



**HAL**  
open science

# First Steps for Determining Agent Intention in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Nathalie Chetcuti-Sperandio, Alix Goudyme, Sylvain Lagrue, Tiago de Lima

► **To cite this version:**

Nathalie Chetcuti-Sperandio, Alix Goudyme, Sylvain Lagrue, Tiago de Lima. First Steps for Determining Agent Intention in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. 12th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence (ICAART 2020), Feb 2020, Valletta, Malta. pp.725-733, 10.5220/0008991207170724. hal-02946618

**HAL Id: hal-02946618**

**<https://hal.science/hal-02946618v1>**

Submitted on 23 Sep 2020

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

# First Steps for Determining Agent Intention in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Nathalie Chetcuti-Sperandio<sup>1</sup>, Alix Goudyme<sup>1</sup>, Sylvain Lagrue<sup>2</sup><sup>a</sup>  
and Tiago de Lima<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>CRIL, Artois University and CNRS, France

<sup>2</sup>HEUDIASYC, Université de Technologie de Compiègne, France

Keywords: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Intention, Epistemic Games.

Abstract: Modeling intention is essential to explain decisions made by agents. In this work, we propose a model of intention in epistemic games, represented in dynamic epistemic logic. Given a property and a sequence of actions already performed by a player in such a game, we propose a method able to determine whether the player had the intention to obtain the property. An illustration of the method is given using a simplified version of the collaborative game Hanabi.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Being able to determine the purpose of an agent or a group of agents from his knowledge would be of interest in areas such as economics, games and, of course, artificial intelligence. Our aim in this article is to be able to discover the agents' intention from, on the one hand, their knowledge of the actions at their disposal and, on the other hand, the actions they have finally carried out. We chose to restrict the study to epistemic games. The game world allows us to work within a defined framework and to have total control over the players' knowledge and actions. Epistemic games are games of incomplete information in which success depends mainly on the players' knowledge about the state of the game and about the other players' knowledge. Examples of this type of games are Cluedo or Hanabi.

Dynamic epistemic logic is a logic that deals with the knowledge of agents and its evolution as a result of events (Baltag and Moss, 2004), (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007). It thus appears as a formalism adapted to the logical modelling of intention in epistemic games, in this case in Hanabi, a game on which we chose to evaluate our work.

Our modelization of the intention differs from the Belief-Desire-Intention theory and it is closer to the intention developed by M.E. Bratman in *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason* (Bratman, 1987). Our modelization is somehow also a generalization of the

utility function described by T. Agotnes and H. van Ditmarsch (Agotnes and van Ditmarsch, 2011).


In the remainder of this article, we will first present the dynamic epistemic logic, then the Hanabi game, before detailing our work on intention modelling in this game.

## 2 DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC

### 2.1 Epistemic Logic

Epistemic logic (EL) is a modal logic that models the notions of agents knowledge and beliefs (Fagin et al., 2003). Let  $N$  be a finite set of agents. It contains the standard operators of classical propositional logic (CPL)  $\top, \perp, \neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$  plus a new operator  $K$  representing the *knowledge* of each agent in  $N$ . For example, the formula  $K_\alpha \neg(\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$  means “agent  $\alpha$  knows that  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  are not equivalent”.

Formulas in this logic are interpreted using *epistemic models*. Let  $\mathbb{P}$  be the set of propositions, and let  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  be a set of  $n$  agents. An epistemic model is a tuple of the form  $U = (M, \{R_i\}_{i \in N}, h)$ , where each  $R_i$  is an equivalence relation on  $M$  and  $h$  is a valuation function. The relations  $R_i$  are called *indistinguishability relations* and define the worlds that are indistinguishable for each agent. The valuation function associates a set of possible worlds in  $M$  to each proposition in  $\mathbb{P}$ . A possible world can then be seen as a model of CPL. We note possible worlds  $M_n$

<sup>a</sup> <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9292-3213>

(where  $n$  is an integer) and  $M$  represents the set of all the worlds  $M_n$ . Let  $\alpha \in N$ , we use  $U_{M_i}^{\alpha}$  to denote the set  $\{M_j \in M \mid (M_i, M_j) \in R_\alpha\}$

The satisfaction relation of epistemic logic is the same as for CPL plus the following:

- $\models_{M_j}^U K_\alpha \psi$  iff for all worlds  $M_i \in M$  we have  $M_j R_\alpha M_i \models_{M_i}^U \psi$
- $\models_{M_j}^U \hat{K}_\alpha \psi$  iff for some world  $M_i \in M$  we have  $M_j R_\alpha M_i \models_{M_i}^U \psi$

Agents can reason about the knowledge of other agents. They can imagine worlds that they know are false but potentially true for other agents. For example, the formula  $K_1 K_2 p \wedge \neg K_2 K_1 K_2 p$  means that agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows  $p$  but agent 2 does not know that agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows  $p$ .

Note that we use the notion of knowledge in this article, instead of belief. Indeed, in games, if one follows the rules, players can only believe truths, even for games where lying is allowed. In the latter case, players, knowing that others may lie, do not take the claims of other players as truth. The only way for an assertion to be false is if the rules have not been respected.

## 2.2 Actions

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) extends EL by adding actions (for more details, see (Plaza, 1989), (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997), (Baltag and Moss, 2004), (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007)).

**Definition 1.** An atomic action is a pair formed by a precondition and postcondition  $a = (pre(a), post(a))$ , where  $pre(a)$  is a formula in EL and  $post(a)$  is a partial function with signature  $\mathbb{P} \rightarrow \{\top, \perp, p, \neg p\}$ .

In particular, action “*nop*” is the pair  $(\top, \emptyset)$ . This action represents the action of “doing nothing”, which has no precondition (i.e., it can be executed at any time) and does not change the state of the world (i.e., the value of each proposition  $p$  remains the same).

Let  $A$  be the set of possible actions and  $U = (M, R, h)$  the current epistemic model. Executing the action  $a \in A$ , in  $U$  generates the model  $U|_a = (M|_a, R|_a, h|_a)$  where:

- $M|_a = \{M_i \in M \text{ such that } \models_{M_i}^U pre(a)\}$  is the restriction to the set of the worlds satisfying the precondition of  $a$ .
- $R|_a = R \cap (M|_a \times M|_a)$  is the restriction of relations to the worlds of  $M|_a$ .
- $h|_a(p) = \{M_i \in M \text{ such that } \models_{M_i}^U post(a)(p)\} \cap M|_a$  is the restriction of the valuation to the worlds

of  $M|_a$  along with the reassignment of the values of propositional variables.

In our setting, agents can execute *indeterminate actions*. This means that a player may not know what action he is actually performing. For example, in Hanabi, a player can place a card without knowing which one it is. The effects of this action are not determined for the player. To deal with that, we allow in our setting actions of the form  $AI = a_1 \cup a_2 \cup \dots \cup a_k$ , where each  $a_i$  is an atomic action. The operator  $\cup$  thus behaves as a non-deterministic choice. And, for each pair  $(a_i, a_j)$ , we have  $pre(a_i) \wedge pre(a_j) \equiv \perp$ , i.e., the atomic actions are mutually exclusive. The execution of  $AI$  in a universe  $U$  is defined as follows.

**Definition 2.** Let  $U^{M_0}$  be a pointed universe, where  $U = (M, R, h)$  is a universe and  $M_0 \in M$  is the actual world in  $U$ . The execution of an indeterminate action  $AI$  in  $U^{M_0}$  is as follows:

- if there is  $a_i \in AI$  such that  $\models_{M_0}^{U^{M_0}} pre(a_i)$ , then execute action  $a_i$  in  $U^{M_0}$ ,
- otherwise, execute action  $(\perp, \emptyset)$  in  $U^{M_0}$

Therefore, the result of the execution of an indeterminate action is a non-deterministic choice among the actions that are executable in the actual possible world. If none of the atomic actions composing the indeterminate action is executable in the actual world, then we obtain an empty universe.

In what follows, we use  $A^*$  to denote the set of all indeterminate actions.

**Definition 3.** Let  $A$  be a finite set of actions,  $U^{M_0} = (M, R, h)$  a pointed universe and  $\alpha$  an agent of  $N$ . We call complete indeterminate action for agent  $i$  in  $U^{M_0}$  all the elements  $AI$  of  $A^*$  such that  $\forall a \in AI, \exists M_j \in M$  such that  $M_0 R_\alpha M_j$  such that  $\models_{M_j}^U pre(a)$  and for all  $M_j \in M_j \in M$  such that  $M_0 R_\alpha M_j \exists a \in AI$  such that  $\models_{M_j}^U pre(a)$ . We denote  $A^{*\alpha}$  the set of all complete indeterminate actions for agent  $\alpha$  in  $U^{M_0}$ .

Many games are turn based. Adding the concept of game turn to dynamic epistemic logic can be complicated and constraining. Introducing simultaneous actions of all the players (*joint actions*) was preferred. Game turns are then modelled using the *nop* action: on each turn, one player plays while the others perform the *nop* action (do nothing). The following definition of joint action is based on the ATDEL logic (de Lima, 2014).

**Definition 4.** Let  $A$  be a set of atomic actions, and let  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  be a set of  $n$  players (agents). A joint action  $aj$  is an element of the set  $A^n$ , one atomic action for each player in  $N$ . We associate, to each joint action  $aj$ , a joint pre-condition  $pre_j(aj)$  and a joint post-condition  $post_j(aj)$ , defined by:




Figure 1: Example of an action.

- $pre_j(a_j) = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n pre(a_i)$
- $\forall p \in P \ post_j(a_j)(p) = \begin{cases} \top, & \text{if } \exists a_i, \ post(a_i)(p) = \top \\ & \text{and } \forall a_i \ post(a_i)(p) = \top \text{ or is undefined} \\ \perp, & \text{if } \exists a_i, \ post(a_i)(p) = \perp \\ & \text{and } \forall a_i \ post(a_i)(p) = \perp \text{ or is undefined} \\ \neg p, & \text{if } \exists a_i, \ post(a_i)(p) = \neg p \\ & \text{and } \forall a_i \ post(a_i)(p) = \neg p \text{ or is undefined} \\ p, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

However, the joint actions defined above are built from atomic actions and not from indeterminate actions. For this case, we have the following definition.

**Definition 5.** Let  $A$  be the set of atomic actions, and let  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  the set of agents. Let the indeterminate action  $AI_i$ , for each agent  $i \in N$ , be of the form:  $AI_i = (a_{1,1} \cup \dots \cup a_{1,j_i})$ . The indeterminate joint action is a non-deterministic choice of joint actions, i.e., it is of the form  $X = X_1 \cup X_2 \cup \dots \cup X_m$ , where each  $X_j = (a_{1,k}, \dots, a_{n,\ell})$  is a tuple of atomic actions, one for each agent.

In other words, an indeterminate joint action is a non-deterministic choice between joint actions, one for each agent, each one formed by atomic actions. The execution of the indeterminate joint action  $X$  in  $U$  is given as in Definitions 2 and 4 above.

### Example

In the example presented in Figure 1, the initial epistemic state  $U$  is on the left. There are three worlds and a propositional variable  $p$ . The world  $M_0$  is circled twice: it is the actual world. The actual world is the one that represents reality (that is, what is true at the moment). The worlds  $M_0$  and  $M_2$  belong to  $h(p)$ , the world  $M_1$  does not belong to  $h(p)$ . Let  $a$  be an action defined by the precondition  $pre(a) = p$  and the postcondition  $post(a)(p) = \perp$ , the result of the execution of the action  $a$  on the universe  $U$  is shown on the right: the worlds  $M_0$  and  $M_2$  satisfy the precondi-



Figure 2: Presentation of the game Hanabi.

tion, they are thus kept and the propositional variable acquires a new value, the one of the post-condition.

## 3 HANABI

We will use the game Hanabi in several examples of this article. Hanabi is a cooperative turn-based card game where 2 to 5 players aim at scoring a maximum number of points (see Figure 2). The cards are of five different colors (blue, green, red, yellow and white) and five different numbers (1 to 5). For each color, there are three cards with number 1, two cards with number 2, two cards with number 3, two cards with number 4 and one card with number 5. There are three clue tokens and also eight life tokens.

To score points, the players must join forces to pile up cards on the table. Each stack has cards of one and same color and they must be numerically ordered. For example, a stack of white cards must start with a white 1 and then it can have a white 2 over it etc., until the white 5. The stack may be incomplete. One point is scored for each card in the table, for a maximum score of 25 points (i.e. five stacks of five cards each).

The players start with 4 to 5 cards each (depending on the total number of players). The remaining cards are piled up face down on a deck. The particularity of Hanabi is that the players cannot see their own cards, but they can see the other players' cards. The actions available for the player are: (i) give a clue; (ii) discard a card; (iii) try to place a card on a stack or on the table.

**Give a Clue.** On his turn, a player  $a$  can give a clue to only one other player  $b$ . The clue covers all player's  $b$  cards. It must be complete and can relate to only one of the 10 characteristics that cards can have (color or number). For example, if player 1 tells player 3 "Your 1st and 4th cards are blue" then the other cards must not be blue. Finally, when a player gives a clue, a

clue token is consumed. This action is only possible if there are clue tokens available.

**Discard a Card.** On his turn, a player can take a card from his hand and put it on the discard pile, face up. Then, the player can draw a new card from the deck, if any, and regains a clue token.

**Place a Card.** When the player chooses to place one of her cards, there are two possibilities: either (i) the card can be placed on one of the stacks or the table or (ii) it cannot. A card can be placed on the stack of its color, if the card at the top of this stack is the previous card (preceding number). A card of number 1 can be placed directly on the table if there is no stack of that color on the table. Placing a card of number 5 makes it possible to complete a stack and to gain a token of life. When a card cannot be placed on a stack or on the table, the card ends up in the discard pile, face up, and the players loose one life token.

**End of the Game.** The game ends if there are no more life tokens, or if the maximum number of points is reached, or after a complete turn following the draw of the last card of the deck.

## 4 INTENTION

### 4.1 Principles

The purpose of our work is to determine, *a posteriori*, the intentions that a player had during a game. In other words, we would like to explain the actions performed by a player during a game. Our idea is based on the following principle: *compared to all the potential results imagined by the player, did he perform the action that led him to the best expected result?* In the following, we will explain this idea in more detail. Let a player and a property  $p$ , expressed as a formula in CPL, be given.

**First Principle.** We associate, to each universe  $U$  and a proposition  $p$ , a value  $v(U, p)$  called *frequency of the property  $p$*  which, as its name suggests, is equal to the frequency of the worlds satisfying  $p$ , indistinguishable from the actual world for the player (see Figure 3). This idea was originally proposed by Markus Eger in his thesis (Eger, 2018).

**Second Principle.** Suppose the player imagines only one possible world, the actual world, and has two




Figure 3: Illustration of the first principle.




Figure 4: Illustration of the simple second principle.

possible actions  $a$  and  $b$  (see Figure 4). The action  $a$  leads to a universe of value 0 and the action  $b$  to a universe of value 1. The best action for the property  $p$  is therefore the action  $b$ . If the player performed the action  $b$ , then he intended to get the property  $p$ , otherwise he did not had that intention. The value of the universe obtained by the best action is assigned to the initial universe.

Suppose now that the player imagines two possible worlds, still with two actions  $a$  and  $b$  (see Figure 5). In the first world, the action  $a$  leads to a universe with value 0.5 and the action  $b$  to a universe with value 1. In the second world, the action  $a$  leads to a universe with value 0.5 and the action  $b$  to a universe with value 0. The worlds being equivalent for the player, there is as much chance for him to be in one as in the other. Actions are therefore associated with the average values of the universes to which they lead. The value of  $a$  is therefore 0.5 and the value of  $b$  is 0.5 as well. As before, we assign to the initial universe the value of the best action (or best actions like here). In this case, no matter what action was performed, getting the property  $p$  cannot be considered intentional since all the actions make it possible to obtain it with the same chances. It's a difference with the Belief-Desire-Intention theory within the intention operator is a normal operator. In particular, in the BDI theory there is the intention of tautology, this is not the case here.

On the other hand, the intention to obtain a property is clear in the case where there is only one best action for that. For other percentages of best actions among all actions, it is more difficult to measure intention. So if it still seems relevant to talk about intention when there are 2 best actions among 10 actions to obtain a property, for 5 best actions out of 10 one




Figure 5: Illustration of the second principle.




Figure 6: Illustration of the third principle.

could speak of randomness. And at 9 best actions out of 10, it is hard to talk about intention to get the property. However, in the latter case, we then have one best action out of 10 to obtain the non-propriety. We are considering establishing thresholds of intention to take it into account more finely.

**Third Principle.** In a third example, the player imagines two worlds again, but this time it is up to another player to play and this one has three possible actions: *a*, *b* and *c* (see Figure 6). Since the second player has his own goals, the different actions are more or less interesting in terms of his personal objectives and the measure of this interest is called *utility*. However, what will be taken into account here is not the utility defined by the second player but what the first player imagines to be the utility for the second player.

First, suppose that the first world is the actual world, the first player imagines the utility of the actions, for example  $u(a) = 0.6$ ,  $u(b) = 0.6$  and  $u(c) = 0.3$ . The first player assumes that the second player is rational and therefore will perform a maximum utility action. Since the two actions *a* and *b* have maximum utility, the first player thinks that the second player will perform one of these two actions with equiprobability. These two actions lead to two different universes whose values are 0.8 and 0.6. The average value of these two actions, which is 0.7, is assigned to the first world. The same reasoning is done with the second world. The actions have different utilities, the universes thus generated have different values and, eventually, the value for this second world is 0.3. Finally, the average value of both worlds is 0.5 and it is assigned to the current universe.

The method of determining the intention of a player proposed here is based on these 3 principles.

**Example.** Consider 3 players and some property *p*. We want to determine the best action for player 1 to get the property *p* in 3 turns. We begin by develop-

ing the tree of the universes as described previously but on 3 turns; this tree has 4 levels. The first level is composed of the initial universe. The second level is composed of the set of possible universes imagined by player 1 after his turn. The third level is composed of the set of possible universes for player 1 after his turn and player 2's turn. The fourth level is composed of the set of possible universes for player 1 after the turns of player 1, 2 and 3. The values of the universes of the fourth level are calculated using the first principle. Then the values of the universes of the third and second level can be calculated by means of the third principle. Finally the value of the universe of the first level is calculated using the second principle. This makes it possible to check whether the action performed by player 1 is the one that, from the point of view of the player in question, had the best chance of obtaining the property *p*.

**Note.** The notion of the value of a universe is close to that of utility. Actually, for the simplest examples, the value of the universe is simply the frequency of occurrence of the desired property within the universe, in other words, the probability of obtaining it. Since a universe is linked to the action that makes it possible to reach it, each action can be assigned a measure of its utility to obtain the property. This therefore defines a utility. However, we prefer not to use this term because we give values to states and not to actions.

## 4.2 Intention in Epistemic Games

First, we define a utility function that will associate, to each world, each action and each player, a value.

**Definition 6.** Let *A* be a finite set of actions, *N* a finite set of players, and *U* a universe. A utility function *u* is a function that associates a real number  $x \in \mathbb{R}$  to each triple  $(AI, \alpha, M_i) \in A^* \times N \times M$ . A Measured Actionable Universe (MAU)  $\Omega$  is a triple  $(U, A, u)$ .

**Definition 7.** Let  $\Omega = (U, A, u)$  be a measured actionable universe,  $M_i \in M$  a world and  $\alpha \in N$  an agent.  $A_{M_i, \alpha}^\Omega = \{a \in A^{*\alpha} \mid \forall b \in A^{*\alpha}, u(a, \alpha, M_i) \geq u(b, \alpha, M_i)\}$  is the set of the most useful actions for  $\alpha$  in the world  $M_i$ .

Now we will formally define the first principle, that is, the calculation of the frequency of a propositional variable within the worlds that the player cannot distinguish from the actual world.

**Definition 8.** Let  $U^{M_0}$  be a universe,  $p$  an epistemic formula and  $\alpha \in N$  an agent. We note  $H(p) = \{M_i \in M \mid \models_{M_i}^{U^{M_0}} p\}$  The presence ratio of  $p$  for  $\alpha$  is

$$pr_\alpha^{U^{M_0}}(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{|I_\alpha^{U^{M_0}} \cap H(p)|}{|I_\alpha^{U^{M_0}}|}, & \text{if } I_\alpha^{U^{M_0}} \neq \emptyset \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The value of a universe, according to a property  $p$ , for  $k$  game turns can now be defined.

**Definition 9.** Let  $\Omega = (U^{M_0}, A, u)$  be a measured actionable universe,  $\alpha \in N$  an agent,  $p$  an epistemic formula and  $k$  a positive integer. Also let  $A_{M_i}^\alpha = A_{M_i, 1}^\Omega \times A_{M_i, \alpha-1}^\Omega \times A_{M_i, \alpha+1}^\Omega \times A_{M_i, n}^\Omega$ . The value of the universe  $U^{M_0}$  for the agent  $\alpha$  to the order  $k$  is:

$$v(U^{M_0}, A, u, \alpha, p, k \geq 1) = \max_{a \in A^{*\alpha}} v_a(U^{M_0}, A, u, \alpha, p, k)$$

where:

$$v_a(U^{M_0}, A, u, \alpha, p, k \geq 1) = \sum_{M_i \in I_\alpha^{U^{M_0}}} avg_{action} \times \frac{1}{|I_\alpha^U|}$$

where:

$$avg_{action} = \sum_{(a_1, \dots, a_{\alpha-1}, a_{\alpha+1}, a_n) \in A_{M_i}^\alpha} value \times \frac{1}{|A_{M_i}^\alpha|}$$

where:

$$value = v(U_{|(a_1, \dots, a_n)}^{M_i}, A, u, \alpha, p, k-1)$$

and

$$v(U^{M_0}, A, u, \alpha, p, 0) = pr_\alpha^{U^{M_0}}(p)$$

The function max in the formula characterizes the second principle, while the double sum characterizes the third principle. When it is the turn of a specific player, the only action performed by the other players is the action *nop*. The second sum then has only one element, so there is no average on the actions of other players, which corresponds to the second principle. When it is the turn of one of the other players, the only action maximum for the specific player is the action *nop*, his other actions giving empty universes and thus null values.

**Definition 10.** Let  $\Omega = (U^{M_0}, A, u)$  be a measured actionable universe,  $\alpha \in N$  an agent,  $p$  an epistemic formula and  $k$  a positive integer. The set of the best actions to obtain property  $p$  at the  $k$ -th turn for the player  $\alpha$ , is the set:

$$Best(\Omega, p, \alpha, k) = \{a \in A^{*\alpha} \mid \forall b \in A^{*\alpha}, v_a(U^{M_0}, A, u, \alpha, p, k) \geq v_b(U^{M_0}, A, u, \alpha, p, k)\}$$

These last two definitions are used to characterize the best actions according to the player to get a property  $k$  game turns in advance. Thus, given a property  $p$ , one can check if the player has made the best sequence of actions to obtain it. If this is the case, then obtaining  $p$  was intentional, otherwise we consider that  $p$  was obtained by accident. For example, if the agent  $\alpha$  performed the action  $a$  and if  $a \in Best(\Omega, p, \alpha, k)$  then this was intentional. This becomes false if all the actions are among the best actions ( $Best(\Omega, p, \alpha, k) = A$ ), in which case no action is intentional.

### 4.3 Utility

The calculation of the best action requires defining a utility for the actions, or more precisely, a utility from the point of view of the player for the actions of the other players. Finding the best way to model utility for a game is a research work in itself and it is not what we were aiming at. Therefore we propose a utility definition based on the end-of-game reward that is calculable by any player for any other player as long as the end-of-game reward information is accessible to all the players.

A player imagines several possible worlds and for each world he imagines, the other players can imagine other worlds. In Figure 7, for player 1, the world  $M_0$  and the world  $M_1$  are indistinguishable from the actual world  $M_0$ . As for player 2, the worlds  $M_0$  and  $M_5$  are indistinguishable and the worlds  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  are indistinguishable.

We start by defining the utility of the actions for player 2 according to player 1. Player 1 knows that player 2 hesitates between either the clique of worlds  $M_0$  and  $M_5$ , or the clique of worlds  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ . So these two cliques must be treated separately. We focus first on the first clique. To calculate the utility of an action of the player 2 according to a world of the clique, the following reasoning is made:

- this world is supposed to be the actual world;
- the maximum score that could be reached at the end of the game after having performed the joint action of player 2 and the other players (here player 1 only) is computed;

- the average over all the other players' actions (here player 1 only) is calculated;
- this average is defined as the utility of the action for this world.

As the players consider these worlds equiprobably, to compare the actions, it is necessary to calculate the average utility of all the worlds of the clique. This provides the utility of the action for this clique. Finally, we define the utility of an action of player 2 from a world possible for player 1 as being equal to the utility of the clique that it generates for player 2. For the other worlds, the value of utility, having no importance, is set arbitrarily.

As regards the utilities of player 1 for himself they do not matter, so they are also arbitrarily set.

For turn-based games, only the *nop* action does not give an empty universe when it is not up to the player to play. Therefore it is not possible to give values to the utilities of the other actions. Giving an identical value to each empty universe would not change the order of the values of the utilities of the actions. One can also skip this step of averaging on the actions of other players. In both cases, the action of the greatest utility will be the same.

### 4.4 Example

We will use the game Hanabi in a simplified version to illustrate the use of the previously given definitions. In the simplified game, there are only red cards of numbers 1, 2 and 3 and two players. There are eight clue tokens and three life tokens. There are only three actions (D, P and C): discard a card, place a card, give a clue (which corresponds here to giving the value of the other player's card). After dealing the cards, player 1 has the card of number 1 and player 2 has the card of number 2, so the deck consists of the card of number 3. Figure 7 shows the initial universe. The game is over: player 1 started by giving the clue "you have the card of number 2" and, after player 2's turn, player 1 knew her card and the card of number 2 had not been discarded. We will check if the property "player 2 has not discarded her card and the player 1 knows her card", noted  $p = \neg D : 2 \wedge (B_1 J 1 : 1 \vee B_1 J 1 : 2 \vee B_1 J 1 : 3)$ , was obtained intentionally.

In the initial universe (Figure 7), player 1 imagines two possible worlds:  $M_0$  and  $M_1$ . Then two cases must be considered: one is where the actual world is  $M_0$  and the other one is where the actual world is  $M_1$  (see Figure 8). The value of the action "give a clue" must be calculated. Player 1 declares "you have the card of number 2". As a consequence, all the worlds that do not satisfy "player 2 holds the card of number




Figure 7: Initial universe.




Figure 8: Initialization of the calculation of the value of the actions of player 1.




Figure 9: Calculation of the value of the action "give a clue" in world  $M_0$ .

2" disappear. In this example, performing this action in  $M_0$  (respectively in  $M_1$ ) yields the universe  $U_{|C}^{M_0}$  (respectively  $U_{|C}^{M_1}$ , where the actual world differs), presented in Figure 9. In this universe  $U_{|C}^{M_0}$ , player 2 has the same three possible actions. If the world  $M_0$  is the actual world, the actions D and P have a utility of 1



and the action C has a utility of 3. Therefore, player 1 thinks that player 2 will perform this action, which means we obtain the property  $p$  with frequency of 1. If the world  $M_1$  is the actual world, the three actions D, P and C have a utility of 1. For player 1, player 2 will perform one of these three actions equiprobably. The property is not true after performing actions D or P, whereas it is true with a frequency of 1 after performing action C. Thus, this universe value is:  $\frac{1+\frac{1}{3}}{2}$ .

The same reasoning is used for  $U_C^{M_1}$  which, in this example, has the same computations as  $U_C^{M_0}$ . By calculating the average value of these two universes, the value of the action "give a clue" is:

$$v_{Clue}(U^{M_0}, A, u, 1, p, 2) = \frac{\frac{1+\frac{1}{3}}{2} + \frac{1+\frac{1}{3}}{2}}{2} = \frac{2}{3}$$

Similarly,  $v_{Discard}(U^{M_0}, A, u, 1, p, 2) = \frac{1}{3}$  and  $v_{Place}(U^{M_0}, A, u, 1, p, 2) = \frac{2}{3}$ . Hence, the best actions are giving a clue and placing a card. Consequently, the player intended to get the property "I know my card, and player 2 did not discard his" after two turns.

## 5 CONCLUSION

We defined here a modelling of intention. This is not the first work integrating intention and epistemic logic. Lorini and Herzig (Lorini and Herzig, 2008) model intention via operators of successful or failed attempts. However, their logic models time linearly (*i.e.* there is only one possible future). It is therefore much less natural to capture game semantics.

Note that, in our approach, the more a formula is specific to a target universe, the more certain it is that the actions will be considered intentional. Therefore, a more general formula would, a priori, result in a better characterization of intention. We intend, in future contributions, to define the generality of a formula within a set of universes.

Also note that worlds are considered here as equiprobable. It might be interesting, in a future work, to integrate weighted logics such as the one presented by Legastelois (Legastelois, 2017).

Our modelling takes into account players able to imagine all the possible worlds and all the universes that would result from them following the actions they think most relevant. If a machine already has limited resources, this same job for a human is even more difficult. One of the ways to take this limitation into account would be to consider an action as one of the best when its value exceeds a given threshold (for example, 80% of the real maximum value).

Finally, a multi-valued logic such as the one in

(Yang et al., 2019) could be used to reduce the size of epistemic models. Integration of this in our work seems feasible.

## REFERENCES

- Agotnes, T. and van Ditmarsch, H. (2011). What will they say? public announcement games. *Synthese*, 179:57–91.
- Baltag, A. and Moss, L. (2004). Logic for epistemic programs. *Synthese*, 139(2):165–224.
- Bratman, M. E. (1987). *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*. CSLI Publications.
- de Lima, T. (2014). Alternating-time temporal dynamic epistemic logic. *Journal of Logic and Computation*, 24(6):1145–1178.
- Eger, M. (2018). *Intentional Agents for Doxastic Games*. PhD thesis, North Carolina State University.
- Fagin, R., Halpern, J., Moses, Y., and Vardi, M. (2003). *Reasoning about knowledge*. MIT Press.
- Gerbrandy, J. and Groeneveld, W. (1997). Reasoning about information change. *Journal of Logic, Language, and Information*, 6(2):147–169.
- Legastelois, B. (2017). *Extension pondérée des logiques modales dans le cadre des croyances graduelles*. PhD thesis, Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris VI.
- Lorini, E. and Herzig, A. (2008). A logic of intention and attempt. *Synthese*, 163(1):45–77.
- Plaza, J. (1989). Logics of public communications. In *IS-MIS*, pages 201–216.
- van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., and Kooi, B. (2007). *Dynamic Epistemic Logic*. Springer.
- Yang, S., Taniguchi, M., and Tojo, S. (2019). 4-valued logic for agent communication with private/public information passing. In *ICAART*, pages 54–61.