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MULTIPRIL, a new database on multilateral price levels and currency misalignments^{*}

Cécile Couharde[†] Carl Grekou[‡] Valérie Mignon[§]

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Abstract

This paper describes the new CEPII-MULTIPRIL database on Multilateral Price Levels (MPL) introduced in 2020. The MULTIPRIL database covers a wide sample of 178 countries over the 1990-2018 period, and includes relative price level series computed vis-à-vis two sets of trading partners (177 and the top 30) according to three different trade-weighting schemes. It also contains MPL-based currency misalignments series for 156 countries over the 1991-2018 period. MULTIPRIL offers the potential to improve the coverage and quality of worldwide price-competitiveness comparisons. By focusing on price level data, it usefully complements the EQCHANGE database on equilibrium exchange rates and currency misalignments derived from series in indices. Its multilateral setting provides a more comprehensive picture of relative price levels and currency misalignments compared to existing bilateral measures.

Keywords: Multilateral Price Levels, Equilibrium Exchange Rates, Currency Misalignments, Bayesian Model Averaging.

JEL classification: F31, C32, C82.

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1 Introduction

The CEPII's *EQCHANGE* database provides time series of real equilibrium exchange rates and corresponding currency misalignments, which are calculated using the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate approach (BEER, see Clark and MacDonald, 1998). Because there is no universal definition of what is an equilibrium exchange rate, several assessment methods coexist in the literature. They are usually classified into three complementary approaches: (1) the *macroeconomic balance approach* —including the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) approach and its variants; (2) the *macro-econometric approach* —the BEER approach and its variants; and (3) the external sustainability approach (MacDonald, 2000; Driver and Westaway, 2004; Couharde et al., 2018).¹

One of the shared characteristics of these different approaches is that they rely on exchange rate indices to determine the equilibrium value of real effective exchange rates (*REER*). By construction, these time-series indices offer a picture of changes in price-competitiveness for individual countries, compared to the level prevailing in some base period. However, using such indices leaves the cross-sectional dimension unexplored and, as a consequence, hampers a complete comparison across countries. This limitation can be corrected by relying on price level data, which take into account both the cross-sectional and the dynamic components of prices. Besides, the use of such data in levels makes it possible to assess the distribution of currency misalignments across countries worldwide.

Thus, to complement EQCHANGE, we develop a new database -MULTIPRIL that provides multilateral measures of price levels (MPL) for a large number of countries over the 1990-2018 period.² Specifically, we describe in this paper the construction of our data set and the equilibrium exchange rate approach used to derive currency misalignments from these MPL series. Cross-country comparisons of prices are already available (see, e.g., the International Comparison Program of the World Bank, and the Penn World Table from the University of Groningen), but they involve only bilateral comparisons where price levels for individual countries are assessed relative to the United States (US). Here, we take advantage of these bilateral data to provide multilateral measures of price levels for 178 countries at an annual frequency between 1990 and 2018, according to three different trade-weighting

¹In a nutshell, the macroeconomic balance approach calculates the difference between the current account (CA) projected over the medium term at prevailing exchange rates and an estimated equilibrium current account, or CA norm. The BEER approach directly estimates an equilibrium real exchange rate for each country as a function of medium- to long-term fundamentals of the real effective exchange rate. The external sustainability approach computes the difference between the actual current account balance and the balance that would stabilize the net foreign asset position of the country at some benchmark level. See Driver and Westaway (2004) for further details.

²See Table 9 in Appendix B for the list of countries.

schemes and two baskets of trading partners.

The use of such multilateral measures leads to several findings. They reproduce some basic stylized facts of International Macroeconomics, such as the Penn effect, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, and the Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey effect.³ They also reveal distinct patterns of price-competitiveness across countries and over time from those depicted by bilateral price levels relative to the US. In particular, the use of multilateral measures still supports the Balassa-Samuelson effect as a factor explaining price differences between countries (the Penn effect), but leads to a stronger effect than that derived from the bilateral measures. Our multilateral measures are therefore likely to provide a different indication of the extent to which a country's real exchange rate is misaligned. Accordingly, from these MPL series, we derive internationally comparable currency misalignments defined as the difference between the observed relative price levels and their equilibrium value.⁴ Due to data availability issues, this sub-database on MPL-based currency misalignments covers 156 countries from 1991 through 2018. Overall, the MULTIPRIL database achieves a degree of completeness in the coverage of relative price series and currency misalignments by adding the spatial dimension —through the cross-sectional component of prices— to the temporal comparisons of the EQCHANGE database.⁵

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the methodology used to construct our MPL series, present the salient features of these multilateral measures, and compare them with other existing indicators of relative price levels. In Section 3, we outline the empirical framework that underpins the determination of the MPL-based currency misalignments. Finally, Section 4 concludes.

³Let us recall that the Penn effect is a stylized fact that refers to the link between the cross-country dispersion of (i) relative prices and (ii) income levels. The Balassa-Samuelson and the Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey effects are two alternative explanations of the Penn effect, based on differences in countries' sectoral productivity for the former, and on differences between capital and labor endowments across countries for the latter.

⁴As described further in Section 3, the equilibrium values of MPL series are derived from a set of robust fundamentals, obtained from a Bayesian Model Averaging analysis, on 24 determinants of real exchange rates and price levels.

⁵The structure of EQCHANGE, as well as the way to access to MULTIPRIL, are provided in Appendix A.

2 The *MULTIPRIL* database

2.1 Methodological framework and salient features

2.1.1 Measuring multilateral price levels

We measure the multilateral price level of country i in period t ($MPL_{i,t}$) by computing the geometric weighted average of its bilateral relative prices relative to its trading partners j:

$$MPL_{i,t} = \prod_{j=1}^{N} \left(\frac{PL_{i.US,t}}{PL_{j.US,t}} \right)^{w_{ij,t}}$$
(1)

where $\frac{PL_{i.US,t}}{PL_{j.US,t}}$ is the price level of country *i* relative to the trading partner *j* in period *t*; $PL_{i.US,t}$ and $PL_{j.US,t}$ are respectively the price levels of country *i* and country *j* relative to the US; *N* denotes the number of trading partners, and $w_{ij,t}$ is the trade-based weight associated to the partner *j*.⁶ *MPL* defined in Equation (1) thus corresponds to the level of the real effective exchange rate of country *i* against its *N* trading partners. A unit value of $MPL_{i,t}$ is in line with absolute Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), but if $MPL_{i,t} = 1.2$, for instance, prices in country *i* are on average twenty percent higher than in its trading partners—at date *t*.

To aggregate relative price levels across trading partners, we rely on three different —tradebased— weighting schemes: (i) two fixed weighting schemes based on the average trade flows over the 2008-2012 and 1973-2016 periods; and (ii) a time-varying weighting scheme based on average trade flows over 5-year non-overlapping windows (see Table 1).⁷ These different weighting schemes are derived for two baskets of trading partners: (i) vis-à-vis 177 trading partners (leading to broad MPL series), and (ii) vis-à-vis the top 30 trading partners (narrow MPL series). The weighted geometric mean of price levels vis-à-vis each trading partner is then taken to derive an aggregated trading partners' price level. We opt for this procedure instead of a chain aggregation methodology —i.e., a weighted average of the growth rates of bilateral price levels. Indeed, changes in chain-aggregated trading partners' relative price levels reflect only changes in the underlying relative prices. Therefore, this method annihilates the effects of the changes in the trade-weights that have been particularly significant for countries like China.

Price levels for each country *i* relative to the US $(PL_{i,US,t})$ are from the International

⁶These weights are normalized so that their sum is equal to one, i.e., $\sum_{j=1}^{N} = w_{ij,t} = 1$.

⁷For the sake of homogeneity, the trade-weighting schemes are similar to those used in the EQCHANGE database; see Couharde et al. (2018) for further details.

Weighti	ng schemes	Trade p	artners
Fixed	Time-varying	Broad	Narrow
2008-2012	1973-1979	177	Top 30
1973-2016	1980-1984	countries	partners
	1985-1989		
	1990-1994		
	1995-1999		
	2000-2004		
	2004-2009		
	2010-2016		

 Table 1: Weighting schemes and trade partners

Note: This table reports the three trade-based weighting schemes and the two baskets of countries used to aggregate relative price levels across trading partners.

Comparison Program (ICP; survey year: 2011)⁸ and obtained by dividing the PPP exchange rate $(PPP_{i,US,t})$ by the nominal exchange rate $(E_{i,\$,t})$, both expressed in units of the currency of country *i* per unit of the US dollar:

$$PL_{i,US,t} = \frac{PPP_{i,US,t}}{E_{i,\$,t}} \tag{2}$$

2.1.2 Distribution of multilateral price levels

Our different measures of multilateral price levels are robust to the weighting schemes (Figure 1). They also follow a bimodal distribution, revealing two different types of countries. The first group includes developing and emerging economies, which exhibit significantly lower prices than their trading partners (first mode located around 0.65 - 0.7) —as can be seen in the right chart of Figure 1. The second smaller group encompasses advanced economies with relatively high price levels (second mode around 1.20), reflecting those countries' general tendency to have higher price levels.

This tendency is also evident when we restrict our analysis to a single year. As an

⁸ICP is a worldwide statistical initiative led by the World Bank under the auspices of the United Nations Statistical Commission. Its main objective is to provide comparable price and volume measures of gross domestic product (GDP) and its expenditure aggregates among countries within and across regions. ICP collects and compares price data and GDP expenditures to estimate and publish purchasing power parities (PPPs) of the world economies.

See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp#1



Figure 1 — Distributions of the multilateral price levels

Note: The series have been trimmed (1% at each tail of the distributions). The different measures are calculated vis-à-vis 177 trading partners. "f1": fixed weights 2008-2012; "bar": fixed weights 1973-2016; "TV": time-varying weights (5-year averages). AEs: advanced economies; DCs: developing countries; EMEs: emerging countries.

illustration, Figure 2 maps out multilateral price levels in 2018.⁹ The color scheme of the map goes from the red (low relative prices) to the blue (high relative prices), with the darker shades indicating higher price differentials. In the case of advanced economies (AEs), it is clear from the blue shades that they tended to have higher relative prices in 2018 compared to the other countries. The five highest relative prices were observed —in decreasing order—in Australia (1.67), Switzerland (1.57), Norway (1.53), the United States (1.5), and Iceland (1.48). In contrast, multilateral price levels were substantially lower in Egypt (0.32), Algeria (0.38), Tunisia (0.39), Sudan (0.39), and India (0.42). With two notable exceptions (Japan and Korea), price levels in Asian countries were lower than in their trading partners. In other regions, the distribution of relative price levels was less uniform. In Europe, and especially within the Eurozone, there were striking differences in relative price levels across countries, with multilateral price levels ranging from 0.8 - 0.9 —for Slovakia, Slovenia, and Portugal—to 1.34 in Finland. In the Western hemisphere, the dispersion of relative price levels across countries was also significant.

2.1.3 Investigating the Penn effect

While Figure 2 provides some clues, we now dig deeper by examining the extent to which our measures of multilateral price levels reproduce some basic stylized facts of Inter-

 $^{^{9}}$ Recall that the *MULTIPRIL* database covers 178 countries over the 1990-2018 period. However, we present data for only 161 countries in 2018 due to some missing observations for 17 economies during this last year.



Figure 2 — Global distribution of multilateral price levels in 2018 Note: The map is based on the average MPL series over the different weighting schemes.

national Macroeconomics. We first consider the Penn effect, i.e., the extent to which the cross-country dispersion of relative prices is related to the cross-country dispersion of income levels. Providing an explanation of deviations of real exchange rates to PPP, the Penn effect has been theoretically addressed by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) through the so-called Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. They conjectured that the Penn effect owes not only to the fact that "rich" countries have higher absolute productivity levels than poor ones, but also because they have a relatively higher level of productivity in the traded goods' sectors —compared to the non-tradable sectors. Over time, empirical studies have confirmed the validity of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis¹⁰ —at least when one considers a sample of countries at different development stages— to the point that this hypothesis is now called the Balassa-Samuelson effect. From Figure 3, it is clear that the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis also holds in a multilateral framework —that is, when considering relative price levels vis-àvis a set of trading partners.¹¹

Bhagwati (1984) and Kravis and Lipsey (1983) have also provided an alternative explanation for the Penn effect that does not require the underlying assumption of the Balassa-

¹⁰For a recent detailed presentation and investigation, see Couharde et al. (2020a) and the references therein.

¹¹Similar conclusions can be drawn when relying on alternative proxies of the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Couharde et al., 2020b).



Figure 3 — Multilateral price levels and GDP per capita (2017)

Notes: MPL data correspond to the average over the three weighting schemes. Data on the relative GDP per capita —in PPP terms— are from the RPROD database (CEPII). We dropped the 1% upper tail observations of the MPL series. In blue: developing countries; in red: emerging countries; in green: advanced economies.

Samuelson model on productivity differentials. According to the Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey effect, deviations of the real exchange rate to PPP are explained by higher capital compared to labor endowments in developed countries, which makes labor more productive and expensive in those countries. Since non-tradables are labor-intensive, their prices tend to be higher relative to those of tradables in developed countries, providing those countries with a higher price level. As shown in Figure 4, this effect is also supported by our *MPL* series.

Overall, Figures 3 and 4 are quite similar, meaning that the two effects —Balassa-Samuelson and Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey— are supported by our data. While this result regarding the closeness of the two effects could be expected, it should be noted that they refer to two different theoretical explanations of the Penn effect. Thus, even if the two effects are close at the empirical level, sectoral productivity (Balassa-Samuelson) and capital intensity (Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey) are two distinct concepts that both appear relevant in our case.¹²

¹²For the sake of completeness, note that although there is some dispersion —in the sense that most developing and developed countries are above the line whereas emerging economies are more equally distributed around it— the line represented on Figures 3 and 4 only aims at illustrating the existence of an overall positive relationship between MPL and (i) relative GDP per capita (Figure 3) and (ii) capital intensity (Figure 4).



Figure 4 — Multilateral price levels and relative capital-labor ratio (2017) Notes: The MPL data correspond to the average over the three weighting schemes. Data on the Capital-Labor ratio are from the Penn World Table 9.0. We dropped the 1% upper tail observations of the MPLseries. In blue: developing countries; in red: emerging countries; in green: advanced economies.

2.2 Comparison with other existing measures of relative prices

Most studies aiming at determining real exchange rate levels use bilateral price levels with respect to the US. They usually investigate the strength of the price-income nexus, the Penn effect, and —in some cases— exploit this relationship to derive misalignment estimates (see, for example, Cheung et al., 2007; Rodrik, 2008; Coudert and Couharde, 2009; Fujii, 2015; Cheung et al., 2017).¹³ By using bilateral measures, these studies can, however, lead to misleading inferences about overall price-competitiveness (Cheung et al., 2007).

As shown in Figure 5, despite the strong positive association observed between the multilateral and bilateral measures of relative price levels, most countries fell above the 45-degree line. This finding indicates that, on average, price differentials vis-à-vis trading partners are higher than vis-à-vis the US, suggesting an overestimation (underestimation) of price differentials for countries that exhibit relative lower (higher) prices vis-à-vis the US.¹⁴ In some cases, the differences between the two measures are substantial. In Japan (JPN), for example, price levels are twice higher vis-à-vis trading partners but only thirty percent higher vis-à-vis the US. In contrast, the price level in Bhutan (BTN) is close to that of its trading partners, but

¹³Without forgetting the adjusted version of the Big Mac index provided by *The Economist*, which accounts for relative GDP per capita to the US to assess the fair value of a currency vis-à-vis the US dollar (https://www.economist.com/news/2020/07/15/the-big-mac-index).

¹⁴By the way, note that Figure 5 illustrates an additional advantage of using multilateral measures rather than bilateral ones vis-à-vis the US. Indeed, as shown, the relative US price level is greater compared to most other countries in the world, which may bias the results.

much lower than the US price level. Most of the difference between the two measures can be attributed to the higher proportion of countries exhibiting lower prices than the US price level.



Figure 5 — Multilateral versus bilateral price levels

Figure 6 provides a temporal insight into the difference between the two measures of relative price levels. It shows that multilateral price levels have always been higher than bilateral price levels in the last 20 years. The difference has increased especially between 1990 and 2001, before stabilizing around 0.20.

Our characterization of relative price levels is thus fundamentally different from the one implied by the bilateral measure.

The way relative price levels are defined —that is, in effective or in bilateral terms—has another implication since it is also likely to lead to potential areas of mismeasurement in the magnitude of the Penn effect and currency misalignments. As an illustration, Table 2 reports the coefficient of the relative price level to per capita income —that is the Penn coefficient estimated in a multilateral setting and a bilateral one. Although the coefficient is positive and significant in both frameworks, its value is more than doubled when all the trading partners are accounted for. In other words, a higher relative per capita income in a country i results in a much larger price level relative to its partners than to the US.



Figure 6 — Distribution of the difference between the MPL series and the relative price vis-à-vis the US

Table 2: The Balassa-Samuelson effect	multilateral versus bilateral framework
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	Price level	Dries lovel	
	relative to trading	r lice level	
	partners	relative to the US	
Deletine CDD	0.223***	0.100***	
Relative GDP	(0.006)	(0.003)	
Constant	-0.179***	-0.169***	
Constant	(0.008)	(0.022)	
Observations / \mathbb{R}^2	4467 / 0.318	4467 / 0.174	

Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *Relative GDP* is consistent with the price level measure, i.e., vis-à-vis the trading partners or the US.

To illustrate the difference in the magnitude of the implied misalignments, the maps displayed in Figures 7 and 8 show the world distribution of currency misalignments in 2018 resulting from the multilateral and the bilateral frameworks, respectively. For most countries, currencies were less undervalued or more overvalued in the multilateral framework than in the bilateral one. This finding is important as it suggests that the evidence of a growth effect of undervaluations based on the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis could be much weaker when using multilateral price levels than indicated by the literature relying on a bilateral framework (see Rodrik, 2008, among others).



Figure 7 — BS effect-based misalignments: multilateral set-up

Notes: A positive (negative) value indicates an overvalued (undervalued) currency based on the Balassa-Samuelson effect, that is a higher (lower) price level than that implied by cross-country per capita income differences. The MPL data correspond to the average MPL series over the different weighting schemes.

Since the spirit behind the calculation of our MPL series is relatively close to that of the IMF's REER level data, we finally compare our multilateral price levels with those calculated by the IMF. While both series aim to provide a multilateral assessment of relative price levels, significant differences exist in the way they are computed.

Since 2015, the IMF has developed an approach to analyze persistent differences in the level of real exchange rates across countries. It complements the External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology, which provides measures of excessive external imbalances. The IMF's *REER* level series are constructed in a two-step process combining PPP exchange rates and *REER* indices. More specifically, the construction of the *REER* level for country *i* starts with the value of its price level relative to the US for the base year, i.e., 2011. The rescaled *REER* index —to the value of the base-year relative price— is then used to derive a time series; that is, the *REER* levels for the non-benchmark years are extrapolated assuming that they change in line with CPI-based *REER* indices (Mano et al., 2019). Thus, the evolution of *REER* levels fully reflects changes in the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (*NEER*) and in the relative Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, as shown by Deaton (2012), relative inflation turns out to be a poor estimate of the actual change in PPP from one benchmark



Figure 8 — BS effect-based misalignments: bilateral set-up

Notes: A positive (negative) value indicates an overvalued (undervalued) currency vis-à-vis the US dollar based on the Balassa-Samuelson effect, that is a higher (lower) price level than that implied by income per capita difference with respect to the United States. The MPL data correspond to the average MPL series over the different weighting schemes.

to the next. This is because the compilation of CPI only accounts for price changes and the national spending patterns while, when compiling PPPs, all sets of budget shares have to be included (see Inklaar and Timmer, 2013) —for instance by using the average share to weight the price difference for each product. Following Deaton (2012), this is likely to lead to systematic differences between domestic inflation rates and changes in PPP, with the PPP of poorer nations increasing at a faster rate than indicated by the inflation differential between poorer and richer countries.

In the CEPII's *MULTIPRIL* database, we use the WDI (World Development Indicators, World Bank) data for bilateral relative price levels with respect to the US. An important advantage of these data is that they rest on the ICP benchmarks, meaning that the comparisons across time and space rest on the same price data. It follows that the MPL series based on these PPPs give a more accurate picture than the measures which combine relative price levels (base year: 2011) with *REER* indexes' growth rates —like the IMF's series, addressing an important criticism of Deaton (2012).

Figure 9 shows the evolution of our MPL series and of the IMF's *REER* level series. To facilitate the comparison, Figure 9 also displays two other variables: (*i*) CPI-based *REER* indices (source: *EQCHANGE*), and (*ii*) *REER* level series computed using the IMF's methodology and *EQCHANGE* CPI-based *REER* indices.¹⁵ Because the latter series are based on

¹⁵For reasons of clarity, we only plot series based on the time-varying weighting scheme. The other schemes



the IMF methodology, we can more easily identify those differences attributable to the tradeweighting scheme as opposed to those due to the use of purchasing power parities.

Figure 9 — Alternative measures of relative prices

Notes: For readability reasons, weighted measures are based on time-varying weights representative of average trade flows over 5-year non-overlapping windows. See Couharde et al. (2018) for further details.

The difference in how PPPs are used has substantial consequences for the level of relative prices. Indeed, in advanced economies (the US and Germany), our calculations lead to higher relative price levels, despite a downward effect driven by our weighting scheme compared to the one implied by the IMF measure. The differences in measures are not solely about magnitudes, but also about the evolution of multilateral price levels over time, especially in developing and emerging countries. In particular, the case of China illustrates well the observation of Deaton (2012). Indeed, over the whole period, the *MPL* series —based on PPPs— changed at a higher rate than implied by the growth rate of the *REER* index. More specifically, the IMF's *REER level* variable indicates that prices in China were respectively around 50 percent and 30 percent lower than those of its trading partners in 1991 and 2016.

lead to the same observations.

With the MPL series, the prices were 65 percent below foreign prices in 1991, and 20 percent below in 2016. For Argentina, we even observe opposing trends between the two series. More specifically, since 2011, the MPL series show a rise in the relative price level, while the *REER level* based on the growth rate of the *REER* index points towards the opposite trend.¹⁶

Overall, the way relative price levels are defined —i.e., in effective or in bilateral terms and computed —i.e., PPPs versus extrapolations based on changes in REER indexes — has important implications since it is also likely to lead to potential areas of mismeasurement in relative price levels and in the magnitude of currency misalignments. Because the extrapolated REER level series are most of the time below the MPL series based on PPPs, they tend to underestimate relative price levels and generate bias in the level of misalignments. The same measurement error holds when using bilateral instead of multilateral measures of relative price levels. Relying on series computed vis-à-vis most of the trading partners and based on PPPs should thus provide misalignment values that better fit the economic reality.

3 The assessment of currency misalignments

This section describes the methodology used in estimating the equilibrium value of multilateral price levels and in deriving MPL-based currency misalignments.

3.1 Determinants of multilateral price levels

While diverse models have motivated a wide range of potential equilibrium REER determinants, empirical approaches based on bilateral real exchange rates commonly juxtapose only limited subsets of candidate regressors. In light of this model uncertainty, we adopt a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach¹⁷ to select determinants of multilateral price levels that have true predictive power.

3.1.1 The Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) methodology

The starting point of the BMA methodology is the finding that there are different possible empirical models, each of them defined by a different combination of regressors, and by a probability of being the "true" model. BMA proceeds by estimating these different models, and constructing a weighted average of all of them.

In greater detail, from X potential determinants, one obtains 2^X possible combinations and, in turn, 2^X potential models M_j with $j = 1, ..., 2^X$. Denoting D the dataset available,

 $^{^{16}}$ We use our computed proxy *-REER level CEPII-* since the original IMF's *REER level* series is not available for Argentina.

¹⁷See Hoeting et al. (1997, 1999) and Fernàndez et al. (2001a, 2001b) for further details.

and considering θ a function of θ^{j} parameters to be estimated, the posterior density of the parameters for all the models under consideration is given by:

$$p(\theta|D) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^{X}} P(M_j|D) \ p(\theta|D, M_j)$$
(3)

As shown by Equation (3), the posterior density of the parameters is defined by the weighted sum of the posterior density of each considered model; the weights being given by their posterior model probability.

Given the prior model probability $p(M_j)$, the posterior model probability is calculated using the Bayes theorem as follows:

$$P(M_j|D) = \frac{p(D|M_j) \ p(M_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^{2^X} \ p(D|M_j) \ p(M_j)}$$
(4)

where $p(D|M_j) = \int p(D|\theta^j, M_j) p(\theta^j|M_j) d\theta^j$ is the marginal likelihood of the data given the model M_j ; $p(\theta^j|M_j)$ is the prior density of the parameter θ^j under the model M_j , $p(D|\theta^j, M_j)$ is the likelihood and $p(M_j)$ is the prior probability that M_j is the "true" model.

Summing the posterior model probabilities for all the models including a specific regressor (determinant) X_k , we derive the *posterior inclusion probability* (PIP), i.e. the probability that this regressor belongs to the "true" model. It is calculated as:

$$p(\theta_k \neq 0|D) = \sum_{\theta_k \neq 0} p(M_j|D)$$
(5)

with θ_k denoting the parameter associated to the variable X_k .

We compute this statistic for each potential variable, i.e., determinant. Then, we include in the model each variable which is found to be robust, i.e., characterized by a posterior inclusion probability greater or equal to 0.50 (see, e.g., Fernàndez et al., 2001a).¹⁸

3.1.2 The data

While the literature on real exchange rate determinants is relatively rich, it is scarcer regarding the channels through which relative price levels could be impacted. However, since the ratio of price levels measures levels of real exchange rates between countries (see Equation (1)), factors determining price level differences embody those causing differences in real exchange rates, in particular through changes in the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods. We thus rely on the literature examining the determinants of real exchange rates and price

¹⁸Note that we follow the Fernàndez et al. (2001a)'s (hereafter FLS) methodology, which assumes equal probabilities for all models, i.e., $p(M_1) = p(M_2) = ... = p(M_{2X}) = 1/2^X$.

levels,¹⁹ and select a set of 23 potential determinants.

Four key structural variables — proxies associated with the Balassa-Samuelson (thereafter, BS) effect, net foreign asset (NFA) position, terms of trade, and trade openness— have proven to be theoretically important and empirically robust determinants of long-run equilibrium real exchange rates.²⁰ We capture these primary real exchange rate determinants that also impact the underlying price levels through respectively the GDP per capita in PPP terms relative to the trading partners, the ratio of NFA to GDP, the ratio of export to import unit values, and the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured in percentage of GDP.

One frequently discussed determinant is the BS effect according to which the lower the per-capita income of a country, the lower the prices of non-tradable goods and, in turn, the domestic price level. We thus expect that the catching-up process of low-income countries leads to a rise in their price levels. Another structural factor that merits examination for possible links to relative price levels is the NFA position. However, its impact on relative price levels may be ambiguous²¹ due to the existence of two antagonistic effects. The first one is a transfer effect, according to which a deterioration (an improvement) of the NFA position emerges because of an accumulation of current deficits (surpluses) and non-competitive (competitive) exchange rates. As a consequence, countries running current deficits (surpluses) may have an overvalued (undervalued) currency. The effect of the NFA position should thus be negative (positive) on debtor (creditor) countries' price levels (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). The second, intertemporal consumption effect, has the opposite consequence: countries accumulating negative (positive) NFA/GDP ratios tend to consume relatively more (less), implying higher (lower) domestic inflation and thus higher (weaker) domestic price level relative to foreign prices.

Terms of trade shocks are also relevant as they can affect wealth, as well as intertemporal consumption patterns. Positive terms of trade shocks cause import prices to be lower, relative to non-tradable prices, than they would be in the absence of such shocks. In other words, an improvement in the terms of trade should raise the relative price of non-tradables and, in turn, the overall price level. The higher price of non-tradable goods may also reflect a wealth effect associated with an improvement in terms of trade. Finally, as mentioned by Kravis and Lipsey (1983), the degree of openness may affect the price level through its influence on the prices of the production factors and should therefore depend on differences in factor endowments between a country and its trading partners. If trading partners are most

¹⁹See for instance Bergstrand (1991), Clague (1986), Edwards (1988), and Sarno and Taylor (2002) for a review of the literature.

²⁰While some variables could have been also added to this group, note that the above four variables define our baseline specification due to data availability issues.

²¹See Égert et al. (2004) on the controversial effect of the NFA position on the real effective exchange rate.

labor-abundant (capital-abundant), the effect of openness should be negative (positive) on the home country's relative price level.

In addition to those four key variables, we consider 19 second-order determinants proposed by the literature. Specifically, we focus on the four broad variable categories below.

Demographics. We retain two demographic variables, namely the population growth rate and the old-age dependency ratio.²² The majority of empirical evidence concludes that both variables are associated with a higher price level through demand factors. For instance, according to Groneck and Kaufman (2017), an increase in the old-age dependency ratio raises the demand for non-tradable old-age related services relative to tradable commodities. This demand shift, in turn, lifts up the relative price level thanks to the increase in the relative price of non-tradables —due to imperfect intersectoral factor mobility.

Economic and policy environment. A stable macroeconomic environment —captured by (i) the expected GDP growth (2 years ahead), and (ii) the output gap (% potential output)— matters for limiting departure of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium level. In addition, macroeconomic policies send important signals about the commitment and credibility of authorities to efficiently manage their economy and reduce the occurrence of macroeconomic imbalances. To account for the possibility of monetary policy to affect the path of the price level through its effect on aggregate demand, we consider: (i) broad money (proxy for money supply), (ii) the real interest rate, and (iii) the credit gap. The impact of fiscal policy is captured by (i) government spending relative to GDP, and (ii) health expenditures relative to GDP. Through their impact on the composition of demand towards the non-tradable sector, government spending and health expenditures may contribute to an increase in relative price levels.

Specialization and participation in the globalization process. Specialization and participation in the process of globalization could have important effects on relative price levels, by delaying or accelerating their needed adjustments. Thus, we examine whether the way countries are inserted into international transactions is a significant determinant of relative price levels using (i) the natural resource rents (in % of GDP), (ii) oil rents (in % of GDP),

 $^{^{22}}$ Note that the demographic structure of the population has a key impact on the NFA position. In particular, an increase in the proportion of young generations leads to a fall in external position for, at least, two main reasons. First, a country in which the young population's share is high tends to require substantial investment in education, housing, and other social infrastructure. Second, as Higgins (1998) emphasized, a high youth dependency ratio is generally associated with low savings due to the smoothing consumption behavior of households.

(iii) the capital-labor ratio (the Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey effect), (iv) the imports-exports ratio, (v) the net foreign direct investment (net inflows; in % of GDP) to measure the nature of specialization and competitiveness, and (vi) the trade tariff rates to capture the trade regime.

Others. The last set of determinants consists of variables that are likely to influence relative price levels, but do not fit in the above groups of variables. We first take into account the socio-political context, measured by the severity of societal and interstate violence. As suggested by Rodrik (1999), such conflict episodes tend, indeed, to distort relative prices by delaying needed adjustments in real exchange rates or real wages. We also account for the geographic situation by using the average distance from the trade partners, and including two dummy variables, for (i) islands and (ii) landlocked countries. The literature largely agrees that the geographical remoteness by inducing high costs of trade tends to increase the cost of living.

The total size of our data set corresponds to 24 variables (including the dependent variable) for 178 countries over the 1990-2018 period. Since countries' relative position is of particular interest in explaining differences in relative price levels, some of the above determinants are expressed relative to the trading partners. The list of variables with their corresponding description, calculation details, and sources are displayed in Table 7 in Appendix B.

3.1.3 The BMA results

Table 3 presents the results of interest from the BMA analysis, namely the posterior inclusion probabilities based on a universe of 2^{19} —i.e., 524288— possible models.²³ We report, for the different countries' samples,²⁴ the results associated with each of the weighting schemes, as well as those based on the variables averaged over the three schemes —see column "Average".

Table 3 highlights the sensitivity of the results to the countries' sample and to the different trade-weighting schemes. Therefore, we consider as robust determinants of the multilateral price levels the variables characterized by a PIP greater or equal to 0.5 (i) for at least two weighting schemes, and (ii) in at least one of the samples in column "Average". A more

 $^{^{23}}$ To remove the potential influence of outliers, all the variables have been trimmed (1% at each tail of the distribution).

²⁴It is worth mentioning that the application of BMA requires the absence of missing data. Thus, the country coverage corresponds to the case where all the variables are available (see column 3.12 of Table 4). Besides, we account for the level of development of countries in selecting variables so as not to rule out a key explanatory variable for a group of economies, but which would not be significant in the whole sample of countries. In other words, we take into account countries' heterogeneity.

insightful view of the results derived from the BMA analysis is provided by the bar chart shown in Figure 10. This four-color bar chart indicates the number of times each different potential regressor has a PIP above 0.5 using a fixed weighting scheme based on the average trade flows over the 2008-2012 period ("Weights f1" in blue) and over the 1973-2016 period ("Weights bar" in salmon); a time-varying weighting scheme based on average trade flows over 5-year non-overlapping windows ("Weights TV" in grey) and an average over the three schemes ("Average" in yellow). As shown, 12 variables meet our criteria (they appear with bars composed of at least three colors) and are thus robustly related to multilateral price levels: Age dependency ratio (old), Capital-Labor ratio, Credit gap, Distance, Imports-Exports ratio, Health expenditure, Oil rents, Output gap, Population growth, Real interest rate, Sociopolitical context, and Tariffs. The most conclusive evidence is for Output gap which appears as the most important (i.e., robust) determinant of multilateral price levels —PIP greater than 0.5 in all the considered samples.²⁵



Figure 10 — Ranking of variables (summary of the BMA analysis)

Notes: The bar chart associates a colour to each trade-weighting scheme, the bar height representing the number of times the PIP of the variable is above 0.5 (see the columns of Table 3). "Weights f1": Time-invariant weighting scheme over the 2008-2012 period; "Weights bar" Time-invariant weighting scheme over the 1973-2016 period; "Weights TV" Time-varying weighting scheme based on non-overlapping five-year average weights; "Average": average over the three weighting schemes.

 $^{^{25}}$ For the sake of completeness, note that we checked for multicollinearity issues by calculating the correlations of our considered variables across the between and within dimensions. We find that multicollinearity is not an issue in our analysis as only two pairs of series are characterized by quite high correlations (i.e., around 0.8): the relative GDP per capita (Balassa-Samuelson effect) and the capital-labor ratio on the one hand, and oil rents and natural resources rents on the other hand.

									\ \							
							Poster	ior Inclusi	on Proba	bility						
		Weig	thts fl			Weigh	tts bar			Weigh	tts TV			Ave	rage	
	Full	AEs	EMEs	DCs	Full	AEs	EMEs	DCs	Full	AEs	EMEs	DCs	Full	AEs	EMEs	DCs
Age Dependency Ratio	1.00	0.12	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.06	1.00	0.89	1.00	0.11	0.98	1.00	1.00	0.07	0.99	0.99
Broad money	0.05	0.06	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.40	0.07	0.16	0.26	0.85	0.05	0.11	0.24	0.47
Capital-Labor ratio	1.00	0.24	1.00	0.07	1.00	0.97	1.00	0.27	1.00	0.15	1.00	0.11	1.00	0.84	1.00	0.09
Credit gap	0.95	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.98	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.94	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.96	0.06	0.06	0.06
Distance	1.00	0.25	1.00	0.06	1.00	0.89	1.00	0.59	1.00	0.20	1.00	0.07	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.09
Expected GDP growth	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.22	0.04	0.07	0.26	0.20	0.08	0.06	0.21	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.17	0.14
Government spending	0.04	0.16	0.06	0.13	0.04	0.97	0.05	0.08	0.03	0.14	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.83	0.06	0.08
Health expenditure	0.20	0.80	0.30	0.25	0.08	0.98	0.73	0.34	0.12	0.27	0.39	0.17	0.12	0.91	0.51	0.28
Imports-Exports ratio	0.63	0.23	0.07	0.15	0.27	0.15	0.05	0.15	0.77	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.53	0.08	0.07	0.16
Island	0.07	0.09	0.43	0.07	0.19	0.06	0.46	0.11	0.13	0.07	0.51	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.48	0.07
Landlock	0.19	0.29	0.05	0.18	0.10	0.14	0.05	0.13	0.18	0.31	0.05	0.12	0.15	0.20	0.05	0.15
Natural resource rents	0.05	0.80	0.11	0.10	0.04	0.13	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.92	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.24	0.07	0.08
Net FDI	0.04	0.13	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.05
Oil rents	0.04	0.88	0.93	0.38	0.04	0.17	1.00	0.15	0.04	0.93	0.96	0.20	0.04	0.25	0.97	0.24
Output gap	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.76	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.60	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.73
Population growth	1.00	0.06	0.05	0.16	1.00	0.09	0.06	0.54	1.00	0.23	0.05	0.28	1.00	0.17	0.06	0.29
Real interest rate	0.05	0.06	0.78	0.85	0.09	0.14	0.67	0.53	0.04	0.07	0.54	0.30	0.05	0.18	0.70	0.43
Socio-political context	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.09	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.09	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.06	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.08
Tariffs	0.72	0.11	0.06	1.00	0.07	0.66	0.10	0.97	0.18	0.14	0.10	1.00	0.24	0.60	0.08	1.00
Notes: The dependent variable	e is the el	ffective p	rice level	(MPL). T	he results	are base	ed on 100.0	<u> 300 burn-ir</u>	is and 200	.000 dra	ws. Simul	ations are	made usi	ng birth-	death MC	MC
(Markov Chain Monte Carlo) :	sampler.	In the co	¥,, sumnle	werage", w	e present	the resu	lts when c	onsidering	the varial	oles aver	aged over	the differe	nt weighti	ing schen	nes. Varia	oles
in bold denote robust determi:	nants. A.	Es: adva	nced econ	omies; DC	s: develop	ing coun	ttries; EM	Es: emergi	ng countr	ies.						

Table 3: Posterior Inclusion Probabilities (PIP)

3.2 Assessing real exchange rate misalignments

3.2.1 Model specification and estimation procedure

A key point is that equilibrium exchange rate approaches usually rely on a panel regression of separate REER indices for each country, which contains no cross-country information. The estimation method often requires using fixed effects, which force each country's regression residuals, i.e., misalignments, to average to zero over the sample period. Results are thus sensitive to the sample span and/or the occurrence of large structural changes that are not well captured by the specification. Regression analyses based on estimates of relative price levels offer a way to overcome these drawbacks as they allow us to exploit differences in misalignments both across countries and over time.²⁶ Typically, to estimate multilateral price levels and derive misalignments in their cross-country dimension, the regression analysis relies on cross-sectional —or pooled— OLS estimations. As shown in Figure 11, such an approach is particularly relevant for our purpose as the cross-sectional (between countries) variation of multilateral price levels is larger than their time variation within countries.

Excluding country fixed effects in the regressions can potentially cause an omitted variable bias. The latter may however be counterbalanced by, at least, three key elements. First, our models include several variables which also control for short term variations —in addition to the long-term dynamics— whereas our approach takes place in a long-run perspective in which only fundamentals matter. As we will show further, we are able to explain more than 70% of the variance of our variable of interest. We thus think that the potential omitted variable bias should be very limited. Second, even if such bias may exist, it is quite useful as it allows us to capture the part of the deviation of the price level from the equilibrium value that is not due to the *identified* structural factors. Finally, it should be emphasized that our regressions include time fixed effects.

²⁶Additionally, since those approaches do not necessarily require the use of country fixed-effects, they allow detecting persistent currency misalignments.



Figure 11 — Cross-sectional and within dimension variation Note: The cross-sectional (resp. within) variation corresponds to the standard deviation between the countries by year (resp. the standard deviation of the MPL series over time and by country).

An additional point concerns the model specification. Specifically, data availability entails an awkward trade-off between the coverage of the model and its performance. Indeed, we would want to provide MPL-based misalignments for the highest number of countries —and periods—, but this broad coverage may lead to the exclusion of some variables for which data is not available, affecting the performance of the model.

$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $				Table	94: Estin	lation of	the differ	ent speci	Incations				
		(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(3.4)	(3.5)	(3.6)	(3.7)	(3.8)	(3.9)	(3.10)	(3.11)	(3.12)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		0.245^{***}	0.280^{***}	0.280^{***}	0.276^{***}	0.284^{***}	0.191^{***}	0.143^{***}	0.140^{***}	0.101^{***}	0.112^{***}	0.123^{***}	0.077***
	I.Relative GDF FC (BS)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.00)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	I Mot four me sector	-1.871	-1.626	-1.505	-1.427	-0.815	0.339	-0.139	-0.215	0.802	1.474^{*}	-0.701^{*}	-0.352
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	TINEL DEBUG ASSESS	(1.302)	(1.268)	(1.393)	(1.370)	(1.171)	(0.797)	(0.989)	(0.960)	(0.755)	(0.756)	(0.361)	(0.324)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1 Towns of tundo	0.308^{***}	0.287^{***}	0.273^{***}	0.267^{***}	0.199^{***}	0.193^{***}	0.213^{***}	0.199^{***}	0.197^{***}	0.240^{***}	0.251^{***}	0.212^{***}
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	I. LETHIS OF FLAGE	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.045)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		-0.059***	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.049^{***}	-0.054^{***}	-0.009	-0.029^{***}	-0.024^{***}	-0.059***	-0.094***	-0.086***	-0.052^{***}
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1.Openness	(0.009)	(0.00)	(0.009)	(0.00)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.00)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			0.003	0.001	0.0214^{*}	0.034^{***}	0.079^{***}	0.086^{***}	0.110^{***}	0.114^{***}	0.105^{***}	0.106^{***}	0.084^{***}
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Distance		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.00)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	I Turn out a Durn out a unit		0.118^{***}	0.120^{***}	0.120^{***}	0.086^{***}	0.079^{***}	0.072^{***}	0.074^{***}	0.073^{***}	0.095^{***}	0.042^{***}	0.003
	1.1mports-Exports ratio		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	I Outsuit son			0.768^{***}	0.779^{***}	0.785^{***}	0.785^{***}	0.791^{***}	0.816^{***}	0.854^{***}	0.820^{***}	0.817^{***}	1.010^{***}
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	1.Output gap			(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.115)	(0.137)	(0.154)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Donulation amounth				-2.323***	-0.214	4.536^{***}	3.734^{***}	3.683^{***}	2.260^{***}	2.187^{***}	2.162^{***}	2.326^{***}
	r opulation growth				(0.353)	(0.395)	(0.606)	(0.625)	(0.620)	(0.638)	(0.737)	(0.789)	(0.731)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	1 Oil souts					-0.990***	-0.492^{***}	-0.507***	-0.521^{***}	-0.411^{***}	-0.469^{***}	-0.482***	-0.364^{***}
3 033** 2 813** 2 845** 1 896** 1 111** 1 430*** 1 Capital-Labor ratio (.014.1) (.014.1) (.0150) (.0157) (.0167) <td< td=""><td>STILL TOTAL</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>(0.072)</td><td>(0.058)</td><td>(0.060)</td><td>(0.059)</td><td>(0.063)</td><td>(0.077)</td><td>(0.097)</td><td>(0.092)</td></td<>	STILL TOTAL					(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.092)
(0.132) (0.144) (0.157) (0.157) (0.167) (0.167) 1Captial-Labor ratio 1.24min 0.059 0.595***********************************	Am Donordonan Batio						3.033^{***}	2.818^{***}	2.847^{***}	2.445^{***}	1.896^{***}	1.711^{***}	1.430^{***}
$ \begin{array}{l clllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	Age Dependency Daulo						(0.132)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.167)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	l Canital-Lahor ratio							0.595^{***}	0.577^{***}	1.083^{***}	1.278^{***}	1.251^{***}	1.244^{***}
	1.Capitai-Laboi 1auo							(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.093)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	I Condit way								-6.479***	-7.332***	-3.629	-6.228^{**}	3.796
	I.CIENT Bap								(2.458)	(2.582)	(2.781)	(2.900)	(3.647)
$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Socio-nolitical context									0.015^{***}	0.023^{***}	0.026^{***}	0.016^{***}
$ \begin{array}{l lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$										(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
$\label{eq:label} I.Tariffs & (0.107) & (0.129) & (0.145) & (0.161) & (0.6145) & (0.161) & (0.6145) & (0.161) & (0.615) & (0.161) & (0.$	Real interest rate										-0.223**	-0.567***	-0.410***
$\label{eq:linearity} \begin{tabular}{lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$											(0.107)	(0.129)	(0.145)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1.Tariffs											100.0	170.0
$\label{eq:1.1} \mbox{I.Health expenditure} $$ 1.619 $$ -0.129 $$ -0.290 $$ -0.394 $$ -0.746 $$ -1.392 $$ -1.619 $$ -1.619 $$ -1.699 $$ -1.699 $$ -1.699 $$ -1.699 $$ -1.600 $$ -0.136 $$ -0.129 $$ -0.290 $$ -0.303 $$ (0.083) $$ (0.083) $$ (0.144) $$ (0.119) $$ (0.125) $$ (0.183) $$ (0.245) $$ (0.263) $$ (0.263) $$ 0.0031 $$ (0.093) $$ (0.094) $$ (0.088) $$ (0.083) $$ (0.144) $$ (0.119) $$ (0.125) $$ (0.183) $$ (0.245) $$ (0.263) $$ (0.263) $$ 0.263 $$ 0.210 $$ 0.247 $$ 0.333 $$ 0.291 $$ 0.333 $$ 0.291 $$ 0.333 $$ 0.291 $$ 0.333 $$ 0.291 $$ 0.331 $$ 0.511 $$ 0.511 $$ 0.530 $$ 0.520 $$ 0.560 $$ 0.561 $$ 0.204/113 $$ 0.291 $$ 0.291 $$ 0.201 $$ 0.$												(0.113)	(0.169) 0.000****
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	l Health expenditure												608.7
$ \begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$													(0.448)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		-0.112^{***}	-0.136	-0.129	-0.290^{***}	-0.394^{***}	-0.746^{***}	-1.392^{***}	-1.619^{***}	-2.161^{***}	-1.999^{***}	-1.660***	-2.295^{***}
$ \begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	CONStant	(0.042)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.183)	(0.245)	(0.263)
R-squared 0.449 0.478 0.492 0.497 0.531 0.614 0.625 0.613 0.666 0.707 0.705 Root Mean Squared Error 0.303 0.295 0.291 0.290 0.281 0.255 0.255 0.256 0.238 0.203 0.207	Observations / Countries	3835/162	3835/162	3834/162	3833/162	3830/162	3795/160	3740/156	3470/154	3197/139	2624/115	2024/113	1629/113
Root Mean Squared Error 0.303 0.295 0.291 0.290 0.281 0.255 0.252 0.256 0.251 0.238 0.223 0.207	R-squared	0.449	0.478	0.492	0.497	0.531	0.614	0.625	0.613	0.630	0.666	0.707	0.705
	Root Mean Squared Error	0.303	0.295	0.291	0.290	0.281	0.255	0.252	0.256	0.251	0.238	0.223	0.207

time fixed effects. We rely on averaged data over the different weighting schemes for variables defined in relative terms.

To address this trade-off, we start by estimating a first specification with only the four primary determinants of multilateral price levels, and progressively extend the set of explanatory variables by including other regressors based on their coverage.²⁷ As shown in Table 4, the R-squared ranges from 0.449 for the more parsimonious model (column 3.1) to 0.705 for the full model (column 3.12). As the models are based on different coverages, they cannot be fully compared, but the specification in column (3.7) is probably the best since it covers a large number of countries without losing too much performance compared to the full model (column 3.12). Indeed, as previously mentioned, our goal is not to select the best model in the absolute, but to find the specification that allows us to achieve the best possible trade-off between country coverage and model performance. Therefore, we consider two specifications for the estimation of currency misalignments: model in column (3.7) —the baseline— and model in column (3.12) —the full model.

3.2.2 Nonlinearities

Another influencing factor in modeling multilateral price levels is that different forms of nonlinearity can be at stake. For example, some studies have documented the existence of a nonlinear relationship between relative price levels and relative GDP per capita in PPP terms (Hassan, 2016; Cheung et al., 2017). Similarly, as suggested before, the effect of the NFA position on relative price levels can also depend on its evolution. An increase in external position will appreciate the real exchange rate in a first phase, but the trend can reverse beyond some accumulated foreign assets threshold. Indeed, countries accumulating positive NFA/GDP ratios will tend to consume relatively less, implying lower domestic inflation and thus weaker domestic price level relative to foreign prices.

We explicitly and sequentially address the stability of the relationship between relative price levels and (i) relative GDP per capita and (ii) NFA, accounting for the possibility of nonlinearities. First, we assess the nonlinearity in the price-income relationship by adding the squared relative GDP per capita to the specification. We then introduce an interaction term between a dummy variable —scoring 0 if NFA is negative and 1 otherwise— and the NFA position. The results including these nonlinear terms are reported respectively in column (4.6) and column (4.7) of Table 5. As expected, the goodness-of-fit of the model integrating these nonlinearities is higher —although marginally— than that of the baseline model— column (4.1).

Second, as countries are not at the same stage of economic development, they are heterogeneous in their price levels. As shown in Figure 2, the advanced economies (AEs) exhibit higher multilateral price levels compared to the other countries. We, therefore, pay par-

²⁷To mitigate endogeneity, if any, some variables are lagged. See Table 7 in Appendix B.

ticular attention to country heterogeneity, which, if not addressed, can generate a bias in cross-country estimates. Concretely, the preponderance of developing countries (DCs) and emerging economies (EMEs) in our sample (respectively 45.4% and 33.9% of the observations) tends to pull down the cross-sectional mean of multilateral price levels. Within the OLS framework, this characteristic may subsequently lead to important departures from the cross-sectional mean for the AEs group. As a consequence, the fitted values of multilateral price levels for those countries would be biased downward, giving rise to an upward bias in misalignments. To account for the differences in the intercept, a possible approach would be to include dummy variables —based on the stage of economic development. However, such a solution would amount to include fixed effects in the estimation.

A more satisfactory alternative is to estimate quantile regressions by decomposing multilateral price levels into ranked quantiles. The idea here is to allow the effects of the regressors to vary along with the price level distribution. Figure 12 reports the quantile regressions coefficients estimated for each variable and, for comparison, the estimated coefficients from the pooled OLS model. For most regressors, the magnitude and statistical significance of coefficients differ significantly along with the distribution of the dependent variable. We thus perform interquantile regressions and compare the overall fit of the model with that from a pooled OLS estimation. The results reported in Table 5 show that the pooled OLS estimation outperforms the interquantile regressions regarding the goodness-of-fit. As a final check, we investigate in columns (4.8) to (4.10) whether estimations based on subsamples accounting for the stage of development lead to a better fit. While this is the case for the AEs group, the goodness-of-fit for the DCs is dramatically reduced. For the sake of consistency, we retain the specification and procedure in column (4.7) of Table 5 as our baseline model.²⁸

²⁸Addressing also the issue of parameters' changes over time, we again found that the pooled OLS method performs better (see Couharde et al., 2020b).



Figure 12 — Quantile regression coefficients

Notes: The x-axis indicates the quantiles of the MPL series. The solid green line represents the quantile regression coefficients and the shaded area the associated 95% confidence interval. The horizontal dashed red lines correspond to the OLS estimates over the full sample (the 95% confidence interval is materialized by the thin dashed lines).

	Tabl	e 5: Compa	arison of di	fferent esti	mation pro	ocedures,	baseline	model		
	Full		Interqu	iantile		Full	Full	ČĹ	EME	A 15.2
	sample	1 st quartile	2^{nd} quartile	3^{rd} quartile	4^{th} quartile	sample	sample	DCs	EMIES	ADS
	(4.1)	(4.2)	(4.3)	(4.4)	(4.5)	(4.6)	(4.7)	(4.8)	(4.9)	(4.10)
	0.143^{***}	-3,00E-04	0.008	0.013^{**}	0.072^{***}	0.326^{***}	0.343^{***}	0.209^{***}	0.341^{***}	0.564^{***}
"WEIGHING CDL LO (DO)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.037)
I NI-4 for the second second	-0.139	0.783^{**}	-0.295	-0.272*	0.522	-0.556	1.632^{***}	2.172^{***}	1.713	-0.086
LINET IOTEIGN ASSETS	(0.989)	(0.384)	(0.391)	(0.145)	(0.649)	(1.067)	(0.548)	(0.346)	(2.460)	(0.591)
	0.213^{***}	0.130^{***}	0.020^{*}	-0.034^{**}	0.123^{***}	0.192^{***}	0.193^{***}	0.183^{***}	0.216^{***}	0.226^{***}
(. Lerms of trade	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.032)
	-0.029^{***}	0.053^{***}	-0.004	-0.003	-0.051^{***}	-0.026^{***}	-0.014*	-0.010	-0.007	-0.093^{***}
U.Openness	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.008)
	0.086^{***}	-0.076***	-0.002	0.018^{***}	0.048^{***}	0.055^{***}	0.064^{***}	0.079***	0.111^{***}	0.016
Distance	(0.00)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.00)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.011)
I Instante Durante actio	0.072^{***}	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.010	0.047^{***}	0.051^{***}	0.041^{***}	0.140^{***}	-0.236^{***}
UIIIIDOLIS-EXPOLIS LAUIO	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.032)
	0.791^{***}	0.404^{***}	0.157^{***}	0.069	0.558^{***}	0.799^{***}	0.806^{***}	0.641^{***}	0.995^{***}	1.003^{***}
L.Output gap	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.142)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.117)	(0.127)	(0.162)
	3.734^{***}	5.839^{***}	0.012	0.622^{***}	0.710	2.055^{***}	1.693^{***}	1.810^{***}	-1.418^{*}	1.255
r opulation growin	(0.625)	(0.972)	(0.255)	(0.199)	(0.680)	(0.622)	(0.586)	(0.605)	(0.741)	(1.044)
1 0:1	-0.507^{***}	-0.176^{**}	0.017	-0.094^{***}	-0.311^{***}	-0.595^{***}	-0.570^{***}	-0.368***	-0.676***	-0.257
1.011 Fellus	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.106)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.152)	(0.376)
	2.818^{***}	1.615^{***}	0.245^{***}	0.545^{***}	1.055^{***}	2.618^{***}	2.425^{***}	3.117^{***}	0.777^{***}	0.761^{***}
Age Dependency Katio	(0.141)	(0.267)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.109)	(0.140)	(0.126)	(0.247)	(0.159)	(0.137)
/ Conital Labor notio	0.595^{***}	0.494^{***}	0.012	0.035	0.174^{**}	0.022	0.092	-0.284^{***}	0.386^{***}	-0.244^{***}
Capital-Labor ratio	(0.070)	(0.123)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.091)	(0.138)	(0.076)
I Sammed Balation CDB DC (BS3)						0.064^{***}	0.070^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.003	-0.142^{***}
(zea) o I Iao anna ann ann ann a'						(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.050)
l Nat foreign assats*Dum⊃0							-7.032***	-3.849***	-0.572	-0.062
							(1.360)	(0.504)	(9.761)	(1.454)
Constant	-1.392^{***}	-0.608***	-0.461^{***}	-0.442^{***}	-0.355^{***}	-0.555***	-0.678***	-0.463^{**}	-1.481^{***}	0.211
	(0.114)	(0.199)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.225)	(0.194)	(0.130)
Observations	3740/156	842/76	1017/99	888/96	993/65	3740/156	3740/156	1699/74	1267/53	774/29
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.625	0.336	0.099	0.135	0.385	0.651	0.660	0.428	0.622	0.691
Root Mean Squared Error	0.252	0.158	0.074	0.077	0.150	0.243	0.240	0.234	0.200	0.113
Notes: Robust standard errors ar	re reported	in parentheses	. *, **, and **	* denote signi	ificance at the	10%, 5% aı	nd 1% confid	lence level,	respectively.	' <i>l</i> ." stands for the lag
operator. All the models include	time fixed	effects. We rel	y on averaged	data over the	different wei	ghting scher	nes for varia	ables defined	d in relative te	erms. AEs: advanced
economies; DCs: developing cour	ntries; EME	s: emerging co	ountries.							

3.2.3 Final estimates

Table 6 presents the final estimates for our baseline and full models over the different trade-weighting schemes. These estimates cover the same, 1990-2018 period, but a reduced number of countries compared to the MPL sample (156 against 178 countries).

The regression analysis shows that both models perform well, the R-squared ranging between 0.653 and 0.743. Most of the variables are significant even if, for some of them, their effect has been altered by the "adjustments" we made and the controls we included —compared to the BMA analysis. This is especially the case for the credit gap.

The regression largely confirms our expectations. A larger relative income is associated with a higher relative price level, although the effect is decreasing with the stage of economic development.²⁹ The nonlinearity in the NFA-*MPL* relationship is also confirmed. Relative terms of trade display a positive sign, suggesting that their improvement is associated with an increase in the countries' relative price levels. Lowered market competition and higher trade costs explain the positive and significant coefficients associated with the variables *trade tariffs* and *Distance*.

An increase in the *Imports-Exports ratio* is, according to the baseline model, associated with higher price levels. However, this effect no longer holds when the full model, which includes fewer observations on emerging and developing countries, is considered. The estimated coefficient becomes, indeed, significantly negative. This result can be explained as follows: if each country transforms imported inputs into final goods by adding nontraded inputs, a higher coverage trade ratio should lead to lower relative price levels in advanced economies and higher relative price levels in emerging and developing countries. Our empirical findings confirm this pattern. As shown by columns (4.8) to (4.10) of Table 5, the positive relationship between the relative trade coverage ratio and relative price levels is overturned for the sample of advanced economies.

The negative coefficient for *oil rents* is consistent with the "resource curse" phenomenon according to which the abundance of natural resources, instead of increasing standards of living, usually leads to non-competitive exchange rates that strangled the development of tradable non-natural resource sectors.

The demographic variables are positively correlated with multilateral price levels, as well as the *output gap*, *health expenditures*, and the *socio-political context*. The Kravis-Lipsey-Bhagwati effect is also confirmed by the positive and significant coefficients associated with the *Capital-Labor ratio*. Finally, the differential in *real interest rates* is negatively signed, suggesting that an interest rate differential in favor of the home country should decrease its

²⁹Further note that, on average, 70% of model performance is attributable to the BS effect proxy.

	Weig	hts f1	Weigh	nts bar	Weigh	ts TV
	(5.1)	(5.2)	(5.3)	(5.4)	(5.5)	(5.6)
l Polotivo CDP PC (PS)	0.320***	0.230***	0.385^{***}	0.275^{***}	0.309***	0.235***
I.Relative GDF FC (D5)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Several Polation CDD DC (DC2)	0.067^{***}	0.065^{***}	0.079^{***}	0.075^{***}	0.057^{***}	0.064^{***}
1.Squared Relative GDF FC (BS2)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)
1 Not forming a sector	1.476^{**}	2.122	1.570^{***}	3.101^{*}	1.696^{***}	2.545
I.Net loreign assets	(0.604)	(1.562)	(0.576)	(1.590)	(0.534)	(1.573)
	-6.740^{***}	-4.231^{**}	-7.021^{***}	-5.315^{***}	-6.719^{***}	-4.543^{**}
1.Net foreign assets Dum>0	(1.363)	(1.792)	(1.346)	(1.806)	(1.312)	(1.816)
	0.196^{***}	0.184^{***}	0.198^{***}	0.195^{***}	0.187^{***}	0.175^{***}
1. Terms of trade	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.044)
	-0.019**	-0.044^{***}	-0.010	-0.028**	-0.015^{*}	-0.042***
1.Openness	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.014)
	0.070***	0.068^{***}	0.047^{***}	0.056^{***}	0.069***	0.066***
Distance	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)
	0.054^{***}	-0.033**	0.046^{***}	-0.040***	0.059^{***}	-0.022*
1.1mports-Exports ratio	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.013)
	0.800***	1.036^{***}	0.805^{***}	1.015^{***}	0.812^{***}	1.024^{***}
I.Output gap	(0.091)	(0.142)	(0.094)	(0.148)	(0.094)	(0.149)
Develotion month	1.636^{***}	0.415	1.346^{**}	0.230	2.321^{***}	0.672
Population growth	(0.571)	(0.674)	(0.591)	(0.695)	(0.589)	(0.685)
	-0.565^{***}	-0.573^{***}	-0.577^{***}	-0.560***	-0.565***	-0.561^{***}
I.Oli rents	(0.063)	(0.109)	(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.064)	(0.108)
And Dan and Inn and Datis	2.454^{***}	1.326^{***}	2.281^{***}	1.375^{***}	2.613^{***}	1.346^{***}
Age Dependency Ratio	(0.124)	(0.164)	(0.122)	(0.167)	(0.131)	(0.171)
	0.153^{**}	0.763^{***}	-0.042	0.537^{***}	0.190^{***}	0.714^{***}
I.Capital-Labor ratio	(0.064)	(0.092)	(0.065)	(0.094)	(0.067)	(0.091)
		4.151		3.965		5.477
I.Credit gap		(3.559)		(3.588)		(3.616)
		0.024^{***}		0.025^{***}		0.026^{***}
Socio-political context		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)
		-0.525^{***}		-0.582^{***}		-0.560***
Real interest rate		(0.132)		(0.133)		(0.139)
1		0.465^{***}		0.346^{**}		0.399^{**}
1. Tariffs		(0.151)		(0.158)		(0.160)
1 77 1/1 1.		2.390^{***}		2.605^{***}		2.455^{***}
i.neaith expenditure		(0.460)		(0.455)		(0.486)
Constant	-0.748^{***}	-1.378^{***}	-0.400***	-0.914^{***}	-0.855***	-1.260^{***}
Constant	(0.110)	(0.254)	(0.111)	(0.262)	(0.114)	(0.264)
Observations	3740/156	1629/113	3740/156	1629/113	3740/156	1629/113
R-squared	0.653	0.734	0.675	0.743	0.662	0.730
Root Mean Squared Error	0.238	0.194	0.293	0.197	0.247	0.199

Table 6: Assessing currency misalignments: baseline and full models (pooled OLS)

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. "I." stands for the lag operator. All the models include time fixed effects. "f1": fixed weights 2008-2012; "bar": fixed weights 1973-2016; "TV": time-varying weights (5-year averages).

relative price level.

3.3 Price levels-based misalignments

As discussed above, switching from the baseline model to the full specification entails a loss of 2111 observations due to the different data coverage. Since these two models display relative strengths and weaknesses (comprehensiveness vs. higher goodness-of-fit), it is not very meaningful to select one specification instead of the other one.³⁰ We, therefore, average estimates of currency misalignments³¹ over the two models to take advantage of their relative strengths and weaknesses, and to incorporate the uncertainty associated with the model selection process. However, this requires that the two models yield very close estimates for these means to be meaningful. As shown in Figures C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix, this condition is met for all the weighting schemes as well as the averaged misalignments —over all the weighting schemes.

Finally, we map the world distribution of currency misalignments in Figure 13, which reports the average misalignments for the considered countries in 2018. The red (blue) color in the map below shows countries with undervalued (overvalued) currencies in real terms. The darker the red (the blue), the higher are real undervaluations (overvaluations).

Figure 13 shows that the economies with the highest misalignments in 2018 were mainly located in Africa, Asia (excluding, in particular, China), the Middle East, and the Pacific region. The most striking observation is the important heterogeneity that prevailed across African countries. Indeed, while Northern African countries exhibited undervaluations —often large as in Algeria and Egypt— sub-Saharan countries mostly presented sizeable overvaluations. Notwithstanding Zimbabwe, that topped the list with an overvaluation of around 81%, countries like Angola, Central African Republic, Congo D.R., Guinea-Bissau, and Kenya displayed overvaluations higher than 40%. As a consequence, few African countries (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia) were characterized by real exchange rates close to their equilibrium level, with misalignments falling within the -/+5% interval. In contrast, Asia and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe and the Middle East were more homogeneous areas with a high concentration of countries exhibiting the largest undervaluations (India, Japan, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand). In Asia, only in China,

 $^{^{30}}$ Recall that the misalignments are obtained as the difference between the observed relative price levels and their equilibrium value. To deal with model uncertainty and for robustness purposes, two equilibrium values are calculated, derived from the two models selected after BMA —i.e., models reported in columns (3.7) and (3.12) in Table 4. The variables considered to calculate the equilibrium values and, thus, the misalignments are those reported in columns (3.7) and (3.12). Two series of misalignments are then computed, and are finally averaged to obtain the reported misalignments as explained further.

³¹Recall that the equilibrium exchange rate is given by the fitted value of the dependent variable. Currency misalignments are then deduced as the difference between the multilateral price level and its fitted value. A positive (resp. negative) misalignment value indicates an overvaluation (resp. undervaluation) of the currency.



Figure 13 — Global distribution of price-based currency misalignments in 2018 Note: The map is based on the average MPL-based currency misalignments over the different weighting schemes.

Korea, and Turkmenistan, real exchange rates could be considered at their equilibrium level while Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, and Lao displayed overvaluations.

Outside of these areas, currency misalignments were less pronounced. In the Western hemisphere, only Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras were displaying significant overvaluations. In contrast, the estimated undervaluations found in Canada and the United States were marginal, reaching respectively -6% and -8%. In the majority of European countries, real exchange rates were also slightly undervalued, except the Norwegian krone which was highly overvalued.

Figure 13 also shows that measures of multilateral price levels (reported in Figure 3) differed markedly from currency misalignments for most countries in 2018, suggesting that they could lead to misleading conclusions when comparing price-competitiveness across economies. For example, countries in North America and in Western Europe displayed undervalued real exchange rates in 2018 while their price levels were higher than those of their trading partners. Higher prices in those countries were, therefore, primarily explained by structural factors, and could not be considered as reflecting large price-competitiveness disadvantages. The difference was less pronounced for Australia and Northern European countries. In West African countries, despite lower relative price levels, real exchange rates were highly

overvalued, suggesting huge price-competitiveness disadvantages. In contrast, real undervaluations in Eastern Asian countries were stronger, compared to their price advantages depicted by their relative price levels.

4 Conclusion

This paper describes the conceptual framework and the methodology underlying the new MULTIPRIL database on Multilateral Price Levels (MPL) developed by the CEPII. It also provides detailed results for patterns in relative price levels and MPL-based misalignments, together with their analysis. MULTIPRIL usefully complements the information provided by the EQCHANGE database regarding equilibrium exchange rates and currency misalignments. MULTIPRIL is also designed to give an accurate picture of the differences in relative price levels around the world, which requires constructing multilateral instead of bilateral relative price level series. Our multilateral approach represents, therefore, a major step forward from the usual bilateral framework.

MPL measures cover 178 countries and are computed vis-à-vis two baskets of trading partners: (i) 177 trading partners, and (ii) the top 30 trading partners. The series span the 1990-2018 period, and rely on the three weighting schemes —consistent with the trading partners basket— included in EQCHANGE: (i) two fixed weighting schemes based on the average trade flows over the 2008-2012 and 1973-2016 periods; and (ii) a time-varying one based on average trade flows over 5-year non-overlapping windows.

Depictions of relative price levels and movements based on our multilateral measures bring new insights as they often contrast with those based on bilateral price levels vis-à-vis the US. However, the cross-country dispersion of relative price levels reproduces some empirical regularities already highlighted within a bilateral framework, such as the Penn effect, as well as its two main theoretical explanations, the Balassa-Samuelson and the Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey effects. We also confirm the relevance of a set of relative price levels' determinants using a Bayesian analysis. Our methodology appears to be particularly suitable as our empirical framework succeeds in capturing much of the cross-sectional variation of the *MPL* series. For the sake of completeness, the *MULTIPRIL* database also includes price-based misalignments for 156 countries over the 1991-2018 period.

By providing consistent data for international economic analyses of systematic patterns in relative price levels and trends, as well as estimates of the world distribution of pricecompetitiveness levels through price-based misalignments, the *MULTIPRIL* database can generate additional studies than those based on real effective exchange rate indexes and bilateral price level measures. Therefore, with the release of this new database, we hope to lay the groundwork for researchers and analysts to improve our understanding of global imbalances, as well as the definition of policy adjustments and structural changes to correct them.

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Appendices

A. MULTIPRIL: access to data

MULTIPRIL is a sub-database of the CEPII's EQCHANGE database. The data are freely available online from the EQCHANGE download page (http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=34) upon registration. Figure A.1 shows the structure of EQCHANGE and how the MULTIPRIL sub-database fits in.



Figure A.1 — Structure of EQCHANGE

Notes: Fixed weights based on the 2008-2012 (resp. 1973-2016) period are referred as "weights f1" (resp." weights bar"). Similarly, time-varying weights are referred as "weights TV". The considered periods are: 1973-1979; 1980-1984; 1985-1989; 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004; 2005-2009; 2010-2016. AEs: advanced economies; EMEs: emerging economies; DCs: developing countries.

B. Data

Table 7: Data: definitions and sources	
Variables	Sources
Relative price to the US : corresponds to the price level ratio of PPP conversion factor	WDI
(GDP) to market exchange rate.	
Fundamentals	
The Balassa-Samuelson effect proxy (relative): measured as the country GDP per	
capita in PPP terms relative to that of its trading partners —geometric— average. Data	EQCHANGE
on GDP per capita in PPP terms are from the WDI database.	-
The net foreign asset position: measured as the sum of the foreign assets (held by	Lane &
monetary authorities) and the deposit money banks minus the foreign liabilities (%GDP).	Milesi-Ferretti ^a
Terms of trade (relative): percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the	UNCTAD
import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000.	
Trade openness (relative): sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured	WDI
(%GDP).	
Other determinants	
Age Dependency Ratio (old age: relative): correspondents the ratio of older depen	
dents people older than 64 to the working are population these area 15.64	WDI
Broad monoy (M3: %CDP relative)	WDI
Capital Labor ratio (relative): measured as the capital stock per employee	PWT 9.0
Credit gap (relative) : measured as the cyclical component (HP filter) of the domestic	1 1 1 0.0
credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP). The data on the domestic credit are from	Authors
the WDI database.	114011010
Distance (relative) — The <i>distw</i> measure (<i>GeoDist</i> database): distance between two	
countries based on bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two countries; the	CEPII
inter-city distances are weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population.	
Expected GDP growth (relative) : GDP growth forecasts 2 years ahead.	WEO
Government spending (relative): general government final consumption expenditure	WEO
($\%$ of GDP).	
Health expenditure (relative): domestic general government health expenditure per	WDI
capita (%GDP).	
Imports-Exports ratio (relative): Imports-Exports ratio of goods and services (% of	WDI
GDP).	
Island: dummy variable scoring 1 if the country is an island, 0 otherwise.	Authors
Landlock: dummy variable scoring 1 if the country is landlocked, 0 otherwise.	Authors
Natural resource rents (relative): measured as the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents,	WDI
coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents (%GDP).	
Net FDI (relative) : net FDI outflows (%GDP).	WDI

(Continued on next page).

Table 8. Table 0 — Data. definitions and sources (Continuea)	
Variables	Sources
Oil rents (relative): measured as the difference between the value of crude oil production	WDI
at world prices and total costs of production (%GDP).	WDI
Output gap (relative): measured as the cyclical component (HP filter) of the GDP;	
expressed as share of potential GDP (permanent component). Data on the GDP are from	Authors
the WDI database.	
Population growth (relative): annual population growth rate.	WDI
Real interest rate (relative): correspond to the lending interest rate adjusted for infla-	
tion (measured by the GDP deflator).	WDI
Socio-political context (relative): measured by the magnitude scores of all societal	Center for
and interstate major episodes of political violence.	Systemic
https://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm	Peace
Tariffs (relative): average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product import	WDI
shares corresponding to each partner country.	WDI
Note: "relative" indicates that the variable is considered in relative terms, i.e., relative to its tr	ading partners
geometric average. The weights used are from the $EQCHANGE$ database (CEPII).	
WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank)	

Table 8: Table 6 — Data: definitions and sources (*Continued*)

WEO: World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund) a: updated using information provided by the IMF (International Financial Statistics and WEO)

Advanced	Emergir	ß		De	veloping	
Australia	Albania	Latvia	$Afghanistan^*$	Fiji*	Montenegro*	Trinidad &Tobago*
Austria	Algeria	Lebanon	Angola	Gabon	Mozambique	${ m Turkmenistan}$
Belgium	Argentina	Lithuania	Antigua & Barbuda	Gambia	Namibia	United Arab Emirates
Canada	Armenia	Macedonia	Azerbaijan	Ghana	Nepal	Uganda
Cyprus	Aruba	Malaysia	$\operatorname{Bahamas}^*$	Grenada	Nicaragua	${ m Uzbekistan}^*$
Denmark	Belarus	Mexico	$\operatorname{Bahrain}$	Guinea	Niger	Vanuatu*
Finland	$\operatorname{Bermuda}^*$	Morocco	Bangladesh	Guinea Bissau	Nigeria	Yemen^*
France	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Pakistan	Barbados	$Guyana^*$	Oman	\mathbf{Zambia}
Germany	Brazil	Panama	Belize	Haiti	Palau*	$\mathbf{Zimbabwe}$
Greece	Bulgaria	Peru	Benin	Honduras	Papua New Guinea*	
Hong Kong	Chile	Philippines	Bhutan	Iran	Paraguay	
Iceland	China	Poland	Bolivia	Iraq	Qatar	
Ireland	Colombia	Romania	Botswana	${ m Kenya}$	Rwanda	
Israel	Costa Rica	Russia	Brunei Darussalam	$Kiribati^*$	$Samoa^*$	
Italy	Croatia	Serbia	Burkina Faso	Kuwait	Sao Tome & Principe [*]	
Japan	Czech Rep	Slovakia	Burundi	Kyrgyz Rep.	Saudi Arabia	
Luxembourg	Dominican Rep.	South Africa	Cabo Verde	Lao PDR	Senegal	
Malta	Ecuador	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Lesotho	Seychelles	
Netherlands	Egypt	Thailand	Cameroon	Liberia	Sierra Leone	
New Zealand	El Salvador	Tunisia	Central African Rep.	$Libya^*$	Solomon Islands [*]	
Norway	Georgia	Turkey	Chad	Madagascar	St. Kitts and Nevis [*]	
Portugal	Guatemala	Ukraine	Comoros	Malawi	St. Lucia	
Singapore	Hungary	Uruguay	Congo	Maldives	Sudan	
Slovenia	India	Venezuela R.B.	Congo DR	Mali	Suriname*	
Spain	Indonesia	Vietnam	Côte d'Ivoire	Marshall Islands [*]	Swaziland	
Sweden	Jamaica		$Dominica^*$	Mauritania	Tajikistan	
Switzerland	Jordan		Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Tanzania	
United Kingdom	${f Kazakhstan}$		Estonia	Moldova Rep.*	Togo	
United States	Korea		Ethiopia	Mongolia	$Tonga^*$	

C. Figures



Figure C.1 — Distributions of the estimated currency misalignments Note: The plots correspond to the kernel distributions. The common sample consists of observations included in the full model.



Figure C.2 — Distribution of the average MPL-based misalignments

Notes: The average MPL-based misalignments correspond to the average of the misalignments over all the different weighting schemes. In the left chart, the bars correspond to the range of the estimate (i.e. Min-Max) and red dots indicate the average by year over all the countries. The y-axis in the right chart indicates the percentage of observations.