



HAL
open science

The effects of cultural and personal differences of the protagonists on the international negotiation

Svetlana Radtchenko-Draillard

► **To cite this version:**

Svetlana Radtchenko-Draillard. The effects of cultural and personal differences of the protagonists on the international negotiation. 2020. hal-02902277

HAL Id: hal-02902277

<https://hal.science/hal-02902277>

Preprint submitted on 18 Jul 2020

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

The effects of cultural and personal differences of the protagonists on the international negotiation

Svetlana Radtchenko-Drailard

ABSTRACT:

International negotiation is a process by which two or more opposing parties interact in order to reach an acceptable position with regard to their differences. Reducing these differences is a choice between two or more equally possible, but sometimes contradictory, solutions, which is often determined by international negotiations. The aim of this research is to highlight the psychological effects of cultural and personal differences on the choices of decision-making strategy by adversaries in major international negotiations during the Second World War. I have established that negotiators who wish to find an acceptable solution or break a cognitive impasse have often found themselves under the influence of a mechanism of an "optimum of creativity" that actually promotes their development of the cognitive process. The conclusion of a final agreement and its results have a significant influence on interpersonal relationships.

Keywords: Negotiation, Conflict, Interdependence, Cultural and Personal Differences, Decision-Making Strategy, Agreement.

Introduction

The very essence of human existence is constructed from impulses, which are of a similar order in all human beings and which aim for their satisfaction in latent or manifest permanent conflicts. Civilization is the necessary path from family to humanity: it is inextricably linked to the innate conflict of eternal struggle between life's impulses and death drives. In accordance with the idea of Freud (1932-1933) "It is a general principle, then, that conflicts of interest between men are settled by the use of violence. This is true of the whole animal kingdom, from which men have no business to exclude themselves. In the case of men, no doubt, conflicts of *opinion* occur as well which may reach the highest pitch abstraction and which seem to demand some other technique for their settlement" (p.204). Then Freud specifies in the next page "The community must be maintained permanently, must be organized, must draw up regulations to anticipate the risk of rebellion and must institute authorities to see that those regulations- the laws- are respected and to superintend the execution of legal acts of violence". (p.205) [1].

The various research results show that the identification process is the result of a series of repeated test situations encountered by individuals in their group. Cultural differences, often difficult to observe and measure, are obviously very important. In my view, in diplomacy and international relations, the interaction of interpersonal values and interests in international negotiations is a possible definition of the term "negotiation of cultural identifications." This term also includes various negotiations that take part in the ongoing process of building cultural identification. In this sense, it makes sense to include the activity of diplomacy (as a process of sublimation that relies on the arts of communication and negotiation, the request for recognition of the other/by the other). We believe that any identification is in fact relational and interpersonal. Negotiators coordinate their actions in accordance with the international mutual recognition standard. Lacan writes (1964) - "Undoubtedly, being negotiated is not, for the human subject, an exceptional situation contrary to the verbiage that concerns human dignity, or human rights. Everyone negotiates at all times and at all levels, because any light understanding of the social structure can be defined as an exchange" (p.10). [2] In the age of interactions in international relations, the increasing number of conflicts is growing due to cultural, ethnic or interpersonal differences. These conflicting trends often seek to be resolved through the international negotiation mechanism.

1. Cultural Identifications and International Negotiation

International negotiation is a complex and specific process by which two or more adversary of different nationalities interact with the aim of reaching an acceptable position given their conflicts and their differences. Just as the process of negotiating over divergent interests is influenced by the parties' identities, the identities are shaped by the way the process is conducted. However, culture profoundly influences negotiation process, communication, cognition, and subjective behaviour of protagonists. More specifically, international negotiation of all types (political and diplomatic conferences, treaties, summits, economic and commercial contracts, scientific exchanges and congress, etc.) is always affected by cultural phenomena which can make relations difficult and non-transparent. Successful international negotiations require an understanding of the negotiation style of those on the other side of the table, and the acceptance and respect of their cultural beliefs and norm. On the other way, ignoring and negligent culture differences can create barriers that hinder agreements or complicate the unfurling of the negotiation process. Knowledge of the culture and values of the protagonists could have a positive effect on the perception of the country and on the communication of negotiators. By setting behavioural norms, boundaries between good and evil, culture influences how negotiating actors will seek to understand, integrate the culture of the other (including, on how to reason, analyze the situation and seek solutions). In this sense, culture promotes certain acts of communication and prohibits others. If we take into account the fact that each individual belongs to several groups (sometimes family, sometimes friends, sometimes the nation), which do not perfectly intersect the groups of others, any encounter between two individuals (adversaries) implies a greater or lesser degree of *interculturality*. In this regard, Moscovici (1984) wrote "The negotiation is a dialogue, a joint product of two negotiators, each acting in a way defined by their role and gradually transforming into a kind of soliloquy with several voices and using conformity. He adds "It is more accurate to think of compliance as a form of negotiation between the individual and the group, which engages about a conflict over how to define reality." (p. 42). [3] In assessing various approaches to organizational research in negotiation, it is useful to employ the simple framework developed by Eccles (1983). Eccles (1983) suggests "... a wide variety of research on organizational negotiation can be categorized according to two key dimensions: whether the negotiations occur inside the organization (internal) or between the organization and its environment (external), and whether the substance of the negotiation is fundamentally over resources

(money, commerce, goods and services, etc.) or ideology (concepts, ideas, strategic approach, etc.). Examples of internal ideological negotiations might include the debate and discussion among leaders that leads to the development of an organization's strategic philosophy and approach, or the disagreement among committee or party members over the wording of a memorandum or resolution. Similarly, examples of external ideological negotiations would include the shaping of mutual agreements, contracts and position statements between organizations, political parties, and etc." [4]. Bazerman and Neale (1983) have identified a number of ways in which negotiator decisions systematically deviate from rationality. This work views the 'mythical fixed-pie' of negotiation as the fundamental perceptual bias in much negotiator behaviour. For Bazerman and Lewicki (1985) "In addition, our research shows that negotiators (1) are affected non rationally by the 'frame' or manner of defining the problem (e.g. maximizing net profit versus minimizing expenses from net profit), 2)are overconfident in evaluating their likelihood of success, 3) tend to non-rationally escalate their commitment to a previously selected course of action, 4)and end to ignore the information that is available by considering the perspective of the other party in the tactical negotiation" (p.5)[5]. The preparation of the negotiation plays a crucial role and depends very much on the goals and motivation of opponents in conflict or who must resolve international conflicts together. From Pruitt's point of (2015) "Except when there is substantial third-party pressure for settlement, participants in intractable conflict will only enter negotiation if they are motivated to end the conflict and optimistic about negotiation's chances of success. Also there were two main channels of communication, each channel providing credibility to the other and serving as a back-up if the other failed. In two of the cases the communication was face-to-face and friendly, but in the third it was distant and mediated by a chain of two intermediaries. A possible reason for this difference is that the parties were positively interdependent in the first two cases but not in the third" (p.59) [6]. Moreover, in the crucial situations of this communication, the way negotiators express themselves is a creation. Each time, it takes original forms and even if the protagonists use a common or similar language code and have to formulate the same message, we can assure that they will never express themselves in the same way. In international negotiation, these communication variables are included in the category of variables, related to the encounter between actors (internal and external communication with the opposing party, detailed sequencing of messages, language styles, psycholinguistic aspects, accuracy of translation and interpretation, intercultural ethics, etc.) and depend mainly on the political and ideological orientations of the protagonists and the characteristics of their personality (attitudes to risk , self-control, self-esteem, resistance to

stress, confidence, etc.). The communication variables are also interdependent with other variables in international negotiation: dynamic variables (movement) during their course (strategic choice, terms of negotiation), behavioral and cognitive variables. (Dupont, 1994; Kremenyuk 2002). In addition, knowledge of the adversary's culture and values could have a positive effect on the perception of the country and on the mutual perception of negotiators. That's why culture represents a major risk factor in international negotiation. I think that some cultural variables influence the strategy and the cognition of negotiators, including 1) their values and beliefs, 2) their mode of communication, 3) national stereotypes and prejudices, 4) previous conflicts, nationalism and chauvinism, 5) social and economic practices, 6) modes of political authority, 7) future perspectives in international interactions, etc. They will have to be harmonized in order to establish the appropriate strategies and tactics required to reach an easy solution. The methods of negotiation vary with culture.

The actions of protagonists are often affected by cultural variables and group stereotypes (considered as '*pictures in our heads*' by Lippmann, 1922) or rigid or over-simplified judgements, which lead people to judge others in terms of their ethnic identity rather than specific information (Kruglanski, 1989). Bion's observations about the role of group process in group dynamics are set out in *Experiences in Groups* where he refers to recurrent emotional states of groups as basic assumptions. According to certain researchers (Druckman, 1977; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Zartman, 1994), cultural variables are an obstacle in international negotiation. They often cause mistrust, hostility and jealousy with regard to the other. In addition, negative cultural variables propagate conflicts and perversion in the moral psychopathology and degrade the interpersonal and international relations. On the other hand, other researchers consider that cultural national variables can be positive and capable of acting as a facilitation factor to minimise conflicts and increase empathy between negotiators (Kremenyuk, 1991; Pruitt, 1992, Radtchenko-Draillard, 2012). Finally, the influence of cultural variables on the behaviour of protagonists and their proposals during negotiation (either as an obstacle, or facilitator) can also pursue different needs associated with different motivations, such as the need for closure, fear of invalidity or need for structure or specific conclusions. The specificity of the decision making process during an international negotiation therefore lies in the comprehension by negotiators, whose capacity of logical reasoning is closely linked to the realization of their own needs and interests. Their goals are sometimes dependent on unforeseeable circumstances or the unpredictable.

In addition, much of the researches on the negotiation is derived from the early descriptive work of Deutsch and Krauss (1962) and Walton and McKersie (1965). Walton and McKersie proposed the distinction between distributive and integrative bargaining. In their point of view, the distributive bargaining process is a set of behaviours for dividing a fixed-pool of resources; what one party gains, the other party loses. In contrast, they think that integrative bargaining views negotiation as a set of behaviours that lead the parties to make trade-offs among alternatives, or jointly solve problems in such a way that the size of the pool of resources to be distributed is increased. Walton and McKersie (1965) consider "The negotiators are subjected of three tendencies which determine their behaviour, namely: first tendencies urge negotiators to sign agreements favourable at the opposite party (which can be an out-group or different country); second tendencies urge negotiators to sign agreements favourable on their own group (which can be an in-group or their own country); third tendencies urge negotiators to sign agreements favourable an all parties (which can be two and more groups or country) or a compromise".[7]. For Druckman (1993), flexibility in negotiation is indicated by a variety of behaviors of protagonists which may be correlated. This choice reflects a willingness to accept a smaller payoff than is possible to obtain while trusting that the other will also cooperate. If he does not cooperate, you lose and he wins. There are risks involved in both cooperative and competitive choices: a cooperative choice may be exploited; a competitive choice may lead to mutual losses. He add "The conception of competitive and cooperative moves made corresponds to changing or not changing positions on issues during a negotiation. Cooperation consists of moving in the direction of the other's positions or away from one's own initial position, demonstrating flexibility. Competition consists of sticking to your own position in the hope that others will move toward that position, resulting in one's own position prevailing as the outcome of the negotiation. (...) Flexibility can be shown to occur in other ways and may be influenced by aspects of the situation other than (or in addition to) the opponent's moves or concessions. It can be reflected in the verbal exchanges between negotiators or in their perceptions of the situation and opponent. " (p.236-237) [8] In my opinion, first tendencies determine an interdependence oriented towards all desires of adversaries, where the convergent intentions are interconnected with recourse to cooperation and peace or alliance (positive effects of interaction); second tendencies reinforce an antagonistic interdependence where the divergent intentions are oriented towards a narcissistic desire and egoism with recourse to competition or perversion in the perception of the other (negative effects of interaction), third tendencies favourite a ambivalence toward interdependent objectives, where the divergent intentions of

adversaries are oriented towards the partial satisfaction of desires and compromise (mixed effects). So, the decision making process could develop a different strategic pattern: 1) integrative (satisfactory agreement for everyone), 2) distributive (decision is beneficial to one protagonist gain and detrimental to the other), 3) compromise and consensual (intermediate or partial agreement for everyone, consensus), In applying his “mathematical theorem of negotiation” Nash considers (1950) "It is also possible to envisage a mixed strategy with an optimal solution and a point of resistance/anchor, which corresponds to the result below which the opposing party is likely to refuse to sign the agreement. It is termed the BATNA – the Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement, which can be flexible, modulated and variable during the international negotiation”. (p.155-162). [9]. The uncertainties about the initiatives and the reactions of the opposite party are important and the negotiator is likely to act with much flexibility in difficult and unforeseeable circumstances. I would suggest that the choice of the strategic form of the decision making process mostly depends on the objectives of the negotiation, the intergroupal and interpersonal relations, the current and future international situation and the subjective particularities of the negotiator’s personality (for example, confidence or defiance, empathy or jalousie with regard to other).

2. Subjective particularities in personal cognition and the behaviour of the negotiators

The personality of the negotiator and the priorities of his actions in international negotiations determine his outcome. Rubin and Brown (1975) argue that individuals have personal predispositions that encourage them to act in a specific direction when faced with an anticipated or unforeseen element. In negotiation, these predispositions shape their perception of the people with whom they must interact and influence their negotiating strategies, the selection of information they will pass on to their opponents, their behaviours and expectations to the negotiating results. Finally, in interpreting the negotiation, they develop the concept of interpersonal orientation, which they define as "a relatively stable predisposition to act, favourably or not, to the behaviour and expectations of the adversary. The negotiator is obliged to react to the competing demands of two fields: his own and that of the adversary; this dual reactivity is a role conflict resulting from its position at the border; this conflict can be represented in terms of psychological complexity - as a juxtaposition of images that the negotiator has with regard to representatives of the opposing party and the

various factions of his own group, his political and ideological orientation and his own position. When communicating with his adversary during international negotiations, the protagonist (political leader, chief) could use various sources of power: the power of coercion (threat, persuasion, bluff, overbid, etc.), the power of cooperation (competence, trust, rewards, etc.), the power of persuasion and accommodation, etc. The threat is a form of pressure very often used in competitive international negotiations: threatens to break the ceasefire, trigger war, economic blockade and embargo, breakdown of diplomatic relations or breakdown of negotiations. It should also be remembered that, more often than not, international negotiations are beginning to take place between several representatives of each group; several individuals have to define a position together in relation to another group. In this regard, it is important to distinguish the different roles of protagonists in international negotiations: (a) the protagonists, who act as representatives of their group or country; b) experts who are present to advise negotiators, provide information and arguments, and prepare proposals and counter-proposals; (c) the president in multilateral international negotiations, who has a role to introduce debate, distribute speech, enforce procedural forms and fixed schedules, etc.; (d) groups of negotiators (delegations): in the case of international negotiations where two parties are involved, each delegation is facing the other and when there are more than two delegations, the phenomena become more complicated because of the multiple roles and goals of different delegations. From the point of view Hermann and Kogan (1977) the leaders are more flexible during negotiations and show more independence from the original position than delegates. Iklé (1964) formulates three qualities essential to the good negotiator: he must be realistic, he must be flexible, and he must be patient. This model, proposed by Iklé (1964), was shown to be quite useful for distinguishing among different types of international cases in terms of their processes and influences. Negotiating solutions to such problems is difficult for several reasons. Key among the challenges is the needs to negotiate the information base, which can itself be a source of contention that can stall the decision processor, bring it to court. The negotiator also seeks different solutions in his intrapersonal thinking when solving problems in the search for individual, interpersonal and intergroupal/international interest. The point is to be able to think with a common concept the negotiator's different reasons to defend a particular solution. When the negotiation begins to develop the news solutions can appear and negotiator must the engage in a discussion with their own party to try to modulate their anticipation and their wishes. If some negotiators can be flexible, they can be faced to intransigence on the part theirs counterparts. Stevens thinks (1963) that "The negotiation can be formalised thanks to the Conflict-Conflict-Choice

model. If, for the necessity of formalisation a negotiation's situation can be reduced to a conflict between two negotiators, it is possible to say that both of them are confronted to a dual conflict, which is both interpersonal and intrapersonal" (p.13-27) [10]. From his side, Cooper (2014) writes "of object relations theory as fundamentally a theory of unconscious internal object relations in dynamic interplay with current interpersonal experience". (2014, p.622). [11] In Winnicott 's opinion" (1960)"The self is a very important part of mental and emotional well-being which plays a vital role in creativity. He thought that» the *True Self* is a sense of being alive and real in one's mind and body, having feelings are spontaneous and unforced; but the" *False Self*" is a defence, a kind of mask of behaviour that complies with others' expectations". (p.140-152). [12] Ryan and Deci's theory of self-determination (1985) also provides some very important elements. According to this theory, motivation is based on two essential needs: a) the need for competence, b) the need for self-determination. Ryan and Deci (2000) distinguish the self-determination continuum showing three types of motivation with their regulatory styles, their rules of causality, and corresponding processes "1) intrinsic motivation based on the theory argues, that social-contextual events (e.g., feedback, communications, rewards) that conduce toward feelings of competence during action can enhance intrinsic motivation for that action; accordingly, optimal challenges, effectance-prorooting feedback, and freedom from demeaning evaluations were all found to facilitate intrinsic motivation , 2)extrinsic motivation based on-the extrinsically motivated behaviors that are externally regulated; such behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand or reward contingency; 3) amotivation results from not valuing an activity when amotivated, people either do not act at all or act without intent--they just go through the motions". (p. 70-73) [13]. In addition, according to the empirical studies of Radtchenko-Draillard (2011), anxiety (high level) may play a different role in the problem-solving process during negotiation: a) it can stimulate anticipation, the development of the most creative, unusual solutions and the development of intrinsic motivation among negotiators, who have a high level of self-esteem (positive factor); b) it can promote developed argumentation, persuasion, preferences for global solutions in agreement with the adversary among negotiators, who have an average level of self-esteem (positive factor); (c)it may increase the justification of its initial position, the disapproval of certain solutions of the adversary with the analysis of their "disadvantages" among negotiators, who have a low level of self-esteem (negative factor). On the other hand, anxiety (low level) can lead to excessive confidence in one's own solutions and a lack of thorough verification in the problem-solving process among some negotiators, who have a high level of self-esteem (negative factor" (p.37-38) [14]. At present, this anxiety

analysis grid is suitable for the study of negotiations. Empirical analysis of national stereotypes in international negotiations through the use of simulations also highlights the fact that there is a link between the content of national stereotypes about its group and its opponent (other) negotiators and their choice of decision-making strategy. In my view, during the negotiation, developing confidence or ambivalence of wishes or distrust of others is a set of options for power techniques, which affect the nature of cooperation (alliances) or competition (conflicts) in interpersonal and international relations. I think that the negotiator (diplomat, political leader, head of state) can use the various sources of power of influence and attitudes in an international negotiation: coercive power and unfavourable attitudes (threat, challenge, indifference, jealousy, etc.) or cooperative power and favourable attitudes (competence, rewards, promises, trust, etc.). International negotiation is therefore an important and difficult activity. It must not only minimize conflicts or objections of interest, but above all create the value of "mutual understanding." Through international negotiation, the divergent wills of the negotiators seek from the outset to create this new reality through a process of transformation of the interests of each group or delegation and the main values of identity committed. Such a transformation is based on a tension between the distributional, mixed and integrative forces, whose relative and specific weight will give the activity its strategic orientation. Finding a good balance between these tensions sums up the art of "good negotiator" who must put his personal strength, experience, reflexive thinking and training at the service of understanding with opponents. I believe that the achievement of solving problem solving depends on the logical analysis of problem solving, the construction of motivation and the perception of rationality during a negotiation that is likely to influence mutual agreement.

1. Empirical analysis of the impact of personal and cultural factors on the course of negotiation

The main purpose of our empirical study is to analyze the three essential stages of negotiation: the identification of the conflict and the means to resolve it; finding goals and selecting them in decision-making and their consequences. Knowing that it is also affected by cultural phenomena (differences in objectives, moral, political, economic or social differences, conflicts of the past, etc.), negotiators must absolutely combine them to reach the desired arrangement and then adapt strategies and tactics in order to reach mutual agreement.

According to my main hypothesis, the specificity of decision-making in the negotiation is in its understanding by adversaries, whose logical reasoning skills are closely linked to the achievement of their priority interests and objectives for their country, precisely (a) negotiators, who are very convinced that their proposal is the best for them and the good of their country - choose the risk strategy; (b) negotiators, convinced that the integrative solution, combining their proposals and the proposals of their opponents, is the best way to reach a mutually beneficial agreement - choose the realistic or optimal strategy; (c) negotiators, who believe that they must gradually advance their proposals and, at the same time, analyse their opponents' proposals in a thorough and careful manner - choose the strategy of prudence. In addition, in seeking mutual agreement with adversaries, it is important that the negotiator properly assesses the probability of his success and failure, measures his personal expectations, wishes and adapts one of the trends of the Atkinson's theory of achievement motivation (1964) a) tendency to achieve success, b) tendency to avoid failure. It is a question of being able to think with a common concept the different reasons of the negotiator to defend a particular solution. According to this idea, the resolution of these trends implies a choice between two solutions or more equally possible but sometimes contradictory for adversaries (war or peace, authority or democracy, threat or diplomacy, hostility or mutual agreement, etc.) which is often determined by international negotiations, and can be understood by psychological vectors such as identity issues, the impact of political discourse Etc. It can also be added that cultural variables (values, prejudices, stereotypes, past experiences with another country), reinforced by the taking of the particular decision-making strategy and personal feelings towards their opponents influence the behaviour and cognitive process of opponents, especially at the beginning of the negotiation. I also applied in my empirical study the concept of Rubinstein's externalization (1957) according to which "... all the psychic phenomena of personality find their explanation in the very unified node of internal conditions by which external influences are transformed and external causes act, in turn, by internal conditions that also develop as a result of external actions (1957, p.257) [15]. On the basis of this concept of externalization the second hypothesis was formulated: the outcome of an integrative and mutually beneficial agreement for all can influence the level of satisfaction of the protagonists and strengthen the positive personal variables and the interdependence of their relations. In order to test my hypotheses as part of my empirical study, I have developed the qualitative analysis grids for the choice of the decision-making strategies during an international negotiation which measures: 1) the valuation of distributivism (rigid), of interactivity (flexible) and of mixed behaviours; 2) the measurement

of choice decision-making strategy (divergence-convergence; fluidity of rational inferences/impulsiveness of wishes/scepticism; game of options of attitudes; 3) the result of the agreement). It includes the following types of personal interventions: a) interventions related to risk decision making strategy and based on the quick evaluation of proposals, divergent and fluid ideas, b) interventions related to realistic or optimal decision making strategy and based on the reasoned analysis of proposals, convergent solutions; c) interventions related to the decision making strategy of prudence, based on hesitation, exhaustive verification of proposals and difficult for these acceptance. (See Annexe). This grid was tested and validated during our preliminary study of 64 subjects of different nationalities who participated in the simulation of international negotiation in the laboratory (formal negotiation)

During my experimental study, I examined three international conferences: 1. The Tehran Conference in Iran (1943, November 28th - December 2th) with Roosevelt as chief negotiator for the USA, Churchill as chief negotiator for the United Kingdom, Stalin as chief negotiator for the USSR; 2. The Yalta Conference in USSR (Crimea, Russia) (1945, February, 4-11th) with Roosevelt as chief negotiator for the USA, Churchill as chief negotiator for the United Kingdom, Stalin as chief negotiator for the USSR; 3) The Potsdam Conference in Germany (1945, Juliet 17th- August 2th) with Truman as chief negotiator for the USA, Churchill and Attlee as chiefs negotiators for the United Kingdom, Stalin as chief negotiator for the USSR. I first studied the cultural factors (antecedents, conflicts in the past, aims, and cultural stereotypes) and subjective attitudes of the protagonists towards their adversary on their choices of decision-making strategy, of attitudes and of behaviour in the initial phase. I also analysed also the effects of the international negotiations process (principal phase or discussion phase). I finally analysed the result (mutual agreement) and the perspective of this agreement within international relations. Using the official documents of the conferences (documents from the archives of the meetings and official treaties signed at the end of the negotiations) I carried out the empirical and statistical analysis of the interventions of three delegations (USA, USSR, UK) during these conferences. This analysis assesses the level of frequencies or repetitions (very rare, rare, from time to time, often, very often) of interventions corresponding to one of the three strategies of decision-making. The stake of the research is to analyze the role and the consequence of the principal negotiations in the resolution of international conflicts (during the Second Word War and The Great Patriotic War for USSR (of 1941-1945

Precisely, during the Tehran (Iran) Conference, American negotiators (USA delegation) often used realistic strategy or achievement with some elements of risk strategy (e.g., *they presented a detailed and argued proposal with ease of implementing divergent ideas from other partners, they often used cooperation with exchanges of ideas and promises to have common strategy with others in their military actions, etc.*). Then, Russian negotiators (USSR delegation) very often used the realistic strategy with some elements of the risk strategy and the strategy of prudence (e.g., *they frequently used the exchange of concessions with the rapid evaluation of a proposal from their opponents and the presentation of a new flexible solution and incorporating elements of their first proposal and the proposals of others etc.*). British negotiators (UK delegation) have very often a mixed strategy, or two strategies, at the same time, the realistic strategy and the prudence strategy, , they were much more cautious than the other parties in the final phase of the negotiation and before an agreement (e.g., *they often developed complementary proposals with elements of their opponents' proposal, but they expressed some scepticism and doubts about their opponents' proposals and frequently argued about the benefit of their main proposal, etc.*). (See Figure n°1). Through these processes, all negotiators had the tools to arrive at clear judgments and creative and acceptable solutions, influencing an integrative mutual treaty and a prospect of their future collaboration to fight their common enemy (Nazi Germany and allies). In conclusion, the Treaty of Tehran provided for the establishment of the second front in Normandy and Provence (France) and the definition of the final strategy for allied nations during the Second World War.

During the Yalta Conference (Crimea, USSR), American, British and Russian negotiators (as allied nations during the Second World War) essentially used a realistic or optimal strategy with an integrative proposal and globalizing the wishes of all participants. Their cooperative tactics (e.g., reciprocity, promises, rule-making and logrolling) have been very effective in this conference. Empirical analysis highlights the fact that realistic or achievement strategy was predominant in the actions of all negotiators. Specifically, American negotiators (USA delegation) have very often used realistic strategy with some elements of the risk strategy (e.g., *they actively participated in the development of a reciprocal agreement with the exchange of ideas and logrolling and globalized solutions beneficial to all; they had empathetic attitudes and evaluated qualitatively and quickly proposals of opponents, etc.*). Then, Russian negotiators (USSR delegation) often used realistic strategy with some elements

of the strategy risk and the prudence strategy (e.g., *they sought convergent solutions with the definition of benefits for each stakeholder and they had emphatic attitudes with promises and confidences; they also used persuasion to convince the other protagonists during the discussion, etc.*). British negotiators (UK delegation) often used realistic strategy with some elements of prudence strategy and risk strategy (e.g., *they often used an exchange of concessions with opponents with the verification and evaluation of opponents' proposals; they had empathetic attitudes with flexibility in preparing the agreement, etc.*). Despite these few discrepancies in the behaviour and cognition of negotiators, these findings attested to the significant preponderance of integrative interventions, linked to the use of realistic strategy or achievement. (This largely confirms our first hypothesis) Just as action between adversaries would only make sense in the light of a shared intention, building itself during the negotiation. In our view, the evolution in the negotiating dimension was consistent with its homogeneity. (See Figure n° 2). The mutual agreement (Treaty of the Three Great Powers) provided for the capitulation of Germany unconditionally, the division of Germany into the four parts (United States, United Kingdom, USSR and France), military intervention in Japan, and it also proclaimed a declaration on "free Europe" with the division into two blocs (Western and Eastern) and the accession to the United Nations project. With regard to the personal satisfaction of the negotiators (after the Yalta Conference and the official press statement), all the negotiators (Americans, Russians and British) seemed to be very satisfied with the outcome of the conference and expressed a desire to continue their negotiations.

At the Potsdam Conference (Germany), American negotiators (USA delegation), Russian negotiators (USSR delegation) and British negotiators (UK delegation) most often use mixed strategies. During this conference, all negotiators regularly used the argument and definition of preferences for each party, and often used the segmentation technique (for example, breaking down an object into several parts and treating them separately). The American negotiators (USA delegation) exchanged ideas with the protagonists in order to find "*common ground*" and often used the risk strategy with the elements of the realistic strategy (e.g. *they quickly presented the proposals at the beginning of the negotiation and assessed all the proposals of the other opponents, putting forward differing points of view in order to reach an agreement, etc.*). The Russian negotiators (USSR delegation) put forward proposals converging with those of the opposing parties (using it very often the realistic or optimal strategy), but they also used the risk strategy elements (e.g., *they quickly evaluated all proposals with their detailed summary; they often used persuasion to convince others, but at*

the same time they also looked for convergent solutions to reach an agreement, etc.). The British negotiators (UK delegation) argued for the plausibility of their own solutions, very often using two strategies at the same time the realistic strategy and the strategy of prudence (e.g. *they conducted an in-depth analysis of the opponents' proposals with the request for additional information and defined preferences for each party, proposed compromises and sometimes expressed an ambivalent attitude with scepticism towards certain proposals or pointed out the disadvantages, etc. for example, they justified them -risk strategy, etc.*). (See Figure n° 3) This mutual agreement (treaty) provided for the pacification, disarmament, denazification of Germany, the trial of war criminals, and the mutual initiative for the creation of the United Nations with the Security Council at the san Francisco conference, USA (1945, 26 June). Just as the process of negotiating on competing political interests is influenced by the identity and subjective specificities of the parties, these factors are shaped by the way the process is conducted. The decisions of the Potsdam Conference after their publication were supported by other countries around the world. In order to maintain world peace and reduce the various inter-ethnic and international conflicts the United Nations Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened. According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes: 1) to maintain international peace and security; 2) to develop friendly relations among nations; 3) to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; 4) and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. The Security Council is composed of fifteen Members: five permanent members with the right of veto: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.

In conclusion of this analysis it should be added that the negotiation process depends mainly on political, diplomatic and international objectives, as well as the cultural and interpersonal characteristics of the protagonists, in accordance with our first hypothesis. (See Figure n°4) Moreover, there was also an effect under homogeneous conditions: the positive interpersonal actions of the State have a significant impact on interpersonal relations during the

negotiations, however, the very important and effective agreements reached (treated) at the end of the Potsdam Conference did not fully satisfy the interests and personal objectives of the main actors (second hypothesis was therefore partially confirmed). It should be added that the change of the Head of Delegation of the United States and the United Kingdom (President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee in the last part of the negotiation certainly influenced the relations between the negotiators and in particular with the head of the delegation of the USSR Stalin; because the atmosphere during this conference was tense. After this conference, there was a breakdown in relations between the Allies, which contributed to the bipolarity of the World and the beginning of the Cold War.

CONCLUSION

In an era of ongoing interactions in international relations, many important political, security, economic and environmental interdependencies are closely linked to the growing number of conflicts caused by cultural differences and interpersonal conflicts. In reducing these conflicts, international negotiations can be defined as the science and art of reaching mutually acceptable agreements. My empirical study is based on an analysis of the main cultural and personal variables and in particular on the behaviour and cognition of negotiators. In this sense, I have interpreted their impact on the three main decision-making strategies of the negotiators (risk strategy, realistic or optimal strategy and prudence strategy). Given the complexity and specificity of the international negotiations analysed, as well as the many analytical approaches used in my analysis, I was able to analyze the link between a realistic decision-making strategy, integrative behaviour, positive cultural variables (cultural similarities, alliances in the past, favourable intentions and positive stereotypes) and positive feelings and favourable attitudes towards opponents. I also found that there is another link between risk strategy, distributive behaviour, negative cultural variables (significant cultural differences, past conflicts, negative prejudices and stereotypes, etc.) and negative feelings and attitudes towards other adversaries. In addition, I have found that there is an intermediate link between the prudent strategy, mixed behaviour, mixed cultural variables and the ambiguous feelings of adversaries (influenced by difficult negotiating conditions, including information imperfection, competing interests, risks, ambiguous attitudes, etc.); in the case of the implementation of this prudent strategy the negotiation process is often unclear, uncertain, chaotic, and does not exclude surprising and unexpected changes in the outcome phase of an

agreement. I also found that the integrative choices of negotiators correspond to changes in positions where flexibility is defined as a cooperative process to advance realistic strategy and distributional choices correspond to non-changes in position where rigidity is presented as a persistence in maintaining a position over the risk strategy. (This largely confirms my first main hypothesis). However, beyond this distinction, I found that in the negotiations discussed at three international conferences (the Tehran Conference, the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference), all negotiators rarely used pure strategies. It seems clear that the concrete situations of these negotiations are complex and contain a proportionate or mixed mix of competition (rigidity) and cooperation (flexibility) in the choice of decision-making strategy (with elements of other strategies). The study found that the conclusion of a final agreement by the treaties increases the subjective satisfaction of negotiators and significantly improves the interpersonal relations between the protagonists during two conferences (The Tehran Conference and the Yalta Conference), in line with my second hypothesis. However, changes in the heads of delegation of the United States and United Kingdom (President Truman and Prime Minister Atlee in the heads of the US and delegations) at the Potsdam conference influenced the atmosphere and the sometimes frosty and tense exchanges with the head of the delegation of the USSR Stalin during this negotiation: despite the very important and important treaties signed at the end of the conference, relations were strained between the adversaries; they used the risk strategy more often than usual as it unfolded. (See Figure n°4). (As a result, this analysis of the Potsdam conference does not confirm the second hypothesis). Finally, this negotiation of the *Three Powers* was the last; relations between them broke down and the Cold War began with the bipolarization of the world. It should be added that in this study, I observed that negotiators also express themselves in different relations with their opposing party: a) communication with the other, b) reducing differences and conflicts with each other, c) cognition and finding a solution acceptable to each, d) achieving a mutual agreement with the other. In conclusion, this empirical analysis undoubtedly underlines the need to examine exhaustively a range of different variables involved in the interpersonal and cultural relationships of the protagonists and to open new avenues for systematic psychological studies of international negotiation.

Citations:

1. Freud, S. (1964). Why War? (1932-1933). *The Standard Edition of the complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. (James Strachey Editor). London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis Vol. XXII, p.197-218.
2. Lacan, J. (1964). *Le Séminaire, Livre XI, Les quatre concepts de la psychanalyse*. Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1973.
3. Moscovici, S. (1984). (Ed.) *Psychologie sociale*. Paris : PUF.
4. Eccles, R. (1983). Negotiations in the organizational environment: A framework for discussion. In Bazerman, M. H., Lewicki, R. J. (Eds) *Negotiating in Organizations*. Beverly Hill : Sage Publications, CA
5. Bazerman, M.H., Lewicki, R.J. (1985). Contemporary research directions in the study of negotiations in organizations: A selective overview. *Journal of occupational behaviour*, vol.6, p.1—17.
6. Pruitt, D. (2015). Prenegotiation Development of Optimist in Intractable Conflict. *International Negotiation*, 20(1) pp.59-72.
7. Walton, R.E., McKersie, R. B. (1965). *A behavioural theory of labour negotiations* New York: McGraw-Hill.
8. Druckman, D. (1993) The Situational Levers of Negotiating Flexibility. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 37(2), pp. 236-276
9. Nash, J. (1950). The bargaining problem. *Economica*. 18(2), p.155-162.
10. Stevens, C.M. (1963). *Strategy and collective bargaining*. New York: McGraw Hill.
11. Cooper, S.H, (2014). The Thing We Carry: Finding/ Creating the Object and the Analyst's Self- Reflective Participation. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 24, pp.612-636.
12. Winnicott, D.W. (1965). Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self. (1960). *The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development*, New York: International UP Inc, pp.140-152.
13. Ryan, R.M., Deci, E.L. (2000). Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being. *American psychologist*. 55(1), pp.68-78.
14. Radtchenko-Draillard, S. (2011). L'approche cognitive de la négociation. *Cahiers de psychologie politique*, 19, pp.25-51.
15. Rubinstein, S.L. (1957). Being and Consciousness. Moscow: Edition of Russian Academy of Sciences. (In Russian).

References:

1. Atkinson, J. (1964). *Introduction to Motivation*. New Jersey: Princeton Press.
2. Bazerman, M.H., Lewicki, R.J. (1985). Contemporary research directions in the study of negotiations in organizations: A selective overview. *Journal of occupational behaviour*, vol.6, p.1—17.
3. Bazerman, M.N., Neale, M.A.(1983). Heuristics in negotiation: Limitations to effective dispute resolution. In Bazerman, M.H. and Lewicki, R.J. (Eds) *Negotiation in Organizations*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, C.A.
4. Bion, W.R. (1948). Experiences in groups. *Human relations*, vol.16I, pp. 1948-1951.
5. Churchill, Winston Spencer (1951). *The Second World War: Closing the Ring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
6. Cooper, S.H., (2014). The Thing We Carry: Finding/ Creating the Object and the Analyst's Self- Reflective Participation. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 24, pp.612-636.
7. Deutsch, M., Krauss, R. M. (1962). Studies of interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6, pp.52-76
8. Druckman, D. (1977). *Negotiations, social psychological perspectives*. Beverley Hills: California Sage.
9. Druckman, D. (1993) The Situational Levers of Negotiating Flexibility. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 37(2), pp. 236-276.
10. Dupont, C. (1994). *La négociation : conduite, théorie, applications*. Paris: Dalloz.
11. Eccles, R. (1983). Negotiations in the organizational environment: A framework for discussion. *Negotiating in organizations*. (Bazerman, M. H., Lewicki, R. J. - Eds.) Beverly Hill : Sage Publications,
12. Freud, S. (1967). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. (1921). *The Standard Edition of the complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. (James Strachey Editor). London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, vol .XVIII, pp.65-144
13. Freud, S. (1964). Why War? (1932-1933). *The Standard Edition of the complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. (James Strachey Editor). London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Anal Vol. XXII.p.197-218.

14. Hermann, M., Kogan. A. (1977). Effects of negotiators 'personalities on negotiating behavior. *Negotiating social- psychological perspectives*. (D. Druckman Ed.) Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications.
15. Iklé, F.C. (1964). *How Nations Negotiate*. New York: Harper & Row.
16. Kremenyuk, V. (1991). (Ed.) *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.
17. Kruglanski, A.W. (1989). The psychology of being 'right': The problem of accuracy in social perception and cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 106, pp.305-409.
18. Lacan, J. (1964), Le Séminaire, Livre XI, *Les quatre concepts de la psychanalyse*, Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1973.
19. Lipmann, W. (1922). *Public opinion*. New York: Harcourt & Brace.
20. Moscovici, S. (1984). (Ed.) *Psychologie sociale*. Paris : PUF.
21. Nash, J.F. (1950). The bargaining problem. *Econometrica*. 18 (2), pp. 155-162.
22. Orlov, A.S. (2003). Tehran 1943: military strategy and military policy. *Military Thought*, vol. 12, 4, pp. 198-2010.
23. Pruitt, D. (2015). Prenegotiation Development of Optimist in Intractable Conflict. *International Negotiation*, 20(1) pp.59-72.
24. Radtchenko-Draillard, S. (2011). La théorie des jeux et le processus de la négociation internationale. *Revue internationale de psychologie politique sociétale- SPPIR*, vol.2 (2), pp. 129-142.
25. Radtchenko-Draillard, S. (2012). La spécificité de la négociation internationale. *Cahiers de psychologie politique*, 21, pp.81-105.
26. Rubinstein, S.L. (1957). *Being and Consciousness*. Moscow: Edition of Russian Academy of Sciences. (In Russian).
27. Rubin, J., Brown, B. (1975). *The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation*. New York: Academic Press.
28. Ryan, R.M., Deci, E.L. (2000). Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being. *American psychologist*. 55(1), pp.68-78.
29. Stevens, C.M. (1963). *Strategy and collective bargaining*. New York: McGraw Hill.
30. Walton, R.E. , McKersie, R. B. (1965). *A behavioural theory of labour negotiations*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

31. Winnicott, D.W. (1960). Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self. In: *The Maturation Process and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development*, p.p.140-152, New York: International UP Inc, 1965.
32. Zartman, W. (1994). (Ed.) *International Multilateral Negotiation*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
33. Zhukov, G. K. (2002-2003). *Memories and Reflections* (in Russian). Vol.1- 2. Moscow: Olma Press.

Official documents and archival documents:

1. The Tehran Conference (Documents). Proceeding of the Conference. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic paper. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/ch8>
2. Tehran Conference (Documents). Declaration of the Tree Powers. 1943. <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-0859.pdf>
3. The Yalta Conference: February 4-11, 1945. (Documents). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic paper. Conference at Malta and Yalta. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Malta/comp3>
4. Crimea (Yalta) Conference. 1945. (Treaties) <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-1005.pdf>
5. Protocol of Proceeding of Crimea Conference. 4-11 February 1945 <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/yalta.htm>
6. Russian Foreign Ministry. Collection of documents on 1945 Yalta Conference. <https://tass.com/politics/1116289>
7. Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe. February 11, 1945. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116176>
8. Russian Defense Ministry Declassifies Documents on Yalta Conference. <https://ruskiymir.ru/en/news/268485/>
9. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume 1 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d1>
10. Russian Foreign Ministry. Documents on major events on WWII (The Potsdam Conference). <https://tass.com/society/1154549>

11. British Documents on the Potsdam Conference, 1945

https://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/hpdfba_8.

Annexe:

Psychoanalytic grids for the thinking and decision-making strategy of negotiators during the negotiation

A. Risk strategy:

- A (1) The negotiator quickly and easily presents all the proposals in the initial phase.
- A (2) The negotiator quickly evaluates all proposals and summarizes the opponent's proposals in the initial phase.
- A (3) The negotiator easily puts forward divergent points of view and proposes his solutions to reach an agreement in the discussion phase.
- A (4) The negotiator uses coercive attitudes, distributive attitudes (threat, bluff, higher offer, cunning, ultimatum, contempt, etc.) and self-determination to promote its solutions; it's uncompromising approach to his opponent's solutions in the discussion phase.
- A (5) Negotiator presents unusual and crucial solutions without hesitation (in a trading area) in the final phase.
- A (6) The negotiator is overconfident about their proposals and critically analyses the opponent's proposals in the final phase.

B. Realistic strategy or achievement

- B (1) The negotiator presents a detailed and thoughtful proposal in the initial phase.
- B (2) The negotiator gives an in-depth analysis of the opponent's proposals and asks it defines preferences for each part in the initial phase.
- B (3) The negotiator proposes an additional or comprehensive proposal with elements and builds an "BATNA or a cognitive agreement zone" in the discussion phase.
- B (4) The negotiator uses cooperative attitudes, empathetic attitudes (exchange of ideas, logrolling, promises, trust, reciprocity, etc.) in the discussion phase.
- B (5) The negotiator looks for convergent proposals in a flexible manner with the opponent in the final phase.
- B(6) The negotiator is involved in the development of a reciprocity agreement and solutions of both parties in the final phase.

C. Prudence strategy

- C(1) The negotiator asks the adversary for information and information and has ambivalent opinion of the opponent's proposals in the initial phase.
- C(2) The negotiator hesitates, is equivocal and slow in the presentation of his proposal or presents sequences proposal in the initial phase.
- C(3) The negotiator performs deductive analyses and controls (with doubt and anchoring) of the opponent's solutions in the discussion phase.
- C(4) The negotiator uses ambivalent attitudes, sceptical attitudes (distrust, hesitation, indifference, circumstances, etc.), and he disagrees with the adversaries' solutions. and highlights their disadvantages in the discussion phase.
- C(5) The negotiator presents a new proposal and brings elements of the first proposal to the final phase.
- C(6) The negotiator strives to reach an agreement by accepting concessions or compromise with additional elements in the final phase.

Figure n°1: Histogram of the frequency of interventions by negotiators from three countries (USA, USSR, UK) using decision-making strategies (risk strategy, realistic strategy, and prudence strategy) during the Tehran conference




Figure N°2: Histogram of the frequency of interventions by negotiators from three countries (USA, USSR, UK) using decision-making strategies (risk strategy, realistic strategy and prudence strategy) during the Yalta Conference




Figure n°3: Histogram of the frequency of interventions by negotiators from three countries (USA, USSR, UK) using decision-making strategies (risk strategy, realistic strategy and prudence strategy) during the Potsdam Conference




Figure n°4: Global histogram of the frequency of interventions by negotiators from three countries using decision-making strategies (risk strategy, realistic strategy, and prudence strategy) during the Conferences of Three Powers (USA, USSR, UK)

