



HAL
open science

Beyond official heritage agendas: The third space of conservation practices in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Gabriel Fauveaud, Adele Esposito

► **To cite this version:**

Gabriel Fauveaud, Adele Esposito. Beyond official heritage agendas: The third space of conservation practices in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Urban Studies*, 2020, pp.004209802095132. <10.1177/0042098020951325>. <hal-03092346>

HAL Id: hal-03092346

<https://hal.science/hal-03092346v1>

Submitted on 12 Feb 2022

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.





HAL Authorization

Page Proof Instructions and Queries

Journal Title: USJ
Article Number: 951325

Thank you for choosing to publish with us. This is your final opportunity to ensure your article will be accurate at publication. Please review your proof carefully and respond to the queries using the circled tools in the image below, which are available in Adobe Reader DC* by clicking **Tools** from the top menu, then clicking **Comment**.

Please use *only* the tools circled in the image, as edits via other tools/methods can be lost during file conversion. For comments, questions, or formatting requests, please use . Please do *not* use comment bubbles/sticky notes .



*If you do not see these tools, please ensure you have opened this file with **Adobe Reader DC**, available for free at get.adobe.com/reader or by going to Help > Check for Updates within other versions of Reader. For more detailed instructions, please see us.sagepub.com/ReaderXProofs.

Sl. No.	Query
---------	-------

- | | |
|---|--|
| | <p>Please note that we cannot add/amend orcid ids for any article at the proof stage. following orcid’s guidelines, the publisher can include only orcid ids that the authors have specifically validated for each manuscript prior to official acceptance for publication.</p> <p>Please confirm that all author information, including names, affiliations, sequence, and contact details, is correct.</p> <p>Please review the entire document for typographical errors, mathematical errors, and any other necessary corrections; check headings, tables, and figures.</p> <p>Please ensure that you have obtained and enclosed all necessary permissions for the reproduction of art works (e.g. illustrations, photographs, charts, maps, other visual material, etc.) not owned by yourself. please refer to your publishing agreement for further information.</p> <p>Please note that this proof represents your final opportunity to review your article prior to publication, so please do send all of your changes now.</p> <p>Please confirm that the funding and conflict of interest statements are accurate.</p> |
| 1 | Please give institutional email address if available |
| 2 | Please check and confirm whether the inserted keywords were correct and amend if necessary. |
| 3 | Reference citation (Logan, 2012b) has been changed to (Logan, 2002b) inorder to match with the reference list. Please check and confirm. |
| 4 | Reference citation (Hughes, 2007) has been changed to (Hughes, 2008) inorder to match with the reference list. Please check and confirm. |
| 5 | Please give reference details, including page number, for this quote |
| 6 | Please check this quote – should it be ‘marks of distinction’ (singular)? |
| 7 | Please give page range of book chapter for Esposito A (2018b) |

- 8 Please give page range of book chapter for Esposito A (2020)
- 9 Please give page range of book chapter for Esposito A, Bekkering H and Goldblum C (2018). Please also confirm if the publication year is correct
- 10 Please give author name (if available), article title, and either page number or web address (plus accessed date) for *Le Petit Journal du Cambodge* (2012)
-

Beyond official heritage agendas: The third space of conservation practices in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Gabriel Fauveaud 

University of Montreal, Canada

Adèle Esposito

French National Centre for Scientific Research, France

Urban Studies

1–16

© Urban Studies Journal Limited 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0042098020951325

journals.sagepub.com/home/usj



Abstract

Urban heritage conservation has often been portrayed as a practice shaped by ‘authorised discourses’ which are produced by powerful actors including the state, international organisations and experts. But the literature has also paid attention to non-governmental actors who produce ‘unauthorised heritage discourses’ by calling for broader and more diversified heritage interpretations and practices. Using the case of Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, we argue that the dichotomy between authorised and unauthorised heritage has produced artificial boundaries between those legacies which have been (or should be) identified as heritage and the multiple remains of the past which nobody has ever attempted to define as such. Instead, we argue that multiple authorised discourses, circulating worldwide, generate a pervasive global hierarchy of value which relates to heritage. Various actors, including bilateral donors, states’ representatives, tycoons, owners and tenants, shape urban tactics which selectively appropriate components of this hierarchy and combine them with socio-political and economic rationalities in order to conserve Phnom Penh’s urban legacies. Taken together, these tactics shape what we name a ‘third space of heritage hybridity’ outside the scope of official agendas.

Keywords

built environment, heritage, history/heritage/memory, informality, politics, power, theory [AQ: 2]

Received May 2019; accepted July 2020

Introduction

In his most recent film, *Diamond Island*, French-Cambodian film director Davy Chou (2016) features two young migrants from rural Cambodia. They work as builders for Diamond Island, one of the most iconic

Corresponding author:

Gabriel Fauveaud, Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal, Centre d’étude de l’Asie de l’Est, Université de Montréal, Pavillon 3744 Jean-Brillant, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7, Canada.

Email: gabriel.fauveaud@gmail.com [AQ: 1]

large-scale, multi-functional real property projects located on an island located at the confluence of the Tonle Bassac and Mekong Rivers in Phnom Penh, the country's capital. One of the scenes shows the young men discovering Phnom Penh during a nocturnal motorbike tour. In their eyes, Diamond Island's brightly lit towers represent an idealised future of wealth, comfort and amusement. At the same time, they ignore the dilapidated city as they speed through it on their bikes. The camera moves from the illuminated towers to the spectral urban landscape of decaying shophouses. It seems to suggest that the new generation of subaltern urban dwellers pays little attention to the city of the past.

This scene reflects a broader social reality shared by many Asian cities. Nation-states have often delegated to the private sector, and especially to real estate developers, the power to produce and manage the urban space of Asian cities (Shatkin, 2017). Under these circumstances, urban modernisation and redevelopment have often been seen as more profitable options than urban heritage conservation. Former residents and activities have been relocated in the urban peripheries in order to leave space for new housing and commercial estates, which a majority sees as both symptom and proof of progress and modernity (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). In the face of the destruction of large parts of their urban legacy, national and local authorities have gradually developed some heritage awareness. Since the second half of the 1980s, urban authorities have initiated conservation policies for historic districts as part of a strategy for the construction of national identities and tourism-driven economic development (Avieli, 2015; Logan, 2002a; Yeoh, 2005).

Local heritage policies in Asia largely draw on norms and good practices disseminated worldwide by international organisations including UNESCO. Through the

World Heritage Programme, the latter plays a leading role in disseminating a 'global hierarchy of value' (Herzfeld, 2004) relative to heritage. This hierarchy is built from principles such as conservation, authenticity, cultural diversity and community involvement. It combines seminal theoretical works (such as Walter Benjamin's theorisation of authenticity)¹ with normative discourses, international models of heritage regulation and 'best practices'. The hierarchy is viewed as intrinsically 'good', and its components are used as 'global yardsticks' (Herzfeld, 2004: 2) for particular types of social interaction. States, international organisations and foreign experts use it to produce what Smith (2006) has called 'authorised heritage discourses' (AHDs), which express dominant visions of the past. Studies have shown that AHDs have great performative power, in that they allow powerful actors to preserve cultural legacies that they view as their heritage. Dominant AHDs circulate at the international level and co-produce the global hierarchy of value, which is thus transformative and evolving.

However, heritage-making does not only involve powerful actors. Another area of research has developed an alternative perspective, looking at the localised effects of the global hierarchy. It has paid attention to subaltern groups and associations who claim the value of marginal legacies and cultural expressions in order to have them officially recognised as heritage. Such claims have often been defined as 'unauthorised' or 'counter' heritage (Byrne, 2014) because they oppose the narrow definitions of heritage produced by the state (De Cesari, 2010; De Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015). In Asia, unauthorised heritage has often included the cultural expression of ethnic minorities, villages and commercial districts. Consequently, a dichotomy has been produced which sees heritage as an arena of struggle between official practices and

counter-hegemonic ones. These dichotomies have helped to shape three dominant understandings of heritage: the first sees heritage as a status (the 'listed' versus the 'non-listed'), the second as a product of state policies and the third as an arena of socio-cultural conflict. We argue that these understandings have oversimplified heritage politics. Drawing on the example of Phnom Penh, we show that in a context where official heritage has not yet been defined, plural tactics which involve conservation perform specific degrees of authority and legitimacy. They shape what, following Bhabha (1994), we call a third space of heritage hybridity, which emerges outside the scope of official agendas. It combines socio-political and economic rationalities which make heritage dissonant, multivocal and plural.

Our reflection on conservation practices covers a vast array of urban legacies. In English, the term 'legacy' is not embedded in the theorisation of patrimonial values, but refers more neutrally and broadly to personal or group inheritances. In urban contexts it has been used to designate physical and built remains from the past. Lancret (2009) uses the French term *héritage*, which is close in meaning to the English legacy, to designate all the inherited traces and cultural expressions that a present-day society receives from the past, whether or not these are objects of value recognition by a particular group. This broad definition allows Lancret to give full consideration to a broad range of objects, spaces and traditions which form the cultural reservoir of a given society, which the latter selectively draws upon at different historical moments in order to identify and protect its heritage (*patrimoine*). The difference between 'legacy' and 'heritage' as we use it here defines a spectrum of possible, shifting degrees of inclusiveness which allows for a 'more nuanced and grounded distinction' between various degrees and stages of value-making (De

Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015: 338). It expands the analytical focus to the entire reservoir of urban legacies (including buildings, open spaces and landscapes) which may receive different forms of recognition, including the status of heritage. In other words, it helps us to accord full consideration to the relationship between the 'part' (the heritage) and the 'whole' (the legacies) and to evolving heritage definitions, including their shadows and also their nuances, which can provide a more accurate picture of the relationship that a given society establishes with the past.

The case of Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, is particularly valuable in this respect. The Khmer Rouge, in power between 1975 and 1979, believed that villages, towns and cities were barriers to the agrarian revolution. The urban population was killed or deported to the countryside and allowed to return only at the beginning of the 1980s, after the Vietnamese army overthrew the regime. These people were to a large extent not the same as those evacuated in 1975 (Carrier, 2019), many of which had died. After the end of the Khmer Rouge era in 1979, the city was partly destroyed, and its reconstruction took more than 20 years. Refugees from the countryside looked for shelter and economic opportunities in the city. New urbanites seized opportunities to occupy empty buildings left to decay for years. Since the 2000s, Phnom Penh has experienced fast urban development: the restart of the private real estate market, drawing important foreign investments from other Asian countries, has deeply transformed the urban landscape. Skyscrapers and condominium towers in the city centre, as well as dozens of new residential projects located on its outskirts, have replaced numerous inherited buildings.

This article draws on several different methods and sources of investigation: firstly, field observations of heritage conservation and destruction in Phnom Penh, gathered

between 2006 and 2015; secondly, the analysis of official documents by international donors and consultants collected in government offices and international organisation headquarters; thirdly, more than 20 interviews (conducted in English, French or Khmer) with professionals, including Cambodian public officials, architects and heritage experts, carried out in 2013 and 2015; fourthly, systematic analysis of articles in the two main Cambodian English newspapers (the *Phnom Penh Post* and *Cambodia Daily*) during the period 2013–2016, used to cross-check the reliability of the information provided by our informants.

How state disengagement generates heritage ‘in-betweenness’

Nation-states have been seen as the leading agents of heritage recognition. Their primary role has to be understood in the context of the modern history of heritage as an institutional practice. Contemporary ideas of heritage are rooted in the notion of the historic monument. As the Industrial Revolution generated dramatic social and physical transformations, historic monuments anchored modern societies to a sense of common identity and tradition, fighting back fears about the possible disappearance of the traditionally familiar world. European powers exported the notion of the historic monument to colonial countries (Guha-Takurta, 2004). Ideas of heritage gradually expanded from isolated monuments to urban heritage. In Europe, this expansion followed the Second World War, when the problems of post-war reconstruction raised governmental awareness about the importance of historic districts. Since the 1970s and 1980s, urban-driven economic development has threatened the conservation of historic cities in developing Asian metropolises. Municipal and national governments have subsequently

started to include urban heritage measures in planning and to treat urban heritage as constitutive of national identities (Yuen, 2006). Since the 1990s, urban policies have tried to reconcile conservation and development and to use urban heritage conversion for present-day uses, including tourist and commercial functions.

Since the end of the First World War, international bodies, conferences and charters have all contributed to constructing a global hierarchy relative to heritage. The ‘magic list of global status’ (Askew, 2010) established by the UNESCO World Heritage Programme contributed to the worldwide dissemination of this hierarchy. In this framework, the state has continued to be ‘a particularly intransigent force in all of UNESCO’s operations by the very structure of the organisation that has states as its members’ (Meskell and Brumann, 2015: 24). Jealous of its national sovereignty, the state operates in line with its own perception of national needs and contributes to the rise of nationalism within the UNESCO World Heritage Programme (Logan, 2002b).

[AQ: 3]

Because the state is dominantly viewed by international organisations such as UNESCO as a leading actor, its disengagement at the local level is often seen as one of the main reasons that new real estate developments are allowed to sweep away urban legacies. The literature has largely interpreted the state’s disengagement as a form of institutional weakness or a symptom of lack of capacity, two interpretations which rely heavily on representations of backward Southern countries in need of assistance and education. The underlying assumption is that conservation would flourish if only planning and regulation were strengthened. Heritage is therefore conceived as a technical field, unconcerned with local politics. It has been associated with ideas of formality, that is to say a form of planning which involves

centrally managed inventory, regulation and spatial classification. These tools establish the value of heritage objects with the purpose of preserving them for future generations. In doing so, such conceptions of heritage processes establish a sharp line of demarcation between official heritage and other urban legacies which are not mapped by formal policies. They establish heritage as a status and as a product of state policies.

In Cambodia, the production of discourses about national heritage started in colonial times. The archaeological site of Angkor has had a central role in the construction of national history and identity since colonial times (Edwards, 2008). The French School of the Far East, a scholarly institution which aims to produce knowledge about Asian civilisations, considered Angkor as its main site of archaeological excavation and knowledge production (Peycam, 2010). It contributed to shaping an idea of national heritage which was espoused by the Cambodian postcolonial state and focused on the monumental remains from the ancient Khmer civilisation (Edwards, 2008; Peycam, 2010). After the period of the Khmer Rouge regime, civil war and foreign occupation, the listing of Angkor as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1992 opened up the perspective of tourism-driven economic development. It enabled Cambodia to rejoin the international community with full rights. Since then, Angkor has drawn numerous donors and international consultant teams together on a regular basis on the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding and Development of the Historic Site of Angkor. This Committee has become an arena of negotiation and struggle about doctrines of conservation and development (Peycam, 2016). At the same time, UNESCO's listing of Angkor repositioned the country on the expanding routes of international tourism (Winter, 2007), which has become one of the

pillars of national economic growth (Esposito, 2018a; Esposito and Fauveaud, 2018).

The exclusion of urban legacies from heritage recognition can be understood in the light of recent Cambodian history. Memories of the urbicide perpetrated under the Khmer Rouge contributed to a widespread indifference to historic buildings, perceived as old and obsolete. A number of them lack basic hygiene and safety requirements but are still home to the poor. As in Vietnam (Harms, 2012), low-income urban dwellers cannot see any beauty in the urban landscapes which form the theatre of their daily struggles. A case in point was the White Building in Phnom Penh, a public housing estate built in 1963 by Lu Ban Hap and Vladimir Bodiensky under the supervision of Vann Molyvann, the most famous architect of the New Khmer movement. In the 1980s, the building was informally occupied. It became insalubrious and was said to harbour petty criminals and drug addicts. However, from the 2000s onwards it was also used as an exhibition venue by artists under the umbrella of the SASA artist collective, which celebrated the building's architectural and historic value as well as its role as a symbol of the social inequalities which undermined the post-war repopulation of Phnom Penh. In spite of this, the building was destroyed in 2017 and its inhabitants relocated, in order to leave space for development (Pen Sereypagna, 2018).

Grassroots movements such as SASA are an exception in Phnom Penh. Such movements develop in countries where civil society is strong enough and the level of wealth and well-being is sufficiently high to allow citizens to develop a concern for cultural and historical issues (Byrne, 2014; Esposito, 2018b, 2020; Herzfeld, 2006). As in other countries which are experiencing poverty, turmoil and unequal development (such as Burma and Laos), civil society organisations

in Cambodia focus on urgent subsistence needs, such as resisting evictions related to urban redevelopment projects (Hughes, 2008; Murray, 2012). [AQ: 4]

Furthermore, negative representations associated with old houses, collective trauma and endemic poverty have contributed to shaping a collective drive towards modernisation and enrichment. In Phnom Penh as in other emerging Asian metropolises (Esposito et al., 2018), the large majority of the urban population dreams of improving their quality of life. Writing about Ho Chi Minh City, Harms (2012: 5) argues that urbanisation is celebrated as 'a universal trajectory to social advancement'. Urban dwellers would rather hope for a brighter future than look back on memories of poverty embedded in the urban past. They often perceive the opportunity to move from the dirty, noisy and unsafe city centre to one of the dozens of new, safe and clean residential estates located in periurban areas as a socio-economic advancement (Fauveaud, 2015, 2016, 2017). These aspirations are endorsed and magnified by Cambodian state policies which target cities for various forms of development including real estate, manufacturing, trade, gambling and finance without the constraints that urban heritage regulations would impose.

In order to make these profitable activities flourish, a high level of flexibility is required for the acquisition and transference of public and private land. Such flexibility is incompatible with spatial mapping, which is a crucial tool for heritage planning. Mapping fixes the value of the areas and districts defined as heritage for future generations, that is to say for the long term. In contrast, land-based urban tactics depend on volatile negotiations of property values aimed at short-term, often speculative, benefits. The urban space must remain unmapped (Kah-Wee Lee, 2014) in order to allow these practices.

While heritage planning is incompatible with these practices, this does not mean that it is politically useless. Significantly, the inventory of Phnom Penh's urban heritage drafted by the Agence Parisienne d'Urbanisme (APUR) at the beginning of the 1990s has never been officially dismissed. It remains in a 'grey space' of permanently pending approval and sporadic revision which relegates urban heritage to an in-between state of uncertainty and ambiguity.² The plan is used politically as a warning about the strategic power – a prerogative of the state – which local Cambodian authorities might one day willingly enforce. Rumours about the possible implementation of heritage planning are a consistent threat and generate waves of destruction of historic buildings by developers who prefer not to deal with the constraints imposed by urban regulations. State officials behave like tacticians amongst other tacticians, negotiating conservation or destruction on a case-by-case basis depending on the power they enjoy. For example, a few young, foreign-educated municipal officials have succeeded in implementing small-scale restoration projects for monuments which represent the fundamental values of the Cambodian monarchy and the Buddhist religion. However, they lack political authority, independence from central institutions and the financial resources to expand their approach to larger urban sectors.

The destruction of urban legacies for the construction of new housing and commercial estates is widespread. Many private developers only take into account buildings' liveable surfaces, which can be specified on the market, but overlook other factors such as architectural qualities, which can increase the properties' value for certain market segments. Moreover, many private developers do not have the expertise to undertake rehabilitation work, and prefer to follow the

track of the construction industry in order to get quick returns on their investment. In this context, the replacement of historic buildings has become common practice since the early 2000s: an informant from Phnom Penh municipality (MPP) told us that while only 35 'historic buildings' inventoried as such by the French cooperation mission at the beginning of the 1990s (APUR and Ministère de la Culture, 1997) were abandoned or destroyed between 1996 and 2004, approximately 30% of the colonial period buildings had disappeared by 2010. Furthermore, between 30% and 40% of the historic buildings had been destroyed by 2015.

Unlike many Asian metropolises, public authorities in Phnom Penh view only a few iconic buildings and cultural sites as heritage. Heritage policies are repeatedly promised but never implemented; urban heritage thus possesses an ambiguous status which exacerbates its vulnerability when faced with urban redevelopment. Institutional behaviours endorse contradictory attitudes towards this urban heritage that lead to both conservation and destruction. At the same time, the uncertain institutional situation gives urban actors the freedom to constantly produce new forms of signification by drawing on the deep reservoir of Phnom Penh's urban legacies. Multiple, small-scale, pervasive conservation practices, mainly targeting individual buildings, do not produce new authorised discourses: they are not granted specific authority or legitimacy in the urban arena, nor do they endorse stable definitions of heritage values. They can be categorised as unauthorised heritage in a context like Phnom Penh where the state authorities have not (yet) established formal planning and mapping for urban heritage. Between local and more global heritage initiatives, between official and unofficial conservation projects, between dominant and counter-hegemonic heritage strategies, urban legacies are given meanings which engage them in

the never fully achieved process of becoming heritage.

This state of in-betweenness recalls the concept of 'third space' proposed by Bhabha (1994), who insisted on the fluid constructions and evolutions of culture and identity formation in the age of globalisation. Third spaces represent, for Bhabha, spheres of in-betweenness, in which individuals and groups are constantly negotiating the construction of their identity. These never-ending processes are hybrid because they challenge and contradict essentialised cultural narratives produced by hegemonic actors such as the state or international organisations. Following De Jong (2009), we believe that third space and hybridity are useful concepts for addressing the multiplicity of heritage processes.

In Phnom Penh, what we name the third space of heritage hybridity comprises multiple, syncretic narratives and rationalities, which are variously combined in urban tactics involving heritage conservation. These tactics attach meanings to a plurality of locations through seemingly insignificant, ordinary, everyday practices of maintenance and reuse (Bhabha, 1994). They do not use these legacies only for the sake of their cultural values but as proxies for something else (Meskell, 2015), as vehicles for and facilitators of political agreements and devices of self-legitimation and as tools for economic profit. They draw on components and fragments of the global hierarchy of value and selectively reinscribe them into multiple and localised tactics. Without relying on well-constructed discourses which would determine socially accepted heritage meanings, they shape the third space of heritage hybridity, in which urban actors produce unstable, ambiguous and sometimes antagonistic heritage representations (Hollinshead, 1998). As the case studies will illustrate, these tactics conserve inherited buildings and spaces for various purposes, including

the strengthening of diplomatic relations between countries, the conversion of urban legacies for economic profit and the improvement of individual social status and political ascendancy.

Hybrid heritage as a co-production

In Phnom Penh, state representatives can support heritage conservation if this helps to attain specific economic or political goals, which are sometimes disguised as the ‘common good’ (De Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015). The rehabilitation of the Phnom Penh Central Market (Phsar Thmey), inaugurated in 1937, is a good example which shows how the implementation of a project sponsored by a foreign donor, supposedly reliant on official agreements and formal planning, is dependent on and closely entangled with local informal politics. It also shows how the global hierarchy of value can first be reinscribed in the donor’s discourse and later selectively appropriated by Cambodian state representatives.

At the beginning of the 2000s, the French government and the MPP formed a partnership for the renovation of three of the most important markets in Phnom Penh, including the Central Market. In 2001, the MPP, the Municipality of Paris and the Association Internationale des Maires Francophones (AIMF) jointly launched a feasibility study which assessed the needs and costs of the renovation. The Central Market was viewed as an important heritage building and tourist site in the capital. In 2005, the French Development Agency (AFD) provided a grant of US\$4.5 million to support the renovation of the market, with a contribution of US\$1.5 million by the MPP. Although its objectives were technical (architectural rehabilitation and infrastructure improvement), the AFD provided the grant subject to the establishment of an

autonomous body, the *régie autonome*, which would be in charge of the market’s daily management and finances.

In Phnom Penh, public markets are managed by a market committee under the supervision of ‘urban districts’ (one of the administrative divisions of Cambodian cities) and controlled by the MPP (Kusakabe, 2016). Vendors have to pay several taxes on sales and fees (including rental fees and fees for sanitation and security), which are collected by sub-contractors hired by the MPP through auctions. The latter are opaque (significantly, the identity of sub-contractors is not made public) and highly competitive, because the contracts are very profitable. Amongst the winners of contracts in the past can be found well-known companies owned by Cambodian tycoons with connections to the government, such as the controversial real estate company Phan Imex (in charge of market tax collection in 2003–2008), which is involved in several land disputes around the country. Tax collectors, along with local representatives and the police, also collect fees from itinerant sellers working near the markets, as well as for parking, which is another lucrative source of income, especially for district and sub-district authorities (Kusakabe, 2016).

This situation has generated tensions in the past. Tax collectors have sometimes been accused of harassing and intimidating sellers (Sokheng, 2014a). The press has also reported tensions between sub-contractors and the municipality about the granting of tax-collection licences, which may involve the payment of generous bribes to the high-ranking officials of the municipality (Kongkea, 2014). Moreover, markets are strategically significant not only for economic reasons, but also for the broad dissemination of political information, especially during political campaigns. The police and market chiefs exert significant control over political activities in the markets, to the

advantage of the leading political party (Seangly and McMorran, 2013; Sokheng, 2014b). In view of this complex governance structure, the AFD believed that the establishment of a *régie autonome* would improve transparency and accountability (AIMF, 2010).

However, the implementation of the project became the object of contestation and negotiation between the municipality, the AFD, the national authorities and the vendors. Since the beginning of the project, vendors protested against the relocation of their stalls and the reduction of their activities due to the renovation work. Local authorities and the AFD had to find ways to reduce these negative impacts on vendors' revenues. Besides, the establishment of the *régie autonome* has been revised several times to fit with different expectations by the parties involved. According to an expert who participated in the renovation project, the main objective of the AFD was to give enough autonomy to the *régie autonome*, and to avoid the involvement of private stakeholders in the management of the markets (which was a central element of the bribery system controlled by local authorities). At the same time, the MPP aimed to simplify the structure of the new management body, which allowed some leeway in the management of the market, thus maintaining, at least partially, the management methods which had prevailed until then. These negotiations delayed the completion of the project. In spite of this, the AFD estimated that the project was an overall success: today, the *régie autonome* is responsible for tax collection. However, the AFD also noted that the current management system has not substantially changed, and that finance and accounting could be more transparent (Granjux, 2013). Moreover, following the renovation, an order from Phnom Penh municipality recommended that the shop-houses surrounding the market should be

renovated 'in line with original design' (Khouth, 2011), but no implementation measures followed. Finally, although the renovation of the Central Market was supposed to be followed by the renovation of two other markets in the capital, the AFD has not pursued its commitment, in view of the aforementioned difficulties.

The completion of the rehabilitation project, even if only half successful, heavily relied on local politics, that is to say on the donor's ability to negotiate with local and national stakeholders, in order to solve the political challenges posed by the reform of the market management regulations. Public discourses and evaluation documents produced after the completion of the project (see for instance Granjux, 2013) remain vague about the multiple problems (including the governance reform, the opposition of vendors and the difficulties of the negotiations) encountered all through the renovation project. At the market's inauguration ceremony in 2012, the AFD stated that Phsar Thmey was a 'heritage object and a source of pride for local authorities' (Eric Beugnot, former AFD director, quoted in *Le Petit Journal du Cambodge*, 2012), while the governor of Phnom Penh defined Phsar Thmey as an 'urban symbol' (Sokmom, 2011). By this means they made reference to the global hierarchy of value in order to reach and celebrate consensus. Official discourses disregarded the constraints and controversies faced during the project implementation, which have nothing to do with heritage matters but depend on local politics. They thus concealed the third space in which local politics, pragmatism, economic imperatives and donor objectives converge to co-produce a hybrid heritage. These discourses are used as a diplomatic tool (Winter, 2015) to reduce former tensions between the donor and the local counterparts and foster mutual agreement about the positive evaluation of the project's outcomes.

Malleable pasts: Conservation projects by owners and tenants

In Phnom Penh, a large number of conservation projects are implemented outside any institutional framework, even though the Cambodian legislation formally regulates this sector. The sub-decree on construction permits (6 ANK/BK/19 December 1997) declares that a building permit is required for the renovation of existing buildings when the renovation modifies the facades, the aspect of the building, its floor areas, premises opened to the public, sanitary and wastewater installations or configuration of the ground (art. 2). However, enforcement measures are weak, especially if the owner is powerful enough not to fear police controls. The relevant authorities are therefore seldom consulted. Furthermore, because the French-sponsored heritage inventory and master plan have never become official legal instruments, local authorities have little power to enforce the specific urban regulations that such instruments prescribe for historic buildings. In this situation, urban legacies become malleable objects, open to every transformation that private owners and tenants may choose to implement. The conversion of historic buildings for profitable functions (e.g. cafes, restaurants, shops and hotels) is a widespread trend in Phnom Penh as it is in other contemporary cities, a trend generally identified as a consequence of global gentrification (Crossa, 2009; Janoschka et al., 2014; Jones and Varley, 1999). However, researchers have mainly focused on the socio-political implications of gentrification and have rarely addressed the rationalities which lie behind privately run conversion projects. In what follows, we examine how these conversion projects combine different criteria of taste, value and objective, thus contributing to shaping a socio-cultural landscape of heritage hybridity.

Urban legacies as proxies of political power and prestige

Our informants in the Phnom Penh municipality declared that, between 2000 and 2010, historic buildings were almost routinely destroyed as soon as they were acquired by new owners. Building replacement allowed quick and secure profits on real estate investment in central locations. More recently, owners and tenants have developed investment tactics involving conservation. Tactics developed by powerful Cambodian tycoons accord urban legacies both symbolic and economic value, which is used to increase their personal charisma. Some of these tycoons have bought historic buildings that they then sit on for several years without regular maintenance, waiting for attractive investment opportunities which may or may not include conservation. The municipality and the Ministry of Culture sometimes try to negotiate with them to promote conservation, but the outcome of such negotiations depends on various factors, including the owner's personal power and public officials' political skills.

For example, one of the most powerful people in Cambodia, who has stakes in media, communications and banking, owns several colonial villas and former public facilities. Some of these have been converted for commercial purposes. One is now an elite social club whose membership costs more than a thousand dollars a year. The building has become the showcase for an elite who can afford to pay for conspicuous leisure activity (Veblen, 1994 [1899]). Heritage values alone do not explain why such a powerful person would buy historic buildings, especially considering that some of them are left to decay for several years before eventually being converted or destroyed. When asked about his reasons for rehabilitating one building, this man explained that he 'only implements projects that bring money'. [AQ: 5]

Economic profitability is only one of the reasons used to justify conservation. Another tycoon with stakes in the lumber industry uses a colonial villa located along one of the main boulevards of the city centre as his company's headquarters. The house is a former property of the Ministry of Culture. An informant who used to work for him declared during an interview that the acquisition involved several informal financial transactions. Regular fees were paid to the Ministry of Culture and the Secretary of State in order to obtain the legal ownership title. In addition, a payment of several million US dollars was allegedly made to the ruling party (the Cambodian People's Party) in exchange for their informal endorsement of the transaction. Bribery is a widespread practice within the administration. Official positions require paying bribes to the leading party and to powerful clans. In turn, high official positions guarantee access to various kinds of resource, as rewards for financial contributions and political loyalty. Informal transactions lie at the very heart of the state's functioning.

Public properties, including historic buildings, today figure amongst the resources which can be used as symbolic and economic rewards, especially since the property boom of the 2000s. Their aura is a sign of the political ascendancy of the parties involved in the transaction. Urban legacies are thus proxies of political power and prestige, social qualities closely associated with capital accumulation displayed through the ability to pay, in both symbolic and material ways, in order to access ownership rights to the historic buildings.

In the case of the colonial villa, the symbolic value is much higher than the economic one. Significantly, the architect hired by the tycoon to rehabilitate the villa was trained by the French-sponsored *École du Patrimoine* (a French-funded training institute for young Khmer professionals) and

formerly worked at the Ministry of Culture.³ Official attitudes to restoration do matter, and the owner shows that they can master the codes and rules of heritage conservation by hiring a recognised expert in the field. These increase the tycoon's socio-political power by highlighting the fact that they are able to indulge in the conspicuous waste (Veblen, 1994 [1899]) of an outrageous amount of money, which also confirms their loyalty to the ruling power to which the bribe has been paid.

Tycoons use historic buildings for various forms of personal advantage. These advantages are obtained through socio-political tactics which are not aimed exclusively at economic benefits but in every case involve the display of personal wealth. Rehabilitated historic buildings are used as 'marks of distinctions and collective symbolic capital' (Harvey, 2012: 106, quoted by De Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015: 349), proof of the elite status displayed by individuals presenting themselves as powerful. [AQ: 6]

Shrinking the global hierarchy to fit with economic priorities

In other cases, the conversion of historic buildings is directly aimed at developing commercial activities. Architects are sometimes involved in the projects, but in the majority of cases tenants and owners design the projects on their own. Many of these are implemented by foreign tenants who have insufficient capital available to develop new properties, and consequently choose to rehabilitate historic buildings selected to attract wealthy tourists and expatriates. By contrast, Cambodian owners rent out (rather than redevelop) central urban sites if they estimate that property values will substantially increase during the period of the lease. They prefer not to leave their property unexploited because it would be subject to the 'unused land tax', equivalent to 2% of

the land value as estimated annually by the Committee for the Valuation on Unused Land. They grant leases of a maximum length of 10 years in order to retain the option of redeveloping the property in a few years' time. Because their tenants have no guarantee that leases will be renewed at a reasonable cost, they believe that the reuse of a historic building needs to be profitable within the period of the lease. Under these conditions, rehabilitation is aimed at maintaining the building for approximately 10 years. A short-term timeline seems to be completely incompatible with one of the founding principles of the global heritage hierarchy, according to which built heritage is rehabilitated in order to last. It proves that this hierarchy can be locally negotiated and selectively appropriated in order to fit with land valuation tactics that use urban legacies as 'motors of capital absorption and accumulation' (De Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015: 350).

Yet heritage values do have some weight in developers' discourses. One tenant who opened a popular restaurant for expatriates said, 'I had hoped the villa was designed by Vann Molyvann, but it was not. At least it is a building from the 1960s'. This shows that architectural history is important to this tenant because it increases the building's appeal to potential customers. However, historical knowledge is generally hazy, since archival sources were largely destroyed during the Khmer Rouge period. An architect who was involved as a designer and business partner in the rehabilitation of a colonial building recalled that:

after buying the building, we went to UNESCO to ask for advice and information on the building. We never heard back from them. Then we found the help of a French-educated Cambodian 'heritage expert' who knew about the history of the building and guided us through renovations by providing information and old pictures.

This example suggests that UNESCO plays quite a marginal role in the field of urban heritage conservation in Phnom Penh. This is mainly because any attempt to interfere in the delicate issue of land management could result in strong institutional resistance to dialogue, and could even be a threat to the UNESCO delegates in Cambodia. In other words, if international experts wish to secure their place in urban politics (and in the country), they have to be careful enough to comply with the informal rules of local politics (Avieli, 2015). UNESCO does not exert some of the authority that its status as an international organisation would lead one to expect, demonstrating to what extent the state – not as a monolithic power but as a multifarious network of actors performing and struggling for power – still plays a dominant role in defining the fate of historic buildings in the developing city. Under these circumstances, it is at the owners' discretion to collect historical data through both formal and informal sources of information. The depth of the owners' commitment to historical knowledge depends purely on the importance they personally attribute to history, not to a general understanding of the value of history for the public good that the Cambodian nation-state might have wanted to provide. They adopt a 'ramified form of common sense' (Herzfeld, 2004: 3), whose vagueness makes multiple interpretations and negotiations possible.

The flexible appropriation of heritage values involves personal tastes and sensibilities. One French tenant said that 'history and architectural value would not be enough. I have to feel the place, I have to feel the vibrations that come from the earth'. As with gentrified districts in other Asian metropolises (Chang, 2016; Lu, 2017), architectural design mirrors not only personal cultural backgrounds and individual understanding of collective representations of the Cambodian past, but also a geographical

'elsewhere' evoked by furnishings, decoration, a wide range of themes (colonial history, American cities, etc.) and eclectic architectural styles. This process results in the aestheticisation of architectural and urban space, especially where high-end hotels and restaurants are concerned.

Some foreign owners and tenants see themselves as the bearers of heritage knowledge exclusive to a cultural elite. Their projects aim to speak 'the idiom of cosmopolitan responsibility for a universal heritage' (De Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015: 340) and to widely disseminate that responsibility. This pedagogical aspect stresses these people's social utility in the foreign arena, thus legitimating their power to transform and manage urban space. Their conservation agendas produce a third space of heritage, in which only a few of the fundamental components of the global hierarchy of value (such as authenticity) are taken into account on a case-by-case base, and are watered down to a level that allows for conversion for short-term economic purposes.

Conclusion: Heritage hybridity as a dynamic spectrum

In this article, we have shown that heritage acts as a powerful reference system infused by circulating international discourses which shape the blurred yet palpable boundaries of the global hierarchy of value. Taking the example of Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, we have pointed out that conservation practices take place in the space between 'authorised' and 'unauthorised' heritage discourses, and between international heritage doctrines and local politics. Phnom Penh's urban legacies are not valued (only) for their heritage qualities. Rather, they are used as 'transactional devices' (Meskell, 2015: 43) for achieving economic gain, political power and greater social capital. Yet heritage does matter. Heritage

values are used to 'consolidate control' over real estate and to increase capital accumulation (De Cesari and Herzfeld, 2015: 340). The global hierarchy of value surrounds urban legacies with an aura of prestige and authority which leads urban actors to conserve and make use of them. A multiplicity of approaches to urban conservation shapes what we have named, following Bhabha, a third space of heritage hybridity. These approaches rarely construct well-argued discourses about the values of the past, and the syncretic rationalities which underpin them are detectable only through their material effects.

The pervasiveness of such conservation practices is even more evident in the atypical case of the postcolonial city of Phnom Penh, where no official heritage policy has been implemented so far. On the one hand, the low performative power of French-designed heritage planning demonstrates that the influence of the former colonial power is being challenged by a newly reconfigured panorama of international relations. While heritage values originating in the Western world still largely influence the global hierarchy of value, elements of heritage discourses can be reframed within political and socio-economic tactics which assign urban legacies a wide range of symbolic, material and cultural values. At the same time, these tactics help to recognise a series of socio-political processes which add nuance and complexity to the sharp dichotomy between authorised and unauthorised heritage, thus defining a broader spectrum of stages of value-making which may prove useful for deciphering urban heritage politics in other developing postcolonial urban situations. Taken together, the three broad groups of tactics that we have examined here – by state officials, tycoons, owners and tenants – show that heritage hybridity is dynamically shaped by case-by-case combinations of dual rationalities, short-term economic

profitability and socio-political legitimation, at both the individual and collective level. The scope and raison d'être of hybrid heritage have deviated from the fundamental international principles of the common good and transmission to future generations. Instead, this constantly reconfigured heritage becomes a ramified, fragmented and ambiguous field of short-term empowerment.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions made on earlier drafts of this final version.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: A part of this article draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

ORCID iD

Gabriel Fauveaud  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9752-4657>

Notes

1. Walter Benjamin (2007 [1995]) questioned how the advent of the instruments for mechanical reproduction (e.g. photography and film), since they allow the manipulation and multiplication of copies, blurred the concept of authenticity for the work of art that was closely associated to the idea of originality and uniqueness. Since the 1990s, the international heritage community has engaged with this reflection and questioned the relativity of the notion of authenticity, especially in non-Western contexts (Jerome, 2008).

2. This inventory identified several hundred buildings to be listed as part of the national Cambodian heritage (APUR and Ministère de la Culture, 1997). Its implementation was formally made possible by the Cambodian National Law on Cultural Heritage of 1996, modelled after French legislation, which was supposed to enable the establishment of heritage lists.
3. The École du Patrimoine is sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, funded by the French cooperation mission and given technical assistance by two Paris-based institutions, the Cité de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine and the École de Chaillot.

References

- AIMF (2010) Création d'une régie autonome pour le marché central de Phnom Penh. Report. AIMF.
- APUR and Ministère de la Culture (eds) (1997) *Phnom Penh, développement urbain et patrimoine*. Paris: Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme.
- Askew M (2010) The magic list of global status: UNESCO, World Heritage, and the agendas of states. In: Labadi S and Long C (eds) *Heritage and Globalisation*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 19–44.
- Avieli N (2015) The rise and fall (?) of Hôi An, a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Vietnam. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 30(1): 35–71.
- Benjamin W (2007 [1995]) *L'œuvre d'art à l'époque de la reproductibilité technique*. Paris: Allia.
- Bhabha H (1994) *The Location of Culture*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Byrne D (2014) *Counterheritage: Critical Perspectives on Heritage Conservation in Asia*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Carrier A (2019) *Phnom Penh privatisée. La propriété à l'épreuve de la coutume*. Paris, Bangkok: Péninsule/IRASEC.
- Chang TC (2016) 'New uses need old buildings': Gentrification aesthetics and the arts in Singapore. *Urban Studies* 53(3): 524–539.
- Chou D (2016) *Diamond Island*. Cambodia/France: Aurora Films et al., 104 minutes. [Film].

- Crossa V (2009) Resisting the entrepreneurial city: Street vendors' struggle in Mexico City's historic center. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33(1): 43–63.
- De Cesari C (2010) Creative heritage: Palestinian heritage NGOs and defiant arts of government. *American Anthropologist* 112(4): 625–637.
- De Cesari C and Herzfeld M (2015) Urban heritage and social movements. In: Meskell L (ed.) *Global Heritage: A Reader*. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 171–195.
- De Jong F (2009) Hybrid heritages. *African Arts* 42(4): 1–5.
- Edwards P (2008) *Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
- Esposito A (2018a) *Urban Development in the Margins of a World Heritage Site: In the Shadows of Angkor*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Esposito A (2018b) Clairs-obscur: Les politiques patrimoniales en Asie du Sud-Est, entre célébration et négation. In: Négri V and Schulte-Tenckhoff I (eds) *Normer l'oubli*. Paris: Editions PUF/Institut de recherche juridique de la Sorbonne, pp. [AQ: 7]
- Esposito A (2020) Un patrimoine urbain vraiment malaisien? Stratégies d'aménagement spatial pour la ville historique de Melaka. In: Delfolie D, Fau N and Lafaye De Michaux E (eds) *Malaisie Contemporaine*. Paris and Bangkok: Les Indes Savantes/IRASEC, pp. [AQ: 8]
- Esposito A and Fauveaud G (2018) The atomization of heritage politics in postcolonial cities: The case of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 37(4): 670–688.
- Esposito A, Bekkering H and Goldblum C (2018) Introduction. In: Bekkering H, Esposito A and Goldblum C (eds) *The Ideas of the City in Asian Settings*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. [AQ: 9]
- Fauveaud G (2015) *La production des espaces urbains à Phnom Penh: Pour une géographie sociale de l'immobilier*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Fauveaud G (2016) Real estate productions, practices, and strategies in contemporary Phnom Penh: An overview of social, economic, and political issues. In: Brickell K and Springer S (eds) *The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia*. New York: Springer, pp. 232–242.
- Fauveaud G (2017) Residential enclosure, power and relationality: Rethinking sociopolitical relations in Southeast Asian cities. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 40(4): 849–865.
- Goldblum C and Wong TC (2000) Growth, crisis, and spatial change: A study of haphazard urbanization in Jakarta, Indonesia. *Land Use Policy* 17(1): 29–37.
- Granjux J (2013) *Réhabilitation des marchés centraux. Les leçons tirées des projets de Ouagadougou, Mahajanga et Phnom Penh*. Report, AFD, France, September.
- Guha-Takurta T (2004) *Monuments, Objects, Histories: Institutions of Art in Colonial and Postcolonial India*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Harms E (2012) *Saigon's Edge: On the Margins of Ho Chi Minh City*. Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Herzfeld M (2004) *The Body Impolitic: Artisans and Artifice in the Global Hierarchy of Value*. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Herzfeld M (2006) Spatial cleansing: Monumental vacuity and the idea of the West. *Journal of Material Culture* 11(1–2): 127–149.
- Hollinshead K (1998) Tourism, hybridity, and ambiguity: The relevance of Bhabha's 'third space' cultures. *Journal of Leisure Research* 30(1): 121–156.
- Hughes C (2008) Cambodia in 2007: Development and dispossession. *Asian Survey* 48(1): 69–74.
- Janoschka M, Sequera J and Salinas L (2014) Gentrification in Spain and Latin America – A critical dialogue. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 38(4): 1234–1265.
- Jerome P (2008) An introduction to authenticity in preservation. *APT Bulletin: The Journal of Preservation Technology* 39(2–3): 3–7.
- Jones GA and Varley A (1999) The reconquest of the historic centre: Urban conservation and gentrification in Puebla, Mexico. *Environment and Planning A* 31(9): 1547–1566.

- Khouth SC (2011) Action to preserve city's colonial heritage. *Phnom Penh Post*, 25 January, p. 11.
- Kongkea BR (2014) Jailing is unjust, says charged tax collector. *The Phnom Penh Post*, 5 August, p. 14.
- Kusakabe K (2016) Flourishing but invisible. In: Brickell K and Springer S (eds) *The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 257–268.
- Lancret N (2009) *La fabrication de la ville et de ses architectures en Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine, entre héritage et projet*. Synthèse des travaux présentée en vue de l'habilitation à diriger des recherches, Université Paris 8, France.
- Le Petit Journal du Cambodge* (2012) 4 November. [AQ: 10]
- Lee KW (2014) Transforming Macau: Planning as institutionalized informality and the spatial dynamics of hypercompetition. *Environment and Planning A* 46(11): 2622–2637.
- Logan W (ed.) (2002a) *The Disappearing Asian City: Protecting Asia's Urban Heritage in a Globalizing World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Logan W (2002b) States, governance and the politics of culture: World heritage in Asia. In: Winter T and Daly P (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Heritage in Asia*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 113–128.
- Lu Y (2017) *De l'ancienne concession italienne de Tianjin à l'I-Style Town: Enjeux et processus de la patrimonialisation et du développement touristique*. PhD Thesis, University of Paris 1, France.
- Meskeil L (2015) World heritage and WikiLeaks: Territory, trade, and temples on the Thai-Cambodian border. *Current Anthropology* 57(1): 72–95.
- Meskeil L and Brumann C (2015) UNESCO and new world orders. In: Meskeil L (ed.) *Global Heritage: A Reader*. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 22–42.
- Murray LR (2012) Target Cambodia. *World Politics Journal* 29(2): 79–87.
- Peycam P (2010) Sketching an institutional history of academic knowledge production in Cambodia (1863–2009): Part 1. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 25(2): 153–177.
- Peycam P (2016) The international coordinating committee for Angkor: A World Heritage site as an arena of competition, connivance and state(s) legitimization. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 31(3): 743–785.
- Seangly P and McMorran M (2013) Vendors made to toe party line. *The Phnom Penh Post*, 21 July, p. 13.
- Sereypagna P (2018) A genealogy of Phnom Penh's white building: From modern minimal housing unit to reimagining of alternative urban futures. In: Bunnell T and Pei Siong Goh D (eds) *Urban Asias: Essays on Futurity Past and Present*. Berlin: Jovis, pp. 41–52.
- Shatkin G (2017) *Cities for Profit: The Real Estate Turn in Asia's Urban Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Smith L (2006) *Uses of Heritage*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sokheng V (2014a) Rein in market thuggery. *The Phnom Penh Post*, 18 February, p. 14.
- Sokheng V (2014b) Flyer furor: Activist held for leaflet distribution. *The Phnom Penh Post*, 25 August, p. 14.
- Sokmom N (2011) Le marché central inauguré. *Agence Kampuchea Press*, 16 May, p. 11.
- Veblen T (1994 [1899]) *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Dover Publications Inc.
- Yeoh BS (2005) The global cultural city? Spatial imagineering and politics in the (multi) cultural marketplaces of south-east Asia. *Urban Studies* 42(5–6): 945–958.
- Yuen B (2006) Reclaiming cultural heritage in Singapore. *Urban Affairs Review* 41(6): 830–854.
- Winter T (2007) *Post-conflict Heritage, Postcolonial Tourism: Tourism, Politics and Development at Angkor*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Winter T (2015) Heritage diplomacy. *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 21(10): 997–1015.