We present a composably secure protocol allowing $n$ parties to test an entanglement generation resource controlled by a possibly dishonest party. The test consists only in local quantum operations and authenticated classical communication once a state is shared among them and provides composable security, namely it can be used as a secure subroutine by $n$ honest parties within larger communication protocols to test if a source is sharing quantum states that are at least $\epsilon$-close to the GHZ state. This claim comes on top of previous results on multipartite entanglement verification where the security was studied in the usual game-based model. Here, we improve the protocol to make it more suitable for practical use in a quantum network and we study its security in the Abstract Cryptography framework to highlight composability issues and avoid hidden assumptions. This framework is a top-to-bottom theory that makes explicit any piece of information that each component (party or resource) gets at every time-step of the protocol. Moreover any security proof, which amounts to showing indistinguishability between an ideal resource having the desired security properties (up to local simulation) and the concrete resource representing the protocol, is composable for free in this setting. This allows us to readily compose our basic protocol in order to create a composably secure multi-round protocol enabling honest parties to obtain a state close to a GHZ state or an abort signal, even in the presence of a noisy or malicious source. Our protocol can typically be used as a subroutine in a Quantum Internet, to securely share a GHZ state among the network before performing a communication or computation protocol.