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“Like Sugar in Tea”:

Competing Imaginaries and the Reinforcement of the Idea of a Nation-State in Egypt

Clément Steuer

Introduction

Identities have been a contentious issue throughout the Middle East and North Africa since the latter half of the nineteenth century and the birth of several competing projects of modernization of states and societies¹ based on different territories and different elements of identity:² language, religion, spatial proximity, belonging to the same political culture, and so on. Due to their colonial origins, the current boundaries have been widely contested in the name of supranational (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism), intra-national (Western Sahara, South Sudan), or transnational (Kurdish, Berber) identities.

All these issues have been reactivated by the Arab springs, which challenged the existing Arab states, and various projects contesting the current Westphalian order have made tremendous progress since then: a pan-Islamic organization (ISIS) managed to control large territories for several years in the name of the Caliphate; Kurds gained autonomy in Syria; the Syrian Social Nationalist Party—advocating a great Syria—achieved political gains; Tuaregs and Toubous became actors in the Libyan civil war. In addition, religious communities and tribes imposed themselves as last-resort protectors for individuals facing the collapse of their states, as was the case in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.³ Even in Morocco and Algeria, largely untouched by the Arab springs of 2011, constitutional reforms recognized the Berber language.

But in Egypt the model of a nation-state⁴ has been reinforced during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves. Eberhard Kienle was right to warn against the tendency to underestimate the weight of various kind of nationalism⁵ in this part of the world, and to highlight

¹ See, for instance: C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origin of Arab Nationalism*; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*; Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1800–1920*; Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry*.

² Or maybe one should use the term “identification,” in order to stress the fact that identity is a process, never completely stabilized (Bernd Bucher and Ursula Jasper, “Revisiting ‘Identity’ in International Relations: From Identity as Substance to Identifications in Action”). This explains why different identities may be in competition at the same time in a given territory.

³ Hamit Bozarslan, *Révolution et état de violence. Moyen-Orient 2011–2015*.

⁴ Understood as a social and historical construct. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*.

⁵ Following here Gellner’s classical definition of nationalism as “a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1). For instance, Egyptian nationalism considers this congruence to exist already, while Arab nationalism aims at building an Arab state coincident with the Arab nation.

the fact that Egypt has always distinguished itself from some other Arab states—like, for instance, Syria—by the preeminence of *waṭanī* nationalism (strictly national) over *qawmī* nationalism (supra-Egyptian) within public discourse.⁶ Indeed, due to Egypt’s relative autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman Empire, and the early building of a modern state, the Egyptian elite developed a conception of Egypt as a territorial nation-state stronger than the imperial-based Ottoman civic identity.⁷ Not only was this national identity better able to subordinate religion, but it also explains why pan-Arabism reached Egypt relatively late, compared to other Arab Middle Eastern countries.⁸

Nevertheless, Arab nationalism became the official ideology of the Egyptian state under the presidency of Gamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir, who went so far as to merge Egypt and Syria into a single state, the United Arab Republic, in 1958. But Syrian people withdrew from this structure only three years later, because they could no longer withstand the hegemony of the Egyptians in their administration. By and large, it has been argued that the Arab nationalism of Nāṣir was first and foremost a tool designed to reinforce the regional position of Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and one of the most powerful of the Non-Aligned countries. Indeed, in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*,⁹ Nāṣir described Egypt as the leader of three circles of influence: Islamic, African, and Arab. In practice, however, the foreign policy of Egypt at that time inscribed itself almost exclusively in the Arab circle.¹⁰ This vision was endorsed by some Western academics, who sometimes describe Egypt as the center of the Arab world.¹¹ On the other hand, Coptic “ethnonationalism”¹² puts Christian traditions at the heart of its definition of Egyptian identity, rejecting supranational affiliations, and refuting the Arab dimension of Egypt.¹³ This ideology distinguishes itself from religious communitarianism by postulating the existence of a “Coptic culture,” the heir of the Pharaonic culture, and cradle of modern Egypt. It does not separate Coptic identity from Egyptian identity but, on the contrary, puts the former at the heart of the latter. This school of thought was born in Egypt during the 1950s, and spread among the Coptic diaspora, especially in the USA and Canada.¹⁴

Pan-Islamism has also played an important role in the history of Egypt, the call for an Islamic renewal and a reformation of Islam having been launched from Cairo during the second half of the nineteenth century by two prominent intellectual figures of that time: Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abdūh. During the 1930s, the Egyptian founder of the Muslim

⁶ Eberhard Kienle, “De la langue et en deçà : nationalismes arabes à géométrie variable.”

⁷ Aaron Rock-Singer, “Religion and Secularism in the Middle East: A Primer.”

⁸ Sylvia G. Haim, “Introduction,” 47; Juan Romero, “Arab Nationalism and the Arab Union of 1958.”

⁹ Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*.

¹⁰ Joel Gordon, *Nasser, Hero of the Arab Nation*.

¹¹ See, for instance, Pascal Meynadier, *L’Égypte au cœur du monde arabe. L’heure des choix*. For a discussion of this vision, see François Burgat (ed.), “Perceptions de la centralité de l’Égypte,” published following a weekly workshop organized around this topic by the CEDEJ and the IFAO in Cairo during the year 1990–1991.

¹² Ethnonationalism “connotes identity with and loyalty to a nation in the sense of a human grouping predicated upon a myth of common ancestry” (Connor Walker, “Ethnonationalism”). Here, the nation is modern Egypt, and the mythic ancestry is the Coptic culture, allegedly heir to the Pharaonic civilization.

¹³ Gaétan Du Roy. “Copts and the Egyptian Revolution: Christian Identity in the Public Sphere.”

¹⁴ Sebastian Elsässer, *The Coptic Question in the Mubarak Era*.

Brotherhood, Ḥassan al-Bannā, advocated the establishment of an Islamic state, bringing together all the Muslims of the world, as the only way to end colonial domination. The Muslim Brotherhood became the most powerful organization of political Islam in the world, and it created branches in many Arab countries. An international Muslim Brotherhood organization was created in order to coordinate efforts to move toward an Islamic state. Nevertheless, due to the domination of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, most of the local branches—such as *Hamas* in Palestine, *Ennahda* in Tunisia, and the Justice and Development party in Morocco—eventually seized autonomy, and today play an important role in the national political life of their respective countries.¹⁵ Finally, some local and transnational identities are present in Egyptian society, the most important being the Nubians, but one could also mention the Bedouins, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, and the Berbers in the oasis of Siwa. These identities did not give birth to political projects aiming at independence or even autonomy, but some activists are advocating their recognition, thereby contesting the hegemonic conception of a homogeneous identity of the Egyptian people.

All these imaginaries were brought to the fore during the political opening of 2011–2013, and were then allowed to express themselves freely within the public space. Nevertheless, the model of a strictly Egyptian identity was the one which benefited most from the revolution. It was never really threatened by the other competing models, and remained beyond question when the identity of the Egyptian state became the object of the political struggles surrounding the writing of a new constitution. With the counter-revolution starting in 2013, divergent models have been expelled from the political field, and have since been forced to express themselves through other channels, including violent ones.

Competing identity models and the hegemony of Egyptian nationalism

The liberation of speech during the 2011–2013 period allowed the public to discuss competing models (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Coptic ethnonationalism, regionalism¹⁶), but Egyptian nationalism remained preponderant.

In 2011, the succession of insurrections in different Arab countries—from Tunisia to Bahrain, passing through Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria, and affecting Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia—fueled Arabist dreams among intellectual circles. It was not only the co-occurrence of all these events that contributed to this feeling, but also the role of Arab satellite

¹⁵ Carrie R. Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood. Evolution of an Islamist Movement*.

¹⁶ Regionalism is a feeling of belonging to a historical and social construct, linked to an intra-national territory. It distinguishes itself from nationalism because it does not claim to be based on sovereignty (David B. Knight, “Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,” 518). It is worth mentioning that in the Marxist literature this term refers to “the analysis of intra-national spatial differentiation,” which is concerned with the study of “mechanisms by which the process of accumulation generates uneven spatial development, and the effects of such unevenness on the development of a national social formation and particular areas within it” (Doreen Massey, “Regionalism: Some Current Issues,” 106).

TV channels such as *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Arabiyya*, which allegedly permitted Modern Standard Arabic to enter its “golden age.”¹⁷ At the same time national symbols had been used by demonstrators almost everywhere, and particularly in Egypt, where the revolution had been dominated by the national flag. Unlike in Libya or Syria, where demonstrators were brandishing a flag different from the official one, Egyptian revolutionaries did not reject the most recent part of their national history along with the regime that wrote it. Nevertheless, among the host of political parties created in 2011 in Egypt,¹⁸ some of them used the symbols of Arab nationalism in their names and logos. For instance, among the host of short-lived political parties of the “revolutionary youth,” the Nationalist Party of the Revolutionary Youth (*ḥizb shabāb al-thawra al-qawmī*) gathered dozens of young activists around a circle of nationalist intellectuals such as Ṣalāḥ ‘Abdallāh.¹⁹ Another example is the Arab Unity Party, *ḥizb al-tawḥīd al-‘arabī*, founded on June 2, 2011, but although its name and its logo feature a map of the Arab nation, it is actually an Islamist party.²⁰

Indeed, the Islamist current was the one that benefited the most from the political opening of 2011–2013. The Muslim Brotherhood ranked first during the first parliamentary elections, organized during the winter of 2011–2012,²¹ with more than 36% of the vote. It was followed by the Salafi coalition, led by the *al-Nūr* Party, which managed to attract 25% of voters. Both these movements are pan-Islamist in their worldview, and their ultimate goal is the creation of an Islamic state. Nevertheless, the structuring of the political field, as well as legal provisions, compelled them to embrace a national identity. In the brand new building they bought in Cairo as a national headquarters, the Muslim Brothers welcomed visitors at a front desk decorated on each side by two little flags: one was green and displayed the logo of the organization, and the second was the national Egyptian flag. The Salafi chose as an electoral symbol the *fānūs*, a traditional Egyptian lantern used during Ramadan. This choice has a dual meaning: a religious one, because it refers to the holy month of Ramadan and because it is a symbol of the light, just like the light bulb of the AKP in Turkey, or the oil lamp of the PJD in Morocco;²² and a political one, because the *fānūs* is typically Egyptian and represents the traditional handicraft of old Cairo. This will to inscribe the party within the Egyptian national identity seems to be a constant preoccupation of the *al-Nūr* Party: for instance, during the elections of 2011 I personally witnessed a Salafi sheikh, a member of this party, claiming among an assembly of young revolutionaries that the Salafi worldview comes from Muḥammad ‘Abdūh and Al-Afghānī, and belongs to the history of modern Egypt, starting

¹⁷ Yassine Tamlali, “Le ‘printemps arabe’ : fin ou renouveau de l’arabisme ?”

¹⁸ For a review of the attitudes of different political forces toward the Egyptian people’s identity, see Clément Steuer, “Representing the people in the street or in the ballot box? The revolutionary coalition campaign during the 2011 Egyptian elections.”

¹⁹ Field observations in May–June 2011, Cairo, June 8, 2011.

²⁰ Field observations, June 2, 2011, Founding congress of the Arab Unity Party, Cairo, Syndicate of Journalists building.

²¹ My fieldwork during these elections was funded by an *Explora Pro* grant from the Rhône-Alpes region (France).

²² Dilek Yankaya, Clément Steuer, and Hassan Zouaoui, “Nommer l’islam politique. Répertoire lexical d’un réformisme et ses réappropriations locales dans les noms de partis islamistes.”

with the French campaign.²³ Members of the *al-Nūr* Party are not the only Salafis behaving in this way: during the Parliamentary elections of 2015, an independent female Salafi candidate was campaigning while wearing an Egyptian flag in the guise of a *niqāb*.²⁴

This period also witnessed the development of a Coptic ethnonationalist discourse, which had existed before, but went public in 2011.²⁵ This current took an activist form during the 2000s under the direction of two priests, Matiyās Naṣr and Fīlūbātīr Gamīl, and was structured around a journal created in 2004, *The Theban Legion (Al-Katība al-taybiyya)*. At the end of the decade, the Theban Legion took part in Coptic protests, especially after the terrorist attack against the Church of the Two Saints in Alexandria on New Year's Day 2011. During the first weeks of January 2011, several fights occurred between Coptic demonstrators and the police. Then, members of the Theban Legion joined demonstrations in Tahrir Square in the first days after the revolution started on January 25. After the fall of Mubārak, several confessional attacks targeted Coptic churches and, starting on March 5, young members of the Theban Legion organized a sit-in in front of the state television headquarters, the Maspero building, north of Tahrir Square, in order to protest against these attacks. Leaders of this ethnonationalist organization played a major role in the establishment of the most important Coptic activist group of that time, the Union of Maspero Youth (*ittihād shabāb Masbirū*).²⁶

Despite being disavowed by the pope, this group succeeded in mobilizing lots of demonstrators, and started to push its agenda (the arrest of the authors of the attacks, freedom to build religious sites, a secular constitution, a civil state) within the public sphere, prompting the government to create a commission in order to examine the reformation of the law regulating the construction of religious sites. The Union of Maspero Youth also organized—besides the sit-in—several “marches” (*masīrāt*) displaying Pharaonic references (*Ankh* crosses, white togas²⁷). On October 9, 2011, the army cracked down on a Coptic demonstration in front of the Maspero building, killing 25 demonstrators. The revolutionary youth came in support from the south of Tahrir Square, and the Maspero killing entered the narrative of the revolution, its victims cited along with the revolution's other martyrs.²⁸ The figure of Mina Daniel, a Coptic activist but also a leftist, killed during these events, became a symbolic link between Christian and revolutionary martyrs.²⁹ This alliance strengthened even further under the reign of Muḥammad Mursi, when the

²³ Field observations, governorate of Gharbiyya, January 7, 2012.

²⁴ Naïma Bouras, “Les femmes du parti al-Nour et les élections parlementaires en Égypte.”

²⁵ Du Roy, “Copts and the Egyptian Revolution.”

²⁶ This does not mean that these protests were only motivated by ethnonationalism. It was a broader movement, caused by a fear of political Islam among many Copts, but also by the process of marginalization of the Coptic community which had occurred under the rule of Mubārak, then Sādāt (Yusri Hazran, “The Origins of Sectarianism in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent”).

²⁷ Du Roy, “Copts and the Egyptian Revolution.”

²⁸ Even by some actors of political Islam, such as ‘Abd al-Mun‘īm Abūl-Futūh. Field observations, 18 December 2011, electoral meeting of Abūl Futūh in Suez.

²⁹ From its inception, the 2011 revolution was not motivated by religion, but on the contrary called for a “civil state” (Steuer and Blouët, “The Notions of Citizenship and the Civil State”).

Union of Maspero Youth participated—along with the rest of the secular opposition—in the protests against the Muslim Brothers’ rule.

Finally, some regional feelings were freely expressed at that time, especially among the Nubians. On November 2011, a meeting was set up in Cairo by several Nubian activists. The general tone was rather moderate, and all the participants were speaking in Arabic, and not in Nubian. One of the speakers created a scandal by claiming: “Nubia first!” (*Nūbā awalān!*) The majority of the public protested and claimed: “Egypt first!” (*Maṣr awalān!*)³⁰

These different models of identity were not only competing in the public sphere, but also occasionally clashed. For instance, after deadly confessional incidents in Imbaba (a popular neighborhood of Cairo on the left bank of the Nile), a demonstration in favor of national unity between Copts and Muslims was organized in Tahrir Square on May 13, 2011. Significantly enough, the Muslim Brotherhood called on people to join this demonstration, but undermined its main theme, announcing that the protest would also serve to support the Palestinian cause, giving a pan-Arabist—and even a pan-Islamic—tone to the event.³¹

If all these competing identity models had to fit the mold of the nation-state in order to exist in the public sphere, it was not only because of legal requirements, but also because any suspicion that a group was contesting the Egyptian nation-state was framed as treason by the government, the media, and even the judicial apparatus, and because this frame was largely accepted by public opinion.

Since the introduction of multi-partism under the rule of Anwar al-Sādāt, the political party law (law no. 40 of 1977) has forbidden the creation of a party based on an existing social cleavage: “The party, in its principles, programs, the exercise of its activity, or the election of its leaderships or members, shall not be founded on a religious, class, sectarian, categorical, or geographical basis, or discrimination because of sex, language, religion or creed” (Art. 4–3). And furthermore: “No membership conditions shall be set on the basis of discrimination because of religious creed, race, sex, or social standing” (Art.5–4).³² This provision has never been suppressed from the law, despite several reforms, the last to date taking place on March 28, 2011, at the beginning of the transition process following the fall of Mubārak. It was even constitutionalized from 2007 until the suspension of the 1971 Constitution on February 2011. It also appears in the current Constitution: “All citizens shall have the right to form political parties by notification as regulated by Law. No political activity may be practiced and no political parties may be formed on the basis of religion or

³⁰ Field observations, Cairo, November 2011.

³¹ Du Roy, “Copts and the Egyptian Revolution.”

³² https://parliament2011.elections.eg/images/Laws/2_%20%2040%20%201977-%20%20%20%202011.pdf Accessed on March 3, 2019. For a non-official English translation of this law in its amended version of 2005: http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/mideast/EG/Law%20No.%2040%20of%201977%20-%20english.pdf/at_download/file Accessed on March 3, 2019.

discrimination based on sex, or origin, or on sectarian basis or geographic location. No activity that is hostile to democratic principles, secretive, or of military or quasi-military nature may be practiced. Political parties may not be dissolved except by virtue of a court judgment” (2014 Constitution, Art. 74).³³

Nevertheless, the interpretation of this law by the administrative courts favors a restrictive definition of geographical, social, religious, or sexual basis: as long as not all the members of a party are of the same sex or practice the same religion, as long as they reside in at least fifteen different governorates (out of twenty-seven), and as long as at least half of them belong to the category of “workers and peasants,” the party conforms to the legal requirements. Theoretically speaking, the Supreme Administrative Court of the State Council considers other scenarios when a political party could fall under the category of a party with a religious basis, such as a party whose ideas and beliefs are strictly religious, or which conducts some religious activities.³⁴ But in fact, this provision did not prevent the legal recognition of many Islamist parties in 2011. Even under Mubārak, the official refusal to recognize Islamist political organizations such as the *al-Wasat* party was based on other considerations and by virtue of other provisions of the party law, such as the failure to meet the minimum number of members, or to produce a political platform different enough from those of existing political parties.

Since the adoption of the 2014 Constitution, some secular opinion advocates a more restrictive interpretation of the party law, and the legal prohibition of all the Islamist parties.³⁵ Several cases have been brought before the courts, but until now the only Islamist political party banned by the Egyptian courts was the Muslim Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party, on the grounds of alleged links with terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the secular adversaries of the Islamist parties are still bringing new cases before the courts, and could win some of them in the near future. Indeed, part of the judiciary is amenable to their arguments: “Judge Mohamed Hamed al-Gamal, former chairman of the State Council, said religious parties should face the same fate as the Brotherhood since they have the same ideological reference. ‘Those parties don’t acknowledge borders and aren’t loyal to the nation, but rather to what they claim is the Islamic caliphate’, he said.”³⁶ In addition, some members of parliament are pushing for a reformation of the party law, in order to impose a stricter legal definition of the “religious basis” of a party on the judicial apparatus.³⁷

³³ <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/constt%202014.pdf> Accessed on March 3, 2019. For an official translation in English: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf> Accessed on March 3, 2019.

³⁴ *Al-Waṭan*, April 15, 2017 <https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/2006037> Accessed on March 5, 2019.

³⁵ Clément Steuer, “Qu’est-ce qu’un parti fondé sur une base religieuse? Interprétations concurrentes d’une catégorie juridique dans le contexte politique égyptien.”

³⁶ “Religious parties in Egypt threatened with political ban,” *Al Arabiya News*, 15 October 2014, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/10/15/Religious-parties-in-Egypt-threatened-with-political-ban.html> Accessed on March 2, 2019.

³⁷ *Al-Yawm al-sâbi‘*, May 20, 2018 <https://www.youm7.com/story/2018/5/20/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87->

As we can see from this debate, a segment of public opinion is more nationalist than the current legislation, and is pushing to harden it. Indeed, the suspicion of pledging allegiance to an alternative identity became a very serious accusation in Egyptian politics in the wake of the 2011 revolution. This accusation was first used against the revolutionary youth (supposed to be pro-US, or at least pro-West) as early as December 2011, when a dozen pro-democracy groups were raided by the police and accused of receiving foreign funding, including from US officials.³⁸ After 2013, this tactic was also used against some of the media (Al-Jazeera, and more recently the BBC), and also against adherents of political Islam, who were accused of working for Qatar and Turkey.

But if Islamist organizations were not targeted by the state prior to the summer of 2013, some secular commentators were using such arguments against them even before that date. For instance, in Suez, one of the local leaders of the Egyptian Bloc—the main secular coalition during the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections—reminded me, when talking about the first round of the elections which had seen a landslide victory of the Salafi *al-Nūr* Party in his district a few days before, that “Muḥammad ‘Alī led a war against the *wahabī*-s in the Arabic Peninsula, and [that] his palace is in Suez.”³⁹ This statement not only portrays the Egyptian Salafis as mere vehicles of a foreign ideology (i.e., Saudi Wahhabism), but also presents them as enemies of the Egyptian state, whose fate is to suffer an ultimate military defeat.

The hegemony of Egyptian nationalism also appears in the names and symbols of some political parties and electoral coalitions. In this way, in addition to its rather patriotic name, it is worth noting that the electoral symbol of the Egyptian Bloc (*al-kutla al-miṣriyya*) was a black-and-white eye. According to a man intervening during a meeting of this coalition as “the representative of the Christians” of the village, this symbol represents the unity of the Egyptian people, because black is the color of the priest’s clothes, and white is that of the sheikh’s clothes.⁴⁰ True or not, this statement was made publicly in order to highlight the national quality of this coalition, and to drive away the accusation that it was foremost a Christian coalition. Also, the name of the main party partner in this coalition was the Free Egyptian Party (*ḥizb al-miṣriyyīn al-aḥrār*). This nationalistic trend was, of course, also present among the parties reputed to serve as vehicles for the remnants of the former hegemonic party, the National Democratic Party (NDP). One of these organizations was called the National Party of Egypt (*ḥizb Miṣr al-qawmī*). Another, the Freedom Party (*ḥizb al-huriyya*), chose the head of Nefertiti as an electoral symbol, because—according to one of its

<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/381059/381059> Accessed on March 5, 2019.

³⁸ Khaled Elgindy, “Egypt’s Troubled Transition: Elections without Democracy,” 96–97.

³⁹ Interview with the author, Suez, December 19, 2011.

⁴⁰ Field observations, Siber Bey, December 31, 2011.

candidates during the 2011 legislative elections—this queen unified Egypt.⁴¹ Even in the Islamist current, one can find several parties with nationalistic names, especially among the dissenters of the Muslim Brotherhood who founded several political parties in 2011–2012, such as the Egyptian Current Party (*ḥizb al-tayyār al-miṣrī*) and the Strong Egypt Party (*ḥizb Miṣr al-qawiyya*), but also among the dissenters of the *al-Nūr* Party, who created the Homeland Party (*ḥizb al-waṭan*) in 2012.

The unchallenged Egyptian identity of the state

Even during the troubled period of transition following the fall of Mubārak, the Egyptian identity of the state always remained beyond question. With the re-establishment of the state's authority in 2013–2014, alternative models of identity were expelled from the political field, either because they had been delegitimized as terrorist enterprises and resorted more and more to violent means, or because they had been co-opted by the hegemonic nationalist discourse.

During the transition of 2011–2013, Egypt witnessed a growing polarization between Islamists and secularists. Paradoxically, this polarization did not result so much in the affirmation of different views regarding the identity of the people (Egyptian, Arab, or Islamic), but rather in the expression of different views regarding the Egyptian state itself (Islamic, secular, or “civil”⁴²), without any discussion regarding its Egyptian quality.

This was not the case during the 1952 revolution, and the Constitution of 1956 defined Egypt, for the first time, as “a part of the Arab nation” (*juz' al-umma al-'arabiyya*),⁴³ contrasting with the purely Egyptian definition of the state's identity during the monarchy.⁴⁴ At that time, the Arabist rhetoric was a tool to mobilize the Arab countries behind Egypt in order to defeat the anti-Soviet treaties devised by the UK and the USA.⁴⁵ In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged and created the United Arab Republic, with its own Constitution. In 1961, Syria withdrew from this union, and in 1964 Egypt adopted a new Constitution, which kept the name of the United Arab Republic (*jumhūriyya 'arabiyya mutaḥaddida*), defined as “a democratic socialist state, based on the alliance of the forces of the working people. The Egyptian people are a part of the Arab nation” (Art. 1).⁴⁶ But the military defeat of 1967 against Israel contributed to the delegitimization of Arab nationalism

⁴¹ Interview with the author, Tanta, December 28, 2011. This was probably a form of shorthand, intended to refer to the role of the XVIIIth dynasty as a whole in the reunification of Egypt after the Hyksos invasion, and the territorial expansion of the empire thereafter.

⁴² Clément Steuer and Alexis Blouët, “The Notions of Citizenship and the Civil State in the Egyptian Transition Process.”

⁴³ “Egypt is a sovereign and independent Arab state. It is a democratic republic. The Egyptian people are a part of the Arab nation,” <http://qadaya.net/?p=5572> Accessed on March 20, 2019.

⁴⁴ Kienle, “De la langue et en deçà.” Nevertheless, the roots of supra-Egyptian nationalism are to be found in the social transformations of this country during the 1930s—namely, economic difficulties, the elimination of illiteracy among the broader part of the population, and the growth of institutional and personal contacts among citizens of the Arab world (Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945*.)

⁴⁵ Kienle, “De la langue et en deçà.”

⁴⁶ <http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/1964Egypt.pdf> Accessed on March 20, 2019.

within Egyptian political discourse. Nevertheless, the 1971 Constitution, adopted by Anwar al-Sādāt, used the same formula once again, only replacing the United Arab Republic with the Arab Republic of Egypt (*jumhûriyya Mişr al-‘arabiyya*),⁴⁷ and adding that the people of Egypt “work for the realization of its [*the Arab nation*] unity.”⁴⁸ But it also introduced, for the first time, a reference to *sharī‘a*: “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic Sharia (*mabādī‘ al-sharī‘a al-islāmiyya*) are a main source of legislation” (Art. 2). In 1980, a reform of the Constitution (referendum of May 22, 1980) replaced the formulation “a main source of legislation” with “*the* main source of legislation.” It has remained unchanged since then. Article 1, on the other hand, was modified in 2007, and redacted as follow: “The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic state based on citizenship. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and work for the realization of its comprehensive unity.”⁴⁹

The Constitution of 2012—drafted by a committee dominated by the forces of political Islam and promulgated by Muhammad Mursī—did not change the formulation of Article 2. If some of the Salafi representatives attempted to suppress the term “principles” in order to make *sharī‘a* itself the main source of legislation, they did not succeed in this enterprise. Interestingly enough, the part of the same article claiming that Arabic is the language of the state was never challenged. But, for the first time, Article 1 of the 2012 Constitution diminished the Arab dimension of Egypt by adding other aspects to its identity: “The Arab Republic of Egypt is an independent, sovereign, united, indivisible state, where no part may be given up. Its system is democratic. The Egyptian people form part of both the Arab and the Islamic nations (*juz’ min al-umatīn al-‘arabiyya wal-islāmiyya*). They are proud to belong to the Nile basin and the African continent, reach into Asia, and contribute positively to human civilization.”⁵⁰ This formulation put the Arab and Islamic belonging of Egypt on the same level, and also added other dimensions to its identity: Nilotic, African, Asian, and human. In so doing, it weakened the Arabic dimension of the country, relatively speaking, and strengthened the affirmation of a purely Egyptian identity, which cannot be reduced to one of its multiple dimensions. That is probably why the major aspects of this article have been kept by the secular opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood until today, despite being reformulated.

Indeed, after the fall of the Muslim Brothers the Constitution was rewritten once again, and the current Constitution of Egypt was promulgated by president ‘Adlī Maṣṣūr on January 18, 2014.

⁴⁷ Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “Les constitutions égyptiennes (1923–2000) : Ruptures et continuités.”

⁴⁸ For the first version of the 1971 Constitution, see: https://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_1971 For a non-official English translation, with all the amendments listed at the end, see: <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/eg/eg002en.pdf> Accessed on March 20, 2019.

⁴⁹ The latest version of the 1971 Constitution, as amended in 1980, 2005, and 2007, is available here: https://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF_%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA_2007 Accessed on March 20, 2019.

⁵⁰ https://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_2012 Accessed on March 20, 2019. For a non-official English translation, see: <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/eg/eg047en.pdf> Accessed on March 20, 2019.

Once again, Article 2 remained unchanged, but Article 1 was reformulated as follow: “The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign, united, indivisible state, where no part may be given up. It has a republican democratic system that is based on citizenship and rule of law (*yaqūm ‘alā asās al-muwātana wa siyāda al-qānūn*). The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation, seeking to enhance its integration and unity. Egypt is part of the Islamic world (*al-‘ālam al-islāmī*), belongs to the African continent, cherishes its Asian dimension, and contributes to building human civilization.”⁵¹ Here, the Arabic and Islamic dimensions of Egyptian identity are not put on the same level anymore, and the writers of the 2014 Constitution distinguish between the “Arab Nation” and the “Islamic world.” But even if the formulation is different, the references to multiple dimensions of Egyptian identity are kept in place, with the exception of the mention of the Nile valley. Thus, the Arab dimension of Egyptian identity is once again put into perspective, which contributes to the reaffirmation of the primacy of Egyptian patriotism (*waṭanī* rather than *qawmī*, to use Kienle’s categories⁵²).

Thereby, the Egyptian identity of the state remained unchallenged during the period of transition starting in 2011, and was even reinforced in the Constitution, including during the time when Islamist political forces were in charge. This reminds me of a metaphor used by an Egyptian activist after the first round of legislative elections in Suez in 2011. The Salafi *al-Nūr* party ranked first in this district, with almost 46% of the vote, and won two seats out of four distributed through the proportional representation system. The first results came out on December 16, during the afternoon, and some calculations were predicting that they would enjoy even more impressive results, with almost two thirds of the vote and three seats out of four. I was in the headquarters of a leftist candidate at that time, talking about the results with one of his supporters, who told me that I should understand and write one thing regarding the Salafis: “Every single people coming to Egypt from abroad—Roman, Mongol, British—just dissolved itself into Egypt, like sugar in tea. Egypt changed them, and they did not change Egypt.”⁵³

The expulsion of diverging imaginaries from the political field

Since 2013, diverging imaginaries regarding the identity of Egypt have no longer been tolerated within the political field. The current regime has been built out of the fear of the destruction of the Egyptian state, whose very existence was threatened by the pan-Islamism of the Muslim Brothers, and by the increasing volatility of the regional environment. The sentiment of national unity has been intensified, to the point that it now constitutes the very core of the regime, as was apparent, for

⁵¹ 2014 Constitution.

⁵² Kienle, “De la langue et en deçà.”

⁵³ Field observations, Suez, December 16, 2011.

instance, during the re-election of President ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī in March 2018:⁵⁴ the electoral campaign was accompanied by parties in the streets (with music, dancing, and Egyptian flags), attracting mainly young crowds; the official anthem of the al-Sīsī campaign was the song of an army corps (*‘ālū eh?*, “What did they say?”); on the Egyptian TV channels, a slogan was constantly repeated: “Every vote is a bullet through the heart of traitors.” The expression of pan-Islamism being henceforth almost impossible within the political field, the path of violence appeared more appealing for some Islamic activists, and terror attacks spread out of the North-Sinai region, where a state of guerrilla war had developed in the wake of the 2011 revolution. Other models of identity—such as Coptic ethnonationalism and Nubian regionalism—have been co-opted by the mainstream nationalist discourse, just as pan-Arabism was previously co-opted, from the 1950s–1960s.

The Sinai insurgency started at the beginning of 2011, with a series of attacks targeting gas pipelines between Egypt and neighboring countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel). It was led by jihadists, mainly recruited from local Bedouin tribes. Economically and socially marginalized, Egyptian Bedouins are largely excluded from the job market, especially in the North-Sinai. The Bedouin way of life, mainly nomadic, has been destabilized by the building of modern nation-states, the drawing of their borders, and the policies of sedentarization imposed from the end of the nineteenth century. Traditional tribal territories extend across the borders—with Israel in the East, Libya in the West, and Sudan in the South—and for this reason Bedouin activities are viewed with suspicion by the state. The low employment rate and the existence of transnational networks favor different forms of trafficking (weaponry, drugs, organs). All these elements, combined with the proximity of Israel and the existence of a great deal of touristic infrastructure—an important source of income for Egypt—in the South-Sinai, explain why the Egyptian state tends to favor a purely security-based approach when it comes to economic, social, and political issues in this area. In August 2012, the situation escalated after an insurgent group attacked a military camp, killing sixteen Egyptian soldiers and intruding into Israel. The state reacted by launching the “Sinai operation,” a deployment of the military across the peninsula. Following the fall of Muḥammad Mursī, jihadist operations intensified in North-Sinai, as did military repression. The conflict started to spread outside the peninsula, with a terror attack targeting the security directorate of Daqhaliyya in the Nile delta, for which *Ansār bayt al-maqdis*, the main insurgent organization of North-Sinai, claimed responsibility. In November 2014, this movement pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and became its Sinai Province.

If North-Sinai constitutes an extreme case, Salafi ideology—not necessarily violent—proved popular in the border governorates, with the exception of South-Sinai and the Red Sea, where the

⁵⁴ My fieldwork during these elections was funded by the project *Power and Strategies of Social and Political Order*, launched by the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences: <http://power.orient.cas.cz/about-the-project-2/>

economy is dependent on tourism. During the 2011–2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, those governorates (Matruh, Nile Valley, North-Sinai) became strongholds of the *al-Nūr* Party, whereas other candidates—including Muslim Brothers—obtained results largely inferior to their national performance. During the presidential elections of 2012, the liberal Islamist ‘Abd al-Mun‘īm Abūl-Futūḥ was supported by different forces of political Islam competing against the Muslim Brotherhood, the most important being the *al-Nūr* Party. He obtained his best results in the Salafi strongholds, especially in the northwestern governorate of Matruh, where he obtained 52% in the first round, as opposed to 18% at the national level. This trend was confirmed during the 2014 constitutional referendum and presidential elections, when the participation rate was at its minimum in these governorates, especially Matruh (less than 10% of the electorate turned out to vote). An explanation of this phenomenon could be the hypothesis of distrust *vis-à-vis* the state in the peripheral areas of the country—which suffered from its establishment—and subsequent support for the pan-Islamic project of dissolution of nation-states to the benefit of a supranational Islamic state.

But while pan-Islamic discourse has been delegitimized by its association with terrorism, other competing models of identity have been co-opted by the Egyptian nationalism promoted by the regime, and integrated into its narrative. This is the case for Coptic ethnonationalism and Nubian regionalism. Indeed, after the overthrow of Muḥammad Mursī, confessional violence against the Christian community has finally been recognized as an issue in the official discourse, mainly in order to legitimize the bloody repression targeting the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies during the summer of 2013.⁵⁵ This was especially true after the deadly dispersal of the Islamist sit-in in *Rābi‘a al-‘adawiyya* Square on August 14, 2013, followed by a wave of attacks against churches all around the country as a retaliatory measure against a community perceived by many Islamists to be one of the pillars of the new regime. Also, the current Constitution includes quota measures in favor of Coptic representation within public institutions, and the Parliament elected in 2015 has the largest number of Coptic MPs since the foundation of the Egyptian Republic in 1953. In 2016, this Parliament passed a law aiming to lighten the restrictions on building Christian religious constructions. This law has nevertheless been criticized by Coptic activists, who ask for a unified law for building houses of worship.⁵⁶

Regarding Nubian identity, it is worth mentioning that the Constitution of 2014 is the first to recognize a linguistic and cultural minority in Egypt: the Nubians. In 2013, a representative of the Nubians, Ḥaḡāḡ Udūl, was nominated as a member of the Committee of fifty personalities responsible for rewriting the Constitution.⁵⁷ Article 236 of this document claims that: “The state

⁵⁵ Du Roy, “Copts and the Egyptian Revolution.”

⁵⁶ *Middle East Eye*, April 27, 2017 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/egypts-law-building-churches-dashes-christian-hopes-equality> Accessed on March 30, 2020.

⁵⁷ Hager Harabech, *Se faire nubien.ne au Caire et au-delà : Visibilité et mémoire chez les 2^e et 3^e générations d’émigré.e.s.*, 42–45.

shall guarantee setting and implementing a plan for the comprehensive economic and urban development of borders and underprivileged areas, including Upper Egypt, Sinai, Matruh, and the Nubian areas (*manāṭiq al-Nūbā*). This shall be made with the participation of the residents of these areas in the development projects, and they shall be given a priority in benefiting therefrom, taking into account the cultural and environmental patterns of the local community (*al-anamāt al-thaqāfiyya wal-bī'iyya lil-mujtama' al-maḥallī*), within ten years from the date that this Constitution comes into effect, as regulated by law. The state shall work on setting up and implementing projects to bring back the residents of Nubia to their original territories and develop such territories within ten years, as regulated by law.”⁵⁸ In 2017, a committee headed by the Ministry of Justice was formed in order to list the people eligible for compensation. It found 11,716 such people. The government is planning to compensate them with land, houses, or cash.⁵⁹ Interestingly enough, the narrative of Nubian activists exhibits some similarities with Coptic ethnonationalism, since it refers to the myth of a Nubian origin of the first Pharaohs.⁶⁰

Conclusion

For two and a half years, the 2011 Egyptian revolution opened a window of opportunity for alternative models of identity to express themselves in the public sphere alongside the hegemonic model of an Egyptian nation-state. Some of these models, such as the Nubian imaginary, were specific to some parts of the periphery. But most of the marginalized peripheries electorally supported the Islamist parties (the Muslim Brothers in the rural South, and the Salafis in the desert borders). This probably goes some way toward explaining why the Islamists began to be increasingly perceived as a threat to the Egyptian nation-state itself. Facing a popular resistance built upon this perception, they proved unable to stay in power. However, this threat was probably more imaginary than real, considering that the hegemony of the Egyptian nation-state model has never been seriously challenged since 2011. On the contrary, it has been continuously reinforced during this period, including when Islamists were in charge, as shown by the redaction of Article 1 of the 2012 Constitution. In this respect, one could probably draw a parallel with the French revolution as analyzed by Alexis de Tocqueville,⁶¹ and advance the idea that the Egyptian revolution was not only an attempt to change the political system, but also represented an opportunity for the center to reaffirm itself as such, expressing continuity in a time of transformation. The identification of the causes of such a phenomenon lies beyond the scope of this article, but one could mention, first, the fact that the Egyptian state and borders do not have the same colonial origins as those of

⁵⁸ 2014 Constitution.

⁵⁹ *Egypt Today*, January 20, 2020 <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/79830/Egypt-s-PM-witnesses-compensation-of-Nubians-displaced-by-dam> Accessed on March 30, 2020. In 2016–2017, Nubian activists organized several protests, requesting the state to fulfill constitutional promises, and faced repression. Indeed, the constitution-makers are not the decision-takers, and the liberal trend, which participated in the writing of the Constitution, has been politically marginalized since 2014.

⁶⁰ Frédérique Fogel, “Des Nubies, des Nubiens : traditions scientifiques et locales de l'identité.”

⁶¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolution*.

many other Arab states, and as a consequence are less challenged by competing imaginaries, and second, the coming to power of the Egyptian military in 2011 in a state of unpreparedness regarding a political transition. Yet, “the socialization of military personnel is that they view society as an organic whole.”⁶²

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⁶² Holger Albrecht and Dina Bishara, “Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt.” On the political role of the Egyptian army, see also Raymond Hinnebusch, “Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States.”

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