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Visual Analytics of Bitcoin Mining Pool Evolution: On the Road Toward Stability?

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Abstract—We present our work on visual analytics tools to support the analysis of Bitcoin mining pool evolution. Mining blocks are a critical component of the Bitcoin ecosystem, helping to keep the system secure, valid, and stable. At the same time, mining is a resource-intensive activity that continues to get more and more difficult. Mining pools have emerged to address this issue and to ensure a more stable and predictable income by sharing computing power. Yet, increased centralization of the mining power is also not without dangers (e.g., the 51% attack), and, thus, it is important to better understand and analyze mining pool activities in Bitcoin. Here, we report three contributions: our extensive data collection on Bitcoin mining pools, our development of two custom visualizations, and our first exploratory data analysis leading to hypotheses and documented activities about pools’ main features such as market share, reward rules, or location.

Index Terms—Bitcoin, Mining pools, Visual analytics.

I. INTRODUCTION

The sharp increase of Bitcoin’s value has attracted great attention on cryptocurrencies and their underlying technology, the Blockchain. In the Bitcoin ecosystem, miners are major actors from cryptographic as well as economic viewpoints. Miners ensure the validity and security of the Blockchain, which is fundamental for people’s trust in the cryptocurrency. Mining is a computing and energy-intensive activity that is rewarded by newly created bitcoins in case of successful mining [1]. While this incentive scheme is fundamental for a proper functioning and growth of Bitcoin, the required resources and unpredictability of mining success has led miners to join their resources in pools. Mining pools gather the mining power of all members to maximize the probability of successful mining, and so, expected rewards [2]. However, concentration of mining power in the hands of very few pools raises security issues, such as an increased likelihood of a 51% attack [3]. Despite the potential danger, mining pools have grown steadily and become critical supporters of the Bitcoin ecosystem.

Understanding the sustainability of the organization of mining activities in pools is critical to assess the future of Bitcoin, and more generally, of blockchain-based technology. A major component of the sustainability of mining systems is the economic efficiency of pools. Yet, it is always difficult to assess the efficiency of an organization. In a competitive context, the stability of organizations that operate on a market tends to illustrate their relative efficiency. In our case, the stability of

mining pools and their distributions can illustrate the efficiency of the system. If new pools easily enter the market, they generate visible turbulence in the system and indicate that the mining ecosystem is not yet efficiently working.

In this article, we make three contributions: (a) we contribute an extensive data collection on Bitcoin mining, (b) we developed custom visualizations dedicated to analyzing the emergence and evolution of mining pools from our data, and (c) we report on findings from our first exploratory analysis using our data and visualizations. Our exploratory analysis shows that mining pools tend to converge toward a limited set of configurations (reward rule, location, hash rate, etc.). In particular, we show that mining market share distributions have become more stable across time and are now operated by a few numbers of pools. Moreover, pools have converged towards a main specific reward payout rule called Pay-Per-Share (PPS). Concerning the geographic location of mining pools, historically, the dominant pools have been hosted in China but tend now to become more globally operated. All this evidence suggests that mining activities have undergone a rationalization process and might currently provide a solid foundation for the stability of the Bitcoin ecosystem.

II. RELATED WORKS

As mining is central to how Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies work, researchers have started to analyze it more closely. Much of the research on Bitcoin mining and mining pools is theoretical in nature and focuses on analyzing reward rules [2], [4], [5], mining strategies [6], [7], and attacks [3], [8]–[10].

Yet, empirical analyses on mining pools have also recently emerged. Wang and Liu [11] provided evidence that the top mining pools became larger as the hash rate grew exponentially between Mar. 2013 and Mar. 2014. The authors analyzed the profit of mining regarding hardware cost and electricity price and concluded that the profit became negative when the hash rate increased faster than the Bitcoin price. Romiti et al. [12] analyzed the distribution of mining pools from Dec. 2013 to Dec. 2018 and found that 3–4 mining pools controlled >50% of the hash rate. The authors further analyzed the reward payout among the top-3 mining pools and found that a small number of members received a total of >50% of the reward from the pool. In addition, the authors detected cross-pool miners who received rewards from multiple mining

pool and provided evidence that miners tend to transfer their rewards to exchange services and wallet providers. Wang et al. [13] analyzed the daily hash rate of the top mining pools from Feb. 2016 to Jan. 2019. They found that mining pools increased their hash rate exponentially in order to maintain their market share. Mining pools were caught in the Prisoner’s Dilemma—if they increase their hash rate to compete with other pools their mining profit diminishes. Finally, Wang et al.’s data confirmed that pools tended to collect transactions that gave large transaction fees to maximize their profit.

Instead of focusing on just a few mining pools and a limited timeframe, our work allows to study mining pool distribution more broadly using a number of different parameters. As such, our work has some overlap with previous works (e. g., Romiti et al.’s study of mining pool distribution) but also extends the work with custom visualizations that show not only the distributions but also help to detect changes in the mining pool ranks over time. We also provide a first exploratory analysis of the evolution of reward rules and locations which has not been studied in previous empirical works. Our results provide new information toward more realistic theoretical models of the Bitcoin mining organization.

III. DATA DESCRIPTION

To analyze the evolution of Bitcoin mining over time, we collected coinbase transactions (the first transaction in each block) from the Bitcoin genesis block (the first ever mined block) until the last block mined in 2019. From the coinbase transactions, we extracted a number of different metrics as described next. We also collected monthly Bitcoin statistics from Blockchain.info and historic data about mining pools from the Bitcoin Wiki to give context to the mining activity.

A. Mining pool reward distribution

We tagged each coinbase transaction we collected with one mining pool (or “unknown”) based on the data from Romiti et al. [12] who collected and manually resolved pool names from various sources (i. e. Blockchain.info, BTC.com, and Blocktrail.com). For each transaction we calculated a *mining reward* as the summation of the pre-defined *block reward* and the variably assigned *transaction fees* for the block. We converted the mining reward from Bitcoin currency to US Dollar using the daily market price data from Blockchain.info. Finally, we aggregated *the number of blocks* and *mining rewards* for each mining pool per month and calculated each pool’s *market share*—the percentage of blocks mined by the pool compared to the total blocks in the month.

B. External mining pool data

Some important information about mining pools is not available for extraction from the Bitcoin blockchain. For example, data on reward payout schemes (how are reward payments distributed to members), mining pool locations, or fees are specific to how each pool operates. To obtain additional information, we collected tabular data available in

the Bitcoin Wiki¹. The wiki maintains an overview table of mining pools that includes information regarding pool name, location, size, reward type, transaction fees, among others. The table is maintained by the community and regularly changed. We crawled the editing history of the construct panel table about mining pools. We simplified the panel data to monthly granularity using the most recent edit for each month. For the mining pools that did not exist in the table, we manually searched for information from the pool’s website and mining pool comparison articles from the internet². The reward rules are categorized into main groups (see Fig. 2). The location of mining pools are grouped by continent-level (see Fig. 3). We defined “global” for pools that operated in more than two continents and kept China separately.

Finally, we collected Bitcoin statistics on hash rate and mining difficulty, transactions (number per block, mempool size, etc.), and market price from Blockchain.info and aggregated the data to obtain averages for each month.

IV. VISUAL ANALYTICS OF BITCOIN MINING POOLS

We built two custom visualizations to analyze mining pool evolution based on a user-centered design process. In this process two computer scientists collaborated closely with an economist (all authors of this paper). We identified design requirements and goals and iteratively revised prototype visualization designs. The two main analysis tasks we identified in the process are centered on: (1) the emergence and evolution of mining pool market shares and (2) external factors influencing the evolution of mining pool market shares and their distribution.

A. Visualizing the emergence and evolution of mining pool market shares

In order to learn when mining pools started to gain market share and which pools dominated the market over time, we focused our first visualization on temporal mining activity. Fig. 1 (a) provides information on the historic evolution of the top 25 mining pools based on the average market share over the entire period. This visualization allows the viewer to see an overview of active mining pools row-by-row. For each mining pool, we see when it started to mine blocks, how it accumulated or lost mining power, and whether it stopped its operations. For each pool and each month in the timeline, we draw a circle representing its market share and use a heated color scale to represent mining power domination (0%–>50%) to highlight the pools that were likely to dominate the Bitcoin network at a time. We chose this representation over a simple heat map alternative because it allows us to represent two quantitative variables.

B. Visualizing external factors influencing the evolution of mining pool market shares and their distribution

Understanding when and why mining pool market shares change is important to understanding the broader mining

¹https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Comparison_of_mining_pools

²e. g., <https://www.cryptocompare.com/mining/#/pools> and <https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/best-bitcoin-mining-pool/>




Fig. 1. (a) The emergence and evolution of the top 25 mining pools. The figure shows the market share of each mining pool as the size of the circle over time. The color scale encodes the mining power domination in the Bitcoin network from no domination (0% mining power) in yellow to completely domination (>50%) in red. Two grey vertical lines in both charts indicates two halving days on Nov. 28, 2012 and Jul. 9, 2016. (b) The Herfindahl index measures the concentration of mining pools in the Bitcoin network. (c-e) Bitcoin mining statistics data from Blockchain.info. (c) Total hash rate in tera hashes per second. (d) Average market price in US Dollar. (e) Total mining reward in Bitcoin currency divided into block reward (blue line) and transaction fees (orange line).

ecology in Bitcoin. To address this analysis challenge, our second visualization presents the temporal distribution of mining pools in connection to the panel data we collected (reward rules, location, etc.). Fig. 2 and 3 show the temporal evolution of reward rules and pool locations weighted by pools’ market shares. For the visualization, we used a ribbon chart design—a stacked bar chart showing a quantitative measurement over time with ribbons connecting the same data category. Each mining pool is represented as a bar whose height is relative to the pool’s market share in a month and the color indicates categorical data (i.e. mining pool, reward rule, or location). For each month, the bars are sorted by the total market share of the category from the highest to the lowest value and within each category pools are sorted by their market shares. This sorting helps us to identify large mining pools or categories that dominated mining power. Ribbons help to track a mining pool’s ranking connection between months. In contrast to our first visualization, here, we can see overall distributions and detect the top mining pools while the first visualization is better for observing the development of individual pools.

V. FINDINGS: MAIN TRENDS IN MINING POOL EVOLUTION

Next, we highlight exploratory findings we made using the visualizations we created. In particular, we saw that mining has undergone important changes from its beginning to the way people engage in it currently. Three main characteristics allow to highlight different stages of mining pool evolution: market share concentration, reward rules, and location.

A. Mining pool market share

In economy, considering the evolution of market share distributions gives a good overview of an activity’s stability. The analysis is typically done through longitudinal studies of the market concentration index. Beyond economic interests, the question of mining activity concentration in Bitcoin is important to understand potential security issues (consensus manipulation). The Herfindahl index³ provides a basic measure of the concentration of an activity or market. This aggregated measure does not, however, provide information about the cause of index variation. Fig. 1 mitigates this drawback by combining the Herfindahl index with the market share of each mining pool, allowing for more relevant analysis of the mining market evolution.

Until 2011, most mining activities were performed by small independent miners following Bitcoin’s original spirit⁴. The mining market was then very fragmented as illustrated by the Herfindahl index close to 0 (Fig. 1 (b)). According to our data, four cycles of concentration of market share can be observed. All these cycles are associated with a rise of bitcoin’s value, as

³Herfindahl index (H) in Fig. 1 (b) is computed on a monthly basis. For each month, let’s n be the number of active mining pools and x_i pool i market share (i.e. the number of blocks mined by pool i divided by total number of blocks found in the month), then: $H = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^2$. H is equal to 1 for perfectly concentrated market and converges toward 0 for very fragmented ones.

⁴It is known that some pools existed between 2009 and 2011, however they are not identifiable in our data and were very small.




Fig. 2. Ribbon chart of market share distribution according to reward rules. Each bar represents the market share of a mining pool while its color stands for a specific reward. The stacked bars are sorted monthly by the total market share of each reward rule and by the market share of the mining pools within each group. The legend on the right is sorted by the market share over the entire period. The red horizontal line indicates a 50% mining power threshold.

investments in mining hardware are indeed strongly correlated with bitcoin’s value [14]. By increasing the expected revenue of mining, a rise of bitcoin value gives an incentive to miners to enhance their investments and might also attract new miners into pools [13]. A primary cycle of concentration started mechanically in the early 2011 with the emergence of first large and identifiable pools, namely DeepBit and Eligius. This rise got amplified by the increase of DeepBit’s hash power during the first peak of bitcoin’s value that occurred in Jul. 2011. At this moment bitcoin’s value reached more than \$30, compared to roughly \$1 few months ago. The growing expected revenue gained from mining lead probably miners to create new large pools such as BTCGuild and SlushPool. The emergence of these two pools participated to the rise of market share concentration until the beginning of 2012. The second cycle began in 2013. Two peaks occurred in Apr. and Nov., during which bitcoin’s value respectively reached more than \$260 and \$1,200. During this period, existing pools increased their hash power (e.g., BTCGuild, SlushPool or 50BTC), and new pools experienced significant growth (F2Pool and GHash.IO), especially in 2014. After the decrease of bitcoin’s value in 2015, the market price raised again and reached peaks at roughly \$450 in Dec. 2015 and even \$750 in Jun. 2016. During this period, F2Pool and AntPool increased largely their hash power. Newly created pools (Bitfury, BTCC Pool, and BW.COM) also enhanced their hash rate. The fourth cycle was driven by the sharp rise of Bitcoin market price at the end of 2017. Most existing large pools, and in particular BTC.com and AntPool, increased their hash rates. Both pools are owned by BitMain, the Chinese Bitcoin mining hardware manufacturer.

It is noticeable that the four cycles have a decreasing amplitude along time, indicating that the market might progressively reach an equilibrium situation. This is due to the exponential increase of hash power which involves very large investment for an incumbent or a new pool to get a significant market share. Since mid-2018, the concentration of mining activities has been rather stable, with 4 main pools accounting each for

10% or more of market share: F2Pool, AntPool, BTC.com, and Poolin.

B. Reward rules and location

Another striking evidence of the rationalization of mining lies in the evolution of reward rules applied by pools. A wide variety of reward rules exist ranging from simple methods (Proportional (Prop.), Pay-Per-Share (PPS), etc.) to more complex ones (Double Geometric Method (DGM), etc.) [4]. This rule variety leaves rooms for strategic decisions by pool managers in order to adopt a reward scheme that attracts miners and makes them behaving loyally, e.g., to avoid block withholding, multi-pooling or pool hopping [2], [15]. Ribbon charts are useful tools to observe the evolution of an organizational feature such as reward rules. In Fig. 2, we can observe a large heterogeneity of applied reward rules until 2016⁵. Progressively, two rewards schemes became dominant patterns with PPS and PPS+ (i.e. PPS for block rewards and PPLNS for transaction fees in most cases). Compared to proportional schemes (Prop., Score, etc.), PPS and PPS+ are less favorable to block withholding [2] and offer resistance to pool-hopping [15]. These reward rules seems to provide an attractive and stable incentive scheme for miners. Pools using PPS or PPS+ can differ however in the fee they apply on reward and transaction fees.

Fig. 3 shows the large evolution in mining pool locations. Until 2015, most pools were located in Europe and the US. The rapid growth of two important Chinese pools (F2Pool and AntPool) profoundly modified this landscape and made China the largest pool hosting nation from 2015 to 2018. According to Hileman and Rauchs [16], cheap electricity and land costs in remote Chinese areas (e.g., Sichuan) are major drivers of this location pattern. Between Mar. 2015 and Feb. 2017, the combination of Chinese pools exceeded 51% mining power threshold and therefore posed the risk of majority attack. This situation persisted until 2019 when global pools

⁵For detailed descriptions of the reward rules, see: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Comparison_of_mining_pools.




Fig. 3. Ribbon chart of market share distribution according to mining pool locations. Each bar represents the market share of a mining pool while its color stands for a location. The stacked bars are sorted monthly by the total market share of each location and by the market share of the mining pools within each group. The legend is sorted by the market share of each location over the entire period. The red horizontal line indicates a 50% mining power threshold.

became dominant. This growth resulted from both the growth of originally global pools (BTC.com and Poolin), and also from Chinese or European pools that turned into global ones (F2Pool and SlushPool).

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Mining pools are the heart of the Bitcoin ecosystem’s security and growth. Their evolution toward rational and stable organizations is critical for Bitcoin’s future. Using visual analytics approaches [17], we collected and joined a large number of datasets about mining pools and developed two custom visualizations to investigate their evolution according to a number of different parameters. In particular, we combined the aggregated measure of market share with pool-level information across time. Our representations allow us to document the rise of mining activity concentration and give rise to insights and further hypotheses as to the cause of this evolution. Important events regarding mining activity profitability (e. g., halving days and bitcoin value) seem to be major drivers of changes to the Bitcoin ecosystem.

We found the use of ribbon charts insightful to show two other important trends regarding pool organization. First, we can observe the rise of PPS and PPS+ as the main reward rules used by pools. These rules seem to provide attractive and stable incentives for miners. Secondly, ribbon charts are very useful to highlight the emergence of China as the main hosting country for pools and show that global pools have become dominant in recent times. These findings raise questions worth further examination, in particular regarding factors that stimulate the stability of Bitcoin mining.

The visualizations we developed are relatively simple but already provide first useful tools for people who want to analyze the evolution of mining pools by highlighting relevant elements that affect these organizations. We are working on a more encompassing visualization tool to help economists develop a more realistic model of Bitcoin mining.

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