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Journal Articles RAIRO Operations Research Year : 2020

Z-equilibria in Bi-matrix Games with Uncertain Payoffs


The concept of Z-equilibrium has been introduced by Zhukovskii (Mathematical Methods in Operations Research. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia (1985) 103–195) for games in normal form. This concept is always Pareto optimal and individually rational for the players. Moreover, Pareto optimal Nash equilibria are Z-equilibria. We consider a bi-matrix game whose payoffs are uncertain variables. By appropriate ranking criteria of Liu uncertainty theory, we introduce some concepts of equilibrium based on Z-equilibrium for such games. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of the introduced concepts. Moreover, using mathematical programming, we present a procedure for their computation. A numerical example is provided for illustration.

Dates and versions

hal-02960353 , version 1 (07-10-2020)



Farida Achemine, Abdelkader Merakeb, Moussa Larbani, Philippe Marthon. Z-equilibria in Bi-matrix Games with Uncertain Payoffs. RAIRO Operations Research, 2020, 54 (2), pp.393--412. ⟨10.1051/ro/2019007⟩. ⟨hal-02960353⟩
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