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► **To cite this version:**

Julien Gueslin. Public Opinion, the French Military and the Baltic Front: From Ignorance to the Discovery of a Geopolitical and National Issue (1914-1918). Communication à la Conférence "Society, war and history: The military, political and social developments of the First World War in the Baltic region (1914–1918)" (Riga, 26 juin 2014). *Latvijas Kara Muzeja gadagramata (Yearbook of Latvian War Museum)*, Riga, 15, 2015. hal-03001356

HAL Id: hal-03001356

<https://hal.science/hal-03001356>

Submitted on 12 Nov 2020

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Public Opinion, the French Military and the Baltic Front:

From Ignorance to the Discovery of a Geopolitical and National Issue (1914-1918)

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Abstract:

If the Latvian Riflemen were celebrated after the First World War in Latvia and in France where this contribution was seen as a proof of friendship between the two nations, it is interesting to see that this “built memory” is very different of the first perceptions of the Baltic Front the French could have. The impact on the struggle for the recognition for Latvia was weak. The chronology of events in Latvia up to 1919 was finally never in phase with the moments when French attention was on the Eastern Baltic. The assessment of the situation in Latvia was strongly dependent on the international conjuncture and especially the way France perceived the balance of power according to its own interests at a particular moment.

First World War in Latvia—Latvian-French Relations- History and Memory

The First World War profoundly changed French society, which understandably was focused on the Western Front and the confrontations taking place there. From 1915 onwards, the epic of the Latvian soldiers was to play an important role in the assertion of Latvian identity and national conscience. Because of this, from 1917, Latvians in the West believed they could invoke the Latvian people's contribution to the Allied victory, and most of all, that they could therefore obtain the swift recognition of the declaration of independence made in November 1918. However, it is interesting to see that this argument had only limited impact. On the eve of the Peace Conference, the image of Latvia remained very vague and ambiguous: who represented what, in a country pulled between a seemingly very weak civil government dependent on Germany, and some famous soldiers who had gone over to the Red Army? If, at that time, Lithuania had a more negative image (one could assert it was fast an invention by the Germans to weaken Poland?), Estonia, on the contrary, had a better reputation, as it had already obtained a certain amount of autonomy from the provisional government, it had proclaimed its independence, and it had created attention at the time of the German invasion of the country and the Treaty of Brest-Litovskⁱ.

This paper thus tries to explain the reasons for this difference in perception, by showing that the chronology of events in Latvia up to 1919 was never in phase with the moments when French attention was on the Eastern Baltic. The military events, and in particular the assessment of the situation in Latvia, were strongly dependent on the international conjuncture and especially the way France perceived the balance of power according to its own interests at a particular moment.

We will not recall here to what extent before 1914, public opinion in France, Germany and Britain was unaware of what was happening in the Eastern Balticⁱⁱ. The French Consul in Riga dealt principally with economic questions, and his reports on political affairs were not very detailed: they seem in any case to have attracted little attention, even if this seems to have evolved progressively in 1913. At the time of the German invasion in 1915, the French Consul thus evoked the determining role of French influence in

the acceleration of the work on the new rail bridge in Riga in 1913 following his reports on the strategic importance of the region, and the decisive results for the mass transport of Russian troopsⁱⁱⁱ.

It seems that French officers visited had attended the Vilna military school and had developed contacts with Russian, Estonian and Latvian officers studying there. During their time there, it seemed that studies were carried out on the strategic importance of the region and of the Russian defence lines. This question deserves deeper archival research, but in any case, no knowledge of it was mentioned.

After the beginning of the war, the Tsarist regime, just like the French censors, clearly controlled the distribution of information. French military circles had very little first hand information about operations and about what was happening exactly on the different fronts: most of the time, the French military representatives were stationed in Saint Petersburg, or at the large general staff headquarters, the Stavka. According to circumstances, and particularly personal affinities, they could nevertheless benefit from special access to the Grand Duke Nicolas or the Russian command. But it was often a case of fragmented information of a strategic nature and exaggeratedly optimistic opinions on the desire to fight to the end, the popularity of the war, or the satisfying state of the army despite the retreat in Lithuania and Courland, a retreat explained by the simple lack of artillery munitions^{iv}. In January 1916, Joffre therefore had to again ask

General Pelé, who had been sent to Russia, to repeat the request of the French command to be informed not only of operations, but also of the projects and intentions of the Russian High Command. In July 1916, he complained of having had no news at all from the Russian front and asked by exemple if the Russian command had given up its great offensive from Dvinsk^v.

The French Consul in Riga sent extremely useful reports, notably on the state of public opinion in Riga and Livonia, but he had very little means at his disposal, and no link with the military authorities. And in August 1915, the German threat led to the evacuation of the consular authorities to Dorpat, and thus the suppression of all French sources of direct information^{vi}. All in all, it was no accident if nothing was known at this time of the heroic action of the 20th Latvian Corps in Eastern Prussia, and especially, very little about the events of summer 1915, notably the role played by the Latvian soldiers in the stabilisation of the military front in front of Riga and the setting-up of Latvian batallions.

Later, after 1918, the Russian communiqués would be referred to, as would the fear of the German invasion, the fact that Kovno/Kaunas and Lithuania were heard of for the first time, the heroic defence of Riga, and the Latvians. But these Russian references to heroic Latvian fighters would soon be drowned or forgotten by the multitude of other events which were just as agonising^{vii}. Also, the communiqués were certainly positive, but typically they mainly referred to bold moves by Latvian troops (for example, surging out of trenches and killing the enemy with bayonets) but which had little strategic effect. Through a certain irony of fate, several communiqués translated into French and taken up by the main French newspapers spoke of « Lithuanian » soldiers. At the end of the war, the ignorance of journalists would be recalled, but in the military archives, texts can be found containing exactly the same mistake. Beyond the confusion, it is especially important to note that no-one then seemed to notice the mistake, a sign undoubtedly of the confusion and undoubtedly of the difficulty at that time of bringing concrete reality to these names.

In addition, both the military and diplomats relayed quite quickly the vision of a Russian general staff which did not see the German offensive in the Baltic provinces as a major threat to its security, as the Germans were unwilling to concentrate substantial numbers there. Thus in the summer of 1915, General Laguiche, following his meeting with General Alexieff and the command of the North West army, recalled the « perfect calm and trust » which existed, or the natural protection (by the sea and the marshes) of Riga: the « German project » in the Riga area seemed « vague », and the destruction of railway lines seemed the first objective^{viii}. Knowing, as we do now after the event, the tensions which existed at this time between the Germany military authorities, this judgment was not necessarily wrong, but of course it also had the advantage of hiding the tactical mistakes and the totally deficient organisation of the Russian army^{ix}.

It was therefore logical that the dramatisation of the situation in Riga in the summer of 1915 was less well perceived by the French military who were in Russia or Paris. The efforts of the Latvian and

Russian units was less well highlighted than the apparent weakness of the German troops, which again can be explained logically as part of a global vision within which they tried to persuade themselves of certain German weaknesses and thus of the possibility of obtaining conclusive victories. The French press therefore, in major articles, often referred to the desperate efforts by the Germans to reach the Dvina or to take Riga or Dvinsk, but other than Russian resistance, they never failed to mention the marsh country or the predominance of the Anglo-Russian fleet in the Riga Gulf, etc. The strict control and the rarity of this information, led to less focus on the Russian army than on the German army: the maps and descriptions multiplied, but with hardly ever a reference to the situation or the history of the region, or to the current efforts of the 12th Army.

Furthermore, contrary to Poland, it was of course until at least 1917 that the loss of the Baltic provinces was not seen in the short term as a political problem; the question of Baltic autonomy was not an issue, pan-German ambitions were linked to a hypothetical German victory which had to be avoided in all cases. And in French military thought, reasoning was less in terms of territory (except to regret the loss of railway crossroads which hindered troop movement and thus the management of armed action on the different fronts), than in terms of military potential and number of divisions.

Germany having failed to nip the Russian army in the bud, and the army seeming to have retreated in good order, German advantages derived from marching forward seemed to be an illusion^x. Also, for the French military authorities, the question was most of all the coordination of Allied efforts and the possibility of helping French troops on the offensive or defensive by fixing German units on the Russian front: where the liberation of Courland by a strong offensive was dreamt of, local, well-targeted and mortal action could suffice.

In any case, it is clear that from the end of 1915 onwards, the Russian general staff saw the Baltic front as little likely to lead to major gains and preferred concentrating on other zones, in order to hope for decisive action. In a secret memorandum to the French and British, General Alexieff wanted offensives to be stopped in directions where « the enemy » was strategically less vulnerable, and Allied forces to be concentrated in Central Europe in order to carry out a thrust on Budapest, basically to remain on the defensive in the North and to move to the offensive in the South^{xi}. As the French military authorities were

themselves increasingly monopolised by the situation in the Balkans and by the need for the Russian army to give substantial support to the entrance of Romania into the conflict, the Baltic front was by common accord a subsidiary zone^{xii}.

For these political reasons (the different Baltic nations were not perceived as a political factor), for military reasons (no strategic stakes), or simply for diplomatic reasons (the French desire not to ruffle Russian pride by closely following the functioning of the Russian units), the French knew very little of military life on the Baltic front until the end of 1916, and knew even less of the role of the Latvian soldiers.

The situation evolved from the end of 1916 onwards, most of all because of increasing French anxiety regarding the weakening of the Russian empire and particularly its military potential. During 1916, General Janin arrived at the head of a French military mission, and this can be explained in two ways.

Firstly, a wish to favour Russian efforts for the benefit of Romania: this led to the transfer of a number of units from the 12th Army towards the South, and thus to reduced possibilities of breaking through the German military front in front of Riga, or of resisting an offensive^{xiii}. Indeed, tensions became greater and greater between the French and the Russians, accused of reacting too slowly to the Romanian

« débâcle ». In 1916, attention was therefore monopolised by the Romanian question and by the Galicia offensive led by General Broussilov. A report by the military mission sums up the beginning of the year 1916 on the Northern front in a few words: because of the entirely defensive temperament of General Kouropatkine and the withdrawals in Galicia, there were only hints of offensives which did not come off, despite huge losses^{xiv}. Only in December 1916, with the famous offensive of the « Mountain of Machine Guns », would the Baltic front and the Latvian soldiers be spoken of more often: while the Broussilov offensive had finally disappointed the hopes it had raised, the first victories of the Latvian soldiers at last enabled a Russian success to be relayed which was as welcome to the general staff as to French public opinion in a tense military context^{xv}. If the military mission emphasised the small territorial gains which were made, it insisted confidentially on the huge losses suffered in the marshes (as much as 70% for some units)^{xvi}.

Secondly, Janin's idea was to give priority to what were the (seen as inadequate) instruction of the Russian army, to the diffusion of modern techniques, and to Western knowledge on the Russian front. The number of French technical missions (artillery, aviation, etc.) thus multiplied, partly in relation to Russian demands which were often badly coordinated, and the French representatives appointed to each

army^{xvii}. The French military thus discovered to their amazement that each Russian army commander was virtually independent of the general staff on all military and organisational questions. Commander Corbel, sent to Dvinsk in September 1916 on the death of a French airman, owed the possibility of visiting the neighbouring front to the « friendliness » of General Dragomirov, commander of the 5th Army.^{xviii} In the same way, by chance, the commander of the 12th army, Radko-Dimitrief, was a great francophile and favoured the actions of a technical mission^{xix}. The Head of Engineering of the 12th Army was sent on a mission to France and decided to improve the organisation of the military front in front of Riga according to the current methods adopted on the french front.

From the end of 1916 onwards, we therefore see the appearance of the first regular reports by the French military on the 12th army, reporting what happened first hand. In March 1917, Captain Aublet referred to the good defensive organisation of the troops of the 12th Army, in spite of difficult conditions, as well superior to that of the 5th army around Dvinsk, for example (good defence of premiers positions, trench networks communicating between each other, the construction of a complete network of roadways in wood and bridges on lakes, the organisation off allback positions, good artillery positions, etc.). But it was written in theses reports that the 12th Army lacked a guiding military plan, and given its fighting ground (lots of marshland), was virtually incapable of leading offensives of great scope. Through lack of being able to proceed with artillery preparations in France or detailed *reconnaisances* of enemy positions, but taking advantage of Russian superiority in numbers, the dominant idea was to give priority to « surprise attacks » (as in January 1917), which gave random results and were costly in terms of human lives lost^{xx}.

However, the French military were stupified to discover the mediocrity and even the negligence of certain officers: Janin, for example, recalled the criminal negligence of a commander of a Siberian regiment of the 12th Army responsible for the death of a thousand soldiers, having ordered them not to take gas masks into the trenches^{xxi}.

The February revolution accelerated the process, France becoming anxious and thus increasingly involved, with the aim of extending the war effort and avoiding an ill-fated peace or *débâcle* in its interests. In Riga, the French representative to the Northern Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Perchenet, carried

out several missions, but it was most of all a polytechnician engineer serving in the Navy, Gueneau, who played an important role: originally having come to electrify the network of barbed wire at the front, he rapidly extended his actions to the whole of the army, by training it and informing it about military questions^{xxii}.

Yet it was precisely when this detailed information began to reach Paris that revolutionary agitation began to reign amongst the Latvian soldiers. For the first time, a French source recalled in detailed fashion the history of the country from 1905 onwards, and the evolution of its troops which were « better instructed and more civilised », having always proved themselves « very courageous », and participating in all attacks. Gueneau particularly evokes the reasons for Latvian resentment, which was linked to bloody losses and to the sentiment of not being supported in their efforts by the Russian command. Germanophobia disappeared progressively in view of Russophobia, to the extent that it was felt that the Russians wanted to exterminate them all to get rid of them. But in the end, the Latvian troops were identified as being the most agitated and as being troublemakers, and those whose military value had the most diminished, even if the excuse of German propaganda, manipulating the Latvian soldiers was often evoked^{xxiii}. From March 1917 onwards, despite the fear of a German offensive and despite the popularity of General Radko, carelessness was apparent, together with a rapid degradation of troop moral, and a failure to maintain the trenches. The French reports signaled the rapid arrival from Petrograd of revolutionary delegates, fraternisation with enemy troops, or German propaganda which was increasingly present (Latvian soldiers taken behind enemy lines to enable them to understand the situation in Courland were evoked, or negotiations concerning Latvian autonomy guaranteed by Germany and an agreement on the sharing of territory with the Baltic people). The second Latvian brigade was said to have threatened to take by bayonet the artillery positions which wanted to carry on firing on the Germans^{xxiv}.

From August 1917 onwards, the German attack on the Riga front showed for the French military the negative spirit of the troops who were opposing resistance, seen as derisory despite the efforts of the provisional government officially invoking resistance, which was combative and orderly. If the role of some Latvians units in certain “delaying” battles was evoked, the telegrams sent to Paris mentioned most

of all the flight of some of the Latvian troops who showed little readiness to fight^{xxv}.

However, following the October Revolution, and in a tense military context, France desperately looked for an alternative solution to the loss of the Russian alliance: interest in the different Russian nationalities and especially their capacity to offer resistance to the German thrust suddenly increased as the emergency became greater. It is very reasonable to think that if the Riga front had been maintained with the essential role that the Latvian forces played, the Latvian cause would undoubtedly have progressed, at least in terms of the notoriety and recognition of the Latvian people. On the other side, the French military could not fail to notice the evolution of the image of the french military action. In April 1916, General de Laguiche could describe for example the great overexcitement of the soldiers at Dvinsk and the spontaneous desire they expressed to be « worthy of the French Army » of Verdun. In 1917, it was more a case of criticising a France which reduced the Russian empire and its nationalities to simple cannon fodder to be mobilised according to the strategic interests of the moment. Certainly, the incompetence of the Russian officers was recalled, and sometimes it was even thought that Latvian blood was sacrificed on purpose, but was this not also the result of a strategy going nowhere? On the French side, care was thus taken to underline the discouragement or irritation of the Baltic soldiers with the mutinies or disputes which had also seized fighters on the Western Front.

At the same time, Latvian propaganda began to achieve its first breakthrough in France, particularly in the political and intellectual circles which favoured the rights of the people and the defence of small nationalities in the context of a new international organisation based on collective law and security. The work carried out firstly in Switzerland then in Latvia by Austra Ozolin and Anna Kenine was to have considerable impact by making the Latvian question known in modest but influential circles, and the historian Seignobos, the linguist Meillet, and the politician Albert Thomas thus committed themselves to this moment in favour of Latvia. German policy in Courland, which aimed for a disguised annexation and favoured colonisation plans, could only increase part of public opinion's sensitivity to these arguments, circulated in brochures and memoirs. In these the first structured accounts of the events since 1905 and of the conflict since 1914 were circulated, which enable the Latvian question to become

understandable in both its political and military dimensions^{xxvi}.

However, given the disappearance of the Latvian military force and the context of the time, it was much more difficult for the Latvian representatives to use the political opportunities which presented themselves and thus to increase the standing of their constant military commitment since the war. Contrary to the Latvians, it was the Estonians who were able to exploit this temporary evolution of French policy by proclaiming their independence in February 1918 at the time of the German invasion of the country, and by underlining their refusal to resist German hegemony. British and French « de facto » recognition was very prudent in its terms. However, with the perspective of the German defeat and the rise in force of anti-soviet Russian troops, the French authorities were to come rapidly back to the idea of favorising the recognition of a Russian power, according at the very most, a very limited autonomy to the Baltic nations. In their eyes it would thus be capable of facing Germany, and Russia would thus, in its eyes, guarantee peace in Europe. But from now on, Estonia had official representatives in Paris and London, which would not be the case of the Latvians until the Peace Conference.

The Latvians however could take advantage of their past military commitment in only one case: that of the Imanta and Troitska regiments whose formation and most of all separation from Russian units was favoured by General Janin, former head of the French military mission previously in Siberia. Knowing precisely the operations which the Latvian soldiers had led, the General was able to obtain agreement from Paris on this subject, despite the hostility or considerable reserves of the Russian authorities in Siberia. If the role played by these formations in the civil war was very little emphasized until their return, it was much more the case for the French High Commissioner Damien de Martel, who was to become the first official French representative in Latvia in 1921^{xxvii}.

But to come back to the autumn of 1918, and while the Latvian representatives demanded substantial armed support to overcome the Bolshevik invasion, the French military and diplomats remained very reserved. The French press and French diplomats referred prolifically to the eminent role played by the Latvian soldiers in the guarding of the « Smolny Institute » and their essential contribution to the defence of the Revolution and the young Soviet state. On the contrary, the Latvian government,

soon to take refuge in Libau, lacked everything and seemed incapable of freeing itself from the pressure of the German military authorities and their Germano-Baltic allies^{xxviii}. In this context, it was therefore very

difficult for the Latvian government to refer to the contribution of the Latvian people to the Allied war effort and to a community of aims, whilst, as we have seen, very little had been known of all this at the time of the events. On the other hand, it became clear that the Baltic zone and populations were becoming an important part of the Russian equation to be resolved, and also a real geopolitical question to be resolved, especially as the Latvian zone in particular seemed to be torn between different powers and influences.

Once again, just after the global conflict, the Russian civil war and then the Baltic wars of independence, the Baltic front could again seem secondary in relation to other theatres of operations. There were few military forces capable of existing on their own and not depending totally on Allied aid. This aid was very difficult to dispatch, and with the end of the conflict, it was reduced as much as possible. Increasingly, it was feared that arming the different Baltic nations would enable them to use the weapons in new clashes with the Russians, leading to a slowing-down of the rebirth of the desired Russian power. All these arguments were of course reinforced by the influence of the tsarist or anti-soviet Russian circles which still had influence with the Quai d'Orsay, hence the very dangerous decision by the Allied governments and commands, for want of a better solution, to allow the German troops after the armistice to ensure the security of the Baltic regions. But if this choice was going to considerably perturb the evolution of the Latvian state by forcing it to enter into new conflicts, paradoxically it would show the importance of the Eastern Baltic as a geopolitical zone and would create a regional balance which would prevent any neighbouring power from obtaining political hegemony. Once again, it was the role of the military mission and the naval division to definitively perceive the solidity of the Baltic identities and national consciences through the mobilisation and commitment of their troops. This was all the easier as many of the military sent to the Baltic zone had served in Russia and knew themselves the past role of the Latvian soldiers. For example, General Niessel was to play an important role in the evacuation of the

“Freikorps”, and also Captain Buschenschutz, deputy to the military attaché during the war and who played an important part in Latvia in the training of the Latvian army. These military missions were to constitute an important stage in the adoption of the response which seemed the most relevant: the recognition of Baltic independences.

After 1921, and the progressive integration of the Baltic states into the « new » Europe, this complex evolution and these misunderstandings took rather a back seat. Linked to the commemoration by the Latvian state of the memory of the Latvian soldiers, French publicists speaking of Latvia would certainly refer to their heroic actions. Indeed, they had the merit of perfectly coinciding with the dominant national imagination, both past (the improvised soldiers of the Revolution going to defend the homeland in danger) and present (a miracle of the Marne or an opinionated resistance like at Verdun, but this time in Latvia). But more than this, it was the souvenir of Admiral Brisson and Colonel Duparquet during the struggle against the army of Von der Goltz or Bermond in 1919 which was evoked, as this of course enabled Franco-Latvian friendship to be shown at a better advantage.

For a historian of today, it is interesting to retrace this slow and confused evolution, these sometimes missed encounters between the evolution of the political and military situation in Latvia, and the variations in the interests of the French elite or public opinion. This shows the gaps or the agreements that can exist between a conflict or a regional theatre, and the global stakes with repercussions on the mentalities of fighters, with their inevitable « boomerang » effects, the despair and radicalisation of the Latvian fighters thus culminating in the modification in return of the vision of the region and the policies linked to this. Far from being linear, or deriving from a certain political or economic determinism, history is made up of detours and of complexe associations of events.

ⁱ AMAEF (*Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (français)* = *French Foreign Office Archives*), Guerre 1914-1918, vol. 702 (27 février 1918), and Jules NOULENS (1933), *Mon ambassade en Russie soviétique*, Paris, 1933, p. 247 sq.

ⁱⁱ See by exemple the article of the famous french historian Charles Seignobos : LVVA, F2575/7, 29 (Charles, SEIGNOBOS, « La politique française. La Lettonie », no date).

ⁱⁱⁱ AMAEF, Guerre, 1012 (23 septembre 1915).

^{iv} SHD (= *Service Historique de la Défense* = *French Military Archives*), 16N 1207, Dossier Laguiche, Telegramme n°86 (23 mai 1915).

^v AMAEF, Guerre, 1011, 15 mai 1915 et SHD, 5N 139 (n°97 (17 janvier 1916) and n° 524 (16 juillet 1916)

^{vi} AMAEF, Guerre, Russie, 641 (22 février 1915) et 1012 (12 août 1915 and passim)

^{vii} AMAEF, Guerre, 1013 (1^{er} novembre 12 et 24 novembre 1915, 29 décembre, 14 mars 1916, 3 septembre, 6 janvier 1917)

^{viii} SHD, 16N 1207 (op. cit, 1^{er} août 1915)

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- ^{ix} Karl-Heinz JANNSEN (1971), « Die baltische Okkupationspolitik des Detuschen Reiches » in HEHN (Jürgen von) et alii, Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten, Marburg, p. 217 sq.
- ^x See by ex. the article: : « La Situation militaire à la fin de 1915. VIII », *Journal des Débats*, 28 décembre 1915
- ^{xi} SHD, 5N118, Dossier Russie (4 aout 1914-30 sept 1916) : Notes relatives au projet du Général Alexeieff (decembre 1915) ; et 7N 757 (6 avril 1916)
- ^{xii} See the letter of General Joffre the 13th april 1916 (SHD, 5N 139)
- ^{xiii} SHD, 16N 3179, Dossier 13, n°33 (Janin, 19 janvier 1917) and Dossier 12 (2 janvier 1917))
- ^{xiv} SHD, 16N 3179, n°30(Analyse...Au GQG, 4 janvier 1917)
- ^{xv} Ibid, 10 janvier 191
- ^{xvi} SHD, Ibid, n°45 (21 janvier 1917) :
- ^{xvii} SHD, 16N 3180, Dossier Conference de Petrograd (Fevrier 1917, Rapport...Annexes V et VI (Etude sur le fonctionnement de la Mission militaire française en Russie))
- ^{xviii} SHD, 16N 3178, n°16bis (4/19-9/22 septembre 1916)
- ^{xix} Cf. Note 17 (« Etude sur le fonctionnement... », Rubrique D, note 4)
- ^{xx} SHD, 16 N 3179, Dossier 15 (N°46bis)
- ^{xxi} Ibid, n°130 (4 janvier 1917)
- ^{xxii} SHD, 16 N3181, Dossier 1 (7 août 1917)
- ^{xxiii} SHD, 16N 2997, Dossier 3 (Colonel Lavergne, 9/22 juin 1917) ; 16 N3181, Dossier 1 (3 août 1917) et Dossier 3 (30/12 août 1917, Gueneau)
- ^{xxiv} SHD, 16 N 1280 (Gueneau (7-20 juin 1917), Perchenet (4/17 juillet 1917) et Janin (26 mai 1917))
- ^{xxv} 16 N 3181, DOSSIER 2(8 septembre 1917, copies of tel. of the french Foreign Office, 5-6 september 1917)
- ^{xxvi} AMAEF, Guerre, 701 (Lettonie,6 mars 1917 and passim) et AAA, Politsches Archiv, Bern, 474-476 (passim)
- ^{xxvii} AMAEF, Europe 18-40, Lettonie, 1 (14 et 25 novembre 1918, 2 décembre 1918)
- ^{xxviii} See note 1 and AMAEF, Lettonie, 1 (29 janvier 1919, 4 février 1919, 28 avril 1919)