

Modelling the second wave of COVID-19 infections in France and Italy via a Stochastic SEIR model 2

Davide Faranda, Tommaso Alberti

▶ To cite this version:

Davide Faranda, Tommaso Alberti. Modelling the second wave of COVID-19 infections in France and Italy via a Stochastic SEIR model 2. 2020. hal-02668318v1

HAL Id: hal-02668318 https://hal.science/hal-02668318v1

Preprint submitted on 31 May 2020 (v1), last revised 8 Oct 2020 (v3)

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

- Modelling the second wave of COVID-19 infections in France and Italy via a
- 2 Stochastic SEIR model
- Davide Faranda^{1, 2, 3, a)} and Tommaso Alberti⁴
- ¹⁾Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l'Environnement,
- 5 CEA Saclay l'Orme des Merisiers, UMR 8212 CEA-CNRS-UVSQ,
- 6 Université Paris-Saclay & IPSL, 91191, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
- ²⁾London Mathematical Laboratory, 8 Margravine Gardens, London, W6 8RH,
- UK
- ³⁾LMD/IPSL, Ecole Normale Superieure, PSL research University, 75005, Paris,
- 10 France

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

25

- ⁴⁾INAF Istituto di Astrofisica e Planetologia Spaziali, via del Fosso del Cavaliere 100,
- 12 00133 Roma, Italy
- (Dated: 31 May 2020)

COVID-19 has forced quarantine measures in several countries across the world. These measures have proven to be effective in significantly reducing the prevalence of the virus. To date, no effective treatment or vaccine is available. In the effort of preserving both public health as well as the economical and social textures, France and Italy governments have partially released lockdown measures. Here we extrapolate the long-term behavior of the epidemics in both countries using a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model where parameters are stochastically perturbed to handle the uncertainty in the estimates of COVID-19 prevalence. Our results suggest that uncertainties in both parameters and initial conditions rapidly propagate in the model and can result in different outcomes of the epidemics leading or not to a second wave of infections. Using actual knowledge, asymptotic estimates of COVID-19 prevalence can fluctuate of order of ten millions units in both countries.

a)Correspondence to davide.faranda@lsce.ipsl.fr

26 I. LEAD PARAGRAPH

COVID-19 pandemic poses serious threats to public health as well as economic and social stability of many countries. A real time extrapolation of the evolution of COVID-19
epidemics is challenging both for the nonlinearities undermining the dynamics and the ignorance of the initial conditions, i.e., the number of actual infected individuals. Here we
focus on France and Italy, which have partially released initial lockdown measures. The
goal is to explore sensitivity of COVID-19 epidemic evolution to the release of lockdown
measures using dynamical (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered) stochastic models. We
show that the large uncertainties arising from both poor data quality and inadequate estimations of model parameters (incubation, infection and recovery rates) propagate to long term
extrapolations of infections counts. Nonetheless, distinct scenarios can be clearly identified,
showing either a second wave or a quasi-linear increase of total infections.

8 II. INTRODUCTION

SARS-CoV-2 is a zoonotic virus of the coronavirus family¹ emerged in Wuhan (China) at the end of 2019² and rapidly propagated across the world until it has been declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020³. SARS-CoV-2 virus provokes an infectious disease known as COVID-19 that has an incredibly large spectrum of symptoms or none depending on the age, health status and the immune defenses of each individuals⁴. SARS-CoV-2 causes potentially life-threatening form of pneumonia and/or cardiac injuries in a non-negligible patients fraction^{5,6}.

To date, no treatment of vaccine is available for COVID-19⁷. Efforts to contain the virus and to not overwhelm intensive care facilities are based on quarantine measures which have proven very effective in several countries^{8–10}. Despite this, lockdown measures entail enormous economical, social and psychological costs. Recent estimates of the International Monetary Fund recently announced a global recession that will drag global GDP lower by 3% in 2020, although continuously developing and changing as well as significantly depending country-by-country¹¹. More than 20 million people have lost their job in United States¹² and a large percentage of Italians have developed psychological disturbances such as insomnia or anxiety due to the strict lockdown measures¹³. Those measures have been taken on the basis of epidemics models, which are fitted

nicipalities in both Lombardia and Veneto which were identified as the two main Italian clusters. After the initial spread of the epidemics into different regions all Italian territory was placed into a 57 quarantine on March 9th, with total lockdown measures including all commercial activities (apart 58 supermarkets and pharmacies), non-essential businesses and industries, and severe restrictions to transports and movements of people at regional, national, and extra-national levels 15. People were asked to stay at home or near for sporting activities and dog hygiene (within 200 m from home), to reduce as much as possible their movements (only for food shopping and care reasons), and smart-working was especially encouraged in both public and private administrations and companies. At the early stages of epidemics intensive cares were almost saturated with a peak of 4000 people on April 3rd and a peak of hospitalisations of 30000 on April 4th, significantly reducing after these dates, reaching 1500 and 17000, respectively, at the beginning of phase 2 on May 4th, and 750 and 1000 on May 18th when lockdown measures on commercial activities were relaxed. These numbers, continuously declining during the next days and weeks, confirmed the benefit of lockdown measures¹⁶. Alarmed by the exponential growth of new infections and the saturation of the intensive care beds, also France introduced strict lockdown measures on March 17th¹⁷. The French government restricted travels to food shopping, care and work when teleworking was not possible, outings near home for individual sporting activity and/or dog hygiene, and it imposed the closure of the Schengen area borders as well as the postponement of the second round of municipal elections. The number of patients in intensive care, like the number of hospitalisations overall peaked in early April and then started to decline, showing the benefits of lockdown measures. On Monday, May 11th, France began a gradual easing of COVID-19 lockdown measures 18. Trips of up to 100 kilometres from home are allowed without justification, as will gatherings of up to 10 people. Longer trips will still be allowed only for work or for compelling family reasons, as justified by a signed form. Guiding the government's plans for easing the lockdown is the division of the country into two zones, green and red, based on health indicators. Paris region (Ile de France), with about 12 81 milions inhabitants is flagged, to date, as an orange zone. 82

on the available data¹⁴. In Italy, initial lockdown measures started on February 23rd for 11 mu-

In both countries, the release of lockdown measures has been authorised by authorities after consulting scientific committees which were monitoring the behavior of the curve of infections using COVID-19 data. Those data are provided daily, following a request of the WHO. To date, the WHO guidelines require countries to report, at each day *t*, the total number of infected patients

I(t) as well as the number of deaths D(t). Large uncertainties have been documented in the count of $I(t)^{19}$. Whereas in the early stage of the epidemic several countries tested asymptomatic individuals to track back the infection chain, recent policies to estimate I(t) have changed. Most of the western countries have previously tested only patients displaying severe SARS-CoV-2 symptoms²⁰. In an effort of tracking all the chain of infections, Italy and France are now testing all individuals displaying COVID-19 symptoms and those who had strict contacts with infected individuals. The importance of tracking asymptomatic patients has been proven in a recent study²¹. The authors have estimated that an enormous part of total infections were undocumented (80% to 90%) and that those undetected infections were the source for 79% of documented cases in China. Tracking strategies have proven effective in supporting actions to reduce the rate of new infections, without the need of lockdown measures, as in South Korea²².

The goal of this paper is to explore possible future epidemics scenarios of the long term behavior of the COVID-19 epidemic²³ but taking into account the role of uncertainties in both the parameters value and the infection counts to investigate different outcomes of the epidemics leading 100 or not to a second wave of infections. To this purpose we use a stochastic Susceptible-Exposed-101 Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model²⁴ which consist in a set of ordinary differential equations where 102 control parameters are time-dependent modelled via a stochastic process. This allows to mimic the 103 dependence on control parameters on some additional/external factors as super-spreaders²⁵ and the 104 enforcing/relaxing of confinement measures²⁴. As for the classical SEIR models²⁶ the population 105 is divided into four compartmental groups, i.e., Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, and Recovered 106 individuals. The stochastic SEIR model shows that long-term extrapolation is sensitive to both the 107 initial conditions and the value of control parameters²⁴, with asymptotic estimates fluctuating on 108 the order of ten millions units in both countries, leading or not a second wave of infections. This 100 sensitivity arising from both poor data quality and inadequate estimations of model parameters has been also recently investigated by means of a statistical model based on a generalized logistic distribution²⁷. The paper is organised as follows: in Section III we discuss the various sources of data for COVID-19 and their shortcomings, and then we discuss in detail the SEIR model and its statistical modelling. In Section IV we discuss the results focusing on the statistical sensitivity 114 of the modelling, and apply it to data from France and Italy. We finish, in Section V, with some 115 remarks and point out some limitiations of our study. 116

17 III. DATA AND MODELLING

118 A. Data

144

This paper relies on data stored into the Visual Dashboard repository of the Johns Hopkins Uni-119 versity Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE) supported by ESRI Living Atlas 120 Team and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU APL). Data can be freely 121 accessed and downloaded at https://systems.jhu.edu/research/public-health/ncov/, 122 and refers to the confirmed cases by means of a laboratory test³. Nevertheless there are some 123 inconsistencies between countries due to different protocols in testing patients (suspected symptoms, tracing-back procedures, wide range tests)^{28,29}, as well as, to local management of health 125 infrastructures and institutions. As an example due to the regional-level system of Italian health-126 care data are collected at a regional level and then reported to the National level via the Protezione 127 Civile transferring them to WHO. These processes could be affected by some inconsistencies and 128 delays³⁰, especially during the most critical phase of the epidemic diffusion that could introduce errors and biases into the daily data. These incongruities mostly affected the period between February 23rd and March 10th, particularly regarding the counts of deaths due to a protocol change from the Italian Ministry of Health³¹. A similar situation occurs in France where the initial testing strategy was based only on detecting those individuals experiencing severe COVID19 symptoms³². In the post lockdown phase, France has extended its testing capacity to asymptomatic individuals who have been in contact with infected patients³³. 135

136 B. A Stochastic epidemiological Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered model

One of the most used epidemiological models is the so-called Susceptible-Exposed-InfectedRecovered (SEIR) model belonging to the class of compartmental models²⁶. It assumes that the
total population N can be divided into four classes of individuals that are susceptible S, exposed E, infected I, and recovered or dead R (assumed to be not susceptible to reinfection). The model
is based on the following assumptions:

- 1. the total population does not vary in time, e.g., dN/dt = dS/dt + dE/dt + dI/dt + dR/dt = 0, $\forall t \ge 0$;
 - 2. susceptible individuals become infected that then can only recover or die, e.g., $S \rightarrow I \rightarrow R$;

- 3. exposed individuals E encountered an infected person but are not themselves infectious;
- 4. recovered or died individuals R are forever immune.

Thus, the model reads as

145

146

149

150

151

169

170

171

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\lambda S(t)I(t),\tag{1}$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \lambda S(t)I(t) - \alpha E(t), \tag{2}$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \alpha E(t) - \gamma I(t),\tag{3}$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I(t),\tag{4}$$

where $\gamma > 0$ is the recovery/death rate, $\lambda = \lambda_0/S(0) > 0$ is the infection rate rescaled by the initial number of susceptible individuals S(0), and α is the inverse of the incubation period. Its discrete version can be simply obtained via an Euler Scheme as

$$S(t+1) = S(t) - \lambda S(t)I(t),$$
 (5)

$$E(t+1) = (1-\alpha)E(t) + \lambda S(t)I(t), \tag{6}$$

$$I(t+1) = (1-\gamma)I(t) + \alpha E(t), \tag{7}$$

$$R(t+1) = R(t) + \gamma I(t).$$
 (8)

in which we fixed dt = 1 day that is the time resolution of COVID-19 counts. By means of γ and 159 λ_0 the model also allows to derived the so-called R_0 parameter, e.g., $R_0=\lambda_0/\gamma$, representing the 160 average reproduction number of the virus. It is related to the number of cases that can potentially 161 (on average) caused from an infected individual during its infectious period ($\tau_{inf} = \gamma^{-1}$). Early 162 estimates in Wuhan³⁴ on January 2020 reported $R_0=2.68^{2.86}_{2.47}$ which lead to $\gamma=0.37$ fixing $\lambda\simeq 1$ 163 as in³⁵ and a 95% confidence level range for the incubation period between 2 and 11 days³⁶. 164 However, the R_0 parameter as well as models parameters λ , γ , and α can vary in time during 165 the epidemics due to different factors as the possible presence of the so-called super-spreaders²⁵, 166 intrinsic changes of the SARS-CoV-2 features, lockdown measures, asymptomatic individuals who 167 are not tracked out, counting procedures and protocols, and so on³⁷.

To deal with uncertainties in long-term extrapolations and with the time-dependency of control parameters a stochastic approach could provide new insights in modeling epidemics^{38–40}, especially when epidemics show a wide range of spatial and temporal variability ^{41–43}. However,

instead of investigating how to get a realistic behavior by stochastically perturbing control parameters, here we investigate how uncertainties into the final counts C(t) are controlled by model parameters²⁴. Thus, we use a stochastic version of the SEIR model in which the set of control parameters $\kappa \in \{\alpha, \lambda, \gamma\}$ is modelled via a stochastic process

$$\kappa(t) = |\kappa_0 + \sigma \cdot \xi(t)|, \tag{9}$$

with being σ the intensity of the perturbation, $\xi(t)$ a random variable from a collection of normally distributed N(0,1) values at each time t, and since $\kappa(t) \geq 0$ we introduced the absolute value in Eq. (9). In this way we can introduce instantaneous daily discrete jumps (e.g., take into account daily uncertainties) in the control parameters to properly model detection errors on infection counts, appropriately described through a discrete process⁴⁴ than a continuous one⁴⁵.

182 IV. RESULTS

183 A. Model validation: first wave

We begin this section by validating the SEIR stochastic model on the first wave of infections.
We have therefore to chose the initial conditions, and then introduce the lockdown measures in the parameters.

a. France

187

In France, the first documented case of COVID-19 infections goes back to December 27th, 2019. 188 Doctors at a hospital in the northern suburbs of Paris retested samples from patients between De-189 cember 2nd, 2019, and January 16th, 2020. Of the 14 patient samples retested, one sample, from 190 a 42-year-old man came back positive 46. As initial condition for the SEIR model, we therefore set 191 I(t=1)=1 and t=1 corresponds to December 27th, 2019. We then use $R_0=2.68^{2.86}_{2.47}$ which 192 lead to $\gamma=0.37$ fixing $\lambda_0\simeq 1$. Strict lockdown measures are introduced at t=80 (i.e., March 193 17th, 2020). First wave modelling results are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1a) shows the modelled 194 value of R_0 . During confinement, we let λ fluctuates by 20% of its value around 1/4. We base this new infection rate on the mobility data for France during confinement, which have shown a drop by $\sim 75\%$ according to the INSERM report #11⁴⁷. The resulting confinement $R_0 = 0.75^{1.0}_{0.5}$, 197 a range of values compatible with that published by the Pasteur Institute⁴⁸. The cumulative num-198 ber of infections is shown in Figure 1b) and shows, on average, that 8 millions people have been 199

infected by SARS-CoV-2 in France. The uncertainty range is extremely large, according to the error propagation given by the stochastic fluctuations of the parameters (see²⁴ for explanations). It extends from few hundred thousands individuals up to 18 millions. The average is however close to the value proposed by the authors in ⁴⁹, who estimate a prevalence of $\sim 6\%$ of COVID-19 in the French population. Another realistic feature of the model is the presence of an asymmetric behavior of the right tail of daily infections distributions (Figure 1c) that has also been observed in real COVID-19 published data⁵⁰.

b. Italy

207

For Italy, the first suspect COVID-19 case goes back to December 22nd, 2019, a 41-year-old 208 woman who could only be tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies in April 2020⁵¹. As initial 209 condition we therefore set I(t = 1) = 1 and t = 1 corresponds to December 22nd, 2019. As for 210 France we use $R_0 = 2.68_{2.47}^{2.86}$ leading to $\gamma = 0.37$ if fixing $\lambda_0 \simeq 1$. A first semi-lockdown was set in Italy on March 9th, 2020 (t = 78) and enforced on March 22nd, 2020 (t = 89). To simulate these two-steps lockdown we again base our reduction in R_0 on the mobility data for Italy which show for the first part of the confinement a reduction of about 50 % and a similar reduction to France (75%) for the strict lockdown phase. Figure 2 shows the results for the first wave by 215 letting $\lambda = 0.25 \pm \Delta \lambda$, where $\Delta \lambda$ represents a 20% fluctuations around the mean value, and by 216 fixing an initial condition on susceptible individuals $S(1) = 6.0 \cdot 10^7$ corresponding to the estimate 217 of the Italian population. A clear difference emerges with respect to the case of France in the 218 behavior of R_0 which shows an intermediate reduction near t = 80, corresponding to March 11th, 219 2020, to $R_0 = 1.4_{1.1}^{1.7}$ before reaching the final value of $R_0 = 0.7_{0.5}^{0.9}$. This sort of "step" into the 220 R_0 time behavior corresponds to the time interval between semi- and full-lockdown measures, 221 whose efficiency significantly increases after March 24th, 2020, also corresponding to the peak 222 value of infections. This is confirmed by looking at daily infections distributions (Figure 2c) that 223 shows a peak value near March 24th, 2020, also observed in real COVID-19 data²⁷. Finally, the 224 cumulative number of infections (Figure 2b) shows that, on average, almost 10 millions people have been infected by SARS-CoV-2 in Italy, ranging between few hundred thousands up to 25 millions due to the the error propagation by the stochastic fluctuations of model parameters (see 24 227 for explanations). Nevertheless the wide range of uncertainty the average value is close to the 228 value estimated from a team of experts of the Imperial College London according to which the 229 9.6% of Italian population has been infected, with a 95% confidence level ranging between 3.2%230 and 26% 52 . These estimates correspond to cumulative infections of \sim 6 millions, ranging from \sim 2 and \sim 16 millions, well in agreement with our model and other statistical estimates⁵³.

B. Future epidemics scenarios

After lockdown measures are released, for both countries, we model three different scenarios: a first one where all restrictions are lifted (back to normality), a second one where strict measures are taken (semi-lockdown) and a third one where the population remains mostly confined (lockdown).

a. France

237

Results for France are shown in Figure 3. Lockdown is released at t = 136, corresponding to 238 May 11th, 2020. The back to normality (red) scenario clearly shows a second wave of infections 239 peaking in summer (early July) and forcing group immunity in the French population. The semi-240 lockdown (green) scenario, corresponding to a reduction of the mobility of about 50%, leads to 241 a second wave as intense as the first wave, but longer, at the end of August. As in the previous 242 scenario, the semi-lockdown scenario allows to reach a group immunity in France. A third lock-243 down scenario is modelled (blue). This latter scenario simulates an $R_0 \simeq 1$, that can be achieved 244 by imposing strict distancing measures, contact tracking as well as reduction in mobility. It results 245 in a linear modest increase of the total number of infections that does not produce a proper wave of 246 infections. As in the first wave modelling, large uncertainties are also present in future scenarios 247 although the three distinct behaviors clearly appear. 248

249 *b. Italy*

Figure 4 shows the results for modeling future epidemic scenarios for Italy. The first relaxation 250 of lockdown measures started at t = 131, corresponding to May 4th, 2020, while strict measures 251 were finally released at t = 146, corresponding to May 18th, 2020. The back to normality (red) 252 scenario moves towards a second wave of infections whose peak occurs at t = 193, correspond-253 ing to July 4th, 2020, exactly three months after initial lockdown measures were released (May 254 4th, 2020). This would lead the so-called herd immunity for the whole Italian population (see Figure 4b), with a peak of daily infections near 5 millions of people (Figure 4c), and R_0 re-approaching the initial value ($R_0 = 2.68$). The semi-lockdown (green) scenario produces a second wave mostly 257 similar, in terms of intensity, as the first wave, but occurring at t = 246, e.g., August 26th, 2020. 258 This scenario will lead to 40 millions infected people, spanning between 25 and 55 millions, thus 259 producing a group immunity in Italy. A third scenario is modelled in which complete lockdown 260 measures are still considered (blue). This latter scenario leads to a more controlled evolution of 261

cumulative infections which still remain practically unchanged with respect to the first wave cu-262 mulative number. It has been obtained by simulating an $R_0 \simeq 1$, resulting from strict distancing 263 measures and reduced mobility, and does not produce a proper wave of infections. However, all 264 scenarios are clearly characterized by a wide range of uncertainties, although producing three well 265 distinct behaviors in both cumulative and daily infections.

C. Phase Diagrams 267

269

271

277

279

In the previous section we have seen that increasing R_0 above 1 can or not produce a second 268 wave of infections and introduce also a time delay in the appearance of a second wave of infections. We now analyse this effect in a complete phase diagram fashion. Figures 5-6 show the 270 phase diagrams for France and for Italy, respectively. The diagrams are built in terms of ensemble averages of number of infections per day I(t) versus the average value of R_0 after the confinement (panels a), and the errors (represented as standard deviation of the average I(t) over the 30 realisations) are shown in panels b. First we note that despite some small differences in the de-274 lay of the COVID-19 second wave of infections peak, the diagrams are very similar. In order to 275 avoid a second wave, R_0 could fluctuate on values even slightly larger than one. Furthermore, for 276 $1.5 < R_0 < 2$, the second wave is delayed in Autumn or Winter 2020/2021 months. The uncertainty follows the same behavior as the average and it peaks when the number of daily infections 278 is maximum. This means that the ability to control the outcome of the epidemics is highly reduced if R_0 is too high. 280

DISCUSSION

France and Italy have faced a long phase of lockdown with severe restrictions in mobility and 282 social contacts. They have managed to reduce the number of daily COVID-19 infections drasti-283 cally and released almost simultaneously lockdown measures. This paper addresses the possible 284 future scenarios of COVID-19 infections in those countries by using one of the simplest possible 285 model capable to reproduce the first wave of infections and to take into account uncertainties, 286 namely a stochastic SEIR model with fluctuating parameters. 287

288

289

We have first verified that the model is capable to reproduce the behavior of the first wave of

infections and provide an estimate of COVID-19 prevalence that is coherent with clinical tests and other studies. The introduction of stochasticity accounts for the large uncertainties in both the initial conditions as well as the fluctuations in the basic reproduction number R_0 originating from changes in virus characteristics, mobility or misapplication in confinement measures. 30 realisations of the model have been produced and they show very different COVID-19 prevalence after the first wave. The range goes from thousands of infected to tens of millions of infections in both countries. Average values are compatible with those found in other studies^{49,52}.

Then, we have modelled future epidemics scenarios by choosing specific fluctuating behaviors for R_0 and performing again, 30 realisations of the stochastic SEIR model. Despite the very large uncertainties, distinct scenarios clearly appear from the noise. In particular, they suggest that a second wave can be avoided even with R_0 values slightly larger than one. This means that actual distancing measures which include the use of surgical masks, the reduction in mobility and the active contact tracking can be effective in avoiding a second peak of infections without the need of imposing further strict lockdown measures. The analysis of phase diagrams show that there is a sharp transition between observing or not a second wave of infections when the value of R_0 is close to 1.5. Moreover, the models show that the higher R_0 , the lower the ability to control the number of infections in the epidemics.

This model has also evident deficiencies in representing the COVID-19 infections. First of all, the choice of the initial conditions is conditioned by our ignorance on the diffusion of the virus in France and Italy in December 2019. Furthermore, we are unable to verify on an extensive dataset the outcome of the first wave: on one side antibodies blood tests have still a lower reliability⁵⁴ and on the other they have not been applied on an extensive number of individuals to get reliable estimates. On top of the data-driven limitations, we have those introduced by the use of compartment models, as there are geographic, social and age differences in the spread of the COVID-19 disease in both countries¹⁸. Furthermore, we also assume that fluctuations on the parameters of the SEIR model are Gaussian, although there are good reasons to think that they should be heavy tailed distributions^{50,55}. We would like to remark however that, to overcome these limitations, one would need to fit more complex models and introduce additional parameters which can, at the present stage, barely inferred by the data.

Our choice to stick the stochastic SEIR model is indeed driven by its simplicity and the possi-

bility of modeling realistic the uncertainties with the stochastic fluctuations instead of adding new parameters whose inference may affect the results. This study can be applied to other countries, and this is why we publish along the code of our analysis alongside with the paper. To date, Northern Europe, UK, US and other American countries are still facing the first wave of infections, so that future scenarios cannot be devised with the same clarity as those outlined in this study for France and Italy.

28 VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

DF acknowledges All the London Mathematical Laboratory fellows, B Dubrulle, F Pons, N Bartolo, F Daviaud, P Yiou, M Kagayema, S Fromang and G Ramstein for useful discussions.

331 VII. DATA AVAILABILITY

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in https://systems.

jhu.edu/research/public-health/ncov/, maintained by Johns Hopkins University Center

for Systems Science.

335 VIII. APPENDIX A: NUMERICAL CODE

```
\% This appendix contains the MATLAB code used to perform
   % the analysis contained in the paper via a stochasitc
337
   % SEIR model
338
339
   %% PARAMETER DEFINITIONS
340
   %tmax: number of day of integrations
341
   tmax=500;
   %nrel: number of realisations of the model
   nrel=30;
   %tconf: lockdown day
   tconf=50
   %tconf2: lockdown release
   tconf2=100
348
```

```
349
   %% LOOP ON DIFFERENT VALUES OF LAMBDA, INFECTION RATE
   for la=1:50
        lambdaconf=0.25;
352
        lambdares=la.*0.02;
354
        %% LOOP ON REALIZATIONS
355
        for rel=1:nrel
356
             S=zeros(1,tmax);
357
             E=zeros(1,tmax);
358
             I=zeros(1,tmax);
359
             R=zeros(1,tmax);
360
             C=zeros(1,tmax);
361
             lambda=zeros(1,tmax);
362
             %S Susceptible individuals (France population)
363
             S(1)=67000000;
364
             %I Infected individuals
365
             I(1)=585;
366
             % Recovered
367
             R(1)=0;
368
             % Inital time
369
             T(1)=0;
370
             % Cumulative infections
371
             C(1)=0;
372
             % alpha is the inverse of the incubation period (1/t_incubation)
373
             alpha0=0.27;
374
             % RO is equal to 2.68
375
             R0=2.68;
376
             % gamma is the inverse of the mean infectious period
377
             gamma0=lambda0./R0;
             \mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\%}}} uncertainty in gamma and lambda
             coeff_gamma=0.5;
380
```

```
coeff_lambda=0.005;
381
382
                %% LOOP ON TIME, INTEGRATION OF SEIR MODELS
383
                for t=1:1:tmax
384
                %gamma=1/Tr where Tr is the recovery time (2 weeks)
385
                %Stochastic gamma
386
                gamma=gamma0+gamma0./5*randn;
387
                %Change lambda for confinement
388
                if t==tconf
389
                lambda0=lambdaconf;
390
                end
391
                if t==tconf2
392
                lambda0=lambdares;
393
                end
394
                %Stochastic lambda
395
                lambda(t+1)=(lambda0+lambda0./5*randn)./S(1);
396
                %Stochastic alpha
397
                alpha=alpha0+alpha0./5*randn;
398
                %Computation of RO
399
                RO(t+1)=lambda(t+1)./gamma0;
400
                %Iteration of the model
401
                T(t+1)=t;
402
                S(t+1)=S(t)-(lambda(t+1)*S(t)*I(t));
403
                E(t+1)=E(t)+(lambda(t+1)*S(t)*I(t))-alpha*E(t);
404
                I(t+1)=I(t) + alpha*E(t) -gamma*I(t);
405
                R(t+1)=R(t)+(gamma*I(t));
406
                %cumulative infected
407
                C(t+1) = gamma0.*sum(I);
408
                %Variables for different realisations
409
                Irel(rel,t+1)=I(t+1);
410
                lambdarel(rel,t+1)=lambda(t+1);
411
                end
412
```

```
end

415

416 %% AVERAGING OVER DIFFERENT REALIZATIONS

417 lambdamoy(la,:)=mean(lambdarel,1);

418 Imoy(la,:)=mean(Irel,1);

419 Istd(la,:)=std(Irel,1);

420 lambdavec(la)=lambdares;

421 ROmoy(la,:)=lambdamoy(la,:)./gamma0.*S(1);

422

423 end
```

5 REFERENCES

413

424

- ¹E. R. Gaunt, A. Hardie, E. C. Claas, P. Simmonds, and K. E. Templeton, "Epidemiology and
- clinical presentations of the four human coronaviruses 229e, hku1, nl63, and oc43 detected
- over 3 years using a novel multiplex real-time pcr method," Journal of clinical microbiology 48,
- 2940–2947 (2010).
- ⁴³⁰ ²J. Wu, W. Cai, D. Watkins, and J. Glanz, "How the virus got out," The New York Times (2020).
- ⁴³¹ ³W. H. Organization *et al.*, "Coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19): situation report, 51," (2020).
- ⁴C. COVID and R. Team, "Severe outcomes among patients with coronavirus disease 2019
- (covid-19)—united states, february 12-march 16, 2020," MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 69,
- ⁴³⁴ 343–346 (2020).
- ⁵Y.-Y. Zheng, Y.-T. Ma, J.-Y. Zhang, and X. Xie, "Covid-19 and the cardiovascular system,"
- ⁴³⁶ Nature Reviews Cardiology **17**, 259–260 (2020).
- ⁶C. Huang, Y. Wang, X. Li, L. Ren, J. Zhao, Y. Hu, L. Zhang, G. Fan, J. Xu, X. Gu, et al.,
- "Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in wuhan, china," The Lancet
- **395**, 497–506 (2020).
- ⁷M. Cascella, M. Rajnik, A. Cuomo, S. C. Dulebohn, and R. Di Napoli, "Features, evaluation
- and treatment coronavirus (covid-19)," in *Statpearls [internet]* (StatPearls Publishing, 2020).
- ⁸R. M. Anderson, H. Heesterbeek, D. Klinkenberg, and T. D. Hollingsworth, "How will country-

- based mitigation measures influence the course of the covid-19 epidemic?" The Lancet 395,
- 931–934 (2020).
- ⁹M. Chinazzi, J. T. Davis, M. Ajelli, C. Gioannini, M. Litvinova, S. Merler, A. Pas-
- tore y Piontti, K. Mu, L. Rossi, K. Sun, C. Viboud, X. Xiong, H. Yu, M. E. Hal-
- loran, I. M. Longini, and A. Vespignani, "The effect of travel restrictions on the
- spread of the 2019 novel coronavirus (covid-19) outbreak," Science 368, 395–400 (2020),
- https://science.sciencemag.org/content/368/6489/395.full.pdf.
- ¹⁰H.-Y. Yuan, G. Han, H. Yuan, S. Pfeiffer, A. Mao, L. Wu, and D. Pfeiffer, "The importance
- of the timing of quarantine measures before symptom onset to prevent covid-19 outbreaks il-
- lustrated by hong kong's intervention model," medRxiv (2020), 10.1101/2020.05.03.20089482,
- https://www.medrxiv.org/content/early/2020/05/06/2020.05.03.20089482.full.pdf.
- ¹¹N. Fernandes, "Economic effects of coronavirus outbreak (covid-19) on the world economy,"
- 455 Available at SSRN 3557504 (2020).
- ¹²O. Coibion, Y. Gorodnichenko, and M. Weber, "Labor markets during the covid-19 crisis: A
- preliminary view," Tech. Rep. (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020).
- ⁴⁵⁸ ¹³N. Cellini, N. Canale, G. Mioni, and S. Costa, "Changes in sleep pattern, sense of time and
- digital media use during covid-19 lockdown in italy," Journal of Sleep Research, e13074 (2020).
- ¹⁴H. A. Rothan and S. N. Byrareddy, "The epidemiology and pathogenesis of coronavirus disease
- (covid-19) outbreak," Journal of autoimmunity, 102433 (2020).
- ¹⁵N. Chintalapudi, G. Battineni, and F. Amenta, "Covid-19 disease outbreak forecasting of reg-
- istered and recovered cases after sixty day lockdown in italy: A data driven model approach,"
- Journal of Microbiology, Immunology and Infection (2020).
- ¹⁶M. Gatto, E. Bertuzzo, L. Mari, S. Miccoli, L. Carraro, R. Casagrandi, and A. Rinaldo,
- "Spread and dynamics of the covid-19 epidemic in italy: Effects of emergency contain-
- ment measures," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, 10484–10491 (2020),
- https://www.pnas.org/content/117/19/10484.full.pdf.
- ⁴⁶⁹ ¹⁷J. Roux, C. Massonnaud, and P. Crépey, "Covid-19: One-month impact of the french lockdown
- on the epidemic burden," medRxiv (2020).
- ⁴⁷¹ ¹⁸L. Di Domenico, G. Pullano, C. E. Sabbatini, P.-Y. Boëlle, and V. Colizza, "Expected impact of
- lockdown in île-de-france and possible exit strategies," medRxiv (2020).
- ⁴⁷³ ¹⁹B. Ghoshal and A. Tucker, "Estimating uncertainty and interpretability in deep learning for
- coronavirus (covid-19) detection," arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.10769 (2020).

- ⁴⁷⁵ ²⁰T. Hale, A. Petherick, T. Phillips, and S. Webster, "Variation in government responses to covid-⁴⁷⁶ 19," Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper **31** (2020).
- ⁴⁷⁷ ²¹R. Li, S. Pei, B. Chen, Y. Song, T. Zhang, W. Yang, and J. Shaman, "Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus (sars-cov2)," Science (2020).
- ⁴⁷⁹ ²²R. Nunes-Vaz, "Visualising the doubling time of covid-19 allows comparison of the success of containment measures," Global Biosecurity **1** (2020).
- ²³A. N. Desai, M. U. Kraemer, S. Bhatia, A. Cori, P. Nouvellet, M. Herringer, E. L. Cohn, M. Carrion, J. S. Brownstein, L. C. Madoff, *et al.*, "Real-time epidemic forecasting: Challenges and
- opportunities," Health security **17**, 268–275 (2019).
- ²⁴D. Faranda, I. P. Castillo, O. Hulme, A. Jezequel, J. S. W. Lamb, Y. Sato, and E. L. Thomp-
- son, "Asymptotic estimates of sars-cov-2 infection counts and their sensitivity to stochastic
- perturbation," Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science 30, 051107 (2020),
- https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0008834.
- ²⁵J. O. Lloyd-Smith, S. J. Schreiber, P. E. Kopp, and W. M. Getz, "Superspreading and the effect of individual variation on disease emergence," Nature **438**, 355–359 (2005).
- ²⁶F. Brauer, "Compartmental models in epidemiology," in *Mathematical epidemiology* (Springer, 2008) pp. 19–79.
- ⁴⁹² ²⁷T. Alberti and D. Faranda, "On the uncertainty of real-time predictions of epidemic growths:
- a COVID-19 case study for China and Italy," arXiv e-prints, arXiv:2004.10060 (2020),
- arXiv:2004.10060 [q-bio.PE].
- ²⁸F. D'Emilio and N. Winfield, "Italy blasts virus panic as it eyes new testing criteria," abc News (2020).
- ⁴⁹⁷ ²⁹K. Arin, "Drive-thru clinics, drones: Korea's new weapons in virus fight," The Korea Herald (2020).
- ⁴⁹⁹ ³⁰P. P. AGI, "Come vanno letti i dati sul coronavirus in italia," AGI Agenzia Italia (2020).
- 31L. Ferrari, G. Gerardi, G. Manzi, A. Micheletti, F. Nicolussi, and S. Salini, "Modelling provincial covid-19 epidemic data in italy using an adjusted time-dependent sird model," (2020),
 arXiv:2005.12170 [stat.AP].
- ⁵⁰³ J. Cohen and K. Kupferschmidt, "Countries test tactics in 'war' against covid-19," (2020).
- ³³J. H. Tanne, E. Hayasaki, M. Zastrow, P. Pulla, P. Smith, and A. G. Rada, "Covid-19: how doctors and healthcare systems are tackling coronavirus worldwide," Bmj **368** (2020).
- ³⁴J. T. Wu, K. Leung, and G. M. Leung, "Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and

- international spread of the 2019-ncov outbreak originating in wuhan, china: a modelling study,"
- The Lancet **395**, 689–697 (2020).
- ³⁵L. Peng, W. Yang, D. Zhang, C. Zhuge, and L. Hong, "Epidemic analysis of covid-19 in china
- by dynamical modeling," arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.06563 (2020).
- ³⁶S. A. Lauer, K. H. Grantz, Q. Bi, F. K. Jones, Q. Zheng, H. R. Meredith, A. S. Azman, N. G.
- Reich, and J. Lessler, "The incubation period of coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) from
- publicly reported confirmed cases: Estimation and application," Annals of Internal Medicine
- 514 (2020).
- ⁵¹⁵ ³⁷E. Lavezzo, E. Franchin, C. Ciavarella, G. Cuomo-Dannenburg, L. Barzon, C. Del Vec-
- chio, L. Rossi, R. Manganelli, A. Loregian, N. Navarin, D. Abate, M. Sciro, S. Merigliano,
- E. Decanale, M. C. Vanuzzo, F. Saluzzo, F. Onelia, M. Pacenti, S. Parisi, G. Car-
- retta, D. Donato, L. Flor, S. Cocchio, G. Masi, A. Sperduti, L. Cattarino, R. Sal-
- vador, K. A. Gaythorpe, , A. R. Brazzale, S. Toppo, M. Trevisan, V. Baldo, C. A.
- Donnelly, N. M. Ferguson, I. Dorigatti, and A. Crisanti, "Suppression of covid-19 out-
- break in the municipality of vo, italy," medRxiv (2020), 10.1101/2020.04.17.20053157,
- https://www.medrxiv.org/content/early/2020/04/18/2020.04.17.20053157.full.pdf.
- ³⁸L. F. Olsen and W. M. Schaffer, "Chaos versus noisy periodicity: alternative hypotheses for
- childhood epidemics," Science **249**, 499–504 (1990).
- ³⁹H. Andersson and T. Britton, Stochastic epidemic models and their statistical analysis, Vol. 151
- ⁵²⁶ (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012).
- ⁵²⁷ ⁴⁰J. Dureau, K. Kalogeropoulos, and M. Baguelin, "Capturing the time-varying drivers of an
- epidemic using stochastic dynamical systems," Biostatistics **14**, 541–555 (2013).
- ⁵²⁹ ⁴¹J. A. Polonsky, A. Baidjoe, Z. N. Kamvar, A. Cori, K. Durski, W. J. Edmunds, R. M. Eggo,
- 530 S. Funk, L. Kaiser, P. Keating, et al., "Outbreak analytics: a developing data science for in-
- forming the response to emerging pathogens," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
- B **374**, 20180276 (2019).
- ⁴²G. Viceconte and N. Petrosillo, "Covid-19 r0: Magic number or conundrum?" Infectious Disease
- Reports 12 (2020).
- ⁴³I. Kashnitsky, "Covid-19 in unequally ageing european regions," (2020).
- 536 44D. Faranda and S. Vaienti, "Extreme value laws for dynamical systems under observational
- noise," Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena **280**, 86–94 (2014).
- 538 45D. Faranda, Y. Sato, B. Saint-Michel, C. Wiertel, V. Padilla, B. Dubrulle, and F. Daviaud,

- "Stochastic chaos in a turbulent swirling flow," Physical review letters **119**, 014502 (2017).
- ⁴⁶A. Deslandes, V. Berti, Y. Tandjaoui-Lambotte, C. Alloui, E. Carbonnelle, J. Zahar, S. Brichler,
- and Y. Cohen, "Sars-cov-2 was already spreading in france in late december 2019," International
- Journal of Antimicrobial Agents, 106006 (2020).
- ⁵⁴³ ⁴⁷G. Pullano, E. Valdano, N. Scarpa, S. Rubrichi, and V. Colizza, "Population mobility reductions
- during covid-19 epidemic in france under lockdown,".
- ⁴⁸H. Salje, C. T. Kiem, N. Lefrancq, N. Courtejoie, P. Bosetti, J. Paireau, A. Andronico, N. Hoze,
- J. Richet, C.-L. Dubost, et al., "Estimating the burden of sars-cov-2 in france," Science (2020).
- ⁵⁴⁷ ⁴⁹H. Salje, C. Tran Kiem, N. Lefrancq, N. Courtejoie, P. Bosetti, J. Paireau, A. An-
- dronico, N. Hozé, J. Richet, C.-L. Dubost, Y. Le Strat, J. Lessler, D. Levy-
- Bruhl, A. Fontanet, L. Opatowski, P.-Y. Boelle, and S. Cauchemez, "Estimat-
- ing the burden of sars-cov-2 in france," Science (2020), 10.1126/science.abc3517,
- https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/05/12/science.abc3517.full.pdf.
- ⁵⁰M. Maleki, M. R. Mahmoudi, D. Wraith, and K.-H. Pho, "Time series modelling to forecast the
- confirmed and recovered cases of covid-19," Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, 101742
- 554 (2020).
- ⁵⁵⁵ Coronavirus milano, la 41enne con la febbre il 22 dicembre: «ora hanno trovato gli anticorpi al
- covid»," Corriere della Sera (2020).
- ⁵²S. Flaxman, S. Mishra, A. Gandy, H. Unwin, H. Coupland, T. Mellan, H. Zhu, T. Berah, J. Eaton,
- P. Perez Guzman, et al., "Report 13: Estimating the number osars-cov-2figf infections and the
- impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions on covid-19 in 11 european countries," (2020).
- ⁵³G. De Natale, V. Ricciardi, G. De Luca, D. De Natale, G. Di Meglio, A. Fer-
- ragamo, V. Marchitelli, A. Piccolo, A. Scala, R. Somma, E. Spina, and
- 562 C. Troise, "The covid-19 infection in italy: a statistical study of an ab-
- normally severe disease," medRxiv (2020), 10.1101/2020.03.28.20046243,
- https://www.medrxiv.org/content/early/2020/04/10/2020.03.28.20046243.full.pdf.
- ⁵⁴Q.-X. Long, B.-Z. Liu, H.-J. Deng, G.-C. Wu, K. Deng, Y.-K. Chen, P. Liao, J.-F. Qiu, Y. Lin,
- 566 X.-F. Cai, et al., "Antibody responses to sars-cov-2 in patients with covid-19," Nature Medicine
- , 1–4 (2020).
- ⁵⁵Y. Liu, R. M. Eggo, and A. J. Kucharski, "Secondary attack rate and superspreading events for
- sars-cov-2," The Lancet **395**, e47 (2020).




FIG. 1. Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model of COVID-19 for France (Eqs 5-8) with $\lambda = 1./S(0)$, $\alpha = 0.27$, $\gamma = 0.37$. Initial conditions are set to I(1) = 1, $S(1) = 6.7 \cdot 10^7$, E(1) = R(1) = 0. t = 1 corresponds to Dec 27, 2019. Confinement is introduced at t = 78 (Mar 17, 2020). a) Time evolution for the basic reproduction number R_0 , b) Time evolution for the cumulative number of infections C(t), c) Time evolution for the daily infected individuals I(t). Solid line shows the average for 30 realisation of the SEIR stochatic models, shading extends to 3 standard deviations of the mean.




FIG. 2. Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model of COVID-19 for Italy (Eqs 5-8) with $\lambda = 1./S(0)$, $\alpha = 0.27$, $\gamma = 0.37$. Initial conditions are set to I(1) = 1, $S(1) = 6.0 \cdot 10^7$, E(1) = R(1) = 0. t = 1 corresponds to Dec 22, 2019. First confinement measures are introduced at t = 78 (Mar 9, 2020) and enforced at t = 89 (Mar 22, 2020). a) Time evolution for the basic reproduction number R_0 , b) Time evolution for the cumulative number of infections C(t), c) Time evolution for the daily infected individuals I(t). Solid line shows the average for 30 realisation of the SEIR stochatic models, shading extends to 3 standard deviations of the mean.




FIG. 3. Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model of COVID-19 for the second wave in France. Initial conditions are set as in Figure 1. After the confinement is released (t = 136, May 11, 2020) three scenarios are modelled: back to normality (red), semi-lockdown(green), lockdown (blue). a) Time evolution for the basic reproduction number R_0 , b) Time evolution for the cumulative number of infections C(t), c) Time evolution for the daily infected individuals I(t). Solid line shows the average for 30 realisation of the SEIR stochatic models, shading extends to 3 standard deviations of the mean.




FIG. 4. Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model of COVID-19 for the second wave in Italy. Initial conditions are set as in Figure 2. After the confinement is released (t = 131, May 4, 2020 and t = 146, May 18, 2020) three scenarios are modelled: back to normality (red), semi-lockdown (green), lockdown (blue). a) Time evolution for the basic reproduction number R_0 , b) Time evolution for the cumulative number of infections C(t), c) Time evolution for the daily infected individuals I(t). Solid line shows the average for 30 realisations of the SEIR stochatic models, shading extends to 3 standard deviations of the mean.




FIG. 5. Phase diagram for the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model of COVID-19 for the second wave in France. Initial conditions are set as in Figure 1. After the confinement is released (t = 136, May 11, 2020) all possible R_0 modelled. a) Average of daily infected individuals I(t). b) Standard deviation of daily infected individuals. Diagrams are obtained using 30 realisations of the SEIR models.




FIG. 6. Phase diagram for the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model of COVID-19 for the second wave in Italy. Initial conditions are set as in Figure 2. After the confinement is released (t = 131, May 4, 2020 and then t = 146 May 18, 2020) all possible R_0 modelled. a) Average of daily infected individuals I(t). b) Standard deviation of daily infected individuals. Diagrams are obtained using 30 realisations of the SEIR models.