IRSIN INSTITUT DE RADIOPROTECTION ET DE SÛRETÉ NUCLÉAIRE

Expert system: a decision support tool for fire safety analysis in nuclear area

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Why developing expert systems?

- The two-zone model SYLVIA is used for fire safety studies in nuclear facilities
- To take into account the different sources of uncertainty coming from initial and boundary conditions and from model parameters, SYLVIA is associated with SUNSET, one of the IRSN statistical tool used in support of risk analysis studies
- Such a use of SYLVIA requires a large number of runs and a significant statistical analysis, not always compatible with the requirements of safety assessments in terms of deadlines
- To overcome this difficulty, IRSN is currently developing expert systems based on SYLVIA databases. This approach allows deriving the most likely diagnosis or prognosis in a very short time, but also deriving a more complex form of reasoning combining prognostic and diagnostic inferences



The expert system

 Computer program that has the ability to answer questions in a very short time, by reasoning from observations and generic knowledge



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Expert system based on Bayesian Belief Network methodology



- An arrow models a causal relationship
- A single processor (processing unit) is associated with each arrow for the local transfer of the information
- The graph allows connecting all single processors



Conditional probability tables

- The link between responses and parameters is encoded by means of Conditional Probability Tables (CPT)
- Two simplifications are made to limit the size of CPTs:
 - Discretization of the parameters and the responses of the study
 - Only the dependency links between a response and its influential parameters are taken into account due to the combinatorial explosion of the configurations

	R1	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4
P_1 P_2 P_3	P ₁ 1P ₂ 1P ₃ 1	0,96	0,04	0,00	0,00
	$P_{1}1P_{2}1P_{3}2$	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
	$P_{1}1P_{2}1P_{3}3$	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
	P ₁ 1P ₂ 2P ₃ 1	0,56	0,31	0,10	0,03
R ₁	P ₁ 3P ₂ 5P ₃ 3	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00

The two-zone model SYLVIA

- Software developed at IRSN for the study of ventilation, fire and airborne contamination transfers inside nuclear facilities
- Advantages of the SYLVIA software
 - Complete modeling of an industrial ventilation network
 - Coupling of the fire with the ventilation
 - Low CPU time consumption
 - Computer architecture suitable for big data





SYLVIA database

- SYLVIA database obtained from a Monte-Carlo simulation
- For each parameter of the study, a value is randomly drawn in its range of variation, creating a set of values of the parameters characterizing the SYLVIA calculation to be performed. By performing this simulation, we obtain the values of the responses associated with this parametric configuration
- The Monte Carlo method consists in reiterating this procedure a large number of times



Pressure effects on fire barriers

Possible consequences of pressure effects generated by a fire on fire barriers:

- A mechanical effect with the severe damage or even the breakdown of the fire barrier elements
- An aeraulic effect with the smoke transfer and other pollutants
 - Malfunction of equiments
 - Intervention delay
 - Transfer of radioactive particles



Test of mechanical behavior of a fire break door under a pressure stress in the STARMANIA facility



Perimeter of the knowledge base

The perimeter of the knowledge base determines the scope of the expert system

General framework of the study

 Two fire sectors represented by two compartments connected by a fire break door



- Fire source modeled by a design fire (αt^2 law)
- Independent management of the ventilation of the two fire sectors

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Responses of the study

7 responses

Reponses	Discretization
Maximum pressure difference at fire break door (hPa)	< 20 [20; 40] [40; 60] > 60
Maximum pressure in each compartment (hPa)	< 20 [20 ; 40] [40 ; 60] > 60
Maximum gas temperature in the hot gas layer of each compartment (°C)	< 65 [65;100] [100;140] [140;180] [180;210] [210;300] [300;350] [350;400] [400;500] > 500
Maximum soot concentration in the hot gas layer of each compartment (g.m ⁻³)	< 1 [1;2] [2;3] [3;5] [5;10] > 10



Parameters of the study

16 parameters

Parameters	Туре	Discretization
Volume of compartments (m ³)	C/D	[100;300] [300;500] [500;700] [700;1000] [1000;3000] [3000;7000] {inf}
Closing time of fire dampers (s)	D	{0;150;1200;inf}
Free volume of compartments (%)	С	[80 ; 90] [90 ; 100]
Leakage rate of compartments (vol.h ⁻¹)	C/D	{0} [0.1 ; 0.4] [0.4 ; 0.7] [0.7 ; 1]
Air renewal rate of compartments (h ⁻¹)	С	[1;5][5;10][10;20][20;40]
Resistivity of the ventilation network (hPa)	С	[1;4][4;7][7;10]
Fire growth factor (kW.s ⁻²)	D	$\{2 \ 10^{-4}; \ 3 \ 10^{-3}; \ 0.012; \ 0.047; \ 0.19\}$
Maximum HRR in open atmosphere (kW)	С	[200 ; 800] [800 ; 1500] [1500 ; 3000] [3000 ; 5000]
Oxygen limiting law and fire extinction (-)	D	<pre>{no limit ; 0 %} {no limit ; 8 %} {no limit ; 12 %} {Peatross ; 12 %}</pre>
Production rate of soot (%)	С	[0 ; 2] [2 ; 5] [5 ; 10] [10 ; 15] [15 ; 20]
Resistance of the fire break door (m ⁻⁴)	С	[1000 ; 3000] [3000 ; 6000] [6000 ; 9000]

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Influential parameters

 Identification for each response of its most influential parameters done with a covariance analysis on a sampling of 10,000 runs

	P _{max} C1	P _{max} C2	ΔP_{max} FBD	T _{max} C1	T _{max} C2	C _{s,max} C1	C _{s,max} C2
Vol C1	-3%	0%	-4%	-52%	-14%	-13%	4%
Vol C2	-3%	-8%	2%	0%	-20%	0%	-12%
Air renewal C1	4%	2%	4%	3%	1%	-6 %	-2%
Air renewal C2	0%	-1%	1%	0%	-3%	0%	-3%
Res fire door	7%	0%	10%	0%	-3%	0%	-1%
tc dampers C1	-18%	-9 %	-17%	11%	-10%	- 29 %	-7%
tc dampers C2	-5%	-10%	3%	0%	-1%	0%	-5%
Fire kinetics	17%	4%	21%	12%	5%	-1%	-1%
HRR max	20%	9%	21%	55%	28%	5%	11%
Res vent network	2%	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	1%
Free volume C1	2%	1%	2%	3%	3%	-1%	1%
Free volume C2	0%	0%	0%	0%	-1%	0%	-1%
Leakage C1	-34%	-19%	-32%	0%	-25%	1%	-18%
Leakage C2	-7%	-18%	4%	0%	9 %	0%	7%
O ₂ limitation	-4%	-3%	-3%	-25%	-13%	-22%	-15%
Soot production	-2%	-1%	-2%	-4%	-1%	78%	22%



Minimum size of the database

- The number of simulations must be sufficient to contain simulations for each configuration of the influential parameters associated with the responses
- The CPT associated with the response "△P FBD" includes 92,160 configurations. A SYLVIA database of 1.6 million calculations ensures that each parametric configuration is observed in the database (9 days of CPU time on 60 processors)

	P _{max} C ₁	P _{max} C ₂	ΔP_{maxFBD}	T _{max} C ₁	T _{max} C ₂	Y _{max} C ₁	Y _{max} C ₂
Max size of CPTs (number of lines)	15,360	35,840	92,160	9,600	43,010	7,680	35,840



Example of an inference combining prognostic and diagnostic modes

What are the configurations that could lead to a pressure difference at fire break door beyond 60 hPa in the specific case of a fire of medium kinetics fire growth in a compartment with leaks?



Results of the expert system

🕌 SE SYLVIA

Inputs Outputs Plots

Parameters

Volume of the fire compartment (m ³)		Volume of compart	f the targe ment (m³)	et I	Renewal ra compartm	ire 1)	Resistance of the fire break door (m ⁻⁴)			Fire dampe in the fire	rs closing t compartm	time ent	Fire dampers closing time in the target compartment			
100-300 🔽 0	%	100-300		14%	1-5	~	0%	1000-30	00	5%	0s	V	0%	0s	V	25%
300-500 🔽 0	6	300-500	~	14%	5-10	V	0%	3000-60	00	28%	2min30s	~	0%	2min30s	V	25%
500-700 🖌 43	%	500-700	v	14%	10-20	¥	0%	6000-90	00	67%	20min	~	100%	20min	V	25%
700-1000	%	700-1000	v	14%	20-40	V	100%				00	~	0%	00	~	25%
1000-3000	%	1000-3000	¥	14%												
3000-7000 🔽 0	6	3000-7000	v	14%												
		00	V	14%												
Fire growth factor		Maxim	um HRR		Leak rate of the fire			Leak rate of the target			Oxygen limiting law			Soot production rate		
-		in open atmo	osphere (l	kW)	compartn	⁻¹)	compartment (vol h ⁻¹)			and fire extinction criteria			(%)			
very slow 0	6	200-800	V	0%	0		0%	0	V	29%	1	V		0-2	V	
slow 0	%	800-1500	V	0%	0.1-0.4	2	100%	0.1-0.4	. v	18%	2	~		2-5	~	
middle 🖌 10)%	1500-3000	V	14%	0.4-0.7	V	0%	0.4-0.		24%	3	V		5-10	V	
fast 0	%	3000-5000	V	86%	0.7-1	~	0%	0.7-1	V	30%	4	~		10-15	~	
very fast 0	6													15-20	2	

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Pressure
Temperature and Soot
Pressure, Temperature and Soot

Responses

Maximum pressure in the fire compartment (hPa)			Maximum pressure in the target compartment (hPa)			Maximum pressure difference at the fire break door (hPa)			Maximum ga	s temperature npartment (°C)	Maximum ga	s temperature	Maximum so in the fire con	ot concentration partment (g m ⁻³)	Maximum soot concentration in the target compartment (g m ⁻³)		
20		42%	20	V	96%	20		0%	65	V	65		1	V	1	V	
20-40	v	36%	20-40	~	3%	20-40		0%	65-100	V	65-100	¥	1-2	V	1-2	V	
40-60	V	15%	40-60	~	1%	40-60		0%	100-140	V	100-140	¥	2-3	V	2-3	V	
>60	2	8%	>60	~	0%	>60	~	100%	140-180	V	140-180	V	3-5	V	3-5	V	
									180-210	V	180-210	V	5-10	V	5-10	V	
									210-300	V	210-300	V	>10	V	>10	V	
									300-350	V	300-350	v					
									350-400	V	350-400	V					
									400-500	V	400-500	V					
									>500	×	>500	×					



Conclusion

- This new software can be considered as a complementary tool of the SYLVIA software, allowing an expert to quickly target the configurations at risk in a specific safety assessment
- Expert systems are specially designed to be used as a decision support tool for expertise in nuclear safety area
- Expert systems represent a new generation of calculation tools in the field of probabilistic fire simulation. They contribute to building the "enhanced expertise" of tomorrow



"The enhanced expertise"



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