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► **To cite this version:**

Alex Auvolat, Davide Frey, Michel Raynal, François Taïani. Money Transfer Made Simple. 2020. hal-02861511v2

HAL Id: hal-02861511

<https://hal.science/hal-02861511v2>

Preprint submitted on 17 Jun 2020 (v2), last revised 16 Feb 2021 (v3)

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Money Transfer Made Simple

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Abstract

It has recently been shown (PODC 2019) that, contrarily to a common belief, money transfer in the presence of faulty (Byzantine) processes does not require strong agreement such as consensus. This article goes one step further: namely, it shows that money transfers do not need to explicitly capture the causality relation that links individual transfers. A simple FIFO order between each pair of processes is sufficient. To this end, the article presents a generic money transfer algorithm that can be instantiated in both the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model. The genericity dimension lies in the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction which must be suited to the appropriate failure model. Interestingly, whatever the failure model, the money transfer algorithm only requires adding a single sequence number to its messages as control information. Moreover, as a side effect of the proposed algorithm, it follows that money transfer is a weaker problem than the construction of a read/write register in the asynchronous message-passing crash-prone model.

2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms; Software and its engineering → Abstraction, modeling and modularity

Keywords and phrases Asynchronous message-passing system, Byzantine process, Distributed computing, Efficiency, Fault tolerance, FIFO message order, Modularity, Money transfer, Process crash, Reliable broadcast, Simplicity.

1 Introduction

Short historical perspective

Like field-area or interest-rate computations, money transfers have had a long history (see e.g., [18, 23]). Roughly speaking, when looking at money transfer in today's digital era, the issue consists in building a software object, that associates an account with each user and provides two operations, one that allows a process to transfer money from one account to another and one that allows a process to read the current value of an account. The main issue of money transfer lies in the fact that the transfer of an amount of money v by a user to another user is conditioned to the current value of its account being at least v .

Fully decentralized electronic money transfer was introduced in [21] with the *Bitcoin* cryptocurrency in which there is no central authority that controls the money exchanges issued by users. From a software point of view, Bitcoin adopts a peer-to-peer approach, while from an application point of view it seems to have been motivated by the 2008 subprime

crisis [27].

To attain its goal Bitcoin introduced a specific underlying distributed software technology called *blockchain*, which can be seen as a specific distributed state-machine-replication technique, the aim of which is to provide its users with an object known as a concurrent *ledger*. Such an object is defined by two operations, one that appends a new item in such a way that, once added, no item can be removed, and a second operation that atomically reads the full list of items currently appended. Hence, a ledger builds a total order on the invocations of its operations. When looking at the synchronization power provided by a ledger in the presence of failures, measured with the consensus-number lens, it has been shown that the synchronization power of a ledger is $+\infty$ [12, 25]. In a very interesting way, recent work [13] has shown that, in a context where each user is associated with a single device (called process in the following) and assuming each account has a single owner which can spend its money, the consensus number of the *money-transfer* concurrent object is 1. This is an important result, as it shows that the power of blockchain technology is much stronger (and consequently more costly) than necessary to implement money transfer. To illustrate this discrepancy, the authors of [13] show first that, in a failure-prone shared-memory system, money transfer can be implemented on top of a snapshot object [1] (whose consensus number is 1, and consequently can be implemented on top of read/write atomic registers). Then, they appropriately modify their shared-memory algorithm to obtain an algorithm that works in asynchronous failure-prone message-passing systems. To allow the processes to correctly validate the money transfers, the resulting algorithm demands them to capture the causality relation linking money transfers and requires each message to carry control information encoding the causal past of the money transfer it carries.

As already indicated, the main problem encountered with money transfer is double spending (i.e., the use of the same money more than once). This problem occurs in the presence of dishonest, i.e., Byzantine, processes. Another important issue of money transfer resides in the privacy associated with money accounts. This means that a full solution to money transfer must address two orthogonal issues: synchronization (to guarantee the consistency of the money accounts) and confidentiality/security (usually solved with cryptography techniques). Here, as in [13], we focus on synchronization.

Content of the article

As previously discussed, and contrarily to a common belief, the result of [13] shows that agreement (such as consensus) is far from being necessary to implement money transfer. The present article goes even further. It shows that, contrarily to what is currently accepted, the implementation of a money transfer object does not require the explicit capture of the causality relation linking individual money transfers.

To this end, we present a surprisingly simple yet efficient and generic money-transfer algorithm that relies on an underlying reliable-broadcast abstraction. It is efficient as it only requires a very small amount of meta-data on its messages: in addition to money-transfer data, the only control information carried by the messages of our algorithm is reduced to a single sequence number. It is generic in the sense that it can accommodate different failure models *with no modification*. More precisely, our algorithm inherits the fault-tolerance properties of its underlying reliable broadcast: it tolerates crashes if used with a crash-tolerant reliable broadcast, and Byzantine faults if used with a Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast.

Given an n -process system where at most t processes can be faulty, the proposed algorithm works for $t < n$ in the crash failure model, and $t < n/3$ in the Byzantine failure model. This has an interesting side effect on the distributed computability side. Namely, in the

crash failure model, money transfer constitutes a weaker problem than the construction of a read/write register (where “weaker” means that—unlike a read/write register—it does not require the “majority of non-faulty processes” assumption).

Roadmap

The article consists of 7 sections. First, Section 2 introduces the distributed failure-prone computing models in which we are interested, and Section 3 provides a definition of money transfer suited to these computing models. Then, Section 4 presents a very simple generic money-transfer algorithm. Its instantiations and the associated proofs are presented in Section 5 for the crash failure model and in Section 6 for the Byzantine failure model. Finally, Section 7 concludes the article.

2 Distributed Computing Models

2.1 Process failure model

Process model

The system comprises a set of n sequential asynchronous processes, denoted p_1, \dots, p_n ¹. Sequential means that a process invokes one operation at a time, and asynchronous means that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary arbitrarily and always remains unknown to the other processes.

Two process failure models are considered. The model parameter t denotes an upper bound on the number of processes that can be faulty in the considered model. Given an execution r (run) a process that commits failures in r is said to be faulty in r , otherwise it is non-faulty (or correct) in r .

Crash failure model

In this model processes may crash. A crash is a premature definitive halt. This means that, in the crash failure model, a process behaves correctly (i.e., executes its algorithm) until it possibly crashes. This model is denoted $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ (*Crash Asynchronous Message Passing*). When t is restricted not to bypass a bound $f(n)$, the corresponding restricted failure model is denoted $CAMP_{n,t}[t \leq f(n)]$.

Byzantine failure model

In this model, processes can commit Byzantine failures [19, 24], and those that do so are said to be Byzantine. A Byzantine failure occurs when a process does not follow its algorithm. Hence a Byzantine process can stop prematurely, send erroneous messages, send different messages to distinct processes when it is assumed to send the same message, etc. Let us also observe that, while a Byzantine process can invoke an operation which generates application messages² it can also “simulate” this operation by sending fake implementation messages that give their receivers the illusion that they have been generated by a correct sender. However,

¹ Hence the system we consider is static (according to the distributed computing community parlance) or permissioned (according to the blockchain community parlance).

² An *application* message is a message sent at the application level, while an *implementation* is low level message used to ensure the correct delivery of an application message.

we assume that there is no Sybil attack like most previous work on byzantine fault tolerance including [13].³

As previously, the notations $BAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ and $BAMP_{n,t}[t \leq f(n)]$ (*Byzantine Asynchronous Message Passing*) are used to refer to the corresponding Byzantine failure models.

2.2 Underlying complete point-to-point network

The processes communicate through an underlying message-passing point-to-point network in which there exists a bidirectional channel between any pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a message, it knows which process sent this message. For simplicity, in writing the algorithms, we assume that a process can send messages to itself.

Each channel is reliable and asynchronous. Reliable means that a channel does not lose, duplicate, or corrupt messages. Asynchronous means that the transit delay of each message is finite but arbitrary. Moreover, in the case of the Byzantine failure model, a Byzantine process can read the content of the messages exchanged through the channels, but cannot modify their content.

To make our algorithm as generic and simple as possible, Section 4 does not present it in terms of low-level send/receive operations⁴ but in terms of a high-level communication abstraction, called *reliable broadcast* (e.g., [7, 9, 14, 16, 25]). The definition of this communication abstraction appears in Section 5 for the crash failure model and Section 6 for the Byzantine failure model. It is important to note that the previously cited reliable broadcast algorithms do not use sequence numbers. They only use different types of implementation messages which can be encoded with two bits.

3 Money Transfer: a Formal Definition

Money transfer: operations

From an abstract point of view, a money-transfer object can be seen as an abstract array $ACCOUNT[1..n]$ where $ACCOUNT[i]$ represents the current value of p_i 's account. This object provides the processes with two operations denoted $\text{balance}()$ and $\text{transfer}()$, whose semantics are defined below. The transfer by a process of the amount of money v to a process p_j is represented by the pair $\langle j, v \rangle$. Without loss of generality, we assume that a process does not transfer money to itself. It is assumed that each $ACCOUNT[i]$ is initialized to a non-negative value denoted $\text{init}[i]$ (⁵).

Informally, when p_i invokes $\text{balance}(j)$ it obtains a value (as defined below) of $ACCOUNT[j]$, and when it invokes the transfer $\langle j, v \rangle$, the amount of money v is moved from $ACCOUNT[i]$ to $ACCOUNT[j]$.

Histories

The following notations and definitions are inspired from [2].

³ As an example, a Byzantine process can neither spawn new identities, nor assume the identity of existing processes.

⁴ Actually the send and receive operations can be seen as “machine-level” instructions provided by the network.

⁵ It is possible to initialize some accounts to negative values. In this case, pos being the sum of all the positive initial values and neg the sum of all the negative initial values, we have to assume $pos > neg$.

- A local execution history (or local history) of a process p_i , denoted L_i , is a sequence of operations `balance()` and `transfer()` issued by p_i . If an operation `op1` precedes an operation `op2` in L_i , we say that “`op1` precedes `op2` in process order”, which is denoted $\text{op1} \rightarrow_i \text{op2}$.
- An execution history (or history) H is a set of n local histories, one per process, $H = (L_1, \dots, L_n)$.
- A serialization S of a history H is a sequence that contains all the operations of H and respects the process order \rightarrow_i of each process p_i .
- Given a history H and a process p_i , let $A_{i,T}(H)$ denote the history (L'_1, \dots, L'_n) such that
 - $L'_i = L_i$, and
 - For any $j \neq i$: L'_j contains only the transfer operations of p_j .

Notations

- An operation `transfer(j, v)` invoked by p_i is denoted $\text{trf}_i(j, v)$.
- An invocation of `balance(j)` that returns the value v is denoted $\text{blc}(j)/v$.
- Let H be a set of operations.
 - $\text{plus}(j, H) = \sum_{\text{trf}_k(j, v) \in H} v$ (total of the money given to p_j in H).
 - $\text{minus}(j, H) = \sum_{\text{trf}_j(k, v) \in H} v$ (total of the money given by p_j in H).
 - $\text{acc}(j, H) = \text{init}[j] + \text{plus}(j, H) - \text{minus}(j, H)$ (value of $\text{ACCOUNT}[j]$ according to H).
- Given a history H and a process p_i , let S_i be a serialization of $A_{i,T}(H)$ (hence, S_i respects the n process orders defined by H). Let \rightarrow_{S_i} denote the total order defined by S_i .

Money-transfer-compliant serialization

A serialization S_i of $A_{i,T}(H)$ is money-transfer compliant (MT-compliant) if:

- For any operation $\text{trf}_j(k, v) \in S_i$, we have $v \leq \text{acc}(j, \{\text{op} \in S_i \mid \text{op} \rightarrow_{S_i} \text{trf}_j(k, v)\})$, and
- For any operation $\text{blc}(j)/v \in S_i$, we have $v = \text{acc}(j, \{\text{op} \in S_i \mid \text{op} \rightarrow_{S_i} \text{blc}(j)/v\})$.

MT-compliance is the key concept at the basis of the definition of a money-transfer object. It states that it is possible to associate each process p_i with a total order S_i in which (a) each of its invocations of `balance(j)` returns it the value v equal to p_j 's account's current value according to S_i , and (b) processes transfer only money that they have.

Let us observe that the common point among the serializations S_1, \dots, S_n lies in the fact that each process sees all the transfer operations of any other process p_j in the order they have been produced (as defined by L_j), and sees its own transfer and balance operations in the order it produced them (as defined by L_i).

Money transfer in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$

Considering the $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ model, a money-transfer object is an object that provides the processes with `balance()` and `transfer()` operations and is such that, for each of its executions, represented by the corresponding history H , we have:

- All the operations invoked by correct processes terminate.
- For any correct process p_i , there is an MT-compliant serialization S_i of $A_{i,T}(H)$, and
- For any faulty process p_i , there is a history $H' = (L'_1, \dots, L'_n)$ where (a) L'_j is a prefix of L_j for any $j \neq i$, and (b) $L'_i = L_i$, and there is an MT-compliant serialization of $A_{i,T}(H')$.

An algorithm implementing a money transfer object is correct in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ and produces only executions as defined above. We then say that the algorithm is MT-compliant.

Money transfer in $BAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$

The main differences between money transfer in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ and $BAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ lies in the fact a faulty process can try to transfer money it does not have, and try to present different behaviors with respect to different correct processes. This means that, while the notion of a local history L_i is still meaningful for a non-Byzantine process, it is not for a Byzantine process. For a Byzantine process, we therefore define a *mock local history* for a process p_i as any sequence of transfer operations from p_i 's account⁶. In this definition, the mock local history L_i associated with a Byzantine process p_i is not necessarily the local history it produced, it is only a history that it could have produced from the point of view of the correct processes. The correct processes implement a money-transfer object if they all behave in a manner consistent with the same set of mock local histories for the Byzantine processes. More precisely, we define a *mock history* associated with an execution on a money transfer object in $BAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ as $\tilde{H} = (\tilde{L}_1, \dots, \tilde{L}_n)$ where:

$$\tilde{L}_j = \begin{cases} L_j & \text{if } p_j \text{ is correct,} \\ \text{a mock local history} & \text{if } p_j \text{ is Byzantine.} \end{cases}$$

Considering the $BAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ model, a money transfer object is such that, for each of its executions, there exists a *mock history* \tilde{H} such that for any correct process p_i , there is an MT-compliant serialization S_i of $A_{i,T}(\tilde{H})$. An algorithm implementing such executions is said to be MT-compliant.

4 A Simple Generic Money Transfer Algorithm

This section presents a generic algorithm implementing a money transfer object. As already said, its generic dimension lies in the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction used to disseminate money transfers to the processes, which depends on the failure model.

4.1 Reliable broadcast

Reliable broadcast provides two operations denoted $r_broadcast()$ and $r_deliver()$. Because a process is assumed to invoke the reliable broadcast each time it issues a money transfer, we use a *multi-shot* reliable broadcast, that relies on *explicit sequence numbers* to distinguish between its different instances (more on this below). Following the parlance of [14] we use the following terminology: when a process invokes $r_broadcast(sn, m)$, we say it “r-broadcasts the message m with sequence number sn ”, and when its invocation of $r_deliver()$ returns it a pair (sn, m) , we say it “r-delivers m with sequence number sn ”. While definitions of reliable broadcast suited to the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model will be given in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively, we state their common properties below.

- **Validity.** This property states that there is no message creation. To this end, it relates the outputs (r-deliveries) to the inputs (r-broadcasts). Excluding malicious behaviors, a message that is r-delivered has been r-broadcast.
- **Integrity.** This property states that there is no message duplication.
- **Termination-1.** This property states that correct processes r-deliver what they broadcast.

⁶ Let us remind that the operations $balance()$ issued by a Byzantine can return any value. So they are not considered in the mock histories associated with Byzantine processes.

■ Termination-2. This property relates the sets of messages r-delivered by different processes. The Termination properties ensure that all the correct processes r-deliver the same set of messages, and that this set includes at least all the messages that they r-broadcast.

As mentioned above, sequence numbers are used to identify different instances of the reliable broadcast. Instead of using an underlying FIFO-reliable broadcast in which sequence numbers would be hidden, we expose them in the input/output parameters of the `r_broadcast()` and `r_deliver()` operations, and handle their updates explicitly in our generic algorithm. This reification⁷ allows us to capture explicitly the complete control related to message r-deliveries required by our algorithm. As we will see, it follows that the instantiations of the previous Integrity property (crash and Byzantine models) will explicitly refer to “upper layer” sequence numbers.

We insist on the fact that the reliable broadcast abstraction that the proposed algorithm depends on does not itself provide the FIFO ordering guarantee. It only uses sequence numbers to identify the different messages sent by a process. As explained in the next section, the proposed generic algorithm implements itself the required FIFO ordering property.

4.2 Generic money transfer algorithm: local data structures

As said in the previous section, `init[1..n]` is an array of constants, known by all the processes, such that `init[k]` is the initial value of p_k 's account, and a transfer of the quantity v from a process p_i to a process p_k is represented by the pair $\langle k, v \rangle$. Each process p_i manages the following local variables:

- sn_i : integer variable, initialized to 0, used to generate the sequence numbers associated with the transfers issued by p_i (it is important to notice that the point-to-point FIFO order realized with the sequence numbers is the only “causality-related” control information used in the algorithm).
- $del_i[1..n]$: array initialized to $[0, \dots, 0]$ such that $del_i[j]$ is the sequence number of the last transfer issued by p_j and locally processed by p_i .
- $account_i[1..n]$: array, initialized to `init[1..n]`, that is a local approximate representation of the abstract array `ACCOUNT[1..n]`, i.e., $account_i[j]$ is the value of p_j 's account, as known by p_i .

While other local variables containing bookkeeping information can be added according to the application's needs, it is important to insist on the fact that the proposed algorithm needs only the three previous local variables (i.e., $(2n + 1)$ local registers) to solve the synchronization issues that arise in fault-tolerant money transfer.

4.3 Generic money transfer algorithm: behavior of a process p_i

Algorithm 1 describes the behavior of a process p_i . When it invokes `balancei(j)`, p_i returns the current value of $account_i[j]$ (line 1).

When it invokes `transfer(j, v)`, p_i first checks if it has enough money in its account (line 2) and returns `abort` if it does not (line 5). If it has enough money, p_i computes the next sequence number sn_i and r-broadcasts the pair $(sn_i, \text{TRANSFER}(j, v))$ (line 3). Then p_i waits

⁷ Reification is the process by which an implicit, hidden or internal information is explicitly exposed to a programmer.

```

init:  $account_i[1..n] \leftarrow \text{init}[1..n]; sn_i \leftarrow 0; del_i[1..n] \leftarrow [0, \dots, 0].$ 

operation  $\text{balance}(j)$  is
(1) return( $account[j]$ ).

operation  $\text{transfer}(j, v)$  is
(2) if ( $v \leq account_i[j]$ )
(3)   then  $sn_i \leftarrow sn_i + 1; r\_broadcast(sn_i, \text{TRANSFER}(j, v));$ 
(4)     wait ( $del_i[j] = sn_i$ ); return(commit)
(5)   else return(abort)
(6) end if.

when ( $sn, \text{TRANSFER}(k, v)$ ) is  $r\_delivered$  do
(7) wait ( $(sn = del_i[j] + 1) \wedge (account_i[j] \geq v)$ );
(8)  $account_i[j] \leftarrow account_i[j] - v; account_i[k] \leftarrow account_i[k] + v;$ 
(9)  $del_i[j] \leftarrow sn.$ 

```

■ **1** Generic broadcast-based money transfer algorithm (code for p_i)

until it has locally processed this transfer (lines 7-9), and finally returns **commit**. Let us notice that the predicate at line 7 is always satisfied when p_i r-delivers a transfer message it has r-broadcast.

When p_i r-delivers a pair $(sn, \text{TRANSFER}(k, v))$ from a process p_j , it does not process it immediately. Instead, p_i waits until (i) this is the next message it has to process from p_j (to implement FIFO order) and (ii) its local view of the money transfers to and from p_j (namely the current value of $account_i[j]$) allows this money transfer to occur (line 7). When this happens, p_i locally registers the transfer by moving the quantity v from $account_i[j]$ to $account_i[k]$ (line 8) and increases $del_i[j]$ (line 9).

5 Instantiation and Proof in the Crash Failure Model

This section presents first the crash-tolerant reliable broadcast abstraction whose operations instantiate the $r_broadcast()$ and $r_deliver()$ operations used in the generic algorithm. Then, using the MT-compliance notion, it proves that Algorithm 1 combined with a crash-tolerant reliable broadcast implements a money transfer object in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$. It also shows that, in this model, money transfer is weaker than the construction of an atomic read/write register. Finally, it presents a simple weakening of the FIFO requirement that works in the model $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$.

5.1 Multi-shot reliable broadcast abstraction in the crash failure model

This communication abstraction, named CR-Broadcast, is defined by the two operations $cr_broadcast()$ and $cr_deliver()$. Hence, we use the terminology “to cr-broadcast a message”, and “to cr-deliver a message”.

- **CRB-Validity.** If a process p_i cr-delivers a message with sequence number sn from a process p_j , then p_j cr-broadcast it with sequence number sn .
- **CRB-Integrity.** For each sequence number sn and sender p_j a process p_i cr-delivers at most one message with sequence number sn from p_j .
- **CRB-Termination-1.** If a correct process cr-broadcasts a message, it cr-delivers it.
- **CRB-Termination-2.** If a process cr-delivers a message from a (correct or faulty) process p_j , then all correct processes cr-deliver it.

CRB-Termination-1 and CRB-Termination-2 capture the “strong” reliability property of CR-Broadcast, namely: all the correct processes cr-deliver the same set S of messages, and this set includes at least the messages they cr-broadcast. Moreover, a faulty process cr-delivers a subset of S . Algorithms implementing the CR-Broadcast abstraction in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$ are described in [14, 25].

5.2 Proof of Algorithm 1 in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$

► **Lemma 1.** *Any invocation of `balance()` or `transfer()` issued by a correct process terminates.*

Proof. The fact that any invocation of `balance()` terminates follows immediately from the code of the operation.

When a process p_i invokes `transfer(j, v)`, it r-broadcasts a message and the local predicate $(sn = del_i[i] + 1) \wedge (v \leq account_i[i])$ is satisfied. Due to the CRB-Termination properties, p_i receives its own transfer message and the predicate (line 7) is necessarily satisfied. This is because (i) only p_i can transfer its own money, a (ii) the `wait` statement of line 4 ensures the current invocation of `transfer(j, v)` does not return until the corresponding TRANSFER message is processed at lines 8-9, and (iii) the fact that $account_i[i]$ cannot decrease between the execution of line 3 and the one of line 7. It follows that p_i terminates its invocation of `transfer(j, v)`. ◀

The safety proof is more involved. It consists in showing that any execution satisfies MT-compliance as defined in Section 3.

Notation and definition

- Let $trf_j^{sn}(k, v)$ denote the operation $trf(k, v)$ issued by p_j with sequence number sn .
- We say a process p_i *processes* the transfer $trf_j^{sn}(k, v)$ if, after it cr-delivered the associated message $TRANSFER\langle k, v \rangle$ with sequence number sn , p_j exits the `wait` statement at line 7 and executes the associated statements at lines 8-9. The moment at which these lines are executed is referred to as the *moment when the transfer is processed* by p_i . (These notions are related to the progress of processes.)
- If the message TRANSFER cr-broadcast by a process is cr-delivered by a correct process, we say that the transfer is *successful*. (Let us notice that a message cr-broadcast by a correct process is always successful.)

► **Lemma 2.** *If a process p_i processes $trf_\ell^{sn}(k, v)$, then any correct process processes $trf_\ell^{sn}(k, v)$.*

Proof. Let m_1, m_2, \dots be the sequence of transfers processed by p_i and let p_j be a correct process. We show by induction on z that, for all z , p_j processes all the messages m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z .

Base case $z = 0$. As the sequence of transfers is empty, the proposition is trivially satisfied.

Induction. Taking $z \geq 0$, suppose p_j processed all the transfers m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z . We have to show that p_j processes m_{z+1} . Note that m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z do not typically originate from the same sender, and are therefore normally processed by p_j in a different order than p_i , possibly mixed with other messages. This also applies to m_{z+1} . If m_{z+1} was processed by p_j before m_z , we are done. Otherwise there is a time τ at which p_j processed all the transfers m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z (case assumption), cr-delivered m_{z+1} (CBR-Termination-2 property), but has not yet processed m_{z+1} . Let $m_{z+1} = trf_\ell^{sn}(k, v)$. At time τ , we have the following.

- On one side, $del_j[\ell] \leq sn - 1$ since messages are processed in FIFO order and m_{z+1} has not yet been processed. On the other side, $del_j[\ell] \geq sn - 1$ because either $sn = 1$ or $\text{trf}_\ell^{sn-1}(-, -) \in m_1, \dots, m_z$, where $\text{trf}_\ell^{sn-1}(-, -)$ is the transfer issued by p_ℓ just before $m_{z+1} = \text{trf}_\ell^{sn}(k, v)$ (otherwise p_i would not have processed m_{z+1} just after m_1, \dots, m_z). Thus $del_j[\ell] = sn - 1$.
- Let us now shown that, at time τ , $account_j[\ell] \geq v$. To this end let $\text{plus}_i^{z+1}(\ell)$ denote the money transferred to p_ℓ as seen by p_i just before p_i processes m_{z+1} , and $\text{minus}_i^{z+1}(\ell)$ denote the money transferred from p_ℓ as seen by p_i just before p_i processes m_{z+1} . Similarly, let $\text{plus}_j^{z+1}(\ell)$ denote the money transferred to p_ℓ as seen by p_j at time τ and $\text{minus}_j^{z+1}(\ell)$ denote the money transferred from p_ℓ as seen by p_j at time τ . Let us consider the following sums:
 - On the side of the money transferred to p_ℓ as seen by p_j . Due to induction, all the transfers to p_ℓ included in m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z (and possibly more transfers to p_ℓ) have been processed by p_j , thus $\text{plus}_j^{z+1}(\ell) \geq \sum_{\text{trf}_{k'}(\ell, w) \in \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z\}} w$ and, as p_i processed the messages in the order $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z, m_{z+1}$ (assumption), we have $\text{plus}_i^{z+1}(\ell) = \sum_{\text{trf}_{k'}(\ell, w) \in \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z\}} w$. Hence, $\text{plus}_j^{z+1}(\ell) \geq \text{plus}_i^{z+1}(\ell)$.
 - On the side of the money transferred from p_ℓ as seen by p_j . Let us observe that p_j has processed all the transfers from p_ℓ with a sequence number smaller than sn and no transfer from p_ℓ with a sequence number greater than or equal to sn , thus we have $\text{minus}_j^{z+1}(\ell) = \sum_{\text{trf}_\ell(k', w) \in \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_z\}} w = \text{minus}_i^{z+1}(\ell)$.

Let $account_i^{z+1}[\ell]$ be the value of $account_i[\ell]$ just before p_i processes m_{z+1} , and $account_j^{z+1}[\ell]$ be the value of $account_j[\ell]$ at time τ . As $account_j^{z+1}[\ell] = \text{init}[\ell] + \text{plus}_j^{z+1}(\ell) - \text{minus}_j^{z+1}(\ell)$ and $account_i^{z+1}[\ell] = \text{init}[\ell] + \text{plus}_i^{z+1}(\ell) - \text{minus}_i^{z+1}(\ell)$, it follows that $account_j[\ell]$ is greater than or equal to the value of $account_i[\ell]$ just before p_i processes m_{z+1} , which was itself greater than or equal to v (otherwise p_i would not have processed m_{z+1} at that time). It follows that $account_j[\ell] \geq v$.

The two predicates of line 7 are therefore satisfied, and will remain so until m_{z+1} is processed (due to the FIFO order on transfers issued by p_ℓ), thus ensuring that process p_j processes the transfer m_{z+1} . ◀

► **Lemma 3.** *If a process p_i issues a successful money transfer $\text{trf}_i^{sn}(k, v)$ (execution of line 3) any correct process eventually processes the money transfer.*

Proof. When process p_i cr-broadcast money transfer $\text{trf}_i^{sn}(k, v)$, the local predicate $(sn = del_i[i] + 1) \wedge (account_i[i] \geq v)$ was true at p_i . When p_i cr-delivers its own transfer message, the predicate is still true at line 7 and p_i processes its transfer (if p_i crashes after having cr-broadcast the transfer and before processing it, we extend its execution—without loss of correctness—by assuming it crashed just after processing the transfer). It follows from Lemma 2 that any correct process processes $\text{trf}_i^{sn}(k, v)$. ◀

► **Theorem 4.** *Algorithm 1 instantiated with CR-Broadcast implements a money transfer object in the system model $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$, and ensures that all operations by correct processes terminate.*

Proof. Lemma 1 proved that the invocations of the operations `balance()` and `transfer()` by the correct processes terminate. Let us now consider MT-compliance.

Considering any execution of the algorithm, captured as history $H = (L_1, \dots, L_n)$, let us first consider a correct process p_i . Let S_i be the sequence of the following events happening at p_i (these events are “instantaneous” in the sense p_i is not interrupted when it produces each of them):

- the event $\text{blc}(j)/v$ occurs when p_i invokes $\text{balance}(j)$ and obtains v (line 1), and
- the event $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v)$ occurs when p_i processes the corresponding transfer (lines 8-9 executed without interruption).

We show that S_i is an MT-compliant serialization of $A_{i,T}(H)$. When considering the construction of S_i , we have the following:

- For all $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v) \in L_j$ we have that p_j cr-broadcast this transfer and that $(sn, \text{TRANSFER}\langle k, v \rangle)$ was received by p_j and was therefore *successful*: it follows from Lemma 3 that p_i processes this money transfer, and consequently we have $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v) \in S_i$.
- For all $\text{op1} = \text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v)$ and $\text{op2} = \text{trf}_j^{sn'}(k', v')$ in S_i (two transfers issued by p_j) such that $\text{op1} \rightarrow_j \text{op2}$, we have $sn < sn'$. Consequently p_i processes op1 before op2 , and we have $\text{op1} \rightarrow_{S_i} \text{op2}$.
- For all pairs op1 and op2 belonging to L_i , their serialization order is the same in L_i and S_i .

It follows that S_i is a serialization of $A_{i,T}(H)$. Let us now show that S_i is MT-compliant.

- Case where the event in S_i is $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v)$. In this case we have $v \leq \text{acc}(j, \{\text{op} \in S_i \mid \text{op} \rightarrow_{S_i} \text{trf}_j(k, v)\})$ because this condition is directly encoded at p_i in the waiting predicate that precedes the processing of op .
- Case where the event in S_i is $\text{blc}(j)/v$. In this case we have $v = \text{acc}(j, \{\text{op} \in S_i \mid \text{op} \rightarrow_{S_i} \text{blc}(j)/v\})$, because this is exactly the way how the returned value v is computed in the algorithm.

This terminates the proof for the correct processes.

For a process p_i that crashes, the sequence of money transfers from a process p_j that is processed by p_i is a prefix of the sequence of money transfers issued by p_j (this follows from the FIFO processing order, line 7). Hence, for each process p_i that crashes there is a history $H' = (L'_1, \dots, L'_n)$ where L'_j is a prefix of L_j for each $j \neq i$ and $L'_i = L_i$, such that, following the same reasoning, the construction S_i given above is an MT-compliant serialization of $A_{i,T}(H')$, which concludes the proof of the theorem. ◀

5.3 Money transfer vs atomic read/write register in the crash failure model

It is shown in [5] that it is impossible to implement an atomic read/write register in the distributed system model $CAMP_{n,t}[t\emptyset]$, i.e., when, in addition to asynchrony, any number of processes may crash. On the positive side, several algorithms implementing such a register in $CAMP_{n,t}[t < n/2]$ have been proposed, each with its own features (see for example [4, 5, 20] to cite a few). As $CAMP_{n,t}[t < n/2]$ is a more constrained model than $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$, it follows that, from a $CAMP_{n,t}$ computability point of view, atomic read/write register is a stronger problem than money transfer.

6 Instantiation and Proof in the Byzantine Failure Model

This section presents first the reliable broadcast abstraction whose operations instantiate the $\text{r_broadcast}()$ and $\text{r_deliver}()$ operations used in the generic algorithm. Then, it proves that the resulting algorithm correctly implements a money transfer object in $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$.

6.1 Reliable broadcast abstraction in the Byzantine failure model

The communication abstraction, denoted BR-Broadcast, was introduced in [7]. It is defined by two operations denoted `br_broadcast()` and `br_deliver()` (hence we use the terminology “br-broadcast a message” and “br-deliver a message”). The difference between this communication abstraction and CR-Broadcast lies in the nature of failures. Namely, as a Byzantine process can behave arbitrarily, CRB-Validity, CRB-Integrity, and CRB-Termination-2 cannot be ensured. As an example, it is not possible to ensure that if a Byzantine process br-delivers a message, all correct processes br-deliver it. BR-Broadcast is consequently defined by the following properties. Termination-1 is the same in both communication abstractions, while Integrity, Validity and Termination-2 consider only correct processes (the difference lies in the added constraint written in italics).

- BRB-Validity. If a *correct* process p_i br-delivers a message from a *correct* process p_j with sequence number sn , then p_j br-broadcast it with sequence number sn .
- BRB-Integrity. For each sequence number sn and sender p_j a *correct* process p_i br-delivers at most one message with sequence number sn from sender p_j .
- BRB-Termination-1. If a correct process br-broadcasts a message, it br-delivers it.
- BRB-Termination-2. If a *correct* process br-delivers a message from a (correct or faulty) process p_j , then all correct processes br-deliver it.

It is shown in [8, 25] that $t < n/3$ is a necessary requirement to implement BR-Broadcast. Several algorithms implementing this abstraction have been proposed. Among them, the one presented in [7] is the most famous. It works in the model $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$, and requires three consecutive communication steps. The one presented in [16] works in the more constrained model $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/5]$, but needs only two consecutive communication steps. These algorithms show a trade-off between optimal t -resilience and time-efficiency.

6.2 Proof of Algorithm 1 in $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$

The proof has the same structure, and is nearly the same, as the one for the process-crash model presented in Section 5.2.

Notation

$\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v)$ now denotes a money transfer (or the associated processing event by a process) that correct processes br-deliver from p_j with sequence number sn . If p_j is a correct process, this definition is the same as the one used in the model $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$. If p_j is Byzantine, TRANSFER messages from p_j do not necessarily correspond to actual `transfer()` invocations by p_j , but the BRB-Termination-2 property guarantees that all correct processes br-deliver the *same* set of TRANSFER messages (with the same sequence numbers), and therefore agree on how p_j 's behavior should be interpreted. The reliable broadcast thus ensures a form of *weak agreement* among correct processes in spite of Byzantine failures. This weak agreement is what allows us to move almost seamlessly from a crash-failure model to a Byzantine model, with no change to the algorithm, and only a limited adaptation of its proof.

More concretely, Lemma 2 (for crash failures) becomes the next lemma whose proof is the same as for Lemma 2 in which the reference to the CBR-Termination-2 property is replaced by a reference to its BRB counterpart.

► **Lemma 5.** *If a correct process p_i processes $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v)$, then any correct process processes it.*

► **Lemma 6.** *If a correct process p_i br-broadcasts a money transfer, all the correct processes br-deliver and process it.*

Proof. When a correct process p_i br-broadcasts a money transfer $\text{trf}_i^{sn}(k, v)$, we have $(sn = \text{del}_i[i] + 1) \wedge (\text{account}_i[i] \geq v)$, thus when it br-delivers it the predicate of line 7 is satisfied. By Lemma 5, all the correct processes process this money transfer. ◀

► **Theorem 7.** *Algorithm 1 instantiated with BR-Broadcast implements a money transfer object in the system model $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$, and ensures that all operations by correct processes terminate.*

The model constraint $t < n/3$ is due only to the fact that Algorithm 1 uses BR-broadcast (for which $t < n/3$ is both necessary and sufficient). As the invocations of `balance()` by Byzantine processes may return arbitrary values and do not impact the correct processes, they are not required to appear in their local histories.

Proof. The proof that the operations issued by the correct processes terminate is the same as in Lemma 1 where the CRB-Termination properties are replaced by their BRB-Termination counterparts.

To prove MT-compliance, let us first construct mock local histories for Byzantine processes: the mock local history L_j associated with a Byzantine process p_j is the sequence of money transfers from p_j that the correct processes br-deliver from p_j and that they process. (By Lemma 5 all correct processes process the same set of money transfers from p_j).

Let p_i be a correct process and S_i be the sequence of operations occurring at p_i defined in the same way as in the crash failure model. In this construction, the following properties are respected:

- For all, $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v) \in L_j$ then
 - if p_j is correct, it br-broadcast this money transfer and, due to Lemma 6, p_i processes it, hence $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v) \in S_i$.
 - if p_j is Byzantine, due to the definition of L_j (sequence of money transfers that correct processes br-delivers from p_j and process), we have $\text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v) \in S_i$.
- For all $\text{op1} = \text{trf}_j^{sn}(k, v)$ and $\text{op2} = \text{trf}_j^{sn'}(k', v')$ (two transfers in $L_j \subseteq S_i$) such that $\text{op1} \rightarrow_j \text{op2}$, we have $sn < sn'$, consequently p_i processes op1 before op2 , and we have $\text{op1} \rightarrow_{S_i} \text{op2}$.
- For all both op1 and op2 belonging to L_i , their serialization order is the same in L_i as in S_i (same as for the crash case).

It follows that S_i is a serialization of $A_{i,T}(\tilde{H})$ where $\tilde{H} = (L_1, \dots, L_n)$, L_i being the sequence of its operations if p_i is correct, and a mock sequence of money transfers, if it is Byzantine. The same arguments that were used in the crash failure model can be used here to prove that S_i is MT-compliant. Since all correct processes observe the same mock sequence of operations L_j for any given Byzantine process p_j , it follows that the algorithm implements an MT-compliant money transfer object in $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$. ◀

6.3 Extending to incomplete Byzantine Networks

An algorithm is described in [26] which simulates a fully connected (point-to-point) network on top of an asynchronous Byzantine message-passing system in which, while the underlying communication network is incomplete (not all the pairs of processes are connected by a channel), it is $(2t + 1)$ -connected (i.e., any pair of processes is connected by $(2t + 1)$ disjoint

paths⁸). Moreover, it is shown that this connectivity requirement is both necessary and sufficient.⁹

Hence, denoting $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3, (2t+1)\text{-connected}]$ such a system model, this algorithm builds $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$ on top $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3, (2t+1)\text{-connected}]$ (both models have the same computability power). It follows that the previous money-transfer algorithm works in incomplete $(2t+1)$ -connected asynchronous Byzantine systems where $t < n/3$.

7 Conclusion

The article has revisited the synchronization side of the money-transfer problem in failure-prone asynchronous message-passing systems. It has presented a generic algorithm that solves money transfer in asynchronous message-passing systems where processes may experience failures. This algorithm uses an underlying reliable broadcast communication abstraction, which differs according to the type of failures (process crashes or Byzantine behaviors) that processes can experience.

In addition to its genericity (hence modular) dimension, the proposed algorithm is surprisingly simple¹⁰ and particularly efficient (in addition to money-transfer data, each message generated by the algorithm only carries one sequence number). As a side effect, this algorithm has shown that, in the crash failure model, money transfer is a weaker problem than the construction of a read/write register. As far as the Byzantine failure model is concerned, we conjecture that $t < n/3$ is a necessary requirement for money transfer (as it is for the construction of a read/write register [15]).

For the interested reader, a slightly weaker version of money transfer (which can be built from a message ordering weaker than FIFO) is presented in an Appendix. Finally, it is worth noticing that this article adds one more member to the family of algorithms that strive to “unify” the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model as studied in [6, 11, 17, 22].

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by the French ANR project 16-CE40-0023-03 DESCARTES devoted to layered and modular structures in distributed computing.

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⁸ “Disjoint” means that, given any pair of processes p and q , any two paths connecting p and q share no process other than p and q . Actually, the $(2t+1)$ -connectivity is required only for any pair of correct processes (which are not known in advance).

⁹ This algorithm is a simple extension to asynchronous systems of a result first established in [10] in the context of synchronous Byzantine systems.

¹⁰ Let us recall that, in sciences, simplicity is a first class property [3]. As stated by A. Perlis — recipient of the first Turing Award — “Simplicity does not precede complexity, but follows it”.

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A Replacing FIFO by a weaker ordering requirement in $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$

An interesting question is the following one: is the FIFO order necessary to implement money transfer in the model $CAMP_{n,t}[\emptyset]$? While we conjecture it is, it appears that, a small change in the specification of money transfer allows us to use a weakened FIFO order, as shown below.

Weakened money transfer specification

The change in the specification presented in Section 3 concerns the definition of the serialisation S_i associated with each process p_i . In this modified version the serialization S_i associated with each process p_i is no longer required to respect the process order on the operations issued by p_j , $j \neq i$. This means that two different process p_i and p_k may observe the `transfer()` operations issued by a process p_j in different orders (which captures the fact that some transfer operations by a process p_j are commutative with respect to its current account).

Modification of the algorithm

Let k be a constant integer ≥ 1 . Let $sn_i(j)$ be the highest sequence number such that all the transfer messages from p_j whose sequence numbers belong to $\{1, \dots, sn_i(j)\}$ have been cr-delivered and processed by a certain process p_i (i.e., lines 8-9 have been executed for these messages). Initially we have $sn_i(j) = 0$.

Let sn be the sequence number of a message cr-delivered by p_i from p_j . At line 7 the predicate $sn = del_i[j] + 1$ can be replaced by the predicate $sn \in \{sn_i(j) + 1, \dots, sn_i(j) + k\}$. Let us notice that this predicate boils down to $sn = del_i[j] + 1$ when $k = 1$. More generally the set of sequence numbers $\{sn_i(j) + 1, \dots, sn_i(j) + k\}$ defines a sliding window for sequence numbers which allows the corresponding messages to be processed.

The important point here is the fact that messages can be processed in an order that does not respect their sending order as long as all the messages are processed, which is not guaranteed when $k = +\infty$. Assuming p_j issues an infinite number of transfers, if $k = +\infty$ it is possible that, while all these messages are cr-delivered by p_i , some of them are never processed at lines 8-9 (their processing being always delayed by other messages that arrived after them). The finiteness of the value k prevents this unfair message processing order from occurring.

The proof of Section 5.2 must be appropriately adapted to show that this modification implements the weakened money transfer specification.