Recently, a new concept—human security—has received attention. This is a people-centered approach that is concerned not so much with weapons as with basic human dignity . . . human security includes safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.

—Ingvar Carlsson, Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood

In the last two decades, a normative frame has emerged that determines the approach to situations of state failure and that sets new priorities for intervention: a nonmilitary vision of security that displaces the processes of securitization into the social, economic, and physical environment—into “the patterns of daily life.” The discourse of human security is a discourse of intervention that focuses on individuals and populations. But it also applies to a set of techniques and a program of action implying various actors, state, international, private, and civil society, and several fields of activity, from military-humanitarian interventions to the negotiation of international treaties. Originating in the world of practitioners and international institutions in the mid-1990s, the idea and definitions of human security have been explored in well-funded research programs and by an academic community of policy advisors for agencies and states. However, social-
science researchers who are not engaged in these networks of global governance seem unconcerned by and even ambivalent toward the blooming of the paradigm. Although for a long time now the idea of human security has interested only those convinced by its mandate, the large amount of writings and international programs dedicated to human security make it a rich source of analysis. Why, for example, is there a reformulation of needs and rights in terms of security? How can we (re)think the political relation that is at the heart of any process of securitization? How do human security projects frame techniques of population management in situations of emergencies? How do the redefinition of security and emergency play within existing power relations at stake in situations of foreign interventions?

Despite the earlier lack of concern, for the last few years, critical studies have been exploring the ethico-political shift that is building new paradigms of action in the post–World War world. In what follows, I will examine the genesis of this concept of human security and its development within institutions as attempts to redefine security have shifted from the idea of “human development” originally concerned with “basic needs” to norms and techniques of humanitarian actions, military doctrines, and, finally, the legalization of interventions in the name of a “responsibility to protect.” While acclaimed as a demilitarized approach to security, the concept of human security has been remilitarized in humanitarian interventions, promoting notions of emergency and safety as moral grounds for political action. This legacy introduces the idea of human security as a practice of government in response to the narrative of global chaos

Securitizing the Patterns of Daily Life
Since the 1990s, questions of environment, identity, crime, and welfare have been reframed in terms of “security.” A turning point in this process was the introduction of a new word in the 1994 *Human Development Report*, redefining security as “humane” and broadening the use of the concept from exclusive military threats to economic, social, and environmental threats. Promoted by economists Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, the report is an annual evaluation chronicling the overall world progress as well as state-by-state situations of “human development” since 1990 within the UN Development Programme. The inventor of the paradigm, Mahbub ul Haq, insisted that “the emerging concept of human security forces a new morality on all of us through a perception of common threats to our very survival.” Why did the redefinition of security originate in an institution of economic development—and a peripheral agency, at that—and how did this new concept of global security originate within the project of “developing humans”? The answer is that the concept of human security began as a rhetorical, strategic promotion of development approaches through the process of securitization. Securitization takes place when an “issue is presented as an existential threat,” that is, as an emergency. Conversely, attempts by policy makers and analysts to label a problem as a security issue necessarily require a political strategy that “frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics,” a strategy “requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” Those who theorize these mechanisms seem critical of an actual broadening of security issues, arguing that it is not advisable to think in terms of securitization in various fields and at various levels of socioeconomic life, since this strategy indeed suspends the normal processes of politics.
However, those concerned with human development see securitization not as an issue of politics and the suspension of normal political procedures, but as an issue of socioeconomic engineering and measurement.

The quantitative index of securitization, understood in this sense, appears in a report coordinated by the UN Development Programme: the Human Development Index. This development-centered ranking of the wealth of nations is intended to replace the gross domestic product as a measure of economic achievement by a combination of wealth and new indexes quantifying the “qualities of life” of the population—life expectancy at birth and the literacy rate. The “agreeable fact that these determinants of a person's good are measurable and comparable . . . irrespective of what a person’s conception of her good happens to be,” and the claim that once measured, they can be maximized and secured, made possible not just new approaches to universal, human, development, but a new concept of human security. The universal threats that define the new paradigm of security are “hunger, disease, and repression,” building a continuum between decontextualized biological and political dimensions that together establish the patterns of daily life. Behind these new approaches lies the long-standing dream of liberal political economy: to secure life, choices, and opportunities, through an adequate management of risks and contingencies. This new ethical objectivism, based on indexes and figures, naturalizes what until then was contained within the political sphere. It then frees the notion of securitization from the political questions involved in the exercise of power, and ultimately, the exercise of force. The previous system had delimited the instrumental use of security to a circle of political decision makers, the military, paramilitary organizations, the police, militias, and so on. From a risk-management
perspective, this ambiguous reversal in the use and connotation of security sees power relations and social formations as other forces that—whether successfully or inadequately mastered—can determine life or death. As the following Borges-like definition puts it: “In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.”

The origins of the concept of human security show how institutional mechanisms within international agencies, conceptual evolution, and ambivalent political ambitions work together to shift the “place of the political.” From this shift there emerges a biopolitical rationale that, translated into actions and projects, has resulted in imperatives of protection, care, and emergency. In practice, over the last decade, the project of “developing humans” has supported the normalization of humanitarian interventions and opened the floor to a new doctrine of interventionism in the UN Security Council.

“Freedom from Want” and, Foremost, “Freedom from Fear”

The Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on September 15, 2005, declared: “We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.”

The complex expressions “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” which mix ideas of rights, law, and emotions, mobilizing a universal theory of human agency,
come from the “four essential freedoms” enumerated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the State of the Union Address he delivered on January 6, 1941 to convince the Congress to commit the country to entry into World War II. The context was a political analysis of world dangers:

Armed defense of democratic existence is now being gallantly waged in four continents. If that defense fails, all the population and all the resources of Europe and Asia, Africa and Australia will be dominated by conquerors. And let us remember that the total of those populations in those four continents, the total of those populations and their resources greatly exceeds the sum total of the population and the resources of the whole of the Western Hemisphere—yes, many times over.

This reformulation of the world situation acknowledges the extraordinary amount of alien (non-Western) populations and resources as the shifting battlefront of international relations. The introduction of these two new freedoms also assumes a project of emancipation from those “universal” emotions, fear and want, considered as the catalysts of political disorders and orders. Introduced into the preamble of the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, freedom from fear and freedom from want have become the aim of the new paradigm of human security, which is used to manage violence through intervention in the post–Cold-War era—a continuation of the moralized, view of peace by war that characterized Roosevelt’s original use of the term.
Of the two, it appears that a concern for achieving freedom from fear is prevailing as the notion of human security evolves. Following the rupture of several states in civil conflicts and the defeat of UN-led humanitarian interventions in Somalia, after difficulties in Bosnia, and failure and shame in Rwanda, the context of the late 1990s marked the narrowing of human security from holistic and development programs to a concern for safety and protection from violence. While UN police operations stumbled (the interventionist being treated as another party to decentralized conflicts), principles of human security were reinvested in an effort to conceptualize a discursive and operational apparatus of civil-military intervention. In the UN arena, the idea prevailed that a reform should “allow the Security Council to authorize action in situations within countries, but only if the security of people is so severely violated as to require an international response on humanitarian grounds.” At the same time, state powers such as Japan, Norway, Canada, and, more recently, the European Union, became interested in human security as a possible program of foreign policy. It may seem contradictory that states would support a people-centered redefinition of security. The notion, however, turned out to be a useful and flexible tool to manage new conditions of sovereignty in the global context.

Canada, particularly, and the then minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, constantly advocated in favor of the concept of human security throughout his mandate as a nonpermanent member and president of the UN Security Council, which, at that time, adopted several resolutions on the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups during armed conflicts. Following that, the Canadian minister of foreign affairs took the lead in negotiating an international agreement for banning land mines. After the initial failure of
this project at the UN, a “coalition of like-minded” states, supported by the lobbying and counsel of powerful Western NGOs, negotiated the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. “The Ottawa Convention,” as it is called, has been praised and offered as an example of the application of a human-security “global agenda.” The banning of land mines is an exemplary human-security project, “providing an alternative source of security to that associated with geopolitics” in an international agreement to eradicate threatening weapons—an agreement that substantial land-mine producers such as the United States refused to sign.

The Ottawa Convention is exemplary in that it avoids engagement with the issues of war and conflict themselves, but still focuses on warfare. It is concerned with the effects of a weapon on individuals—civilians. Its concern for land-mine injuries is a paradigmatic case of the human-security approach, focusing on the long-term and human-dimension of the effects of conflicts on populations—how wars deprive individuals of a part of their vital or core being and how this deprivation disables people. Moreover, the unforeseen, accidental nature of land-mine injuries and their relationship to everyday activities and places (cultivating fields, traveling, playing around the house) give an idea of what insecurity may mean at the level of daily life. Thus, land-mine injuries dramatically illustrate how people need to be secured in their basic, physical integrity so that their daily lives also remain intact.

**Emergency and Safety: Remilitarizing Human Security**
The shift in favor of freedom from fear brings two consequences when applied: a temporal frame of action focused on emergencies and on the present, and a spatial frame focused on physical integrity. This instrumental use radically changed the meaning of the notion of human security as it was being largely diffused in policy papers and agendas. Specifically, it absorbed the original, development approach into the conceptual framework of human security. The definition of human security as physical safety was strengthened and put forward as a practical line of action that could be taken by states. In a policy statement by then minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, entitled *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*, Canada thus proposed to make “safety for people” the principal object of its statecraft. In the same vein, he advocated “grounding the human security agenda in sound fact—for example, knowledge of the pathology of small weapons, the health impact of conflicts, etc.” Later, the call for a doctrine of human security in the European Union would build on this narrow definition of safety, as opposed to vague, holistic, and development-oriented approaches. In 2005, the Barcelona Study Group, a collection group of influential academics and experts commissioned to develop a common policy on foreign and military affairs for the EU proposed what was called the Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The project relied on an operational definition of human security based on the “identification of a narrower core of human security threats.” “Genocide, large-scale torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, disappearances, slavery, crimes against humanity and war crimes . . . come under this category. Violations of the right to food, health and housing, even grave and massive ones, are not commonly recognized as belonging to this category, although some authors would make a case for these as ‘survival rights.’” Instead, it claimed, “a narrower
category of situations that become intolerably insecure, as outlined above, could be one of the criteria for deciding to deploy operational capacities.”

The focus on safety as protection against an all-encompassing idea of violence redefines the subject of security through mechanisms of abstraction and decontextualization. This, however, does not entail a shift between generous ideas and the necessity for focused action in the name of efficiency. Since the modern origins of the concept of human security, indeed, mechanisms of abstraction have been at play, be they UN Development Programme’s “thresholds” of destitution or the UN’s normative protection of vulnerable “categories of humanity.” The EU conception of human security, however, goes one step further by abstracting from the concept of security “food, health, and housing”—the concrete elements of the pattern of daily life that was the raison d'être of the original paradigm shift to the focus on human security within the UN Development Programme—in favor of protection from violence and “freedom from fear.” Building on the tradition that it leaves out, the narrowing process contrasts life in its vital functions and the social life of individuals, choosing to focus on the former. The threshold process opens the path to a separation between a bodily person (the “core” of our being, in human security literature) and the everyday life of the body—a peripheral life that is now excluded from the scope of protection.

The definition of human security as freedom from fear leads precisely to defining “a narrower category of situations that become intolerably insecure” as “one of the criteria for deciding to deploy operational capacities.” From Roosevelt, to the Barcelona Study Group, to Axworthy, the freedom-from-fear approach has rested on an ambiguity. On one hand is a pacifist call for “a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point
and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression.” The Ottawa process for banning land mines and Axworthy's engagement for the reduction of small arms follow this emphasis on disarmament. Mary Kaldor, the head of the Barcelona Study Group, was also a founding member of European Nuclear Disarmament and author of the first statistics on the arms trade at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. However, on the other, until world disarmament happens, the duty of those who call for reducing and eradicating weapons is said to be to use them appropriately through “military intervention for human protection purposes.” This expression means that humanitarian intervention involves the use of military force to provide assistance to people whose political, economic, and social conditions are untenable. This ambiguity in the concept of the freedom from fear reverses the paradigm of security that was first defined by its nonmilitary focus and emphasis on demilitarization and converts it into a redefinition of security achieved by military means.

This remilitarization of humanitarian ethics and standards of securing lives carries with it a wide range of private and civil-society actors, mechanisms of subcontracting, and norm-building processes that affect populations worldwide. It has therefore reconfigured the conditions of possibility of state sovereignty in the context of globalization. Celebrating a global approach to human security, indeed, is not antithetical to patriotic values, as Axworthy shows: “We have never been more self-confident about our place in the world. . . . This is perhaps because the human security agenda is one that promotes Canadian interests while projecting Canadian values.” However, the discourse of human security, with its rhetoric of a world in disorder and its valorization of the
protection of human life by military interventions, if necessary, erodes the concept of state sovereignty in the name of enforcing humanitarian standards of safety wherever necessary. As the last decade and more in Kosovo have shown, the concept of human security puts into question norms of sovereignty and reopens a wide range of possibilities in the political organization of populations and lands, from occupied territories to independent states, by means of several forms of tutelage and presence, be they military or not, legal or not.

**Global Human Security**

Since 2000, the concept of human security had framed a “foreign policy ethics” for Western democracies that are evaluating “how to restore the usefulness of their armed forces in a world redefined by the United States over the skies [sic] of Kosovo and Afghanistan.” Particularly, Canada, as well as the European Union, have embodied the institutional concept in coordinated humanitarian and military operations in areas defined by emergencies. More than a mere ethical slogan for interventionist foreign policies, the paradigm has been based on two principal ideas: first, a globalized vision of security in which the safety of the populations of others and their resources is the guarantee of one’s own national security and consequently the management of global disorder as a goal of national self-interest.

The idea of justifying one’s concern for the security of others in this way acquired a new dimension after September 11, 2001 and the reconfiguration of security discourses. “The whole point of a human security approach is that Europeans cannot be secure while
others in the world live in severe insecurity. National borders are no longer the dividing line between security and insecurity: insecurity gets exported,” Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor declare.37 The case of post-2001 Afghanistan sheds a light on this globalization of the idea of national security. After 2001, analysts and scholars put forward the idea that the Taliban is the product of the camps established by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for Afghans in Pakistan.38 Adherents to the Taliban, it was argued, are mainly produced by an incomplete humanitarian management of the forced displacements of the last decades. Their individual and physical insecurity, their poverty, the destruction of social frameworks, and the lack of psychological care made them a threat to regional and global security.39 The call for humanitarian action brought together concern for the care of victims and a traditional security approach to conflicts around the idea of a win-win situation: The securitization of the victims’ basic needs is also the guarantee of the security of Western states.40

Humanitarian intervention, as a political process, thus becomes a pact of security anchored in the bodies of aid beneficiaries, while the liberal regulatory perspective of the Human Development Index is shifted toward the political decision to maintain or influence existing power relations. Indeed, the 1994 Human Development Report organizes the paradigm of human security in seven dimensions of security—environmental, economic, political, community, personal, sanitary, alimentary—thus drawing circles of security inward towards the individuals who are supposed to anchor the process.

The “merging of development and security,”41 as Mark Duffield calls it, introduces a broader, globalized view of human security, while development programs
are integrated within the programs of humanitarian intervention, including projects such as demining, converting poppy cultivation into “the cultivation of legal” crops, and “reconstructing” the area of Kandahar. In undertaking these programs, the Canadian International Development Agency Program—the first of the aid donors in Afghanistan—has lost the relative autonomy it used to have in terms of its development agenda. Since 2001, development, indeed, became one of the three pillars of the government of Canada’s “integrated intervention” in Afghanistan, labeled as “Protecting Canadians: Rebuilding Afghanistan.” In fact, because of the situation in the field, the Canadian International Development Agency mainly financed humanitarian aid, distributed by Canadian soldiers in an attempt to “win hearts and minds.” Populations in need of care and control thus stand at the core of the security network. This apparatus translates all dimensions of life in terms of security and, at the same time, fuses together issues of development, the military, and humanitarian assistance in one and a same process, phrased in terms of human security.

The process of redefining our ideas of war and peace in this way and of bringing about new configurations of life in the name of human security has developed as an answer to how Western democracies should address the threat of global disorder that is bursting existing frameworks such as traditional ideological oppositions, existing assumptions about the conduct of wars, established international agreements on the conduct of hostilities, and so on. In the last decade, Mary Kaldor has become one of the most acclaimed theorists of “new wars” understood in this way. She has argued, in particular, that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a reconfiguration of warfare—and more broadly, a reconfiguration of the relationship between violence and
the political. While analyzing the politics of wars and the “globalized war economy” using the examples of Bosnia-Herzegovia and Nagorny-Karabakh in the Caucasus, Kaldor echoes other analysts of conflict management in pointing out the “ruptures” in the modes and forms of violence. Despite disagreements and differences in nuance, such analysts commonly share the vision of incipient chaos and the causal assumptions illustrated by Robert D. Kaplan’s colorful title in an article published in the Atlantic Monthly: “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Fabric of Our Planet.” The disorder occurring in several parts of the world is said to be marked by an economy of war based on pillage and by an “extreme” form of globalization: translational, informal, illegal networks, remittances, and the diversion of humanitarian aid. “The new type of warfare is a predatory social condition,” Kaldor writes in New and Old Wars, that not only damages the zones of conflict, but also contaminates neighboring areas, spreading refugees, identity-based politics, and trafficking. It creates “bad neighborhoods,” clusters of disorders in world society and the global economy, such as the Balkans, Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. The human-security doctrine will build on this idea while referring to conflicts as “‘black holes’ generating many of the new sources of insecurity . . . that spread across borders and are increasingly difficult to contain.” The new wars are said to be marked by two forms of violence: the genocidal violence of states and a free, generalized violence derived —at best— from older forms of identity politics. This quite unintelligible violence is marked by anomie, as well by as a withdrawal from the political—Kaldor’s core argument. Another important result of such disorder is a change in warfare, which becomes unrestrained, technologically archaic, and barbaric.
In the end, like many analysts of “global chaos,” Kaldor advocates a “civilizing process” of cosmopolitan law enforcement (that is, an international law for individuals) and, finally, the use of force that resembles that employed by the police.

This way of thinking posits the idea of human security as a practice of governments in response to the specter of global chaos. It follows that such a response is not about instituting order, but about Managing Global Chaos, as the title of a book by Chester C. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson forthrightly puts it.\(^5\) Within these perspectives, the shift from political order to the management of disorder becomes a shift in the technology of government, a shift advocated as a way to cope with “new wars” and to gain control over “moving power systems.”\(^5\) Evolving modes of intervention under the banner of human security have come to depend on the notion of policing violence.

**Policing Violence as a Technique of Government**

In the last several years, Canadian peace operations, that is, operations undertaken under a UN peacekeeping mandate or within a—usually NATO-led—“coalition of the willing,” have deployed police officers in addition to traditional military forces, a policy for which Canada claims “leadership.”\(^5\) The use of police as peacekeepers in war-torn areas illuminates how the securitization process is imagined under the paradigm of human security. It defines intervention as a combination of several strategies: the coercive exercise of force (“executive policing”), the humanitarian securitization of lives (“assisting aid and humanitarian assistance”), the normalization of social relationships, by a “neutral” third party (“monitoring and investigation of human rights violations”), and
the normative implementation of political organization (“institutional capacity building,” lending “support to electoral process,” “security sector reform”). The model inspired the EU Human Security Doctrine, which sought new practices of intervention to address the principal issue in the use of force: the “dangerous disjunction between traditional security instruments and actual security needs.”\(^5^4\) The report thus proposed “a ‘Human Security Response Force’, composed of fifteen thousand men and women, of whom at least one-third would be civilian (police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, and so on.). The force would be drawn from troops and civilians already made available by member states as well as a proposed Human Security Volunteer Service composed of volunteer students and personnel from NGOs, and private corporations.\(^5^5\) Intervention in the name of human security thus merges military and civilian agents, with the focus of the intervention being the government of populations. In this sense, it confirms what already is taking place in the management of zones of disorder: the coengagement of international and state-based public forces and elements of the private sector—be they NGOs, experts working on short-term contracts, private military companies, or private security companies (—through mechanisms of funding, subcontracting, and lobbying.\(^5^6\) In the Canadian military-development program in Afghanistan, for instance, the state development agency finances a large number of private NGOs and is a donor to international agencies for humanitarian relief.\(^5^7\) At the same time, the military subcontracts with private companies to provide security, logistics, and training for the Afghan administration and police forces.\(^5^8\) The rise of this private-public and civilian-military complex marks the emergence of new modes of warfare—Kaldor’s new wars—that fit the rationale of global governance.\(^5^9\) The human-security
doctrine solidifies and gives a frame to ad hoc practices of population management inherited from the evolution of capitalist economics and public policies in the West.

The emphasis on humanitarian ethics and concern for the survival of populations reconfigure the strategies of crisis management a technique of government. The issue now facing human-security intervention is how to adapt the use of force to a situation where lives matter. The imposition of control has to target forms of political violence expressed in terms of systems of flows, decentralization, and the blurring of the difference between civilians and combatants, all while not being “very destructive” in terms of human lives.60 This operates in a specific economy of power, one that valorizes sparing both the use of force and the taking of lives by trying to control and influence actions in a more intimate way.

In the end, the idea of policing violence focuses on flows: Securitization is concerned with deactivating the dangerous movement effects that break out from zones of insecurity.61 A multiplicity of dangerous situations and potential threats takes the place of concrete risks and namable foes. This reconfiguration implies the need for police activity and efforts to monitor uncontrolled movements spreading from “black holes” and “bad neighborhoods.” For example, Canada is a frequent “safe third country” of destination for Haitians leaving Haiti, and it welcomes a large migrant community from this country. Not surprisingly, then, Haïti is the main receiver of Canadian International Development Agency Program development programs after Afghanistan. These programs are oriented toward good governance, fighting corruption, and restoring the rule of law—although one may argue that the economic, agrarian, and environmental situation in Haïti should require more development-oriented aid policies. However, Canadian International
Development Agency Program programs are said to be part of an “integrated approach,” and they coordinate with the interventions of the Canadian police (the National Defense and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) within the frame of the UN Stabilization Mission.

Legalizing and Legitimating Interventions

This humanitarian interventionism is now undergoing a process of legalization within the UN Security Council in the name of the “responsibility to protect.” UN Security Council Resolution 1674, passed in April 2006, is a final segment of the curve in the impressive trajectory of the development of the concept of human security in the last decades, from the peripheral UN Development Programme to the very core of the UN institution. The resolution definitively associates the concept of human security with the humanitarian norm of action. By means of the Human Development Index, the idea of human security is derived from the constitution, or rather the recognition, of the global human population as a subject of knowledge and biopower. This initial shift toward population(s) as the means and end of government is what initiates a redefinition of interventions and their justification within the legacy of the human security concept, reframed via the indefinite and polysemic idea of “responsibility.” The overall argument follows former Secretary-General Annan’s reflection on sovereignty and intervention:

The sovereignty of states and their legitimacy to be granted sovereignty in a “collective security” system is rooted in their responsibility to their populations: the state now is the “servant of its people, and not vice versa.” If states do not prove responsible to their
population, that is, if they fail to provide for their human security, then the “international community” has the responsibility to free this population from its irresponsible governors through an intervention. As the title of one of Annan’s books, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, shows, the argument of responsibility takes root in the shift toward a “people-centered” paradigm of government. As Michel Foucault noted, in this paradigm, with “the emergence of the problematic of population . . . population will appear above all as the final end of government. What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health.”

While legitimating interventions, the project of protecting human security also made their legalization technically possible. Security Council Resolution 1674 is put into practice by including the threat to civilians in a conflict as a “threat to collective security” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: threats under Chapter VII of the charter authorize the use of force. The inclusion of “civilians and protected persons” in the scope of “international peace and security” is in fact the outcome of a number of resolutions during the last decade in favor of specific groups within several conflicts. They refer, indeed, to seeking protection for “vulnerable” categories of people.

While achieving collective security has been the founding narrative of world society since 1945, human security is nonetheless changing this narrative in such a way that some agents remain, while new ones appear and others disappear. The concept of a responsibility to protect is an answer to and redefinition of the “right of humanitarian intervention” that emerged in the 1990 with a humanistic vision of humanitarian action. The history of the norm is charged with a legal utopianism: the aspiration to transcend
governments in the name of the common good of humanity. In the field, however, this
state of mind encounters the actions and goals of military interventionists and the
organization of new humanitarian-military apparatuses. Far from norm building and the
legal debates, the apparatuses of humanitarian intervention open a space where the
concrete consequences of the discourse of human security develop, as the Canadian
programs in Afghanistan show. As the responsibility to protect, the doctrine of human
security reemerges on the path opened up by the security machineries in operation for
more than a decade. In the case of interventions, the development of a technical and
strategic apparatus in the name of human security has been a turning point, activating in
return an institutional process of legalization. In the process, the humanitarian imaginary
and the passionate discourses of the “duty to intervene” have been lost.

Conclusion

The trajectory of the development of the concept of human security leads from
offices dedicated to development and the elimination of poverty to the core of the power
and the central Security Council. Laid out in programs and speeches, its itinerary is
entangled with utopianism in a rather ambiguous way, because at least since the
Enlightenment, that utopianism always already has been associated with a practice and an
ethos of power. The ambiguity of the notion, however, may be what makes the difference
between a totalizing ideology and the “open,” “invisible” ideology that is the concept of
human security as a horizon of thought printed “in our heads.”
The demilitarized, people-centered idea of security was first proposed as a “practical utopianism.” The founding fathers of the concept of human security within the human development school then led the battle for what was labeled a New International Economic Order in the 1970s. The “right to intervene” also was built on the short-lived utopian vision of creating “humanitarian corridors” that would serve the good of the people above the interests of the states. Finally, doctrinal attempts to bridge the gap between legality, legitimacy, and the idea of responsibility turned to the Enlightenment’s cosmopolitan perspective on governance and its unified history of humankind. “Basically, it is the cosmopolitan alternative, but [we] thought the term rather intellectual, hence ‘human security,’” Mary Kaldor and Alan Johnson write in *New Wars and Human Security.*

That perspective on governance can be seen in a little-known treatise published by Émeric Crucé in 1623, *Le nouveau Cynée, ou discours d’état.* Before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 imposed its own solution in the form of the modern nation-state, Crucé dreamed of an alternative to wars and violence. Building precociously on the idea of united humanity (“Distant places and separated houses do not weaken the sameness of blood”), Crucé conceived peace not as the mere absence of war, but as a positive program based on freedom of movement and commerce, concerned with feeding the poor, regulating systems of justice, and stabilizing currencies. This ideal would be achieved through an early version of the modern United Nations, a permanent international council in the city of Venice under the collegial direction of monarchs from all religions and all civilizations. This universal vision of humanity, however, excluded “cannibals and savages,” whom Crucé proposed to offer as a target to military men so as
to divert them from war among themselves. Today’s “cosmopolitan alternative” strangely echoes this ambiguous utopia by stating that “armies which were originally maintained for the defense of borders have been used for peace-keeping operations outside, and sometimes far away from, those borders.” These are seen as “somehow relevant and useful operations, whether to serve humanitarian goals or to keep the armed forces fit.”

This vision of “far away” violence also recalls the controversial statement of the barbaric nature of the “new wars,” their archaism, and their irrational explosions of violence, conceived as *anomia* and as a withdrawal from the political.

The contemporary “zoning” of humanitarian emergencies and states of violence—the identification of conflict zones, safe humanitarian zones, International Zones—recaptures the ambiguity of the concept of human security in political actuality through a multilevel process of securitization. On the one hand, it implies narratives of global chaos and consequently mechanisms of management through military and humanitarian interventions. On the other, it involves techniques of care and the engineering of minimum standards for the survival of populations. These build on mechanisms of separation at different levels and the threshold definition of individuals as those whose “core” needs to be secured. While being put forward as a doctrine, a paradigm, or a buzzword, “human security” is the point of conjunction of these practices. It is a “strategical thinking of crises,” anchored in the safety of an “individual” who is the empty place of the political subject. While presenting the world both as an integrated globe and as a space pierced by zones and “black holes” of chaos, the concept of human security engages power relations in a complex play of inclusion and exclusion in which the greatest difficulty remains to think what is outside. This may relate to the “inclusive,”
“centrifugal” dimension of security mechanisms, which work in terms of regulation and circulation. Or else it may lie in the genesis of the program itself: In 1947, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer used the idea of “freedom from fear” to name “the project of modernity,” as they phrased it: “Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown. That determines the course [of] enlightenment. . . . Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.”

1. Among these research programs are the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at the Harvard School of Public Health, the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity at Oxford University, and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS) based at the University of British Columbia.


5. The United Nations Development Programme belongs to UN “programs and funds,” which are third-rank institutional agencies working under “principal organs” such as the Security Council and “specialized institutions” such as the Criminal Penal Court. It directly depends on the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, which, since the end of the Cold War, have been less influential in the UN decision-making process, where the Security Council prevails. And the United Nations Development Programme is concerned with development, a field that has become marginal since the failure of the political and economic aspirations of the Third World countries in the late 1970s, giving way, in the last two last decades, to a logics of security upheld by the Security Council.


10. Ul Haq, _Reflections on Human Development._


16. “The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Four Freedoms,” Address to Congress January 6, 1941, *Congressional Record* 87, pt. 1: pp. 44–47.

17. Ibid.

18. Thomas Hobbes’s, *Leviathan* (1651) is famous for its account of fear and envy. In order to achieve political tranquility, humans replace fear of each other with fear of the state. “Fear stabilizes subjectivity and this makes the Commonwealth possible,” as William Sokoloff puts it in “Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” *Theory & Event* 5, no. 1 (2001). The political function of these emotions are also central to Kant’s idea of “unsocial sociability.” For Kant, the inclination to fear and to want is a catalyst of political societies and therefore the condition of progress: “Thanks be to Nature, then, for the incompatibility, for heartless competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule! Without them, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity would forever sleep, undeveloped.” Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (1784), in Immanuel Kant, *On History*, ed. Lewis White Beck, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Anchor, and Emil L. Fackenheim (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).


30. Roosevelt, The "Four Freedoms."


41. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, p. 15.

42. The zone is “securitized” by the Canadian army within the NATO mission.


56. See Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* and “Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians.”


59. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, p. 45. Of the nine members of the Barcelona Study Group, five are researchers at the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of Global Governance


61. Dillon and Reid, “Global Liberal Governance.”


66. Ibid.


69. After a number of well-intended “condemnations” and “affirmations,” paragraph 26 of UN Security Council Resolution 1674 notes that “the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons . . . in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to international peace and security.”

70. See supra note 21.

71. “The protection of children,” “women in war,” and “the protection of displaced persons” mobilize UN programs and commissions through several specialized agencies (the United Nations Children Fund, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and related networks of NGOs.


75. The economic and legal struggles in the 1970s of what was then called the “Third World” to reform the UN toward the goal of producing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were launched in 1973 by the Algerian summit conference of the nonaligned countries, aimed at equalizing the terms of trade and reforming world economic institutions. (These ideas were developed further in Mahbub ul Haq, The Poverty Curtain [New York: Columbia University Press, 1976]). The NIEO initiative has been enthusiastically accompanied by practical action on the part of intellectuals such as Mario Bettati, the legal expert and future architect of the “humanitarian right to intervene” in the 1990s, and Mahbub ul Haq, author of the term “human security.” See Mahbub ul Haq, “The Third World Challenge: Negotiating the Future,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 2 (Winter 1980–81), and Mario Bettati, “La réforme de l’ONU pour l’instauration d’un nouvel ordre économique international,” Politique étrangère 41, no. 4 (1976): pp. 385–98). Being dedicated to development, the UN Development Programme was on the forefront of these debates in the 1970s. The initiative lost momentum after a decade of fruitless negotiations.
76. Anthony Pagden, “The Genesis of ‘Governance’ and Enlightenment Conceptions of the

77. Kaldor and Johnson *New Wars and Human Security*.

78. “La distance des lieux, la séparation des domiciles n’amoindrit point la proximité du sang,”
Emeric Crucé, *Le nouveau Cynée, ou discours d’état: Représentant les occasions et moyens
d’établir une paix générale et liberté du commerce par tout le monde*, ed. Alain Fenet and Astrid
Guillaume (1623; Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004), p. 82, available in English as


80. Such techniques are applied through the World Food Organization and the UN High Commission
for Refugees programs, as well as in the World Bank’s “fight against poverty.”

81. Mariella Pandolf, “La scena contemporanea: Paradossi etici e politici,” in Matilde Callari Galli,
Giovanna Guerzoni, and Bruno Riccio (eds.), *Culture e conflitto* (Rimini: Guaraldi Editore, 2005),
pp. 43–61.

