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**Sub-theme 27: «Hybridity and Beyond: Exploring Alternative Organizational Approaches
for Addressing Social Issues»**

Convenors: Marya Besharov, Tommaso Ramus, Francesco Rullani

**Identifying elastic hybridity through a multilevel perspective of institutional complexity:
Case study of a French prison.**

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Abstract:

Driven by external constraints and internal requirements, the prison institution is an ever-changing environment. Prisons are subject to a pendulum effect of public policy, with grey areas around the application of best practices. To theorize the alternance between various institutional requirements, we will use the institutional logics perspective and question the recent concept of elastic hybridity.

Drawing on the hybrid exploratory approach, we have performed a case study of a French prison in order to understand the beliefs, discourses and practices of the penitentiary field. First, we identified four institutional logics (protection, reintegration, legal bureaucratic, and performance), characterize the field and the organization to explain antecedents of oscillation. Therefore, we analysed the concept of complexity via multi-level characteristics: the degree of conflict intensity, the degree of attention to conflict, and the degree of means' availability. Then, we identified consequences of this balancing act with greater precision through illustration of creation spaces. We illustrate how temporary organizational arrangements can shape and influence institutions through the creation of spaces for interpretation and negotiation.

Therefore, our research contributes to deepening scientific knowledge in the management of societal institutions and its constant adaptation to societal challenges. The study of organizational practices resulting from the management of elastic hybridity in the penitentiary field also brings empirical contributions to institutional theory.

Keywords: elastic hybridity, institutional complexity, institutional logics perspective, prison

Introduction

Prisons, previously considered closed, mysterious, and unknown institutions, have become significantly more open to the outside world since the beginning of the 21st century. As a guarantor of the protection of society and reintegration of detainees, prisons must respond to major societal challenges that often seem contradictory. According to Mbanzoulou (2014), Director of Research of the National School of the Penitentiary Administration, French prisons have been subject to major reforms. Driven by external constraints and internal requirements, the institution must continually redefine its missions and practices. The French Penitentiary Administration has defined four objectives attempts to satisfy simultaneously: the safety of people and property, of the respect of universal human rights, rational management of institutions, and pursuit of effective sentences (Lascoumes, 2006). Considering these objectives, formulating an institutional consensus based on its ideological definition and its task is challenging. We can also find such spaces in penitentiary policy. Carlier (2009) identifies pendulum policies, where « security » phases alternate with « humanization » phases. This alternance complicates the construction of a unique and durable hybridity in prisons. It seems, then, that the penitentiary institution is based on a fragile institutional balance and depends on flexibility given to actors within the organization in order to integrate multiple beliefs, meanings and discourses.

In this context, refining the definition of institutional complexity proves relevant to understand the implications of elastic hybridity and its consequences on the institution. Moreover, studying the effects of hybridity on the evolution of organizational practices leads us to research the factors that allow this temporary institutional balance. Here, the institution allows each actor to work for his/her own *ideal type* of the sense of sentences despite an enacted framework. Thus, by considering institutional arrangements as temporary, we could explain how certain institutional developments seem scattered and often go unnoticed but are still being witnessed. According to Battilana *et al.* (2017), we question hybridity not as the final state of an organization, but as an action of continuous readjustment of institutional requirements. For that purpose, in a context of institutional complexity, how does elastic hybridity participate in the evolution of the penitentiary institution? In the next section, we will outline the theoretical background of our arguments. Next, we will describe our research method and our findings, then conclude with a discussion about contributions and further research.

Theoretical context

Our research relies on the institutional logic perspective mainly defined by Thornton and Ocasio (1999, 2008, 2012) and based on « *the five core meta-theoretical principles of institutional logics (i) embedded agency, (ii) society as an interinstitutional system, (iii) the material and cultural foundations of institutions, (iv) the historical contingency of institutions, and (v) institutions at multiple levels of analysis* » (2015 : 4). These key elements allow us to explain the institutional tensions and conflicts in society, as well as the organizational responses to address them. Hybridity can be one such response to manage conflicting institutional prescriptions, particularly in the public sector, where we need to mobilize multiple stakeholders' support to address societal problems (Denis *et al.*, 2015; Smith and Besharov, 2019).

Relation between hybridity and complexity

Institutional literature resumes two main approaches to hybridity: a constant vision on the one hand (Skelcher and Smith, 2015), and on the other hand, a more dynamic one vision that considers hybridity a continuous process requiring daily readjustments of logics (Gümüşay *et al.*, 2020). Thus, Lüscher and Lewis (2008: 234) advance, « *Working through' does not imply eliminating or resolving paradox but constructing a more workable certainty that enables change.*». This notion could explain « (...) *hybrid organization's ability to maintain unity in diversity by empowering staff to personally and dynamically engage competing logic, in particular when these are central and incompatible* » (Gümüşay *et al.*, 2020: 6). This implies that instead of mixing logics, i.e., erasing the points of difference to create a new logic, an organization temporarily chooses to highlight the foreseeable differences and decides according to the situation to highlight one of the logics. Ashforth and Reingen (2014: 505) define this « *balancing effect* » as: « (...) *a momentary and expedient resolution of a current manifestation of the duality, in which who wins appears to depend on a tacit reciprocity of turn taking along with environmental demands [...] The upshot is institutionalized ambivalence and dynamic equilibrium with potentially wide swings in behavior over time* ». Thus, after having identified this oscillation effect and understood its construction, it seems interesting to understand why this oscillation forms. What would the antecedents be? This line of reflection leads to our first research question: *Why does elastic hybridity form in the penitentiary field?*

To respond, we must analyse the existing literature on institutional complexity. Indeed, the presence of multiple institutional orders in a society (Friedland and Alford, 1991) creates a diversity of interdependent institutional logics which materialize in an organizational field (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Some logics can be contradictory, and conflicts emerge between « *their respective systems of meaning and normative understandings, built into rituals and practices, [then] provide inconsistent expectations* » hence forming institutional complexity (Greenwood *et al.*, 2017: 321).

According to Raynard (2016), we study institutional complexity by analysing three factors in relation between logics: the degree of incompatibility, the absence of a hierarchy, and the degree of jurisdictional overlap. But what about an organizational field that is subject to more than two institutional logics? Is there a distinct degree of institutional complexity defined for each relationship between logics? Or is the complexity a sum of conflictual interactions? Does the complexity depend only on logic at the institutional level, or is it also related to the organization's contingencies and its environment? In order to respond to the call of Vermeulen *et al.* (2016) we will strive to explain other sources of complexity. This is the reason why we will complete our analysis with other level of characteristics. Indeed, institutional logics emerge in an organizational field and are filtered by various attributes of the organization itself (Greenwood *et al.*, 2011).

Studying these elements can allow us to understand why different conflicts with the same theoretical institutional intensity does not resolve in the same way. Field level and organization level allows actors to have flexibility to respond to institutional complexity. In this way, we integrate the dimensions of the organization field and organization itself into the definition of complexity. This leads to an understanding that the scope of conflicts does not only depend on the institutional definition of the conflict.

Organizational field was defined by DiMaggio and Powel (1983: 148) as the set of relationships that the manager of an organization encounters in the exercise of their activities. It is an intermediate level between organization and society. According to Greenwood *et al.* (2011) the organizational field is defined with three dimensions. The first, fragmentation, « [...] refers to the number of uncoordinated constituents upon which an organization is dependent on legitimacy or material resources » (p. 337). The notion of fragmentation makes it possible to identify the range of prescriptions placed on an organization (Pache and Santos, 2010). The next dimension is the formal structuring of the field, which represents the formalization of requirements (p. 337).

Decreased formal structuring of the field increases the discretion of an organization because informally organized pressures may be less intense than those arising from more formalized and better coordinated groups. Finally, the third dimension to consider at the field level is the degree of centralization. More specifically, this concerns the hierarchical power structure of institutional constituents: the more centralized the field, the more unified the environment becomes, with clear and specific organizational rules (Meyer *et al.*, 1987).

Concerning organizational filters, we also refer to the analysis of Greenwood *et al.* (2011). The organization's position within a field, along with its structure, ownership governance, and identity, are crucial organizational characteristics. The centrality of the organization in a field will make the organization more dependent and more exposed to institutional requirements than a peripheral organization. Centrality can also limit relationships with actors in other fields, contrarily to a peripheral organization capable of carrying out important boundary work (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010).

Therefore, through the study of institutional logics, characteristics of the organizational field, and the centrality of the organization, we can explain why an organization oscillates between different logics. Ultimately, this oscillation ends up becoming institutionalized because institutional complexity also appears to be oscillating and disparate, perhaps depending on the intensity and materialization of conflicts at different levels.

Characteristics of elastic hybridity


To go further, we must also question consequences of elastic hybridity on institutions. Alternation is not a natural process for individuals and organizations. That is why spaces are given to actors to appropriate organizational practices according to their logic affiliation. In mobilizing three concepts of institutional literature, we can observe that interpretation given to actors allows them to engage in different conflicts, but it is also a way to engage them more largely in institutional change. Our second research question, then, will ask, *How does the «balancing effect» affect the structure of the penitentiary institution?*

First, hybridity materializes in intergroup conflicts and results in alternating decisions and oscillating actions, which allows each group an opportunity to be supported in the long term (Ashforth *et al.*, 2014).

Next, it is necessary for organizations to accept diversity of discourses and their appropriation by individuals. Indeed, Gümüşay *et al.* (2020) identify two processes called «polysemy» and «polyphony». Both processes reduce intra-organizational and intersubjective conflicts.

« *Polysemy is the judicious use of concepts, words, artifacts or images that support multiple meanings, or logic, and so help reduce conflict between their representatives* » (p. 41). It can be conceptual or based on physical representations. This mechanism supports organizational integrity by accommodating different personal beliefs and hence allows multiple logics to coexist. On the other hand, « *Polyphony, the mechanism behind this multivoicedness, is an individual's judicious use of place, time, and/or languages to enable simultaneously, but separate enactments of competing logics*» (p. 45). It allows organizations to reconcile several discourses, and thus facilitates the combination of multiple institutional requirements simultaneously.

To Nicholls and Huybrechts (2016: 2), the development of «*discourses that extend beyond borders*» promote the voluntary acceptance of multiple interpretations. They encourage inter-organizational relationships because all institutional logics are represented. Smets *et al.* (2012) and McPherson and Sauder (2013) illustrate these processes when diverse groups of professionals became more flexible, adopting other logics to manage daily work. To frame these mechanisms and to avoid the domination of one of the logics, Smith and Besharov (2019) highlight two concepts: « *guardrails* » and « *paradoxical frames* ». Guardrails are «*formal structures, leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships associated with each side of the hybrid*» (p. 27). Guardrails create moments of tension and conflict within groups, which allows decision makers to raise awareness about meanings and practices being overly focused on one logic. Paradoxical frames « *are cognitive understandings of dual elements as contradictory and interdependent* » (p. 26). They allow organizations to review and reinterpret the relationship between opposing elements and enable leaders to move forward rather than trying to permanently resolve tensions. Ramus *et al.* (2017) complete these analyses by identifying two processes which can make hybridity sustainable. These same processes can also apply in the context of elastic hybridity. First, via «*formalized collaboration*», tensions became opportunities for mutual understanding. The creation of negotiation spaces allows the carriers of different logics to discuss and confront each other in a productive way, allowing the organization to survive despite oscillation. Second, they highlight « *collaborative formalization* » as a process by which groups have an interest in working together and develop new rules and procedures over time that have integrated competing logics into mixed practices. These processes can be a temporary way for groups to collaborate on a project or a work situation. Thus, the mechanisms presented can contribute to the evolution of the institution when they influence the decision-making processes; by allowing greater collaboration between the various stakeholders and questioning the original hierarchical structure.

Figure 1. Theoretical framework:

Source: Author.

Methods

Case study

We used a qualitative case study to « capture institutional logics » (Reay and Jones, 2016). This research aims to analyse different uses of logics by a wide panel of actors that is naturally suited to qualitative data and methods that require immersion in the phenomenon. Since our case study focuses on understanding processes in the penitentiary context, access to professionals and their work conditions ensures the credibility of our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).

Our research method is a unique case study conducted in a French prison¹. Built as part of the « 13 000 program »² and implemented in the 1990s, it houses an average of 700 adult men each year and is overlooked by 190 prison guards, insertion and probation staff, along with health professionals, education staff and external visitors.

The prison's size, among the largest in France, allows us to analyse a significant number of interactions between different groups of professionals and within the same groups of professionals.

¹ We refer here to what is called in France a « Maison d'Arrêt » i.e. remand prisoners (persons held in pre-trial detention pending trial or whose sentence is not final) as well as convicted persons whose sentence or the remainder of their sentence does not exceed two years and convicted persons awaiting assignment to an institution for sentences. There are 86 of them on French territory.

² The « 13 000 program » is a final result of massive construction prison policy started in 1986 by A. Chalandon

Also, under the law of 22 June 1987 which lays down the principles of delegated management, certain non-sovereign activities were granted to private groups by contract, such as food preparation, laundry service or building maintenance. Today, this establishment is part of a multi-technical and multi-service market, just like 32 other French establishments³, meaning that minor tasks in the prison are managed by private companies. The involvement of private-sector subcontractors alongside the public management of the prison guarantees the presence of a variety of institutional logics, and their complexity.

This establishment is also interesting thanks to its entrepreneurial capacity, which presupposes a high degree of collaboration among personnel. Indeed, the prison was the first certified within the framework of the European Prison Rules (EPR) (2006) concerning the reception phase of detention. Additionally, to reduce violence in detention against staff and among detainees, a group composed of prison wardens, rehabilitation, health, and education staff are working towards the development of the «RESPECT modul»⁴. These actions, which create spaces for collaboration between professional groups, legitimize our analysis of elastic hybridity and temporary institutional consensus in this prison.

Data collection

Regarding data collection, we used three sources. First was participant observation, performed for a duration of fifteen days with an average of 10 hours of physical presence per day. Our posture during this phase can be defined as « *peripheral participant observation* » (Adler & Adler, 1987). Indeed, a real involvement of the researcher with his field and his subject is necessary in order to access subjective experiences of organizational reality and ongoing negotiations between members and subgroups (Zilber, 2002). Observing both work and social interactions allowed us to analyse work practices and clarify the reasoning behind these practices. We maintained a board journal (BJ) close at hand to keep constant track of our observations. The result was a fifty pages document containing brief diagrams of places and meetings, personal conversations, and a combination of both formal and informal exchanges and feelings. Our second source of data collection was interviews.

³ More largely 58 French establishments out of 185 are under delegated management. Key figures of the French Penitentiary Administration on 1/01/2018

⁴ Respect program is an innovation of Spanish Prison Administration began in 2001 in Leon and initiated in France in 2015. It is a more flexible detention regime for prisoners. The objective is to create a climate of mutual respect through accountability and enable their empowerment in everyday actions.

We did four non-directive interviews with penitentiary personals from outside of organisation. The objective was to clarify the concept of our topic through discussions with key actors of the field. Also, we performed ten semi-directive interviews with organizational staff, to guide the discussion towards more accurate and complete answers. We used snowball sampling to contact them⁵.

Table 1. Data of interviewees

Name	Duration of interviews	Position	Length of service
EXP	1h45	Prison Guard, Inter-regional Secretary of the prison union	20 years
EXP	1h45	Senior official in the Penitentiary Directorate	9 years
EXP	2h00	Probation Director	3 years
EXP	1h30	Compagny site director	15 years
PA	45min	Student prison guard	6 months
PA	1h	Multipurpose prison guard	8 years
PA	1h	Room-check Prison Guard	8 years
PA	1h30	Prison Guard in charge of visitors	34 years
PE	1h10	Building Sector Chief	25 years
PE	1h40	Chief of Reception	13 years
PE	1h05	Instructor	17 years
PDIR	1h20	Chief of establishment	28 years
PDIR	1h10	Vice chief of establishment	20 years
PDIR	1h25	Chief of detention	29 years

Our third source of analysis was secondary data. We collected two distinct categories of documents. The first category was internal and concerned thirteen of our secondary documents, including activity reports, job descriptions, internal procedures, and reports on the “Respect” module. These internal documents provided essential information for our case study that we could not obtain from external sources, due to the security limitations around the organization. The second category of data was external, and we collected twenty-four documents. We used professional literature on prisons, historical documents, legislative texts, and press articles to immerse ourselves in the working conditions of penitentiary personnel.


⁵ To ensure the complete anonymity of respondents while maintaining the interesting nature of their status, respondents will be referred to by homogenous titles differentiating only the hierarchical position.

These three data collection techniques allowed us to develop a holistic view of prison practices and discourses in the field. To analyse and code them we employed Nvivo.

Data analysis

According to Reay and Jones (2016), we used the method of « *pattern matching* », which consists of a comparison of theory and data: « *Social world is constructed and understanding occurs with iterations between prior theories and empirical with current findings* » (p. 443). For this reason, our approach was abductive. Indeed, when our first studies on penitentiary establishments began in 2017, we were not yet in a research process. Our initial observations and our first discussions with prison staff allowed us to better understand the issues surrounding penitentiary administration. Based on these initial thoughts, intuitions, and incipient reflections, we started to review the literature in 2019 in order to find a theoretical framework aiming to explain the contradictions faced by prison guards. We then tested this first conceptual framework in 2019 in our case study. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting health protocols, we could not return to our study site. To remedy this situation and to try to confront this new theoretical framework, we restudied the 2019 data. Our process of conceptualization is summarized in Figure 2.


Figure 2. Process of abductive conceptualization of research.



Source: Author.

We identified three phases in our data analysis. First, the characterization of logics, field and organization aims to highlight the diversity of institutional discourses and their inherent contradictions. Then, by the elaboration of a historical narrative, we can identify the phases of oscillation between logics, and thus the elements framing the diversity of discourses and decisions. Finally, by identifying spaces of creation resulting in collaboration between professional groups, we were able to find out how elastic hybridity modifies institutional structures. We have coded them into thematic analysis units. In this way, we used deducting coding which allowed us to define *a priori* codes from the literature. These are supported by *ex-post* codes from abductive analysis, notably illustrated in the work of Smets *et al.* (2012). At this point, we need to conduct another phase of data collection to reinforce our results for the analysis. Our data structure is summarized in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Data structure



Source: Author.

Main findings and analyses

The first step in our analysis was to characterize institutional logics, field, and organization to demonstrate the multi-level characteristics of institutional complexity. Our results showed that different degrees of conflict treatment entail a double prioritization of requirements, depending on time and situation. As a result, prioritization permits the creation of distinctive spaces that stimulate collaboration and influence institutions.

Table 2. Characterization of institutional logics.

		Reintegration logic	Security logic	Bureaucratic-legal logic	Performance logic
Categorization and classification	<i>Conception of population</i>	Detained person	Prisoner	Person Placed Under Hand of Justice	Public service user
	<i>Conception of prison</i>	Place of amendment and resocialization	Place of protection of persons and society	Place of execution of the penal decision	Regalian public service
	<i>Conception of tasks</i>	Giving meaning to sentence, prevent recidivism	Ensuring health and safety of people	Ensuring the monopoly of legitimate violence	Ensuring public service performance
	<i>Means of action</i>	Listening, discussion, negotiation, empowerment	Confinement, authority, sanction	Memorandum, employment status, regulations	Rationality of means, implementation of objectives, contractualization and externalization
Identity	<i>Distinctive Aspect</i>	The actor guard	The prison warden	Enforcement staff	The agent
Structure of authority	<i>Governance structure</i>	Collective and multidisciplinary	Hierarchical - military	Hierarchical - bureaucratic	Contractual
	<i>Control of Structure</i>	Peer review and labeling process	Administrative and Judiciary jurisdiction	Administrative Jurisdiction	Management control and financial sanctions

Source: Author.

Defining a multi-level complexity through the characterization of institutional logics, field and organization of prison

Characterization of logic's relation: how intense are the conflicts?

To qualify each relationship, we created a matrix with conceptual groupings. This matrix intends to clarify the relationship between orientations of logics rather than quantifying our coding. These orientations are illustrated in Tables 3, 4 and 5 in appendices.

Three groups of institutional relationships appear in the matrix: volatile, aligned, and restrained relations, according to Raynard's definition (2016).

This presupposes different degrees of institutional conflicts depending on the appearance of logics. We can illustrate these different degrees of conflict with examples of verbatims.

Volatile complexity (relation between security and rehabilitation logics): « *Sometimes we had small talks, we had time to look after detainees, had advised them on their detention process. If sometimes we managed to get one of them out of the detention process, it felt good (...) But it's true we tend to miss out on this aspect, we just open the doors, send them to activities because it's the new principle of the administration, but there's too much movement to manage.* » (EXP)

Restrained complexity (relation between security and performance logics): « *The chief of establishment is the guarantor of the good functioning of his establishment and it is remain the case whatever the mode of management, whether it is public management or delegated management, what does not change for the warden director is that he is the guarantor of the good performance of his establishment. It is just an approach change.* » (EXP)


Aligned complexity (relation between rehabilitation and performance logics): « *By empowering and holding responsible detainees with a contract of trust, the relationship between staff and detainees [is] evolving. Consequently, the guard must not be satisfied with simply enforcing the regulations in force in the respect module; he must make the necessary efforts to explain to those concerned the results of the positive initiatives on community life and all their shortcomings.* » (SD: Respect Modul Training)

Nevertheless, we observed that two relationships that have the same theoretical intensity on the institutional level were not necessarily treated or resolved in the same way by the actors. This discrepancy revealed that complexity seems to be defined beyond the institutional level. Admittedly, institutional level seems to be equivalent to the degree of opposition between beliefs and discourses of the logics, but the institutional complexity results mainly from their management. According to our findings, management of institutional conflicts takes shape at the level of the field and the organization depending on contingencies. These elements were previously not covered in the definition of institutional complexity and were instead considered a strategic response to complexity (Vermeulen *et al.*, 2016).

Characterization of the field: what degree of conflict treatment?

We argue that institutional complexity is the result of three analysis levels, especially because the penitentiary field is complex and its actors difficult to satisfy. We identified it as fragmented, centralized, and formalized, according to the characteristics defined by Greenwood *et al.* (2011). First, we noted a strong fragmentation of the organizational field. We have not found any scientific research defining precisely the penitentiary field and its actors. We have therefore developed a brief portrait to illustrate the diversity of the field resulting from the analysis of primary and secondary data, summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Actors of the penitentiary field.



It is worth noting that this field corresponds to a societal institution and is therefore subject to very disparate requirements as many actors try to influence its evolution. Greenwood *et al.* (2011) assume that fragmentation by itself increases the complexity of an organization. They argue that fragmentation results in the presence of uncoordinated actors likely to support disparate sets of institutional prescriptions (Pache and Santos, 2010).

« Initially the penitentiary establishments were not of interest for anyone. Then, step by step, with organizations such as the CGLPL [Controller General for Places of Deprivation of Liberty], state organisms, but also thanks to association such as the OIP [the International Prisons Observatory], the media also ... More people became interested in what was happening in the prisons and it created awareness. And, of course, this has made and is making our practices evolve more rapidly.⁶ » (EXP)

Regarding the formalization of field requirements, we note that from the 2000s onward, field requirements have been growing increasingly formal with the recognition of detainees' rights and the opening of prisons to the outside world. Indeed, the collective awareness of detention conditions has diversified the number of actors interested in it and has made it a political object. This result is increased formalization of institutional requirements concerning practices from 2006 (EPR) and more particularly in 2009 in France with the Penitentiary Law.

« Indeed, the Penitentiary Law of 2009, the influence of international and European texts, and the multiplication of internal control instance such as the CGPL created in 2007 or the Defender of Rights in 2008, constitute both external and internal sources that have given rise to new demands on prison guards. » (SD, Professional dissertation, 2016).

Finally, study of the field's centralization has allowed us to determine that the penitentiary administration is undeniably a central administration under the sovereign missions of the French State and directly attached to the Ministry of Justice. Its Administrative Direction in Paris can rely on ten inter-regional directorates.

« It is the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration that sets the pace for national orientations then the Inter-regional Directorates [which] control implementation on a case-by-case basis inside organizations » (BJ).

However, we can moderate this centralization because its territorial levels conserve political flexibility. Also, the high fragmentation of the field mitigates arguments of centrality. Pache and Santos (2010) argue that institutional complexity is most acute in fields that are moderately centralized because even if actors do not have decision-making power, they can still have a detrimental effect on the organization.

⁶ All verbatim are translated from French into English by the author.

«The penitentiary administration suffers from insufficient steering within the Ministry. It is caused by both the lack of necessary support at the highest level to implement long-run reforms and the ever-growing workforce's suffocation because of overly centralized management process. The multiplication of consultative instances and the increase in the volume of decisions taken thus degrade the effectiveness of the central administration. » (SD, Audit Office, 2016).

Through these dimensions, we can also observe an important political volatility of the field. The prioritization of certain requirements seems to respond to politico-media events, and heterogeneity of actors makes it difficult to define a single institutional response. Indeed, we observe that same intensity of conflict does not necessarily have the same political exposure and the same ideological interest for different actors in the field. Therefore, conflicts do not receive equal treatment. For example, the relationship between reintegration and security logics, which is much more politically exposed, is subject to more alternation than the relationship between bureaucratic-legal and performance logics. We analyse political volatility as a destabilizing factor to the field, thus making it more vulnerable to oscillate between logics. Therefore, the characteristics of the field prove to be more important than we thought because they influence the degree to which conflicts need to be addressed. Lascoumes (2006) compare prison to an *avoiding blame politics*, i.e. a policy without great ambition or a real project. Thelen (2004: 16) likens the prison to a political institution where *« there often seems to be too much continuity at supposed historical breaking points, and too much change beneath the surface of seemingly stable institutional arrangements »*.

« Nowadays unfortunately the central administration does not necessarily have the time to do the in-depth work because the political order responds to and behind every mediatized events. This over-mediatization dictates the political agenda in its way of acting, or at least reacting, and afterwards it has consequences. » (EXP)

Thus, beyond the intensity of institutional conflicts, it is also necessary to consider the degree of attention and treatment granted to the conflict by the actors in the field. This will necessarily impact the allocation of means to conflict resolution.

Characterization of organization: the availability of resources for conflict resolution

These initial findings allow us to determine that complexity depends not only on the nature and intensity of the conflict, but also on the characteristics of the field. The question of organizational characteristics is also pertinent: can they be an explanation for alternation? As we illustrate below, organizational characteristics define the degree to which the organization can manage institutional conflicts, and thus ultimately organize its management resources.

These resources will then make it possible to define when and how elastic hybridity can take shape.

First of all, we determined from our analysis that this penitentiary establishment occupies a central position in its organizational field. Indeed, our establishment is a prison at the heart of the penal chain, since it accommodates both pre-trial accused and some convicts. The prison is therefore upstream and downstream of the penal decision. These establishments are not subject to a *numerus clausus* compared to other penal establishments. That encourages endemic overcrowding and makes prisons the most complex institutions to manage in this field. Also, historically this prison was built as a decluttering facility for the region, i.e., it accommodates inmates that other prisons in the region could not or no longer wished to accommodate. Its population is therefore particularly subject to violence and the reintegration is complicated because they are often far from families and places of residence. This central place impact the means of conflicts resolution. The organization has limited room to manoeuvre, particularly concerning reintegration logic and means of its prioritization. They are directly dependent on many other actors, such as courts, regional prisons, and inter-regional management, for the nature and number of detainees, as well as the length of detention.

« We're a machine that never stops spinning, we can't refuse anyone. When they bring in convicts, we take them. » (PE)

« Every detainee they don't want to keep, they happen here so it's not the quietest. For example, young adults are unmanageable so they send them to us and we have do with. It is also important to know that some establishments hide their dangerous detainees because there are quotas per year for these transfers, so sometimes there are surprises in terms of behavior It's can be very dangerous. » (PA)

Governance and organizational structure depend on the diversity of professional groups within the institution. Indeed, the structural division of work within prisons is important. In addition to prison staff – who are divided into occupational groups (guard staff, rehabilitation staff, administrative staff and direction staff) - there are also health and education professionals and representatives of the management company. These groups are represented at weekly meetings and take part in the decision-making process. Thus, all the logics are represented in the establishment and must be partly integrated by the management. However, according to Greenwood *et al.* (2011), the more differentiated an organization is, the more likely it will experience institutional complexity. In our case, the diversity of professional groups leads to polarized discourses and strongly restricts dialogue.

The last dimension concerns organizational identity. Prison staff report an evolution of the culture and values of the professional group. This leads individuals to question their membership within a group and encourages the diversity of intra-group logics. The lack of a cohesive identity among guards, as well as each guard's weak sense of membership in their professional group, contribute to a fluctuating organizational identity for the prison itself. As a result, each professional group can no longer be equated with a single logic. Therefore, balancing effect accelerate because dualities are less clearly defined and subgroups of dualities form. We witnessed the formation of a diversity of intra-group logics among prison guards, which interviews proved to be a direct consequence of the complicated nature of recruitment.

« The profile of the guard has changed because the problem is that we have difficulty to recruit. We have staff who are recruit with averages of 2 at the entrance exam. We have psychologists who opposed the entry of people and we took them anyway. And that will be a problem for us in a very near future because these people don't know how to position themselves with the criminal population. » (EXP)

« We were asked not so long ago what the ideal profile [of a guard] would be. It was extremely complicated to agree, extremely complicated. Today, it's not so much a question of saying which profile you want to recruit, but rather, what you do afterwards with these profiles. In any case, we all had different opinions on the ideal profile, and finally it came out it was not necessarily the profiles that feed our current recruitment campaigns. » (EXP)

The analysis of these different dimensions allows us to answer the first research question: *« why does elastic hybridity form in the penitentiary field? »*. We wanted to understand specifically the underlying causes of oscillation characterizing elastic hybridity that justifies multi-level analysis. Our results confirm that the institutional level allows us to define the degree of intensity of institutional conflicts, notably through the dimensions defined by Raynard (2016). We proved previously that there are different intensities of conflict between different logics and their dimensions. Also, the characteristics of the field will directly impact the way conflicts are handled, particularly through the degree of exposure and treatment of certain conflicts. For example, the security-reintegration conflict is more prominent in the political-media debate than the bureaucratic-performance conflict. The response to this conflict therefore seems more complicated because it is subject to greater volatility. Institutional complexity also depends on the characteristics of the field and the willingness of actors to resolve conflicts or, on the contrary, to exacerbate them. Finally, it also appears that the characteristics of the organization will influence the degree of conflict resolution through the means it dedicates to resolving conflict.


An organization whose identity is questioned and whose decision-making depends heavily on other actors has less freedom of action to define effective means of resolving conflicts. Therefore, the organization has to deal more often with opposite demands depending on the situation and the actors involved.

Finally, we can identify three levels of antecedents to elastic hybridity: the institutional level as a definition of the degree of conflict intensity, the organizational field level as a definition of the degree of conflict attention, and the organizational level as the availability of means for conflict resolution. These antecedents allow us to identify two prioritization that could explain the process of balancing effect between requirements.

Impact of complexity: distinctive prioritization

Also, our inability to identify clear and distinct institutional cycles in the manner of Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) reinforced our belief that having more than two logics in a societal field complicates the creation of one hybrid form and promotes alternation between requirements. Due to the involvement of many stakeholders and contradictory requirements, our historical narration allows us to illustrate this pendulum effect between logics. It is summarized in Figure 5 with illustrative events.

Figure 5. Timeline of most illustrative events according to institutional logics in the penitentiary field



From our current results we can categorize two types of prioritization, long-term and short-term, in our analysis. In view of the nascent character of this code, the definition of these prioritizations is still vague, and will need to be defined in more detail. We can identify temporal prioritization in contradiction to situational prioritization. This temporal prioritization is reflected in the practice's evolution and long-term orientations thanks to not fully visible actions. When studying oscillations, some of the objectives set are extremely slow to be achieved. Sometimes even short-term orientations made think us that the predefined objectives are no longer relevant. However, often after long periods of non-change, evolutions take place, as was the case for EPRs:

« It took 10 years for the Prison Law to mature internally. We had already set up working groups, but we didn't have any specific instructions. The objective was to reflect on the modernization of the prison administration, on the evolution of practices...And it was up to us to say which practices had to be changed. Perhaps it was a gas factory because everyone was in working groups, and at the end there were as many prison laws as there were working groups. I think they must have thought that they were no longer in control of much, so they retained a certain number of elements that stood out from the rest, and they put in a methodology. They matured that until we got to the 2009 penitentiary law, where there was a small steering committee. » (PDIR)

This prioritization supported by the definition of *guardrails* identified by Smith and Besharov (2019). The organization studied is highly centralized because institutional level defined formal organizational structures, leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships. Thus, the representation of the four institutional logics within the institutional structure establishes a framework for dialogic work that allows for the consideration of contradictory requirements in the long term. In contrast, the organizational and field levels are subject to situational prioritization, particularly with regard to the politico-media context. This distinctive prioritization sometimes leads to taking opposite orientations in the short term compared to those defined in the long term. According to our results situational prioritization refers to a strategic resolution of the conflict according a specific moment, the actors in place and the place of action. This situational prioritization highlights the definition of *paradoxical frames* (Smith and Besharov, 2019) at the organizational and field level. Indeed, the actors become aware of this oscillation and use their reflexivity to be able to appropriate and orient the oscillations depending on their support for logic.

Example of situational logic prioritization : performance and security against reintegration : «Article 51 of Justice Programming Act (2018-2022): (ref : art. 100 de la loi pénitentiaire n° 2009-1436 du 24 novembre 2009) : Easing of procedures for the construction of penitentiary establishments and deferment of the moratorium on individual confinement. The article 51 is to facilitate the extension and construction of prisons (...) in particular by easing urban planning procedures and allowing local authorities, their public establishments or their associations to transfer land to the State. It also provides for an extension of the moratorium on individual sealing until 2022. » (SD: Senate's report 03/10/2018)

These two temporalities used together by multi-level actors allow blockages to be overcome thanks to the creation of a temporary institutional arrangement. Indeed, situational decisions allow the organisation to legitimise itself at a given moment of conflict while at the same time pursuing different objectives over a longer term. They allow managers to review and reinterpret the relationship between opposing elements when conflict arises and thus seek solutions by playing on several different tables. These prioritizations also create windows of opportunity for spaces of interpretation and discussion.

In order to respond to the second research question, «*How does the "balancing effect" affect the structure of the penitentiary institution?*» we focus on consequences of elastic hybridity. Indeed, the oscillation between the different demands requires organization of creative spaces for the negotiation of demands at the level of the organization. Most of these spaces are temporary depending on a project, but we note that some of these experimental spaces have been institutionalized to allow for meetings and dialogue between the actors of different logics. We distinguish two types of spaces in our results: spaces of interpretation and spaces of negotiation.

Spaces of creation: collaborative evolution of the institution

Spaces of Interpretation: appropriation and reflexivity around logics

Spaces of interpretation refer directly to the processes of *polysemy* and *polyphony* defined by Gümüşay *et al.* (2020). These spaces appeal to the relationship between organization and individual concerning the strategic use of several logics. The organization tolerates multiple representations, particularly through blurring around certain practices. Actors can apply the logics that they deem most relevant in the various situations they encounter. In our study, spaces of interpretation are often assimilated to the action of "working with the human", i.e. leaving the actors room for manoeuvre in the application of the rules.

This expression is often used when it is a question of individualising treatment in order to reduce « pressure in detention ».

« I would often tell my officers to try to resolve a conflict situation or a situation that seems difficult to you, don't look in your books, don't look in what you were taught at ENAP⁷, don't look to the left or to the right, just use common sense. So afterwards you are added to the penitentiary, but now you want officers who at some point, beyond their level of education, who can have the necessary common sense and calm. » (PDIR)

« From what I have seen, we are obliged to postpone lower tension among the detainees to avoid as much conflict as possible. There is a line and we are obliged to weave around it that to calm the detention and to avoid going into permanent conflict with them precisely so as not to put ourselves in danger.» (PA)

Spaces of Negotiation: discussion and setting a new norm

Spaces of interpretation stimulate reflexivity, and subsequently allow the actors to invest themselves in more and more spaces of negotiation. They allow for debates on norms and practices through discussion, implying a surpassing of individuals interpretation of conflict. We note two types of negotiation spaces as referenced in the literature by Ramus *et al.* (2017): those that allow for «*formalized collaboration*» and those that promote «*collaborative formalization*». In our study, the former takes the form of a single multidisciplinary commission (CPU) where professionals can invest the debate on penitentiary norms. These spaces are institutionalized and are a part of the detention process. These spaces allow for the confrontation of points of view and the meaning attributed to the sentence. Depending on the purpose of the CPU, the group leading the meeting may change. Therefore, formalized collaboration spaces bring about change within the prison institution by allowing for concerted decision-making, regardless of how localized it may be. Thus, the necessary alternation between logics directly influences the decision-making processes within institutions where the need for representativeness of all groups must be met. Concerning the spaces of «*collaborative formalization*», they allow, beyond the discussion, to put in perspective the opposite points of view. They are spaces aiming to define the penitentiary norm. In the establishment under study, these spaces are materialized in the working groups of the establishment project or the Respect module:

⁷ Ecole Nationale de l'Administration Pénitentiaire: National School of Penitentiary Administration

« The machine [of the establishment project] was launched in October. It involved the prosecutor, the sub-prefect, the sentence enforcement judge, and she also made written contributions on the first theme. And from there, we set up working groups, with all groups of personnel, personnel from the company, from the health unit, from the national education system, so everyone. Everybody was agreed, even a trade union agreed with more than 60% of the project, so this is a real victory already.» (PDIR)


These verbatim notes also allow us to identify a link between spaces of interpretation and negotiation. The more institution gives interpretation spaces with *polysemy*, the more spaces for *formalized collaboration* appear through the creation of an organizational space dedicated to discussion. These spaces where collaboration seems to be necessary to carry out one's work reinforces the *polyphony* of individuals and their ability to be reflexive about their role vis-à-vis to different logics. This allows them not to fear change, but to participate in it through spaces that then allow *collaborative formalization*, i.e., the definition of new norms. Thus, we note that, facing the evolution of the supervisory profession and the desire of certain players to play a more active role in detention, the staff most involved in one of the logics are likely to become more involved in normative negotiation, thus participating in the evolution of their profession. Their boundary work puts them in the position to play an active role when faced with change.

« Guard involved in the implementation of the RESPECT module interviewed by a journalist: "For me reintegration is a politically correct word, I wanted to see what it concretely looks like in the Respect module. He did 2 visits of modules (where he worked): he was not in favor at the beginning but finally was very surprised. "Respect Modul is an outstretched hand, it is the possibility that the detainee is more involved in his detention through concrete things."» (BJ)

« The whole point of a multidisciplinary action is to work more closely together, we take the benefits of the collective to move forward, and there is still a lot to be done on that side. The collective is the primary goal of the establishment project to integrate everyone into a collective dynamic.» (PDIR)

We therefore define the creation of spaces from two processes which support and reinforce each other. The first process creates spaces of interpretation, that allows each actor from the organization to use the logics suited to a given situations or actors they encounter. The second process aims to define a new norm through negotiation and debate around norms. Thus, the creation of these spaces leads us to think that the elastic hybridity to be durable needs to create spaces for cooperation. These spaces within the penitentiary institution changed in part the bureaucratic organizational structure defined by Weber by allowing more horizontal relationships between groups of professionals.

To conclude our analyse and link our findings, we summarized the set of concepts in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Representation of elastic hybridity: antecedents and consequences.

Source: Author.

Contributions and research perspectives

Due to its theoretical and empirical nature, we hope our study will bring contributions to the institutional literature and the penitentiary field. First, we aid in the advancement of the conceptualization of institutional complexity thanks three levels of analysis: institution, field, and organization. These levels allow for a better understanding of balancing effect thanks to three antecedents identified: the degree of intensity, the degree of attention and the degree of means' availability. Through these three dimensions, we note the emergence of two types of prioritization of institutional requirements: temporal and situational. These two types of prioritization allow us to conceive of elastic hybridity over the long term despite actions and decisions that at first sight have no link between them. Also, we can better understand the consequences of oscillation and the temporary processes in place to satisfy some stakeholders. As a result, organizations need to adopt multiple interpretations and spaces for discussion to find negotiated solutions that can take the institution forward. Our study also brings important empirical contributions by analysing a public institution that until now remained on the periphery of existing research. In relation with the subject of this sub-theme, this study allows to understand how an organization may present different facet to match face to the constant evolution of societal mores and ideals. We therefore hope to contribute to a better understanding of social issues through the illustrations of elastic hybridity presented.

We recognize many limitations to this work. Indeed, the ten interviews conducted deserve a consolidation by a longitudinal study. Also, we cannot have all the information that we need, which requires us to strengthen our methodology in identify more precisely who are the key actors in the field.

To conclude we propose two issues for further reflection. First of all, we ask the question of elastic hybridity choice as an organizational response. We know according to Gümüşay *et al.* (2020) that elasticity is created when logics are central and incompatible when mixing or compartmentalization are impossible. But a question remains, is it still a strategic choice from managers? Or is it a default choice because no other form of hybridity is possible? What are the elements leading to this decision? Finally, we want to develop our knowledge on how elastic hybridity is experienced by managers. This would bring our research closer to the work of Thornton *et al.* (2012) and question the appropriation of logics by manager through three processes: *accessibility*, *availability* and *activation*. Santos *et al.* (2015) put this research into perspective by developing a model to describe the roles that individuals can play when they are integrated into a context of organizational hybridity. These questions refer directly to the notion of institutional entrepreneurship and the role that a manager can play in influencing institutional arrangements.

It is also interesting to raise the question of the institutional work the manager does to legitimize his decisions. Indeed, understanding the oscillating decisions and actions suppose that managers make their decisions according to several temporalities as we showed. As a result, time is a predominant variable in the study of institutions. Thus, we raise the question of the appropriation of time by managers in their management of elastic hybridity. To this end, we are closer to the work of Granqvist and Gustafsson (2016) on *temporal institutional work*. Also, Ramus *et al.* (2020) develop a framework on temporal (*mis-*)*alignment* that helps us to understand how we manage the implementation of complex and long-term strategies. Their study of time through two dimensions (*objective and subjective*) give information about the nature of oscillating actions (*symbolic or substantive*) due to managers' interpretation of contradictory requirements. This very enriching work can be questioned with regard to the two prioritization that we have identified. Are both temporalities reinforced by both types of action? In conclusion, our study attempts to analyse why and how elastic hybridity modify institution and creates spaces of opportunity enable to the management of paradoxical requirements. We thus continue to understand how a public organization evolving in a complex environment contributes to societal transformation.

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Table 3. Illustration of volatile complexity relations:

	Reintegration Logic - Security Logic	Performance Logic – Bureaucratic-legal Logic
Incompatibility of logics' prescriptions or proscriptions	<p>« Sometimes we had small talks, we had time to look after detainees, had advised them on their detention process. If sometimes we managed to get one of them out of the detention process, it felt good (...) But it's true we tend to miss out on this aspect, we just open the doors, send them to activities because it's the new principle of the administration, but there's too much movement to manage. » (EXP)</p> <p>« With the EPR, we are not allowed to do body searches anymore, we are stuck. It's true that it's changed things quite a bit, except that there are not a lot of things that ringing the security gate, today, so we're left with limited room of manoeuver to ensure the security of the establishments. » (PA)</p>	<p>« You know when a company gets a contract, before it has had to make a big effort to get it, to cut back on a certain number of things, sometimes being the lowest bidder, but at a certain point, being the lowest bidder makes it possible to get the contract. From the economics point of view, it does not always make it possible to ensure a quality service. » (EXP)</p> <p>« They have contracts, they are here to make money (...) here we are not too impacted compared to other prisons where they have to redo everything, and it costs an arm and a leg. If they have the ten-year guarantee it's good, otherwise it's all for the administration, so it's the administration that pays back and the prison is paid twice. » (PDIR)</p>
Unsettled prioritization of logics at the field level	<p>« This job will always be complicated, ultimately it reflects society, you are all at the same time, a social educator and the image of the authority of the country as the police are outside » (SD: BJ).</p> <p>« The role of the floor guard, in an establishment like ours, in practice is to open and close doors and obey their officer. In theory, he will fulfil his regalian missions, as they like to tell us: we look after security, we look after the individualization of the sentence, the course of the prisoner » (PA)</p>	<p>« If we define the contract, we can say that we're always on the edge : we must always remain courteous, we are company customers, we don't have a hierarchical relationship, but somewhere we indirectly support them through the market. But it's a tricky thing because we are from the public and they are from the private sector: we must always make sure that things go according to plan remains but at the same time we're not their hierarchy, we remain their customer. We're the client without being the boss and that's the difficulty particularly in prisons.» (PE)</p>
Jurisdictional overlap of focus	<p>« Good guards are people who do their job, who are human, who listen to detainees, who works as a team (...) don't leave their colleagues in trouble. They try to have a vision of optimal security. You always have to be careful, attentive, observant. » (EXP) « One essential thing in our country today is to think about the meaning of punishment, its meaning, its effectiveness, because protecting our fellow citizens, which is at the heart of the regalian missions, also means knowing how to punish reprehensible things. But it is also (...) knowing how to give meaning to this punishment » (SD: Speech President Macron).</p>	<p>« These processes already exist, for example, in nursing homes, where meetings involve public service users in the institution's life. This also changes professional practices, because it's a revolution not to associate but to consider the opinion of prisoners as users of the public prison service. » (EXP) « Is the reception of families in the visiting room a mission that should be the responsibility of the prison administration? Anything that is not regalian can be outsourced. And it's just as much less to manage for a headteacher, except that he has to manage the partner anyway, because we are in a commercial relationship and we have to evaluate the performance. » (EXP)</p>

Table 4. Illustration of restrained complexity relations:

	Reintegration Logic – Bureaucratic-legal Logic	Security logic - performance logic
Incompatibility of logics' prescriptions or proscriptions	« When the EPR has been put in place, we were forced to comply. A company from outside comes in and validates or not the EPRs implementation. The set-up stage and the supervision have not been explained by the administration. No one has explained why and how it was put in place. Why it was put in place to facilitate the work of everyone, or of one person, or in the interest of the detainee? These are all ways of getting us involved, the administration does not.» (EXP)	« At some point we can also tell Bercy that if we want public money is well used, then we do not just hire anyone, we will take them when they are competent. But they are too afraid that they will cut us off, so we have to recruit, recruit and recruit well, but then we will end up with agents who are unfit or who aren't made for that or who will screw up.» (PDIR)
Settled Prioritization of logics at the field level	« The idea is that today we are in a global rewriting of detention regimes, but it takes time. In the long term, we move towards a detention regime that is in principle open and by exception closed. (...) So obviously this will fundamentally change and that must lead to a change in practices. In the notes we are writing, particularly in the last one, which is what we call it, we want the warden to be a real actor in detention, much more than just opening and closing cell doors, but behind that, of course, there will have to be a reorganization of detention so that officers can have more time.» (EXP)	« For example, when a light bulb explodes in a watchtower, the company has not intervened and in the aftermath there is an escape and a certain number of technical failures are highlighted, if the warden director is unable to prove that he has done everything possible, that the failure comes from the company, then it is his responsibility. The warden director is the guarantor of the good functioning of his establishment and this remains the case whatever the mode of management, whether it is public management or delegated management, what does not change for the warden director is that he is the guarantor of the good performance of his establishment. It is just an approach change. » (EXP)
Jurisdictional overlap of focus	« The EPRs made to standardize practices across all penal institutions because the aim is to have the same detention regime regardless of the establishments and individuals. Because certain detainees who regularly attend penal institutions, often report that for the same type of institution the regimes vary depending on where they are. This is not normal, and we knew that today practices must be set down in writing, and it is necessary to formalize them so that they can be integrated in the same way by all.» (EXP)	« It should also be noted that prison staff do not like private staff in prison because they feel that it takes away from their relationship with the prisoner. For example, in the detention kit, sometimes the warden would reward good behaviour by giving a prisoner a new pair of tongs because the others were broken up; now it is not possible anymore. The company has to give the same for everyone, otherwise it has sanctions. » (EXT) « Here it's the same with the cell doors - they are still quite sturdy, but in other establishments, they are sometimes not - if someone say that there's not much money left, that the doors don't need to be as sturdy and they put in less sturdy ones. This poses serious security problems. » (PDIR)

Source: Author

Table 5. Illustration of aligned complexity relations:

	Performance logic-Reintegration logic	Bureaucratic legal-Security logic
Compatibility of logics' prescriptions or proscriptions	« By empowering and holding responsible detainees as a result of this contract of trust, the relationship between staff and detainees [is] evolving. Consequently, the guard must not be satisfied with simply enforcing the regulations in force in the respect module, or with noting the positive or negative points using the evaluation grids and pointing it out to the detained person; he must make the necessary efforts to explain to those concerned the results of the positive initiatives on community life and all their shortcomings. » (SD: Respect Modul Training) « Today the reflection is a little more advanced, it must lead to an autonomous care of the detained person. I think is really the objective today, we are looking for the autonomy of detainees and this is a major step to limiting recidivism. » (PDIR)	« What I expect of the guard staff is that they are upright, that they are clear in their behaviour, trustworthy, they agree with the code of ethics, with themselves, their colleagues, but also the detainees and the families that they come into contact with. Let him respect the right of reserve and let him be respectful and loyal, and when I say loyal, I am not asking for slavery. Above all, it means being respectful and having a certain potential to listen carefully. Maturity is important for all that is security and dialogue. » (PDIR)
Unsettled Prioritization of logics at the field level	« Before we only had small prisons in the cities, next to the court, now we build bigger and bigger prisons, but why don't we rebuild smaller ones? Maybe it's not the most efficient economically, but at least we can work better with the detainees, here they are drowning. X is the only establishment built in town, the others are all out of the way so to bring in the associations, the family is complicated. » (PDIR)	« Today, one of the problems is the recognition of the guard's authority by the detainee. Today, a prisoner in a penitentiary establishment only recognizes the authority of the staff who can possibly bring something to him, so in an establishment, the first degree of recognized authority is the building officer. Before, they are convinced that the staff can bring them nothing, so they are less hesitant to be violent or aggressive.» (EXP)
Jurisdictional overlap of focus	« This system, which works in the opposite direction of what we should be doing, and our common concerns be, also has the added characteristic of costing a community that is no longer protecting. Because building prisons, maintaining a large building stock, putting quality trained officers in them, running these institutions has a cost. Over the last 30 years, seven building plans have gone through, billions have been sunk. A day in detention costs more than 100 euros on average when an electronic bracelet, to take just one example, costs only 11 euros.» (SD: Speech Macron)	« My job is to make sure that the rules are respected, well put in place. For example, that the prisoner is signed all his documents, that he has his blankets, his night clothes, he has seen the doctor and all these elements were noted. Traceability is my role, it is a lot of administrative work. For example, if I have 20 inmates searched in the back, I have an hour's work just to fill out documents and all these documents are sent to the prosecutor. » (PDIR)

Source: Author