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Conference Papers Year : 2020

Custom Instruction Support for Modular Defense against Side-channel and Fault Attacks

Abstract

The design of software countermeasures against active and passive adversaries is a challenging problem that has been addressed by many authors in recent years. The proposed solutions adopt a theoretical foundation (such as a leakage model) but often do not offer concrete reference implementations to validate the foundation. Contributing to the experimental dimension of this body of work, we propose a customized processor called SKIVA that supports experiments with the design of countermeasures against a broad range of implementation attacks. Based on bitslice programming and recent advances in the literature, SKIVA offers a flexible and modular combination of countermeasures against power-based and timing-based side-channel leakage and fault injection. Multiple configurations of side-channel protection and fault protection enable the programmer to select the desired number of shares and the desired redundancy level for each slice. Recurring and security-sensitive operations are supported in hardware through custom instruction-set extensions. The new instructions support bitslicing, secret-share generation, redundant logic computation, and fault detection. We demonstrate and analyze multiple versions of AES from a side-channel analysis and a fault-injection perspective, in addition to providing a detailed performance evaluation of the protected designs. To our knowledge, this is the first validated end-to-end implementation of a modular bitslice-oriented countermeasure.
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Dates and versions

hal-03058888 , version 1 (12-12-2020)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03058888 , version 1

Cite

Pantea Kiaei, Darius Mercadier, Pierre-Evariste Dagand, Karine Heydemann, Patrick Schaumont. Custom Instruction Support for Modular Defense against Side-channel and Fault Attacks. International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2020, Oct 2020, Lugano, Switzerland. ⟨hal-03058888⟩
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