

A killjoy perspective on object representation by bumblebees

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1	Technical comment to:
2 3	Solvi, C., Al-Khudhairy, S. G., & Chittka, L. (2020). Bumble bees display cross-modal object recognition between visual and tactile senses. Science, 367(6480), 910-912.
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5	Title: A killjoy perspective on object representation by bumblebees
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13	Abstract:
14	Solvi et al. (1) reported that bumblebees trained to discriminate objects by touch could
15	distinguish them through vision, and vice versa. We argue that this behavioural feat may be
16	explained by egocentric heuristics rather than an abstract representation of object shapes. We
17	call for more considerations of animals' ecology, neural circuitry and actual behaviours.
18	
19	Main text:
20	Insect cognition research is living a golden age, with increasing numbers of studies showing
21	that insects can solve ever more impressive behavioural tasks despite their miniature brain. In
22	the latest example, Solvi et al. (1) describe an elegant experiment where bumblebees trained
23	to discriminate cubes vs. spheres, either visually (through a transparent screen) or by touch (in
24	the dark), could apparently also recognize them in the other modality. This suggests that
25	insects form a "modality-independent internal representations of object shapes", an ability
26	that we humans are explicitly self-aware of.
27	This study is designed to demonstrate, in an insect, the existence of a 'higher cognitive
28	process' drawn from human psychology rather than the animal's known neuro-anatomy or
29	natural behaviours. This approach undeniably drives the field of comparative cognition
30	forward by suggesting unsuspected and often sensational human-like cognitive abilities in
31	small-brained animals. However, this provides no insights on how or why these behavioural

feats are achieved; and because the incentive is to seek for complex phenomena, this approach is subjected to the risk of overlooking more parsimonious, 'killjoy', explanations (2). This is particularly true in insects, which perceive and interact with the world in very different ways than humans do. Such an approach ought to be supplemented with considerations for plausible mechanisms underlying the phenomena, ultimately enriching species comparisons (3).

Cross-modal transfers in insects are not new (4, 5), and in some cases we have a good 38 understanding of how this is implemented in their neural circuits. For instance, insects can 39 40 memorise directions based on wind ,or self-motion cues perceived through mechanosensors and subsequently recover these directions using visual cues (6-8). Because there is no a-priori 41 42 reason to link these cues in any particular fashion, such transfers require the simultaneous experience of both cues at some point in the past, and involve Hebbian-like plasticity (i.e., 43 44 cells that fire together wire together) in a well characterised area called the Central Complex 45 (8, 9).

The fascinating aspect of the new study by Solvi et al. (1) is thus not so much about a cross-46 modality transfer per se, but the idea that such a transfer is achieved through an internal 47 representation of object shapes. This seems at odds with previous work. For instance, flies 48 (10) and bees (11) can learn to visually discriminate two triangles shown side by side, with 49 one pointing up and one pointing down, suggesting – as in the present study – their ability to 50 memorise shapes. However, this apparent ability vanishes if the triangles' relative positions 51 are slightly shifted vertically so as to align their centres of mass, showing that insects do not 52 53 build a mental image of shapes, but extract instead a limited number of specific features. Congruently, insects' visual receptors and neural processing are poorly suited to reconstruct 54 55 the world's shapes but remarkably efficient to pick-out task-relevant features (e.g., indicating the presence of flowers in bees, flying targets in predatory insects, or distant trees in fruit 56 57 flies). Such filtering, so-called 'matched-filters', "severely limits the amount of information the brain can pick up from the outside world, but frees the brain from the need to perform 58 more intricate computation to extract the information finally needed for fulfilling a particular 59 task" (12). In sum, insects seem not equipped to build internal reconstructions of the outer 60 61 world, but are excellent at using ecologically relevant task-related heuristics.

How could we reconcile Solvi et al.'s (1) results with such an idea? Without information
about the sensory-motor experience of the bumblebees, we can only provide tentative
explanations, more to sparkle the debate than to defend a strong belief.

First, bumblebees may have achieved mechano-visual associations during previous 65 66 experience with edges, curved or flat surfaces, presumably here also through Hebbian-like plasticity. This would be exciting; however, it should be understood that such associations 67 may link egocentric perceptions (i.e., centred on the animal viewpoint rather than the world) 68 and thus do not imply any form of abstract object representation or 'world-centred' 69 70 reconstruction. Such egocentric cross-modal transfers would require the unimodal perception to be similar to what it was during the past bi-modal experience. That is, the bumblebee 71 72 would need to view the object from a short distance (close enough to touch it) to trigger the 73 associated bi-modal representation.

Alternatively, bumblebees may have used a sensorimotor trick. Insects can visually guide 74 their legs and antennae appropriately when trying to reach an object (13, 14). This visual 75 control is based on egocentric features such as the apparent movement of proximal edges or 76 77 surfaces (13, 14). Therefore, even though the objects presented in Solvi et al.'s (1) visual condition are covered with a transparent screen, bumblebees may visually adjust their 78 79 appendages differently when preparing to touch the round sphere or the flat, edgy cube. These object-specific movements might bear similarities with the ones effected during the act of 80 sampling the objects in the dark. 'Preparing to grasp the cube using vision' and 'sampling the 81 cube in the dark' might involve similar movements, specific of the object. Because this self-82 83 induced experience - whether through proprioception, motor command or both - occurs just before the bumblebee receives the reward or the punishment, it is likely learnt as a salient 84 85 cues allowing differentiation. An operant rather than Pavlovian conditioning, which would predict a spontaneous transfer across visual and dark conditions. This may sound far-fetched 86 to us humans, but it would not be the first time insects use their own movements to solve 87 object-recognition paradigms in unsuspected ways (15). Intriguingly, even for us, the objet-88 89 specific movements effected when grasping are based on a limited set of egocentric visual features rather than our ability to form object-based representation (16). 90

In any case, both egocentric hypotheses predict that bumblebees tested in the light would need
to approach the object within reach to recognise it as good or bad. As it turns out, this seems
to be what they are doing. The example videos courteously shared by the authors showed that

- 94 the bumblebees tested in the visual condition approached (close enough to touch it) both the
- 95 rewarded and punished objects equally often (21 vs. 22 instances). Their straight approaches
- 96 reveal that they do see the targeted object... but have yet no information allowing
- 97 discrimination. The bumblebee trained in the dark further displayed multiple attempts to reach
- 98 the punished object through the glass with its legs or antennae before moving on. These
- behaviours seem hard to conciliate with the psychology-inspired idea of "a complete, globally
- 100 accessible, Gestalt perception of the world".
- 101 Surely, an analysis of the bumblebees' actual behaviour is needed. Our egocentric
- 102 explanations may prove to be wrong but we hoped it showed how consideration of insects'
- neurobiology, ecology, and sensory-motor dynamics can lead to alternative, more
- 104 mechanistically grounded explanations.
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