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Morality and Equality from Rationality Alone - A repeated game approach of contractarianism

Abstract

This paper highlights the role that equality and reciprocity play in preserving peace and cooperation among individuals with conflicting interests. Following the contractarian tradition, I model a mutually beneficial interaction as a prisoner's dilemma and using repeated game theory, I show that a mutually beneficial joint venture may be undertaken only if the final distribution of incomes is sufficiently egalitarian. From a pre-moral context, the model allows to derive endogenous bounds on the income of each individual that reproduce Moehler (2018)'s weak universalisation principle. Contrasting with the well-known equity-efficiency trade-off, the model also produces an equity-efficiency complementarity.
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Dates and versions

hal-02948051 , version 1 (24-09-2020)
hal-02948051 , version 2 (03-03-2021)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02948051 , version 2

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Alexis Louaas. Morality and Equality from Rationality Alone - A repeated game approach of contractarianism. 2021. ⟨hal-02948051v2⟩
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