goal. We could include here the criterion of quality and/or beauty. There are other normative sets that can be articulated strictly to the ethical dimension, such as aesthetic normativity, a job well done and making healthy choices. This set is usually "complex" enough to be systematically increased and reinterpreted, thus giving rise to responses for unforeseen situations.

"I like to sunbathe," or "I am going to the east beach" are phrases that have no eidetic value, but if they are accompanied by a sentence such as, "The sun is the source of life," they reach a dimension that they couldn't reach by themselves and thus take on an eidetic nature. In this sense, eidetic studies are interested in the organized set of propositions, where the parts are interested to the extent that they integrate a set and where they are not mere sentences and, from this point of view, "empty of thought."

Having said that, it may be assumed that there are absolutely no “empty” propositions or phrases as they may contain particles of eidetic substance. In fact, the less information we have about these, the more interest there is for these types of fragments; an example of this is the case of extinct peoples. The Code of Hammurabi gains all its importance by being the first. An equal share of phrases of a constitution or code among the thousands from the 20th century would not have the same value at all.

By eidetic system I gather an eidetic entity which is composed of a sufficient amount of eidas and combinations to account for what is necessary for the existence of a society in a holistic sense. This system is composed of notions (concepts, “eidas”) that are articulated and attempt to understand a part of existence-reality, (the notion of “reality” itself or the definition of reality will depend on the eidetic system) in addition to attempting to provide criteria to act in relation to that reality. This may be explicit or not.

However, I insist that not all set of words or even a set of words with meaning are eidetic systems in the strict sense. The distinction between eidetic system and an eidetic entity looks to draw attention to the fact that there are entities that don’t “make a system,” although all entities can be part of systems. In fact, their condition is to branch out and articulate with each other and form more complex entities.

Apart from making sense, in order for a set of words to be conceived as an eidetic entity, they must be extensive enough to offer criteria for something. A system should offer an explanation about something and provide criteria to act accordingly by distinguishing “yes” (do it) from “no” (don’t do it); this must be done in an ethical, operative or any other kind of manner: good or bad, right or wrong, adequate or inadequate, relevant or irrelevant, conducive or not conducive, etc. However, there are simple units of sets of words with meaning (entities) that assume, show or share some eidetic systems concepts without becoming systems.

I propose to distinguish between an “eidetic system”, defined as a system of thought with a holistic sense, and an “eidetic artifact,” which is an entity that does not have a set of concepts to interpret reality or a part of it. For example, a manual to fix computers or lawnmowers is not an eidetic system because it does presume to understand the meaning of a part of the world, but instead only aims to imply how a tool operates. Other types of eidetic artifacts

are survey forms and prescriptions for curing diseases, even though behind that survey there may be an entire interpretation of society. In contrast, a catechism does express an eidetic system because, even though it is also a manual, it is a simplified and summarized version that aims to understand an eidetic system.

I realize that I fall short in these formulations and that I am not able to offer an entirely satisfactory proposal. Perhaps not all of these distinctions are fully valid or relevant.

3.3 From your approach it seems to be the case that the object of eidetic studies is the idea itself, no matter the idea. Can an idea be studied as the “thing itself,” detached from the social relations in which it is enlisted and lives?

They can be studied in themselves as well as autonomously and in their relationships, that is to say, simultaneously. The existence of interrelationships does not deter the study of ideas in their entity. The objective is to deal with ideas as such by looking for laws that account for their evolution, mutations and types without focusing exclusively on particular cases. However, as with any discipline, eidetic studies should not be reduced to a case by case basis; the key to its constitution is having an object.

In any case, the concept of “idea” is a problematic notion, which is why I prefer “eidetic entities.” Psychology studies ideas, as do neurology and logic as well. In the case of eidetic studies, the notion of idea refers to eidetic entities and not how the notions of “mother,” “table” or “I” are perceived by a child, for example. Psychology and neurology deal more with the genesis of ideas in the brain or in relation to personality. They also deal with ideas (illusions) as a product of diseases, but not in terms of brain, biological, chemical processes, nor in terms of products of the brain associated with certain regions of it and with a role in the formation of the individual’s personality. They also don’t deal with how judgment is created or connected in a valid way. Logic works with the valid linking of ideas in both judgments or propositions.

As a result, I think it is reasonable to speak of eidetic entities to roughly define the object of our studies. Based on the distinctions we have been tracing, we can come up with research on eidetic entities, systems, artifacts or specimens. In all of the cases eidetic studies will find border areas with other disciplines that, in some

sense, deal with ideas.

Let me try to explain myself better. When I speak of eidetic studies and eidetic entities, I am not thinking about the physiological function of the brain that allows the development of “ideas,” nor am I referring to neural relations or how they develop. I am thinking, rather, of a specifically anthropological need to build “ideas” in the same imperative sense of the physiological need to be breath air in order to live as biological organisms, in the words of Althusser (1967). Althusser develops this theme of “anthropological need” in the attempt to build a general theory of ideology.

Just as Aristotle defined man as a political animal, Althusser points out that man is by definition an “ideological animal.” He developed this proposition precisely in order to critically review Marx’s approaches, pointing out that ideology is not only a fake conscience or alienation of the social subject, but it is inherent in the subject. The human subject, whoever he may be, cannot develop a concrete practice without an ideology. The Althusserian definition of ideology is “a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals with their real conditions of existence.” Therefore, if the “idea” is ultimately the expression of the inherent need of human beings for an “imaginary relationship” with their “real conditions of existence,” the imaginary, abstract, or the “idea” is the means required through which humans try to understand the “real conditions of existence,” or, even more, the reality that exists beyond their subjectivity. A human being also needs to transform their own subjectivity into an “idea” in order to understand it. If we accept this as a valid premise, are we able to speak succinctly of a science of the “idea,” without defining the conditions that lead to a specific idea? It must be said, what are the reality conditions that cause the need to represent it in an imaginary way because we need to create an action against it? On the other hand, Althusser is unable to establish a difference between the areas of “eidetic” and “ideological,” which are not the same.

I am not talking about the physiological brain, but rather the “eidetic brain,” which refers to the mind and its ability to create “intellectual” work in a stricter sense more than an “intellective” one. However, I don’t want to lavish on you a bunch of words that mutate their meaning to such an extent that they may enlighten some but confuse others [10.3-10.4].

3.4 Alright. But I take note of the expression “eidetic brain”: I would like you to further explain what you think about it. I would now like to ask you what specific implications the premise has according to which ideas are not substances, but somehow it is appropriate to treat them as if they were.

When working on these issues, I've become more and more aware of the evident recurrence to metaphors and models to think and express myself. To work on objects such as ideas is very abstract and it's hard to grasp them. This aims to give consistency to ideas, stating that we can think of them as “substances,” such as bacteria, molecules or many other things, and not just as “accidents” or “features” attached to things, for example, color. In fact, I prefer to talk about models than metaphors. Although they are very close, model and metaphor are not synonymous. In any case, I prefer to suspend judgment regarding the “ontic” nature of these issues.

The readings of Lakoff and Johnson (2001) have encouraged me in two ways: to reflect on the ways the brain thinks and to express myself in this abstract field, a field that is so hard to understand by people who are not trained in philosophy. It seems to me that those of us who are trained in philosophy can deal with ideas as such in an easier way. As a counterpart, we may have greater difficulty in assuming them as operants and after having studied Aristotle, Plotinus and Averroes, we find it very difficult to consider them as operants in the real world.

3.5 In the following chapters we will come back to your criticism to instrumentalism in the eidetic field but I don't want to continue without asking you how you would answer the difficult question of whether we can simply speak of a “science of idea?” Do eidetic studies want to be that, simply the science of eidetic entities, or is that not exactly the idea?

Yes, however, I prefer to switch out the concept of “science” for one of disciplinary area or point of convergence. And besides, why “simply” when there are so many relationships, overlaps and borders to cross? It can be done and that is what I want to affirm and determine as well in what sense, because ideas can also be studied in a “non-eidetic” way; for example, they can be studied from the perspectives of psychology or cognitive science.

3.6 You're making reference to the need for eidetic studies to have a series of basic concepts, a common work language... a moment ago you mentioned the concept of "eidias" [3.2]. What place do "eidias" have in your proposal, in the delineation of said common language?

What are the basic "elements" that form an eidetic entity? "Eida" is that basic unit. It has been named in different ways and almost always in plural: "understanding key concepts," "basic notions," "components," "matrix ideas." In other words, the notions without which the entity cannot be such.

Each entity is composed of a set of notions or fundamental concepts -eidias- articulated among themselves and with other concepts present in the ecosystems where they have developed, even without being exclusively a part of them, but rather a part of shared languages. I understand fundamental concepts to be those notions without which eidetic system cannot be characterized as specific. If these notions "enter" or "leave," assemble or disassemble, mutations occur. For example, they could be compared to the atoms of a molecule.

For example, in Cepalism, eidias are: center/periphery, development, deterioration in terms of exchange, heterogeneous distribution of science and technology, substitutive industrialization of imports, etc. These are concepts present in the ecosystem: Latin America, raw materials, processed products. For example, in Marxism, eidias are: socialism, communism, capitalism, production relations, productive forces, production models, capital, dialectic. These are concepts present in the ecosystem: Middle Ages, slave economy, market economy, liberalism.

For eidias to assemble, they require certain affinities. An eidetic system is not simply a bag with many eidias. Eidias have characteristics that allow them to be composed as sets with meaning. To better respond to this question, we can turn to the linguistic model. As is the case with languages, complex eidetic entities are made up of basic concepts that are combined through grammar, thereby forming phrases or sentences.

In any case, this issue of eidias for me seems to be the least developed concept we have talked about thus far. I'm not fully satisfied with what I'm answering, because I'm not clear nor do I have enough consistency to give you better formulations.

3.7 One wonders whether there is only one grammar of ideas or if each eidetic entity has a specific grammar...

Grammar consists of the affinities that allow eidas to assemble and create sets with meaning and not just accumulation. Grammar is what “looks for adjustments” to make these sets coherent as a whole (they could be thought of as stones that construct a wall). It is what gives the charges value thus allowing them to attract each other (they could be thought of as atoms in a molecule). It is what “enhances” them as a certain coherence by making the whole more than the sum of its parts (they could be thought of as a team). It is what arouses them thus allowing them to couple (it could be thought of as an orgy).

But that union is not completely closed, because systems mutate, receive new eidas and cast eidas away as well. On the other hand, eidas themselves mutate and not only individually (or in an isolated manner), but they also mutate within systems in an interactive manner.

For example, the eida “dictatorship of the proletariat” in Marxist thinking has diminished in importance almost to disappearance. But, in order for this to happen, and for the eidetic system to keep up, the other eidas must mutate by creating consistency and eventually they must be either adjusted or strengthened or new eidas must be incorporated.

If there are eidetic systems with sufficiently diverse grammars, then they become immeasurable, although I think that practically does not occur because the brain has the translational ability to make them commensurable. That is why the crossing of eidetic entities is possible, even if they belong to very distant families, something that doesn’t happen with biological beings. To put it another way: the brains of Sapiens come formatted in such a way that they produce coherent entities with said format and they are all commensurable at some level.

3.8 You have mentioned several times the word “meaning.” Isn’t there the risk of turning it into a “wild card” term due to fact that its plurivocity allows those interested, in this case yourself, to use it to “remove the chestnuts with the hands of the cat” an expression that I heard from you? Let us add that

you have answered evasively when I asked if you consider yourself a former skeptic of meaning who reunited with it when embracing the cause of Ouramerican eidetic development...

I'm noticing a hint of forwardness in your insight. Let us hope it does not take away intellectual credibility from our conversations.

To move forward in a definition and a reflection regarding the issue of meaning would lead us much further away from these talks than we desire. Let us define it for now as that which is present in a sign, a word or sign or word groups that make that set comprehensible for another person and which distinguishes it from another set that is not comprehensible.

Let us assume that the word "sense" as guidance, motivation and direction has been key for me; with that taken into account, I've never been a skeptic. I have written about skepticism to describe recent forms and refute them philosophically, relying on a key and radical criterion: the "cogito of the sense".

3.9 In short, we could say that the object of eidetic studies are eidetic entities as you defined them, as well as the eidetic systems, which are a more specific type, although extended, of the eidetic entity. Notions like specimen and eidetic artifact are smaller in scope and they can be thought of as variants or modulations whose demarcation does not impact at all on the general orientation of the proposal. There is, on the other hand, the issue of systems composition where eidas, grammar and somehow, meaning, have a role. In general, from your argument it seems there isn't only one type of eidetic system or entity. When you understand this, it becomes unavoidable to wonder how eidetic systems and eidetic entities could be classified...

Classifying such abstract entities is very hard work. To tackle it, those who are engaged in this disciplinary field have been put at our disposal, as well as all other sciences and disciplines. We even have a cultural trajectory that has already set numerous classification criteria. In fact, there are multiple ways to classify eidetic systems. I

will try to offer some advancements that suffer, first of all, from the lack of detailed knowledge regarding entities through which thought has been expressed in so many places around the world. I've been working on four, maybe five, possible criteria for classifying eidetic entities. These criteria are not, of course, the only possible ones.

Firstly, we can classify eidetic entities according to what might be called the "degree of agency," that is to say according to the degree of consciousness (I say "conscience" as a design or explicit decision) with which people develop ideas, be it individually or socially. From this criterion I can state three degrees of agency: quasi-null, low and high.

Secondly, we can subdivide eidetic entities as if they were "literary genres." In fact, throughout their evolution, eidetic entities have been diversifying in a manner similar to literary genres. A worldview is not the same as a philosophical system or an ideology. A scientific or disciplinary paradigm is not the same as a manifesto or proclamation. I am mentioning just a few genres, those which are easiest to conceptualize and the most consensual.

Thirdly, eidetic entities can be classified by their "Eidetic-gene code" also called geneidetic code or their fundamental concepts. We classified systems of thought by species or families and thus, we are able to distinguish positivism from Marxism and Islam, for example. Each one of them have fundamental concepts that distinguish them, as if they were a DNA code.

Fourthly, the entities can be classified according to their "function," that is to say by considering the role they play in their relationships with societies.

Fifthly, I still might add a classification according to the "degree of complexity" of entities, or, in other words, according to the amount of eidas that entities are composed of. Also, there are basic eidetic units that are concepts or disjunctions. They articulate with each other by forming larger entities or attaching to more complex preexisting entities (made by multiple eidas); then, we could speak of uni-eidas and multi-eidas. Examples of uni-eidas may be: the "well done" notion, which is primary, or the "identity" notion, which is not that primary but it contains some sophistication. Another example is the dilemma "well-done/poorly done," which is a basic notion [see Appendix 1].

3.10 Let's break it down bit by bit, following the order you just

said. Let's begin with the "degree of agency." You mentioned three of those degrees: quasi-null, low and high.

The first consists of those most basic notions: There are better and worse (prior to good and bad) that denotes a certain degree of preference. This is a pre-sapiens base level, shown in the mobile-animated conditions of "animals" that allows them to get food, mate and escape from danger. It is progressively associated in some mammals with zoo cultural structures where they establish forms of zoo organization, such as zoo hierarchies. This has become part of our genetics. It is important not to confuse nature with genetic or "essence," because living beings are natural and have genetics in which we evolve, but we have no essence. In their languages, sapiens portray and extend the notions of better/worse toward cultural fields, adhering to the notion of best/worst through a large number of quasi-synonyms: good/bad, right/wrong, well done/poorly done, relevant/irrelevant, beautiful/ugly, etc. which is expressed in the elemental structure of languages: yes/no, although all of this is settled on a pre-human species basis known to one of the oldest in history, especially in the genetic inheritance of pre-sapiens. Whatever the case, this level is the basis on which other levels of greater complexity are settled, levels that must take that level into account, although not in linear but convoluted ways. In fact, on several occasions and after losing the sense of primary immediacy, in numerous societies and in view of distant purposes, beliefs and reasoning can develop very opposite options on what they defined as better/worse and, of course, about the means to distinguish them, even to the point of denying the principle itself.

A second level of greater agency, although unconscious in terms of of a scheduled development of ideas, are native languages (languages with a certain level of isolation over generations, giving rise to a quasi-fusion between language and world view), beliefs and attitudes. This involves eidetic entities adopted during socialization by every new member of a culture. In this sense, from the point of view of the person, they are "a priori," meaning they are received, taken for granted, lived "spontaneously" and even unconscious. This second level could not exist without the first. Strictly speaking, this involves the usual non-programmed branching-reprocessing of a person, carried out over centuries by multiple anonymous people

and social existence in relation to environments and the ways in which they work and the coexistence they develop and survive with other societies (of animals, pre-sapiens, sapiens, and according to the circumstances). Something that must be kept in mind here is how hunter-gatherer sapiens have learned about the astuteness of animals and their zoo culture; this is a process that has continued throughout agricultural societies and small village livestock farming, with a very low urban level and even with varying degrees of transhumance or transfer due to soil depletion.

To define this level, I revisit the distinction of Ortega y Gasset between beliefs and “ideas” as such. I couldn’t say it better than Ortega y Gasset puts it in *Creer y Pensar* from 1940. He defines these beliefs as:

These basic ‘ideas’ that I called ‘beliefs’ do not arise at a specific time and date within our life; we don’t arrive at them through a particular act of thinking. On the contrary: Those ideas that are truly ‘beliefs’ constitute the vessel of our life and, therefore, do not have the character of particular content within this. It is worth stating that we do not have ideas, but rather we are ideas. Moreover, precisely because they are very radical beliefs, we confuse them with reality itself.

They are “ideas in which we find ourselves, which seem to have been there already before we occupied ourselves with thinking.” And he insists:

Beliefs form the basis of our life, the ground on which it develops. Beliefs are what place us in front of what for us is reality itself. All of our conduct, including intellectual conduct, depends on the system of our true beliefs. In these beliefs, ‘we live, we move, we are.’ Consequently, we tend not to be aware of them; we don’t think them and they act latent, like implications of how much we expressively do or think. When we truly believe in one thing, we do not have the ‘idea’ of that thing, but simply ‘rely on it.’

These are eidetic entities that have a symbiosis with societies;

they modulate them for a long time; they adapt to events and changes; they interact with them throughout history and they often lead them to their ruin, because ideas can get too fixed on obsolete formulas, formulas which societies are not able to detach themselves from or shake off on time. This last point questions any vulgar functionalism, according to which ideas have some useful social function at all times. Societies give shape to eidetic entities that seem beneficial, though not necessarily; in fact, sometimes they can become eidetic “straitjackets.”

Now, my stance against Ortega, who states that this level is the “deepest stratum of our life, the one that sustains and carries all others” and that these beliefs “are, therefore, the land on which we endeavor,” is that these entities are not the deepest stratum, but rather the second deepest, and this second deepest stratum is less basic, less widespread, less immutable than that other proto-eidetic, which is as much idea, belief and instinct as it is genetics; although it’s not so immutable that it cannot be betrayed or performed in a reverse order by sapiens: The best is the worst, death by suicide.

The third level is programmed reasoning and, in this sense, conscious reasoning. They develop eminently in sedentary societies, starting with the invention of writing, with the differentiation of roles between a professional intelligentsia that is almost always male, and a population that is illiterate and segmented with peasants, artisans and military. That does not prevent them from being residents of the previous two and, even more important, does not prevent them from managing to penetrate into the previous levels. I note that In relation to the first, I mention the case of suicide by honor. In relation to the second, I mention the emergence of Scientism in the beliefs of some societies. Societies believe that science and technology are good and they improve life; this has become a belief, and is especially the case in relation to medicine, which is something that even works by suggestion.

3.11 Following this line of reasoning, don’t you think we should introduce another level or sub-level that is characterized by an even greater degree of agency of conscious or planned development? This sublevel would be related to “scientific” work on ideas in a sense close to what you have called “eidetic engineering,” and may well refer to a defection of negative sign, manipulative and even perverse

ideas.

That is an important suggestion. It could probably lead us to finer subclassifications. I understand that within the consciously planned intellectual work there may be various levels of agency.

This could be a fourth level, and it could correspond to what I have vaguely called eidetic engineering; unaware that by introducing this notion, I was attempting to unfold the reality it referred to. In any case, it is a name that attempts to register something that we permanently engage in.

3.12 Following the order that you propose, we should now address the classification of eidetic entities according to “genre.” I know that you have given this matter much thought and that you perceive it as important and fascinating, as well as extremely complex.

It is true what you say about the complexity or better put in this case, the difficulty. The answers I have been giving on this point have been developed very recently; they have even developed during these conversations, during which I have written and rewritten, as well as said and gone back on what I have said and they have been accompanied by your questions, comments and objections that have helped me so much. The level of eidetic genres refers to literary sciences and establishes a parallelism with literary genres: novels, short stories and poetry, among others. It must be acknowledged that I am forcing the notion of literary genre, since what I offer is not strictly comparable. I emphasize that it is difficult to be thorough in this field.

In particular, with regard to this genres level, I’ve worked on a classification proposal that distinguishes, for now, five entity classes: eidetic proto-systems, eidetic systems themselves, paradigms and scientific papers, artifacts and devices.

An eidetic proto-system is a notions compound with which we are formatted genetically. This is the case of notions revolving around being (to be/not to be, presence/absence), space (up/down, near/far) and time (past/future). This is also the case of notions regarding evaluative: positive and negative, desirable and undesirable, friend and enemy, pleasure and pain. Several of these

notions are found in mammals, and they are already studied in primates. At this point, I am particularly interested in emphasizing the break with an “essentialism of hominins,” which accentuates the differences with animals by regarding them as an undifferentiated package and denying them all forms of zoo culture, as well as the ethical issue and animals rights. Despite the fact that this is not a subject of this book, it is relevant nonetheless.

Regarding our interest, I noted that chimpanzees and bonobos can clearly identify the members of their clan, as well as imagine elaborate strategies of partnership in view of distant objectives, which include friendship, seduction, threat, punishment and reward (Goodall, 1986; Romero de Solís, 2003). Like many other species, they can transmit the “zoocultural” heritage of the group. I use this neologism to express the vast number of behaviors with great gradations of elaboration that are invented, discovered, and transmitted in the animal kingdom. This process of zoocialization occurs for the hen that teaches her chicks to flee from the bay-winged hawk as well as for the muskox that teaches its youngsters the “zoo technique” to make a circle with their rears inwards and the antlers outwards to defend against wolves. It also occurs against the collective fishing of orcas, and for the chimpanzee clan, with its zoo-strategies alliances to displace the dominant male. According to Goodall:

Chimpanzees make and use a variety of tools. The most widely used elements for the manufacturing of these tools are branches, rocks, herbs, and leaves. These are modified to get termites, ants, honey, nuts and water. Some of these objects can also be used for cleaning or as a weapon. There are regional differences in the type of tools used. For example, the use of two stones or logs as anvil and hammer to split hard shell fruits is done only by chimpanzees in West Africa. These skills are learned and socially transferred from generation to generation, which is why nowadays we talk of chimpanzee ‘cultures’ in various regions.

The discovery of “mirror neurons” has clarified some aspects of the imitation process and cultural transmission, key elements in the existence of some social species. I’m tempted to consider this

eidetic proto-system as a deep structure on which languages and other eidetic systems settle. It is a set of criteria that evolution has come to imprint, that is innate, not thought of as “essential.” That’s why they are not completely closed or immutable, or absolutely homogeneous.

The deep structure of eidetic systems is already present in many animals and developed in several mammals. Here we are not referring to the structure of the human language, but rather the structure of a previous one. This structure is composed of the polarities I’ve just mentioned and without these polarities a “superior” animal and above all a “zoocial” animal cannot make indispensable decisions on what it should and should not do in relation to others and to the environment in which it lives; examples of this are the recall of water sources, pastures, preys and lairs etc. All of this is associated with memory ability, without which these criteria could not function and would remain in pure instinctive immediacy.

3.13 Now, this proto level, isn’t it similar to the first level of agency, where, according to what you said, that level was null and void?

It isn’t just similar to the first level; it is the same. Different dimensions are emphasized, precisely because I am classifying from another perspective by following another criterion, although I am referring to the “same thing.”

3.14 Let’s get back on track. It’s time to address the eidetic entities of the second type, defined as eidetic systems. I have the impression that the implementation of the generic criterion will be clearer.

I agree with you. Eidetic systems claim to account for large areas of reality, which include historical and current issues, as well as natural and social issues by always indicating the right and wrong ways of behavior in a given area. In addition, there are eidetic systems that address wide dimensions and as they develop, they include more and more dimensions. Of course, they don’t cover them all, and one of the characteristics of eidetic systems includes first and foremost covering other dimensions. This implies that

various eidetic systems are found in communities and individuals covering a variety of needs; thus, there may be people who adopt the neoliberal ideology and Lutheranism. Said eidetic systems negotiate, in a tug of war, in the existence of people by reaching agreements and maintaining conflicts whose characteristics vary depending on the cases.

A first type is language, which contains a basic proto-eidetic structure and is deeply rooted in the brains of sapiens, brains which have historically evolved to adopt and create languages. Languages must be considered a syntax and a basic or elemental world view, where these binary systems both operate and develop. They are filled with synonyms and associations such as light and darkness. This does not exclude specific characteristics of linguistic families. We can make an important distinction between the languages of indigenous people or people who had high levels of isolation for generations and the cosmopolitan languages in people who had great amounts of movement, in particular the languages of colonists. The first languages tend to identify themselves with the world vision of said people, having specific words that aim to represent realities and beliefs of a specific people (this is of course an abstraction, since it is inconceivable for people not to communicate in any way with others). The cosmopolitan languages of colonists, more similar to pidgins, represent the opposite case, in which global movement has incorporated multiple concepts and meanings gathered from multiple contacts; these may have enriched the language, but removed its eidetic specificity at the same time.

A second and very broad type is the mentality-belief that identifies with the background or the world view of a culture. There are at least three levels. The first level involves short stories, as well as morals and fables. This level is also comprised of prayers and invocations, which are understood as sets of phrases with meaning that give account of brief cases, be it real or imaginary, that explain every day cases and are eventually transformed into eponyms. These eponyms aim to distinguish right from wrong and prudent from imprudent; they offer lessons, criteria and behaviors as well. The second level involves oral myths, which are defined as a series of narratives, morals and fables articulated by a sense of time normally referred to as an exceptional time where said people (and humanity) were created. Finally, there is the level involving the great books that express and inspire a certain culture: the Iliad, the Bible, the Koran,

the Chilam Balam and the Upanishad. These all include multiple narratives of collective authorship that were compressed and organized by those who “edited” these books. They were edited by the intelligentsia of literate-urban cultures, i.e. with a relatively high degree of agency. However, on the one hand, they are constituted in the trajectory of the people more than those figures. On the other hand, after decades and centuries, whatever those figures laid down became the shared ancestral heritage of those and other people within the global circulation. These are the expression of the mentalities of a culture, which are understood as a not often explicit set of criteria of wide dissemination (though sometimes they are), which are implicit in the work of societies and involve beliefs, forms of coexistence, customs, and both allowed and prohibited activities, among others.

A third type is world view, which gives an action its meaning. Examples of this can be, in part, the cosmogonies and myths mentioned in the preceding point, as well as theologies and philosophical systems with their concepts, professional ethics and epistemologies. Examples of this include historicism, positivism, idealism and Marxism. Another example that is closely linked to this level might be sensitivities, which seem to be a middle ground between certain sets of ideas and a sort of collective mood.

A fourth type are ideologies in the specific sense of the term. The word “ideology” is complicated. It has intended to mean: the science of ideas, false consciousness, and system of representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts according to the circumstances). The meaning I give is none of these: I’ll call the first one “eidology” or eidetic studies, eidological studies or, more synthetically, “Eidetics”, so to speak, aesthetics. The second one, that I won’t practically talk about, I prefer to call directly false consciousness; and the third I’ll call it eidetic entities. There is a fourth definition, which alludes to what is most commonly known as “political ideologies,” which are eidetic systems that include a set of proposals for organizing a society or federation of societies with state and social divisions; these are expressed in groupings and political organizations vying for the direction of society. This set of proposals is normally articulated to a relatively totalizing plan of society and covers many dimensions of philosophy regarding human beings and their life in society. These ideologies give meaning as well and their defining feature is their focus on the mode of

organization of states and the international system as a collective life (making almost no reference to the individual behavior scope). Ideologies lay foundations, justify or guide the work of societies in relatively short periods of time (decades). Liberalism, socialism, social-Christianity, and development economics are all examples that come to mind. They are given a name every now and then to take on new meanings and come to terms with the dynamics of societies. What I have recently called “cotidianities” (*cotidianías*) could also fit there, although it doesn’t seem obvious, since these elements don’t usually offer holistic explanations of the same type as the other entities I mentioned.

3.15 What exactly do you mean by “cotidianities” (*cotidianías*)?

This expression groups together those eidetic entities that contrast with ideologies to the extent that they attempt to give meaning to existences as private existences. They don’t arise from programs or political parties, as the issue at stake is not the model of society or State, but rather the model of everyday existence in the domus. “Cotidianities” tend to refer to very specific dimensions of existence, although they may sometimes come from religions; by becoming cotidianities, they left behind many factors they had in their original ecosystems. This occurs, for example, with people who accept the kind of meditation inspired by Buddhism in a pragmatic way, seeking a greater degree of emotional balance without taking the entire vision of Buddhism. Buddhism is not a cotidianity, but an eidetic system. “Light Buddhism” would be a cotidianity, as are vegetarianism, veganism, the hippie movement, transcendental meditation, bodybuilding and many more. Their partiality, lightness and brevity lead me to doubt that they are eidetic systems in the strict sense.

3.16 It is an original and interesting concept. I wonder to what extent these cotidianities are typical of today’s societies, more or less unique to them.

Cotidianities are not exclusive to mass post-industrial urban society. However, societies of high circulation are fertile ground for them, without a doubt, since in such scenarios the intelligentsia and meanings must permanently reinvent themselves. In this type of

society, the same seed in the same soil seems to generate existential exhaustion. New seeds and crop rotation are needed to make existence more intense, hence this openness to experiences and eidetic innovations [9.31; 10.6; 10.9].

Regarding shared beliefs in the short term, cotidianities don't allow the familiarization and internalization with the hard concepts their respective gurus understand; these gurus could be called cotidianity gurus or cotidianities' intellectuals. That short-termism, added to the fact their creators tend to be neophytes, causes them to come to concepts of their own trajectory in order to say things they cannot present in technical terms. So, for example, they adjust the beliefs of an Indian origin by coupling them with Freudian Christian concepts or principles, or by coupling the nutritional-biological principles of vegetarianism with sports categories. It is not eidetic babbling but rather mazamorra^{2*} or, more precisely, mazamorras in constant shuffling, because, in the end, mazamorras are all (or almost all) eidetic entities. These eidetic pidgins could be called "eidgins". Eidgins are everywhere at various levels of eidetic work, although they are particularly frequent in high mutation, something that is significantly important when the original language of the received eidetic specie is distant from where the receiver ecosystem lives. There are eidetic species of very long permanence, such as the founding books of religions; other eidetic species are of very high mutation, such as cotidianities and eidetic artifacts. These species mutate faster than languages and this contributes to the emergence of eidgins.

3.17 Once again, let us get back on track. It's time to speak now about paradigms and scientific studies. Why did you give them a separate treatment, apart from the eidetic systems?

In general, scientific paradigms and scientific discourse want to produce true judgments about reality; in contrast, those "sense-giving" paradigms and discourses are intended to produce criteria to guide practices, in the understanding that there are inevitable

* Although mazamorra can be defined as a traditional dish made of sweet corn, in Chile it is also used in a derogatory way to express a mix of something unrecognizable. TN.

overlaps. The scientific paradigms that have been “secularizing” don’t want to be holistic or give meaning but prefer to instead be explanatory of a specific scope of reality.

Examples which come to mind are: the theory of relativity, psychoanalysis, theories which are created synthetically, often times in artificial languages such as mathematical formulas, equations etc. Who would question that there are ideas, and ideas par excellence, which many times are of immense duration and amplitude? Who would question that Einstein presents us an important eidetic elaboration about the universe, different from that presented by Newton? However, I doubt eidetic entities such as the formulation $e=mc^2$ and a scientific article about crustaceans in the eastern Mediterranean are of the same type, nor are others such as articles about literary trends in contemporary Africa or the mineral composition of the moons of Jupiter. However, they should all be considered scientific issues.

I have thought about the desirability of putting aside these types of entities because, as I said, they don’t have a holistic intention of giving meaning. That is why they don’t seem to be eidetic systems, at least not the same type we talked about a moment ago. However, paradigms and scientific research must not be confused with scientific belief. This last one can be considered an eidetic system. Taking an immense amount of judgments of various disciplines and activities, it becomes a sort of world view, often at odds with the most recent findings, since it feeds off of old clichés derived from old paradigms. I predict that this belief will become more widespread in the coming decades, feeding on the vast and growing production of scientific dissemination at all levels. Several “cotidianities” simply feed off of this type of literature.

3.18 Artifacts, devices...

“Eidetic artifacts” are sets of utilitarian information, indications and concepts used to operate in a specific practical scope, such as skills, procedures and instruments. Catechisms and manuals and textbooks are part of them. Examples of these are general manuals of: medicine, livestock, combustion engine mechanics, computer programming and fishing in the rivers of the Amazon.

When speaking about “eidetic devices,” I think of entities

which are of lesser complexity than the systems added to them to enhance some of their dimensions. In other words, they involve a set of ideas articulated on a fundamental notion basis that doesn't constitute an eidetic system because of its small dimensions in terms of holistic pursuits, and that can be articulated to other entities, especially to systems to improve its functioning. This is a simple set of ideas focused on some specific dimension, which gives the pre-existing eidetic system capacities it didn't have before.

It is also important to open another classification, under the title of "others" because all intelligent expression is, or can be seen, as an eidetic entity. Examples are: rock paintings, material culture, all literature and the arts, and in general all the expressions that don't intend to convey ideas, but rather awaken feelings, emotions, and entertain or distract. I repeat, even to those that are not formulated in sentences, such as paintings or the broad spectrum of issues linked to material culture, are examples as well; in all of these cases eidetic matters are unwittingly expressed. In order for what I have just said not to be taken as a contradiction, we could distinguish between a circle of eidetic studies as such (more restricted), and another circle of extended eidetic studies [3.2].

3.19 Moving on, we need to talk about the classification according to geneidetic code, which seems to be the classification that needs less clarification, being that it is of more common use.

The proposal to classify eidetic entities/systems according to their code or geneidetic kinship is inspired in biology and linguistics. It has to do with the classification criteria of languages, which are grouped by the similarities of sounds, grammar and other aspects. Is it possible to determine the code of eidetic systems? I'm inclined to think that it should be. This takes place after establishing basic notions. For example, in the case of Marxism, the basic notions could be: class struggle, productive forces, production relations, capitalism, socialism, communism, working class, bourgeoisie, surplus value, revolution, alienation, religion criticism, progress, dialectic, civilization, history, materialism, idealism, and religion as the opium of the people. It should also be possible to establish relations between these notions by pointing out the following simple propositions: There exists a class struggle between bourgeoisie and

proletariat, the revolution of the proletariat will lead to socialism, and so on. Some of these notions are found in other eidetic entities such as positivism, Hegelianism, and the economy of the 19th century. This is how kinship is established.

By thinking under this clef we can determine what the qualitative changes are that allow different species to be talked about. A clear difference should be established with what occurs in living creatures, where, roughly speaking, a different species is equivalent to the impossibility of crossbreeding. In the eidetic field all breeding is possible and ad infinitum.

However, these relationships or classification by geneidetic families can be traced back to long before philosophical systems and ideologies, whose examples I have given. For example, the notion of a single god, which is omnipotent and male is an eidetic line with several thousands of years from which we can follow filiations and hybridizations. This has been the classification used most by the history of philosophy and, more broadly, the historiography of ideas, where each family and geneidetic sub branch has a name and on many occasions a surname. A few examples are: Comptean positivism, Spencer's positivism, logical positivism and so on.

3.20 This in terms of the eidetic code or kinship. We should now talk about the fourth criterion you mentioned: function. I know that you have given this fourth criterion thought more than once, and that it interests you greatly. Where would classifying eidetic systems according to their function lead us?

Taking inspiration from a Darwinian model, I wanted to understand why certain eidetic systems can have the same functions as others with remote or no geneidetic kinship at all in various ecosystems. Some can function as higher predators belonging to different geneidetic lines or families and establish validating arguments for domination or the fight against domination in very similar terms to other systems, even though they come from different geneidetic lines. This is because we could say there are "essentially oppressive" eidetic entities and others that are "essentially liberating." This classification gives toolism more arguments, since the "intra-eidetic" loses value as the "extra-eidetic" acquires greater presence. This is where the greatest

misunderstandings come about in trying to universalize this concept.

Misunderstandings, such as “A knife and a computer are equal, for I can murder someone with both; one I stab in the heart of my enemy, with the other I crush his head.” On top of this, there is a narrow and false conclusion: “This proves that a computer is nothing but a weapon.”

In fact, it is possible, in a pragmatic and somewhat schematic way, to establish ten functions that can be set as oppositions or tensions:

- Identitarian/Centralizing
- Disciplinary /rebellious
- International Union/Nationalism
- Social cohesion /Social confrontation (Christ preached love the neighbor/Christ came to bring not peace but sword).
- Imperial-colonial expansion/Invader expulsion

Identitarian and centralizing positions, key in the discussions that have inspired the peripheral intellectual, have emerged within the intelligentsia with quite a different formation. We find within Christianity Protestants, Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox, Coptic, and Huguenot; within Islam we find Sunnis and Shiites; within Sunnism we find Wahhabism and Neo-Salafi; within Hinduism: the Brahmo Samajism, the Aryan Samajism; within Buddhism we find Sen; Within Confucianism; within modern philosophies we find Enlightenment, romanticism, positivism, neo-Thomism, non-Marxist socialism, Marxist socialism, existentialism, social Darwinism, and various combinations. In short, various trends of thought, with very different genealogical roots, have contributed to perform centralizing and identitarian functions.

Something similar happened to the disciplinary function. It has been a key factor in modernity, but also in all ancient societies who aspired to efficiencies of different types. The role of rebellion, also a key factor, has been equally inspired by sophisticated eidetic systems with different points of view. The function of justifying invasions of expansion by empires has turned to numerous eidetic entities since time immemorial. Even more, eidetic development has been closely linked to literate intellectuals who have thought of themselves and their respective societies as those in charge of providential missions to dominate, civilize and save people with

whom they have contact. This has occurred among the Chinese, the Greeks, Spaniards and the British.

3.21 From this point of view, someone could finally argue that eidetic systems have no relevance because, in the end, it seems that human beings do “the same things” with any eidetic system, and such systems would be mere decorations of those things which refer to social functions.

It would be a first but hasty conclusion. Confrontation among humans are pre-sapiens and to have confrontations (steal, kidnap, kill) people don't need elaborate eidetic entities. However, not everything is reduced to that. It's not that we need elaborated eidetic entities to carry out elaborate disciplining or rebellion programs; it is more than that. Elaborated eidetic entities conceive these tasks and tasks are subsequent and derived from ideas. There is little difference between the pillaging actions between sapiens and lion communities versus hyenas; they steal each other's food, but this is not the case with other forms of aggression. The Identitarian /Centralizing dilemma requires elaborated eidetic systems and it would be unthinkable to explain those without taking them into account.

On the other hand, the apparent secondary role of eidetic systems in confrontations among sapiens does not mean there isn't any system that is more prone toward one alternative when facing dilemmas. It is not trivial to discover which eidetic systems are more likely to boost invasion and which are more likely to expel trespassers. No less important than discovering proclivity is discovering the possibility of enhancing such and such functions and working on them.

3.22 Are there any other classification criteria in addition to the five you've already mentioned?

Of course. In fact, there are numerous (as a last resort, infinite) possible ways to classify eidetic entities according to the knowledge objectives of each person or group.

These ways operate many times by excluding the third system, such as in the utilitarian classifications of an object. For example, the cattle thief classifies animals into two groups:

butcherable and non-butcherable (among “non-butcherable” there are the groups: very skinny oxen, flies and worms), just as the fundamentalist intellectual classifies positions into two types: the true type (for example, feminism in the version of Judith Butler) and all others. Other criteria of interest include the time or the geo-cultural region in which examples such as ancient thinking and medieval thought were created. Another criterion of interest would be who held these ideas: social classes (proletarian eidetic systems, bourgeois eidetic systems, etc.), as well as regions of the world, cultures and peoples (Oriental eidetic systems, French philosophy, etc.). Lastly, we have the relationship to the scope of reality they address: social thought, economic thought, internationalist thinking, etc. This last form of classification is almost identified with academic disciplines.

In daily academic life, we turn to very different criteria. As criteria, we can simultaneously mention social thought, African thought, Argentinian thought, ancient thought, positivist thought, reactionary thought, Mao thought, etc. By using this criteria, we demonstrate that we are using diverse criteria for the classification of thinking types, thus bringing us closer to the way in which Borges’ mythical Chinese classified animals than to rigorous formulas. This pre-Linnaean work would lead us to classify plants in the following manner: plants that belong to me, plants in the garden next door, plants visited by many birds, plants which are (entering) on the left side of the house, plants which grow tall, scented plants, plants with large leaves and lastly, plants I have seen only in books. I believe that even to those who deal with ideas and have no notion of botany, a classification of this type would seem ridiculous, even if they may have accepted it as something helpful for domestic purposes only, but not scientific.

3.23 I wonder if a disciplinary field could reasonably move forward without stopping at this type of disquisition about qualifying criteria. Isn’t there something byzantine in the eagerness to clear everything up a priori? Wouldn’t it be healthier to construct objects of particular studies and dedicate yourself to researching them with propriety, thus avoiding getting into these meanders, which are both fascinating and labyrinthine, yet ultimately, insoluble? More directly, why do you think classifying eidetic entities/systems

is so important?

I'm not quite sure but, in any case, it is nothing a priori, as you say. It can be a triviality derived from the trajectory of western thought. Aristotle already classified political systems into monarchies, republics, tyrannies, etc. On the other hand, it seems that we cannot live in everyday life, nor move forward into the world of knowledge if we are not able to name things with concepts that will enable us to understand them in their differences, characteristics and similarities. How do I live without distinguishing a hill from a river, or a huge hill from a small one? One of the functions of language is to name, distinguish, and classify. In a sense, talking is classifying. Going more into specifics: among those who deal with ideas, a lot of mistakes and misunderstandings come from the inability to give a minimally consensual and precise conceptualization.

There was a person who attempted to come up with a theory of kissing by classifying them into two groups: the first kiss and all of the others...

3.24 But you aren't answering me in specific terms.

A key issue is to arrive at a certain (relative) consensus in the language of a disciplinary field. Another is to advance in the determination of the objects that we focus on in order to avoid confusion; this would allow us to choose the best methodologies according to the type of entities being studied. This is especially necessary for the people who make intellectual history (a better title would be the history of political speeches) who seem to believe there is only one type of eidetic entity, that being the modern western political discourse. Another key issue is to move this forward as a way of expressing the tasks of eidetic studies, one of which, just as in the dynamics of any discipline, is configuring an object of study, as well as thinking about it and processing it.

3.25 Alright. I like to think that a proper dose of this effort can make us better builders of specific research objects. No doubt. Getting back to your argument, would you say then that the actual existing eidetic studies are in a pre-Linnaean phase in regard to the consistency of their criteria qualifiers?

Should a paradigm that classifies in the Linnaeus manner be formulated? Obviously, we should not assume there is only one type of classification possible, a single criterion. As in every task, there may be various criteria as well as discussion among those who defend one or the other and, at least in the long run, each one of them will be validated by the outputs they deliver; on the other hand, it will not be necessary to renounce the others, as they can also generate significant outputs in specific cases.

Classification criteria are rather utilitarian and depend on the objectives of knowledge. The Linnaean system has been extremely productive for science. The discovery of genetics has allowed for very fine classification and genetic engineering work. However, what would a cattle thief, connoisseur of Linnaeus, if he is unable to distinguish a juicy ox from a skinny one with tuberculosis? Or what would a national intellectual do when unable to distinguish the multitude of alien ideas from authentic national thought?

How much useless discussion derives from confusing the day-to-day political discussion through the media, with a philosophical system such as that of Thomas Aquinas or confusing both with a world creation myth among the Quechua people? It is about different eidetic entities, whose origin, authorship, objectives and structure are different. Therefore, whether, on the one hand, they can be grouped as eidetic entities, on the other hand, they must be distinguished in order to say relevant things about each one and their gender.

3.26 I would like to know what you are thinking about, specifically, when you state that linguistics has a great advantage over eidetic studies in terms of delineation of classification proposals, among other things.

I am going to try to respond with a reference to a case. I recently learned that the evolution of Oceanic languages is not comparable to that of the Continental languages. A series of studies conducted from 1970 on has highlighted this. The evolution of the Continental languages can be outlined in the use of family trees. On the contrary, to understand the genealogy of the Oceanic languages, which are spoken in multitudes of islands and islets scattered throughout the Pacific, it is necessary to resort to various types of

classifications which are not mutually exclusive but complementary.

It is the only possible way of approaching the complex cultural, linguistic and geographical diversity of the Prehistoric Oceania. Specialists teach us that in order to reflect both the vertical inheritance and the horizontal interrelationships among various subgroups, it is essential to combine family trees, dialectic chains, interrelationship networks and reticular structures (Green, 1999).

I think eidetic studies are still far from considering these problems in a systematic manner and yet it is a direction that it could and should move towards, given the characteristics of the eidetic universe, which recalls that complex diversity, applicant for patient combinations of criteria. In this connection, it should be stated that the very rapid evolution of contemporary eidetic entities makes many classifications obsolete. Something else happens, however, in the case of societies without literary intelligentsia differentiated from the mass of the population.

3.27 A moment ago, you said the dispute between the different criteria qualifiers would be resolved by taking into consideration the specific outputs derived from their respective use. Based on your experience in these studies, what can make a criterion for the classification of eidetic entities/systems more or less productive?

Ecology has classified species by their role in the environment and this has been very productive in terms of conservation. I insist on plurality in this area: both the ecological formula and the genetics can be equally valid, according to the objectives they pursue.

Three things have drawn my attention when classifying: the struggle against Eurocentrism (where I have classified European thought and the peripheral regions, understanding the functioning of peripheral societies in recent centuries, and from there the basic distinction between identitarian and centralizing), the struggle against “toolism” and the struggle against “lazy contextualism” or “contextus ex-machine”.

In relation to this, I send young people out to conduct field studies in order to discover eidetic specimens in the speeches of people, libraries, archives, old recordings, etc. It is very important and of particular interest. A good article on a newly discovered

eidetic specimen can put a young person on the map of the discipline.

3.28 I have the feeling that, at least in a sense, one of your qualifying proposals, the one related to eidetic levels or genres, carries a sort of historicization, since it unfolds from the most remote past up to the present: From protosystems we arrive at the era of science, passing through myths and religion. Someone could even perceive Comptean resonances in your outline; this does not mean, of course, that in all cases the oldest levels have disappeared entirely. They can continue to exist as ancient geological layers and even operate in some manner. In relation to this, I would like to ask you what you think about the constitution and development of eidetic entities/systems?

The stages in the process of constitution can be thought of as a sequence that goes from simple to complex, with jumps and steps included. A key leap was the emergence of spoken language, as well as the emergence of scripture and professional intellectuals and the process of secularization. It seems that in archaic societies there are very few types of eidetic entities, in terms of “eidetic genres,” such as short stories, creation myths, languages and a few more.

This is why a fifth criterion of classification can be made on the basis of the complexity degree, or the amount of eidas [3.22]. This approach may be relevant for those dealing with very specific tasks or monographs. Entities can be understood as composed of cells (thus, they can be unicellular and multicellular organisms) or in chemical terms (thus, they can be seen as separate atoms, such as simple molecules like water, or highly complex molecules like some organic ones). The minimum eidetic entity is an eida and it can be worked as such.

The first entity would be the narration of short stories. These do not yet cover the worship of the sun or the moon, nor do they tell about the origins of the world or the management of magic techniques, although these possibilities cannot be completely excluded, for this genre of narratives coexist with more elaborated eidetic entities. Malinowski recreates several of these narratives in his *Magic, Science and Religion*. Let's quote some of them, to illustrate what I'm trying to say:

“A louse and a butterfly go flying for a while, the louse as a passenger, the butterfly as aero plane and pilot. In the middle of the performance, while flying over-seas just between the beach of Wawela and the island of Kitava, the louse emits a loud shriek, the butterfly is shaken, and the louse falls off and is drowned.”

“A man whose mother-in-law is a cannibal is sufficiently careless to go away and leave her in charge of his three children. Naturally she tries to eat them; they escape in time, however, climb a palm, and keep her (through a somewhat lengthy story) at bay, until the father arrives and kills her. There is another story about a visit to the Sun, another about an ogre devastating gardens, another about a woman who was so greedy that she stole all food at funeral distributions, and many similar ones.” (Malinowski, 1948: 81-82)

There are stories created revolving around just a couple of eidas, for example, the children’s fable of the three little piglets, articulated on the basis of two polarities: security/threat and work/laziness. It is true that this fable and its different versions could get more from it, but its moralistic nature is very simple, both in regard to eidetic resources, as well as the narrative plot.

These types of entities tend to be non-conceptual. By being non-conceptual and organized on the base of somewhat indeterminate notions, they can be conceptualized in many ways. In any case, the three piglets story is more elaborate than the louse and the butterfly of the Papuans, which can be read in two ways, the first being that the meddler endangers his life, and the second being if you are taking daring actions, take them with caution.

In this aspect, eidetic studies can be inspired by the work of the sub-discipline known as philosophy for children. Be as it may, there are eidetic entities of one eida, two eidas, a few eidas and “n” amount of eidas. Eidetic entities enhance their own growth, multiplication, enlargement and mutation. Eidetic entities/systems only mutate in their symbiosis with human communities. Latency leaves them paralyzed, although later readings (re-interpretations) can revitalize them.

Linked to the complexity degree criterion, the additional

criterion of “conceptualization degree” or, better, “conceptuality” may be introduced. There are non-conceptual, semi-conceptual and conceptual eidetic entities. The ones I have just mentioned, along with many others (in general, all those expressed in unspoken languages) are part of the non-conceptual. The work of eidetic studies “as such” tends to be carried out mainly on conceptual entities.

3.29 You talked about growth, expansion, branching, mutation...

By definition, eidetic systems are “growers.” Ramifications appear from them which apply to new things, adding in free association dreams, fantasies, and characters. This must be understood in relation to the way the brain works, so now we are in a territory that borders with cognitive sciences. They bring a thousand potential stories, reminiscent of the endless phrases built with language. Eidetic entities look for brains to branch out and are eager to reproduce. This occurs in two ways, one being as branching and the other as outreach to other brain-societies [10.6 et seq.]. This is only an expression, as these entities obviously don’t have will power, in the same way that bacteria or fungi don’t have any either and yet their purpose in life is to reproduce.

The following is an example to illustrate this: Imagine Christianity of the first centuries, such as some Gospels, parts of the Old Testament, the epistles of Paul etc. The texts of the first patristic studies are a growing corpus with their nucleus in the Sermon on the Mount and from this a Christian reinterpretation of the prophets arose, where concepts such as love, forgiveness, salvation, community, believers, resurrection, revelation, and Parousia articulate with notions such as self-sacrifice, Ignatius of Antioch, the Neoplatonic dualism of origins, among other things. These became a web with layers and sub-concepts associated with each other according to the interpretations of this or that. This way, a comprehensive set, more or less harmonic, and with many discordant notes is created. At that point, it is a sufficiently large eidetic system, a constellation with clusters or subsystems that overlap, hybridize and mutate along three or four centuries and where an immense eidetic corpus is already constituted. In such a case, taking six, eight or ten items (that’s all it takes), you can build

notoriously different new interpretations although they belong to the same geneidetic line. According to the order and the importance given to each of the eidas, interpretations or versions may be classified in the following ways: authoritarian or libertarian, hierarchical or egalitarian, metaphysical or pragmatic monistic or dualistic, individualistic or collectivistic, centered on faith or charity, chauvinist or less chauvinist, etc. That is to say, there may be speeches which are increasingly differentiated and old versions can combine, especially if a capable author impregnated in some external eidetic system (for example, Neoplatonism) appears and achieves a new interpretation or synthesis. So you can develop a new branch or family (new generation) that unifies authoritarian versions with monistic, metaphysical and hierarchical versions, and others that restart authoritarian, egalitarian, metaphysical, dualistic, focused on faith versions and so on. If you add to any of these versions the notion “barbarism”, for example, or “city-polis”, or “jihad”, imagine the immense variety or quantity of possible combinations. The new eida, coming from another constellation, can double the amount of interpretations or versions from one day to the next.

3.30 When do ideologies appear in this scheme? I think secularization has something to do with it.

When the State is desacralized, when it is assumed in its non-divinity, people can imagine alternative societies to the existing one. This is how several models of society are formulated, such as Indigenism, pan-Africanism, anarchism, agrarianism, Cepalism, Dependence, socialism, social-Christianity, and neo-liberalism.

Ideologies in “Proto” stages have existed since millenniums and they can already be detected among the Greeks and Latins. The writings of criticism are a background to this, which appeal to a reform in the actions of the rulers as well as the writings or libels who expressed their discontent. However, they are circumstantial evidence and do not present an alternative discourse.

In the strict sense, ideologies develop in conjunction with the practice of a nation state. On the one hand, they encourage and on the other, they are the result of this new form of social organization. The emergence of the polis nation state with a large number of literate participants who have significant social, ethnic, gender,

economic or cultural differences and where a central power appeals to them as a base or a community is key in displaying ideologies. In inadequately segmented societies and/or in societies in which very few have access to some form of active participation and access to power, ideologies don't arise.

Some eidetic entities are supported by a balance between two parties, the "explanatory" and the "Projective." They must have eidas that allude to both aspects; this is particularly true with ideologies. To that extent they provide meaning to life, especially as social-political existence. On the other hand, ideologies don't have holistic purposes; for example, they don't refer to death and much less to the afterlife. It could be said that this is not within their competence. However sometimes, when overlapping with eidetic systems from which they have been developed, they can also refer to those planes of existence; this was the case with Social Christianity and Islamic socialism. This Liberalism must provide meaning to societies in which it is inserted, as in the case of the "freedom" eida. This is key to the eidetic systems that not only aim to interpret the reality of those polis but also aim to transform them. In one way or another, they must provide convincing of their validity.

I do not consider autochthonous positivism, liberationism, nationalism, feminism, Negritude, and integrationism strictly as ideologies because while they may be combined with others, they do not allow by themselves to "organize" the polis' life. I would say Indigenous positivism and liberationism are philosophical systems. In addition, feminism, Negritude and nationalism are more so "eidetic devices", since they may agree with many ideologies.

Ideologies are typically organized into four or five dimensions: economic, social, cultural, political and international. They are also organized to the extent that they are perceived as valid choices for a state and on the basis of which parties can be organized. These dimensions are not fixed or unique. The environmental dimension has been incorporated completely in the last decades, although it is accepted more as a program and to win voters than as part of the systems. For its part, environmentalism has completed a set of dimensions that it didn't originally have. Feminism can hardly be considered as an ideology, although there are feminists parties and in many of them feminist recognition is observed. The same occurs with nationalism, because they comprise

only some dimensions of what are noted above, not being able to eidetically conform by themselves a government program. I'd take Integrationism as part of the internationalist thinking. As it can be seen, in this area there is a lot to clarify and to discuss.

3.31 As we said a moment ago, the fact that a new eidetic genre is appearing does not necessarily lead to the disappearance of others.

Clearly not, although it takes away a certain relative importance. It should be kept in mind that eidetic dimensions overlap at a social and even an individual level. The fact that ideologies emerge does not mean that we abandon the level of the mythical. These levels coexist by contradicting and negotiating combinatorial formulas. Analyzing ourselves only as ideological humans and not as mythical humans or humans with beliefs and attitudes is doing it wrong. Former genres such as the lizard brain still exist at the base of the most conceptual eidetic systems and the ancestral ones exist within the current ones. As a field of study it is interesting to determine how these diverse entities are articulated.

3.32 Before closing this part of our conversation, I would like to ask you about a concept you mentioned but didn't have a specific treatment. I am referring the notion of eidetic device. You mentioned it at some point. For a moment I thought you were using it as a synonym of artifact. Then it appeared in your list of genres, separately. What is exactly an eidetic device?

I'll try to answer you with an example. I pointed out that Christianity has led to a radical innovation in its dissemination regarding earlier eidetic systems by developing the notion of proselytism as part of its corpus. Previous eidetic systems had never thought (as part of their internal components) that it was necessary to disseminate themselves. Islam inherited this feature and then several other systems, in particular, a few ideologies.

I thought it was interesting to study another functional operation to dissemination, which is expressed in the relationship between evangelical Christianity and self-help. It has had great success in places where rapid processes of promotion or social

mobility occur: South Korea, Brazil, Chile, among others, in the last decades of the twentieth century. A system incorporates an eidetic device, so to speak, that covers it, like a medicine pill covered with a layer of honey or, better, like a seed coated with a juicy pulp that will make it tremendously more attractive for consumption.

4

IDEAS, REALITY AND SOCIETY: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP?

4.1 I would like to start this part of our discussion with a couple of interconnected questions. Where would you say your willingness to rethink key issues related to the life of ideas, based on contributions from life sciences originates? Secondly, what are the most important elements you've considered useful to borrow from these sciences in order to strengthen the proposal of eidetic studies?

In my view, the most important part of your question is the part about “the life of ideas”, and it deserves further thought. Numerous eidetic entities, especially ancestral entities, which are entities that are constituted as mentalities, and beliefs and are collectively established over centuries (a myth about the origin of a village, for example), as well as those that have wide repercussions (proposals concerning economic development), acquire a highly independent existence, unlike those other eidetic entities which are “freshly prepared” by a person with a name, a date and a place.

Those entities have earned such a weight within a community that they mutate regardless of individual wills due to the fact that there are too many brains interacting. Moreover, they

become paradigms that rule over brains and condition them in the way they think since they implement their categories and inhibit, on several occasions, the implementation of others.

I have been enormously interested in these eidetic entities as they make up minds, seize them and acquire such dynamics that they can be understood as living forces that contain a plan or a reproduction strategy to such an extent that they seem to be composed of highly replicative “memes”. I also find them interesting because they cannot be conceived as “products” or “tools” for individuals, but rather as frameworks with which individuals think, interpret the world and imagine solutions; there is no escape from these frameworks without experiencing crisis, ruptures, betrayals, pain, disorientations, loss of sense, etc.

The case of languages, especially those of indigenous peoples and their relationship with mentalities is perhaps a good example. People are born, educated, learn to speak and behave within a language, starting from a mentality and with a mentality. It is not that languages or mentalities are eternal or immutable, but they linger for decades and sometimes even for centuries and millennia and every existing thought is produced within them. They are the frameworks I mentioned previously. Working through the concept of “mentality” allowed French economic and social historians to deal with both the eidetic dimension in the long-term and ideas shared by various social sectors rather than dealing with only the short history of ideas of certain groups or movements. They dealt with this concept so much so that they purported to associate mentalities with the psyche and its study to psychology. This does not make me blind to the fact that there are parents and children who live in different languages, sometimes very different, and that they reach important degrees of communication and confrontation because they understand and decipher the feelings of one other.

4.2 What would be the role of life sciences in all this...?

Well, if we can understand that at least some eidetic entities are endowed with “autonomous life”, then the recurrence to life sciences with the purpose of understanding some of their processes seems obvious. However, do not interpret autonomy as autarchy or solipsism.

Life sciences offer varied conceptual tools to picture eidetic matters. Among the most important tools is the notion of environment or ecosystem, from which we can elaborate the notion

of “intellectual or cultural ecosystem environment;” there is also the notion of genes, which we can use to develop “gen-eidas;” in addition, there is the notion of genetic engineering, from which we can build the “(gen)eidetic engineering” notion. Why not conceive an eidetic system as a composition of concepts, notions and eidas that are equivalent (approximately) to genes that contribute to granting it its entity?

4.3 You’ve made statements about the relationship between ideas and societies where they act in symbiosis. At some point you sent me the draft of an article in which you were trying to go further, arguing that certain eidetic entities created human beings...

My argument is in no case in line with how some “theologies” have conceived this concept, according to which a spirit would have created human beings. What I meant to suggest was that within this symbiosis eidetic entities possibly found (selected) better brains to house themselves in and be cultivated, brains which could grow (serve) better to such or such entities.

Maybe the wording is not entirely clear. To avoid idealistic confusion, I prefer to say that eidetic entities have been constructing humans and societies in the ups and downs of their reciprocal relationship with those entities. This can be said of societies and even, in some ways, of individuals. We already know how people act when they take on a new eidetic system or when they are incorporated into a new environment where a new eidetic system is “in the air”. Not only external aspects change but they begin to rebuild their entire existence from the new criteria. It is in this sense that certain eidetic entities constitute, construct or “create” humans.

It can also be said that some eidetic systems contributed to the selection of humans. There were “perverse” eidetic systems, such as certain taboos that prevented people who did not belong to the same lineage from marrying one another. These eidetic systems generated a degree of consanguinity that resulted in the extinction of the communities that held them. There were other eidetic systems that incorporated other taboos, for example one that ordered all children to be killed. The clan that adopted this also became extinct, and this happened very quickly. There was an eidetic system that ordered their children’s skull to be seriously deformed; those children also died, and the clan became extinct as

well. There were other eidetic systems that helped human beings to persevere their existence, for example, one that summoned people to be paired up with people from other clans. This eidetic system generated the reproduction and selection of their guests and not their extinction. Also, marriage with other clans involved receiving cultural assets, both material culture as well as symbolic. The exogamy discourse did not only aim at what was “natural” but also “cultural”, and made these clans become more open minded and adaptable to the environment. The good eidetic system (the good-thinking) produced survival by exogamy, thus preventing the extinction of the clan. In this regard, the “good” eidetic systems produced human beings. The “bad” systems made their guests become extinct.

However, many other possibilities could be cited, such as eidetic systems that allow the behavior of the weather, preys, plants and their nutritious and curative possibilities to be understood in a better manner. Another example are eidetic systems that encourage the possibility of learning about (or using to their advantage) zoo-wisdom (and I do mean, “wisdom”) of all animals in the environment in which these pre-sapiens or sapiens humans developed. Some examples of these environments are: routes, caverns, medicinal plants, water zones, fisheries and food, protection from inclement weather, use of tools, skills and tricks. The ability of the brain to “store” an eidetic system that would make it possible to use animal wisdom to its advantage would be tremendously functional to the evolutionary process of pre-sapiens and sapiens. Eidetic entities that allow all of this to be used to their advantage would allow them to be led much faster than others which are less fit, starting from proto-hominid all the way to the status of sapiens.

While this may be valid for small simple societies, it cannot automatically be extrapolated to large and complex societies. Even a simple law such as the warrant to practice incest is enough to make a clan go extinct; however, this kind of commandment is unthinkable in a complex society and much less in a society that, in addition to being complex, has a high circulation of goods, people, ideas, messages, etc.

On the other hand, we can imagine that a rapid evolution with enough accumulation of sapiens mutations was favored by an eidetic entity that only permitted mating with other sapiens who had achieved, for example, speaking status, thereby marginalizing and discriminating against those who hadn't.

4.4 To sum it up, from this perspective it is not possible to

speak of pre-eidetic sapiens.

There is no original state of tabula rasa at all. There isn't one, not for a society, nor for a school or generation, nor even for an individual. It is impossible to imagine an individual or a group who decides to assume such and such ideas without already being in symbiosis with (or immersed in) some eidetic system. The zero state or tabula rasa as a brain or a set of brains that hold a dialogue and make decisions without resorting to any type of ideas is absurd. On the other hand, to understand the Neanderthals, it is necessary to turn to certain eidetic entities that allow complex notions such as elaborate clothes, arms, administration of the clan, some funeral rites, and perhaps some forms of art or ornamentation at least.

4.5 “Life” is also a complex concept. What notion of life do you have in mind when thinking about these issues?

A certain autonomous existence, which is reproductive, and spreads, thereby establishing relationships with other living beings.

We do not have to understand life in exactly the same way as biological sciences, which also do not have a total consensus and much less a rigid orthodoxy. The expression “life as we know it so far on Earth” is often heard.

I say “life” in the sense of an independent dynamic that is beyond people's decisions, where such decisions affect small plots or perhaps higher, but in the very long term, and in a very uncertain way. I say life in the sense of a hatch that not only depends on the will, but also, and very importantly, on a multiplicity of brains that are operating in the world in relation to different situations.

Perhaps there are better expressions than “life”, but I have not yet found them. In any case: hatching, reproduction, independent dynamics, which depend in some small measure on wills...

4.6 At what point does a society or a human being (or living being) start to “need” an eidetic system? When does what you call symbiosis occur? Relatively complex societies such as the clan of chimpanzees, the myriad of ants or the pack of wolves do not seem to need them...

Although clans of chimpanzees have some invented and transmitted zoo-cultural elements, whereas other clans do not, nor are they present among chimpanzees in captivity, everything seems

to indicate that we are not in the presence of societies with complex eidetic systems. Not even simple systems, such as those composed of a few commandments of basic understanding, such as killing the people of the clan, that's a no; stealing from people close to you, also a no; challenge the leader next door, no; seduce the couple of your neighbor, no; paired with people of the clan, no; collaborate with the feeding of the clan, yes; participate in the defense of the clan, yes; among other ideas.

These zoo-cultural elements constitute proto-eidetic systems, which are not spoken; they are not conceptual, but they come strongly in genetics and are “updated”, “implemented”, and “enacted” by existence in zoo-society. We can broadly say that they are taken on in the guild of chimpanzees, though they are not respected in captivity, as there is no clan under that condition. They are the basic principles for the existence of a viable clan or a pack of wolves, among other groupings of animals. There is a rudiment of culture and proto-eidetic entities, whose possibility lies in genetics. These entities are also not innate, in the sense that they are automatic; they are developed throughout the millions of years of the clan and then learned-enacted as a viable formula for survival. For example, not all canines practice it and not even all wolves live in clans. The invention of the clan among wolves is a zoo-cultural expression. It is a zoo-society that is relatively complex and viable for survival which allows them to hunt bigger prey, defend a territory and even feed some of the wounded and disabled. Said clan respects a set of basic commandments, but it cannot imagine, formulate or transmit a commandment such as “You Will Worship the Lord your God”, nor can it tell a myth about the original creation of the clan along with the world.

4.7 It seems inevitable to ask how to think from this approach about the great issue of ruptures that eventually constitute what we call the human condition...

I'm afraid a question of this nature involves a somehow essentialist conception and perhaps because of this only a tautological response can fully answer it. In truth, I do not have a clear answer. I tend to think that pre-humans (such as pre-sapiens) had more or less complex eidetic systems. It seems to me that at this point we are bordering anthropology, archeology and paleo-anthropology. My information is not enough to respond. Beyond this, what I am interested in highlighting is that in regard to cultural elements and eidetic elements in particular, there doesn't seem to be

a radical gap from animality to humanity, especially if we consider mammals that live in society; these mammals must give each other zoo-rules and, above all, pre-sapiens humans.

4.8 These are abysmal issues; surely that's why they fascinate us so much. In my notes I have highlighted one of your ideas according to which eidetic systems (or some) relate to humans as their gut flora do. This is, of course, an analogy, a model, the kind that you explained before [3.4]. I have noted, too, that the introduction of this image is closely related to your criticism of the instrumentalist view on ideas. I think it is important you develop this point.

The problem arises in this manner: The notion that states “eidetic entities are instruments created by human beings for specific purposes” implies a pre-eidetic theoretical decision, in which the consciousness transparently decides to “use” such ideas for an objective that has been set. The strongest objection that can be made to this conception is that it is not possible to imagine an intelligent entity making a mental operation before having ideas because it is inconceivable to think pre-eidetically to make the decision of instrumentalizing ideas. Any decision in this regard is a process that takes place in the framework of the existence of eidetic entities previously implanted. Any determination of objectives, critic, change, etc. is given only in the framework of prior eidetic entities. That is to say, many of these entities are not things, such as a hammer or a cannon that can be used for a predetermined objective.

As we saw, there are eidetic entities that have a life of their own, so to speak, in symbiosis with their guests, and therefore they are not strictly “usable” as tools. Examples of these are: proto-eidetic systems and languages-mentalities-beliefs. They are not even thinkable as parts of the body: I cut ideas like I cut my nails or an ear; I don't amputate ideas the way I can amputate a finger or a leg, and I can't even extract them as if they were a molar or a kidney. If you killed my gut flora, I die with it, unless I'm able to create an artificial digestion system that meets the roles played by these bacteria in symbiosis with my body. In this sense, some eidetic entities are not “parts” nor “appendixes” of human beings. They are different realities symbiotically articulated to them, which have evolved along with intelligent beings, such as the gut flora that doesn't exist without the digestive organisms, though it's not a

member, but a guest. It has evolved with and within these.

I notice a language problem which is not easy to avoid. We would say humans use their hands to work, their lungs to breathe, their hearts to make their blood circulate, their blood to oxygenate their cells and their brain to think. But the usage of the word “use” is excessive. It’s excessive in the same way as it is to say that a baby uses its mother’s breast to feed, or that a fetus uses the umbilical cord for that same purpose, or that I used my brothers to play with them during my childhood. These types of expressions not only pervert the meaning of the verb to use, but also the senses of the body, human relationships and language, as post moderns who spoke of the uses of history without assuming we are immersed in history as fish in the ocean. A fish does not use the ocean; a fish cannot be imagined without the ocean; a fish lives in the ocean and is part of the ocean; a fish is the ocean, along with the water, salt, seaweed, sand, currents, tides, sea stars, and the other living beings. From this misuse of language, and misuse of the word “use”, and these misunderstandings is where cheap toolism and so much confusion is generated.

All of the above, without prejudice to a fisherman who can use a small fish as bait on a hook...

4.9 I recall that a reference to the gut flora of elephants went in the same direction...

Individuals are born without gut flora and, therefore, cannot live independently from their mothers until such flora is developed in them. Human beings are born without eidetic systems and they acquire the ability to think in a complex way as long as they internalize part of the systems of ideas from their communities. In order to develop their intestinal flora, baby elephants must eat adult elephants’ droppings. In any case, these bacteria and fungi that live in our body and establish a symbiosis with us are much older than human beings and even older than mammals. Let us be consistent then and think hard about who uses whom for survival, although symbiosis implies mutual benefit. Something similar is what we must do by consuming the eidetic “droppings” of our elders in order to achieve a relatively autonomous and complex thinking. May the people with a weak stomach not be offended and may they not accuse me of coprolalia because in the field of life, generation and decomposition are two sides of the same coin.

Now, in order not to give rise to misunderstandings, what I mean is that some of the eidetic entities can be thought of as gut

flora and I do not mean to imply that ideas are bacteria. There is nothing here relating to organicism. It would be as abusive as saying that Earth is made of numbers because it is said that its circumference measures 40,000 kilometers. In this case, at least, mathematics is only epistemic and not ontic. However, ideas have been conceived as memes whose purpose is to reproduce by searching for a place for doing so (Harari, 2015).

And, of course, it is not just elephants. An immense number of animals need gut flora in their digestive systems in order to live. If that premise is valid, can we talk of gut flora alone? Obviously, we can. For example, we can study which types of bacteria are in symbiosis with our digestive systems, as well as study the chemical components of said flora and many other things. On the other hand, this does not mean to say that they don't exist in symbiosis with such and such animals; however, the distinction between both levels is elementary.

4.10 Beyond the model life sciences offers, what inspiration can eidetic studies find in other disciplines?

Life sciences offer us numerous and useful formulations to imagine ideas. We can think of a model that come from physics or more particularly, from optics. Just as light behaves in different ways, either as particles or waves, it can be said that some eidetic entities behave as different things. For example, on many occasions, though not always, eidetic entities can be thought of as tools.

4.11 I would like you to offer some examples of this dialectic, which is undoubtedly complex.

There are eidetic entities that, without having been created as tools, are manipulated by someone for information, to exercise power, to manipulate, to motivate or justify or for other purposes.

Tools should not only be considered a “weapon” to kill, submit, or compel another to do what I want. Tools can also be conceived as a “scalpel” to operate, a “microscope” to observe, “tweezers” to extract something fine or a “laser” to perform precision operations. Tools can be conceived as large machinery to make transportation easier, such as a “robot” which performs routine operations. That is to say, when referring to “ideas as tools”, they should not be understood only as a kind of Machiavellian plan

to dominate third parties, although, as in any technological endeavor, this may also be present.

An eidetic construct that is created to obtain information can be a pattern to perform surveys, or a guideline for in-depth interviews. An eidetic construct created to teach mechanics is a car mechanics manual, while one created to reconcile couples with troubles is a therapy text. Another eidetic construct may be created to guide students, such as a brief program for a course on the history of feminism in Afghanistan, and one titled “Traffic Laws” is created to regulate the traffic. All of these are cases of elaboration of eidetic constructs as instruments, which are guided by a utilitarian objective in the immediate term. These cases can be grouped into what I call “eidetic artifacts”.

The same could not be said, for example, about the drafting of *Facundo* by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, which combines objectives and varied levels of discourse. *Facundo* is not an instruction manual, nor a program or recipe box, although instrumental rationality is not completely absent in the work. It is a work that tries to explain the operation of a society and generate awareness of the situation suffered by Argentina; however, it also gets carried away by imagination when telling myths, stories and comics seeking meaning and coherence. That is, it goes well beyond instrumental rationality and this could be said all the more about Sarmiento’s work as a whole or the whole of 19th century Latin American thought.

However, course programs, manuals, survey forms, and self-help books are not the only eidetic constructs that can be conceived as “toolism”. It is possible to build other types of eidetic entities by considering their instrumental purpose as well. Privileged examples come from two fields: The construction of artificial languages (such as the language of mathematics or Esperanto) and genetic engineering. These two areas give us clues about how to devise complex eidetic instruments.

Let’s imagine a complex problem, for example, the need to deepen democracy, the desire to promote respect for human rights, the protection of the environment or any other complex purpose, in the sense that these issues are broad, not unambiguous and not immediately obtainable. Can we imagine an eidetic endeavor that contributes to any of these goals? How do we build eidetic instruments that contribute to achieving these ends (found at another level than instrumental)? It is possible to do so, or at least conceive it. In fact, those who focus on the law, political science or

philosophy have proposed on several occasions develop works aimed at meeting objectives such as these. In this regard, what's proposed does not offer any novelty; the novelty lies in conceiving them as an applied eidology task which is guided by instrumental rationality and follows, somehow, the model of those who build artificial languages or those who practice genetic engineering.

4.12 It is clear that there are ideas-tools, but it is also clear that you think that not all ideas are tools and, furthermore, that we shouldn't think of the life of ideas based on that image.

More importantly, the set of eidetic entities cannot be conceived as a tool since it would be like conceiving the universe as a tool, which again completely perverts the concept of "tool".

To think of eidetic systems as human beings' tools is the same as conceiving culture or languages as tools. It is almost easier to think in reverse: Great eidetic systems use people as tools for their benefit, such as Zen Buddhism allied with Pan-Asianism used kamikazes (suicide pilots) for their fight against other eidetic systems. Ideas can be conceived as a species of beings, or something along the line, who are looking for heads to develop and settle in. This refers to ideas looking for brains to prosper in or brains that are conquerable and colonizable enough to devote themselves to the "crop" of certain ideas. I say "crop" in the sense of developing such ideas, systematizing them, taking care of them, reproducing them, hybridizing them, implanting them, ramifying them and combining them. In short, the purpose is to serve them.

But obviously there couldn't be a unilateral relationship where just one of the parties obtains benefits. As a result, these brains are, in a way, like colonies of ants that cultivated mushrooms. Without a doubt, the ants eat the fungi, but the mushrooms in their eagerness to reproduce also use the ants.

Which came first? Did the plant that spread its pollen through birds and insects or those that feed on the sweetness of the plant come first? Can there be a before and an after in this case? Can it only be said that the plant uses the pollinator or that only the bird or insect use the plant with nectar? Clearly, no. In the long process of the evolution of societies, those societies that can't exist without idea systems have been developed. That is to say, it is impossible for a complex society or a complex human being group to conceive of a zero moment or tabula rasa, a time when groups or societies think but think without ideas or categories, and thus, this

group or society without ideas, so to speak, freely chooses what ideas they will grow because they are useful or more useful than others.

Why not look at things from the other side, from the fungus (i.e., from the eidetic system), and say: “Look at such a smart fungus! It has found an anthill, or the brain of a bourgeois intellectual, willing to cultivate it and propagate its genes”.

It should be kept in mind that the various varieties of fungi competing to be cultivated by ants must be useful to them in order to be cultivated and they must be better than others in order to seduce the ants, so to speak. The fungi must develop a strategy to achieve the spreading of their genes. This is not automatic nor necessary. In this regard, the actors would not be a few ants that decided to cultivate fungi for their benefit, but rather the fungi (ideas) that are looking for ants to serve them by cultivating them. It's the fungi that “designed” a strategy for their own benefit (unaware of it, of course) of seduction towards ants by naturally offering them a few crumbs.

4.13 You are again very close to stating that eidetic systems could be thought as having originated prior to human beings...

At least in some sense, they are. It is reasonable to think that not all eidetic entities appear with the arise of sapiens, which is the human we are. It is easy to imagine after many paleoanthropology tests that Neanderthals, who were not sapiens, although they were undoubtedly humans, already held eidetic entities, as it is proved by the highly probable existence of speech, the presence of the hyoid bone, ornaments, and funeral ceremonies. Beyond that, numerous works of animal ethology show the existence of zoo-material and zoo-symbolic cultures (Goodall, 1986; Romero de Solis, 2003). This shows the existence of eidetic proto-systems [3.10].

Why would it be abusive to imagine that the mutations “producing” the sapiens didn't consist in part of the ability to better seize symbolic constructs, both those that were handled before their appearance as species, as well as those that appeared in this process of mutual construction? Let's not be confused. This is not idealism; in any case, it is Cognitivism and genetics, issues which refer to the material, as it might be understood at the beginning of the 21st century [10.13].

Ancestral eidetic entities (short stories, world views, ancestral

“theologies”, mentalities, founding myths), which are always collective and not individual creations, in the sense that they are attributed to a specific person and dated at the time that person invented them, cannot be conceived as products (nor as excreted products, or as fabricated products), nor as amputated limbs. The best way to conceive them is as organisms in symbiosis with human beings, as ancestral organisms even older than sapiens. We shouldn’t conceive them only as “products” of humans, just because they are associated to the species and to the collective creation of it, or because it is unthinkable to conceive the species without these ancestral entities. That without prejudice that portions may be amputated (pruned), or that we can question some of its parts, or that we can flee from prejudice.

Ancestral eidetic entities were created with the species and even, in some sense, it can be said they contributed to creating it. The sapiens species is also “product” of the proto-eidetic entities and primeval entities, because without them, it wouldn’t reach its state of being (it would not have come-to-be), like so many evolutionary branches or early sapiens clans that became extinct. Ancestral eidetic systems are conditions of possibility for the existence of actual existing societies. That is why it can be said that the “best” eidetic systems “created” human beings, as it allows them to “reach sapiens humanity”.

4.14 One might wonder about the reasons for the lasting symbiosis. It doesn’t seem easy to formulate an answer, among other things because you are openly questioning “toolism”, and that leads to distancing from any kind of functionalist explanation...

That’s right. In this sense, perhaps it would be helpful to recall a series of reflections by Yuval Harari on what might have allowed sapiens to make use of fictional language. Harari says something like: “Fictitious language, myths and legends can be seen as a disadvantage of sapiens in relation to other animals, to the extent that it distracts the former from more important things by using their precious time in meaningless fantasies” (2015). And yet, he adds, “it seems that the correct way to address the issue is not in that way, but rather in the opposite way: Fictional language might be the most important advantage of sapiens in relation to other species, both human and non-humans, for the simple reason that it allowed sapiens to imagine things not only individually, but also collectively. This is what would have opened the path for the

forging of common stories and, further, the unusual ability to cooperate flexibly in enterprises of various kinds. Many people who do not know each other can successfully cooperate if they share common beliefs such as myths, stories, and gods. Harari goes even further and points out that the modern world rests on belief in entities that are fictitious and imaginary, for example: corporations, states and, we could add, money. I think that in Harari's thesis there are inspiring elements to think about the role of eidetic entities throughout history.

However, I don't want to distance myself from the functionalist explanations at all levels. Just as there are a wide variety of eidetic entities, there are also several relationships between human beings and their communities with those diverse entities. In short, it's about a general understanding of how languages and eidetic entities have been built in symbiosis with communities.

4.15 At the beginning of this chapter I wanted you to talk about the origin of your willingness to rethink this whole problem by turning to categories taken from life sciences. However, soon the conversation turned toward the issue of the life of ideas. I will resume with this concern, then. In one of the meetings in which the outlining of this volume started to take place, I asked you about the presence of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela among your inspirations.

Strictly speaking, the work of Maturana has minimal presence in what we have been talking about. This is not the case with the book *Connaitre*, written by Francisco Varela (1989), which has been important for me for a couple of decades. It is a book I have brooded over many times and it has inspired numerous reflections that have pieced together and given shape to several of the issues which we've talked about, in particular the issue of life and cognitive sciences.

There is another important dimension linked to this and that is the vast number of general scientific documentaries and documentaries about nature and animals that I have seen on TV over the years.

Before and after cable TV, documentaries on science and technology were a passion. This allowed me to take a look at genetics, robotics, the functioning of the brain, the big-bang, the mass exterminations of species by cataclysms, artificial intelligence

and other things.

In this regard, I have talked with colleagues about how they believe their experiences (travels, other readings, the news, TV, movies, etc., except for political changes and dialogs with professors) have affected their work. I was surprised to see that some of them were almost experience-proof and that their academic career was almost closed off to the non-academic, in the strictest sense. On the contrary, the experience of another colleague who, after dealing with herds of stray dogs within the campus, because of his position, presented a multi-year research project on dogs and culture which was relevant, showing how that life experience had an impact on his intellectual work.

Don't think it's about me, but dealing for so long with mammals and other zoological families, apart from humans, has revealed to me the existence of a zoo-psychology of domestic birds and mammals. This culture includes how some animals learn, how they create their hierarchies, how their affectivity is developed, how they doubt and how they decide. Speaking of this, I've done this in dialog with some dispersed readings and TV documentaries. Jane Goodall's Wild Chimpanzees documentaries had an impact on me, and they helped me to think about the issue of values and communication among non-humans and about how the yes/no (do it/don't do it) is associated with permission/prohibition, pleasure/pain, as well as with hierarchies and the zoo-history of the clan, herd or pack. What interested me the most was the creation of a gesture language and related sounds. This, which is very ancient, plus millions of pre-sapiens years, helps us understand the eidetic proto-systems in primates and pre-sapiens humans. That is why I wanted to speak about zoo-cultures. There is a leap within the progressive development of facial muscles, such as smile and anger, especially the smile, because anger is quite evident in many animals. The smile is more "human", although we can see precedents in chimpanzees and dogs. A smile is an evolutionary human leap that is used to gain the sympathy or mercy of the superior. The first step is to plead and then comes benevolence. This takes us away from the issues under discussion, but it is simply being discussed to allude the possibility of establishing connections, thereby allowing us to be inspired by other academic and existential fields.

This has led me to discuss the misunderstood contextualism that derives from a confusion between the part and the whole, that is, the confusion between a genre of eidetic entities and every entity,

as if any entity could be compared to German Ideology. Smart observations about German Ideology cannot be extrapolated to the tales of the Bushmen lions and that is not only due to the fact that this is a society without classes (see Prada, 2009). Although knowledge is always marked by power, power is also marked by knowledge. By creating concepts, our theoretical work has allowed us to create distinctions and precisions that collect and exceed what Destutt de Tracy, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did, who in the early and mid-19th century coined the notion of “ideology”.

4.16 You have also postulated that eidetic studies can be thought of as part of, or, better said, in interrelation with the science of knowledge or cognitive disciplines, along with other like-minded approaches.

Cognitive studies are performed at different levels, from very different disciplinary perspectives and with procedures and varied instruments. More than addressing an area of nature, so to say, they confront a problem. Lots of disciplines are concerned with knowledge. We have artificial intelligence studies and linguistic studies, for example. We also have neurological studies or cerebral physiology, such as brain functioning and psychological studies, which include the development of intelligence, memory, and learning processes. We also have philosophical studies such as logics, gnoseology and epistemology, which aim to promote good rules of thinking and theoretical knowledge procedures and science. Eidetic studies can also be considered a cognitive science, to the extent that they deal with how eidetic systems work or how intellectual communities operate as eidetic brains, among other dimensions.

4.17 I'm going to insist: In what sense or senses can it be said that eidetic studies are part of the cognitive disciplines?

I believe that eidetic studies are part of these disciplines in at least four ways:

First, and in a special place, they form part of the cognitive disciplines by studying how eidetic entities are created, even before the creation of sapiens and current sapiens in particular (assuming the changes in the functioning of the brain of sapiens throughout tens and tens of thousands of years). In addition, they study how sapiens come to be by using language, which is the other face of

elaborate eidetic entities.

Secondly, they form part of these disciplines by studying eidetic entities as such by taking them on as subjects. They study how they emerge, how they are structured or composed internally, how they unfold in history, how they work or evolve, how they rework, intersect, mutate, change, grow, develop or decay and how they become obsolete, how they are overtaken or replaced. Also, they study how they circulate, how they move within a society or between two or more societies or intellectuals' communities and how they relate to societies in which they unfold. All of this in relation to the operations and articulations of the physiological brain.

Thirdly, they achieve this by being conceived of as eidetic engineering work, for example: production, reprocessing, crossings or eidetic entities processing or knowledge.

Lastly, by studying how people behave as social entities and how intellectual communities behave to produce knowledge. Also, by studying in what way it is possible to improve production-productivity of intellectual communities. Studies of knowledge not only deal with how the brain produces knowledge, but how intellectual communities produce knowledge by somehow considering them as collective brains.

5

Thinking of changes at the eidetic level

5.1 You went back at a few formulations from Yuval Harari, in which a parallelism is established between the characteristics of replicative memes and the life of eidetic systems. If I understand correctly, with the introduction of this analogy, you tried to draw attention to the fact that ideas live and reproduce by following a few guidelines that do not

necessarily have to do with what individuals, brain hosts, or brain carriers consciously do or stop doing. It seems to imply that it would be advisable to conceive eidetic systems as living beings that display specific strategies of self-propagation...

I think it is a good concept or a good formulation of things, although it would be better to refer to Richard Dawkins, since Harari was inspired by his contributions. In the same way that naturalists speak of “strategies” in the animal or plant species by attributing to them a sort of “intelligence” in their struggle for life, you can understand some eidetic entities as living beings that merge and team up with human beings for a supposed mutual benefit. In evolution (and don’t necessarily interpret evolution as progress), it is irrelevant that one species is older than the other in the relationship between the bee and the plant with nectar, or that a symbiosis occurs between species of various, very genetically distant families, because in both cases there will be an encounter.

We have said there are certain zoo-cultural forms, especially, though not only, in primates. Eidetic entities are as old (or older?) as human beings or, at least, as old as the sapiens-sapiens. Then, who created whom? In any case, eidetic entities didn’t create sapiens as part of a plan, as a preset decision; nor did humans create eidetic entities, and the parties didn’t consciously create a symbiosis strategy. That is part of a long evolutionary process.

This is important because it leads to visualize that any decision relating to changes of eidetic entities to which it adheres, uses or is ascribed, etc., is only possible from other eidetic entities in or which it has been before. In this sense, the notion of “using an eidetic system to defend interests” can be valid, except for the one system that allows me to discriminate what my interests are. The utilitarian-toolist vision comes from an instrumental rationality, which in this case isn’t applicable. Instrumental rationality is understood as a practicalist approximation of means toward goals, and it is determined by a conscious, previous decision for the minimization of effort to reach a goal.

To illustrate this point, I usually use two ways. As I see it, an example of an inappropriate expression is one made by Mark Bevir (2003) in his otherwise very interesting work on Theosophy and the Indian National Congress. There he writes: “Annie Besant, like Hume and Sinnett, used theosophy to resolve the Victorian crisis of

faith after she had spent some time investigating spiritualist phenomena”. A faith is not “used” to replace another, and an eidetic system implanted from infancy is not “used” to replace another; instead, it is “reached” or “caught up” or discovered or invented and, in any case, it unfolds darkly, by trial and error, being one sometimes oriented and sometimes lost. But in no case can it be thought of as a process equivalent to instrumental rationality, which decides to use a tool for a goal, such as a hammer for a nail, bombing an enemy post, or carrying out a survey or an advertising campaign. Again, to define things in such terms would be ignoring the profound doubts, existential crisis and anxieties that eidetic system changes mean for people.

The second example shows a happier expression. It is a statement by Raquel Sánchez García (1999, 305), who points out that “one of the most interesting periods in the evolution of Russian nationalism are precisely the years in which it had to live alongside the communist system, years in which the symbiosis between the two ideologies can be observed (giving rise to quite peculiar theoretical products), as well as the separation and diversification of said ideologies after Stalin’s death. The interest of this historical period is given by the decisive relationship established between nationalism and political power, a relationship that has been formed throughout the entire history of Russia as a game of interdependencies and subtle managements, alliances and ideological justifications.”

5.2 At a certain point you presented an image according to which eidetic systems appropriate brains. Beyond its rhetorical value, doesn’t a statement like this make it difficult to think of changes at the eidetic level? I mean, the image is strong, and helps to visualize something relevant, but perhaps it doesn’t help to understand how the transformations of ideas take place, nor the margin for maneuvering of those who work with them...

To get to this issue, I think it is key to distinguish eidetic entities that are in symbiosis with societies, these entities generally come from a long cultural history with contributions from many known and anonymous people, from those that are the creations of individuals or small groups. In other words, to distinguish between

eidetic entities that have become social culture and those that have not reached that level. It must be noted as well that not all of them will reach this level. The fact that it is impossible to think about a state of absolute tabula rasa does not mean that the existence of reasoning that partially modifies the same entity with which it is in symbiosis (that questions it, relativizes it) is inconceivable.

Microorganisms of the intestinal flora also change (they are replaced and even mutate), either by changes in the diet, general changes in the environment, due to medical treatment, or by any aging or health modifications. They do, of course, with no conscience at all.

That is to say, neither eidetic entities nor ecosystems can be conceived as completely closed and shut down forever. If some kind of “opening” of the system is not conceived, then it is not possible to think about changes (mutations) in it. At the eidetic level, many changes do not involve conscious management. Disasters, for example, induce, motivate, and lead to changes in the ideas of the community affected; they are not aware or programed, nor the result of the activity of a single individual or a *think tank*.

Every eidetic entity has at least two openings: the first alludes to the fact that, given its complexity, it is subjected to interpretations that are not unique or unambiguous; the second is related to the fact that there are situations it doesn't cover or explain. When people experience situations not covered by a conception, they can make additions or corrections (mutations) that make it possible to explain (give an account of) these new facts. So, the system changes by additions, modifications, adaptations and expansions. This process can be compared to a house to which rooms are added or modified to respond to new needs. Another comparison is technology, which creates new resources from the ones it has, but also receives new inventive contributions from the outside according to challenges that had not been addressed before.

In fact, these entities also mutate mainly through the crossing with others and, in many opportunities, completely outside the decision of the host. Very closed entities cloister and drown people; people of low sensitivity and with weak inventiveness get caught by entities in (and with which) they live.

5.3 The two sources of change you've just pointed out, the possibility of different interpretations and the appearance of

unforeseen and unexplained situations, both authorize a link with the notions of do-it-yourself (or conscious management) and of contextuality. They are notions in relation to which you have developed an intense, controversial work. I would like you to develop these items, and some of their implications as widely as possible.

They are key issues for eidetic studies. It's about making progress on the explanation of how new ideas arise, how they appear, and why they mutate. Questions about genesis refer to an area where cognitive sciences and eidetic studies intersect. As to why ideas mutate, there are different types of explanations. One explanation highlights the greater capacity of new ideas to explain reality, new problems that are eventually detected and, on occasions, this has to do with what we said about disasters. Another explanation highlights that new ideas better express the zeitgeist. Another explanation draws attention to the fact that some power is forcing its presence.

To paraphrase Lucien Goldmann, an eidetic system exceeds or replaces another when it accounts for facts the previous one didn't consider, a theory that manages to explain what the previous one didn't. Furthermore, changes occur within the possibilities of existing eidetic entities and the "formats" of the committed brains.

Once again, this can be managed consciously or not. It must be remembered that, historically, the majority of societies didn't have "professional" intellectuals who set out the need to resolve these types of theoretical problems. These problems were solved in everyday dialogs at a colloquial, collective level. Facing the eruption of a volcano, there was no available group of geologists able to explain the reasons for the event.

One thing that I've been thinking of is that eidetic entities grew, considerably, in dreams. The non-vigil has played and plays a central role here. It is very reasonable to think that pre-sapiens dreamed and had fears and desires before speaking, or at the same time that proto-languages were shaping. From there, transmissible commandments were originated.

I'm not blind to the fact, however, that numerous cultural elements, some of them eidetic, are replaced by the presence and pressure of powers of various types. Adopting ways of dressing and the way you carry your own body change in colonies through the

desire to blend with the colonizer, to socially upgrade, to receive acceptance and approval, to participate in information and businesses in a better way, to stand out among the other colonizers, or to take on the “right tone,” among other reasons.

5.4 Where does the reference to the oneiric level aim at exactly?

I'm interested in dreams as inputs to the constitution of eidetic entities, especially the most basic. Examples of this are: short stories, myths and cosmogonic stories. I wonder to what extent non-vigil states were able to shape, in that confusion of the conscious and the unconscious that characterizes them, entities that were forming with multiple fragments that later shaped a story. At that level, it would seem that desires and fears express themselves in a more vivid or clearer way than during wakefulness, as well as the tension between what is desirable and undesirable. We must remember that many peoples conceived dreams as messages from the above and these messages were therefore worthier of consideration than messages at a conscious level, especially if they came after ceremonies loaded with hallucinogens capable of radicalizing moods.

This involves, on the one hand, products of a brain (not necessarily of consciousness) previously formatted by the culture and, especially, by language. These new products, on the other hand, got lodged (or installed, or loaded) again or strengthened in the brain as frames (or programs), and as a possibility and demand (such as a seed that could and “wanted to be” a leafy tree), as an instrument and as obsession, and as a fantasy of what was desired. [10.6-10.11]

5.5 It is true that in the abyssal level you mentioned it is difficult to imagine a defined professional intellectual consciously concocting an eidetic system with certain characteristics, pursuing certain purposes. Acknowledging this, there is no doubt that the defined professional intellectual or the conscious agent of eidas is a figure that actually exists, and he/she is especially important in the last few centuries in societies such as ours...

I fully accept what you say, but let's understand this in the long and the "very long" term. Ancestral eidetic entities, usually quite simple (created most likely as taboos, slogans or commandments), were created unconsciously and randomly by various pre-sapiens or recently sapiens clans. As a result, some better and some worse eidetic systems appeared (in view of the hominization process), while some were simpler and others more complex; some eidetic systems were able to articulate more information and others had a lower capacity and, in fact, all of this is connected with the ability to manage oral languages.

You must imagine the tremendous leap it could mean for a society to assume that the center of existence, so to speak, lies in the "heart" (this thing that seems endowed with its own life, beyond consciousness, dreams, bumps, or the inertia of the body), and not in the hand, or the fang. Acknowledging the "heart" as the one that thinks, feels, and organizes existence is a tremendous leap in the capacity of an Erectus, Neanderthal or other pre-sapiens clans or a society of sapiens-sapiens to assume the importance of knowledge. An eidetic system centered on the tusk or hand was quite inept at giving importance to knowledge and social selection through knowledge and communication skills.

One time, surely by trial and error, people who took on the possibility, now consciously, of modifying existing eidetic systems appeared on the scene, improving existing judgments and/or abilities to transmit them. Thus, humans started to transform from producers-products of unconscious eidetic entities to more aware agents of these entities. This likely first started taking place regarding matters of empirical content, then more abstract matters, such as ways to measure distances or calculate the construction of a pyramid. Then, this evolved to more formal affairs and how to handle the rules of thinking, in which Aristotle played a big role. This process of change and awareness of what eidetic entities are, allowed people to transform from creatures to creators of eidetic entities and later they were able to imagine a modification programmed task and the creation of new entities. The more recent and more individual creation they are, the more they can be conceived as products, even as artificial limbs, although this vision does not fully account for their truth nature.

I am not aware of studies that show how the individual intellectual figure appeared. Biblical studies may provide

information about prominent people with their own names, particularly prophets, people identified as those who made autonomous judgments, relatively “diverted” from tradition and who had an innovative role in what was assumed as “belief.”

5.6 For various reasons, these statements seem to me to be of the utmost importance, particularly because once again they put your approach “in the waters of history,” if it fits the expression. Among other things, they lead me to ask you how far and in what direction you think your reflections about ancestral eidetic systems and their condition as creators of humanity (“Hominidae”) can be productive in addressing more contemporary eidetic systems, which may be considered in a more conscious, scheduled, and even in an utilitarian-tooling way, that is to say, products of the work of differentiated professional bricoleurs or conscious agents. That also leads me to ask you whether in certain cases, statements such as Mark Bevir’s, whom you just mentioned, make sense. In fact, there are conscious agents of ideas around us who work on and with these ideas to achieve specific purposes; so much so, that sometimes our world seems to be “the kingdom of toolism”...

I think the reflections at the level we have been talking about can be productive in several ways. Above all, they help to keep in mind that these dimensions have not disappeared but continue in force. And this leads us to wonder about the ways they are intertwined with more recent statements.

I believe it is important to note that a conscious or scheduled management of ideas doesn’t cover the totality of what happens in today’s societies. All levels of agency are present. I take the picture of an iceberg as an example to tell you that, while I understand your suggestion and your concerns, I don’t think this level has taken the place of others, but it happily coexists with them, standing on their shoulders. I can accept that in many societies there is a level of “hyper” consciousness and programming consisting of thinking about thought, in general, and thinking about the conscious-programmed thought. However, it is not appropriate to believe that the external tip of the iceberg is all there is and everything under the water doesn’t exist.

On the other hand, this stroke of hyper awareness and programming shouldn't be confused with manipulation or simple toolism, firstly because this level is intertwined to all previous levels and it is only understandable on that basis; also, because the occupation of the thought about thought itself cannot be interpreted as a sort of a Machiavellian manipulation. This is not only because the issue of ethics is more present today than ever in the discussion of scientific and intellectual work, but also because it would be abusive to identify consciousness or programming with perversion [9.23-9.26].

“Our world is almost the kingdom of toolism,” you say. At least, my world is very large, varied, multiple societies coexist in it and, in these and their relationships, there are multiple levels. You suggested that it would be the dominance of toolism. You haven't convinced me, but let's see if you can convince the Islamic world of that, or the Roman Christians or the Bushmen or the Quechua Ecuadorians of the Sumak Kausai. Let's see if you can convince them that the messages transmitted by the Prophet are tools of some group to manipulate them during fifteen centuries. What group could manage to organize such a plot for so long to manipulate millions and millions of people?

We have precisely done this epoché so you don't believe that Islam is someone's tool to manipulate millions and millions of people. And if the CIA had believed it could do it, it backfired 1,000 times, many more times than Rubén Darío believed when he recited about the 1,000 lion cubs. This aims to take ideas seriously and precisely not to distort them as simple tools used by a transparent and “un-eidetized” consciousness.

On the other hand, I completely accept the fact of toolism, in some sense, and I also accept eidetic studies must deal with this topic permanently appearing in these conversations that we are systematizing. I dislike this word because of the utilitarianism issue, the use and abuse, the cynicism that it implies, but beyond that, I am interested in the matter of eidetic engineering, a more elegant name than “instrumentalism,” “manipulation” or “toolism.” I am very interested in talking about this engineering, which is one of the ways to reformulate the studies about ideas, so anchored and frightened in historiography.

5.7 You mentioned the possibility, and even the desirability, of

conceiving eidetic systems (at least some of them) as composed of concepts-notions-eidas that are approximately equivalent to genes that give their respective identities [3.9, 3.19]. In your perspective, this analogy would allow progress for a better understanding of how changes at the eidetic level are made. But it has also enabled you to formulate your proposal for (gen)eidetic engineering, linked in part to the desire to promote eidetic development.

Indeed, the occupation of knowledge is to produce new ideas, so in this sense, a professional of knowledge is a geneidetic engineer. In an eidetic cross, eidas combine as molecules or genes giving rise either to modified eidetic specimens or to previously inexistent ones.

This is usually defined as an “influence,” a notion as wide as vague, but that makes those who settle for little or lack an analytical mentality happy. The models of genes and molecules are particularly used to think about the evolution of ideas and to forge or improve that basic and insufficient notion called “influence.”

5.8 You mentioned the word influence... Let’s make a parenthesis, if you like, to present your points of view on this notion. Several times I have heard you put it into question, brood over it, use it in certain ways, argue about it...

“Influence” is a loose and vague notion, but not completely disposable. In the use of this word there are at least three ideas involved: The change in ideas, the circulation of ideas and, above all, how ideas are combined. In the case of circulation, normally the notion of influence is combined with “expansion” and “dissemination.”

The influence notion is so broad and vague that it loses value at the time of fine analysis, since the judgments that comprise it can always pass as real, thereby preventing discrimination against specific or delicate cases.

Something similar happens with the notion of “context” and “sickness;” the latter is so vague that it allows you to describe both a deadly cancer, a cold, a hand infection, madness and even, in many places, women’s periods and pregnancy. It would be ridiculous for modern medicine to refer to all such cases by using

the sickness concept because, even though it allows true judgments, they are so vague, so lacking in information, that they prevent us from understanding the ailment or curing it. Working in our field just with the notion of influence is as ridiculous as that.

On the other hand, influence is also “cause,” and it’s a crucial notion to me for the preparation of eidetic cartographies. The arrow has been key in making these cartographies because it represents some level of influence understood as the source, causality and projection. I have worked with this criterion for decades; some cartographies have been published in my book on the South-Saharan African thought, which can be found on the Internet (Devés, 2008). [See Annex 2]

5.9 Let’s pick back up the issue of changes. I have the impression that, in order to strengthen the eidetic studies proposal, it would be essential to have tools that make it possible to establish with relative clarity when we are faced with changes within a given eidetic system (adjustments, adaptations) and when we are faced with the change of an eidetic system (displacement, substitution, absorption, mutation). In turn, it seems that an eidetic system can be moved from a somehow hegemonic situation to a less major one without being completely “wiped off the map,” but seeing its centrality reduced and having, eventually, new social, political or cultural functions.

Let’s clear the path a bit to get there better. The question why ideas appear is not the same as how they appear, nor is it the same the one as to why they become hegemonic. In other words, the question about an idea’s genesis does not have to do with the question regarding hegemony. It is one thing to explain why changes occur and another is to explain the process of eidetic mutation itself. Eidetic mutation happens through the replacement of eidas and before that through the incorporation or replacement of eida components. Origin and mutation are two problems that are closely attached. It is not about the search of a zero point, but rather the emergence of mutations and the process of change. New ideas are formed on the basis of ancient ones, like trees, which branch out or cover themselves with new rings each year. An idea *in nuce* begins to be developed, branched, elaborated, or notions are

deducted that, just as corollaries, can be derived from there.

The matter of mutation is a key element for eidetic studies. It is a question of determining what mutation means and what internal processes are generated (as well as the external factors with which it is accentuated, slowed down or re-directed) that account for it. Eidetic entities are permanently mutating in an immense variety of forms. Each new specimen reframes, adds, cuts, and crosses eidetic elements. Another very different issue is to query which ones will replicate massively through societies and, even different from this, is to wonder why some of them succeeded and others don't in specific places and times.

5.10 But the truth is ideas have always mutated in some connection with humans and with non-eidetic realities...

Eidetic entities mutate in relation to human beings. However, when it comes to eidetic mutations, we must study them at a proper eidetic level without prejudice to showing connections with non-eidetic elements; they must never be studied by replacing the inherently eidetic with the non-eidetic. It can be said that Shia Islam has mutated in the last decades of the twentieth century in relation to the processes of decolonization and this may be true. However, that claim tells us nothing about the mutations of Shia Islam as an eidetic system and therefore, it is quasi irrelevant to those involved in eidetic studies. If the changed elements remain inexplicit, along with the ones that were replaced by others, or the ones that were reduced or increased or if the elements from other eidetic entities were included in the new Shia Islam, among other things, are unclear, then the claims about the processes of decolonization is completely abstract from the point of view of this disciplinary field.

The relationship of eidetic with the non-eidetic can be thought-out starting with the consideration of the different non-eidetic levels involved such as:

- Organs of production and reception of ideas, organs of accommodation and reproduction of ideas, that is: the corporeal, neurons, brains; reception such as ears, eyes...

- Modulations of languages to express these ideas, changes in languages, references within these, everything that has to do with giving account of specific situations of expression: images, symbols, the evolution of languages, meanings, through

associations, languages genres, possibilities and limitations in expressing those ideas...

- Supports and physical means through which to express and disseminate ideas: Paper, ink, printing, newspapers, electronic media...

- Ecosystems and niches where such ideas house themselves and develop: institutions, groups, networks, organizations, corporations, peoples, social sectors, classes, states, international organizations, regions of the world, in some eras more than in other...

- Motivation (biographical and psychic, among others) of human beings to hold and spread such ideas: militancy, conviction, economic interests, desires of power...

- The non-eidetic topics eidetic entities deal with, for example: explaining natural and social issues about the city, global warming, the clash of civilizations, the origin of the universe, why the sun rises, among others...

- People, sectors and historical situations that are considered protagonists and promoters of both the positive and negative: peasantry, the Mexican Revolution, the State, business people, among others.

- People who receive work favorably and those who don't, for example: business people's media, the Japanese audience, among others...

- Energizers that provide energy, money, and resources for the circulation of ideas, such as: corporations, churches, political parties, states, institutions, groups, guilds, corporations, foundations, organizations, agencies, public agencies, municipalities...

5.11 In Latin America, there have been several approaches to the issue of how to think of changes at the eidetic level. They were developed from philosophy, literary criticism, and history. In an important sense, the different positions seem to refer to various conceptions on the “biology of culture” to freely use a notion introduced by André Reszler (1984, 77ff.), in particular, how to characterize our peripheral culture, and how to understand the implications of that status. We have the classic polemic between Salazar Bondy and Zea, about to turn

half a century; we have the text, also a classic, by Roberto Schwarz on ideas out of place (which in recent years has been revisited, recovered and debated, in particular by Elias Palti, giving rise to controversial exchanges); we have the contribution of Bernardo Subercaseaux, who in the 80s contrasted what he called the “reproductivist model” to “model of cultural appropriation,” reproducing, in other key, aspects of the controversy between Salazar Bondy and Zea as well as the implications of Schwarz’s statements... The list could be expanded. I understand you feel, like myself, identified with the model of cultural appropriation, that is, with Zea and with the second variant of Subercaseaux, as well as with that implication highlighted by Palti, according to which no idea is out of place, strictly speaking, but they all are in place, and it’s our job to clarify how that occurs in each circumstance...

In part, I’ve been engaged in the studies of the South American thought because of an annoyance against a pedantic eidetic mimicry, an empty one, unable to connect with reality. Thus, one of my tasks has been to report the mimicry, the alienation, and our intellectuals’ schizophrenia, something I noticed particularly in the strongholds of philosophy.

However, I obviously didn’t invent, nor did I discover this. It should be noted that in our region, it is an already accepted fact that we have repeated and copied many more ideas than the ones we have invented or that are copied by others. It is a topic of the Latin American culture; we have invented little and copied a lot. In eidetic terms, this is something relevant. It is also seen in the eidetic systems names. For a long time, and still today, eidetic entities have been thought with European names, such as, liberalism, positivism and Marxism. It is harder to see scholars talking about Arielism, Cepalism, etc. On the other hand, in any intellectual ecosystem, both things can happen. They are antagonistic as models, not as realities. Besides, it is likely it’s not about choosing, but working its dynamics and combinations.

I do not believe in the “contextus ex-machina,” which says when a book or an idea reaches another place, it automatically adopts the ways of the local. That would be assuming there is no alienation, nor schizophrenia, nor the pedantry of saying things that

are valued in the centers and making recommendations based simply on the demonstration effect or, on other occasions, recommendations paid by those who benefit from those opinions, whether they belong to the empires or not. All that exists, at least that's what common sense tells us; however, I feel it is of the utmost importance to determine why, among the books of such nature, some were read in a place while others weren't, and why they were more successful in some places or times than others.

I've been thinking over and over about this intellectual dependence which I have tried to relate to psychic issues and social psychology, expressed in the "affective dependence" concept, as well as in the concept known by many as intellectual inferiority complex or feeling, seeking to deepen and explain this.

5.12 I have a couple of additional questions on this issue. First, I have a question on the outline you presented in *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX*. This was a schema exogenously determined in cycles in which centralitarian and identitarian dispositions alternated. It is a proposal you published a long time ago and that, in some sense, could be the subject of your own critique of contextualism. What do you think about this? More particularly, how would you recover this proposal in the framework of our conversation regarding in which manner it is advisable to think about changes at the eidetic level?

With regard to cycles, I introduced elements of eidetic dynamics and others of a non-eidetic nature, especially assuming what I have called great exceptional events, thought of as "catastrophes" (wars, revolutions, invasions, large economic crisis) that baffle or unsettle intellectuals, leaving them without response to such events and making existing proposals seem invalid. However, that doesn't undermine the presence of non-eidetic elements, but it gives them meaning because of their specificity. My observation doesn't aim to destroy the notion of impact of the non-eidetic in the eidetic, but it aims rather to place it in its own measure and, above all, to specify and mediate it, taking the element of "sensitivity" (something we haven't talked about in these talks) into account. That is what I wanted to do by overcoming the vague notion of "context."

My critique of the *ex-machina* contextualism, or lazy contextualism, is radical because it perverts with its vagueness or indeterminacy the relationships between the eidetic and non-eidetic, which are numerous and determinable in principle, as we have seen before. Changes in ideas and changes understood as replacements, are related to the non-eidetic in many ways. For example, changes in intellectuals' ecosystems often have to do with the alternation of generations, changes in the sensitivity of the new generations, the search for a voice and their positioning in ecosystems. They are also related to differences among classes and have to do with major wars, social or natural cataclysms that have an impact on the sensitivity of the intellectuals. Changes also have to do with invasions and migrations of people from other cultures, with programs organized by empires, states or certain groups in power; changes also have to do with the economic formations and working ways. In another sense, changes have to do with various dimensions of the material and symbolic culture, certainly with the evolution of languages, and probably a lot with mutations of the brain... If all this is called context, or one of these things is context, or the second and the fourth ones, or the first and fifth, then it is a concept that completely lacks analytical value. This doesn't mean, in any way, to disqualify those who, in the name of a well understood contextualism, strive to articulate sociopolitical realities and eidetic entities and, in particular, some systems, devices, and mechanisms. What I mean is that perhaps it may be convenient to leave a word that leads to more mistakes than clarifications at this point of knowledge.

5.13 The second question has to do with your presentation in the *Jornadas de Talca* in 2016, which we already talked about in a previous section [2.22-2.24]. You covered there the issue of eidetic development resorting to elements of the reception theory of literary texts, although at a proper distance, since they have different dynamics. The topic of aware development addressed there, obviously has a close relationship with changes at the eidetic level.

I've been wondering for a long time now about changes at the eidetic level, change as a replacement or a supersession of an eidetic system by another and, more recently, a change within

eidetic entities. I understand they are two very different things, even though they both take place together or simultaneously at times.

Regarding change as supplanting, I tried to explain how the change, for example, from a culturalist identitarian movement (Arielism) to a social identitarian movement (the indigenous American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) occurred shortly before and shortly after 1920. What happened for this to occur, what was necessary, what were the causes and conditions. This is a prickly problem that requires precision. For example, I believe that the Mexican Revolution and the Soviet Union played a role in it, but not big enough to explain it and perhaps not even “necessary.” Social prominence was clearly manifesting before in farmers’ movements and, above all, artisans and workmen; but these revolutions not only encouraged them but also allowed them and society to be taken seriously. On the other hand, this implied a certain generational change. I also believe that the cataclysm of the First World War altered some convictions in such a way that allowed spaces where new ideas settled, leaving people obsolete or baffled...

But you’re asking me about a specific work. The focus of it was the rework of the Liberation Theology in Sri Lanka by Aloysius Pieris, but the objective was not directed towards the theological question itself but the process by which a member of the professional intelligentsia, with a corpus aware of ideas, receives and re-elaborates a new corpus which comes from outside his intellectual ecosystem. In order to do this, I developed a model with five moments and several operations, which I will copy, since it is more didactic this way (Devés, 2017).

- First moment: The reception starting with the prior external filtering to its reception on the part of the ecosystem under study. It was provided by external agents to the ecosystem, had been edited, translated, sent, distributed, and circulated in networks. Operation of reading previously translated works where the eidetic system at issue is expressed. Operation of receiving an established canon in the issuer ecosystem, where the key works of the eidetic system are set, and will be eventually republished, anthologized and translated. Operation of incorporation to established networks that, initially at least, don’t depend on the receptor intellectual ecosystem. Operation of incorporation to the institutionalism and training

programs where people from the receiver ecosystem can meet.

- Second moment: Reception by a filtering that is both internal and proactive to the reception-selection-approximation according to criteria from the receptor ecosystem. This is the first level of ownership with a “horizon of experiences-expectations.” Operation of selective reading of the most usable material, according to the expectations horizon, from eidetic systems already installed in the ecosystem. Operation of searching for contacts, translation of other works, setting up contacts and even learning languages from the receiver initiative.

- Third moment: It’s a simple processing, using ideas immediately and without the mediation of a conceptual creation. Operation of reading the eidetic system received from pre-existing categories in the reception ecosystem, starting with what is friendlier and more familiar. Operation of reinterpreting reality and the history of society itself and beyond it with the received eidetic system. Operation of associating the new eidetic system with the dilemmas of the intellectual ecosystem.

- Fourth moment: It’s a complex reprocessing and conceptual creation. Operation of detection in the reality of problems that might be interpreted (in a privileged way) with the received eidetic system, that in tension with the third moment, of naïve reception, might look like all reality was interpretable with the eidetic system imported. Operation of creating concepts inspired by the received eidetic system, in order to understand specific phenomena that were not in the primary-imported version, because it was not relevant to the ecosystem in which it was embodied. Crossing operation, that is, encounter and articulation of notions from various origins, whether ancestral from the ecosystem itself and/or from other recent imports, with elements of the in process eidetic system.

- Fifth moment: Baptism, articulation, critic and agenda, aiming at a new denomination, reached in the articulation, merger or crossing between components of the arrived system eidetic (and eventually other foreign ones) and one or more of the ones present within the reception ecosystem, in the critic of the arrived eidetic system as being insufficient, and in the formulation of a work agenda consistent with this novelty. Operation of designation of baptism of the new eidetic system. Operation of critics and

detection of inadequacies and limitations of the received eidetic system to understand the reality of those who receive it, in explicit break with the first ingenuity that adopted it as a package and panacea. Operation of development of articulation categories or synthesis categories that'll enable the encounter, fusion or crosses between elements from various eidetic systems. Operation of formulation of an agenda of the new eidetic system as an expression of its novelty.

5.14 I would like to revisit the topic of the intellectual, which is understood as the differentiated professional who works with ideas, and in your words is a conscious agent. A manufacturer? At some point in our conversation I got the impression that this bricolage project, or conscious management is situated at superficial levels. However, we have also admitted that conscious eidetic production, and even professional, is increasingly important. In fact, eidetic studies that actually exist deal mostly, though not exclusively, with this type of work, with its fruits, if I may use this expression. I want to suggest the following: while it is true that at a theoretical and epistemological level it is relevant to be aware of the fact that existing eidetic studies deal with a limited segment of the eidetic world governed by individual "laws," it is also true that a question is imposed regarding the relevance and the current sense of the emphasis you give to the reproductive strategies level of eidetic systems over the level of conscious development of eidetic systems by the intellectuals. What is it that we can "see" thanks to this emphasis that we would miss otherwise?

I don't like "superficial"; I do prefer "recent", in terms of the long eidetic duration. And the previous answer focuses precisely on the work of a professional intellectual, who works with a bibliography and whose explicit task is to produce and rework ideas. I would, therefore, like to clear doubts regarding this matter.

It's a matter of considering a disciplinary field that by far transcends the ways of doing things of our community of specialists. Just to mention other spaces let's mention what Mircea Eliade has done, with so much recognition, or in South America, Miguel León-Portilla or Rodolfo Kusch, whose works were

collected in anthologies on the philosophy of America. We have people working in other lines of research, though they don't consider themselves fully part of the intellectual or conceptual or ideas history, which seem to be the most explicit ones in recent decades.

5.15 Politics is a topic of great relevance here. I am referring to the conditions or political boundaries to enunciate or, better, conditions or boundaries which allow certain eidetic systems to thrive or not. For example, for eidetic systems related to the idea of revolutions to prosper, certain political conditions were required; today, the idea of revolution is still alive, but in a different way compared to life as it was lived half a century ago. Another, more recently example is Neo-developmentalism. This eidetic system had a notorious centrality in our America around 2010, when a sort of gravitational center seemed to appear in Brazil, Argentina and other spaces; however, with the political crisis in Brazil and other changes at the regional level, it seems to have lost not only its centrality, but also its consistency. It may still be alive, but in other conditions. In summary, what happens in politics seems to impose certain limits or parameters for eidetic systems to be successful or not, at least for certain types of eidetic systems. How do you think about this problem without falling into the limitations of misunderstood contextualism? In another respect, what happened to those eidetic systems and why did their reproductive strategies prove to be ineffective?

Firstly, I want to tell you that it is one of the most important questions of eidetic studies, as fundamental to the discipline as it is difficult to answer. Let's start by distinguishing why they appear from why they thrive.

I can't tell you what the conditions are that allow eidetic systems or other eidetic species to be successful. Hypotheses have been developed by studying specific cases, but I think they didn't have sufficient information and didn't make a basic and questionable distinction between eidetic entities of long duration and "domestic" ones. The survival of crocodiles over 500 million of years and the way in which poodles thrived in the court of Louis XV of France can't be explained in the same manner. This key

distinction is not made by intellectual historians who believe that poodles (or, in any case, domestic animals) represent the reality of all species.

You cannot explain how the myths of exogamy have prospered in the same manner in which neoliberalism has prospered. It is not the same to ask why an eidetic system has thrived for centuries and throughout societies, as Islam has, than wonder why Neoliberalism has prospered for 25 years in Chile as an economic policy. Distinguishing questions is key to giving good answers. In my view, the bibliography has not even formulated the problem well enough to respond properly.

I'm going attempt two different answers: ideas prosper because they generate good replication methods and also, ideas thrive because they establish fruitful symbiosis with their host societies.

The best cases are Christianity and Islam, and even Buddhism, perhaps to some lesser degree. Judaism serves us as a witness to this reasoning. I have pointed out that a key innovation of Christianity, inherited later by Islam, was to incorporate the "proselytism" device as part of the eidetic system [3.32]. The "replicating-proselytizer" method presented a tremendously higher way of spreading than the "replicating-vegetative" system of other eidetic systems. Judaism is a religion that has thrived for more centuries than Christianity and Islam and has a diverse diaspora around the world. Its geneidetic matrix is very similar similar to that of Christianity and Islam as well, but lacking the device previously mentioned, it has been reduced to one ethnic group-culture.

The second criterion consists of the happy symbiosis that empowers both parties. These eidetic systems (and keep in mind that within Christianity and Islam there have been numerous trends and bifurcations, not all equally successful) have enhanced their societies by encouraging them to flourish and develop instead of pinioning or inhibiting them like other eidetic systems that drowned societies with taboos or imposed onto them so many obligations that exhausted them; these other eidetic systems also lied to them so blatantly that there was no way to take them during contingencies and protests of reality. When I say they were beneficial symbiosis, I am referring to the following: the population extension of communities, work efficiency, openness to innovation and hybridizations at various levels, the affirmation of their identity, and

their ability to defend themselves and expand. In parentheses, it should be noted that peripheral intellectuals have wondered insistently about these issues. The question: Why have our societies been razed by European expansion? it is the question of validity regarding the ideas we deal with and with which we develop our relationships with other societies; also, whether such ideas will enhance us or are straitjackets and if so, to what extent. That is, it doesn't mean that these eidetic systems are completely beneficial and that some or many of their gen-eidas cannot be (or become) "harmful" (as opposed to "suitable") to these societies, in new situations.

The consideration of these long-term and broad expansion eidetic systems allows us to develop good global theories. This is the case, although the majority, not the entirety, of the eidetic entities that we are interested in are current eidetic systems which are short-term and sometimes involve broad expansion; these systems are frequently located within the intelligentsia unconnected to societies, in the form of myths, mentalities, hegemonic ideologies, etc. This variety nearly prevents the formulation of theories but casuistry, so it is best to establish an abstract characterization. For example, eidetic systems can thrive due to the following:

- They allow the expression of opposition to power, such as Marxism in colonial Africa.
- They are systematically supported by power, going from the dominant groups to broad social sectors over the decades, such as Neoliberalism in Pinochet's Chile or the Cuban version of Marxism.
- They are supported by colonial powers, such as Christianity in colonization conditions. From here another question is derived: Why do some eidetic systems continue after the disappearance of colonialism?
- They cover explanatory needs better than others: an example is scientific theories and theories regarding natural issues rather than social issues, although all are covered to some extent. Relativity vs. Newton is the classic example for this genre. Something similar happens with ideologies, which are often tested by their opponents (and by the population, in general) for not being able to achieve the objectives they proposed. That is to say, they are

tested through analysis results and, above all, common objectives rather than by their explanatory capacity.

- Their representatives or diffusers receive systematic external support in human or material resources due to fact that they give direct benefits or provide indirect services to the population. This is the case with the missions of various religions, one particularly clear case being Mormonism.

- They offer an easy to understand option that seems consistent with the times: Cepalism.

- They represent interests and offer identity to low consideration intellectual groups, for example: liberalism in the South America of the first decades and the mid-nineteenth century, socialism in Europe during the second half of the 19th century and first decades of the 20th century.

- They allow small intellectual sectors to position themselves in a niche within ecosystems by expressing values and opposition to others and satisfying the requirements of small dissident social sectors. Examples of this are seen in the Trotskyism, in Christianity sects and in groups who cultivate eastern religions in non-eastern regions, among others.

- Proselytizing figures arrive with enough charisma to sow some seeds and take care of their plants for some time, whether they are missionaries of religious eidetic systems, sciences (natural, social and humanities) or ideologies.

On the other hand, I could distinguish in more abstract terms three types of explanations: the evolutionist, that tries to explain changes by a certain natural selection among entities; the functionalist-contextualist, that explains changes in response to the capacity to satisfy functions or needs within a society, and the instrumentalist-toolism, which explains changes by the action of power (propaganda, weapons). It must be noted that any of these explanations will accept combinations and exceptional cases. The last two aim to explain ideas as products of societies and they generally refer to short-term eidetic entities located in small spaces, such as the elite in power in some capital of a dependent country.

A misunderstood contextualism is the lazy one that doesn't intend to provide a specific explanation, but is satisfied with the word "context," without having to explain the specific. Certainly,

there may be a completely honest and poorly managed attempt to provide an explanation, for example, due to a lack of information and, above all, due to a lack of fineness in the necessary distinctions. All of the above leads to distorting confusion.

In any case, a great number of non-eidetic realities have an impact on the eidetic and, by the way, it is not reduced to politics. A great natural cataclysm or one brought about by humans, such as the detonation of nuclear bombs, affects societies greatly. Paradigms are disassembled, and alternatives are desperately sought. Another example: the economic success of a state that until recently was backwards motivates a revision of economic theories, a revision that would not have taken place if everything had remained the same. Another example is how the existence of a great geo-political military and cultural power will generate diffusion actions in its proposals while causing admiration in many people. This is quite evident in the case of the USSR, which became an international phenomenon, rather than a political one. They motivated, financed, and inspired communist parties in many places, all of which declined afterwards with its implosion.

A lot less frequent today is the individual-psychological explanation, which aims to take into account the condition of those who think, as well as the condition of the thinking “subject” and the ways in which said subject wants or decides to position himself in the intellectual scenario by seeking his own niche and the psychological dynamics of unconscious reaction. An example of this is the young generations against the older ones, which seek to find their “place in the sun.”

5.16 Unlike those who focus on the study of intellectuals as intellectuals, or those who study networks, or the imposed or suggested constraints by various materialities, I've always been interested in highlighting the work that a particular thinker performs with the eidetic matter; I'm interested in the laborious forging, the goldsmith of the eidas –all of this without denying the importance of the above. In fact, most of my studies have been on authors considered in singular, albeit in relation to a broader issue. My book *La Argentina como desilusión* addresses the work of five intellectuals. Another one of my books, *La idea de América en el historicismo mexicano*, addresses the work of three. Apart from those

considered in those volumes, I have also studied other leading figures in depth; this is the case, for example, with Carlos Pereyra. I'm currently studying Darcy Ribeiro. Even in studies where I tried to think in terms of moments or process, I continued to be a tributary of this philo-biographical predisposition.

As a result of living so long in this manner of working, I am inclined to see working with ideas by each intellectual as a sort of epopee associated with the laborious forging of "something to say," usually with paraenetic branches. Thus, I see a master bricoleur in each intellectual, defined by a unity of purposes who arranges and re-arranges materials they have at their disposal on successive backdrops or contexts. Notions such as forged a niche, positioning, etc. certainly play a role here. Bajtinian roots play a role as well –an idea according to which a work, any work, is first and foremost a dialog of multiple voices and, at the same time, an unstable, changing equation, torn apart by tensions including the very crucial one between the much-touted unity of purpose and the incessant flow of history, which presses, so to speak, toward fickleness. These provisions position me at a certain distance from those who tend to blur the author figure, under the assumption according to which authors are like ventriloquist dummies, spoken by speeches or by structural dynamics that go beyond them.

Forgive the interruption, but toolism alludes, in good measure, to ventriloquism, even though they are not synonyms.

5.17 I can perfectly admit that not everything here is "conscious management;" however, this point of view has allowed me to outline specific periodizations that do not always match great panoramas, though they do tinge them, and sometimes question them. Putting us at this level, there are resonances, deferment, obstinacies and other phenomena that constantly seem to lead us to undermine manual schemes, which are, nevertheless, essential, because they are the ones that allow us to identify interstices and cracks.

In principle, I don't think that radicalizing the dilemma regarding author or speech (or eidetic system) will lead to

something too interesting; I think it is rather a matter of emphasis. Personally, I'm more interested in what someone does with all that, how they solve conflicts and moral dilemmas, and how they reformulate the equation. Ideas have a life, but only through and in those who bring them to life. You yourself talked a moment ago about upheavals and existential crisis. Of course, all of this is also something historical, i.e., the professional-defined intellectual is a historical product that only exists in some societies...

I mention all this to present two issues. The first issue deals with in which regard this manner of understanding things can intersect with the eidetic studies proposal. That is to say, what place is there in this proposal for the author and his epopee.

There is the work of recognized authors by name, years and circumstances from a certain time, that is identified with the emergence of writing in various societies. I don't understand what the problem would be. Many eidetic entities have a creation date and an author. However, the isms, the contemporary ideologies are recognized in general as thought trends in which numerous personalities have had an influence. Of course, as technicians in these matters, we establish a canon of figures, and I have been very interested in doing so –we made distinctions, set up sub-schools and determined key dates in their constitution.

I have been interested in the great eidetic movements as well as very specific cases because of their representative nature. For example, I've distinguished moments and figures in the identitarian movement of South America from Argentina to Mexico. I have no doubt of the importance of figures, increasingly into the present, where an academic career is established with the possibility of making innovative contributions, especially in literature and plastics.

Regarding the importance of the author in the gestation of eidetic entities, I have talked about the possibility of psycho-eidetics in equivalence to psycho-linguistics; it seems entirely reasonable to me to do this and even if it's not my expertise nor my affinity, it can be yours. Although I am interested in defining a discipline space, I believe it should be done quite openly. That's the reason for multi-perspectivism, as we are trying to establish a field on the basis of a vast amount of work acknowledged as valid by ourselves, and

whose unity is given by a recognition of its peers and not by the secondment to a specific method and much less to a paradigm.

Regarding the psycho-eidetic, it would be particularly important to work in connection with cognitive sciences and the study of the unconscious. I don't mean this only from a psychoanalytic point of view. What I am referring to is the fact that we are still working intellectually as we sleep, and the brain works "intellectually" or "academically" on the sidelines of consciousness or of our decisions. In the brain we have many files we are not aware of. When we find the tip to the ball of yarn, it begins to unravel and to emerge, allowing us to write in that key. This is taken on particularly by those who write novels and screenplays since they must put themselves inside the mind of several characters that are not themselves.

5.18 The second issue has to do with a bunch of ideas I outlined in a recent study. I do not know if they're equivalent to what you call models, but there are some images or metaphors there trying to apprehend aspects which aim to characterize the life of ideas by going perhaps "beyond" the personal will of intellectuals. I am referring, in particular, to the notions of symbolic sagas and cultural stations.

With the first notion, I wanted to call attention to the persistence or, better, the recurrent appearance/recreation in our cultural history of certain motifs or topics, for instance: the saga of Shakespeare (Ariel/ Caliban/ Prosperous), the saga of Hegel, the saga of Marx (Marx and Bolivar), the saga of Las Casas, the saga of the baroque, the onomastics saga, among others. These appear to be eidetic systems with their own life here. With the second notion, by using the word "station" in a railway sense, I have tried to emphasize that there are key moments in which intellectuals, meanings, symbols, and temporalities intersect by taking into account a specific topic or question.

As I know you are aware of these attempts, because you've heard me elaborate on them, and I also know they somehow caught your attention, I would like to hear your thoughts on the matter. The idea is to move a few steps forward into unraveling what their relation is, or what could it be, to a proposal such as the one of eidetic studies. We know,

of course, that these images lack, at least for now, great theoretical pretensions. They are just someone's attempt, someone who is accustomed to working in a philo-biography plane, to go a few steps "beyond" that record. We also know that we are talking about very contemporary and less abyssal matters than the origin of the species, where conscious and tooling elements play an important role, as we have been highlighting.

The multi-perspectivism proposal opens the possibility of several entries into a discipline field and, though on the one hand, these multiple perspectives contribute to looking at an object in a more fully and complemented way, on the other hand, they open the path for lazy relativism. To avoid this relativism, every view must show its validity and its contributions to the discussion within the field, in dialog with people who work from other perspectives. That said, I find what you have proposed quite interesting, except regarding the "imprison" part, because eidetic studies intend to "liberate," by being part of the libertarian epistemologies, if there were any by a lucky chance.

What you propose may contribute to conceptualizing problems that were unnoticed from other perspectives. In a way, the issue of the sagas could be related to the proposal of Lovejoy, long-term issues that appear and reappear in intellectual discussion, thereby constituting a trajectory within an intellectual ecosystem or, more broadly, of a culture. The set of these matters creates certain thickness, as successive layers of sediment or rings.

What you said about rail stations to me seems like an imaginative analogy that can be fruitful. Let me add, expressions such as these can summon reinterpretations of eidetic phenomena that relieve new dimensions and allow other readings of phenomena that have been almost overlooked to be made. I believe we have talked about it, but the question of ideas that are out of place is one of these issues that has been dealt with again and again, and one that can be assumed as a part of a saga, and part of a station. It is a question that gives, for that reason, consistency and a path to a certain task.

6

INTELLECTUAL NETWORKS AND EIDETIC CIRCULATION

6.1 No so long ago, during these discussions, you mentioned the study of intellectual networks as being among the most important contributions that Latin American eidetic studies have made [2.6; 2.25]. Your contributions in this regard were numerous. We have, for example, the book *Redes intelectuales en América Latina*, published in 2007 and reprinted in 2014. In this work, you gather interventions, which are different in nature, yet related to this topic. These include: specific studies, such as Arielism networks, ECLAC networks and theosophical networks and profiling agendas to develop “intellectuals productive forces” (Devés, 2007a).

This textual set is preceded by an introduction, in whose pages you sought to establish conceptual and methodological parameters. There, you defined intellectual networks as “a set of people engaged in the production and dissemination of knowledge, who communicate over the years due to their professional activity”. Then, you proposed a methodology to study them, which focused on considering several ways of communication and the establishment of the

frequency and density of contacts. You also pointed out that the category seemed useful to complement others, such as “influence”, “generation”, and “field”.

I wonder, first of all, what balance you make of that proposal, both in its terms as well as in its subsequent drift, i.e. do you still consider it valid? Have you seen it giving results in some way? Secondly, has your focus incorporated new concepts or topics of interest associated with the problem of intellectual networks?

Intellectual networks are a current concept, which has had a wide and favorable reception. It is a broad and even elastic concept. This allows different people to approach it from various work interests. This laxity has led to the point that any group of academics is called an intellectual network, in any sense. Words go far beyond their initial definitions. People speak words colloquially, but they aren't always worried about the words being critically consistent.

On the other hand, by checking Google we can perceive that many people have done theses and articles in recent years. It's worth mentioning the work of colleagues and disciples, especially those who have worked on this topic with Marta Casás and Teresa García Giraldez, with whom I have also worked. In particular, the concept has been important in the work of the Mendoza group, especially in the case of Claudio Maíz and Alejandro Paredes. Other close people, such as Ricardo Melgar Bao, Fernanda Beigel, Paola Bayle, among many others with whom we have talks, have also made contributions.

In truth, this concept has met the need to refer in friendly and projective terms to intellectual work. I say “friendly” in contrast to the concept of “field”. In fact, intellectual networks can be thought of as an intellectual field or as actors of the intellectual field. But the specificity of the notion accentuates more the collaboration and cooperation among intellectuals than disputes and conflicts, though without denying their existence, of course.

I say “Projective terms” because the concept allows you to speak towards the future in terms of programmatic collaboration. Other people speak of “intellectual communities”, “epistemic communities” or “the intellectual”. Perhaps these are fewer friendly notions. Networks and intelligentsia are female concepts in Spanish.

This is not trivial.

Carlos Tulio Medeiros has organized, within the *Internacional del Conocimiento*, a workshop on intellectual networks, not as a historical or sociological research about networks, but as a programming of activities within networks. This has also been thought of as a place for “academic business” to present projects and establish forms of association. I have had the opportunity to participate twice in these conferences, both held in Colombia. Hugo Biagini has also developed the notion in this more projective way during the *Corredor de las Ideas*.

Despite the success of the construct, recent works have barely managed to connect the studies of the past with the circumstances of the present to a limited extent, and even less so with the challenges of our intellectuals in the global space.

There is a deficit of work intention that would allow us to capitalize the experience of networks. I present to you the following analogy with economic studies: in this area we are informed every day about possibilities, the ups and downs, performances and deficiencies, investments and improvements. All of these tell us: “If you want to do well, keep in mind such and such factors”. Regarding knowledge and those who accompany it, there isn’t anything even remotely similar that would allow us to be more efficient, more reflective, or allow us to take advantage of what is happening and handle options. Even so, many of us are convinced of the importance of knowledge and its management for life. But eidetic studies are not contributing as much as they could to the eidetic development in South America. This is an issue about which we should talk more [7].

6.2 From your effort to define this, I have listed some key features of the intellectual networks, which are: durability, density, internationality, among others.

For intellectual networks to exist, there must be an amount of accumulated time, and years gone by. Not all groups of people who meet are a network. A network involves a relationship of trust and recognition.

The temporary matter and the need for years are decisive in distinguishing the sporadic or casual contacts from the real constitution of a network, which requires frequency or density in

their communication. Density allows one to understand what the most active nuclei of the network are, as well as the moments of greater or lesser vitality.

At a national level, you can also talk of networks. However, as my studies have sought to understand large spaces that transcend nation states, I've been more interested in studying international networks. Clearly, I have been less interested in national networks, for there are countries that are enormous, real worlds in themselves, such as China, India or the USA, among others.

In this regard, I have tried to graph the networks of individuals and institutions in a similar manner to the relationship, reception and emission cartographies we spoke of before [5.8] [see Annex 3].

6.3 What could you say regarding the second part of the question with which we opened this chapter? What new concepts or issues related to the problem of intellectual networks have you incorporated lately? I have heard you speaking of intellectual net-creation, eidetic circulation...

I would separate these notions. Net-creation (*redificación*) is a concept that aims to express the action of creating networks. It can easily become the verb: "Net-create" (*redificar*). I think it is better than other expressions, such as forge networks, build networks, and even weave networks. In addition to this, this notion has helped me move forward with the idea that it is necessary to "net-create the South American intelligentsia" that, in addition to pointing out the necessary articulation of people working in distant regions of the continent, refers indirectly to a building and creation labor, given the proximity of language. Of course, intellectual networks have much to do with the circulation of ideas.

6.4 I have also heard you talk about eidetic dissemination, even during these discussions and, also, more particularly, about "strategies for the dissemination of eidetic entities".

Anthropology and Archeology have widely discussed the diffusionism of certain ideas or practices, though I don't know much about that discussion. Simple ideas –the idea of the wheel, ax or arrows quiver– disseminated, first of all, through the simple

observation of the object. By contrast, manufacturing procedures and the best processes were derived from a relatively developed learning process. In order to understand a *Ruca** a person just needs to look at one already made. Something very similar happens with the idea of the wheel –it is disseminated simply through the process of seeing it work. Many ideas of things or procedures are transmitted precisely so –just by looking at them, in the same way that brief melodies are transmitted just by listening to them. Representations of things are simple and cannot develop dissemination strategies. The idea of the wheel is not an eidetic system, although it may take part, as a metaphor, in various systems. Only intelligences can disseminate them.

Eidetic entities are not representations of things; they are not deictic, but conceptual, and are referred to as “invisible” issues (although visible sometimes in their branching, while operating). In order to be transmitted, they need other methods. To a large extent, they need languages and concepts, although that is not always the case and there may be fragments that are transmitted just by looking at them, but that is rather the exception. For example, a tattoo or a funeral ceremony can be transmitted just by looking at them, but they are almost empty of eidetic significance.

The most basic level of reproduction refers to those eidetic entities already modified or domesticated to humans and communities (even in pre-sapiens levels) in such a way that they cannot operate without such entities. Operating without these would be a return to pre-clan animality, as is the case with wolf-children and, in a certain way, with chimpanzees in captivity. Deprived of such systems, these individuals are incapacitated for life in society. Their innate brain capacities have atrophied by not being “enacted” at the proper time. Therefore, we can say that human societies and pre-sapiens clans have become addicted to this symbiosis with eidetic entities and are not able to socially function without them.

In this way, eidetic entities have generated mutations in sapiens. This is very difficult to prove, although the fact that they have produced immense mutations in the organization of societies is very easy to prove. In any case, this “innatism” should not be understood in an essentialist way. Certain diseases and wolf-children

* *Ruca* means *home* in Mapudungun, a native language in Chile. T/N

are the best antidote to that. Brains are immense potentialities that must be “turned on” or “enacted” by the elderly community for them to work; otherwise, those immense potentialities are atrophied. To put it concisely: without symbiosis, humans, chimpanzees or canines may exist as biological individuals, but would die as zoocial or social beings.

Accepting the above, that is, that there can't be societies or clans without some type of eidetic entities, it could be maintained that a first strategy of propagation/diffusion of such entities is to serve, in some way, host communities. It serves them by offering them interpretations, filters, hermeneutics of information, criteria, consolations, satisfactions, and by giving them meaning, among other possible benefits. In this way, if we understand that many eidetic entities are normally in symbiosis with the human communities in which they live, their most frequent instance of reproduction is by transmission of the oldest toward the youngest, in everyday life, which refers to vegetative growth.

This is how most eidetic entities that have not included the “proselytizing dimension” spread; they are entities that have little interest in spreading toward other communities, but they spread by vegetative propagation, in a “spontaneous”, “unprogrammed” way. Their own evolutionary dynamics will help them better propagate if they are successful in allowing the quantitative expansion of their host society. If they allow their societies to work well, societies thrive, if not, they are weakened, and they may even disappear, and with them, such entities. The taboo that prohibits exogamy is the clearest case in this regard.

6.5 But, can there be eidetic entities that propagate and disseminate without giving any kind of “benefits” in return?

There have been and there are eidetic entities that operate only as “parasites”. They just live as dandruff or scabies, they reproduce in individuals and communities, and mutate to breed better. They do not provide any benefits either, and only follow their own reproductive rationality. Dawkins' contributions have been strong in this sense. Memes are selfish and can reproduce without benefiting the host; they can even destroy the host progressively, although not fast enough to prevent the entity itself from propagating and infecting others. Computers and artificial

intelligence eloquently illustrate these types of destructive and highly respondent memes.

There may also be beneficial entities in the short term but nefarious in the mid or long term. For example, an eidetic entity that comprises the taboo prohibiting exogamy may have socially cohesive effects in the short term, but it will end up extinguishing the host society over time. However, eidetic systems that give meaning but don't report benefits of some type don't seem to be conceivable.

Eidetic entities tend to reproduce as any living being that launches its spores and requires direct vectors (such as people-hosts) or indirect vectors (such as newspapers, postal services, vehicles carrying books, among others in addition to energizers that boost said circulation, as does the energy of the wind or insects with spores). Plants seeds need vectors such as animals, winds, water currents, among others. Many plants contribute to this by covering their seeds of sweet pulps, inviting animals to eat them and then depositing the seeds elsewhere. In any case, the only entities that can disseminate are the ones implanted in intelligences when they have active life. Those found in latency cannot do so. There are "direct" dissemination strategies, which operate similarly to seeds. There are strategies that I'll call "indirect", which consist of altering the field so that the own eidetic species can thrive better. This, by the way, will create a more fertile field for other entities that require similar fields.

6.6 I'm under the impression that until now you have dealt only with the spontaneous level, the most basic of eidetic reproduction/diffusion. I understand that there are other levels. I think they should be developed more broadly.

Some eidetic entities, in addition to serving their host communities by contributing to their reproduction and survival, lay down specific dissemination strategies to go to other communities, thereby migrating from one thought ecosystem to another. That is to say, some entities have also discovered "proselytizers" procedures— the main procedure involves offering rewards of meaning to those who transport them, like: "If I spread, I'll make you feel that you're good, and I will make you feel fulfilled by this action; in addition you will be a hero for those you convert, because

they will consider you their savior". These entities discovered and stressed the "altruist" vocation that sapiens understand (and probably also early humans), and take advantage of it, encouraging it to their dissemination. It must be noted as well that altruistic vocation must be understood in dialectical relation with selfishness: I reproduce better if I am altruistic than selfish; in the long run, pure selfishness would be bad business. Pure altruism would also be so, except in societies where the eida "sacrifice for a cause" has achieved such a hegemony that they can request the radical sacrifice (death) of some for the community by offering an immense reward to the immediate kin (relatives, task companions, etc.). This could be very ancient, as Romero de Solís tried to prove it in the suggestive article about religion and moral in chimpanzees (2003).

The type of reward for the reproduction promise of biological genes states that "if you sacrifice yourself for the clan, this will provide security and reproductive chances to your relatives". This is less radical than the second formulation, which is notoriously more abstract: "If you sacrifice yourself for the eidetic system itself, you will be rewarded in the afterlife". This method generally inhibits all reproductive capacity of the individual host, whose genes are not going to reproduce, since he won't have sexual intercourse and reserves all his effort for the dissemination of the eidetic entity. In addition, he will soon die, thus sacrificing himself for the entity that has managed to convince him that he is making the best possible deal, as his society will exalt him as it has done with others who preceded him in the same task. Furthermore, they have convinced him that in the grave he will receive the hundred-fold of what he delivered as a sacrifice. Eidetic entities that don't have the "divine reward in the afterlife" eida and that have been notoriously less successful in achieving a sacrifice for their dissemination, have wanted to partially replicate this, because within that framework, hosts don't have a right to expect such magnificent reward when sacrificing for these eidetic entities. The offering "to be seated at the right hand of the Father who is in heaven" is not equivalent to "you will receive a black and white photograph in the hall of the party's central committee". Both rewards are too uneven in exchange for giving one's life for the dissemination of the hosted eidetic entity.

In any case, it's a master game of the eidetic entity that can request a total sacrifice of the host, although the issue should be

managed with good judgment by this entity, because if it “flies off the handle”, it could make all its hosts disappear during an inefficient sacrificial fever. The eidetic entity must not exploit (parasite) their hosts too much, for there is a risk that these will become aware of the exploitation, or a risk that they’ll commit suicide, thus leading to the extinction of the undiscerning entity.

The strategy is similar to that of plants that provide edible fruit. Of course, these are not altruistic plants wanting to feed little animals; instead, they seduce animals with the pulp of their fruits, so later, animals sow the pit-seed, covered within the pulp. Experts in fruit trees had “twisted the neck” to the plant’s strategy. They have manipulated it to produce a delicious pulp, but they have also castrated them of their direct reproductive capacity since they have removed the seeds.

I still think the best example of the proselytizing strategy at the eidetic level is the one that refers to the difference between Judaism and Christianity, a topic that we have already mentioned [3.32, 5.15]. Being two systems that share an immense amount of geneidetic code, Christianity was involved in a tremendous mutation that consisted of the incorporation of proselytism with the eida: “You shall propagate this eidetic entity”. This represents an evolutionary leap with a tremendous dissemination impact (don’t take evolutionary as a positive thing, except for the fact that it is measured by the number of adherents or, in other words, by the replication of their memes: the difference in the number of adherents is one-to-one thousand, or a little less than that). This also implies mutations from other associated eidas, for example, the eida “people of God” in Christianity loses ethnic meaning.

Eidetic systems that have incorporated the proselytizing eida should also offer remuneration for their bearers-diffusers. They can be immediate, as the personal fulfillment of doing the right thing is supposed to be, and also mediate, as the large rewards you will get in the grave, thanks to your current effort.

6.7 From your point of view, are there any eidetic innovations equivalent in radicalness to the incorporation of the component or, better said, “proselytism” device from the Christian eidetic system, a phenomenon you mentioned a moment ago?

It seems to me that there is none as radical as that. An interesting case is Evangelical Christianity, which integrated the self-help device. We have also mentioned it before [3.32]. In part, it involves eidetic mutation through hybridization or association, although the image of the seed that is coated with sweet pulp in order to be swallowed and better disseminated is also valid here. In this case, the device unites its forces to proselytism.

Proselytism is not the only procedure used by eidetic entities to be disseminated. Another very efficient procedure is the prestige given to the bearer for carrying them, as if it were a jewel with no “practical” utility such as a knife or an umbrella; instead, it merely serves as an ornament. This happens paradigmatically with eidetic entities that are filled with gimmicky phrases and high-sounding words that help the foolish to flaunt some knowledge and good tone. This can be complemented by what happens with the “country brand”. If an eidetic entity ends up appearing in books by authors or schools of thought associated with France, it benefits from the “country brand”. It gives it a touch of distinction. The French culture, among a few more, has managed to gain a prestige from which the eidetic entities that have managed to be associated with it can benefit. These eidetic entities can do this, not so much through conviction, but rather by instrumentalizing that prestige as a person wearing a jewel, while France, for its part, uses all of its bearers to disseminate its ideas, culture and its own country brand.

6.8 Let’s return to the subject of net-creation and eidetic circulation. It would seem that net-creation connects naturally with the eidetic development topic... But you said that circulation alluded to something else.

Indeed, net-creation can be one of the main instruments for eidetic development. For its part, circulation is a different problem. It is a topic articulated to networks, since one of the channels privileged to study eidetic circulation is considering intellectual networks. For example, I’ve recently wanted to show the importance of a network by studying the case of the Ecumenical Association Third World Theologians (EATWOT) and its role in the circulation of the Latin American theology toward Africa, Asia and Oceania.

6.9 What were main conclusions of that approach from the

viewpoint of the relation between intellectual networks and eidetic circulation? Can eidetic circulation be studied through other channels apart from the consideration of intellectual networks?

Yes, and there are plenty. Intellectual networks constitute the “means” or “vehicle “of a circulation or propagation of ideas; however, these ideas and their circulation come before the constitution of intellectual networks themselves, which are relatively recent.

Here again, it is necessary to distinguish the types of eidetic entities in order to speak of circulation more accurately. Worldviews, theologies and their rituals have circulated for tens of thousands of years during encounters among clans and ethnic groups, wars and slaves capture with their respective languages and conceptions, trade routes and the circulation of trade embarks for the last 7 or 8 thousand years have all been vehicles in which eidetic entities have circulated normally outside their own plans.

Let us remember that there are currently societies in which the notion of a professional intelligentsia is almost inexistent or rudimentary. In these societies the circulation of ideas –some ideas– occurs through the media, labor migration or other “non-professional” ways.

I answer in a somehow disorganized way, since the question is too broad and if we break down the answer it would be too long. However, what is important is that networks don’t obviously exhaust the topic of eidetic circulation.

6.10 If we are restricting ourselves to speaking about current societies, how would you describe what takes place today?

I insist that there are currently societies in which the notion of a professional intelligentsia is almost inexistent and that this is not an exclusive phenomenon of the past. We must also not forget that there are eidetic entities/systems that do not spread through the work of “academic intellectuals articulated in networks”. Think of popular educators, pastors, preachers, evangelists of “cotidianities”...

Ideologies are spread simultaneously in academic environments and their networks, although this takes place

primarily through media on paper or in electronic form. Ideas associated with scientific and academic affairs are disseminated through educational institutions and more recent ones, through higher education. There, the people who receive and house such or such ideas, are often articulated in groups, circles, and in international networks, which are important means of circulation of those kinds of ideas.

By the way, these levels cannot be totally separated, but there certainly is an emphasis on the means of circulation of such and such eidetic entities and, in fact, they take advantage of several means of spreading during various historical moments. They achieve this by creating innovations that are properly eidetic, such as simply using technologies and available forms of organization or management.

6.11 I would like to ask you how you conceptualize the intellectual, the academic, the thinker. At times, it seems to me that you use them as synonyms; at times, it also seems that your developments are crossed by inexplicit subtleties in this regard. Are there differences among these figures? In addition, what is your opinion regarding the figure of the freethinking, solitary, sniper intellectual? Does that figure still exist?

It is my conviction that most of those who are included among the intelligentsia earn a living at the university, without prejudice to the fact that their income may also come from other sources such as media, public function, non-governmental organizations and other cultural institutions (public or private).

On the other hand, what has been traditionally called “intellectuality”, that is, people who exercise a certain critical awareness by intervening in public discussion, normally don’t do it on a steady basis nor throughout their life. There are people in academia that actively participate in public debates at certain times, while in others they don’t. I do not see a substantial difference that is sufficiently clear between both intellectuals and academics groups. I would regard this more as different functions, not different people.

Regarding the notion of the classic “intellectual” of the 18th and 19th European centuries, as Émile Zola, is, first of all a

chauvinist figure and, secondly, it refers to a minimum proportion of those who participate both in public discussion and the eidetic production in the broad sense. This, however, is not homogeneous in all societies, nor in every moment. It is also not the case in strictly current societies. This intellectual figure may have had some relevance in Latin America during the dictatorships suffered some decades ago, as their work at public universities was prohibited for them during this time. However, now, in order to be an intellectual, it is increasingly more important to have university credentials and post-degrees, unless the person has their own economic means, which is a rather exceptional case.

In Latin America, an intelligentsia has been strongly developed and inserted in the so-called *think tanks*, or independent academic centers. In general, its participants were not entirely divorced from the university environment. In the case of the Southern Cone of Latin America, it was clearly seen how, after the dictatorships, these people threw themselves into most universities. Other people went to the civil service abandoning, by and large, their intellectual work. Needless to say, *think tanks* continue to exist, especially, although not exclusively, in the right wing.

6.12 A moment ago, you stated that the classical concept of “intellectual” is a word with a *machista* connotation. What do you mean by it?

First, because it refers to “the intellectual” as a male in Spanish. Second, because it is a concept that appeared in a society at a time where women did not have public participation, except for very few exceptions. In addition, the public space was restricted to a few men who had power and voice. The discussions are eminently “among pairs” and through the “serious press”, although it coexists with satiric and complaint skits. These are people close to the power of the institutions. Third, it would be almost an aggression to say today: “The role of the male intellectual”, to a university community predominantly female, in so many places. These are the reasons why I prefer to speak of intellectuality. This notion still sounds a little elitist. The notion of intellectual networks seems better, even though I understand that, at times, pragmatic tasks undermine the capacity and analytical precision related to the concept.

6.13 It seems that you are almost close to confusing the notions of intellectual or intellectuality to the scope of the university.

Not only to the scope universities but to the wider world of the professions of knowledge. These professions consist of people who are professionally dedicated to the generation and transmission of ideas and knowledge, people who voice their opinions based on expertise, people who advise civic entities and international agencies, and people who propose models of society. This happens in societies with professions and socially differentiated activities.

Octavio Paz and Mario Vargas Llosa, recognized as important intellectuals of our South American sphere, are very exceptional people due to their talent, legitimacy, and economic means at their disposal. People associated with them have worked with somehow less recognition, such as Enrique Krauze and Hernando De Soto, who have worked under the framework of foundations, research centers and publisher groups sponsored by the former. In general, these types of people move through universities as well, except when they are of old age and they no longer feel it is necessary to do so. But the exceptionality just mentioned allows us to think of the intellectual phenomenon in South America precisely by contrast, especially when taking into account the longevity of some of those figures of reference, who could no longer be academically active during the last decades of their lives.

Some of these figures have created and sustained teams, magazines, and research and opinion centers on public issues. Hernando de Soto, for example, created along with other people, the think tank “Libertad y Democracia”, a team of great eidetic production and enormous impact. It is a very relevant topic of study, to the extent that these think tanks produce ideas funded by big companies and the neo-liberal international policy.

6.14 Let’s try to advance a few more steps in conceptualization...

This is not a purely technical question, as it might be to develop a circulation model, or a reception of ideas model. They are concepts present in everyday cultured life, academic discussion, and

in the media. I am not that interested in proposing rigid definitions. I understand there is an emphasis that it is necessary to consider. It is not easy to agree fully on all the components involved in the definitions, much less in societies of high circulation, social mobility and rapid change.

It is clear to me that my main purpose is not to make a sociology of intellectuals. I deal with the people who work in the field of ideas and knowledge, which are not completely equivalent notions. I once talked about the “professionals of knowledge”. I admit that the thinker and the intellectual are not synonymous, nor are the scientific and the intellectual, nor the teacher and the intellectual, at least not necessarily. On the other hand, these concepts have different meaning depending on the country or moments, because they are of common use in cultured environments. The meaning of the notion teacher and professor varies from environment to environment.

An interesting point, which has never ceased to concern me, is the following: if you are working with a too restricted notion of intellectuality, there would be a sociology centered on the study of very few cases, thus losing significance. At this level, the consideration of the exceptionality distorts more than it clarifies. Taking up what we said a moment ago, Octavio Paz is not an example of the Latin American intellectuality; he is the complete exceptionality.

At times I have introduced the idea of intellectual and academic networks, attempting to capture the enormous amount of people dedicated to these activities, who must be counted by thousands. These include students, at least graduate ones, or those who have decided to follow the academic career. An estimate would show a million professors in higher education and one hundred thousand researchers in Latin America. These people have developed projects, they organize activities, and circulate. How do we call them? What do we say to them?

I refuse to believe that the only intellectuals are Émile Zola or, for Latin America, Octavio Paz, Mario Vargas Llosa and Eduardo Galeano. If we think the only intellectuals out there are Umberto Eco and Noam Chomsky, we are operating with a way too restricted notion. There are cases, as the latter, or as Wang Hui in China or Yuval Harari in Israel, who are academics, intellectuals and thinkers all at the same time.

Recognizing that there are differences, nuances, and emphasis, I insist it is desirable to have inclusive concepts on this level without forgetting what has already been said about paying more attention to the roles than to people. In other words, the same person may over time play more than one role.

In this sense, intellectual networks are more than a strictly analytical concept, a functional concept, with a projective purpose aiming to provide agendas of articulation, action, and work towards the future. In this sense, I am not interested in discussing very fine disquisitions that would lose relevance too soon. In part, I see myself also as an operator, or, better said, as a net-creator. Because of this, the intellectual networks concept is very relevant.

Summarizing. Currently, the notion of “intellectual” comprises primarily those who exercise research and teaching in higher education. This includes, in numerous opportunities, writers, politicians, diplomats, liberal professionals and social leaders who, due to their work, are recognized as peers within the field. Deciding who is, who isn’t and who comprises intellectual networks is partially historic, because, depending on the degree of professionalization of the intellectual work, we will accept with ease the integration of certain people. Since the concept of working towards the future has the advantage of being wide and collaborative, it emphasizes communication among knowledge professionals, allowing them to connect the proper intellectual work with activities in the public space.

In any case, I am interested in favoring the notion “intellectuality”. This category does not have an elitist nor a *machista* connotation, attached to paper support; besides, it is the opposite of the “intellectual male” notion in Spanish; it is also not marked by “the frenchified curse” of the Dreyfus *affaire*.

6.15 You recently mentioned in some way your own self-perception in the scene. You said that you tend to think of yourself as an operator and net-creator. Are those figures part of the intellectuality? Are there other ways to be an intellectual? What would be the specificity of the operator and net-creator compared to other figures? Is it a role, a position or function that can vary along an itinerary?

You have questioned, not without reason, my lack of precision in this talk about intellectuality. If I understand correctly, my version would be somehow “populist”, like talking about people without alluding to class differences. This is especially sensitive in these conversations, since we’ve made such a great amount of classifications, enumerations, and distinctions regarding other matters.

I see distinctions within the professions of knowledge and I can see roles and changes. We have spoken on numerous opportunities about intellectuals in “oral” societies versus societies with written languages. This distinction is crucial and has to do with urban culture and institutionality. Perhaps the strongest distinction, although we haven’t quite addressed it, is the emphasis on research-teaching in higher education versus the emphasis on public discussion. We refer to the “intellectual” as emphasis on the second option. However, this would not be valid for the collective and massive image of “intellectuality”, which, in its amplitude or vagueness, aims to overcome this tension.

Another tension can be seen between figures of isolated work versus figures who create teams and networks. We’ve talked a lot about networks, without alluding to these differences. Another tension is still seen among those who live thanks to state institutions versus those who work in NGOs, foundations and private institutions. Certainly, other possible tensions can be named in relation to institutions, financing, roles, type of society, gender and ethnicity. This is an issue that covers a sociology of intellectuals, the academia and the university, coming again and again across intellectual history, the flow of ideas, the history of ideas, and the sociology of knowledge.

6.16 On more than one occasion I have heard you talk about the need to advance in the establishment of criteria for evaluating the success or failure of intellectual networks. Can you develop this point?

I am interested in the research that can be useful to the process of net-creation of intellectualities. As we said, the notion of intellectual network has a dual dimension. On the one hand, they are created as the unit of analysis to study the eidetic, intellectual and cultural reality, as well as the flow of ideas. On the other hand,

they are used as a notion to organize and imagine the work of the academic world towards the future. Existing studies on intellectual networks cover in general case studies, without theorizing on the matter and much less in understanding ways to improve or enhance the activity of such networks.

I highlight four criteria to do so:

- Empowerment of intellectual activity
- Organization and management
- Interconnection with the media
- Resources

Intellectual networks are very important for several reasons. They are key in the circulation of knowledge and ideas, in the production and dissemination of wisdom, innovation of knowledge and, certainly, in the relations between intellectuality and society. Their study is of the utmost importance to better understand these matters, as well as to understand the functioning of the intellectual networks themselves, making that function more fluid. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the “performance” of the various networks, as well as implement a process of reflection which aims to improve their functioning. It must be noted that the speech about “internationalization” is key in the administration and the work of the universities, as well as in the role of networks in this internationalization project, which cannot be reduced to the intellectuality present in the academia; it is also key in *think tanks*, NGOs, international organizations, political parties and other niches where it’s hosted.

In parentheses, we have spoken little about the prominence and agency of the intellectualities and networks. At present, one of the strongest ideas within what some call the “scientific community”, is that a connection to networks is a key element in order to make “science” in the sense of “programmed intellectual activity”. Another strong idea is that the presence of knowledge in society derives from the assumption of certain protagonist agency of networks in the global public opinion.

Virtually no human activity can be assessed in a closed way, based on a single criterion and at once. Even the explicit objectives, being decisive, are not enough by themselves in the long term.

Whatever the case, a company is successful if it produces money for those who create it; a political party is successful if it gets votes; a sports team, if it wins competitions and/or allows those who manage it to be illicitly enriched, and a scientific article is successful if it has a good impact index. However, what makes it possible to evaluate the functioning of an intellectual network?

Before continuing, it is useful to distinguish two types of extreme intellectual networks. On one side, there are “spontaneous” intellectual networks like a club of friends, which have not been officially “founded”, nor have they been given explicit objectives and whose life is simply to talk and circulate information. On the other hand, there are more “programmed” networks, which are created based on objectives, denominations, and they think to themselves. In the first case, the circle of negritude, in Paris in the 1930s can be located; in the second, the Central American Democratic Union in Mexico in the 1940s.

Here we are interested in, above all, the latter, although it is understood that the boundaries between the two can be fuzzy and changing over time. Now, there are necessary goals and goals that are excluded in principle in any intellectual network, even though they are not declared or denied. The promotion of intellectual work at a certain level is a necessity; the annihilation of all intellectual endeavor is somewhat contradictory, because it would reduce the intellectual network to silence and its participants to the intellectual suicide.

The criteria for assessing the performance of intellectual networks should be approached with elasticity, according to the conditions of each one. Due to the fact that they aren't constituted of any regulations, they therefore don't have to comply with conditions to exist, except those implying their definition, many times not conscious among those who participate. On the other hand, because they are a fuzzy and not a very differentiated grouping, it will be quite difficult to assess their performance, so the criteria offered must be assumed only as guidelines for an evaluation.

As an example, it may be noted that a network created in order to promote futuristic or prospective studies can be considered successful if it achieves its goal, even though it may be vague and progressive. Other criteria which determine its success are: if it perseveres in time, if it grows in number of nodes and synapses, if it

is able to place greater resources in pursuit of its goals, if the amount of those who receive their products increases or if its academic offer increases and diversifies. It can also be successful if it opens programs, if it publishes publications and they receive contributions and if they are read, among many other things.

I insist on the importance of distinguishing between those intellectual networks with stated objectives and those other “de facto” networks, without goals, considering the whole intermediate range. The first ones, at one end, are close to an organization such as a scientific society, the latter, to a study circle or even a group of friends.

An intellectual network must also be distinguished from a study circle, because the study circle is smaller, composed of barely a handful of people, and usually of short duration. Needless to say, these concepts are used in ways that are elastic, especially when it comes to translations and temporary displacement. A famous case is the Prague circle.

Although an intellectual network is not managed in exactly the same way as a company, public service, NGO, or even a university, other educational institution or research institution, there are elements and a common language to measure their success, failure, efficiency or impotence. The highly decentralized feature of a network that is not pyramidal needs an extreme elasticity to succeed. The benefits here are intangible, indirect, academic and having to do with relationships. These benefits are non-monetary as well as without any direct power, which thus requires a different treatment of intellectual networks regarding groups with other purposes that offer immediate benefits and therefore can place demands of a different nature. For this reason, adherence is ensured among these groups by giving salaries in addition to so many fringe benefits, as in the case of universities.

6.17 I know that you have been interested in moving towards the delineation of a typology of management models for intellectual networks.

There are management models of an autocratic type, which are impossible to implement in intellectual networks, on the grounds that there is no possible coercion, neither through succulent awards nor through equivalent punishment.

A smooth way could be the semi-autocratic model or the clientelism-populist model, where nodes have a quantity of goods to distribute and are associated with affection and the transmission of knowledge. This often occurs in universities with an organization model based on the “entitled chair-holders” system, with assistants, deputies, helpers, grant holders, and other semi-servile forms.

The model of support works better; it is a mitigated form of the clientelism model, which operates among people of different status, and where the youngest receive-inherit prestige and knowledge in exchange for work and tributes.

For its part, the collegiate-egalitarian model operates mainly among nodes, sharing decisions and responsibilities. In this model, the operation of the network depends on communication, consensus and the right direction. Here, the communication, consensus and peer democracy operate based on solidarity keys. The main nodes (coordinators) of the network, in general, don't depend on designations nor elections, but rather disposition, capacity and recognition. This, unlike a designation or an election, conditions a different legitimacy upon them and is subjected to capacity-willingness to maintain it.

6.18 I would like to recall the strengths and weaknesses you have stated for each criterion: empowerment of the intellectual activity; organization and management; interconnection with the media; resources. It may be relevant to do it here; the proposal is quite close to the design of an indicator system, on which a sort of index could be created.

For practicality reasons, it may be useful to present these strengths and weaknesses as an outline form, as follows:

1. Strengths and weaknesses in the empowerment of the intellectual activity

- As research.
- As publications.
- As the quality of teaching.
- As extension and/or transfer.
- As contributions to public discussion.

2. Strengths/Weaknesses in communication, organization and management.

- In the density of communication among its participants, which would result in the density of synapses.

- In the creation of an institutionality, organization, media, and work teams.

- To develop an appropriate work program that shows and offers very clear objectives to its participants.

- To understand the reality and aspirations (identity, values, interests) of those involved and of the generated dynamic.

- To fully use the potential of those who participate, as individuals and as a set.

- The use of a relevant language for the development of intellectual networks.

- To expand its action radius by incorporating more numerous sectors and emerging intellectualities.

3. Strengths/weaknesses in the interconnection with the environment.

- To link up with cultural production and dissemination institutions, such as universities, magazines, scientific societies, among others.

- To associate with state and international agencies related to culture, science and technology.

- To access the media, the press, the publishing world, and massive magazines.

- To establish connections with social and political organizations of the civil society.

- To capture or relate to intellectual figures with high social capital.

- To express a voice that represents the feel of the intellectuality sectors, meeting interests, expectations or needs, such as the need to become international and publish.

4. Strengths/weaknesses in resources.

- In human resources with management capacity, dissemination, communication, use of language and other skills.

- In obtaining-generation and use of funding.

It is vital to conduct the empirical studies that are essential in determining the validity and scope of this evaluation pattern. This pattern has emerged from my own research and work in the net-creation practice. However, there are still very few cases studied, too few to take its validity for granted and to consider the need for adjustments or corrections that could make this pattern better.

6.19 It's been sufficiently clear that intellectual net-creation and eidetic circulation are concepts that point to different issues. We've talked a lot about networks; next, when we address the topic of eidetic development, we'll talk more about net-creation. Regarding circulation, is there a new analogy with life sciences?

In this case, there is no analogy with life sciences. On the contrary, I wanted to install the *circulacionist* neologism, precisely in order to not be confused with the term *circulatory*, which refers specifically to the blood flow within the body. The concept of *circulacionist* alludes to what happens outside the organism, even in the case of living beings, for example, animal and human migrations.

6.20 It is clear you are interested in eidetic circulation. But you have also proposed thinking of circulation in a general sense, i.e. considering non-eidetic areas. What exactly is the meaning of this concern?

I propose thinking of eidetic circulation as a key to thinking of the circulation of the non-eidetic. Notice that European expansion generated similar reactions in intellectuals everywhere outside the center; the dilemma “to be like the center” versus “to be ourselves”. The finding of this similarity allowed me to visualize the peripheral unit in the world. The eidetic helps me think about the other types of circulation at a global level, as well as goods, and people. European expansion is a phenomenon of circulation that exceeds the eidetic, which constitutes a global periphery. Even more so, it could be said that the peripheral condition is a product of circulation, rather than of modernity.

Along these lines, I have argued that the *sapiens* is genetically *circulacionist*, that is, there is a genetic predisposition (never confuse “genetics” with “essence”, as genetics mutate and essence is fixed) to circulate, and this is associated with curiosity and a prejudice (or presumption) that better places may exist than the one we inhabit. Rapa-Nui is the extreme example. In this sense, many species were not able to go “beyond”.

If the case were any different, it would be difficult to explain

how, in a relatively short period, sapiens reached all the corners of the globe, sailing so many times in seas whose shores were invisible on the other side. The desire for search conquest, reward, and recognition, plus the ability to experience the thrill of pursuing a promise and breaking boundaries seems to be distinctive of the species.

Obviously, we are no longer speaking of eidetic circulation in the strict sense. Something that has interested me in recent years is the international shift in historiography and the history of ideas. This is in some way post linguistic turn, and has to do with, among other things, the contributions of David Armitage (2013). The relationship between circulation and diffusion is a fascinating topic.

In several papers I have tried to address this connection beyond ideas themselves: networks, intellectual journeys, institutions energizing circulation, relations among circulation studies, communication sciences and language sciences (Devés, 2016).

The topic of intellectual networks regarding the circulation of ideas has been key to me, especially the South-South circulation of ideas, in order to arrive at the question of communication of senders, receivers, antennas, broadcasters, intellectual journeys, etc.

6.21 What were your sources of inspiration in relation to the development of these interests? You've just mentioned David Armitage. I understand it is a quite recent reading.

I have arrived at these formulations through studying the contributions of Leopoldo Zea, as well as his work, life, manner of performing an intellectual agenda and his networks –of which I consider myself a son and a part of. I have also focused on the ways in which he has studied thought, and I have started to see the similarities, kinship, circumstances and contexts where similar eidetic species flourished with and without circulation.

Perhaps the most important aspect of all this was the process of beginning to conceive South America thought as an issuer of ideas and not only a receiver. During the time of Zea's work, it was thought that we were only receivers. One of the big leaps from there has been to demonstrate that we emit thought and that this had been occurring for decades. Another revelation has been the fact that there are networks that articulate regions and that ideas

circulate from the inside out and, obviously, from the outside in.

An attempt was made to expand the agenda. This expansion has gone in many directions, for example: improving the conceptualization with the purpose of defining the eidetic trends of our region; searching for originality through names, inputs, innovations, differences and similarities with thought of other regions, such as Asia, Africa, the US, the Slavic world, and Western Europe. Further examples of this expansion are: linking ideas with intellectual networks and institutions; granting space to emergencies: women, indigenous people, Afro-descendant people, underrepresented countries –Brazil in particular– as well as the Caribbean, Central America, Paraguay and Ecuador. Also, there is a goal of going beyond the parallels between the peripheral regions, which master Zea had already insisted upon, and in the circulations among these regions, whose study he didn't have the time to carry out. Armitage is a young man. The text to which I have referred is from the year 2013.

6.22 Let us try to better establish the scope of the concept. When is there circulation?

It can be said that an idea has circulated when it is implanted into another ecosystem and when its seeds have taken root in new lands. A container full of books of Mao can get to Valparaiso and stay there, or be distributed, but never read. We can say that said books circulated as things, but not as ideas; it would be like dead bodies reaching the shore of Valparaiso, incapable of life and, therefore, of reproduction. It is the difference between importing frozen beef or live specimens for their reproduction. People who read are the ones who give life in action to the circulation of ideas. Even if tons of books or megabytes of messages were to arrive, without these people, the ideas they bring wouldn't have reached their destination. Books may reach many parts and lay their roots, but they have also reached other regions where that did not occur. It's the person who reads and through the act of reading (reception) and communication, gives life to those ideas that lived only in latency (dormant). This same person also grants the spirit, water, and soil to the bagged seed that arrived at a port and gives new life to ideas when they are expressed to other people. Ideas are truly alive when they adhere to natural intelligences –not to artificial ones

(for now)— and to people and their communities. All this, taken as a whole, would be part of the flow of Mao's ideas.

6.23 Let me insist, what exactly could be the theoretical status of the circulation concept?

Let us start by distinguishing the notion “circulation of ideas”, which is widely referred to in literature, and the broadest, plainest notion of “circulation”. Although they are related, and, to a certain extent, they are part of each other, I think your question aims to the most comprehensive matter.

In a way, the concept of “circulation” works as a theory, but in another, as a device. As a theory, I wanted to develop one able to exceed the one of modernity-modernization, which has been as successful among intellectuals in the world, as misleading for intellectuals of the peripheries. In this regard I would say three things:

1 The notion of circulation aims to understand large spaces and processes from the point of view of the peripheries, that is, those who have been scammed and expelled and are seeking better worlds, the “circulator” and the “circulated”. In this connection, it allows phenomena from various historical periods with the sapiens condition to be articulated.

2 A circulation theory must be able to take on an explanatory multi-dimensionality that doesn't assert itself in a mono-causal element, but rather in a collection of them where existential, genetic, cultural, economic and information questions come into play, to the extent that circulation is strengthened in our human condition.

3 Circulation is movement and should, therefore, take into account energy and space-time as key elements. Circulation needs energy. The acceleration of circulation involves greater energy consumption for which more energy must be obtained and move, thus entering into the vicious cycle of warming.

However, the circulation construct lacks a meta-historical objective, such as modernization, unless we take the “zero-cost circulation” as an objective. Assuming it for the economic and environmental issue is possible, but it is difficult or even impossible

for the psycho-vital dimension, because if we are genetically circulationist sapiens, then we, even nomadic people, need large doses of permanence and stability. That is to say, you cannot conceive circulation with zero psychic cost.

6.24 All of this is fascinating, but it seems that it takes us well beyond the limits of the eidetic studies. You were recently telling me that eidetic circulation would be a “device-concept”? What does that mean exactly?

We should first be asking if a statement, that is not a theory, has any value. Intermediate-range theories have already been discussed, theories that would have a less explanatory level than just theories full stop. What other theoretic construct that is not a theory can have some explanatory validity (or other type of validity)? Sometimes, it might be more useful to develop a concept that contributes to the clarification a problem or improves a theory, in the same way that a device increases the efficiency of a machine. If one accepts this, then circulation can be a device of this kind. Understood as such, it would be a concept that could have a similar range to that of “hegemony” –a useful concept, with fewer pretensions than a theory. Of course, we will have to see what its role would be, which factor it could improve, and what its scope would be. On the other hand, it seems very easy for a concept of this type to transform into “ex machina”.

How do you build a concept as a device? Can the concepts of “dialectic” or “hegemony” be examples? They can be partially thought of as similar to intermediate-range theories, and perhaps of an even shorter-range. Gramsci reworked the notion of “hegemony” 80 years after Marxism was invented.

The “circulation” concept aims to improve the structuralist interpretations of Marxism, dependence, imperialism and modernity-modernization, removing interpretations and putting in some others. This is because it allows phenomena from several historical times with the sapiens condition to be articulated, on the one hand. On the other, it allows the historical breaks and survival dimensions with the socio-economic and psycho-affective dimensions to be established. In summary, the concept can be assumed as a kind of mid-range theoretical device that can be implemented or combined with other constructs (theories,

paradigms).

6.25 How can we relate the study and centering of intellectual networks with what we discussed in the previous chapters about the changes at the eidetic level and the ideas-society symbiosis? Have you thought of concepts that allow bridges between the study of the “autonomous life” of ideas or eidetic entities/systems (memetics approximation) and the study and projection of intellectual networks to be built?

Yes, of course. For example, ideas colonize intellectual networks and through those networks, memes start spreading, as these are privileged places of “contagion”. Networks are exploited by some eidetic entities to be disseminated and circulated. Intellectual networks can be studied as active, “operators” and as passive, “patients”, according to the question asked.

6.26 I would like to ask you about the relationship between networks and creativity. It seems that the link could go well within sufficiently flexible and plastic frameworks. But what happens with the routinization and the bureaucratization, which seem to inevitably accompany institutionalization? Professionalization and institutionalization bureaucratize; bureaucratization can suffocate and in fact, it does so on numerous occasions. In this sense, institutionalization may not always be a “friend” of neither eidetic development nor creativity.

I don't want to fall into a metaphysic answer. Indeed, institutionalization leans towards routinization, going into the letter rather than the spirit, to comply with formalities than what they are indicating. I think that a danger for academic institutions is that they may be devoured by the bureaucracy of forms, thereby complying with conditions that are written in duplicate or triplicate, that stifle and castrate intellectual activity. And not only that, it also allows sly people to meet the requirements and even manipulate indicators in order to make it appear that they are of the highest standards without producing anything of much value.

On the other hand, intellectual, academic, and scientific activities are stronger every day. The production of articles, books,

papers, inventions, patents, projects, equipment, and symposia would not be possible without this institutionalization, academic and scientific administration, as well as transparent funding formulas.

Intellectual activity is an activity of the masses and not selected figures. However, there are still great figures and as well as an immense number of modest figures like us. It is short-sighted to imagine contemporary academic activity as a romanticized narration of what happened in times of Newton, although some of it carries on to this day and has been reproduced far beyond Cambridge and London. All this is pretty obvious, but it is worth remembering it in this place.

EIDETIC DEVELOPMENT AND APPLIED EIDOLOGY

7.1 I would like you to clarify what you're thinking when talking about "improving" thought. The ideas of "eidetic development" and "applied eidology" caught my attention from the moment you mentioned them, since they connect these kinds of studies with passions which, in the broad sense, are different than historiographical and even erudite passions.

For me, it is important to start by distinguishing the issue of "good thinking" or "thinking more and thinking better" from "applied" eidetic works. They are not synonymous, although they may overlap in certain cases.

I have already talked about economic science and its claim to improve the economy. Architecture would not be comprehensible without the goal of producing designs which are more beautiful and/or more economical or efficient in energy usage, among other possibilities. Biological research would also be incomprehensible if it did not have an impact on medicine, agronomy, livestock and forestry, among other areas. Why would eidetic studies have to pretend that they do not improve thinking, in some way?

In summary, to me it seems that this might be formulated as follows: the study of ideas can and, in a way, must contribute to the better development of ideas. There is no need to understand eidetic studies as only a plain curiosity about ideas. Even those who deal with philately, one of many occupations considered to be idle, can aspire to contribute to the better functioning of the mail, or to understand other things. In many disciplinary areas there are knowledge objectives that have to do with the improvement of the endeavors in that area, and the economy has always been the best example. The case of medicine may be clearer: it would be completely absurd if it didn't contribute to the health of people.

However, if the notion of "improving the functioning of the economy" is quite elusive, the notion of "improving the functioning of ideas" is even more so. For me, this seems very worthy of being taken into account. Having said that, the opposite purpose would

be quite indefensible: “We study ideas without expecting, in any sense, to be a contribution to them”. I think this *reductio ad absurdum* is the best proof of the validity of my assertion; although it illustrates very little what I intend to argue, as I myself am not even completely clear about it, and I have not sufficiently improved the formulation during the years I’ve been pondering the matter.

To advance in its elucidation, it should be kept in mind that other disciplines have formulated things in other ways. Those studying chemistry, for example, don’t claim that organic chemistry works better. They do claim, however, that knowledge of organic chemistry is useful to those who can discover uses for such knowledge. If the question is formulated in this way, it can be assumed that the studies of ideas in many planes can contribute to specialists in several areas (not only in eidetic studies) taking advantage of this knowledge in their respective work, even if we, the specialists in eidetic studies, are unable to imagine it.

That said, some possible areas can already be pictured, for instance:

- Cognitive sciences, because eidetic studies could contribute to understanding how eidetic entities are produced in the brain.
- The studies of human evolution, due to the fact that eidetic studies could help understand how certain eidetic entities influenced the selection processes of certain features of sapiens.
- The studies of university administration, as the study of intellectual networks could contribute to the processes of international insertion.
- International studies, as the study of certain intellectuals and political networks would allow a better understanding of the constitution of non-state actors in the regional or global space.

In addition, discussing what improving thought could mean is key. For example, it could mean the following things: improving intellectuality management, thinking with greater relevance, being able to respond to the needs of peoples, generating knowledge that enhances identities, thinking while embracing the path of the intellectual ecosystem itself and contributing to creativity in intellectual ecosystems, among other ways of formulating these issues.

7.2 Have you tried to define what you mean by “good thinking”?

In my *Cartas a la Intelectualidad*, designed to a great extent to enhance the greater-better thinking of our region, I tried to make a description of the levels at which good-thinking could be pictured. There I wrote:

“I’d like to suggest the following criteria: To think with logic and method; to think with intellectual honesty, in the sense of listening genuinely to ideas, proposals and arguments of others and in the sense of working based on data and evidence, that is to say, to manage a sufficient amount of information to develop theories or to make recommendations; to think with inventiveness and creativity while avoiding the beaten paths of repetitions and fashions; to think radically and in-depth, avoiding phrases with several meanings used to talk without saying anything. Finally, to think with common sense, something that is as crucial as difficult to communicate”. (Devés 2007b).

I believe, however, that other levels could be added, such as enhancing creativity, which has much to do with the functioning of the brain and with the kind of collective brains that intellectual environments are (I am aware that I am going a bit far when talking about collective “brains”, but every brain develops and operates in relation to other brains and the world in general, and it would be a “robinsonade” to picture completely isolated brains...).

7.3 The above is in regard to eidetic development. But what would “applied eidology” be then?

The applied alludes to the tension between basic knowledge and applied knowledge. In this sense, I am referring to studies on eidetic entities and other related realities that have a utilitarian, focused and close nature. Thus, I understand applied eidetic studies or applied eidology as those studies which aim to improve specific aspects, in a similar manner to technological contributions, and do

not relate to theoretical issues or basic or general research.

I have given the example of a request from a publisher to determine the criteria for future publications. This is an applied study with an immediate purpose. There are various types of demands: there are demands of publishing houses to make educational texts, demands of museums to exhibit their samples or exhibitions, demands of agencies that need to know the ideas of their partners, demands from the media about what various political figures think, among other demands. Education and extension are entities that often demand these types of studies. I call all this work applied studies, because they have very specific purposes requested by those who commission them. It is similar to a survey, a market study or the manufacturing of a robot for the automotive industry, in other disciplines.

I can even offer an example of an applied exercise in which I have participated: the study of historical intellectual networks in order to improve the management of the network of the *Internacional del Conocimiento*.

This would involve research that has an immediate purpose and aims to be useful at a specific and pre-set level. Let's picture an agency such as CLACSO commissioning a study on the trajectory of social scientists' networks in the region starting with the question: how can the history of these networks inspire and strengthen "net-creation" today and in the future? This would be an applied study and could also be made more precise, by offering, for instance, recommendations from historical cases (both successful and unsuccessful). This is what I have tried to do by comparing the APRA, Cepalist, and Arielist networks.

7.4 A moment ago, and also at another time during these discussions, you referred to the "empowerment of creativity", placing it in relation to the "ecosystemic model", in which the concept of "intellectual environment" plays a key role [7.1; 7.2; 2.6]. I am quite familiar with your attempt to think about the intellectual ecosystem of Santiago de Chile between 1968 and 1972 in these terms. In said contribution you proposed to characterize the uniqueness of that creative and resonant experience by trying to establish its causes and offering a reflection on the possibility of "replicating" situations with similar "eidetic vitality". I have the impression that this desire

is closely linked to the issue of eidetic development. I would like you to present here, if possible, the core of your arguments.

The first thing I'd have to say is that operating with the ecosystemic model approach causes us to give priority to the search for certain explanations over other possible ones. This model allows some facts to be better explained than other models, because the questions it allows us to formulate are consistent with it. It is about exploring all the possibilities of the model without taking it literally, mechanically or naïvely, and without transforming it into a dogma. Favoring one model or another depends on the interests of knowledge and an attitude toward existence, so that those who aim to develop knowledge and eido-diversity turn to the model that best serves them in thinking about this matter. In this case, I believe that these eidetic entities can be thought of as tools. People with warmongering propensity will prefer to follow the model of the battlefield, while people who love life will prefer to follow the ecosystemic model approach.

To work with the ecosystemic model means, first and foremost, assuming a set of criteria, considering notions such as “niches”, “eidetic balances”, (eidetic) biodiversity or “eido-diversity”, among other factors. To put it simply, if Dependence wouldn't have been so important in the ecosystem of Santiago, neo-liberalism would not have been either. Both eidetic entities must be understood in their balances...

Regarding the approach to the intellectual ecosystem of Santiago de Chile 1968-1972, I have worked on several dimensions and hypotheses, which were based on an intellectual mapping effort. Thanks to this effort, it was possible to identify about 30 niches, as well as to clarify that there were about ten niches that primarily hosted a great amount of foreigners who had arrived from other countries. In general, these were the niches which managed to position ideas with greater immediate receptivity. One of the main hypotheses of the study argues that, given the density of intellectual life, the ecosystem of Santiago 1968-1972 reached a capacity of attraction and empowerment of many figures, developing even more as such. To put it more categorically: numerous people arrived at the ecosystem without previously having an important production. They reached that production only within this

ecosystem, and with those contributions, they helped shape the ecosystem. If these people had died before reaching this ecosystem, or another very similar one, they wouldn't have existed as intellectual figures, but, on the contrary, they came out of this ecosystem a few years later as internationally recognized figures.

The large influx of newly arrived people from abroad, whether they were Chilean or not, involved the development of a good number of networks that synergized themselves, thereby invigorating the ecosystem. In addition, the Santiago ecosystem, or some of its niches, developed contacts with other ecosystems or niches in various regions of the world. The presence of people from Germany, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Spain, Peru, Uruguay and Chilean people with postgraduate degrees in France, Belgium, Italy, USA-Chicago favored such contacts; some of them even became long-term networks.

Not all of these networks were created during the period of 1968-1972. Many of them were pre-existing. ECLAC, ILPES, FLACSO had a good number of networks (Devés, 2004a) and this allowed numerous foreigners to be attracted and young people to be sent off to study abroad. Other networks at that time were, for example, the Jesuit network which was broad and vigorous, the Christian Democracy that was associated with ecclesiastical networks, the Episcopal Conference (Devés, 2010b), the Socialist Party that was associated with some APRA networks (Subercaseaux, 2008) as well as with the Second International networks. More notably, several figures had extensive connections far beyond the country and region, such as Pablo Neruda, as well as Raúl Prebisch, Felipe Herrera, Osvaldo Sunkel and Roger Veckemans, which were among the most “net-created” (*redificados*).

At the same time, it must be understood that ideas do not circulate only through the agency of those who produce them. In fact, another ability of the ecosystem was to develop ideas that aroused great interest outside of it, thus encouraging importation from other ecosystems. That is to say, networks that circulate ideas do not only originate in the producer ecosystem but are also actively imported from other ecosystems. In light of that, it seems interesting to determine which eidetic products were demanded from the outside, and why. It is notable that in those years, shortly before and after, several factors such as radical politics, as well as the search for ideas contributing to the development of Africa and

Asia from non-colonizing countries made possible the demand of numerous products created in Chile and Latin America (Devés and Ross, 2009). These products included: social-Cepalism, Dependence, socialist Christianity, Liberationism, and, the revolutionary political discourse on the one hand, and the Macondian literature on the other. Another important factor was the existence of a climate of sympathy toward South America which constituted a favorable a priori to the intellectual and cultural production. Other factors were the search for exoticism, which was a frequent dimension in certain areas of the center. In numerous occasions, this involves foreign networks that carry out a successful task of eidetic imports which in turn re-export to other places, thereby by acting as relay antennas of South American ideas. This is particularly relevant in some niches of the colonial or neo-colonial capitals that have contacts in South America, Asia and Africa (Devés, 2006).

7.5 What were the conclusions of this alignment effort? I ask this both regarding the explanatory or interpretive “performance” of the approach or model, as well as in regard to deriving “specific recommendations”, directly related to the issue of eidetic development.

In the Santiago ecosystem of 1968-1972 new ideas hatched, and a few existing ideas were renewed. In addition, there were eidetic crosses and mutations, forms of life-thought diversified and several of these were sent outside Santiago. High productivity intellectual ecosystems are measured, among other things, by the vertiginous emergence of new eidetic species, with mutations and several ramifications. That was the case here. The derivations of Cepalism and social Christianity were various and lightning-fast, while the crossings were not far behind. Intellectual biodiversity enhanced vitality.

Now, after having explored the potential of the ecosystemic model in relation to the questions asked, one of those questions regarding high productivity and the other regarding a high export of ideas, I have concluded that the discovery of a series of conditions for eidetic vitality does not satisfactorily explain all the dimensions involved. I have not been able to make enough progress in the formulation of a complete explanation of the phenomenon. It

seems to me that several of these dimensions must be explained by chance. This chance brought together so many high potential figures and in addition, there was an unusual interest for the cultural and eidetic products of Chile, South America and the third world. The wave of creativity that flooded the planet those years also contributed to this. All that generated and was also a generator of high levels of tension, dynamizing the ecosystem –as if it were cosmic wind.

If, as has been stated from the beginning, one of the concerns behind this work is to learn from, and eventually replicate, the case in study, it must be assumed that a large part of the experience is not replicable and what can be exploited as “lessons” is not much. The union of the factors outlined above could explain the high levels of intellectual vitality, creativity, successful eidetic crossings (social Christianity, Dependence and French structuralist Marxism that produced socialist Christianity), and mutations (a part of the social Cepalism, or second-generation, mutated into Dependence), but certainly the totality of the conditions is not replicable or repeatable.

From the point of view of an eidetic development strategy, it can only work with some of the variables that seem to be replicable and, perhaps, generate them artificially under similar conditions to those that existed in Chile during those years. But the experience as a whole is not repeatable at will, for it doesn't seem reasonable to think that the internal dynamic of the ecosystem by itself can explain the creativity and the exports. In addition, if the exogamy and the convergence of people with high levels of creativity is very important, it requires too much luck to merge figures with the potential of Prebisch, Furtado, Freire, Cardoso, Gunder Frank, Sunkel, Frei M., Allende, Neruda, and many other high level figures, in the same ecosystem, even if they were not yet, at that moment, what we think of them today. Processes as important as the Vietnam War within the framework of the Cold War or the rise of social movements and human rights in USA and Europe are also not reproducible at will. Lastly, the coincidence of factors such as these makes the repetition of the case very unlikely.

However, if we acknowledge the non-replicability at will, we should also acknowledge that the ecosystemic model not only has limitations, but also some strengths in order to understand this type of phenomena. A clear lesson is that bringing eidetic studies closer

to life sciences and economics sciences can help the empowerment of eido-diversity and eidetic development.

Once again, the question is whether we could learn something with this study that we couldn't have learned by using other models. As I see it, we can learn a few things; mainly, that the approach is appropriate for telling the growth of intellectual ecosystems, expressed in terms of the empowerment of intellectual life. This formulation is more correct and especially more helpful than the one regarding academic profitability and even much more than the formulation regarding achieving hegemony in the intellectual field. Life is the best friend of networks, communication, the circulation of ideas and the exchange and encounter among academics; it's also a friend of the proliferation of activities and horizontal integration. Above all, "fruitiness" is better than hegemony, claimed by the masochist realists who enjoy both their own defeats and picturing remote sanguinary rematches.

Nevertheless, it is my conviction that all these models with their strengths and weaknesses fail to sufficiently explain the exceptionality of Santiago 1968-1972 and, in any case, they fail to show us how to repeat it. They fail to explain it well in the same way we can't explain nor predict the movement of tectonic plates with all their accumulation of energy and the tremendous shake-ups they will produce, nor can we predict the major solar storms and the effects on the ecosystems of our planet in the short and long term.

7.6 Have you ever thought about the specificity of the Santiago ecosystem in relation to other ecosystems, whether contemporary or not?

Without a doubt, the comparison with other cases can help us better understand several issues. It is always relevant to have in mind various intellectual ecosystems at the same time, some with extraordinary political "vibratos", and others without.

A first "witness ecosystem" is Havana, where Cuban socialist thought originated, and was profusely exported. But this ecosystem was too small, with little freedom of thought, and, also, there was a low development of the economic-social sciences to generate new eidetic systems. That's why its creative dynamics fell apart quickly.

Another "witness ecosystem" is the Mexican capital. In fact,

several of the figures that formed the Santiago ecosystem migrated to Mexico and were later joined by others, particularly from Argentina. However, no movement that was strong and innovative enough was created. The brightest people who settled there, such as Néstor García Canclini, Enrique Dussel, Ruy Mauro Marini and Hugo Zemelman, among others, some of which had been in Santiago, weren't able to re-generate the dynamics of Santiago in that immense and somewhat sclerotized ecosystem, even if some of them were linked to the important network led by Pablo González Casanova.

Although some of them had lived there before, it is true that none of the figures who created the most relevant proposals of Santiago settled in Mexico (Prebisch, Furtado, Medina Echavarría, Freire, Cardoso, nor the neo-liberals, obviously). But perhaps more important than that was the fact that the euphoria of the sixties was fading fast. To put it in astrological terms: the influence of Saturn was fading, Saturnalia was ending, and behaviors were changing. The time to suffer was coming. We should also consider the enormous dimensions of the Mexican ecosystem. In such a place, new presences may tend to be diluted. Santiago de Chile during 1968-73 was more similar to the Mexican capital at the beginning of the 1920s, more similar to the one of José Vasconcelos, than of Luis Echeverría's.

Managua can be another "witness ecosystem". Having had exceptional political conditions and a good amount of migration of young students in solidarity with the process, it lacked a comparable institutionality. Therefore, it couldn't achieve the necessary critical mass.

Caracas had better conditions during the first decade of the 21st century, during the government of President Hugo Chávez. However, although the "XXI Century Socialism" emerged with quite a bit of visibility there, what happened doesn't have similar proportions with what Liberationism or Dependence were, for example. At that time, there were no dictatorships to frighten the intelligentsia and make them take refuge in Caracas.

An element that may contribute to explaining what is happening is the fact that the US is draining part of our most creative intelligentsia and exerting a gravity that distorts the functioning of our South American ecosystems.

The matter of non-repeatability is not exclusive to Santiago

de Chile, nor to South America. Something similar has happened in relatively small ecosystems, such as Vienna or Prague in the 1920s. Those were “moments of glory”, which have not reoccurred. On the other hand, there are exceptional cities such as Paris or New York-Boston: they are quite big and interconnected ecosystems with a great quantity of exogamy where various sub-ecosystems can be in a state of almost continuous movement.

In the late 1960s, we got the magic wand of history: we were the right intellectual ecosystem at the right time. We did not have the density of Paris, Vienna or New York, cities that reached their own dynamics; we also did not have the density of Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro or Mexico, all intellectual capitals much greater than Santiago de Chile. Nonetheless, at that time we were luckier than the latter, and I mean luckier in the sense that there was a greater flowering of per capita creativity...

7.7 What conclusions or recommendations can you derive from your participation in the study of historical intellectual networks in order to improve the management of the *Internacional del Conocimiento* network, an experience to which you referred, in passing, just a moment ago? I am under the impression that in this case, in principle at least, applied eidology and eidetic development are quite close.

One of the most relevant topics in the trajectory of the South American thought is the one that emerges from the work of Martí: “The imported book has been defeated by the natural man”. The intellectuals of the 19th century thought wrong, because they believed it was possible to import and introduce solutions without knowing our reality. Stated in this manner, it sounds very obvious, and I have quoted this topic many times. Now, Martí offers a solution: in order to act in a better way, it is necessary to study our reality. This also seems obvious today, but although we know the South American reality significantly better compared to the times of Martí, it is not obvious that we are delivering better solutions. In other words, knowledge may be necessary, but it is never enough in order to think or act better. For example, we may have mega and gigabytes of information, but we completely lack common sense to organize this information and transform it into viable proposals. Artificial intelligentsia not only lack information, but above all, lack

common sense.

Can eidetic studies contribute to thinking with some common sense? I believe that they can help little or not at all in achieving this goal. However, I do believe that the cultivation of common sense is key to any person and superlatively so for the intelligentsia who want to transform reality into a sense of freedom, anarchism, equity and good living precisely so that their initiatives are not hoist by their own petard, which may harm and reverse these goals, as it happened, for example, in Chile in 1973. But this leads us in other directions that are not precisely the ones that guide us in these dialogs.

7.8 You have also been interested in comparing the relative success of intellectual networks. Don't these approximations show practical recommendations associated with the issue of eidetic development?

It is perhaps worth noting the criteria that makes it possible to compare the success of intellectual networks. An article on Chilean economic-social scientists and their insertion proposed four elements to explain how the high productivity of Chile between, say, 1960 and 1973 had been possible:

1The existence of an intelligentsia with a remarkable “peripheral” nature: it was cosmopolitan, knowledgeable of languages, well-traveled, and possessed studies from first world universities. At the same time, they had a very clear feeling of their difference and marginality.

2The existence of an intelligentsia supported by the state, by civil society (Catholic Church, masonry, political parties and groupings) and by international organizations (UN, OAS), which allowed the circulation of ideas and people, as well as a sense of security that came from a sufficiently broad and pluralistic environment, with multiple institutions and financing sources.

3The existence of stable politics able to give space to Chilean or resident intelligentsia as well as attract foreign intellectuals was marked by a broad political game with a center-left bias, which gained confidence and interest in the country. This fluidity of communication between the political and the intellectual may be in part an explanation of this.

4 The existence of a strong and stable state with reasonably defined economic policies, focused and planned toward development; a state that raised these matters and other things as challenges: industrialization, agrarian reform, the expansion of educational coverage, and planning. (Devés, 2006).

7.9 I insist: How do you specifically think about the role of intellectual networks in relation to eidetic development? It seems to me that from your point of view, net-creation, that is, its promotion in certain ways, plays a key role here.

I think that fluid contact among the people working in the area of knowledge and thinking improves the quality of the work. This is a consensus at present, without prejudice to the fact that not everything is equally productive and that there may be an excess of circulation that inhibits production.

Having said that, networks and their tasks (meetings, trips, everyday life) generate intellectual synergy as well as psychic states of empathy, euphoria and a feeling of safety through collaboration, which are elements that contribute to the intellectual work.

I believe, however, that the experiences of net-creation could increase and that various possibilities should be highlighted; the most successful ones must be emphasized, and innovation in formulas must continue. New disciplines, new questions, new institutions and new generations all invite us to search for new net-creation forms that can improve all of our work. Above all, we must invent new procedures (types of encounters, financing, and objectives) to make networks more efficient or productive in terms of the proposed objectives.

7.10 In general, your contributions on this subject have a bit of a melancholic tone. In other words, I'm under the impression that you think there were moments in Latin American history where a greater amount of eidetic development was presented; these moments were associated with a certain vitality (of some) of its spaces and networks, and our work is not currently keeping up with the background or the challenges presented. Somehow you suggest that our intellectual ecosystems are, in relative terms, "not very vital", or that we could be doing more and better things, over here or over there,

than the structural constraints that might limit us...

Could we be doing more and better things? By all means we could. And plenty.

I don't believe there have been moments of greater eidetic production if we are measuring this according to research output indicators. We have never published as much as we do now in relative and absolute terms. I am not familiar, however, with the impact indicators. I do know, however, the impact of the most important thinkers of the region within the region itself and beyond it, and I believe that we generated more impact during the 1960s and especially during the 1970s than today, in relative terms. At that time, South American thought had a greater impact in the region and in the world, including Asia and Africa, by the way.

7.11 What do you think about vitality? It is a word that obviously has other connotations.

If we put it in terms of indicators, I would say that the amount of material published, and all the launched graduate courses are at an all-time high; there haven't been as many networks organized or as many research projects as there are now, among other indicators. But this is not the same as originality and innovation. If you ask me about this, I think there was at least a better period (the long sixties), when we recognized, and we were also recognized from the outside, as a region that generated thinking that was more innovative, original, interesting, valid or however you want to call it. I am inclined to make a small nuance, though I don't know if it's a very valid one: current vitality has to do more with the letter than the spirit of what is real intellectual vitality, creativity and originality.

7.12 In addition to net-creation, I think that the conformation of consistent agendas is another one of the elements that can be integrated into an eidetic development strategy. This brings us back to what we talked at the beginning about your recovery of Leopoldo Zea's legacy. What do you think the key components of a Latin American agenda should be nowadays, not only for eidetic studies, but for the eidetic development in the region? In other words, based on what elements can we

make an agenda of empowerment of intellectual life?

You ask me, very specifically, about an agenda for the eidetic development in the region. In truth, goals can converge and be formulated in various ways. This eidetic development may overlap a lot with the development or intellectual projection, or the development of thought or research.

The notion of an *intellectual agenda* of South America is key in this case as well as the notion of an *organic intellectual* in the region. Much progress has been made towards agendas and towards a certain intellectual and technology/scientific integration in the region, compared with the late or mid-twentieth century or before that. The university consortia, the SciELO and Redalyc systems, the vast expansion of networks, and the role of CLACSO constitute a basis in which agendas of collaboration and projection of our intellectuals are created.

In 2016 at a conference at the Universidad de la República (Uruguay), I stated the following: We are not producing a knowledge that enables a better global projection; we are not producing knowledge with sufficient relevance and fidelity to a trajectory. This knowledge also does not appear interesting, nor does it provide a contribution to the intellectual communities of Asia, Africa, Oceania and Europe, although I understand that there are a few exceptions; we are not generating innovative knowledge that can revolutionize disciplines and challenging the global endeavor.

Within the *Internacional del Conocimiento* arguments on the projection of the work and particularly on ways to continue the net-creation process of the region intelligentsia with the rest of the world have been permanently discussed. There are so many issues at stake that topics and agendas tend to overlap: institutionality, financing, psycho-affective provisions, conditions of autonomy and freedom, training and post degrees, academic culture... Beyond that, I would mention the following tasks:

It is a decisive matter that our intelligentsia love and admire, in some ways at least, Our-America; they must imagine, feel, and assume themselves as South American and not as “western”.

A task related to the increase in creativity and autonomy (and this must be understood as a greater openness to the real world) consists of moving toward the enlargement and dis-westernization

of the canon of readings by increasing the presence of thought of our region in bibliographies and giving presence to the social sciences and to the thought of Asia and Africa.

A third task is to increase the number of area studies with an interdisciplinary nature: studies about Asia, Africa, indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, studies on the Pacific, studies on the South Atlantic etc. Fully associated with this is creating and strengthening postgraduates by area, with specialties in social sectors and geo-cultural regions, and not purely in disciplinary areas.

To think with relevance. By this I mean the compilation of new ways of thinking, with a greater comprehensive ability. This can be achieved by organizing the forms of knowledge from our needs and aspirations, both from an epistemic level (disciplinarity) and an institutional level (education and research).

To strengthen a proactive intellectual work, that is, a work not defined as critical in the first place, from the protest or resistance, expecting others to guess good options, but from its ability to offer alternatives. To achieve this, it is essential to dialectically overcome the level of critical-lazy thinking by moving toward alternative thinking. That is to say, to overcome the level of studies that continue to get tired in diagnostics and criticism of what happens and raised as a fundamental criterion in the elaboration of specific proposals.

To contribute to the presence of this region in the global space. To this effect, I understand integration as the integration of knowledge. This would make it possible to advance in the conformation of an organic South American intellectuality.

To move toward the development of criteria and institutions to affirm the quality, relevance, and fidelity of an endeavor toward the construction of the trajectory of those who research, according to criteria of our region and of the Global South.

BEYOND THE CENTER

8.1 In my opinion, one of the most interesting contributions of your book *Pensamiento Periférico* is the extrapolation of the thesis regarding the tension/alternation between the centralitarian and identitarian provisions from the Latin America scope to the totality of the peripheral space. How did you come to this formulation?

Peripheral countries clearly have similar problems of dependency, imperialism, poverty, marginalization, and the dichotomy of democracy/dictatorship. We also have the problem of the low presence of our thought at a global level. However, due to the fact that we are perceived as different continents with different cultures, we have been led to believe that we are very different than other peripheries, and that we have never said anything to each other and have nothing to tell each other.

However, the reaction to European and Western expansion has been and is currently extremely similar in all peripheries. In fact, a thought of similar structure is forming in all of the peripheries, whose pattern is the one you mentioned: to be like the center or to be like ourselves. This involves a common pattern beyond the differences of religions, languages, and ethnicities.

We have mentioned the importance of the contributions made by Leopoldo Zea in this regard. However, I must also

highlight another work that was extremely important in devising the notion of “peripheral” thinking with those characteristics. These are the contributions made by the Polish writer Eugeniusz Górski, who provides a comparison of parallels and tensions between South American thought and Western Europe. The work of Górski, which in turn was inspired by Zea’s work, as well as by Andrzej Walicki’s work, achieves a set of formulations that were instrumental for me (Górski, 1995).

Classical approaches such as Isaiah Berlin’s could also be mentioned. This author undoubtedly made a great contribution to the understanding of contemporary “western” Russian thought by masterfully revealing both authors and trends. His approach, among others, led me to imagine the notion of a peripheral thought that shared a similar pattern or structure in various peripheries. The insistence of Berlin in the clash between “Slavophiles” and “Westernizers” is key when highlighting Identitarianism and Centralitarianism. Of course, Berlin only speaks of Moscow and Petersburg; Russia and the USSR were so much more than this, but Berlin was not too sensitive to that fact. More recently, Marlene Laruelle, a French author who works in the U.S., has expanded on the version that the classical works of Berlin had offered us regarding Russian thought. One of Laruelle’s achievements has been connecting Russian thought with Turkish and Islamic thought, enriching and pluralizing the image of what defines this great country in eidetic terms, with so many and diverse intellectual ecosystems (Laruelle, 2008; 2007).

8.2 In a few words, how would you characterize that “common pattern” of peripheral thought? What would you say the “common denominators” of peripheral intellectuals are?

The term “peripheral thought” is understood as thought that emerges in/on the part of intellectuals who think in relation to the center and broadly move between the choice of being-like-the-center versus being-ourselves. I have formulated this notion with the purpose of understanding a kind of thinking that took place in the last few centuries in most of the cultural spaces of the world. A peripheral intelligentsia is an intelligentsia *impressed* by what the center is; this intelligentsia admires the power and beauty of this center, a center that disqualifies others as subhuman, decadents or

barbarians (it must be noted, this has taken place in an immense amount of cultures). This intelligentsia impressed by the center generates a kind of thinking which is quite different than that of the intellectuals who are from those same regions that have not yet noticed the presence of a center and continue to think in terms of their own ancestral cultures or world views. What occurred historically among these cultures and world-views is that they suffered a kind of earthquake when the contact with the center took place; new intelligentsia were popping up everywhere thinking structurally in relation to the center. This kind of thinking is only understandable from a type of sensitivity whose nature is related to the inferiority complex.

In summary, the central idea is as follows: In several regions of the world, from the 18th century onwards, but especially during the 19th and 20th centuries, an intellectuality who thought of reality within the framework of the “peripheral quandary” appeared. The perspective of “imitation” versus “differentiation” has inspired the most important controversial issues in much of the world. The fascination of the model of the center versus the rejection of that model is what constitutes the dilemma of the periphery.

8.3 In your opinion, what have been the main contributions of the notions “peripheral thought” and “peripheral intelligentsia” to Latin American eidetic studies? What might their projections be?

These concepts have facilitated progress in three directions. First of all, they have been helpful in understanding a great part of the intellectual work of the last centuries. Secondly, they have contributed to understanding the similarities among the South American, Asian and African regions, which refrain from being understood under the East/West notion; they have also been helpful in understanding the similarities of some parts of Oceania and Europe as well, where the intelligentsia has thought in a “peripheral” manner. Thirdly, they have helped us begin to assume from where, or from what level, it is necessary to take a leap into a dialectic that breaks away from the dilemma of being-like-the-center versus being-ourselves.

An additional issue for which these concepts have been useful, albeit more indirectly, has to do with the fact that they have

allowed me to work with the circulation of ideas in a better way in addition to allowing me to formulate this notion in the context of the South-south “circulation streams”.

8.4 The third direction you mentioned refers to the ability to be placed in some kind of platform or threshold based on which we could undertake a leap toward a “new dialectic”, capable of breaking away from the dilemma of being-like-the-center versus being-ourselves. It gives me the impression that we are, again, in the territories of formulation of agendas and eidetic development. What would this groundbreaking dialectic specifically be about?

I don’t really have good answers for this. I only have rudiments, or perhaps the desire to get out of this dilemma more than proposals about how to actually achieve it.

This dilemma has been the core of thought among the regions that have been invaded, colonized, and imperialized by Western European expansion. Although this process is not over yet, I think the perseverance of the topic may inhibit us rather than project us –this even applies to intellectuals who are mestizo products of said process.

Considering things in other terms seems to be key in not getting stuck in the past or in a present that refuses to end. I wrote about this in *Pensamiento Periférico*:

Probably the greatest observation that must be made to those who continue to think within the framework of the peripheral dilemma is that they are unable to cut the Gordian knot of such quandary, or free themselves from it to take on other ways of thinking. That is to say, this discussion as to whether we should be like the center and in which way, is truly preventing us from seeing the most important and more radical dilemma: greater or lesser happiness, fulfillment and autonomy, beyond any belief, culture, custom, model and vested interests. That is to say, a thought and an intelligentsia that aims towards good-thinking and dealing with those elements that go towards greater knowledge, better intellectual levels, better education and thought levels, greater well-being and quality of life, a better practice of democracy and politics, higher levels of equality and freedom, a better situation in terms of nutrition, health and the environment; to have better or worse quality of life, better expression of what we are and want to be,

higher levels of happiness, of fulfillment, of loving and friendly treatment among the people.

8.5 Given this, a critical reader could tell you that this dilemma that presents as the most important and radical is a dependent variable of the peripheral and dependent condition of our countries.

I believe one would have to argue in the following manner: peripheral thought is only understandable in relation to a certain peripheral situation; on the other hand, understanding a situation as peripheral stems from a thought which possesses bases to perceive this condition... there are eidetic bases in various entities which make it more possible to assume this condition of marginality and impairment, and these bases can be very ancient.

8.6 In my notes I wrote a statement according to which your readings of recent years have tended to focus on a number of authors who seek to establish connections among various parts of the world, and especially in regard to the south-south circulation. The list of names is extensive. It includes some authors you have mentioned in passing throughout these discussions, such as David Armitage, as well as several others who until now have not been mentioned here. I would like to devote a moment to comment on what you have been reading and with what emphasis.

One of the main reasons I have been interested in those authors who manage to establish connections between various parts of the world, and particularly in the area of south-south circulation, is because I believe they help us get out of the notion of influence, which is as productive as it is dangerous. The notion of “influence” denotes a series of issues and connotes many more. In particular, in our region it connotes a kind of naturalization that we are always influenced or biased, but never influential, albeit this is not found in the denotation of the word influence. When referring to the south-south circulation, on the other hand, we do not have the underlying assumption that the center is emitting, and we are only receiving.

What David Armitage (2013) proposes as more innovative, although it is a bit obvious from the point of view of eidetic studies

in South America, is the idea of “international shift”. Intellectual history studies are losing the national character people frequently bestowed upon them, as the spatial issue goes beyond borders in order to take into consideration transnational contacts and circulations in wide regions.

However, the findings of Armitage don’t seem to be such a novelty for the “Latin American thought” studies, borrowing a more conventional formulation. We had always imagined a space that transcended national states, not only because of the European source from which ideas originated, but also because in many opportunities regional and non-nationals eidetic trends were studied. This has taken place from Colonial times until today, even more so if we observe the approach of the indigenous contemporary intellectuals, who were inspired by conceptions previous to the arrival of Europeans.

Having said that, the formulation of Armitage seems relevant to me. However, it could be the case that this formulation has entered into our field as a fad and there will be no shortage of people who believe and maintain that this has only recently begun to be practiced and will regard it as a discovery. I may be simplifying a bit his approach, an approach whose assertions are very well formulated.

8.7 What other authors have struck your attention?

The following Turkish authors: Selçuk Esenbel, Cemil Aydin, Arif Dirlyk (see bibliography). These three authors, the first one a woman, the other two men, have published a great number of works in English; that’s why I was able to get to know them. Their great contribution has been connecting Ottoman and Turkish thought and, more broadly, the thought of Islamic regions with intellectuals of other Asian ecosystems.

Along these same lines, I have been interested in the work of the German author Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, who has worked on Muslim, Japanese, and Chinese thought, among others. I’ve been googling Botz-Bornstein due to your questions and getting to know more of his works, even those of a different nature, as he has multiple and innovative interests. I was quite interested in the research that discussed the notions of “memes” and “genes” in relation to the Chinese concept of “wen”. Polemicizing with

Richard Dawkins (1976), Botz-Bornstein (2010) questions the meme notion as mechanistic and closely adaptationist in order to propose the wen concept as an alternative. In his view, wen is an untranslatable notion. Its meaning would be “pattern”, “structure”, “writing” and “literature”. I, for one, think this can perhaps help us understand in which manner the parties involved in the process of symbiosis between eidetic systems and societies negotiate their relationship, without one of them simply “adapting” to the other.

The work of Dawkins, to me, seems to be as interesting as it is provocative and I think it opens a multitude of suggestions to understand the dissemination of ideas and, more broadly, culture; however, it doesn't take into account the way in which living beings change their environments, perhaps not as individuals or in the short term, but as communities in the long term, which improve their environments for the survival of the species itself. Human communities do the same thing in several occasions, although most of the times their population growth is such that they destroy the environment, thus making it unlivable for themselves.

I should also mention Pieter Boele van Hensbroek (1999), a Dutch author who has worked on South-Saharan Africa, political thought and philosophy. His book inspired me to write my work on sud-Saharan thought and he also inspired me to think about some of the levels at which I could innovate in regard to what has already been done in these matters.

I would like to allude once more to the French author Marlene Laruelle, whom we recalled a moment ago when mentioning the contribution of Isaiah Berlin on Russian thinking and culture.

8.8 After your new mention to Boele van Hensbroek, the question about the book you dedicated to South-Saharan African thought goes without saying. What was it that led you confront that effort?

I wanted to create a book on African thought for several reasons. A first reason, although clearly insufficient, is that there are in fact very few works on African thought in Spanish and other languages, except English. More important than that is that the brief outline I offered, without attempting to achieve the degrees of erudition of some of the existing works, nor their detailed

deepening in the Anglophone Western Africa (which normally occupies two-thirds of the work), aimed at four main objectives indicated in the Introduction to the volume:

1.To reach a schematization of South-Saharan African thought, intended for people who, from multiple disciplines and geo-cultural backgrounds, are interested in the intellectual production of the region.

2.To cover a notoriously broader spectrum than the one covered by the above-mentioned texts by conceiving South-Saharan thought with its necessary extensions.

3. To show some parallels and connections between South-Saharan thought and other regions of the world, particularly with other expressions of peripheral thought.

4.To contribute to the constitution of South-Saharan thought by providing concepts, defining schools of thought, showing inheritances and connections and highlighting emerging sources of ideas.

It may be useful to delve into and better explain the second part of these points, that is, the topic of “necessary extensions”. This is particularly due to the fact that I understand that studies on the African thought have conceived South-Saharan Africa as being quite small and have left out a huge number of hotspots or emerging sources of thought.

It is true that my “outline” is maintained on two coordinates which are those from other works: writing and production in European languages and languages derived from them –however, my outline aims to cover the whole field which said coordinates establish. In this outline I have the following objectives: Firstly, to cover a wide period, which addresses 150 years between 1850 and 2000. Secondly, to assume the difference between African and black people in order to encompass the intellectual South-Saharan space in response to the production of black, white and Asian intellectuals. Thirdly, to try to account for a production that is not only generated in the anglophone West Africa but also in the following countries and languages: the region of South Africa, which is barely addressed in other histories of thought, countries with French-speaking intelligentsia beyond Senegal, and countries with Lusophone intelligentsia. Fourthly, to expand disciplinary areas by moving beyond papers and political thinking toward disciplines such as the pedagogical, historiographical, economic, philosophical,

theological, and aesthetic thought. Fifthly, to be open to non-conventional sectors, such as women's thought by looking for the outbreak of its emergence; I also want to be open to the thought of Eastern intellectuals, especially the thought of Indian or Indo-descendant origin, the works of foreigner professors and foreign resident researchers in Africa who have lived there for years and are inserted in the South-Saharan intellectual environment. Sixthly, to assume, even in a small portion, what is happening in Islamic spaces. This other academia bears little relation to the "recognized" academia in the way which is proper to a university yet affects more and more the reality of the region. Lastly, to deal with connections with non-African thought, and not be restricted to the most well-known thought, which is Caribbean and U.S thought.

Ultimately, the aim is to recognize, map, and present South-Saharan thought in a no doubt incomplete and sketchy way, albeit broader than the conventional way. One is given the impression that conventional studies do not even suspect the immense variety of existing intellectual ecosystems in that great region (paragraphs taken from Devés 2011).

8.9 You were just telling me that the book of Boele van Hensbroek served as an inspiration and support in this case. To which degree would you say your effort has brought something new to the study of this topic?

As I was saying in the previous response, the most important thing in my personal contribution was to more broadly include French thought and, above all, Portuguese thought, which Boele didn't take into account in his work. On the other hand, Boele focused on political thinking in the broad sense and I wanted to go clearly beyond that by pointing to cultural issues in a broader manner, as well as including international, ethnic and theological matters for the purpose of putting an end to discussions on Globalization. By doing this, I attempted to offer a more comprehensive overview and highlight the role of a few South-Saharan thinkers.

I must take this opportunity to tell you something that doesn't come from the book in question, which is the great difference between African descent in the U.S. America and African descent in South-America, especially in Brazil. African descent

intelligentsia in the U.S. is more independent, precocious, more creative and more able to establish itself in networks. There are a lot of reasons that may account for this kind of virtuous circle. I believe that the development of civil society, the protestant religion, economic means, literacy, as well as religious and educational institutions are some of the reasons for this advantage.

8.10 Can it be said that in order to study African thought it is necessary to rely on paradigms or methodologies that are different from those used to address Latin American thought?

An important difference, although calling it “paradigmatic” doesn’t seem obvious, refers to the relationship between the thought of South-Saharan Africa and U.S. American thought (and in part Caribbean), particularly the thought of the afro-descendant intelligentsia, which is considered more relevant than European thought when it comes to understanding the thought of that region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, on the contrary, there are many more references to European thought than U.S. American thought.

8.11 But what specific theoretical challenges would you say resulted from the effort of schematization of sub-Saharan African thought?

I prefer “sud-Saharan”. Africans are credited with too many “subs” to add one more and in any case, as my north is the south, they would not be sub, but “super-Saharan”. Unfortunately, in the Portuguese edition of my book, which was the first, the cover of the book indicates “sub-Saharan”, thus contradicting the content.

It seems inevitable that the construction of the “schema” of a thought involves theoretical challenges. I think that, in this case, there were three most relevant challenges. The first challenge was to thematize “driving forces”. The second was to formulate the “most important causes”. The third challenge was to make progress in the development of a series of concepts that would allow each species to be designated within the wide eidetic diversity.

Thematizing “driving forces” means conceptually discovering and formulating those “intentions” or “objectives”, or “designs” or

“topics” that cause African thought to move and allow us to understand the “sense” of their movement.

“Causes” are those recurring elements which modulate with nuances in places or times by different people, and that are recognizable as repeated concerns in the sud-Saharan space, while at the same time are shared with other thoughts, particularly emanating from other intellectuals who think peripherally.

The development of concepts to designate the various eidetic species stumbled, in this case, upon the “mono-thematism” of some scholars that have almost identified “African thought” with “nationalism”, showing on the one hand a lack of imagination and, on the other, a lack of knowledge about the “semantics variety” that exists for naming schools of thought in the region.

8.12 There seems to be here an interesting controversy. What exactly do you mean by the opposition between “mono-thematism” and “semantics variety”?

The explosion of African thought of the last decades makes the collecting, naming and classifying a variety of manifestations that are proliferating, for example within philosophy and theology and everywhere, increasingly interesting to those of us who are dedicated to eidetic studies. The more interesting this becomes to the extent that, as the intellectual longevity increases, there are people who throughout their existence welcome and cultivate several eidetic species, in a proliferation similar to Friedrich Schelling’s, who throughout his decades, it is said, gave life to five different systems. It’s key to assume and name this eido-diversity. For this reason, to use almost solely the notion “nationalism” to refer to the South-Saharan thought is impoverishing the thinking of the region and shows little imagination.

8.13 In that book not only did you cover African thought, but also intended to study the connections with the thoughts of other regions...

As important as expanding the study of the interior is, it is just as important to expand the study of the connections with the exterior: its parallels, relationships, and kin. This is something I tried to go into more depth on, or at least increase, in *Pensamiento*

Periférico. In the case of African thought, this dimension has traditionally been addressed in its most important aspect: the relations of African thought with the thought of black Americans, both Caribbean and US-America; however, this leaves other multiple relationships almost without treatment. And it should be understood that relationships are both “from the outside in” of the region and vice versa. Also, it should be understood that such relations come about not only through personal contacts but that there are parallels, similarities or kinship where few or no personal relations were involved.

Perhaps the fact that I wrote this book as part of my progress on the thought of peripheral regions can help clarify this point; then, the book melts almost completely, but is corrected and increased with the other book about peripheral thought. In that regard, it was an insight of a larger project. It was a product of the great leap that my research gave on these matters the year I taught at the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras; I was invited by my dear friend Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, during a period of great creativity, when *Cartas a la Intelectualidad* was created along with this work which is now read, during a brief trip from there to Dominican Republic.

8.14 Speaking of connections, circulation and dissemination, I have heard you in a couple of opportunities talking about your research on the reception of Latin American theology in Asia, particularly in South Korea. What lessons have you extracted from that no less “exotic” incursion?

You ask me for “lessons”... I don’t know what lessons you mean nor if I extracted any or not. Let’s see if my answer refers to any “lesson”.

I had already worked on something like this before. The most important thing has been the paragraphs included in the book on peripheral thought and a few articles about projections of the ECLAC-Dependentist thought in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. I have a paper on the influence of Gandhi in South America and, before that, Ricardo Melgar and I had written about the presence of Asian thought in our region along with another article, altogether, on theosophical thought, which, tangentially, barely covers a few aspects of Asian thought.

More recently, I have wanted to venture into the Pacific in order to look elsewhere. The idea is not to look at the world by traveling across the Atlantic and through Europe, but instead to look directly at the Asia-Pacific region. The study on the impact of Liberationism on Minjung theology was one of the ways in which I did this (Devés 2016).

8.15 What were the main findings?

It has been stated and reiterated that Minjung theology was inspired by Latin American theology and/or that it was a South Korean expression analogous to the liberationist theology of over here. The idea at that time was to detect how the Korean theology had learned about what was happening in this region in the 1970s, since it was clear that both intelligentsias had practically no knowledge or relations with one another. The most interesting thing to highlight in this respect, I think, was the role of the EATWOT network of theology in the Third World, as a “mediator” of ideas between Asia, Africa and South America.

More broadly, I would say my interest in Asian thought must be associated with a number of concerns: firstly, there is a concern for peripheral thought; secondly, there is a concern for the extensions of studies on Latin American thought. This extension has to do with the inspirations received, which clearly go beyond western European thought, which is what (almost the only thing) has most been studied. Lastly, there is also a concern for the projections of Latin American thought towards Asia, particularly the economic and social ideas toward the Indian subcontinent.

8.16 What has this contributed to your studies and more generally to your academic endeavor?

A task of mine since the year 2000 has been to place myself in the dynamics of thought in the different regions of the world of the past 200 years. In the so called “Asia”, a continent which is quite heterogeneous, and where most of mankind is concentrated, nothing could be said of the totality without taking into account these regions. This, which is a no-brainer, is not seen as such by those who deal with the study of ideas in South America.

The first thing I learned was a more global vision, which at least allowed me to say something on the thought of China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, and various other places. More than that, I learned to establish connections and parallels that other people had not seen between these regions and South America, especially with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, but also with a number of other countries in the region such as Peru, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

I could also mention a motivation for the promotion of academic meetings and the expansion of networks, although minimal, in the context of our activities in IDEA-USACH and the *Internacional del Conocimiento*.

Above all, it has allowed me to get to know ideas and people that I barely knew before, let's put it this way, because of general culture. In particular, historical figures such as Gandhi and Sun Yat-sen, as well as figures who are alive, such as Subalternists...

8.17 You mentioned Gandhi and the Subalternists and, a moment ago, the Indian subcontinent. In this very complex case, does the “semantic variety” allow itself to be captured in the peripheral dilemma? What would you say, briefly, on the possibility of comparing the Indian eidetic dynamics with the ones from other immense spaces such as the African, Chinese, and Latin American spaces? Have you identified a “distinguishing feature” in that space?

Answering that I have not identified any distinguishing feature might sound like superficiality or stupidity. At the same time, it would sound pretentious to assume that I was in a position to capture a common characteristic of such heterogeneous intellectuals. These intellectuals were expressive of societies that amounted to, at the beginning of the 21st century, more than a billion people, with so many diverse cultures and very different intellectual ecosystems. Only recently has it encompassed in the state that we today call the Republic of India, something so superficial and so recent for them, for a thousand-year-old trajectory of learned intelligentsia.

I don't want to do that because it would be vulgar. It would suffice to think of Bengal and Mumbai (Bombay) or of Delhi and Keralam as places facing greater differences than those existing

between Mexico and Seville or between Buenos Aires and New York. It is about intellectuals that host eidetic entities which emerged and/or were created in Sino-Tibetan, Dravidian, Indo-Aryan or Iranian languages, some of those languages more different among themselves than Spanish from Polish or Portuguese from Swedish. Even if I have read, on the other hand, something of R. M. Roy, Rabin-Dranath Tagore, M. Gandhi, Amartya Sen, Gayatri Spivak or Vandana Shiva, what common reflection could I establish on these figures, that was valid for Indian intellectuals as you ask?

It's easier for me to characterize American and South-Saharan intellectuals as educated intellectuals of very recent date and originated, as literate, from the European path. Especially the South American, as South-Saharan intellectuals already existed as literate before the 15th century in several places in the region, such as what is now Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, North Sudan and Ethiopia. This even occurred as far back as two thousand years ago and, it must be noted, I am not referring to the geo-cultural breadth of what today we call Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, but rather, the Amhara people and the Tigray. Something similar happens with what we today call the Federal Republic of Somalia, Eritrea and even Tanzania, or Zanzibar specifically.

For example, I find it fascinating how the Amhara-Christian intellectuals next to the Patriarchate of Alexandria distanced themselves from the European intellectuals after the Council of Chalcedon had become affiliated with Monophysitism. You can imagine the Amhara intelligentsia, the Coptic and even the Zanzibari (for some years now, I have had to deal with demonyms of so many peoples of the world for whom our Spanish dictionaries do not have names) as something frozen in time, at least until the first decades of the 20th century. This is something that makes it difficult but not impossible to feed and even promote innovations such as certain forms of Marxism in the margins of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and even in the African islands of the Indian Ocean.

In the Americas, if there was an educated intelligentsia among the Maya, this path was cut off relatively soon, and it appears there is no educated path that lasted until the arrival of the Europeans, which makes the South American literate intellectuality clearly more homogeneous from this point of view. On the other hand, the intelligentsia included within what today we call the People's Republic of China have been more homogeneous than the

Indian because of the centralization degree of the ancient empire, with a Mandarin system which was regular and widespread between the years 600 and 1900 approximately.

You may possibly complain about the fact that I resorted to erudition by ignoring the need to give you an answer. What else could I have done in response to a question of such magnitude? By the way, I couldn't have answered it in half a page without making offensive generalizations due to its simplicity for the intelligentsia of this great space, who may read these lines.

8.18 Why did you want to study the Pacific Rim lately? I have also heard your speeches about it, even the announcement of a major research project.

It's not at all a "major project"... As I was saying, it has been a challenge filling the balloon of ideas, with some of their history, at least of the last two centuries.

Several years ago, I published a first article (2009), inspired by the work of Marius Jansen (1976), on pan-Asian networks in the Pacific toward the 1900s, covering Chinese, Japanese, Philippine, Korean, Vietnamese and a few more. Then, in the book about peripheral thought (2014, 2017) I expanded on ideas and peoples, taking notes on several things in the South Pacific: New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, New Caledonia and as so on. Afterwards, I worked on the circulation of the Liberation theology in South Korea (2016).

I have felt this calling for several decades now in the bosom of my IDEA-USACH and in our networks to progressively open new spaces and have something to say about this vast region. There is a debt of South American thought with the Pacific, so to speak. We have thought too little about this space. Atlantic connections have monopolized the interest and have left connections through the Pacific very much in the background and I understand that for you, as an Argentinian from Buenos Aires, it will be even more difficult than for me. But this should change as "power moves" towards here, as some people say.

Precisely the "circulation" concept of which we have already spoken enough, contributes a lot to this matter of thinking about the Pacific –this Pacific "within us" of which we are navigators, to paraphrase Epeli Hauofa. On the other hand, I'd have thought it is

relevant to detect how in that world so unknown to us, the Liberationist thought in pedagogy and theology, has had enough presence, and how, from the 1970s onwards, numerous figures who led the independence processes of those territories were the inheritors of this thought.

9

IMMERSION IN THE FUTURE

9.1 How do you address the question of the future of ideas, eidetic studies, and eidetic development?

I think they are different problems. Let us first consider the future of ideas. Are you referring to trying to predict what the regional “eidetic scenario” or “global scenario” will be? In which areas? The manner in which you asked makes the question too difficult to answer due to its lack of specificity.

You know very well that futurology can work in several ways. One way is by consulting experts, a second by projecting trends, and another is by combining these and other criteria. In the case of eidetic studies, we don’t have, at least not for now, trends such as “demographic growth” or “oil prices”.

For reasons which we have discussed here, experts in eidetic

studies have little voice over the present and future; their interests are more anchored in the past. However, one of my proposals is precisely that our studies should address the eidetic prospective as well. It is necessary, then, to say something about the method, something about what may occur, and also something about the imponderables.

9.2 Let's start then with methodological issues.

A fundamental aspect has to do with the construction of appropriate instruments. Futurology cannot only be a set of intuitions of someone who is informed. It must be based on verifiable empirical information. This is linked to theoretical questions about how eidetic dynamics unfold: scientific progress, generational cycles, questioning the experts, and intellectual fashions.

For example, in twenty years from now, the main eidetic actors will be those who today are doing their doctoral thesis. Authors don't quote twenty years after what they considered to be "top" twenty years before. Therefore, there is a reason to believe that what today is "top" in terms of citations will not be such in twenty years. It is a negative criterion: what is currently relevant will not be such within twenty years. Nevertheless, we must also see here the different ecosystems and the "delay effect", which surely doesn't operate the same way in apparel fashion than in eidetic fashions. In this way, it is possible to move forward in interesting considerations about the future by studying the topics and citations in current doctoral theses and submitting this information to basic statistical procedures.

Books sales by subject or author should also be studied under these criteria. What happens on the Internet should equally, and increasingly, be studied regarding the circulation of subjects, books, citations, downloads, references, etc. The same applies to topics of congress, symposiums, workshops, and meetings. In the second decade of the 21st century, for example, meetings on post-decoloniality have grown. This is a very clear trend. However, from what we know about eidetic dynamics, it is highly likely that it will drop noticeably in the first half of the third decade.

The academic world has a dynamic of constant innovation. We must systematically say new things. Due to psychological

reasons, which I don't know how to properly call them, though they have to do with generational cycles, ideas age very fast. In addition, new phenomena emerge, and new milestones are highlighted.

On the other hand, we have the major themes that will unsettle public opinion. These big issues are not completely "objectives", nor have they derived exclusively from "big events". Their engagement has to do with perceptions and sensitivities, as well as with different "filters". I tend to think that a topic such as Global warming, which has already been established as a major global issue, surpassing even globalization, is going to continue in force although most likely some of its formulations, and perhaps even its name, will be modified. It is going to continue in force because we are not going to solve or stop it. What would bring about this change? An immense environmental cataclysm, where hundreds of thousands or millions of people die, something I don't think will occur long before 2050. I am not primarily referring to a nuclear disaster either, since this type of event may happen at any time. Also, a succession of minor cataclysms is another possibility, which might postpone a cataclysm on a large scale.

9.3 Something like that would be what a moment ago you classified as imponderables...

Yes, because this type of phenomena may invalidate any projection of trends. This may occur at least in the spaces where the imponderable occurs or in places directly affected by it. These events break the daily rhythms of the intelligentsia. They can even mute them.

The history of Arielism teaches a lot about this. Arielism lost its validity before closing its natural historical cycle, so to speak. Events such as the Mexican Revolution, the great war and the Russian Revolution left Arielist intelligentsia practically silent, and it had to be replaced by a young intelligentsia that went on to speak on behalf of the societal, and against what was considered culturalist.

Something similar happened with pre-Keynesian liberal economic thinking during the crisis of 1929. This thought became voiceless. Then new voices barged in. The strategy of the state intervention in the economy was the strategy of intellectual groups which until that time had little presence but were able to respond then to the perplexity caused by the immense and unforeseen crisis,

and from it, they gained prominence. This partially explains some of the changes through replacement in ideas, as we have discussed before [5.13].

9.4 Let us now focus on what you think can occur in terms of ideas over the next twenty years. What may be the most notable trends, issues, problems, and institutional developments?

First of all, some trends that are not harsh nor strict, but that are common sense could be mentioned. One is the decrease of Marxism. It will probably continue to decrease or experience a “negative growth rate” at a global level. Another trend is the emergence of several eidetic trends which question the notion of “development”. Self-help eidetic devices have also proliferated, which have joined several eidetic systems.

The vast amount of information available makes it possible to distinguish some trends, even when they are not “translated” into quantity/time coordinates.

In Latin America, Foucaultism, which was so fashionable in the first decade of the 21st century, has practically disappeared. It lasted for ten or fifteen years and it will continue this descending path.

As noted, it is presumed that a current trend and in certain places on the rise, such as post-decoloniality, won’t last more than fashion trends do. As I have already pointed out, it will clearly fall within the next decade.

There seems to be a sort of theory here, according to which fads more or less last. One hypothesis is that the normal duration of fads can be distorted by events which change the sensitivity of intellectuals. It must be noted, a special theory of fads among the literate intelligentsia and professionals should be required, since these fads seem to operate differently than women’s massive clothing, for example, or musical fashions, also massive, or types of cars.

9.5 So where will ideas go in the next twenty years?

Speaking exclusively of South America, I would highlight the presence of what today is called emerging intellectuals: intellectuals

of indigenous and Afro-descendant origin. I think that, in general, the presence of the indigenous intelligentsia will be greater than the Afro-descendant intelligentsia. The Afro-descendant intelligentsia is relatively smaller. Also, there will be a greater presence of women in the “top” ranks. Today, women are already the majority in Latin American universities, but not in the “top” ranks. I think that in twenty years there will be more “top” women among the intelligentsia, not only a Beatriz Sarlo or an Elena Poniatowska. However, women will continue to be among the largest minority regarding citations. Topics related to indigenous and Africa will have a greater presence. I don’t think the same will happen with gender issues.

9.6 Why?

I think gender issues have already experienced significant growth, a kind of peak. This is not to say that they will disappear, nor that they can’t go through a process of reworking. Only that they will not continue to grow.

To put it better: their growth will decrease and in general terms they will decline, although they will be reconverted. Among their modifications, we will have associated topics such as the topic of transgenderism, which will go from “perversion” to a topic that is in fashion, and not only intellectual fashion. Among the youth of several parts of the world, within a short time, possibly within decades, we will have a boom of operations, transplants and hormones toward forms of androgyny, opposite and complementary sex: I am referring to people who will want to cultivate both possibilities, also the intermediate ones, and others to be invented. Examples include: the penis, anus, clitoris, breasts and more, if possible, like a true sexual “combo”. This will be an expression and a motivation for changes at the eidetic level: ideas go first, while broader and more shared convictions will come later.

9.7 Any other topics?

Environmental issues, such as Global warming, are going to have a greater presence, though this will not be exclusive to Latin America. The “international perspective” is probably going to gain space in the manner in which they think about problems, which will

be addressed in a more “planetary” way. This seems obvious, but it is important. It already exists but is going to increase. The issue of the Pacific: In Latin America the “consciousness of the Pacific” is going to grow, while the “consciousness of the Atlantic” will decrease. The presence of the Pacific Ocean will be greater in speeches. Latin America is going to turn its back a bit on the Atlantic. It seems obvious, although it is very difficult to prove. On the other hand, it will be an inevitably uneven process, different in Chile than in Uruguay or Argentina. It has to do with China, Asia, Australia, and geopolitical changes. We will also have more centers of study on these issues.

9.8 What may happen with the Centralitarianism/Identitarianism contrast in the next few years in the region and in the world?

This question is very relevant, and yet I am not able to answer it in a satisfactory manner. Firstly, I am not able to answer this due to the fact that I failed to establish a sufficiently clear measurement of the pre-eminence of the identitarian or centralitarian in a certain place, at a certain stage. This is due to the fact that, in part, our audience refuses to establish the necessary distinctions. For now, I prefer to speak of a permanent tension, instead of cycles, not so much because I don’t think about this, but because I don’t feel capable of proving it nor conveying it properly. I have noticed on several occasions that when I say things in this regard I am misunderstood and then ideas get distorted. For example, ideas of new intellectual generations are mistaken with the practices and policies of states.

9.9 And what do you think will happen at a global level?

In the shaping of eidetic entities and in open discussions at a global level there will be a greater presence of eidetic elements from the Chinese, Indian, Arabic and African trajectories than what we know today. There will no doubt be more presence of “the Chinese” in academia: topics, researchers, figures, problems. Even the language, which suggests that more people are going to study mandarin, thereby increasing references.

Among the topics of growing interest at the global level I would mention: environment, water, alternative energies,

international human rights, violence linked to drug trafficking, networks on consensual issues, although in this last case, lighter networks would be involved. Among the growing topics of interest, I would also mention an interest in cultural studies and the religious phenomenon, alternatives to capitalism and cognitive sciences, which will have an impact on all conceivable crosses. References to life sciences, and science of knowledge are also relevant here.

I must still highlight the importance in the last decades of the Indian intelligentsia, particularly those who write in English and are connected to international networks, a good part of which lives in countries of the center. I believe that this will continue to grow in the third decade of the 21st century and probably in the fourth as well.

9.10 So far, we have talked more about the future of ideas than the future of eidetic studies themselves. How could this matter be addressed?

The future of eidetic studies could be addressed from several points of view. One relevant perspective is to think about what “remains to be done”, such as pending tasks, in the framework of what is relatively consensual for our work communities.

Another way to deal with the problem is wondering about what other communities are doing that we haven’t done yet.

Another perspective would be to imagine reformulations of the eidetic studies that examine other, unconventional things: eidetic development or applied eidology could be one of them.

Another point of view refers to non-thematic issues but to the proposal of new problems or formulations for the direction of the discipline: In this regard, I highlight the deepening of relations with other disciplines, such as cognitive sciences.

I should mention that these talks allude to an agenda everywhere. Moreover, they constitute an agenda and they are an agenda as the sea is the ocean.

9.11 But if you were to say that future aspect of the discipline has greater innovative potential, what would you say?

Perhaps its own constitution/reconfiguration and the construction of its own autonomy, abandoning the condition of the

daughter of historiography.

9.12 Regarding this last part, would you conceptualize it as a tendency or rather as a personal longing?

Well... it would be like a prophecy that I'm trying to self-fulfill.

9.13 And, what do you think about specific initiatives, such as meetings or publications?

I would like to have a meeting about the future of this disciplinary field, in addition to having more frequent conversations about innovation, meaning, and how our research contributes to the good-thinking.

9.14 What might the history of Latin American thought be in the future, or, better said, what might the studies on Latin American thought be? You have spoken of “paneidetism”, and that ideas are everywhere...

One of the criteria that I have set out to achieve in the study of ideas is moving towards new areas of study by elaborating on what people who preceded us did in the past. It would be extremely limiting to understand the ideas of Latin America only as “philosophy” or as “essays”, in the way the first scholars did. Ideas that emerge within political science production, economic production, pedagogical production, or international issues and far beyond those, should certainly be addressed. But it is not only a question of disciplinary extensions, but generic, ethnic, and geographic extensions, among others; these genuinely account for what is thought in the region.

It is necessary to make these extensions because people who began the study of ideas among us came from a philosophical training and wanted to create a “history of philosophy” as their European professors did. At first, they realized that South American philosophy production was scarce and very inaccessible, since those works had not even been conveniently edited. They also had trouble reading classical languages, Greek and Latin, while indigenous languages were completely unknown to them.

Then they found a first resource, which stated the notion that philosophy should be changed since our philosophy came from political or legal thinkers of the 19th century. Thus, they found the path of political philosophy or culture and through that path, they traversed new fields. This tendency aroused reactions in the philosophical field itself by those who argued that this trend was not Philosophy, and that the work of those who studied it was even less so. This resulted in a philosophical discussion about the meaning of philosophy in Latin America, which helped to broaden the spectrum of this occupation.

There are people who continue to work on these issues, but their heyday was in the 1950s and sixties. It was, in my opinion, the appearance of the concept “Latin American thought” that, in a large part, cut the gordian knot. The question of whether it was or wasn’t philosophy, and to what extent, was overcome when speaking of “thought”, a broader and vague notion, which allowed many eidetic manifestations to be incorporated without having to attach them to the European disciplinary organization. It is this notion, the “thought” notion, that allows us to fairly conceive “paneidetism”.

9.15 You’ve just mentioned “paneidetism” again and the issue of “expansion”. I would like to take this opportunity to ask you to delve into, as much as it is possible, the “expansion” issue. I have the impression that your assessment on the incorporation of areas of interest, or the broadening of the object of study, is mostly a positive sign. This is consonant with the right demands for inclusion of various groups and for the visibility of multiple problems. But it is difficult to reconcile this with another heavy trend of our time: hyper-specialization.

My position in this regard is highly positive. These expansions allow us to imagine, study, capitalize, give spaces, and give voices to numerous eidetic agencies, levels and formulations, as well as sub-disciplines and societal sectors. This, by the way, involves new challenges, since it is necessary to be specifically trained to study unknown eidetic entities within the ecosystem itself.

9.16 Let’s talk about “expansions”, both those that have occurred and the ones you consider necessary.

Among the facts, what is considered our object of study has been growing. There have been major expansions that have granted the discipline a category and interest that it did not have before. At the geographical level, the region is “expanding”, and is taking into account territories about which little or nothing was said before: Brazil, Central America as well as the Caribbean –territories which are not just Spanish-speaking.

At the level of human groups, thought was originally something that was only produced by men; now progress has been made in the presentation of some female thinkers. Thought was also something that was originally only generated by essayists; now we are moving forward to expand the notion of groups that generate thought: intellectuals in the broadest sense. To put it more precisely, the dimension of thought “producer” is being sought out in all human groups, or rather, an eidetic “democratization” has gradually been undertaken.

At a disciplinary level, the most important innovation has been the incorporation of economic-social sciences as an object of study. Traditionally, works deal with essays and something they called “Latin American philosophy”. However, they largely ignored the production of the economic and social disciplines, not considering them “thought” producers.

At the thematic level, subjects such as international affairs, defense and security, as well as insertion on the global stage have been appearing. Other issues include the aesthetic issue, something which oddly enough has been covered very little from the perspective of ideas, as well as the condition and expression of women, their role and their specificities.

As has already been said, the specific work of “eidetics” is more the use of a perspective than the search for a topic. Thought is produced everywhere; the challenge is to be able to capture and process it. It is the task of the specialists in the discipline to expand their skill to study the entire production of ideas. The deficits in capture and processing have given rise to an affirmation which is both easy and lazy: Latin American thought is superbly found in literature. New questions have also appeared, such as the matters regarding the circulation of ideas, the impact of our ideas on a global level or the question of intellectual networks.

9.17 After several decades of expansions of the object of study, do you think expansions will continue in the future? Are there still pending expansions?

You ask me about the territories to which those interested in the thought of the region could venture. All that has been done can be done again and in a better way. Therefore, the field of work is infinite; thus, I think it can be fulfilled in the same manner in which we have referred to expansions. There has been talk of several kinds of expansion, such as geographical, generic, disciplinary, and projections.

In regard to the geographical regions, virtually nothing has been written in eidetic terms about the Amazon region, as far as I know; with respect to gender, we don't have a history of feminine thought in Latin America; regarding the disciplinary scope, topics regarding works about "the city" or, more broadly, the thought of engineering, architecture and urban planning, an area in which the matter of modernization has been crucial, is very virgin. In regard to the ethnic question: indigenous thought produced in indigenous languages has been studied very little among us, unlike the major contributions made by African scholars, for example with points of view such as *sage philosophy*. For example, regarding the relationship between Latin American and non-Latin American nearly everything is to be said, except for the little that has been said in relation to the thought of the western end Europe. What has been recently stated can obviously be linked to the projections and elaborations of Latin American thinking beyond borders, a topic which I have found particularly interesting in recent years, in particular the projections toward the African Indian subcontinent and the Pacific.

To me, these seem to be some of the territories to which we could move towards, but I insist: innovation possibilities in research objects, without mentioning the possibilities from the renewal of methodologies or perspectives, are immense.

Progress has been made in the conceptualization of our ideas. There is less talk of "Romanticism", "Spiritualism", or "Positivism", usually borrowed concepts, to develop more original formulations such as "Arielism", "Indigenismo" "Cepalism", or "Liberationism". Probably the most important change, and derived from the same thing, is that people who looked at Latin American ideas "philosophically", due to their strict (narrow?) training in European

philosophy, were unable to see aspects of our thinking that didn't conform to this paradigm. It was this paradigm they used to define the trends of thought that appeared in this region, which also had low levels of originality –they repeated concepts such as “illustration”, “Romanticism”, “Positivism”, “Spiritualism”, “Idealism”, “Comtism”, “Spencerism”, etc. In this way, the thought created in Latin America was seen only as a projection of the European schools of thought.

The first and largest problem that this entailed was blinding ourselves to the completeness of our own thought; the second was strengthening the awareness of our secular inferiority; the third problem was hindering the development of eidetic studies. To explain the difficulty of fully seeing our thought, we can turn to the optical model. The lenses used allowed us to see only a part of reality, for which they were specialized, but left other dimensions in the dark. I won't overuse, as so many people do, the word “hide”, because I think that there wasn't a plan to hide these other dimensions. This is especially clear, for example, in the conception of thought of Rodó as Spiritualism. No doubt there are several dimensions of Rodoism, or more broadly, Arielism, which correspond to spiritualist patterns; however there are also anglophobic patterns no less important which don't belong to spiritualist thought. That is to say, Arielism is composed of a spiritualist dimension on the one hand, and an anglophobic dimension on the other. The philosophical view, with European lens, allowed us only to see the spiritualist dimension, leaving the other one completely marginal.

Undoubtedly, the expansions can and should continue at the thematic, disciplinary, group and territorial levels. However, in order for that to happen in a smoother way, it is essential to take a leap into theoretical-methodological issues that allow us to move forward.

9.18 I understand that a good part of your proposal for reconfiguring the disciplinary space is aimed precisely in this direction. I wanted to ask you if the image of “a leap into theoretical-methodological issues” refers to imagining the advent of new paradigms in this field of study.

The issue of the paradigms is intimately linked to the manner in which the object of study is cut out. For instance, the identification of “thought” with essay and philosophy, allowed important advances in the 1940s to be made. However, by the 1970s it became a huge obstacle, which continues to be the case up until today, although in general it has improved. On the other hand, the use of the category of “influence” in assembling thought currents among us allowed Romanticism and Positivism to be outlined, but it gradually became a straitjacket for Arielism, Indigenism or Cepalism thought. Let me go further: conceiving eidetic studies as “history” or “historiography of ideas” has caused the discipline to deal with too many late authors, making it difficult to approach the present and therefore making the incidence on discussions about the present more difficult, though not impossible.

Paradigms also compete for the understanding of the intellectual phenomenon by interpreting it as a succession of generations, a field, or intellectual networks. For example, the theory of “field” wants to discover how power and capital work; “intellectual networks” aim to study how the intelligentsia works, how they transform into agents and how ideas circulate. The “generation” theory aims to understand changes and cycles. To some extent, they are competing paradigms; however, they are also instruments that simultaneously shed light on different dimensions of the phenomenon and in that regard, they may also be complementary.

But I am also thinking of several other things. For example, we should assume that these micro-paradigms are quite compatible and each of them is designed to study a specific dimension, far from covering the whole. On the other hand, by conceiving eidetic studies also as eidetic engineering we could enhance our endeavor, and not to mention the new interdisciplinary alliances...

9.19 To what extent do you submit that conceiving eidetic studies also as eidetic engineering could enhance the endeavor in our work area? Beyond that, which new interdisciplinary alliances are you thinking about?

Interdisciplinary alliances, for their part, open us to other dimensions, sensitize us to new fields of study related to these disciplines, and above all, they pose questions that have not been

asked in eidetic studies –studies which are too tied to political thought, and spent on authors and questions of conceptual and intellectual history... In this regard, international studies open us to questions about internationalist thought, which has been studied relatively little, and new problems: the international circulation of South/South ideas, and the notion of global repositories of ideas, for example. The alliance with cognitive science would lead to matters such as the origin of eidetic phenomena in relation to the origin of sapiens and their evolution, among other things.

The alliance with areas of engineering would open doors toward the study of complex composition and the construction of new eidetic entities. It would enhance it, I think, by presenting new challenges and bringing it out of a sort of historiographical ossification. Engineering allows you to think about various tasks; it also allows us to think about eidetic studies that are orientated towards determining what has happened or is happening now, while those which are more proactive may aim to generate eidetic practices instead. And I would like to point out that both possibilities are not mutually exclusive. The possibility of eidetic studies reinventing themselves in so many ways possible, and going through so many different paths, allows for the formulation of different and innovative topics. In this case, for example, we have spoken of a certain Geneidetic engineering. We could also speak about relations between Eidetics and computing, or eidetic technologies in relation to devices that we have also spoken about. You may be tempted to ask me if I could propose at least one program for a course on Eidetics and engineering. In truth, I wouldn't be able to do it, at least not for now.

9.20 Is there more?

There are many more. For example, there are relations between the structure of eidetic phenomena and brain shapes, as well as relations among the properties of the brain, languages and eidetic entities. There are also relations between “eidetic evolution” summoning “brain evolution” in a reciprocal requirement dynamic, though I am specifically interested in the eidetic requirement for the evolution of the brain. I am thinking, in particular, of a certain euthanasia carried out over millennia by the cultivators and creators of oral language and words, against the less suitable brains for this

operation. Examples include the likely euthanasia of the descendants (hybrids) of Neanderthals or *Homo erectus*, who were unable to (syllabically) speak with the same skills due to the insufficient development of the hyoid bone, if that were the case.

9.21 Your view of balance and perspectives of eidetic studies is positioned right in the tension among the “much has been achieved” point of view, the “it is still not enough” perception, and the “we are not taking advantage of all of our capabilities or potential” perspective.

It is true. I believe that we are not accounting enough for or accepting the “eidetic capital” we have and much less what is possible within the infinity of possibilities.

There are an immense number of elements in indigenous knowledge, in their intellectual ecosystems, and in their languages; there is a repository and tradition we aren't taking full advantage of from the eidetic production perspective, and that research on thought studies doesn't even know enough. We do not need to go to China or Ethiopia. We haven't done much to take advantage of this. Also because of this, I consider the issue of the democratization of our intelligentsia something very important in helping to cool down from the smothering Europeanism.

On the other hand, going beyond any sort of autochthonism or narrowness, our eidetic capital is that of the entire world. We must see what we are capable of doing with what is in some way (careful though-not anyway) at our disposal. Among other endeavors, if eidetic studies can be pictured as work for the thinking more and thinking better, I think it is paramount to do some prospecting of global resources of ideas. I understand that it is only an expression and it cannot be done literally because of various limitations, among them, the conceptual ones. Therefore, it has been one of the most recurrent motifs of my recent agendas this matter of extending the bibliographies of the curricula beyond what is produced intellectually in four or five countries that leaves out more than 90% of humanity, even when those four or five countries produce more than 50% of what is produced by humanity.

The aim is to promote an opening to the eidetic messages of the world and the orientation of our antennas to capture the voices of the eidetic universe, beyond conventionalism, dependencies,

complexes, prejudice and pettiness. For example, listening, mixing, merging, crossing, blending, testing, sensitizing and training to know and understand categories with which the peoples of the South Pacific understand the ocean.

The proposal of eidetic studies has been imagined in part as an endeavor for the study of ideas aimed at more and better thinking. It is not easy to accurately define this last expression, since thought, because of its own development, is constantly disarming previous diagrams. It is, therefore, an intention of movement much more than an arrival point. In the peripheries this idea of “more-better” is expressed, among other dimensions, in a spirit of autonomy. To think more and to think better is to think with greater autonomy and this is related to the ability to manage a greater variety of eidetic information, thus making it more feasible to cut the umbilical cord of the cultural-affective dependency that often afflicts them. But perhaps you were not talking about this with your question.

9.22 It is true. I wasn't talking about that; I was talking about something else that I'll pick up again soon. I would now like to ask you why you perceive eidetic heritage as capital and not in other ways.

It's not that. It is one of the possible languages to be questioned, but there are many others. I tell you otherwise: From South America, we have barely contributed to the mapping of the eidetic heritage of the world and even less to processing it in an innovative way. Otherwise still: how do we take advantage of all discoveries in order to patent new technological inventions, or another way to put it: how do we expand the corpus of philosophy in timorous curricula, or to put it simply: how do we organize programs for skillful students to work with eidetic innovation.

9.23 Another area of concern is how to think, not in terms of laws, but in logic or connections, on the life of the ideas in our time by taking into account that everywhere we look there is a staggering diversity, which is indicative, apparently, of the reign of contingency, arbitrariness, and eidetic opportunism, if I may say so. I don't want to slip into cultural decadentism, but I wouldn't be totally frank if I didn't say that to think of

our time, I tend to go, at least at a colloquial level, to the image of the “feuilleton age” [*Das feuilletonistische Zeitalter*], introduced by Herman Hesse in the Introduction to his novel *The Glass Bead Game* (*Magister Ludi*) [*Das Glasperlenspiel*].

Don't slip into decadentism, it's not a good thing. On the other hand, it is better to think about this diversity to which you refer as the blossoming of a thousand flowers than as chaos; and even if it were something chaotic, why would it matter? What do you mean by logic and connections? I can't understand this part of the question.

9.24 I am referring to the possibility of formulating more or less satisfactory explanatory hypotheses on eidetic dynamics. It doesn't seem like an easy challenge to scientifically account for so much diversity.

It is not necessary to imagine an all-encompassing theory that would hold true for all possible levels. Attempts to partially understand reality are perfectly possible and necessary. But it would be absurd to focus on a sort of all-encompassing theory about Eidetics. It would be more like a crazy character of Borges than you or me.

By the way, I'm not talking about thesis along the lines of the following: “To understand eidetic reality it is necessary to properly articulate it with the non-eidetic”. This is not a theory but a truism. Maybe you could tell me some examples of the type you're thinking of to understand you better. In any case, the efforts we have made to classify eidetic entities, among many other things, are filled with theories about it.

9.25 “Feuilleton age” is an idea coined by the literary historian Pliny Ziegenhals, a character invented by Hesse, and alludes to a time that does not lack spirit, but it doesn't know what to do with it; this results in the unprecedented spiritual freedom which is unbearable for the own spirit. The feuilleton age of Ziegenhals/Hesse is characterized by incessant and insubstantial chatter in the mass media, industrial production, and is devoid of sense of scientific articles (sometimes crossed by irony and self-irony). It is also characterized by the

continued manufacturing of intellectual trifles, a flood of isolated fragments of knowledge devoid of significance, and degradation, venality, and claudication. It is a dystopian image. Ziegenhals/Hesse allude to an industrial eidetic dynamic, vacuous and opportunistic, for which (bad) ideas for mass consumption are continuously and consciously manufactured. What do you think of that type of provision, for which not only the issue of “opiniology” is questioned, or at least some aspects of it, but the whole spirit of our time?

Opiniology is not really a problem of eidetic studies, although I understand that it is related to it. It is a phenomenon of communication rather than ideas. Opiniology could be studied as a mentality and not as ideology. But I don't really see what I could answer you regarding this.

It seems that you want me to take the bait of decadentism with your question in order to see if I make judgments that affirm the idea that ours is the worst of times or at least a very bad one, so I conservatively make a reference to a more or less golden past. Nonetheless, I should appreciably say that I do not feel that way: I am not afraid of chaos, nor does the abundance of information overwhelm me and nor does the crazy deployment of creativity scare me.

9.26 I think that, like with all dystopia, the image of the “feuilleton age” refers not so much to the future as it does to the present, in critical terms. In addition, it doesn't refer just to communicational opiniology, but to the spirit of the times we live in. It could be legitimately interpreted, I think, in a simmelian key, that is to say, as a critique of the tragic saturation of the cultural sphere, and, more prosaically but no less fairly, as a critique of the productivist criteria of important sectors of the academia or the academic bureaucracy. Another related issue is the question on the meaning of the eclosion of diversity. Isn't there something like an “industry” of diversity?

In principle, one might think that productivism doesn't have as much to do with academia as it does with society. On the other hand, the mean is the message, and productivism and saturation may be more conducive to the development of certain eidetic

entities than to others. Indeed, it would be more conducive to the development of eidetic entities of a recent line than of an ancestral kind. What do I mean by this? I am referring to consciously managed entities, toolmakers, instrumental, engineered entities. Will high productivity, acceleration, and eidetic bombing be more inclined to ideas regarding innovation? Here, we shouldn't forget Gatopardismo, nor small permanent hollow innovations.

But for generations it has been the case that the number of programmed information that is received in the urban area of western cities and in the large peripheral cities is clearly greater than what human beings are able to process. It is not a phenomenon of the beginning of the 21st century. More than a century ago there were of dozens of newspapers in circulation in these cities. Apart from newspapers, there were other sources media: press, cinema, etc. Information cramming is not exclusive to this time.

I would add to this that in my reading about the history of disciplines, mainly of philosophy, the past is often approached as something transparent and easy. It is often said: "In such and such century there were two or three tendencies, whereas in the contemporary world multiplicity is complete and radical". But this is not the case. It happens that those who say this aren't quite eager, for various reasons, one of which includes the desire to agree with everyone, to seriously map their own time. On the other hand, multiplicity is better than worse. It's linked with specialization. There must also be people capable of making wide connections and answering far more diverse questions than those who deal with monographic subjects.

9.27 In regard to eidetic development, i.e. to think more and think better. Will Latin America or the Global South reach higher levels of eidetic development? On which factors does them reaching this objective depend?

Knowledge is one thing, ideas are another. They are related issues but are not synonymous. If there is an increase of ideas, knowledge increases as well. New paradigms, concepts, and methods have much to do with whether there is more information or knowledge. But they are not the same. Any transmission of information involves the consumption of megabytes.

In prospective terms and based on these distinctions, I think

that Latin America and the peripheral regions in general are going to increase their apparent presence in the indicators of knowledge production (scientific, academic, and indexed journals articles). Firstly, because academia will not cease to grow in quantitative terms and, in relative terms, will grow more than the center. Fifty years ago, this wasn't the case. Secondly, because the indexing system was in its infancy, plus it was kept artificially restricted because the institutions involved were not sensitive to what was happening outside the center. From the year 2000 on, awareness has been rising, resulting, recently, in a sort of *boom* in this sense. Institutions transform into businesses that have to show what is produced in the world to be sold. This is how academic production gets distorted.

However, at the level of ideas, it is much more difficult to predict. But above all, it is more difficult to distort ideas in commercial terms. However, producing subsidiary knowledge—small articles indexed on minor matters—is so much easier than producing big ideas. One prediction would be that there will be a higher growth of empirical scientific articles than in the production of new ideas or eidetic systems or paradigms.

9.28 In terms of eidetic development, this panorama you trace is at least ambiguous...

Yes, because only exceptionally do we get an intelligentsia that is able to develop/submit/mature/or circulate ideas at the level of large regions. This won't change that much over the next twenty years, even though the production of indexed articles is expected to quadruple in that period. Now do not misunderstand: the latter is a good thing. We are going to know much better different realities and, thus, the global reality in all areas: agricultural, social, climate change, etc. In some way, Martí was asking us for this. But this is not enough, because this is not the only aspect of eidetic development. Surely, the amount of ideas produced in the peripheral world will also grow, but I do not think that this will occur in the same proportion as in indexed articles. This growth won't reach 30% of the global growth.

9.29 Do you think eidetic studies are changing in relation to broader transformations, such as the emergence of the society

of knowledge and information? Would they have greater significance toward the year 2000 than in 1900 or 1800? To put it another way: Do eidetic studies acquire greater or lesser significance in this type of society?

A somehow simple response is that if the presence of knowledge and information is so great in these types of societies, then the know-how and how to navigate it, as well as having instruments is more important than in other societies. Another more elaborate answer could be that I am confusing things and even twisting them, as the society of knowledge and information seems to be a kind of society that must be understood by disciplines that are not eidetic studies, at least not in the first instance. Furthermore, if knowledge and information have more presence, it is because ideas have less presence, thus, eidetic studies lose relevance, suggesting that in times of Ideologism eidetic studies had particular validity ... But rather than thinking of a decrease of the eidetic I prefer to think of the emergence of new eidetic entities. Once again, these new entities will not necessarily make the older ones disappear, but they will be added, thus possibly downplaying others.

9.30 Do you venture to predict what new eidetic species may appear?

More than half a century ago the end of ideologies was predicted during the time of maximum Ideologism: the 1960s. This notion was brought up highly to date toward the end of the 20th century after the fall of the Wall. It should be noted, both ideologies in the strict sense, and eidetic entities in a broad sense, have not disappeared.

I venture to suggest the development of “short-ideologies”. What I mean by short ideology is an eidetic system very similar to the traditional ideology. Although it is further away from the philosophical system and more focused on specific issues, it doesn’t need to respond to a philosophy of history, but rather has a few mottos or articulated maxims, with little sophistication and enough simplicity to work in the media. It is not entirely new. Catechisms worked this way by simplifying an eidetic system for mass consumption, especially for children. I could put it this way: a short ideology is one that can be assimilated in the context of television

programs for people who love sports or that can be repeated by cartoons and TV hosts at breakfast time. This leads to political programs with a smaller dogmatic scale and satisfied with alliances in the short term that can be recomposed fast and where ideologies are closer to the programmatic than to beliefs of faith. But beware of this; it's not a prediction for the rest of the times, but for a couple of decades. I think hard ideologies will return, those which people die for.

In order to flourish, these ideologies must accept the type of societies in which they are housed and the niches within such societies. Certain niches favor some ideologies, while other niches favor others. The technical support of cartoons allows certain eidetic entities to navigate more easily while others navigate with greater difficulty, but not in abstract terms, but rather in the framework of millions of existing cartoons, in the framework of a culture of existing cartoons.

9.31 Other predictions?

More than a prediction, what I am doing now is specifying the present and barely pointing out that this will endure for decades. Ideology refers eminently to the public sphere and it has to do with the project of society. In the tension of difference and encounter, several eidetic entities have developed and claimed to be givers of meaning to existence and day-to-day behaviors in a space that was covered before by other eidetic systems such as religious, philosophical, or cosmogonic myths. Of course, what I'm saying isn't very original if I'm not able to better characterize this thought that is "weak", not in the "non-dogmatic" sense of Gianni Vattimo, but rather in the "simplified and little developed", and in the very opposed way to French matrices and more akin to Saxon matrices, to put it in European terms. To make progress in this field I have introduced the concept of "cotidianity" (*cotidiania*, we have spoken on it previously [3.14; 3-15]). The hippie movement was a movement hinged on a cotidianity and had a high capacity of association with other cotidianities, such as naturism, eastern religions for western consumption, true naturism, nudity, environmentalism and anti-consumerism. Another cotidianity is veganism, which comes from a line of the hippie trend. It is present mostly in university niches and contributes to the discipline of its

adherents, thus giving them a sense of militancy and helping them to feel superior. It also establishes relationships with other cotidianities such as environmentalism, naturism, anti-consumerism, new physiocratic forms and simplified versions of religious eidetic systems of cultures different from those where the person involved lives. It blooms in academia; there it thrives, develops and colonizes. Another cotidianity is bodybuilding, which is ultra-short, and it prospers more so among non-university people; it colonizes bands or maras rather than sects, and it is related to militarism. These cotidianities are accepted with various levels of adhesion and there is no shortage of those who seek to follow them until death, such as those who follow a principle of healthy eating end up committing suicide due to a practical lack of protein, minerals or vitamins, as their orthodoxy prevents them from “poisoning” themselves by eating foods that have those nutrients. This gives them a high sense of militancy, belonging, and an identity with a strong differentiation, with their distinction marks rather than militants, although this is variable... Veganism associated with environmentalism generates greater militancy than bodybuilding in the cultivated version of motorcycle riders, with their fake costumes of props warriors, their tattoos and forced masculinity...

Tailor's drawer

The image of a tailor's drawer refers to a space made with the remains of supplies and scraps of fabrics... Things that have not yet found a place in the work of the craftsman, but he decides nevertheless not to discard them, in part because he suspects they may be useful one day, and even eventually get him out of trouble. Similarly, we have decided to preserve here, with a somewhat lower level of stylization than previous chapters, fragments of conversations that, for various reasons, didn't find their place in the most consolidated areas of the volume –we thought wise not to discard them. These fragments couldn't find a place at the time due to having been raised extemporaneously and their level of preparation being somewhat lower, also because they were perceived as hard to assemble to the main lines, and for having taken place when the book looked for closures, rather than new openings. In this section, the habit of square bracketing some referrals to previous passages directly linked to the topics addressed is still maintained.

10.1 One issue that we didn't address, despite being relevant, is the onomastic question. Your largest study is titled *Pensamiento Latinoamericano...*, afterwards, I have read you and heard you make reference to our America. Lately, perhaps due to the execution and publication of *Pensamiento Periférico*, you have increasingly highlighted the South American aspect, and even speak of South America to refer to the region usually called Latin America. What elaborations underlie these movements?

It has been a decision made in recent years and has to do with avoiding defining Our-America as "Latin", first of all, because it is a denomination that excludes other ethnic-cultural manifestations, but also because, in my field of work, the emergence of indigenous intellectuals is an important matter as well as a claim to identity.

It is true that my study is entitled *Pensamiento*

Latinoamericano,* and not Our American or South American thought. When I started that work, I was quite attached to the traditional canon of Latin American philosophy, which in the 1990s was still the predominant look in the work of eidetic studies endeavors of the region. Successive openings to different aspects of eidetic work have led me to expand upon, among other things, the groups that “emit” thought.

I remember when I was writing the first volume, I traveled to Cochabamba and presented some of my progress. I was asked then why there wasn't any presence of indigenous intellectuals in my outlook. I could only offer an insufficient response, almost a tautological one: “On the one hand, I can't read indigenous languages; on the other, within the canon I operate, these intellectuals and expressions of thought have a very low presence”. It is true that the book addresses these issues, but, looking at them today, it does it poorly. It is evident that I should have done it differently. In the Presentation of volume II of the Portuguese edition, I mentioned this deficiency. The growing presence of indigenous and Afro-descendant intellectuals is one of the major breakthroughs of the beginning of the 21st century.

In regard to the Our-America expression, I brought it back for our use, but those who aren't part of it couldn't legitimately name this region that way; instead they could call it South America (*Suramérica*), from Mexico to the South. I prefer South over Sud because traditionally Sud has alluded to the America of the South (*Sudamérica*), different and opposed to Central and North America (and the Caribbean), thus leaving out more than half of the countries. Conversely, South alludes to the global South, which is another way of saying the peripheral, beyond the latitude in the strict sense. It is likely that this focus relates to the development of my book *Pensamiento periférico*.

10.2 Among my notes, two ideas are highlighted, ideas with which you have tried to overcome the notion of ideas-instrument. I am talking about the notions of ideas-product and ideas as technology systems. Both images caught my attention, especially the second.

Some ideas can be thought of as products. In fact, in

* *Latin American thought* T/N

academic language one often speaks of “intellectual production”, although obviously, not all products are an instrument. A fundamental objective of applied eidetic studies (as it has been in good part the goal of universities, think-tanks, research centers, etc.) is the “production” of ideas.

I have described the behavior of eidetic entities somewhere else as explainers and givers of meaning in the world. I have also described them as instruments; however, we can also conceptualize them as “products”. This refers to another possible way of classifying eidetic entities. The three modes (explainers-givers of meaning, instruments and products) are overlapped in some areas, although I think they can be distinguished, for which a rigorous definition of what we are talking about must be conducted. These types of definitions, on the other hand, constitute the specificity of the discipline.

But the set of eidetic entities can also be compared to the set of technological systems that, overall, can't be characterized as a “tool”. Technologies are too old and too varied, they are too embedded in the life of societies to be conceived, at this stage, as simple tools. The technological system is in symbiosis with societies. That doesn't mean that the technological system prevents us from making tools as a conscious and specific design, but that fact allows us to understand that the system as a whole can no longer be considered a “tool”. For the rest, this has been said over and over in the history of contemporary thought.

This conceptualization moves between two poles that may be considered contradictory but do refer to a fundamental distinction among eidetic entities. On the one hand, they are conceived as creators of human beings and, therefore, tremendously transcend the intentions of those who hold them. On the other hand, human beings are conceived as the creators of eidetic entities, leading up to the radicalness of the engineering work with those entities. How can we reconcile these two extremes, and apparently opposing viewpoints? It is more of a sphere with two poles –“North and South”–, antipodes that are not excluded but work by their own circular sense of this reality.

Should the Earth, in order to respect coherence be only North or South, or in order to avoid contradiction, should it be carried out in the abstraction of the Equator? This is not merely a sophism. If it is accepted that human beings are simultaneously and

circularly products and producers, then why couldn't the same about ideas be accepted: they are creators of human beings while they are circularly produced by us... The main issue lies in adequately understanding the notion of "producers" and of "produced". Something similar happens with the relationship we human beings have with the planet. We are Earth—we are completely products of it—and we have been able to modify it. We even envision the possibility of leaving Earth some day and migrating toward sidereal bodies that are more hospitable (or more immune to our contaminant influences). The same thing couldn't happen with eidetic entities: we may be able to modify them, but we are not able to leave them. It would be as absurd as migrating over and over, pretending to leave the universe. Because, in truth, we are not products of planet Earth but of the universe and we are incompressible without it, even though we may be able to emancipate from this planet in which circumstantially we were born. We cannot flee the universe nor get rid of it; also, we are doomed to live with eidetic entities hosted in our midst, in symbiosis with them, because they have allowed us to reach the state of hominid, for in them lies our human life, our best life and our emancipation.

10.3 At a certain moment ago, you outlined a distinction between what you call "eidetic origin" and the "neurological origin" of ideas. However, there wasn't an opportunity to sufficiently develop the point at that moment [3.3].

There are various perspectives to interrogate. Eidetic studies have a specific perspective to inquire about ideas, equidistant from the neuroscience approach and communication sciences. That is to say, it is not about inquiring about how neurons are connected or what the regions of the brain are that deal with the articulation between ideas and spoken language. This also is not about inquiring about anatomy, functions or areas of the brain that affect the gestation or processing of ideas. It is not the physiological brain, but the "eidetic brain".

10.4 You insist on the notion of "eidetic brain". This is your chance to explain it more broadly.

The brain can't think in any way. It thinks according to the formats it carries within, as if it were a "hard drive" which conditions compatibilities and incompatibilities. Francisco Varela, who maintained the inconvenience of making the human brain equivalent to a computer, would not approve this. But I can't find another way to express what I mean.

Clearly, I'm not referring to the "areas of the brain" explained by those who study it from a physiological perspective. Instead, I am trying to understand how brain parameters allow eidetic studies to be implemented, developed and then processed. The notion of "eidetic brain" refers to the compatibilities and incompatibilities between, on the one hand, eidas and eidas' combinations and, on the other, the basic parameters, "the hard ones" of the brain. How does the brain behave in the combination of eidas? How does it process, and elaborate? This is the brain that interests us. Eidetically, we do not operate in any way; we operate within what the human –sapiens– brain allows us (and maybe pre-sapiens...?).

It is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that, in this plane, we are not talking about psychological or social motivations, nor about the decisions or pressures of power, whatever they may be, nor about the work of "eidetic energizers".

It could be of a great scientific interest to determine if when an eidetic brain receives an idea, Broca's area operates simultaneously (I'm just saying, because I am ignorant in this field), and if when there is an eidetic hybridization, then Wernicke's area is operating, and whether it has to do with issues that border psychology, such as attention, concentration, the ability to listen and talk. This would imply an important interdisciplinary work, but it would no longer properly be a subject of eidetic studies.

To once again present a disclaimer, I should point out that one of the problems of eidetic studies is determining, for example, what the procedure is by which a new eidetic entity is formed from components of previous entities: what eidas remain, what eidas come out, which eidas are changed and how the recomposition of eidas take place to give shape to the new entity. All of that is related to the programs of the "brain's hard drive", "installed" in us from the time of pre-sapiens.

In regard to these issues, it's worth noting that some texts about the origin of spoken language and the evolution of brains do

not sufficiently take into account the importance of eidetic entities in this process. They seem to refer to a spoken language devoid of content, criteria and values, as if they were simply deictic and utilitarian issues.

10.5 All this seems to bring us back to the topic of the relation between eidetic studies and cognitive sciences.

Of course. It allows us to associate eidetic studies as studies whose subject of study is the life of eidetic entities, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive linguistics, genetics, and brain studies. The purpose of these studies and topics is to understand how ideas are produced and how they enter in symbiosis with human beings. This relation also helps us understand what the mutations of eidetic entities are once the use of spoken language is perfected, which, like a channel, allows them to have a qualitatively greater fluency. It's a vast field. Although it is not a topic of eidetic studies per se, it is very important for eidetic studies to have specialists with several careers who would enable them to participate in this interdisciplinary dialog.

10.6 Let's move on to another matter. I remember that when we talked about the classification of eidetic entities you mentioned dreams [3.29]; you also mentioned dreams when we spoke of changes at the eidetic level [5.3-5.4]. When we were tidying up the transcript, you stated the issue of dreams and that their "originating" relations with eidetic dynamics was a topic you were greatly interested in, and that it was a topic you'd have liked to develop more broadly. This may be a good time to do so.

This is a good time, since there are few problems where the need for an interdisciplinary treatment is so evident. On the other hand, if all that we have talked about is uncertain and tentative, this is even more so.

In my opinion, dreams contribute to giving shape to eidetic entities, which is a statement that requires explanation. This seems particularly clear for the ancestral eidetic entities in their hatching and arbitrariness, but also for others of more recent emergence, such as ideologies and cotidianies. I am not referring only to the

better characterization of the processes of “elaboration” of entities, but also to better understanding the procedure for the elaboration of the eidetic (and physiological) brain. Paying attention to dreams can contribute to making sense of or explaining the many quirky taboos of so many peoples— taboos that don’t require 100% utilitarian and functional explanations. Of course, we should make a distinction here between the brain activity during the non-vigil (what invariably happens while we sleep) and brain activity during narrative dreams (dreams we sometimes remember), despite the fact they are similar in that we, as aware intelligences, are lacking complete authority over them. Here is where procedures of metaphors, metonymies and analogies, among other formulas, ride free. It is common for ideas to evolve, mutate, and develop allegorically rather than “logically”; this happens in societies as well as in individuals, whether they are knowledge professionals or not.

10.7 You’re presenting notions that require explanation and clarification. “Non-Vigil”, “narrative dreams”; procedures of metaphors, metonymies and analogies, “allegorical development of thought”

We have said before that the brain thinks largely based on metaphors. Dreams operate through metaphors and analogies, and this applies to nice dreams, unpleasant ones, as well as nightmares, although there are also dreams that are neither one thing or the other. Dreams are privileged places of dislocated creativity, because we don’t control them and the brain gets carried away freely, so to speak, in free associations, without the awareness that pretends to control it and focus it on certain “useful” things.

I mentioned the investigations of Lakoff and Johnson (2001) about the importance of metaphors, not only when speaking, but also when thinking, and as a significant element for everyday life. These authors state: “Human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined” (2001, 42).

10.8 Where would it lead us?

I’m trying to say that in the non-vigil, whether in narratives

dreams or non-narrative dreams, or in psychedelic daydreams, or in different combinations of these modalities, the brain is a fertile field where eidetic entities can “run rampant”, branching out in a crazy way (“crazy” as in fast and bizarre), thus giving rise to unsuspected results that don’t come exclusively from previously developed eidetic plans.

This phenomenon is particularly relevant in the framework of shamanism, where the “intellectuals” of those cultures, that have existed for some tens of thousands of years up today, have expressed their ideas within the framework of ceremonies where the presence of hallucinogens is common and where trance is a “proof” of the value of the speeches. The increase in certain brain capacities as an effect of hallucinogens operates as a fertilizer that promotes the prospering of eidetic entities, although most likely of some kinds more than others. For example, eidetic entities alluding to the union between humans and nature thrive better in said situation than research on particle acceleration. On the other hand, it is reasonable to think that these substances have had some kind of long-term effect on the evolution of the brain, as it was suggested by Rodriguez and Quirce (2012). These authors have argued about the role hallucinogens would have had in the process of hominization, mentioning the antecedent of Terence McKenna. From my point of view, it is another way to approach the issue of how the eidetic level is decisive in the process of the sapiens’ brain hominization and evolution. Without prejudice to remember zoopharmacognosy as pre-human work.

During non-vigil and distraction states, the brain fulfills, in addition to possible others, these two functions: to continue working on the issues that concerned us during wakefulness (be it daily and existential affairs or theoretical issues) and, on the other hand, deploying fantasies, desires, fears, free associations, follies, phobias and everything that our brain wouldn’t dare sensibly think about. It is said that with hallucinogens this is accentuated. This second dimension makes it possible to build mythical tales based on imaginations, half real and fantastic beings, passages through dimensions, times and identities, without completely detaching from what is lived in daily life: references to people, animals, plants, places, situations, criteria of what is desirable and what undesirable, of good and of fear. The fact that this happens more in certain disciplinary areas than in others, or more in some levels of eidetic

work than others, or more in some societies than in others, doesn't make this dimension disappear or less important.

All this takes on particular relevance if a society believes that dreams are words, expressions or communications that come from other worlds of greater wisdom. For example:

It is said that thoughts also occur in the heart, and the Toba theory places them coming almost always from beyond, showing us a very porous image of the person in her interaction with the world. The most common phrase that can be heard in this connection is the "a thought just came to mind" (Wright, 2015: 38).

In parentheses: this conception of thought as a matter that is not "created" by the individual mind, but one that is rather "received", "having come", or "installed" is interesting. There is a resemblance with the notion of "influence", to the extent that it is not produced but received. I find here a (another) relative value of this notion, when it accepts thought as an object that is installed in our environment and of which we haven't been properly its creators. This is linked in turn to the topic "out of place" ideas [5.8 and 5.11]. In the case of shamanism, one who receives revelations from beyond; and in the case of peripheral, those who receive them from beyond the ocean, from a far, prestigious place, from another place.

Continuing on, dreams represent the possibility of a fanciful leak and then stories become attributed to supernatural beings. Thus, due to the fact that dreams gain a plus of symbolic capital for its privileged communication with an apparent beyond, giver-meaning entities can be developed for society, in order to defend any power criteria, or any eventual counter-power. All sort of arbitrary stories can appear, as well as arbitrary customs, supposedly dictated by higher beings. There are societies that secularize these fantasies by transforming them into expressions of art, allowing them to be deployed without attributing a supernatural character or normative.

A key aspect is that people don't necessarily invent this with a plan, let alone foresee if their story, along with many others of diverse origins and with diverse paths and versions, is going to have good reception. That is to say, the corpus of myths is spontaneously created, in a multi-causal, random way, and therefore is not programmed. Proof of this is the immense variety of mythical

known tales. And surely the number of unknown stories is much greater, along with the missing stories, which are immensely more so. Whatever the case, the opening to dreams allowed for an explosion of intellectual creativeness.

10.9 These statements seem to be important for understanding the conformation of ancestral eidetic entities. Are they limited to that area, or can they be “brought” to the waters of contemporaneity?

I'm interested in the non-vigil states and narrative dreams as components to the constitution of eidetic entities, especially the most primary or core: short stories, myths and cosmogonic tales. But I am also interested in studying how these patterns are maintained even in the academic endeavor, as well as in the formation of ideologies and cotidianities, particularly in those entities that inspire movements such as Hippism, deep environmentalism, light orientalism and even veganism.

In what way were dreams able to contribute to the constitution of eidetic entities? To what extent could they shape, in the confusion of the conscious and the unconscious, entities that were created with multiple fragments in order to give shape to a story that, being on the one hand a product of the brain (not necessarily of consciousness), on the other remained housed within it as a framework (a program), a possibility and a requirement (a seed that could and wanted to be a leafy tree), as an instrument and as an obsession, as a fantasy of what it is wanted? How did desires and fears, the tension between what is desirable and what is undesirable express themselves there in a more vivid or clearer way than during wakefulness? They had a major impact among lots of peoples that conceived dreams as messages from a superior beyond and, therefore, they were considered more meritorious than messages at a conscious level, even more so if they came after ceremonies loaded with hallucinogens that were able to radicalize moods. In societies where shamanism operates, dreams and visions assume greater importance with hallucinogens; they are like a sounding board haloed with prestige and sanctity. How many taboos may come from dreamed prohibitions due to poor digestion, in the midst of snoring and cries, a bad memory, a long face, a casual fall, or tripping over a cheeky root or a stone ...?

10.10 What role would the non-vigil have in the eidetic construction, especially in the work of the professional intelligentsia?

I am not able to determine a valid model for all cases. On numerous occasions people, even those who exercise the professions of knowledge-thought, carry out activities of re-elaboration, combination, hybridization and recomposition, among others; they carry these activities out in a non-programmed and completely unconscious manner, in the same way that dreams operate. And this is not a mere analogy: eidetic elaboration processes (as well as the artistic and mathematic ones) operate in an important way outside of consciousness –more or less in an “automatic” mode. It can be put this way: consciousness proposes a task to the brain that the latter is going to perform consciously and, also, unconsciously. Although the contemporary work of eidetic development intends to account as explicitly as possible for its creation process (explaining methods, citing sources and bibliographies), this doesn’t exhaust the fact, at all, that such and such things might be processed or combined in ways that are infinitely varied and that not everything always originates from conscious and explicit decisions; they often originate, rather, from unconscious levels, which perhaps then we may try to justify.

I’ve tried to make it clear that the intellectual endeavor works partly as a pre-determined “project” but that in many opportunities the result is something unforeseen or unforeseeable. It is not like making a building, for which we have, before even beginning, a blueprint.

This, which is easy to accept in shamanic societies, is notoriously more difficult to accept for the professional and institutionalized intellectual work which is typical of urban and literate societies. I would like to emphasize this in two ways: the brain continues to work while we sleep in regard to dimensions of dreaming; eidetic entities don’t require conscious thought in the waking state to deploy –they develop by using all states.

10.11 If I understand correctly, this series of considerations on the significance of the non-vigil in its different forms allows you to register, once again, the intellectual, academic, and

“programmed” eidetic work –a more recently emerged work and more typical of our time– in the broader and long-lasting primordial backdrop that you are so interested in highlighting.

Of course it does. This is very relevant, since it enables us to connect pre-sapiens brain functioning with the functioning of the brain of an intellectual who imagines post-neoliberal models of society. Obviously, we are not referring to long duration, but to an extremely long duration, a duration of over ten thousand years. Something similar happens with what we talked about circulation. These are constituting processes of species, of the hominid condition. They are natural, although not essential, as we pointed out. Eidetic studies should be able to cover all societies of intelligences and all times where these societies have been deployed.

10.12 We have spoken of ideologies as eidetic systems [3.14], but almost nothing about “ideology” in the Marxist sense of the word.

The notion of “ideology” understood as false consciousness, and as a concealing discourse, is normally associated with the notion of “justification” or “legitimization”, which are almost synonymous. It is said that ideological principles are spread in order to justify. Here, a radical distinction must be made: justify in order to legitimate the actions of the leaders who undertake those actions before others (i. e., before those who are underprivileged due to these initiatives); or justify in order to legitimate within the group of actors who carry out such actions. In other words, I am interested in distinguishing the “ad-extra” (outward) justifications from the “ad-intra” (inward) justifications, although this is not an absolute distinction.

But I would like to stop on the ad-intra justifications because, frequently, speeches that critics call “ideological”, don’t reach subordinates or potential subordinates. This happens largely with speeches about others’ savagery. The supposed savages almost never hear these speeches that, should be noted, would make very little sense to them. One would have to be very foolish to say: “Since I am a savage, I should become a slave of a civilized person”. This is not so obvious when it comes to less direct ways of presenting it, such as when underdeveloped countries (a certain

form of savagery) accept the direction of developed countries (a certain form of civilization).

In this regard, it is very relevant to assume justification from another point of view, that is to assume it as ad-intra, a politically correct discourse within a society that serves to project it toward the outside in tasks of domination, expansion, and hegemony. This is the case with the ideology of Christianization in the world that the West has undertaken. This ideology has been useful since the times of Henry the Navigator when it came to legalizing, on the part of the elite and its various sub-groups, a work of state investment and expansion. Giving a Christianizing nature to their overseas enterprises allowed them to legitimize themselves before those who disagreed and also among those who undertook those enterprises, thus giving greed a sense of a crusade. It didn't make any sense however, to Africans, Americans and Asians, who were more than willing to spend the rest of their lives without receiving the good news that Europeans brought along with slavery. Another thing happened with the children of mixed parentage and with captives who were "trained" in their schools from a very early age. They could indeed accept that the European expansion of their peoples had been a providential mission of saving benefits, and therefore they would become allies of the conquistadors in the new lands.

But once again, the purpose of the theory regarding the enslavement of savages is to gain the willingness of allies who won't be enslaved as a result of these actions but become partners in the enslaving task of the savages who are outside the margins and who won't know nor understand that ideology. That is to say, in colonial-imperial cases, ideology operates firstly as a legitimate discourse among those who undertake the conquest-exploitation rather than among those who inhabit the invaded regions and suffer or will suffer the invasion-exploitation from the centers.

10.13 Louis Althusser was mentioned a couple of times during our conversations. At the time we didn't want to expand on it too much. But I remember that, off record, you mentioned something about the atmosphere to breathe, and toxicity...

The thing is Althusser has a very strong and interesting expression, as biological as it is ambiguous, but precisely its ambiguity makes it especially noticeable: "Human societies secrete

ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life” (1967). The point is that secretions are toxic and therefore they cannot be an “atmosphere to their respiration”. Toxic things don’t help life. Secretion means precisely to get rid of and to clean up the useless.

However, these types of contradictions in the metaphors introduced by someone like Althusser show us how he tries to approach a relevant problem by trying to emancipate from the straitjacket of eidetic forces with which he operated. I believe that the image of symbiosis is better than that of secretion, at least at a level of languages-mentalities-beliefs. In Althusser’s conception, society seems to be prior to ideology. Otherwise he couldn’t declare himself a materialistic in his schema. Luckily, today one can be materialistic without assuming said type of materialism. Eidetic entities, at least in their proto-form and beyond it, are prior to human sapiens. Archeology shows in regard to the Neanderthal that they already had “modulated” brains, thereby making them suitable for conceptualizing things immediately imperceptible by the senses. Sapiens societies were able to be constituted only by taking into account these eidetic dimensions. Nevertheless, bear in mind that this does not contain any of the idealism in the way that it was conceived by Marx and Althusser, whose materialism was closer to that of Democritus than the materialism we are able to handle today. This is thanks to the immense advances of genetic studies, studies of the brain and so many other disciplines, including eidetic studies.

10.14 In the conversations we had on chapter six, you covered in extenso the dissemination strategies of eidetic entities. However, you barely mentioned the issue of “field” or ecosystems in which these entities are disseminated. What makes one field better than another?

Intellectual ecosystems can be understood as fields where some eidetic entities could thrive better than others. This is another dimension that crude thinking would attribute to context. Fields are formed with the set of previous eidetic entities which have sedimented, in addition to the effect that entities themselves have, in symbiosis with humans, on the field in order to make it more functional, prone and favorable to their own development. This

happens together with what comes from extra eidetic elements, some of which are alive –such as socio-economic (long-term) conditions or as a revolution (short-term)–, and some of which are not alive, for example, successive natural disasters.

10.15 In that same chapter you stated that an eidetic entity should not exploit or parasitize too much its hosts under penalty that they realize what it is doing and/or commit suicide, thus leading to the extinction of the undiscerning entity. Can there be humans who, in turn, are able to exploit eidetic entities, thus destroying them?

The best way to destroy an eidetic entity is by “silencing it”, not by communicating it. In oral societies, the consequence of this is the extinction of the entity. In societies with written language, it can leave it in a state of latency, without necessarily extinguishing it. Another way to destroy an entity is by killing all its bearers, as has been attempted, for example, when people decide to burn a pine forest in order to kill all moth eggs and prevent them from spreading to other plantations. Another way is by refuting its principles and showing that the entity is unworthy and that it should not be disseminated because it is wrong or harmful.

I believe, however, that this is not the objective of your question, and that it is aiming at something more subtle: whether or not an eidetic specie can be unintentionally destroyed by treating it so inadequately, as if it were a problem of “mishandling” or something like that, such as the person who feeds his pet with affection but inadequately, will end up killing it. It has been said that men kill what they love... If I graft harmful eidas to an entity, even if I have the best of intentions, in the end I will weaken and kill it, because I create unbearable contradictions for it. There are extremely toxic hybrids to an eidetic body, which undermine it from within. This is what happens with the “criticism” device in theological and ideological institutions attached to very closed philosophical systems. For instance, when purporting one religion to be critical. Only an encapsulated criticism in certain very limited dimensions is possible; if the criticism overflows, it’ll make that theological entity collapse. Overall, if eidas are artificially grafted to an entity, without respecting its balances, it will collapse due to internal contradictions. It is impossible to cultivate open criticism

and, at the same time, believe that such or such a book has been “revealed”.

10.16 What you mention is extremely interesting, because it refers to the certainly relevant topic of the degree of plasticity or elasticity of eidetic entities. But emphasizing that point made you “beat around the bush” and not answer satisfactorily the question of whether or not there can be humans who exploit eidetic entities, thus destroying them.

I think so. If eidetic entities, in their pursuit to spread, exploit humans, humans in their eagerness to survive also exploit eidetic entities. In both cases, the danger is that exploitation is such, that the exploited will be destroyed. If a person exploits an eidetic entity for his own benefit, with a calculation as cold as the calculations of eidetic entities with naive humans, he will weaken it and eventually destroy it.

There are humans who “use” eidetic entities, I do welcome the term now, such as flags or as instruments of self-promotion. People who do this raise the eidetic entity up as a “savior” notion to others, provided that they grant a key role in the community, money, or any other type of benefit. How do you recognize this? For example, when said person identifies the entity with himself or when speaking of that entity, he is talking about himself or when introducing the composition of that entity he almost only speaks the way in which he has built that entity. That is, this involves the ability of some homo sapiens to parasitize an eidetic entity by looking solely for a personal benefit: “You’d be free if you granted me benefits”. This, firstly, is the nature of the eidetic quackery: they convince people with the prestige of the concepts and promise benefits to their carriers. For this to happen, the eidetic entity must be well positioned, so that when the person identifies himself with it, he’ll be marked with that prestige. For example, people listening to someone referring permanently to solidarity, which is something positive, must believe him to be noble. Ultimately, this is said by many preachers, gurus or philosophers of various liberations that exploit their followers. For example: “You will be part of the liberation if you help me get an honorary degree”.

But you may say, in such a case, the eidetic entity is used as a

sort of *captatio benevolentiae*, a beautiful mask to an ugly face, but it is not abusing of the entity itself, but of a few naive fellows; you could even say the entity takes advantage of these types of megalomaniac figures to spread in a better manner. This is the case, although one thing doesn't go against the other: by exploiting this eidetic entity beyond a reasonable level, it gets destroyed; by messing around with it, it gets cheaper, trivialized and discredited, thereby falling into a vicious circle. When the communicator is discredited, the entity is discredited as well. To put it another way: Those who parasitize a prestigious eidetic entity in an extreme manner, by exploiting it and being inconsistent, make it fall into such disrepute that then nobody trusts it. This leaves the entity within the category of masquerade and nonsense.

The excessive parasitism of an entity makes it impracticable for existence. The entity is exhausted and lacking strength to establish symbiosis, because normal humans create antibodies and prefer, in their eidetic needs, other options of association; this occurs in the underlying assumption that numerous eidetic entities are competing for those symbiosis. This occurred with the eidetic entity Renaissance Catholicism, which sold too many indulgences and lost credibility as an inspiring eidetic system of a good existence.

10.17 I would like to return to your interest in the Pacific. Is your only goal to advance towards a global mapping of ideas or have you linked other purposes or forms of utilization of this approach? Have any theoretical and methodological developments appeared worthy of communicating?

The interest in the Pacific has to do with several concerns. We have already talked about a few [8.18]. One way to undertake the global circulation of ideas is by carrying out studies about ideas of many parts of the world. Being able to say something about each major region, knowing a few points, and having a few references are ways of making a world map, an eidetic atlas; this was a long-standing aspiration for me, and I have been frustrated by my lack of energy and/or lack of astuteness to implement it. This clearly has to do with the desire to think of the Pacific as a whole, as a basin and advancing in what can be said about this macro region. To

contribute to placing the South Pacific in the global eidetic map is key. To think of ideas globally and to take on the world in its various manifestations, regions, peoples, and cultures are things I tried to accomplish with the book *Pensamiento Periférico*, but I wanted to continue by going toward those less well-known areas to me and, and dare I say, also for specialists in eidetic studies anywhere. And yet, there is no better place to think of the “oceanic condition” (from the word ocean, not from Oceania, which would be a truism). This perspective offers us new opportunities to think of circulation and sapiens myths in a better way, this concept of “go beyond, as soon as possible”. I think this has not been seen among other peoples, more patently, more dramatically, and more obsessively. Although, at the moment, anthropology has revealed this better than Eidetics, which are indeed fellow disciplines.

Another issue that has surfaced, one that I have just began to systematize, revolves around the question: what makes the ideas of an author such as Paulo Freire, the South American thinker, who is in my opinion the most internationally recognized of all times, arrive and germinate in places so unusual, such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Timor-Leste, among others...? I have developed a first list of response criteria about Freire that I want to propose:

- He was able to think about a problem affecting peripheral regions everywhere: absences or deficiencies of education in adults.

- He developed an interesting association between literacy and socio-political consciousness, allowing thinking to take place in a correlative manner regarding social change that was unrelated to political parties, guerrilla factions or international forces.

- He was able to formulate very happy concepts, which not only presented his proposal but also were easy to understand: awareness, pedagogy of the oppressed, and education as the practice of freedom.

- He managed to reconcile two eidetic systems very much in vogue at the time: social Christianity and Marxism, in particular, young Marx’s.

- He was articulated in networks and institutions with high global circulation, such as the World Council of Churches.

- He had an ethical position that made him particularly credible and reliable.

- He visited places toward which our intelligentsia doesn't normally go, such as Africa and the South Pacific. He also wrote about some of these places and his experiences.

I don't have much to say in order to systematize, prioritize, or articulate these elements in a better way. They serve as a somewhat naive approximation to think about this. In truth, there are so many new topics appearing before us... It is not possible to address them all in this book...

10.18 Another issue you've been brooding over has to do with the definition, characterization and exemplification of eidetic device. We talked about it at the end of chapter three, but I know that what was spoken in that moment doesn't deplete your reflections in this regard. What else would you like to add, looking to help the reader better understand in which things you are thinking about and in which you aren't? On the other hand, it seems to me that you find this notion particularly suitable, not so much for what it denotes per se, but for the wide range of problems relating to the life of ideas whose inclusion allows us to appreciate.

We said before that a device is a small eidetic entity with no holistic pretensions and that offers a very defined sense. Let see if another example helps me explain myself better. In this case, I could be inspired in a mechanical analogy. I have thought of fuel saving devices that can be placed in an engine, and that let you accurately adjust the amount of oxygen to the proper temperature for the perfect gasification and fuel efficiency. Of course, the eidetic device doesn't operate exactly in this way.

I have also had in mind that languages have devices that allow you to improve them as well. For example, the letter "s" for making plurals, is a tremendously useful device –it facilitates the operation of romance languages in regard to Latin and Greek. The apostrophe S ('s) in English to denote possession is another device that, though it doesn't have the importance of the plural "s", it also helps and simplifies a language, especially a spoken one. I don't know if it would be appropriate to think of zero (0) in mathematics as a device. If so, it would be one of the most important devices.

10.19 I'm going to insist on a point you mentioned without going into depth: What would the role of the eidetic device be? Does it all boil down to making the eidetic system in question more attractive?

The self-help device contributes to the dissemination of some eidetic systems. Thanks to this integration, the eidetic system in question grants additional satisfaction to those who consume it, carry it, hold it, however you want to call it, for that matter.

In fact, to be installed in a society all eidetic systems must offer certain rewards in the short term, as well as benefits in the long term; otherwise, its community could either disappear with it (such as certain systems that ordered the bodies of those who adopted it to be seriously deformed), or it could abandon that eidetic system like an infection that prevents society from functioning (as was the case with systems that oppressed the thought and the life of societies, thus entering a contradiction between this system and the development of the productive forces of that society). In open societies, when confronted with others, eidetic systems must offer further rewards and benefits. In closed societies, a unique eidetic system or a system without competition, can endure more time by offering less benefits. In open societies, eidetic systems must mutate faster to adapt to changes in their societies, as well as to empower them in the global race. A dissemination strategy is to be covered with a sort of sweet juicy pulp, which although it doesn't guarantee a long-term stay, it ensures its adoption and rapid diffusion.

At this level, the contribution of the self-help device consists in convincing those who acquire the package that they are entering into a new life of harmony with cosmic forces by a decision to overturn their existence; this is in a mutually beneficial association with deities that will help him more and in a better way as long as the person helps more and better in return and disseminates the eidetic system more and better as well. That is to say, it grants those who accept it an advantage of self-assessment, ego, respect and status by being part of a partnership with divinities. This is something that dignifies, bestows importance and makes people feel powerful and part of what is good. In addition, it is a valid option against those who had betrayed true Christianity, the original one, the evangelical, the one of the poor. A base of this was found in a

previous Christianity, although it had already lost it in large part. Roman Catholicism in colonial regions started, in a sense, to lose its ethos of diffuser commitment. The mass was simply Christianized, and, by behaving as a herd, lost, or did not actively or ethically accept the role of “helping divinities” and being part of a joint venture in the cosmic order.

The type of articulation between the evangelical Christianity eidetic system and the self-help eidetic device can be explained in two ways: specific and general. In a specific sense, self-help operates with a significant decline of the theological condition in order to get closer to psychology, as well as the communications endeavor, advertising, guidance and therapy (personal, couple, or group therapy). Self-help articulates itself to evangelical Christian thought by removing edges, thereby offering a light morality and a social solidarity, in regard to festivities and social meetings; it barely covers the issues of sexuality, without many demands of stoicism. From a general perspective, self-help works as a giver of meaning with a low level of orthodoxy, thereby allowing ideas to be construed according to everybody’s viewpoints of things. This is achieved without involving constrictor external judgments, thereby plunging the eidetic level into a friendly coexistence and in an ethics vindication with low levels of conflict. In this sense, the self-help device is the denial of “hard eidetic” and is a wonder to the society of the masses. This is not to say that evangelism doesn’t have principles, but we have to agree they are incomparably less harsh than Iranian Shiism of 1980.

10.20 Is self-help the only device that has been added to an eidetic system?

No. At the beginning of the 21st century it was one of the most visible, but a few decades before it was nationalism. The anti-imperialist-nationalism joined Marxism, liberalism, Christianity, and Islam among others. It’s not that all liberals or Marxists became anti-imperialist-nationalists, but this association allowed Marxism to grow enormously; it also revitalized it, as it did with other eidetic systems. This shows precisely that the nature of these devices is to adhere to eidetic systems that can be very opposite among each other and even irreconcilable. The case of anti-imperialist-nationalism is usually “bellicose”, while the case of self-help is

“harmonizing”.

10.21 How do eidetic devices adhere or implant to eidetic systems? The image of a device integrated to a machine is illustrating but fails to explain what happens in living beings and especially in eidetic ones. The notion of symbiosis could work if both had the same entity, but by removing the systemic nature from the device, you've turned the analogy inappropriate...

Your observation is very acute. Let's take a look at this issue that requires very precise words and the subtlest of distinctions, which makes it, on another note, something impracticable. For example, a lot of people in Academia seek to perform something as hard as surgery to the cornea using boxing gloves, instead of surgeon gloves or even less likely, laser beams.

In life sciences, mitochondria are a topic that is greatly spoken about. These are a device that contribute to the production of energy for some cells. They aren't a part, in the sense of “member” of the cell, because mitochondria have a different genetic code from the cells in which they are housed and associated. Biology speaks of “organelle” to describe them, distinguishing them from an “organ”, though symbiosis is used to refer to mitochondria and cells, something we couldn't properly say about a device installed in an engine. But these examples, whether mechanical or biological, merely aimed to clarify and, above all, explain the matter and also myself about what I mean to say. My low abstraction capacity leads me to think of these similar cases, be it cells, or engines, since they are easier to understand than what happens with eidetic systems, entities that can be so elusive, or even abstract, as some people say, and so difficult to conceive... This is in part the reason why sociologism is successful, since by making simplifications, and resorting to words for everyday use in politics, it intends to understand the difficulty of these phenomena, taken them as accidents or additions of human beings, whether in the form of “accidents”, as the pigmentation of the skin or hair type, or as “members” or worse, as “tools”: fists, grapple, and rifles.

10.22 Could you give yet another spin to the matter? How do eidetic devices adhere or combine or associate in the system?

I understand that you no longer want more metaphors, but an eidetically strict and specific response. However, at the moment I am not able to offer it, and this possibly derives from the fact that I have not been able to sufficiently define the notion of “eidetic device”. Imagine how many other kinds of eidetic entities will have to be conceptualized for a greater knowledge of reality and for a better functioning of the discipline.

In any case, when talking about eidetic engineering, the notion “device” acquires greater importance. The construction of devices to make ideas more productive is key. I think that the device “criticism” is the best example of how significant these types of entities may become.

10.23 Could you explain this last part more thoroughly? How has the device “criticism” worked, and how does it work?

The device “criticism” plays a similar role, in a way, to the “self-help” device; but in another way, it appears as diverse and even antagonistic. They are located in various fields: “Self-help” is related to coexistence and harmonic everyday life, while “criticism” mainly relates to the work of research. Both work as lubricants to facilitate the work.

Self-help states we are all good, pretty and siblings; we love each other, and we must live harmonically with our many strengths and small weakness, since the gods love us and want us to be happy and good, both boys and girls. I know I’m simplifying something. The device “criticism”, for its part, aims to overcome an authoritarian, dogmatic and arrogant intellectual work and move toward a non-dogmatic, democratic and precisely critical endeavor. It is a sort of lubricant intended to make the intellectual work more fluid, just like self-help lubricates the human relations of everyday life. But if we changed planes it would be fatal. For example, if criticism starts working in everyday life (such as those people who want to question, explain, clarify and psychoanalyze everything and therefore they become unbearable) and self-help gets involved in the academic endeavor (such as those compassionate professors, for whom students are like spoiled grandchildren whom everything must be tolerated, students who shouldn’t need to study but receive help by giving them optimal grades, so that teachers don’t develop

in the students a sense of frustration, since, after all, everybody else is to blame), then a catastrophe occurs: a daily life of paranoia and an academic culture that is both lazy and self-indulgent.

The notion “criticism” has been introduced among other reasons to lubricate intellectual work, thus preventing some eidetic entities from overheating, which would result in dogmatism or fanaticism. The “criticism” device is found in European thinking, and it is addressed as such at least in Kant’s work, though it certainly existed previous to that in intellectual practice. Thomas Aquinas profusely illustrates this, among many other authors, and even prior to him, for instance, we could see a similar procedure in the dialogs of Plato.

The criticism device is a method to question judgments. The work of the academic disciplines couldn’t function without this systematic questioning. I say academic disciplines not to say scientific endeavor, because I think Liberal Arts broadly turn to the same type of reasoning, and this is present in European culture and its derivations. However, it is also present in the Muslim intellectual trajectory, as well as in the elaborations of Greek philosophy for example, and also in the possible readings of the Koran which are subjected systematically to criticism by other commentators.

The basic criteria of this device are: the formulation must be consistent in its various parts, or the formulation must be consistent with known facts. Another criterion that doesn’t work very differently, although it has an element a priori, is that the formulation must be consistent with sacred stories. The fourth one is practical: the fabricated thing should correspond to what is expected.

Briefly stated, this device is found in Erectus, Neanderthal and sapiens intellectuals; it is key, for example, to refining a stone ax and key in education skills, as simple as they may be, such as handcraft skills. This is so, although many sapiens may be tempted to believe that their own formulations are, finally, ultimate or unbeatable, so criticism in this case should stop. This notion is manipulated to criticize all eidetic systems, except their own. I have come to know people who are Stalinist, racist, Christian and also others who lack “intellectual honesty” and tendentiously manipulate the notion of “criticism”. It is therefore very important to add other devices to criticism to enable a more efficient functioning. Perhaps the best so far is the notion of “self-criticism”, that, although it is

helpful, is far from preventing naive criticism or tendentious criticism. The notion “knowing the state of play” also helps people to absolutize their own versions or conviction by learning what other people know and think, avoiding the bad habit of being *homo unius libri*.

There may be objections to the allusion to “intellectual honesty” by arguing that it is something found at the level of ethics and not at the eidetic level. But I think it is not a correct distinction. The notion of “intellectual honesty” is also an eidetic construct which, although it’s not implanted to an eidetic entity, it does work in a given intellectual ecosystem as a device that contributes to the proper functioning of it (to its creativity and strength). The notion of “intellectual honesty” is key to the functioning of academia and beyond it. By intellectual honesty I am referring to the following: not hiding information, being informed about works that deal with the same or similar issues, receiving counter arguments, dialoging with opposing positions, dwelling on arguments and not on the people who state them and admitting anonymous evaluations, among other things. This eidetic construct has an extensive background in western culture, both in the Semitic trajectory, as well as in the Greek trajectory; however, its formulation is recent. I could speak of an eidetic device, but it’s more appropriate to say that they constitute in accordance to an academic culture than to a greater eidetic entity –and this makes it difficult for me to understand it as a device, in the way I have defined it.

This ethical position is not universally shared, and it is not even necessary to assume that is understandable by all cultures, despite the good efforts of K. O. Apel, J. Habermas and others regarding the argument. For example, it is an almost incomprehensible notion to those who imagine their work directly inspired by supernatural forces and those who believe their intellectual endeavor to be a weapon. Any criticism or self-criticism is perceived by such people as a betrayal to those forces and as a way of providing weapons to the enemy. This criterion greatly weakens these intellectual endeavors as well as those ecosystems, thereby affecting them on each of their levels and starving them. Examples of this are: 18th century Spain and Russia during a large part of the Soviet era, with apologetic, fearful intellectuals incapable of thinking, who were obliged and controlled by leaders of parties, churches or states.

It must be added, on the other hand, that for this effect the device “intellectual honesty” is just that, a device, and no one attempts to attribute it “transcendental” meaning as valid beyond all possible experience. The reference in this case is to a pragmatic principle in which some intellectual communities operate. This principle favors information, argumentation, and communication, which, in turn, helps drive intellectual work forward, as well as discoveries, the creation of new concepts and, by and large, the emergence of new ideas. That is to say, it is not an “ideological” criterion but a “procedural” one.

I must remind you that you haven’t asked me a thing about “eidetic artifacts”. I would have to say that, maybe, you found this notion irrelevant. Despite the fact that these conversations we’re interweaving trending toward a book, may come closer to an artifact more than other entities.

10.24 There is some space for you to refer to any matter that you think is relevant and that we have not addressed until now. It would be something like “Speak now or forever hold your peace”, or as you were just saying, for this first edition.

I could talk about the usefulness of eidetic studies, about its authors, about the possibility of study programs, or about interdisciplinarity, agendas of research, the need to open new fields of work, etc.

10.25 But you can’t go too far. We are bordering the threshold of available space. We can only briefly address a couple of issues. I wouldn’t like this book to close with a reference to eidetic artifacts, suggesting that this book is somehow similar to the manuals that teach us how to manipulate a lawn mower. It seems to me that such a picture, so close to the end, wouldn’t leave a stimulating impression. I therefore propose the following two topics. First of all, I think it may be of interest if you present more elements to place the proposal of eidetic studies in your academic and intellectual itinerary: How did you get here? In fact, if a reader who knew you because of some chapter of this book, he could imagine that you are a kind of Mircea Eliade’s emulator in Latin America, which is not the case, since your previous contributions have

not gone exactly in *that* direction... Secondly, it seems to me that it may be relevant to insist on the characteristics and potentialities of this disciplinary field in South America.

My articles about eidetic studies are decreasing in “content” in order to be more and more relative to answers to theoretical or epistemic questions, which should contribute to the development of the disciplinary field. For example, works that incorporate a new language and try to make some dimension clearer: circulation, the notion of intellectual networks, reception-reprocessing, and the notion of intellectual environment.

Eidetic studies, as we have practiced them in our region starting a century ago, have been particularly close to philosophy, historiography, literary studies and sociology. They have approached anthropology, linguistics, psychology, economics and other possibilities on hand notoriously less. I say “on hand”, because for the community of us who deals with these things, they are not such remote disciplines. They have approached even less so other disciplinary fields: general natural sciences, as well as cognitive sciences and technologies, disciplines with which I am trying to build some precarious bridges.

What would the possible agendas be? I’ve made themed agendas pointing toward eidetic studies endeavors within South America, noting the need to update national stories, and open up to eidetic systems housed in new groups or sectors absent in canonical works. I have also highlighted the need for articulating ideas with intellectual networks as ways of linking the eidetic itself with other para-eidetic and non-eidetic dimensions. On the other hand, I have pointed to the need to study parallels and circulations among the regions of the South. I have suggested we open up to new conceptualizations, especially from disciplinary areas as diverse as they are far away from ours; nevertheless, they can be very inspiring through analogies and metaphors (which are so important to think, explore and broaden our thinking). Having said this, it is no less true that there are other spaces, and that they are numerous, in which eidetic studies can formulate agendas of exploration and work. So many levels of endeavors and overlaps with other disciplinary areas come to mind.

To formulate these agendas is part of the formation work of this disciplinary space where several lines of work intersect, and

which are assumed as interlocutors and speaking partners. To suggest new paths is a way of inviting those who are starting in these matters to step into opportunities that are multiple, beyond the beaten tracks. It is also a way of showing unfulfilled tasks, tasks that seem so remote that they don't even have a name, an intention, or an interest. For example, my attempts to classify eidetic systems including expressions much beyond philosophies and ideologies, as well as the claim of a specific conceptualization that gives both identity to this disciplinary field (emancipating it of its subservience in respect of other disciplines) and allowing it to engage in dialog with others.

This puts us in the face of key theoretical problems: what are the specific methods that may allow us to study eidetic manifestations of the sapiens from 50,000 years ago, such as the notion of “circulate” or “go beyond borders”; or to study eidetic entities housed in “Neolithic” societies, builders of megaliths from 10,000 years ago and until the twentieth century, or to study eidetic systems more conventionally accepted of the 20th and 21st centuries, with their changes, mutations, permanence and forms of expression? But I don't want to lean again toward Cognitivism and neuroscience, which I have little knowledge of...

10.26 I would like to come back to an important topic. I am referring the parallelism you outlined between eidetic studies and Linguistics [2]. I remember there were conversations in which we mentioned the contributions of Vladimir Propp; however, they were not recorded in the preceding chapters. It seems to me that in your reclamation of Propp there are elements that help us better understand the meaning of parallelism.

Linguistics and eidetic studies have numerous overlaps. Languages and ideas are closely related. Ideas are formulated with words. At the same time, languages are largely an expression (materialization) of eidetic systems. I have drawn on numerous studies of Linguistics to move forward in this proposal. Let me mention, for instance, the classic distinction between synchronous and diachronic, which is key to distinguishing eidetic studies as an encompassing disciplinary space of the “history of ideas”, which is a specific area of eidetic studies. An item that has interested me are

the “functions” identified by Vladimir Propp in Russian folk tales. Based on the work of Propp, his identification of 37 “functions”, you can picture in the broader field of our studies the existence of certain “functions” or eidas that could make up diverse systems. In this manner, we could therefore think of different possibilities of combination. Imagine 37×37 or 37^{37} : It is a fabulous amount. Of course, this wouldn’t work exactly in this way on the eidetic plane, but it can be used as an inspiration to think. At the same time, there is another matter of interest in Propp’s work. “Functions” can be thought of as genes, and this has to do with what we talked regarding classification according to code and, also, what we talked regarding engineering.

10.27 On several occasions you mentioned that certain methodologies and/or perspectives to study certain eidetic entities would not be valid to approach others. It may be productive to present some examples.

It is true. Although I am afraid, however, that there’s no room to brood over the matter, because, as you’ve just said, we are running out of the space-time of this book. To begin, I want to answer you with the words of Javier Fernández-Sebastian:

It is certain, as noted by Lucien Jaume, that “the philosopher’s own questions are not those of the historian of political ideas” (‘European’, Fernández adds in other places). Let us also concede that ‘the two approaches’ can be ‘complementary’, and that, without a doubt, ‘the dialog with each other is a win-win situation for both sides’. Even so, it is still true that it’s a difficult dialog, in which one is often faced with dilemmas and incompatible conundrum, and if those are debated within the same individual, the risk of methodological schizophrenia would most likely be very high”. (Fernández Sebastian, 2004, 142).

Fernández is quite level-headed when delimiting the discussion to only two perspectives, having so many others that are not considered in these clarifications, although these two and a few more are the ones displayed on his narrow horizon of discussion.

Having said that, a work on political philosophy, which is of great proportions and takes a lot of time to develop and mature, is not studied in the same way as an opinion published in a newspaper or the Internet about the current situation of the week. This happens

because, in general, we aren't interested in knowing the same things about these two types of eidetic entities which offer, moreover, quite diverse potentials. A work on political philosophy is not studied in the same way as a work that seeks to describe the identity of Lima, Quito or Mexico City; a text published on the Internet about corruption in a municipality is not treated in the same way as a letter from a friend to another in which he describes his approach to vegan cotidianity. Said letter is not studied in the same way as a myth about the creation of the world among the Incas.

On the other hand, we don't use the same methodology when trying to find out what the main concepts are that constitute or assemble a thought than when inquiring about the feeling or sensations that engulf a generation. As a matter of fact, the question regarding the gestation or mutations of the notion of "returning to Africa", and the question regarding the most important metaphysics debates in German language of the 18th century are fairly different questions. The problem of vegetative reproduction of ideas isn't studied in the same way as proselytizing reproduction, because, among other things, the former doesn't have the great problem of language, and the latter does. Following up with the idea, a generation isn't studied in the same way as one individual and one of his works is; now, in order to take it to extremes, cave paintings and the statements of the boss in the Medellín mafia cartel are certainly not studied in the same way, since we are not usually interested in asking them the same questions, nor we can access these sources in the same way. The research on an English author of the 17th century is not developed in the same way as one on Chinese thought for 3000 years.

Why "not"? Because there are several levels of conceptual elaboration, and because in some cases concepts constitute the key to answering and, in other cases, entities are constructed on the basis of images. Another reason why not is because the interests of knowledge are different when approaching one entity or the other, and also because sometimes we are interested in understanding these entities while on other occasions, we are instead interested in knowing the types of symbiosis these entities established with such and such community or how they articulated an intellectual network.

10.28 This insistence on your part in broadening the scope of

the disciplinary field of eidetic studies seems to have among its consequences the emphasis on the partial nature of approaches, such as the history of modern political ideas, intellectual history, the history of intellectuals, the history of concepts or conceptual history. I understand that this underlies some reluctance on your part to refer in detail to these approaches and their “insignia authors”.

These works are historiographical, and we have said that eidetic studies shouldn't be thought of as a branch of historiography. Within historiography, they refer only to the political history of urban societies in Western Europe between the 16th and 19th centuries. These contributions have less relevance for those interested in mentalities or those who are interested in the economic ideas in such societies or groups, needless to say, in scientific ideas. They have even less relevance for those who are studying the chroniclers of the conquest of America or eidetic entities associated with indigenous groups that stood up against the colonists during the colonial era. These contributions are much less relevant for those studying eidetic species of other societies, such as the thought of Augustine of Hippo, the Bible, Confucius, Parmenides, Avicenna, or the Maya stelae. This is not to say that there are no contributions from well-understood contextualism capable of guiding research about Avicenna or Augustine. There are indeed. But at the same time, if we study the expressions of political thought of the 20th century and current thought associated with the press and the Internet, then the contributions of Van Dijk seem more relevant. Of course, this is about eidetic entities of a different type.

As I conceive them, eidetic studies cannot focus exclusively and not even in a priority manner on a single range of eidetic entities. They must be able to welcome them all. In addition, they must ask those entities as many questions as possible. On the other hand, they shouldn't only cover history, but they must also address the present, and even wonder about the future of ideas.

That's precisely why I didn't want to linger with those authors, because there is a great deal of talk about them. Initially, those were your most immediate questions. I wanted to highlight that eidetic studies cannot be reduced to the history of political ideas, seen as intellectual or conceptual history during the time of

the expansive circulation of Europe, which basically are tiny parts of the broad occupation of eidetic studies. It is like believing that oceans are reduced to “Mar Chiquita”.

On the other hand, they haven't been significant inspiration for my work. I haven't carried out in-depth studies about authors of centuries ago, but instead I have focused on the period that starts at the end of the 19th century, that is to say, on authors who operate within a field of a reasonably contemporary language. Above all, I am interested in creating panoramic works, rather than dwelling on the particular works of a few people. I have instead aimed to describe the eras and intellectual ecosystems by going toward common factors, where hermeneutics and languages of one or another author in this particular case have relatively little significance.

Regarding the search for regularities in broad intellectual sectors, I could refer to issues such as the author's death, intellectual history and the study of intellectuals. We have talked about this in connection to networks. Another frequent topic in these matters is the already so old “linguistic turn” as well as what I mentioned in relation to the recent “international turn”, a subject we haven't covered sufficiently. By the way, I have been more involved in the international turn.

What do I want to tell you about all this? I want to tell you that in truth my work has had little to do with the works of J. Pocock, Q. Skinner, and even of R. Koselleck, whom apparently you would have liked to talk about. Regarding the contributions of Pocock, whose work I only know very superficially, I may tell you that while reading it, I wanted to discriminate as best as possible between the criteria of the (new?) contextualism he proposed many decades ago, and the contextualism I have defined as *contextus ex machina*. It seems to me that Pocock's most sensible contribution aimed to emphasize that an eidetic entity is not understandable but in relation to the linguistic framework of the culture in which it is registered. Otherwise, I would say that this is a conclusion of the laborious contextualism itself, i.e. the contextualism that I contrast to the lazy and facile one.

I have already pointed out that, by and large, when proposing a different approach, often the previous approaches get caricatured in order to refute them more easily. We also melt them all into one single package, as if by criticizing the defects of one, we are

rejecting them all. I remember a critique of Elías Palti about Zea, arguing against Arthur Lovejoy. The fact is, while indeed they both (Zea and Lovejoy) spoke of the history of ideas, they didn't take on the same conceptions about the endeavor: Zea never entertained the notion of *Chain of being* or something similar to it.

Otherwise, there are certain trends marked by occasions. For example, the “international turn”, the “linguistic turn”, and the importance of context or infrastructure have been accentuated at certain times, thus broadening the horizons of research. When conceptions are over-accentuated in other occasions, it generated counter-reactions or rapid abandonment of positions that weren't productive and that even obscured the nature of ideas, presenting them, for example, as excrescences of human life.

10.29 Still, it seems to me that much of what you've tried to propose in these conversations doesn't correlate much with your own work, which is more focused on eidetic dynamics of the 20th century. You have taken us (our readers and me) far away, to remote times, both prehistoric and pre-sapiens. It is not how a reader of your best-known books pictures you, at least not a priori...

We have addressed matters relating to my own work in multiple opportunities: For example, I have addressed South American and peripheral thought, networks and circulation, reprocessing and hybridizations and the trajectory of eidetic studies in the region, among other several specific topics. Nevertheless, I have wanted to lay out for you and also generally brought up many other issues that I have never addressed empirically and that I will surely not address, because what we have been interested primarily in these conversations is the way of designing this disciplinary field, much more than addressing my career. For that, it has been necessary to speak of the vast duration, as well as refer to multiple historical cases and expressions of many societies and, above all, refer to the most varied modulation of the disciplinary field.

10.30 The topic about “the death of the author” has not appeared throughout our conversations. At times, your accent in the preexistence of the eidetic, in the long term and the very long term, etc. led me to imagine that you were close to these

formulations. However, as our talks move forward, and while you presented new concepts and accents, that initial impression started to change. What value do you assign to that issue, that had such a central place a few years ago?

We know that, often enough, those who take over a new problem make gimmicky approaches in order to highlight it. For instance, in order to draw attention to the context of language or intellectual heritage, they could state that the author would provide little or nothing to the matter. But those who speak in that manner would hardly have accepted that kind of death for themselves. Foucault or Derrida most likely would not have accepted that anything written by them was not due to them, but rather to the universal history of thought. A key method to understanding the authors in a sagacious manner is applying their own method. This, which is superlatively relevant with skeptics and radical relativists, is also important to all those who propose a method of understanding an expression of culture.

Barthes, referring to Mallarmé has pointed out that “to him, just like to us, it is the language and not the author that speaks”. He insists that “all Mallarmé’s poetry consists of suppressing the author for the benefit of writing (which, as you will see, is to return the reader his place)”. (Barthes, 1968) What is highlighted by Barthes must be understood as a way of stating his innovation. However, it is a matter of perspective that won’t be definitely decided, but only in terms of better formulations, because it’s poorly presented. There will be no solution if it is not by saying that both parties have an impact: author and reader. This idea, that it’s language and not the author that speaks, connects with the one that has been reiterated regarding the fact that authors are, under certain conditions, spokespersons of ideas, although it’s not stated in the same sense. As a counterpart, it silences other dimensions, dimensions where innovation is indeed present, as well as the ability to articulate the eidetic heritage that was created before in a number of ways and in a relatively original way, as I wanted to emphasize a moment ago [10.2].

10.31 Recently, you mentioned again the issue of reception and eidetic re-elaboration. I think I remember that this dimension is not part of your proposals for the classification of

eidetic entities. Could you say something in this regard?

In simplistic terms, eidetic entities could be classified according to the reception among those that have had a wide and/or long welcome and those that have had a brief and/or scarce reception. This first distinction, more colloquial than academic, can be improved according to regions, time parameters, and social sectors. This can be achieved by distinguishing those that have reached a wide audience and those that have been received and re-elaborated in the communities of knowledge professionals; it can also be achieved by distinguishing those eidetic entities that have been received uncritically, as well as those that have been used as components for further elaborations.

We have talked a bit about this [2.22-2.23; 5.13], and I am afraid that if I tackle these issues, you could suggest that we better leave them for another occasion. On the other hand, the criterion of “functions” also points to this fact, as it refers to the manner in which such and such eidetic entities have been modulated and re-modulated by social agents. We have spoken of this [3.20]. But also, we have said something about how to classify ways of reception [5.13]. I wouldn’t like to speak with you from Eurocentrism, since avoiding it has been and still is a permanent task. Why don’t we wonder about Indian or Chinese innovations? In this regard, the formulations of Anne Cheng (2002) come to mind regarding the manners in which Chinese thought proceeds—thought that wouldn’t be linear or dialectic but spiral. To wonder about the scope of statements such as this would be key for those of us who are interested in encompassing research.

10.32 Let us then go to the last pending matter. It is about insisting on the potentialities of this disciplinary field in South America.

I believe that, like any advancement in knowledge and in its formulations, the development of eidetic studies may have positive (and negative) consequences, depending on the perspective of evaluation—consequences we can’t even conceive today. I think the most important issue must be formulated around the question of how this disciplinary field contributes to thinking more and thinking better. In the context of societies where knowledge and thinking are

progressively decisive, to contribute to the better management of ideas is also decisive. Whether this is in the sense of working better with ideas, or assuming eidetic capitals in a better manner, and to put emphasis on the available heritage, among other ways to say it.

With regard to the professions of knowledge, I think that in our South-American case, eidetic studies should bring us closer together with Asia and Africa. They could also allow us to be considered in the immense heritage of these regions, as well as to search for dialog elements, identifying meeting points.

Specific issues suggest that if we study intellectual networks it should also contribute, in some sense, to managing them better. And if we study the circulation of ideas, this should also contribute to them moving more freely and fluently.

On the other hand, it is clear that not all research or all formulations of eidetic studies can have implications in the same manner. Also, is it clear that not all people will look for the same purposes. For example, the recovery of eidetic heritage, or inputs necessary to think about the development of nations and states have various criteria to starting a research in this area.

By the way, if our conversations continued, other possible formulations would appear, formulations that could answer your question better, which is key when establishing a disciplinary space.

10.33 This matter could be put in another way, more specific or practical: How would you argue before the authorities of a university in order to encourage them to implement a program of eidetic studies?

I think I would do it mainly from the notion of increasing the skills of working with thought and increasing the components of the university to think more and think better. If we all work with ideas, training specialists in the study of them is of the utmost importance. It will be a disciplinary space that will surely overlap with others but will be far from being confused with philosophy or historiography, as these disciplines don't have the endeavor of working with the management and development of ideas. It will enhance several other fields of knowledge, among which cognitive sciences and international studies will stand out. I believe it is very important that we think of eidetic studies as synergy actors of the intellectual endeavor. I would also reason about the possibilities of

communication with other countries in South America and the world, taking into account that the knowledge of the eidetic trajectory of regions allows for a better intercultural encounter.

10.34 More generally: How, in what way, should we study ideas from South America?

Let's see if I understand you. Are you thinking about the way in which the South American condition involves a perspective on eidetic studies? Or, in other words, are you thinking about whether or not there is any specificity of our work in these lands? In response to this, I would say we shouldn't imagine an essentialist answer type, as if we had a unique perspective—or a privileged one—due to our condition, or something along those lines. That genre of prospects doesn't sound right to me; it doesn't tell me much. If one can talk about something particular rather than specific, I would say that our work must be developed first of all by displaying positive eidetic expressions of the region and, indeed, not only those made in western languages; also, our work must show the ways of circulation to/from the region; likewise, it must highlight what has happened in other peripheral regions, especially in those expressions more related to ours.

10.35 Would you say that is where our main/potential contribution would be, or could there be something more?

Immediately after that, other matters that aren't related to content turn up. By the way, we cannot make the former without marking new concepts that allow the expression of our eidetic trajectory; and that couldn't be done if we can't achieve a certain conceptual density and a development of this disciplinary field with enough identity. Simultaneously, it's about clarifying what questions we ask to the trajectory of our thought that won't simply replicate those asked in other regions. Beyond this, it involves what questions we contribute from our own trajectory to question the thought of the world. A topic comes immediately to mind that we have covered: why when the West defines modernity does it never mention slavery, a feature so characteristic of our colonial region? As you can see, many things start to be linked. You could now wonder what these questions and these necessary concepts would

be to express what is our own, and we would have to start our conversation all over again in order to start answering each of the questions that would come in cascade, in a circular exchange, with their repetitions and variations, their accents and differences, their evolutions and their own galaxies of ideas; there, we would infinitely navigate through infinite territories, probably making those who read us infinitely bored.

EPILOGUE

EDUARDO DEVÉS

We have chosen the conversation style to say things in a way that could not be used in indexed journals. I believe blind evaluation (which does actually exist) is a good method and it should be delved into and improved, but I don't think it should work in every case nor for every genre of the intellectual endeavor. This time we have tried to move toward a less controlled procedure, which has allowed me to say things that couldn't be proved rigorously or developed to their best extension or depth.

I've been brooding over this work for years. Nevertheless, I have published little regarding this matter specifically, though tons of fragments have appeared within what was published at that time. I started writing it in 2007 in the Dominican Republic. I finally had a "lightbulb moment" in the library of the University of Santo Domingo, and I wrote for hours, pages and pages of what would become the initial core of the work. Only once in my life had I experienced something similar. It was in Belgium, in Corroy-le-Grand (near Louvain-la-Neuve) in December of 1981. I had a "lightbulb moment" again, which was a rare occurrence, and I wrote in a hurry about ten sheets that eventually created the embryo of my book *Escépticos del Sentido*. This work would be published in a first short edition in 1983 and a second, improved, edition in 1984. Of course, I have had some bursts of inspiration before, but not with the same sharpness, such as the cascade of ideas that can make your hand get tired at the rhythm of a running pen. Nowadays, I only write on a computer, and I am its addict.

The volume has grown in pages but above all, and more greatly, it has grown in conceptualization, distinctions, connections, and innovative formulations. The conversations with Andrés Kozel have encouraged and invited me to be clearer, more explicit and consistent in the arguments; however, that did not imply that the conversations did not have to be done and recreated again and again... There are, of course, many reasonings that we both believe are still insufficient.

The main purpose of these proposals is to establish a disciplinary field that assumes autonomy and possesses a great space for overlaps that are both thematic and interdisciplinary. In this area, distinguishing the study of ideas from historiography, sociology, as well as from the study of myths and religions has been key. The purpose of this has been the ability to renew contacts from the perspective of difference, inter-discipline and from the reference to many other specializations, such as linguistics, communication sciences, cognitive sciences, administrations, and life sciences, among others.

My greatest fear is to frighten those who are approaching this work because of my constant reference to biology and zoology, which appear in these conversations, as well as the reference to so many other disciplinary fields which are distant from the Liberal Arts speech, such as economy, engineering,

chemistry, and administration, among other disciplines. I do fear scaring and frightening, but I also have an intuition, or rather, a conviction that we can move forward through these kinds of connections and analogies. We could have talked further about this and that, as it is always happens, by the way. It could have been an infinite book if we had an infinite amount of energy, imagination and time at our disposal, and, moreover, if those who read it also had an infinite amount of patience. This book was conceived as a book of intuitions or hypothesis, or suggestions to think. If I had thought I should and could account for all judgments and occurrences, I would have used the method of articles for indexed journals.

This has not been the case. On the contrary, the book was thought from the beginning as essayistic, and when I contacted Kozel to arrange everything as a sequence of talks, that was the core of our agreement. It's about questioning, proposing and arguing; however, it was not necessary to reach a consensus regarding content, but only agreements about the form. That is how it turned out and I think it was an excellent decision. His insight helped me to better organize my points of view, without compromising the many disagreements and without suggesting him moderation in asking or acceptance of everything I was saying.

It's not impossible to publish another edition that is most likely motivated by the observations and critiques I expect to receive, and which could be highly productive if these conversations are able to generate them, along with the heartache they must provoke among those who cultivate too prudently some of the furrows that intersect in this disciplinary field we call eidetic studies.

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Annex 1

Classification criteria of eidetic entities

(familia)
Entidades eidéticas según código geneidético
Todo enramiento es posible y ad infinitum

Entidades eidéticas según función

Funciones posibles

- Identitaria / centralitaria
- Disciplinadora / de rebelión
- Internacionalista / nacionalista
cosmopolita / chovinista?
aislacionista?
- Cohesiva / confrontativa
- Expansionista / rechazo invasor
Expulsion invasor

Entidades eidéticas según grado de
complejidad

(según su cantidad de eidas)

de la U.

Annex 2

Entidades eidéticas según grado de agencia

- Casi nulo
- Bajo
- Alto
- Muy alto

Entidades eidéticas según géneros

(Proto Sistemas eidéticos)

Sistemas eidéticos

- a- lenguas originarias
- b- Mentalidad - creencias
- c- sistemas filológicos
- d- Ideologías
- e- ~~Paradigmas científicos~~ ?
- f- Cotidianas ?

Artefactos eidéticos

Dispositivos

→ Paradigmas y estudios científicos

Otros ?


DEJES V.

Criterios de clasificación de las entidades eidéticas:

- Según grado de agencia
- Según generos
- Según código genético
- Según función
- Según grado de complejidad

David U.


Examples of eidetic mapping: "Influence" as reception and emission



UMBRALES
des

Leopold Senghor - Negritude


Mapping of reception in two stages



UMBRAL
de V&S

Mohandas Gandhi

Mapping of issue 1900 - 1975




UNIVERSAL
REVIEWS

Annex 3

Examples of eidetic mapping: circulation of ideas, intellectual networks, institutions


Pan-Africanist networks (Third generation Pan-Africanism)

Towards 1945 - 1950



Centre for African Studies


Lisbon 1951



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de VÊS

Latin American Social and economic sciences

Circulation of ideas from Latin America to Africa



UMBRAL
desires

Colección Estudios de las Ideas

Objetivos:

- Fortalecer un espacio disciplinar que se constituye, cada vez, con mayor identidad, resultado, entre otras cosas, de polémicas entre tendencias y subespecialidades;
- Ampliar la cobertura de los estudios eidéticos, sin restringirlos a los temas de mayor desarrollo en nuestro medio, sino fomentando encuentros interdisciplinarios sin que se pierda que el punto de mira son los estudios de las ideas;
- Ofrecer otra oportunidad para publicar sobre estos asuntos, siendo la voz de una comunidad epistémica;
- Interesar en el estudio de las ideas a jóvenes u otras personas que están buscando caminos posibles de desarrollo académico.

Comité Editor de la Colección: Andrés Kozel, Bernardo Subercaseaux, Carlos Ossandón, Eduardo Devés, Sandra Iturrieta


Títulos publicados:

1. *Historia de las ideas en Chile. Homenaje a Javier Pinedo*, VVAA
2. *Estudios Eidéticos. Una conversación desde el Sur sobre la vida de las ideas y la reconfiguración de un espacio disciplinar*
Eduardo Devés – Andrés Kozel
3. *Pensamiento indígena en Nuestramérica. Debates y propuestas en la mesa de hoy*
Pedro Canales - Sebastião Vargas, Editores
4. *Debates intelectuales. Estudio sobre historia de las ideas, pensamiento políticos y cultura en Chile*
Javier Pinedo
5. *José Carlos Mariátegui, Originales e inéditos 1928*
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6. *Jorge Millas, aproximaciones a su obra*
Cristóbal Friz, Maximiliano Figueroa, Editores
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Sandra Iturrieta, Editora
8. *Problemáticas internacionales y mundiales desde el pensamiento latinoamericano*
Eduardo Devés – Silvia Álvarez, editores
9. *Studying Ideas. A conversation from the South on the studies of ideas and the reconfiguration of a disciplinary space.*
Eduardo Devés – Andrés Kozel

THE CONVERSATIONS that make up this book deal with the history, the realities and the perspectives of the wide spectrum of approaches that are dedicated to the study of thought and ideas. The notion of “Eidetic Studies” is presented, somehow containing a proposal for the reconfiguration of the disciplinary space. In fact, these conversations mostly revolve around specifying what this proposal consists of or could be, how it would relate to other pre-existing approaches, how its links with other disciplines could be thought. Key issues are the emphasis placed on conceiving these studies “beyond” the strictly historiographic level (without, of course, excluding it), and the invitation to promote and densify exchanges with other disciplines –the closest and most common ones and also others, apparently distant –such as biology, cognitive sciences, engineering. Throughout the conversations, definitions, conceptual distinctions and classification criteria are offered. They can be useful to study the life of ideas, realities as fascinating as complex.



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