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Journal Articles Computers & Chemical Engineering Year : 2020

Optimal design of exchange networks with blind inputs and its application to Eco-industrial parks

Abstract

Motivated by the design and optimization of the water exchange networks in Eco-Industrial Parks (EIP), we investigate the abstract Blind-Input model for general exchange networks. This abstract model is based on a Game Theory approach, formulating it as a Single-Leader-Multi-Follower (SLMF) game: at the upper level, there is an authority (leader) that aims to minimize the consumption of natural resources, while, at the lower level, agents (followers) try to minimize their operating costs. We introduce the notion of Blind-Input contract, which is an economic contract between the authority and the agents in order to ensure the participation of the latter ones in the exchange networks. More precisely, when participating in the exchange network, each agent accepts to have a blind input in the sense that she controls only her output fluxes, and the authority commits to guarantee a minimal relative improvement in comparison with the agent’s stand-alone operation. The SLMF game is equivalently transformed into a single mixed-integer optimization problem. Thanks to this reformulation, examples of EIP of realistic size are then studied numerically.
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Dates and versions

hal-03080152 , version 1 (17-12-2020)

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David Salas Videla, Kien Cao Van, Didier Aussel, Ludovic Montastruc. Optimal design of exchange networks with blind inputs and its application to Eco-industrial parks. Computers & Chemical Engineering, 2020, 143, pp.107053. ⟨10.1016/j.compchemeng.2020.107053⟩. ⟨hal-03080152⟩
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