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Aggregative cycles evolve as a solution to conflicts in social investment

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Abstract

Multicellular organization is particularly vulnerable to conflicts between different cell types when the body forms from initially isolated cells, as in aggregative multicellular microbes. Like other functions of the multicellular phase, coordinated collective movement can be undermined by conflicts between cells that spend energy in fuelling motion and 'cheaters' that get carried along. The evolutionary stability of collective behaviours against such conflicts is typically addressed in populations that undergo extrinsically imposed phases of aggregation and dispersal. Here, via a shift in perspective, we propose that aggregative multicellular cycles may have emerged as a way to temporally compartmentalize social conflicts. Through an eco-evolutionary mathematical model that accounts for individual and collective strategies of resource acquisition, we address regimes where different motility types coexist. Particularly interesting is the oscillatory regime that, similarly to life cycles of aggregative multicellular organisms, alternates on the timescale of several cell generations phases of prevalent solitary living and starvation-triggered aggregation. Crucially, such self-organized oscillations emerge as a result of evolution of cell traits associated to conflict escalation within multicellular aggregates.

Author summary

In aggregative multicellular life cycles, cells come together in heterogenous aggregates, whose collective function benefits all the constituent cells. Current explanations for the evolutionary stability of such organization presume that alternating phases of aggregation and dispersal are already in place. Here we propose that, instead of being externally driven, the temporal arrangement of aggregative life cycles may emerge from the interplay between ecology and evolution in populations with differential motility. In our model, cell motility underpins group formation and allows cells to forage individually and collectively. Notably, slower cells can exploit the propulsion by faster cells within multicellular groups. When the level of such exploitation is let evolve, increasing social conflicts are associated to the evolutionary emergence of self-sustained oscillations. Akin to aggregative life cycles, resource exhaustion triggers group formation, whereas conflicts within multicellular groups restrain resource consumption, thus paying the way for the subsequent unicellular phase. The evolutionary transition from equilibrium coexistence to life cycles solves conflicts among heterogenous cell types by integrating them on a timescale longer than cell division, that comes to be associated to multicellular organization.

Introduction

Multicellular life cycles have evolved multiple times during the history of life. Their emergence is thus believed to follow from general mechanistic principles, rather than from rare fortuitous events that took place in a single lineage [1,2]. In at least six occasions, transitions to multicellularity gave rise to aggregative multicellular life cycles [1,3], where the multicellular body forms by aggregation of dispersed cells. Such cells need not be genetically identical and can reproduce also in isolation. In aggregative life cycles, thus, conflicts withing groups [4,5], as well as between solitary and grouped cells [6]-[8] appear unavoidable. Cell-level conflicts are thus predicted to hinder the evolutionary stability of collective functions – notably those achieved by division of labour between different cell types - and ultimately to doom altogether this type of multicellular organization 9.

Traditionally, theoretical models for the evolution of multicellular organization focus on such conflicts, that manifest whenever cells that invest more or less in a collective function coexist within social groups. The contribution of different types of cells is typically evaluated at the time of completion of multicellular development, after which ensues a dispersal phase. In the amoeba D. discoideum, for instance, strains that produce a disproportionately large amount of spores in chimeric fruiting bodies are interpreted as 'cheaters' that undermine cooperation within the multicellular structure 10. Evolutionary game theory offers solutions to the maintenance of collective cooperative behaviour, under the assumption that groups form over and again (e.g. in the famous trait-group model 11). For *D. discoideum*, several options have been proposed 12, that range from biasing the composition of the multicellular groups 4,13. to modulating the individual investment in response to group composition 14,15 These game-theoretical explanations only focus on one specific phase of the life cycle, while they disregard the mechanisms that enable such phase to occur repeatedly. The effect of varying selective pressure that cells experience along a life cycle has instead be taken into consideration in models and experiments exploring the evolution of life cycles 16–18. However, the time scale associated to the life cycle was extrinsically imposed and thus requires an appropriate source of environmental variation – for instance the day-night cycle – prior to the emergence of subsequent adaptations.

Here we address the emergence of a new time scale in the eco-evolutionary dynamics 32 of populations facing a trade-off between performance in the multicellular aggregates and in isolation. Such a trade-off can occur when collective function is achieved through 34 traits that also affect the behaviour of isolated cells. We focus in particular on differences in motility, that underpin both the benefits gained by group migration, and the capacity of single cells to feed efficiently (other possible mechanisms will be touched 37 upon in the discussion). We show that, under selection for increased performance within heterogeneous groups, evolution leads to the emergence of an intrinsic timescale associated to the alternation of solitary and aggregated phases.

Cell motility, a widespread feature in aggregative multicellular species, is assumed

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here to be an ancestral trait that is heterogeneously represented in a cell population. In D. discoideum, amoebae exploit their individual motility to feed on bacteria in the soil. When they starve, they form multicellular slugs whose collective motility is essential to ensuring dispersal of spores that seed the following generation [19]. Cells that have lower motility before aggregation are more likely to become exploitative spores 20. As spores are positioned in the rear of the slug, they can benefit of the traction by more motile cells present at the front [21].

In itself, motility has the potential to drive cell-cell encounters and the consequent clustering into aggregates. At sufficient density, spatial self-organization of motile 50 particles is known to give rise to aggregates 22. By virtue of being part of a group, the 51 constituent cells can reap advantages of the collective organization, for instance predation resistance and the opportunity of sharing public goods. Notably, individual 53 motility results in enhanced directional and tactic collective displacement, which allows cells to escape the arena of local competition for space and resources [23, 24].

Although it supports collective function on the ecological timescale, cell-level motility may on the other hand destabilize cooperation within cellular collectives on evolutionary times. Firstly, motility differences within aggregates can produce conflicts for the exploitation of the benefits of collective displacement. Akin to what observed in 59 D. discoideum, cells that invest more energy in displacing the group, thus providing a public good, may have a selective disadvantage. Secondly, cell motility enhances mixing 61 in group formation, thus opposing positive assortment mechanisms, such as kin 62 recognition, that are known to support cooperative behaviour [13]. One could therefore 63 expect that social conflicts within heterogeneous multicellular aggregates may lead to a 64 prevalence of slow cells, that would be unable to sustain efficient collective displacement, a scenario captured by the so-called 'tragedy of the commons' 25, 26. 66

We show that the picture changes when feedbacks between cell behaviour and their environment are also taken into account $\boxed{27}{-30}$. In our case, this requires considering possible advantages that motility confers to cells both in isolation and as a consequence 69 of collective displacement. Eco-evolutionary cycles are now possible, where cells 70 alternate phases when they are found chiefly in isolation or aggregated. Alike 71 aggregative life cycles, grouping is triggered by depletion of environmental resources. 72 The resulting heterogenous aggregates experience social conflict, and are eventually 73

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superseded by individually dispersing cells. These oscillations are essentially related to the population traits and have a typical timescale – longer than a cell's generation – that sets the pace of recurrence of the multicellular stage. We use adaptive dynamics to show that such emergent timescale arises in the course of evolution as selection increases the intensity of social conflicts. In the discussion, we address the possibility that cycles of aggregation, coupled to the demography of cells of different motility, may act as a scaffold to the evolution of aggregative life cycles.

Models and methods

Eco-evolutionary model for fast and slow cell types consuming a shared resource.

We describe the 'ecological' (resource-consumer) dynamics of a population of N cells, coupled to the 'evolutionary' variation of the frequencies of two types of cells, that differ 85 in a heritable motility trait: a fraction x of cells is fast-moving and a fraction (1 - x) is slow-moving. Both cell types forage on a shared resource of density R. The resource is 87 assumed to grow logistically in the absence of consumption, and is consumed at the same rate by all cells. Instantaneous growth rates of each cell type depend on the product of resource density and reproductive efficiency, as measured by 'payoffs' p_F and p_S – discussed below – that take into account the partition between the solitary and 91 aggregated phases of the fast and slow type respectively. The cell population size thus 92 changes at a rate equal to the the average payoff $\bar{p} = x p_F + (1 - x) p_S$ times the 93 resource density. Corresponding to these payoffs, the frequencies of cells with the two 94 motility traits change in time according to a replicator equation for the fraction x of fast cells 30,31. 96

The time variation of the resource density, total cell population size and fraction of

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fast cells is thus described by the following set of ordinary differential equations:

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = R \left[r \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) - N \right]$$

$$\frac{dN}{dt} = N \left[\bar{p}(x, R) R - d \right]$$

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = x \left(1 - x \right) R \left[p_F(x, R) - p_S(x, R) \right]$$
(1)

where r and K are the maximum growth rate and the carrying capacity of the resource, respectively (rescaled so that the probability of encounter between the resource and the cells is 1 in a time interval), and d is the mortality rate of cells (assumed to be identical for every cell type). These equations can be equivalently formulated in terms of resource density and the number of cells of slow and fast types, as shown in S1 Text. Contrary to the sole replicator equation, they describe the dynamics of both cell population composition and size, beside that of resource density.

We consider that payoffs of the two cell types (illustrated in Fig $\boxed{1}$) depend on environmental conditions $\boxed{28}$ through the resource density R. Moreover, they depend on the social context, reflecting differences in foraging efficiency and social investment when cells are either in isolation or inside groups.

The payoffs represent the success of different motility types in competition inside or 108 outside groups. First of all, we consider that the partition of the population between 109 isolated cells and groups depends on resource availability. We suppose that when cells 110 are occupied in food acquisition and handling, they tend to keep feeding locally. We 111 model this by assuming that, at any point in time, the fraction of cells that is in a 112 group (whether fast or slow) is negatively correlated with resource density, so that all 113 cells are solitary when the resource is at carrying capacity, and that all cells are in 114 groups when the resource is completely depleted. We also assume for simplicity that 115 groups are formed by randomly drawing cells from the population. The average ratio of 116 cells between types within a group will thus be, independently of the group size, equal 117 to the proportion of the types in the population. Note that this proportion, as well as 118 the actual number of fast and slow cells inside and outside aggregates, can vary in time. 119

Then, we reason that while isolated cells compete locally for nutrients, cells inside 120 groups can take advantage of collective behaviour for escaping local overcrowding more 121



Fig 1. Illustration of payoffs of slow (red) and fast (blue) cells in different social contexts. The probability of cells to be found alone (left) or grouped (right) depends on the resource density and is indicated on top. On the left, cells displace individually in a patch of resource. Slow cells are disadvantaged with respect to fast cells in local foraging, as indicated by the context-dependent payoffs below (explained in detail in the main text). The right panel illustrates the alternative scenario, when cells are grouped. Collective displacement toward new patches of resource is fuelled by fast cells, that instead reap no benefit, having spent all their energy in propulsion. Within aggregates, thus, slow cells behave as social cheaters in a public goods game.

efficiently than individual cells. Formation of heterogenous aggregates at the same time 122 creates disruptive conflicts as to the contribution to collective displacement. 123 Computation of the average payoffs of cells of any type thus requires separately 124 evaluating performances in isolation and within groups. 125

Fast cells are efficient in looking for immediately available food, and outcompete in 126 this task slow cells. Whenever moving a short distance is sufficient to reach food items, 127 fast cells indeed thrive in isolation. We therefore assume that the probability that cells 128 remain outside aggregates is proportional to the amount of food available in the 129 environment. We consider for simplicity that this probability is $\frac{R}{K}$, that is cells are 130 always alone when the resource reaches its carrying capacity (when the proportionality 131 factor is different, the results are qualitatively the same, as discussed in S2 Text). The 132 payoff of isolated fast cells will thus be $\frac{R}{K}\lambda_F$, where λ_F measures how efficient they are 133 in solitary feeding. Within groups, instead, fast cells spend all their energy in propelling 134 the aggregate, including slow cells, so that they have a null payoff. 135

Slow cells, conversely, cannot reproduce in isolation, because they are inefficient at 136 chasing local resource items. They can however benefit of the collective displacement of 137 the group, whose propulsion is sustained by fast cells. As in classical public goods 138 games that model social conflict, benefits of the multicellular organisation reaped by 139 slow cells are assumed to increase with the fraction of fast cells in the groups 32. This 140 is the product of the fraction of fast cells in the population times the probability that a 141 fast cell is in a group $(1 - \frac{R}{K})$. The average payoff of slow cells is then $x (1 - \frac{R}{K}) \lambda_S$, 142 where the parameter λ_S measures the ability of slow cells to exploit fast cells within the 143 collective phase in order to enhance their own success. λ_S will be later considered as an 144 evolvable trait. 145

The average payoff in the population is then:

$$\bar{p}(x,R) := p_F x + p_S \left(1 - x\right) = \left[\left(\lambda_F - \lambda_S\right) \frac{R}{K} + \lambda_S \right] x - \left(1 - \frac{R}{K}\right) \lambda_S x^2.$$
(2)

A summary of the parameters involved in the model is shown in Table 1. Our choice of

Table 1. List of the parameters used in the model.

Parameter	Description
d	Consumer death rate
K	Resource carrying capacity
r	Resource maximum growth rate
λ_F	Fast cell payoff
λ_S	Slow cell payoff

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the payoffs is an extreme case of more realistic scenarios when fast cells can also 147 reproduce within groups, and slow cells in isolation. We have chosen this simple form 148 because it exemplifies the hardest possible social conflicts, those associated with the 149 death of one of the cell types, as observed in some extant species of Dictyostelids (e.g. 150 D. discoideum). It also allows for more straightforward analytical solution. However, 151 numerical simulations (not shown) indicate that qualitatively similar results hold when 152 both cell types reproduce both inside and outside groups, as long as a sufficiently 153 intense trade-off exists between the benefits of movement in isolation and those gained 154 by social displacement. 155

Results

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Different motility types can coexist in equilibrium or organize along aggregative cycles.

We first address how cell population partitioning in grouped and solitary components ¹⁵⁹ and their composition in fast and slow types change in time, for a fixed set of ¹⁶⁰ parameters. Among the possible eco-evolutionary regimes available to the cell ¹⁶¹ population, we are particularly interested in self-sustained oscillations and in their ¹⁶² associated timescale. Later, we will explore how such dynamics change when the ¹⁶³ parameter defining the intensity of social conflicts can evolve. ¹⁶⁴

The model described by Eqs. (1) has two qualitatively different dynamical regimes of 165 coexistence between fast and slow cells: a stable equilibrium and a stable limit cycle (a 166 detailed analysis of all the equilibria and their stability is provided in S1 Text). When 167 the coexistence equilibrium $(\hat{R}, \hat{N}, \hat{x})$ (present whenever $\sqrt{\lambda_F K/d} > 1 + \lambda_F/\lambda_S$) is 168 stable, slow and fast types are found in constant proportions both as free and 169 aggregated cells. The two cell types survive because of their respective advantages in 170 one or the other state of aggregation. Neither the total population size, nor resource 171 availability change in time, so that there is no timescale associated to demography or 172 cell type frequencies. 173

When the coexistence equilibrium becomes unstable, it is surrounded by a stable 174 limit cycle (Fig 2), that we call 'life-like cycle'. In the oscillating regime, indeed, the 175 eco-evolutionary dynamics has a temporal structure akin to the life cycle of aggregative 176 multicellular organisms, with an environmentally-triggered alternation of solitary and 177 grouped stages (Fig 2). The population size undergoes limit-cycle oscillations, where the 178 total number of cells has a phase delay with respect to the resource (as in classical 179 resource-consumer ecological models). At the meantime, the proportion of cells that are 180 found within groups and the composition of both grouped and solitary fractions change 181 in time (S1 Fig): when resources are abundant, a small percentage of cells is grouped 182 and fast cells grow in number by virtue of the advantages gained by feeding locally; as 183 resources are progressively exploited, more and more cells are found inside groups. Slow 184 cells can thus exploit the contribution of fast ones towards collective displacement, so 185 that 'cheating' increases in the population (S2 Fig). By overthrowing the collective 186 function, the 'tragedy of the commons' causes the overall payoffs, thus the population 187 growth rate, to decline. Lower consumption now allows resources to build up again, 188 providing renewed opportunities for fast cells to multiply in isolation.



Fig 2. Eco-evolutionary cycle of cells of differential motility and their resource. Representative oscillations of resource concentration, total population size and fraction of fast cells. Dashed lines indicate the position of the unstable coexistence equilibrium (analytically derived in S1 Text). The simulated trajectory illustrates the temporal arrangement of cycles in the model, similar to that of aggregative life cycles: aggregation is triggered by resource depletion; aggregates provide the collective function, but offer to slow cells the opportunity for social exploitation; as group function is degraded by the rising of 'cheaters', resources can build up anew, restarting the cycle. Parameter values are: r = 1, K = 1, d = 1, $\lambda_F = 28$, $\lambda_S = 16$.

Although consumer oscillations have a similar phase arrangement as predator-prev ecological dynamics, they hinge upon the coupling of ecology and evolution. Purely ecological equations can be obtained in the neutral case when both types have the same payoff, so that the frequency of fast and slow cells is constant. The demographic dynamics is then described by the first two equations, with the average payoff being



evaluated for that fixed frequency (S3 Text). In this case, linear stability analysis shows that the coexistence equilibrium is always asymptotically stable.

In order to determine in what circumstances equilibrium coexistence or non-steady 197 behaviour should be expected, we examine the dependence of the dynamic regimes of 198 Eqs. (1) on parameters, focusing in particular on those defining the payoffs of fast and 199 slow cells. In the plane (λ_S, λ_F) , limit cycle oscillations (Fig 3A, inset) appear when the 200 coexistence equilibrium loses its stability as a result of a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. 201 We can use the bifurcation condition (implicitly defined as the solution of a third degree 202 polynomial, see S1 Text) to delimit the region in parameter space where the dynamics is 203 out-of-equilibrium. Fig 3 displays the amplitude (panel A) and period (panel B) of the 204 life-like cycle, respectively. The parameter-dependence of the dynamics is best 205 illustrated when one parameter at a time is let vary. The bifurcation diagram when the 206 level of exploitation λ_S is the control parameter, and the others are held constant, is 207 illustrated in S3 Fig. When exploitation is low, fast and slow cells coexist. Past the 208 bifurcation point, demographic oscillations become increasingly large and slow, but they 209 do not appear to approach, as exploitation becomes more severe, a global bifurcation 210 that would break down the oscillations (S4 Fig). Correspondingly, as social conflict 211 increases, grouping becomes more and more associated to a specific phase of the life-like 212 cycle. Oscillations in the fraction of fast cells remain instead bounded because their 213 success comes with their doom: the more numerous they are, the more they get 214 exploited by slow cells (S3 Fig). 215

A characteristic feature of aggregative life cycles, and more broadly of multicellular 216 organization, is that the duration of the higher-level cycle encompasses several cellular 217 generations. Therefore, we compared the period of the aggregation life-like cycle with 218 two timescales associated with cellular demography: the maximal and average growth 219 rate of the two cell types during population-level oscillations. In both cases (S5 Fig 220 and S6 Fig) the period of the cycle is longer than the duplication time of the cells, and 221 can thus be consistently interpreted as the duration of collective-level generations. The 222 time-scale separation is highest close to the onset of the oscillations (see S5 Fig and S6223 Fig). As the amplitude of the oscillations increases, the period of the life-like cycle 224 decreases, but it always remains larger than a cell generation. 225

We have seen that the feedback between ecology and population composition can



Fig 3. Dynamical regimes and dependence on cell-level parameters. Equations (1) display two main qualitatively different dynamics: limit cycle oscillations (LC), where an unstable equilibrium coexists with a stable limit cycle, as illustrated in the inset of panel A, and a stable coexistence equilibrium (SC). The bifurcation diagrams in panels A and B recapitulate the dependence of the eco-evolutionary dynamics on the two parameters determining the benefits at the cell level: strength of social exploitation by slow cells λ_S , and advantage of solitary living for fast cells λ_F (other parameters are as in Fig 2). The heatmaps reveal the variation of amplitude (A) and period (B) of the oscillations. The white line (analytically derived in S1 Text) indicates the Hopf bifurcation where the coexistence equilibrium changes stability. In the oscillating region, the timescale associated to the life-like cycle is slower than those associated to cell division (see S5 Fig) and S6 Fig).

give rise to a temporal compartmentalization of cell behaviour along a cycle, with slow 227 and fast cells taking advantage alternatively of collective and individual motility. Next, 228 we examine whether such a life-like cycle can be expected to emerge and be maintained 229 when the key cell-level parameter responsible for social cheating – the level of 230 exploitation of the collective function by slow cells – is allowed to evolve. 231

Evolutionary increase of exploitation intensity drives the emergence of life-like cycles.

In multicellular organisms, cheating by lower-level, independently reproducing cells is ²³⁴ expected to destabilize the collective function ²⁵,²⁶. In the framework of our model, ²³⁵ cheating occurs when slow cells exploit fast cells for propulsion. If competition between ²³⁶ fast and slow cells occurred exclusively within social groups, then the slow type would ²³⁷ invade, and eventually cause the decline of collective movement. ²³⁸

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We consider now that the social exploitation parameter λ_S is a continuous trait 239 subjected to mutation and selection, and study its evolutionary changes in the 240 framework of adaptive dynamics 33. Long-term variations in the exploitation level 241 occur as a resident population is repeatedly challenged by mutants with a different trait 242 value. If an infinitesimally small number of mutants grows in frequency (i.e. has 243 positive invasion fitness), the new trait is assumed to substitute the resident. Numerical 244 simulations in the oscillation region confirmed that such substitution actually occurs, 245 and coexistence of the mutant and the resident was never observed (not shown). 246

Invasion fitness of a mutant needs to be evaluated by considering that the total population is composed of three components: fast cells, resident slow cells and mutant slow cells that differ only in their value of λ_S . The dynamics is thus described by five ODEs with the constraint that frequencies add to one (S4 Text). When the cell types coexist at equilibrium, computation of the growth rate of a rare mutant of trait λ_S into a resident population with parameter λ_S^* yields:

$$S(\lambda_S, \lambda_S^*) = d \; \frac{\lambda_S - \lambda_S^*}{\lambda_S^*}.$$
(3)

The invasion fitness S thus has the same sign as the difference in exploitation level 247 between the mutant and the resident. Once the system has transitioned to a cyclic 248 regime, it is not possible to compute the invasion fitness analytically. In order to find if 249 the evolutionary dynamics pushes λ_S consistently towards higher values, or a reversal in 250 the direction of evolution happens in the non-equilibrium regimes, we estimated 251 numerically the invasion fitness as the average rate of increase in the frequency of an 252 initially rare mutant type. 253

Fig 4 displays the invasion fitness for different values of the resident exploitation 254 parameter λ_S^* , assuming that mutations produce a small increment in exploitation 255 $(\lambda_S - \lambda_S * = 10^{-1})$. In both equilibrium and cyclic regimes, invasion fitness remains 256 positive for all levels of exploitation. This means that exploitation becomes 257 progressively more severe, as one might expect given the advantages of cheaters within 258 social groups. Nonetheless, such evolutionary change also drives the system toward the 259 bifurcation point, so that as cheating becomes more effective, the emergence of the new 260 collective timescale generates a temporal compartmentalization, whereby social conflicts 261 dominate in only one phase of the cycle.

Moreover, invasion fitness scales as the reciprocal of λ_S (Fig 4, inset), therefore the 263 time necessary for a mutant with increased λ_S to invade the population grows 264 progressively larger. The population might therefore reach the limit when the timescale 265 of mutations is comparable to that of trait substitution, opening the door to a possible 266 quasi-neutral coexistence, along an oscillatory trajectory, of strains with different levels 267 of exploitation. This could offer an explanation, alternative to limited dispersal and fast 268 evolutionary variation [29], to the observation that coexistence of different strains rather 269 than competitive exclusion seems to characterize natural cell populations. In 270 aggregative microbes, an unrestrained escalation of exploitation levels may hence boost 271 genetic diversity by diminishing the returns to cheating. At the same time, however, the 272 system would be driven toward regimes with higher excursions in population size, where 273 stochastic fluctuations in finite populations may cause the population to go extinct. 274



Fig 4. Invasion fitness. Invasion fitness of mutants whose level of social exploitation λ_S is higher with respect to the resident trait $\lambda_S *$ as a function of the latter (remaining parameters are as in Fig 2). Continuous lines represent Eq. (3), dots the rate of increase of perturbations transverse to the limit cycle, averaged over a period of the cycle (S4 Text). The invasion fitness is always positive, leading to selection of ever-increasing levels of cheating, but its decline means that the evolutionary dynamics of the trait grows progressively slower.

Discussion

The emergence of life cycles involving a multicellular stage is a necessary step in major transitions in individuality, whereby organization at higher levels provided access to novel collective functions [2]. The evolutionary origin of collective reproduction and life cycles has been addressed both theoretically [27,34–36] and experimentally [17,36] in systems where single-cell bottlenecks and clonal expansion ensure efficient purging of cheating types. The evolutionary establishment of aggregative life cycles, where different cellular types can come together, has instead been much less explored.

Here, we have considered the possible role of pre-existing differences in cell motility 283 in the evolution of eco-evolutionary 'life-like' cycles, whereby cells come to alternate 284 aggregated and solitary phases on a nascent timescale, on which both population size 285 and composition undergo periodic oscillations. Such a timescale is longer than that of 286 cell division and emerges as an adaptive response to social conflicts that differential 287 motility raises within multicellular aggregates. Setting the pace for recurrence of 288 heterogenous aggregates, it can be associated to a higher level of cellular organization, 289 and act as a scaffold to subsequent evolutionary innovation 18. 290

Alternating selective pressures are considered a basic ingredient for the emergence of 291 multicellular life cycles. They can be extrinsically forced by environmental fluctuations, 292 either periodic or stochastic, that exogenously set the timescale over which benefits and 293 costs of multicellular organization are evaluated 37,38. In our model, equilibrium 294 coexistence of cells with different motility evolves into a cycle that alternates phases 295 where either fast or slow cells are selectively advantaged. The timing of these phases 296 depends on cell-level parameters, and changes along the evolutionary trajectory. As in 297 the case of extrinsic oscillations, such alternating selective pressures, generated by 208 genetically distinct partners, may set the scene for selection of more complex strategies 299 for cell behaviour, notably phenotypic switching [39] or context-dependent phenotype 300 determination [15, 16, 40]. The possibility that extrinsically imposed periodic changes in 301 selection lead to the emergence of phenotypic variation typically associated to life cycles 302 has been experimentally demonstrated in Hammerschmidt et al. 17. In our work, we 303 thus focused on the emergence of the timescale of such variation. Extensions of the 304 model to cases when behaviour is not or is only partially heritable would however be a 305 natural next step towards the complete integration of cell ecology in the evolution of aggregative life cycles.

We have shown that increasing social conflicts drive the transition from an initial 308 state, where different conflicting types coexist at equilibrium, to eco-evolutionary limit 309 cycles, where their frequency is coupled to the partition of cells between solitary and 310 aggregated states. Such cycles bear numerous analogies to aggregative life cycles: they 311 display recurring phases of enhanced aggregation, and are characterized by conflicts 312 within aggregates, as well as between aggregates and solitary cells. When resources are 313 scarce, fast cells behave as cooperators fuelling collective motion [4,21]. However, they 314 play the role of 'loners' by feeding on locally available resources when these are 315 plentiful [7,8,41]. Cooperation therefore stands as a side effect of individual strife for 316 survival, which only manifests when fast cells join groups by chance [42]. Slow cells, on 317 the other hand, cheat within groups but cannot survive in the absence of fast cells, so 318 that social exploitation curtails itself through population dynamics. When cheating 319 increases – as predicted by the 'tragedy of the commons' 25,26 – over evolutionary 320 times, the system progressively moves towards the oscillatory regime, where conflicts are 321 solved through the temporal compartmentalisation of social investment. 322

Previously, non-steady behaviour was identified as a means to maintain cooperation 323 in spite of cheaters success within groups 28, 30, 43-45. Individual-based simulations 324 taking motility into account showed that limit cycle oscillations in the frequency of 325 cooperators and cheaters could occur due to the undermining of the collective function 326 by the spread of cheaters. Their period encompassed numerous collective cycles, each 327 marked by a discontinuous dispersal event (whereby cells were randomly reallocated in 328 space) 32,46. In the model discussed here, the timescale over which social conflicts 329 play out is instead the same as that of the aggregation dynamics, and defines – 330 independently of the initial state of the population – the period of recurrence of the 331 collective state. It is therefore more appropriate to describe the origin of the temporal 332 organization of life cycles, rather than a specific cycle already punctuated by a single 333 dispersal event (which could instead represent a successive adaptation). 334

An indication that motility phenotypes may have been involved in the emergence of aggregative life cycles is that the emergent eco-evolutionary cycles bear many similarities to the life cycle of *D. discoideum*. In particular, our model depicts a

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continuous exploitation of fast cells by slow cells, that occurs not only at the stage of reproduction (as in game-theoretical models), but at any step of the multicellular phase, analogous to what had been proposed to occur in slime moulds [21].

Even though the example of *Dictyostelium* made us focus on motility as the factor 341 underpinning collective function and conflicts among different cell types, we expect 342 similar transition to take place when conflicts and trade-offs stem from other heritable 343 traits that affect both solitary living and collective function, notably from differences in 344 adhesion or in sensitivity to signals. In order to distinguish among different possible 345 cell-level features in their effect on the population cycles, more realism needs to be 346 introduced in the description of the population dynamics. Simple deterministic 347 equations allowed us to fully characterize the parameter-dependence of the dynamic 348 regimes, and to apply analytically adaptive dynamics theory. Individual-based models 349 however would offer the opportunity to examine more closely other aspects of the 350 eco-evolutionary dynamics, such as demographic fluctuations and group 351 formation 24,47,48. Finite-size fluctuations 49-51, in particular, are expected to be 352 important if cell-level parameters attain, along an evolutionary trajectory, regions where 353 the population bottleneck becomes more extreme. 354

By assuming that fast and slow cells have the same probability of being found inside 355 groups, our model describes in a very crude way the process of group formation. 356 Differences in speed, possibly associated to differences in adhesion, may indeed induce 357 differential grouping properties among cell types. Since traits that influence assortment 358 affect the evolutionary process 13, 23, 46, 48, 52–54, a more detailed description of 359 motility-induced biases would be important to evaluate the applicability of our 360 conclusions to specific microbial populations. In particular, future studies describing 361 explicitly the process of group formation may address the consequences of evolution of 362 motility on dispersal strategies 55–57. 363

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Supporting information

S1 Text. Equilibria of the eco-evo dynamics and linear stability analysis.

S2 Text. Bounded probability of remaining alone.

S3 Text. Linear stability analysis of the purely ecological dynamics.

S4 Text. Adaptive Dynamics.

S1 Fig. Eco-evolutionary limit cycle oscillations in the number of aggregated and isolated cells.

The numbers of fast and slow cells found in the solitary and in the aggregated state oscillate in time along a life-like cycle. These quantities are computed along a limit cycle solution of the eco-evolutionary dynamical system, for the same parameter values as Fig 2 of the main text.

S2 Fig. Payoffs of the fast and slow cell types in the oscillating regime.

The payoffs of the two strategies oscillate in time as a consequence of the variations in the fraction of aggregated cells and in group composition. These quantities are computed along a limit cycle solution of the eco-evolutionary dynamical system, for the same parameter values as Fig 2 of the main text.

S3 Fig. Bifurcation diagram for varying strength of social exploitation by slow cells.

Bifurcation diagrams of the three state variables as a function of the exploitation parameter λ_S (remaining parameters as in Fig 2 of the main text). Continuous lines indicate the stable coexistence equilibrium and the stable limit cycle, the dashed line indicates the unstable equilibrium. The transition from the coexistence equilibrium point to the limit cycle occurs through a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. The parameter values that identify this bifurcation are numerically computed as explained in S1 Text and are illustrated by the white line in Fig 3 of the main text and S5 Fig. S6 Fig.

S4 Fig. Period of oscillations against exploitation strength.

The period of the eco-evolutionary limit cycle increases a function of the exploitation level λ_S (remaining parameters as in Fig 2 of the main text). The fact that the period does not diverge indicates that an increase in exploitation level does not drive the system towards a global bifurcation that would go undetected by the local analysis of the equilibria we performed.

S5 Fig. Ratio between the timescale of the life cycle and the maximal cell generation length.

Bifurcation diagram with respect to the parameters λ_S and λ_F (remaining parameters as in Fig 2 of the main text). The numerically obtained heatmap indicates the ratio between the period of the limit cycle and the *fastest* timescale of the demographic dynamics, computed as the maximum value of the population growth rate along the limit cycle. The white line is the bifurcation curve analytically derived in S1 Text.

S6 Fig. Ratio between the timescale of the life cycle and the average cell generation length.

Bifurcation diagram with respect to the parameters λ_S and λ_F (remaining parameters as in Fig 2 of the main text). The numerically obtained heatmap indicates the ratio between the period of the limit cycle and the *mean* timescale of the demographic dynamics, computed as the average value of the population growth rate along the limit cycle. The white line is the bifurcation curve analytically derived in <u>S1 Text</u>.

Aggregative cycles evolve as a solution to conflicts in social investment

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S1 Text

Equilibria of the eco-evolutionary dynamics and linear stability analysis

In this section we describe two equivalent formulations of the resource-consumer dynamics, and we present the linear stability analysis of the model.

The system is fully described by the three variables R, N_F and N_S , denoting respectively: resource, number of fast cells and number of slow cells. Then, the dynamics is given by the following ODES:

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = R \left[r \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) - \left(N_F + N_S \right) \right] \tag{1}$$

$$\frac{dN_F}{dt} = N_F \left[p_F R - d \right] \tag{2}$$

$$\frac{dN_S}{dt} = N_S \left[p_S R - d \right],\tag{3}$$

where K is the carrying capacity of the resource and d is the mortality rate of both kinds of cells. The growth rate of each cell type differs because of their reproduction rate, that is proportional to the type's payoff (see main text for the definition of the payoffs).

The system can be equivalently described using total population size and composition. We define $N = N_F + N_S$ the total population, and $x = \frac{N_F}{N}$ the fraction of fast cells. Combining (2) and (3), we

get the dynamics for the total population:

$$\frac{dN}{dt} = \frac{dN_F}{dt} + \frac{dN_S}{dt} = N_F p_F R + N_S p_S R - d (N_F + N_S)
= N \left[\frac{N_F}{N} p_F R + \frac{N_S}{N} p_S R - d \right]
= N \left[x p_F R + (1 - x) p_S R - d \right]
= N \left[\bar{p}(x, R) R - d \right],$$
(4)

where in the last line we have used Relation (2) of the main text. Equation (4) states that the total consumer population grows at a rate that is proportional to the average payoff $\bar{p}(x, R)$.

Applying the chain rule for the temporal derivative of the variable x and using (2) and (4), we get the dynamics for the social composition:

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{N_F}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N} \frac{dN_F}{dt} - \frac{N_F}{N^2} \frac{dN}{dt}$$

$$= \frac{N_F}{N} \left[p_F R - d\right] - \frac{N_F}{N} \frac{N}{N} \left[\bar{p}(x, R) R - d\right]$$

$$= x \left(1 - x\right) R \left[p_F(x, R) - p_S(x, R)\right],$$
(5)

which takes the form of a replicator equation for the cell types fractions.

Eq. 1 of the main text, in terms of the resource density, total population size and fraction of fast cells, is finally given by Eqs. (1), (4) and (5):

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = R \left[r \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) - N \right]$$
$$\frac{dN}{dt} = N \left[\bar{p}(x, R) R - d \right]$$
$$\frac{dx}{dt} = x \left(1 - x \right) R \left[p_F(x, R) - p_S(x, R) \right]$$

with:

$$\bar{p}_F(x,R) = \alpha R \lambda_F$$

 $\bar{p}_S(x,R) = (1 - \alpha R) x \lambda_S,$

where αR is the probability that a cell is found in isolation, that we assume to depend on the resource availability. This formulation highlights the distinction between the ecological consumerresource dynamics (given by the equations for R and N), and the evolutionary dynamics describing the competition between the two cell types (given by the replicator equation for x).

In the main text, we considered that this probability varies between zero, when no resource is available, to one, when resources attain the carrying capacity. This is modelled by choosing $\alpha = 1/K$. This choice was driven by simplicity and in order to reduce the number of free parameters. Since the amplitude of the oscillations of the resource depend on all parameters, it indirectly bounds the probability in an interval strictly contained in [0, 1]. In S2 Text we consider the more general case when $\alpha \neq 1/K$, but in the following of this section we will keep the same scaling as in the main text.

The average payoff thus takes the form:

$$\bar{p}(x,R) = \left[\left(\lambda_F - \lambda_S\right) \frac{R}{K} + \lambda_S \right] x - \left(1 - \frac{R}{K}\right) \lambda_S x^2.$$

The dynamical system has two sets of degenerate trivial equilibria (0, 0, x), and (K, 0, x), the latter corresponding to the resource being at its carrying capacity in the absence of consumers.

If $\lambda_F K/d > 1$, the system has one fixed point where only fast cells are present:

$$\hat{R}_F = \phi K \qquad \hat{N}_F = r (1 - \phi) \qquad \hat{x}_F = 1,$$
(6)

where for convenience we have defined:

$$\phi = \sqrt{\frac{d}{\lambda_F \, K}}$$

the fraction of the carrying capacity at which the resource is at equilibrium. This composite parameter appears in several expressions derived in the following, demonstrating that the effect of death rate dand of carrying capacity K on the system equilibria and on its evolutionary dynamics are compounded, so that an increase in the former can be compensated by a proportional increase of the latter. If, furthermore, the condition:

$$\phi \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_F}{\lambda_S}\right) < 1 \tag{7}$$

is satisfied, then a coexistence equilibrium exists:

$$\hat{R} = \phi K$$
 $\hat{N} = r (1 - \phi)$ $\hat{x} = \frac{\lambda_F}{\lambda_S} \frac{\phi}{1 - \phi}$ (8)

where the proportion of fast cells decreases when the level of exploitation by slow cells increases. In order for a coexistence equilibrium to exist, thus, not only the payoff of fast cells needs to be large enough for their population to survive based on the resource available, but slow cells also need to have a sufficiently high 'incentive to cheat', that is their payoff needs to be sufficiently high so that communal living provides sizable advantages. Relation (7) means that slow cells can survive when resources are depleted as a result of consumption by fast cells.

The trivial manifold (0, 0, x) is always a saddle point, corresponding to the fact that in the absence of consumers, the resource will increase. As long as $\lambda_F \leq d/K$, the equilibria with R = K, N = 0 are stable for any x, that is the consumers will go extinct and the resource reach its carrying capacity.

The fast-only equilibrium Eq. 6 is stable as long as no positive coexistence equilibrium Eq. 8 exists. The leading eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix in the fast-only equilibrium:

$$J(\hat{R}_{F}, \hat{N}_{F}, \hat{x}_{F}) = \begin{pmatrix} -r \phi & -\phi K & 0 \\ 2 \lambda_{F} r \phi (1 - \phi) & 0 & r \phi K (1 - \phi) [\lambda_{F} \phi + \lambda_{S} (\phi - 1)] \\ 0 & 0 & -\phi K [\lambda_{F} \phi + \lambda_{S} (\phi - 1)] \end{pmatrix}$$
(9)

becomes positive when relation (7) is satisfied, that is when the coexistence equilibrium exists. In this case, this equilibrium is a saddle point. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix \hat{J} in the internal equilibrium $(\hat{R}, \hat{N}, \hat{x})$ is:

$$\hat{J} = \begin{pmatrix} -r\phi & -\phi K & 0\\ \frac{r\lambda_F\phi}{\lambda_S(1-\phi)} \left[\lambda_S + \phi \left(\lambda_F - 3\lambda_S + 2\lambda_S\phi\right)\right] & 0 & r\phi \left(1-\phi\right) K \left[\lambda_S - \left(\lambda_F + \lambda_S\right) \phi\right]\\ \frac{\lambda_F^2\phi^2}{\lambda_S^2\left(\phi-1\right)^3} \left[\left(\lambda_F + \lambda_S\right) \phi - \lambda_S\right] & 0 & \frac{\lambda_F\phi^2 K}{\lambda_S\left(\phi-1\right)} \left[\lambda_S - \left(\lambda_F + \lambda_S\right) \phi\right] \end{pmatrix}$$

can be numerically evaluated as a function of the parameters, and the equilibrium can be shown to be stable close to the transcritical bifurcation that generates the coexistence equilibrium, and successively to bifurcate into an unstable focus.

This Hopf bifurcation of the coexistence equilibrium occurs when the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix transitions from having three real solutions to having one real and two complexconjugate solutions. The bifurcation condition is thus that two roots of the third-degree characteristic polynomial are simultaneously null. We thank Alice l'Huillier and Bertrand Maury for pointing out that we could use Cardano's method to numerically compute the boundary of the region in a 2dimensional parameter space were the system oscillates.

If we fix the parameters d = K = r = 1, then the Jacobian matrix as a function of the evolutionary parameters, evaluated at the coexistence equilibrium, reads:

$$\hat{J} = \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{1}{\sqrt{\lambda_F}} & -\frac{1}{\sqrt{\lambda_F}} & 0\\ \frac{1}{\lambda_S(\sqrt{\lambda_F}-1)} (2\lambda_s + \lambda_S\lambda_F - 3\lambda_S\sqrt{\lambda_F} + \lambda_F^{3/2}) & 0 & \frac{1-\sqrt{\lambda_F}}{\lambda_F^{3/2}} (\lambda_S + \lambda_F - \lambda_S\sqrt{\lambda_F}) \\ \frac{\lambda_F^2}{\lambda_S^2} \frac{(\lambda_S\sqrt{\lambda_F}-\lambda_F - \lambda_S)}{(\sqrt{\lambda_F}-1)^3} & 0 & \frac{\lambda_F}{\lambda_S(\sqrt{\lambda_F}-1)} - 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

The sign of the real part of the eigenvalues λ can now be found as a function of the evolutionary parameters λ_S and λ_F . The secular equation for the Jacobian can be cast in the following form:

$$\mathcal{P}(\lambda) = \lambda^3 + p\lambda + q,$$

where:

$$p = \frac{(\sqrt{\lambda_F} - 1)(\lambda_F - \lambda_S + \lambda_S \sqrt{\lambda_F})}{\sqrt{\lambda_F} \lambda_S(\sqrt{\lambda_F} - 1)} - \frac{(\lambda_S - \lambda_F \lambda_S + \lambda_F^{3/2})^2}{3\lambda_F \lambda_S^2(\sqrt{\lambda_F} - 1)^2}$$

$$q = \frac{(\lambda_F - \lambda_S + \sqrt{\lambda_F}\lambda_S)(\lambda_S - \lambda_S\lambda_F + \lambda_F^{3/2})}{3\lambda_F\lambda_S^2(\sqrt{\lambda_F} - 1)} - \frac{2(\lambda_S - \lambda_F\lambda_S + \lambda_F^{3/2})}{27\lambda_F^{3/2}\lambda_S^3(\sqrt{\lambda_F} - 1)^3} - 2\frac{\lambda_F + \lambda_S - \sqrt{\lambda_F}\lambda_S}{\sqrt{\lambda_F}\lambda_S}$$

All these quantities can be numerically evaluated, given the parameters λ_F and λ_S . Following Cardano's method for the resolution of third order equations, we define the quantity $\Delta(\lambda_F, \lambda_S) = \frac{q^2}{4} + \frac{p^3}{27}$, whose sign determines the nature of the roots. Since $\Delta(\lambda_F, \lambda_S)$ is always positive $\forall \lambda_F, \lambda_S \in$ [2, 40], the Jacobian has one real and two complex conjugate eigenvalues, which we call Λ_R and $\Lambda_{C_{1,2}}$, respectively. Λ_R is always negative in the region of the parameters investigated. The real part of Λ_C , instead, can be either positive or negative. The numerical bifurcation curve, that is the solution of $Re(\Lambda_C) = 0$, is displayed as a white line in S5 Fig. Along this line, the system undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation (Ott 2002), whereby a stable focus gives rise to an unstable focus and a stable limit cycle of frequency $Im(\Lambda_C)$.

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S2 Text

Bounded probability of remaining alone

When the probability α of cells remaining alone is different from 1/K, cells cannot avoid being in groups even when resources are very abundant. Numerical estimations of the bifurcation boundary (Fig 1) indicate that the qualitative structure of the bifurcation diagram remains unchanged, but the bifurcation boundary displaces towards higher λ_F as the probability of aggregation decreases. This means that, somewhat counter-intuitively, oscillatory solutions emerge more easily when cells have less opportunity to group. This is a consequence of the fact that increased grouping forces an additional load that free-riders impose to the collective function. The total number of cells is thus maintained low, and resources high. The coupling between resource-consumer ecology and population composition can however be re-established if the population as a whole can achieve faster growth by being more efficient in solitary feeding, which occurs for high λ_F . Interestingly, the role of the social exploitation parameter λ_S is almost unchanged in the region when oscillations are possible.



Fig 1: Dependence of the bifurcation diagram on the probability to aggregate. As the maximum probability of being in the solitary state decreases, the region when oscillatory behaviour occurs displaces towards higher λ_F .

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S3 Text

Linear stability analysis of the purely ecological dynamics

Purely ecological equations correspond to the neutral case when both slow and fast types have the same payoff, and the social composition of the population is fixed to the value x_0 for which fast and slow strategies have equal payoff, that is:

$$x_0 = \frac{\lambda_F}{\lambda_S} \frac{1}{\frac{K}{R} - 1}$$

Consequently, the average payoff \bar{p} will be equal to the fast cells payoff:

$$\bar{p}(R) = p_F(R) = \frac{R}{K} \lambda_F.$$

Then, the purely ecological dynamics is given by the two equations governing the temporal variation of resource and consumer densities:

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = R \left[r \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) - N \right]$$
$$\frac{dN}{dt} = N \left(\frac{\lambda_F}{K} R^2 - d \right).$$

The corresponding coexistence fixed point $(\hat{R}_{eco}; \hat{N}_{eco})$ is then:

$$\hat{R}_{eco} = \phi K$$

 $\hat{N}_{eco} = r(1 - \phi).$

The Jacobian of the ecological system is thus:

$$J = \begin{pmatrix} r(1 - 2\frac{R}{K}) - N & -R \\ \\ 2\frac{\lambda_F}{K}NR & \frac{\lambda_F}{K}R^2 - d \end{pmatrix}.$$

By evaluating J at the fixed point we get:

$$\hat{J}_{eco} = \begin{pmatrix} -r\phi & -\phi K \\ \\ 2\lambda_F r(1-\phi) & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

According to the Jury conditions, the fixed point will be locally asymptotically stable if $Tr(\hat{J}_{ec}) < 0$ and $Det(\hat{J}_{ec}) > 0$ (Strogatz 2018). Here we have:

$$Tr \, \hat{J}_{eco} = -r\phi < 0$$
$$Det \, \hat{J}_{eco} = 2\lambda_F \, K \, r(1-\phi)\phi > 0$$

as long as such a coexistence equilibrium exists (i.e. when $\phi < 1$). Hence, the coexistence fixed point of the ecological module is always asymptotically stable for each value of the single-cell payoffs parameters λ_F , λ_S .

References

Strogatz, Steven H (2018). Nonlinear dynamics and chaos: with applications to physics, biology, chemistry, and engineering. CRC Press.

Aggregative cycles evolve as a solution to conflicts in social investment

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S4 Text

Adaptive Dynamics

In the framework of adaptive dynamics, we consider an infinitely large population where slow resident cells are characterized by a level λ_S^* of social exploitation. We assume that a mutation induces a small random phenotypic variation, generating a mutant sub-population of slow cells with exploitation level λ_S close to λ_S^* , i.e. $|\lambda_S - \lambda_S^*| \ll 1$. The eco-evolutionary dynamics in the presence of a population of mutant slow cells is:

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = R \left[r \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) - N \right] \tag{1}$$

$$\frac{dN}{dt} = N \left[\bar{p}(R, x, y, z) R - d \right]$$
(2)

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = x R \left[\lambda_F \frac{R}{K} - \bar{p}(R, x, y, z) \right]$$
(3)

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = y R \left[\lambda_S^* \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) x - \bar{p}(R, x, y, z) \right]$$
(4)

$$\frac{dz}{dt} = z R \left[\lambda_S \left(1 - \frac{R}{K} \right) x - \bar{p}(R, x, y, z) \right]$$
(5)

where x, y, z (such that x + y + z = 1) are the frequencies of respectively fast and slow resident and slow mutant cells. The average payoff \bar{p} now reads:

$$\bar{p}(R, x, y, z) = \lambda_F \frac{R}{K} x + (\lambda_S^* y + \lambda_S z) \left(1 - \frac{R}{K}\right) x.$$

Adaptive dynamics assumes that a phenotypic mutation is initially carried by an infinitesimally small fraction of the population, that is the continuous limit for a mutation occurring in one individual of

a large population. The invasion fitness S is then given by the per capita growth rate of the rare mutant into the resident population. If the population is at equilibrium, this can be computed by linear stability analysis of the equilibrium corresponding to the case when the population is solely composed of residents $(\hat{R}; \hat{N}; \hat{x}; 1 - \hat{x}; 0)$:

$$S(\lambda^*, \lambda) := \frac{\dot{z}}{z} \Big|_{(\hat{R}; \hat{N}; \hat{x}; 1-\hat{x}; 0)} = \hat{R} \left[\lambda_S \left(1 - \frac{\hat{R}}{K} \right) \hat{x} - \bar{p}(\hat{R}, \hat{x}, 1 - \hat{x}, 0) \right].$$

At such equilibrium, from Eq. (4) follows:

$$\bar{p}(\hat{R}, \hat{x}, 1 - \hat{x}, 0) = \lambda_S^* \left(1 - \frac{\hat{R}}{K} \right) \hat{x}, \tag{6}$$

that substituted in Eq. (5) yields:

$$S(\lambda^*, \lambda) = \hat{R} \left(\lambda_S - \lambda_S^*\right) \left(1 - \frac{\hat{R}}{K}\right) \hat{x}.$$

By equating the average payoff of Eq. (6) to that obtained from Eq. (3):

$$\bar{p}(\hat{R}, \hat{x}, 1 - \hat{x}, 0) = \lambda_F \frac{\hat{R}}{K},$$

and solving for $\left(1 - \frac{\hat{R}}{K}\right)\hat{x}$, we can express the invasion fitness as function of \hat{R} :

$$S(\lambda^*, \lambda) = (\lambda_S - \lambda_S^*) \frac{\lambda_F}{\lambda_S^*} \frac{R^2}{K}$$

Finally, substituting the equilibrium value of \hat{R} (Eq. (8) in S1 Text), we obtain Eq. (4) of the main text:

$$S(\lambda_S, \lambda_S^*) = d \, \frac{\lambda_S - \lambda_S^*}{\lambda_S^*}$$

The derivative of S with respect to the evolving trait λ_S specifies the fate of the invasion of a mutant whose phenotype has a given distance from the resident (Brännström et al. 2013). Since in our case such derivative:

$$\frac{\partial S}{\partial \lambda_S} = \frac{d}{\lambda_S^*}$$

is positive whenever there is a coexistence equilibrium, a mutant with $\lambda_S > \lambda_S^*$ will eventually invade the population and become the new resident, replacing the previous one. On the other hand, a mutant with $\lambda_S < \lambda_S^*$ would decrease in frequency over time, and go extinct without affecting the resident population composition.

Such analytical results were obtained when the interior equilibrium fixed point exists and it is stable. Numerical integration shows that, when the system's attractor is a limit cycle, the invasion fitness maintains the same scaling as for the equilibrium case and that when it starts invading, the mutant substitutes the resident. We computed numerically the rate of divergence of z after a subpopulation of slow individuals with trait λ_s^* was initialized at an initial frequency $z(0) = 10^{-10}$. The dominant Lyapunov exponent was estimated by linearly fitting $\ln(z(t)/z(0))$ for $0 < t < t_{max}$. Since the trajectory oscillates (the unstable manifold of the limit cycle is not parallel to the z axis), t_{max} has been chosen sufficiently large ($t_{max} = 2000$) so that those oscillations are averaged-out. We checked that the same results were obtained by computing the average rate of divergence, and that, when the system has a stable equilibrium, the numerical results matched the analytic calculation of the invasion fitness.

References

Brännström, Ake, Jacob Johansson, and Niels von Festenberg (2013). "The hitchhiker's guide to adaptive dynamics". In: *Games* 4.3, pp. 304–328.