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Senegal since 2000 *Rebuilding Hegemony in a Global Age*

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Senegal is often seen as a model of democracy in Africa. The changing character of Senegalese political life since independence has been paralleled by just as many changes in the literature about it. Initially most work tended to focus on the long history and rooted character of Senegalese democratic culture. This was essentially an urban-based political history centred on the lives of an enlightened class of *évolués*, African elites with a French education. In various shades, subsequent authors described how the powerful Muslim brotherhoods functioned as mechanisms for political integration in the countryside: in exchange for agricultural services and other resources channelled to client marabouts, the party-state could count on the votes of the disciples attached to these marabouts (Copans 1980; Coulon 1981). Cruise O'Brien (1975, 1992) analysed this procedure as a way to bring the state back home to people. Towards the end of the 1970s, when authoritarianism was at an all-time high in Africa, Senegal brought the *de facto* one-party state to an end and returned to a limited version of competitive politics. This, coupled with the voluntary departure of President Senghor from office in 1980, replaced by his young Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, gave birth to the idea of a 'Senegalese success story' (Diop & Diouf 1990).

Senegal is therefore remarkable in the sense that it had a competitive political party system rooted in a democratic culture well before the 'third wave' of democratisation hit Africa from 1989. Another distinctive aspect of this reading of Senegalese politics was the emphasis on the stable mechanisms of incorporation which linked the peasant citizens to the state via the intermediary roles of the religious brotherhoods and the ruling *Parti Socialiste* (PS). Through this linkage, the state extracted resources from groundnuts production and passed down favours. Urban elites, marabouts and peasants constituted discreet parts of a functioning political system within this self-proclaimed 'peasant state'.

Nevertheless, this semi-democracy and the carefully prepared succession from Senghor to Diouf bore the imprint of external constraints on the post-colonial Senegalese state, along with economic difficulties caused by declining groundnut prices and drought. Popular discontent was also mounting as a result of declining economic opportunities, as was rural-urban migration. President Diouf and a new elite, a generation of 'technocrats', progressively took over from the older 'barons' of Senghor's PS. This reshuffle of the ruling class actually ended up in a reciprocal assimilation of elites (Diop & Diouf 1990). Ideologically, the regime

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broke away from *négritude* during the 1980s and took popular aspirations into account by affirming a 'traditionalist pluralism' that further strengthened the marabouts as political brokers (Diop & Diouf 1999).

Quickly, however, the transition ended in disappointment. The economic crisis of the 1980s, the implementation of structural adjustment, the decline in living standards, and the outbreak of conflict in Casamance, all led to a critical re-reading of Senegalese political life. Most research has moved away from a linear vision of political change and begun to focus on new themes, such as the crisis in the social contract, the survival strategies of the former single party and the societal break with totalitarianism (Diouf 1994). Critically appraising the extent of the changes brought about by Abdou Diouf, Fatton (1987) borrows Gramsci's notion of 'passive revolution' to describe the process of political liberalisation as very controlled and highly selective. Procedurally speaking, changes were few, and power was still used in very much the same way as under the single party, with a combination of co-optation and coercion.

The erosion of the PS hegemony was aggravated by the 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994, a result of the general crisis of the clientelistic Francophone African states which had tied their currencies to the French Franc. Donors backed economic liberalisation policies and governance conditionalities which further weakened the clientelistic basis of the regime. With the dismantling of agricultural extension services and the privatisation of parastatals, the productive arenas linking the state to the general public could no longer serve as vehicles for mobilising political support.

The shift in the policy orientation of external players was combined with severe internal struggles within the PS itself. Two of its leading 'barons', Djibo Ka and Moustapha Niasse, chose to leave and to create their own parties, respectively the Union for Democratic Renewal (*Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique*, URD) and the Alliance of Forces for Progress (*Alliance des Forces du Progrès*, AFP). The former's good results in the legislative elections of 1998 demonstrated that Diouf's attempts at political 'decompression' – the co-optation of opposition figures and anti-corruption measures – had had little effect on voters. The persistent crisis of the groundnut economy and its liberalisation also strained the close relationship between the state and the marabouts, and it is typical of this evolution that the state failed in its attempts to use the development of irrigation-based agriculture in the Senegal River Valley Region in the same clientelistic way as it had done with groundnut cultivation (Dahou 2004). The economic and institutional foundations of Senegal's partial democratisation were coming under increasing strain. The weakening of the state's capacity to distribute patronage was key to Diouf's defeat in the 2000 election (Beck 2002). The presidential elections in February-March 2000 thus came at a time when the Abdou Diouf regime was on its last legs. The increasing untenability of the extant post-colonial model was therefore one of the fundamental triggers of increased democratisation in Senegal.

In February 2000, Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (*Parti Démocratique Sénégalais*, PDS) and the main opponent of both Senghor and Diouf since the democratic opening of 1978, ran as the candidate of a coalition of opposition groups, including all the small but influential post-Marxist parties. With 30.1 per cent of the vote in the first round, he came second to Diouf (who obtained 41.3 per cent), but he rallied to his side Moustapha Niasse, who ranked third (with 16.8 per cent). In the second round of voting, on 30 March 2000, Wade was elected President with 58.5 per cent of the votes.

To their credit, Diouf and his entourage quickly accepted defeat. This smooth transition owed much to the massive mobilisation, particularly in the urban areas, which had been taking place in the run-up to the elections. Over the years, Diouf had had to give increasingly strong guarantees of transparency and fairness within the electoral institution. An independent National Observatory of Elections had been created for this purpose, and the opposition was united and efficient in its close watch on the electoral process, as were the press and civil society organisations. The press played a key part in transmitting the results straight from the polling stations. A unified opposition and an activist civil society and media were critical elements in the deepening of Senegalese democratisation. The resulting change in ruling party (*alternance*) has revived idealised linear readings of Senegalese political life, confirming the oft-quoted idea of 'Senegalese exceptionality' (see Gellar 2002; Hesse 2004).

By 2007, enthusiasm about the quality of Senegalese democracy had once again waned among local intellectuals, civil society activists and journalists as well as foreign analysts. Their disappointment seems as profound as the many hopes which *alternance* had raised. Many observers express concern about the authoritarian and patrimonial drift that has seeped into political life. The works of the journalist Abdou Latif Coulibaly (2003, 2005, 2006) are typical of this disappointment. Coulibaly's first book on Wade describes in scathing terms the clientelistic, personalised and amateuristic nature of the new regime. Described as 'the most important counter-hegemonic piece of work to have emerged out of Senegal since March 2000' (Diop 2004: 34), this book created a political storm. External observers have also been critical. Thus, in her analysis of the ambiguities of democratisation worldwide, Marina Ottaway (2003) describes Wade's Senegal as a case of semi-authoritarianism. Protests have intensified against Wade's governance. Yet, on 22 February 2007, Abdoulaye Wade was re-elected President with more than 55 per cent of the votes in the first round.

How can one make sense of the twists and turns in both the historiography and the politics of Senegal? How can one interpret Wade's 2000 election and his 2007 re-election? What do these tell us about trends within Senegalese democratisation? Behind the automatic celebration of *alternance*, what has changed – and what has stayed the same – since 2000? More cautious than most commentators, Diop and Diouf (2002) suggest that the change in ruling party would result in a new 'passive revolution', akin to the limited changes that marked the transition from Senghor to Diouf. Putting aside political scepticism and the tide of criticism against Wade, this chapter identifies the changes, both long-term and short-term, that have occurred in Senegalese society and politics since 2000 and their impact on the process of democratisation.

We argue that one important change has been the rebuilding of the Senegalese economy around migration, remittances and increased donor funding. Even though this reconfiguration around migration is not wholly beyond the reach of the state, it has contributed to the reduction of the grip of the Senegalese state on society. Notwithstanding this fact, the new regime has been able to gain unprecedented room for manoeuvre by playing its international cards well, and benefited from a rather favourable international economic and political climate before the economic difficulties of the 2008 credit crunch. This has allowed the PDS government to rebuild the hegemony that the PS had lost; democratisation since 2000 seems to have reconstructed the erstwhile foundations of dominant party rule, albeit with a different dominant party now in charge.

A Changing Political Economy

Migration is crucial to understanding the new political economy of Senegalese democratisation. Shortly before *alternance*, Senegalese sociologist Malick Ndiaye (1996 and 1998) described the figure of the *moodu-moodu*, the illiterate and pious informal migrant, wandering throughout the world with his bag of goods for sale, the symbol of the revenge of society against the once hegemonic state – home to the *évolué* and the *ku jang ekool* (Wolof for ‘school-educated’). In today’s Senegal, the indisputable triumph of the migrant has indeed challenged the centrality of the state, while never escaping its grip entirely. Furthermore, the Senegalese state itself, whose path has so often been determined by external forces, has found in this particular characteristic a source of renewed strength.

The Migrant Triumphant

Groundnuts have been central to the Senegalese economy since the colonial period, but have not recovered from the economic crisis that precipitated the introduction of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s. Production, which had stood at around 1 million tons, has halved since 2000. Structural problems with the way the sector was organised have forced many producers to turn to food crops. The ‘peasant state’ remains unable to stimulate growth in the agricultural sector and continues to focus only on those crops from which export revenues can be guaranteed. Alternative crops, such as cotton and horticulture, struggle to make headway. The contribution of agriculture to GDP has fallen to less than 10 per cent in recent years. This persistent crisis is speeding up the rate of rural-urban migration. Urban population growth stood at 4 per cent in 2003, in a context of high population growth of 2.5 per cent per year.

Mineral extraction is not a viable alternative source of state revenue. The long anticipated extraction of iron, gold and petroleum still seems some distance away, though Mittal announced in 2007 that it would exploit ore in the Tambacounda region. Once an important source of export revenue and a pillar of Senegalese industry, phosphates have suffered a decline in their market share and are facing a major financial crisis. Furthermore, mounting prices of petroleum products have caused serious problems, notably in terms of the cost of electricity supply which affects the whole economy.

Nevertheless, economic growth remained fairly stable between 1995 and 2005, at around 5 per cent per year, but declined to about 3.6 per cent in 2006, to rebound at an estimated rate of 5 per cent in 2007. Despite the boost received from the 1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc, the other pillars of the Senegalese economy, the fishing industry and tourism, remain fragile in the medium term. Over-fishing has led to a declining trend in catch rates, and fishermen’s unions are highly critical of the clientelism that pervades relations between Senegal and the European Union. Tourism, which amounted to 2 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2004, has also seen a decline. Industrial production remains weak and investment scarce. The high cost of production factors has meant that foreign direct investment has remained low. Unsurprisingly, exports to the United States have not taken off despite Senegal’s inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2002. In terms of general productive economic fundamentals, not much has changed from the declining days of the PS.

Consumption and distribution activities are now the prime movers of the economy and make up 80 per cent of growth. Consumption is critically stimulated by external financial inflows. One estimate puts migrant remittances at US\$1 billion in 2004. Western Union alone has 400 branches in the country, a testimony to the scale of these financial flows. Vast sums are also transferred informally. These remittances are key to the dynamism of the services sector. Trade, in particular, benefits from migrants because of their role as (both legal and illegal) intermediaries between Senegal and the outside world, and because of the high levels of consumption that remittances generate in Senegal. The transport sector and the property market have also been booming as a result of remittances, particularly in the Dakar region where in 2003 alone the construction industry grew by 20 per cent.

Migrant remittances are one of the main engines of growth in the Senegalese economy today and they continue to grow. Historically rooted along the Senegal River and later in the groundnut basin in the heart of Murid country, international migration now affects the whole country and is no longer the preserve of the stereotypical ubiquitous *moodu-moodu*. Present estimates of the size of the Senegalese expatriate community often run in excess of 1 million, which is considerable given that the 2002 census put the Senegalese population at 10 million. Remittances are what keep the Senegalese economy afloat, and the nicknames *italien* and *américain* have replaced *évolué* as markers of achievement and metaphors of success and moral worth in contemporary Senegalese society (Havard 2001; Foucher 2007a).

The Politics of Migration. The transformation of the Senegalese economy around remittances has profoundly affected the political dynamics of democratisation. Already under Diouf, a ministry for Senegalese abroad had been set up and representatives of the migrants had been included in the Senate. Politicians have followed the marabouts in paying attention to the expatriate Senegalese communities. Notably, Wade launched his 2000 election campaign among the diaspora. This trend has continued unabated and Paris and New York are key sites for Senegalese politicians. More importantly, the disintegration of the state's near monopoly over the economy and the explosion of migration have consolidated the pluralism that started from 1978 with the introduction of the controlled multiparty system. The shift of the Senegalese economy from groundnuts to migration and its increasing dependence on resources generated abroad could be seen as the final stage in the process of ending the hegemony once enjoyed by the state over Senegalese society.

Caution, however, is advised with this hypothesis: 'globalisation' cannot be equated with the demise of the state. As has been shown at various levels by Boone *et al.* (1998) and Dahou (2004), privatisation and liberalisation during the Diouf era have been ambiguous, often working to the benefit of political elites. It could similarly be shown that opportunities for emigration do not escape the reach of the state. Scholarships for study abroad are still used by the government to control students (Zeilig 2004), and ever since the colonial period, the Hajj pilgrimage has been organised by the state and used as a reward for reliable partners. One could also cite the way the state tries to exert authority over the distribution of real estate which is the main target of migrant investment. Property investment projects are often targeted at migrants abroad and the state-owned Senegalese Bank for Habitat has opened a New York branch. There is,

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however, no doubt that this delocalisation of the economy stems from the erosion of the earlier Senegalese 'social contract' and that the Senegalese state is no longer the 'gatekeeper' it once was.

Migration is a blessing for the government on two other counts. For now, migration acts as a safety-net, injecting a new dynamism into the economy and providing an exit option for young Senegalese caught between non-employment-generating growth, on the one hand, and the increasing fragility of social services, on the other. At the heart of these migratory flows and the patterns of reinvestment associated with them stand organised social groups and networks, for example religious ones, which are intricately linked to the state (Riccio 2001). Through these brokers, strategies for political and economic accumulation connect the migratory processes and the state. The rapid rise of the Murid marabout Cheikh Béthio Thioune, who is very active in structuring migration, and his alliance with Wade, is a case in point.

However, migration does not come without its dangers for the state, and it is putting the Senegalese government's international standing at risk. Since 2005 and the tightening of controls in the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Senegal has become a major departure point for West African migrants who have been gathering along its coastline to try and reach the Canary Islands by sea. Spain and the European Union have been exerting pressure on Senegal to repress these migrations. Dependence works both ways, however. Dakar has obtained some advantages, such as an increase in European (particularly Spanish) foreign aid as well as an opportunity to organise the flows through a quota of temporary work permits. With typical opportunism, Dakar announced a plan to encourage would-be migrants to go 'Back to Agriculture'. This is a somewhat dangerous gambit, as the repression of migrants and smugglers by the Senegalese police and the forced repatriation of Senegalese nationals have stirred up trouble on several occasions, with Senegalese would-be migrants protesting against this violation of their 'right to migrate'. But so far, the reputation of President Wade seems not to have been affected.

The Externally Driven State

In much the same way as it has used migration for its own ends, the state has been adept at playing on its external linkages with the outside world. And the Senegalese often refer jokingly to Abdoulaye Wade's taste for *tukki*, travel in the Wolof language. Born as an external creation, the Senegalese state has taken its externally oriented nature to new heights under President Wade, and aid has both increased and diversified. Wade has thus softened the budgetary constraints that played such a large part in his predecessor's defeat.

Wade has carefully raised his international profile. He mediated crises in Madagascar and Côte d'Ivoire and contributed troops to peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan. He has consistently taken pro-Western positions on key international questions, such as reparations for the Atlantic slave trade, the War on Terror, Zimbabwe and Darfur. On the war in Iraq, in order to cosy up to his traditional French allies as well as his American friends, Wade was reserved, tempering the initially very pro-American line of his entourage. Although he was not initially part of the continent-wide development initiative that gave birth to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), spearheaded by the Nigerian, South African and Algerian Presidents, he hurriedly put together his own 'Omega Plan' which got

him on board the NEPAD founding team. Wade has earned invitations to the G8 meetings as a representative of Africa. He has also strengthened links with Morocco and the Gulf states, and Dakar hosted a summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference – an event regularly delayed but very profitable in terms of investments. In October 2005, Dakar decided to recognise China and break with Taiwan – a pure exercise in *Realpolitik* that seems to have borne fruit in gifts and loans totalling CFAF 337 billion.

Diplomatic weight has also given the Wade government additional leverage in its relations with the Bretton Woods institutions. Dakar has repeatedly, and with little consequence, refused to comply with their rules, for instance in connection with the planned privatisation of the electricity company, Senelec. The government's increased access to development aid is the other major factor stimulating consumption and growth in an otherwise unstable economic context. Senegal has a long tradition of being one of the largest recipients of aid to Africa. President Wade has maintained this status, for example by securing Senegal's inclusion in the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative through its classification as a Least Developed Country in 2001. Senegal's external debt decreased from 69 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 38 per cent in 2005 (CFAF 1750 billion). The reduction in debt-servicing obligations has increased the state's budgetary latitude.

Wade has also benefited from the softening of the so-called 'Washington Consensus', as well as the post-September 11 turn towards 'state-building'. Worried about 'failed states' as grey zones harbouring terrorism, illegal immigration and humanitarian disasters, Western governments are now more willing to engage in 'state-building' projects, resume budgetary assistance and allow new loans. Playing on Senegal's image as a model country and its large set of contacts ranging from the Arab World to Europe, the United States and Japan, the Wade government has attracted more aid than Diouf. In 2003, official development assistance to Senegal stood at US\$450 million, significantly higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa. In 2004, aid reached US\$1 bn, three times the African average.

Increases in aid flows, years of externally-driven economic growth, the long-run impact of the 1994 devaluation, combined with increases in tax revenue, have led to increases in the national budget since 2000. Between 1999 and 2006, state spending doubled, from CFAF 600 to 1,200 bn. And Senegal's credit rating has improved. With the tolerance of aid donors, the government's budget deficit, which had been suppressed in 2002, stood at 3 per cent of GDP in 2005 and 5.7 per cent in 2006.

During the 1990s, President Diouf had to give up the idea of creating any new posts in the 'structurally adjusted' civil service, where the number of civil servants stagnated at 65,000. By contrast, in 2003 President Wade launched a recruitment drive with the creation of 15,000 new posts spread over time in the health and education sectors and 1,000 in the judiciary. Between 2003 and 2004 alone, civil service staff numbers increased by more than 6 per cent to a new high of 71,694. State capacity and the latitude for patronage and clientelism have thereby improved since 2000.

It is not yet clear whether this injection of new money into the apparatus of the Senegalese state will improve its effectiveness. In spite of the notable improvements in national income and expenditure, the state's public performance remains problematic. Whatever the effect on the actual quality of public service delivery, this 'renaissance' of the state budget is certainly having an impact on

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the political sphere. As shown below, it has given the regime the means to pursue its hegemonic project. Even if Senegal remains dependent on the outside world, this external dependence has not necessarily weakened the state.

By 2000 the international legitimacy of the Diouf government had worn thin, even with the expert management of the economy by the former Prime Minister, Mamadou Lamine Loum. Under President Wade, Senegal is now one of the 'model students' of African democracy, and the relative scarcity of such models means that the international community over-invests symbolically and materially wherever it finds them, inverting, in part, relationships of dependence between Senegal and the donors.

Rebuilding the Hegemonic Bloc

Changes associated with democratisation in Senegal since 2000 have had the consequence of re-constituting the erstwhile foundations for a dominant party hegemony, but under the control of a party different from the PS. Wade's political charisma, his election, his diplomatic activism, the country's continued economic growth, the transformation of the aid paradigm and the new international context have all contributed to a strengthening and recentralisation of state power around the President. Borrowing from Diouf's well-worn carrot-and-stick tradition, the new regime has been trying to establish and guarantee its hegemony, whilst not quite achieving it fully. Frustrated by not being able to achieve the desired hegemony over a population captured by the spirit of nascent pluralism, the Wade government has grown impatient and has occasionally drifted towards authoritarianism. The political opposition and the press have focused on this authoritarian drift. But despite the mounting criticism of his governance, Wade seems sufficiently successful at establishing his hegemony; indeed, while he obtained only 31 per cent of the votes in the first round of the presidential election of 2000, he obtained 55 per cent in the election of 2007.

A Forever Shifting Bloc?

It is worth remembering that just before the PDS came to power in March 2000, the party was particularly weak. The successive comings and goings of Wade in and out of various PS governments had tarnished his image. The 1998 legislative elections were a disaster for the PDS. Lastly, many PDS notables had 'cross carpeted' to the PS or had set up their own political parties. The PDS victory in 2000 was only possible because of the creation of a broad opposition coalition, over which the PDS was only marginally dominant. This electoral majority subsequently fell apart, and since then, President Wade has struggled to re-establish a political bloc under his control.

As mentioned above, Wade's principal partner in the 2000 coalition was Moustapha Niasse. Niasse thus earned the job of Prime Minister in the new government. But the AFP was too much of a rival for the coalition to survive into the legislative elections of May 2001. The clear victory of the PDS in these elections gave the party a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, though this was as much a product of the bias of the electoral system; although the PDS gained less than 50 per cent of the popular votes, it obtained 75 per cent of the seats.

After the AFP left the government, small left-wing parties that had played an important role in the build-up to *alternance* followed suit. The Independence and

Workers Party, the Jëf-Jël Alliance and the Democratic League-Labour Movement all distanced themselves from the new government. Only And Jëf remained, but its leader Landing Savané felt that it was better for him to be replaced in government by fellow party members. To compensate for this erosion, Wade relied increasingly on traditional PS mechanisms for political and economic control. Senegalese democratisation seems to have gone full circle. Playing on the growing cleavages within the PS, Wade achieved the cross-carpeting, or what the Senegalese call *transhumance*, of major PS figures into the PDS fold and brought back former big chiefs in the PDS who had left the party in the 1980s and 1990s to join the PS. He also rallied together the smaller parties and created space for them in the government. Of note were Iba Der Thiam's Convention of Democrats and Patriots party and Djibo Ka's Union for Democratic Renewal. Discussions were also initiated with the PS.

All this has been happening at the same time as realignments and internal factionalism within each party, ending in schisms and further realignments or fusion. In Senegal as elsewhere in Africa, the proliferation of political parties suggests the existence of a fluid and unstable market in political goods where small-scale yet dynamic political entrepreneurs look to increase their market value in the eyes of bigger fish. The proliferation of ministries and presidential advisers with ministerial rank, the rapid succession of Prime Ministers (four in the last seven years), the even more numerous ministerial changes (six in just six years) stem in part from the need to weed out underperformers in a new political team, but above all from the necessity to constantly rebuild the coalition.

Back to the Future: Presidentialism Consolidated

Facing this uncertainty, President Wade embraced presidentialism, not only in his choice of institutions but also in how these institutions were run. This was yet another return to old PS ways. He disregarded widespread calls among his coalition partners for a change in the parliamentary system. The Senegalese constitutional tradition is presidential, and this tradition was not changed in the new Constitution adopted in 2001. In fact, the President now enjoys greater power to dissolve the National Assembly. The reduction of the seven-year presidential term to five years, an old demand of the opposition, was adopted, but it soon emerged that it would not apply to Wade's first mandate. The National Assembly remains weak and dependent, due to both French-derived institutional traits and persistent capacity problems. An example of the former is that, according to the constitution, the Assembly cannot pass legislation that increases the budget without working out a way to finance it, which is generally beyond its expertise. This virtually gives the executive a near-monopoly in the initiation of laws. An example of the latter is that members of the Assembly have little research capacity or training; a growing number do not even understand French, the working language of the state. Optimistic observers see the National Assembly as a 'liaison-type legislature' (Thomas & Sissokho 2005), but this liaison is more of a one-way street, with the Assembly functioning as a channel through which to legitimate projects decided upon by the executive (Samb 2004: 47).

But presidentialism has expanded outside the constitutional text as well. The Presidency and Prime Minister's Office have exerted a growing direct influence over the state bureaucracy and the budget, and procedural requirements are regularly circumvented. Furthermore, the President and Prime Minister have created and/or taken direct control of a number of state agencies, such as the

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Agency for the Promotion of Investment and Public Works and the Agency for the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, thus increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. To take but one example, the Agency for the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and its significant funds coming from the Gulf countries are under the authority of the President's son, who works as an adviser to his father. In 2006, these agencies controlled about 10 per cent of the whole budget and about 20 per cent of the investment budget. The enhancement of presidential powers through the creation of parallel bureaucracies directly under executive control is another recurring theme within African democratisation.

Clientelism and Alternoce

In spite of good governance pronouncements, clientelism has remained at the heart of Senegalese political life since *alternance*. As seen above, Abdoulaye Wade has been in a much better position than his predecessor to play the game. The growth of the Senegalese economy, further increased by considerable international aid with few strings attached, has given the new government room for manoeuvre. Yet the reconstruction of a clientelist base has not been smooth or gone unchallenged, and many Senegalese deride *alternance* as *alternoce*, where *noce*, the French for 'wedding party' or 'ball', refers to the 'good life' that the victors are now enjoying. As far as clientelism is concerned, the actors may have changed but the show continues.

From March 2000 onwards, the new government began its campaign to capture the state apparatus and the parastatals that have traditionally served as loci for clientelism. It is significant that while, in the early 1980s, President Diouf had been increasingly keen on using army officers in the strategic parastatals, in an attempt at better technocratic governance, President Wade has been placing PDS figures in these positions, with all the potential negative economic consequences. The persistent difficulties faced by such key parastatal companies as the Senegalese National Society for the Marketing of Oilseeds, and the Senegalese National Lottery or Senelec, owe something to this PDS interference.

An even more glaring example of Wade's efforts to increase his client base is the failure to keep the commitments he had made in 2000 to keep the size of government down to 20 ministers and to do away with the Senate and the Economic and Social Council. While in April 2000 there were only 28 ministers, they were no fewer than 44 in September 2006. Even though the 2001 Constitution did abolish the Senate and the Economic and Social Council, a Council of the Republic was created in January 2004, a purely consultative body with about one hundred councillors whose appointments are largely controlled by the President and which is chaired by a former PS heavyweight who sided with Wade soon after the first round of the March 2000 elections. The distribution of perks to Assembly members and the increase in their number (from 120 to 140 and then to 150) follows the same logic of maximising hand-outs for political middlemen.

These strategies of clientelism are very similar to those used by Diouf, and there is little doubt that 'vote-buying' also played a part in the 2007 elections. As a means of political mobilisation, clientelism remains the strategy of choice, despite democratisation. One issue in which this has been particularly clear is the separatist conflict in Casamance, where initial pretences at change and a quick solution soon gave way to a well-worn policy of co-optation. This policy, a revamped Senegalese army, and the mounting unhappiness of the population

with the separatist movement have combined to bring the conflict to a standstill, but the insurgency has not disappeared (Foucher 2003, 2007b).

The composure with which Senegalese politicians publicly assert their clientelistic practices, and the seriousness with which the local media report them, show just how much clientelism remains at the heart of Senegalese political life (see Blundo 1998, 2000). However, in spite of the new resource base of the state, it is no longer simply a case of triumphant clientelism as during the PS 'single party' era; even within continuity, there are some elements of change. The uncertainties unleashed by *alternance* have opened up a phase of competitive clientelism, where allegiances are no longer fixed as in the seemingly unending reign of the PS. With the strengthening of local government that resulted from the 1996 law of decentralisation, and the support which aid donors provide to NGOs and local organisations, opportunities for patronage are now less concentrated. This dispersal of resources, which had been key in bringing about *alternance* in the first place, persists, despite the PDS government's resolute attempts to concentrate resources under its control. At all levels, economic and political entrepreneurs tap their own resources to mobilise clients, whom they use in turn to bargain for influence and advantages further up the political chain. Democratisation has led, not to programmatic accountability, but to a competitive clientelistic system.

The Return of 'Urban Bias'?

The attack on the 'urban bias' characteristic of post-colonial African states by scholars like Michael Lipton and Robert Bates in the late 1970s and early 1980s softened the intellectual ground for the anti-statist arguments that ultimately led to structural adjustment policies. Most economic and political liberalisation policies are premised on an implicit assumption that adjustment would lead to improvements in rural lives by reversing the 'urban bias'. Democratisation in Senegal would seem to be turning this logic on its head.

President Wade, because of the new-found solvency of the Senegalese state, has been able to use the politics of distribution to go beyond his immediate clients within the PDS and his own political coalition allies, and to reach out to other important strategic social actors. This was a feat which the PS was increasingly unable to achieve in the run-up to the 2000 elections. This broadening of the PDS clientelistic base was clearly apparent after a student strike in January 2001 went out of control. The Wade government quickly gave way to collective student demands, handing out some financial assistance and grants to the students. More discreet classic methods of co-optation were used as well, with some of the student leaders being provided with government scholarships for study abroad. In this way and for some time, the government was able to dissipate student protest (Zeilig 2004).

In the same way, a whole gamut of public policies can be interpreted as mechanisms for widening the scope of co-optation. The increase in the budget of the Press Fund from CFAF 100 million in 2000 to 300 million in 2003 is another example. The political potential of this measure is considerable, given the extreme financial fragility of the Senegalese press (Wittmann 2006). Other sectors of civil society, like the trade unions, have also been targeted. The pressures of competitive clientelism, in the context of increased state revenues, may be leading to an increasing concentration of group-based patronage on urban constituencies, in a very similar way to the political calculus of the immediate post-colonial

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regimes across much of Africa. Wade is favouring those classes in society that politically could do the most damage to his regime: the urban salaried workers. Unsurprisingly, therefore, civil servants have benefited most from improvements in their conditions. Particular attention has been paid to strategic constituencies: the highest ranks of the territorial administration, university staff, judges, customs officials, police officers and soldiers. Workers in the official private sector have not been forgotten, with the state obliging private-sector management to concede to one of the workers' main demands, the extension of the working age from 56 to 60 years. Group patronage is also targeted at the urban population as a whole through the reduction of tariffs on the import of basic staples, in spite of the fact that these measures have direct negative effects on the agricultural sector (Faivre-Dupaigre forthcoming).

We should also not forget that, because of the PS mechanisms for incorporating and controlling the peasantry, the arrival of the PDS in government was celebrated less in the countryside than in the towns, which had nurtured the hope that the opposition would defeat the PS. This urban-rural electoral divide is yet another feature which occurs in many African experiments with democratisation. Even if the rural areas did contribute to reversing the PS majority, the results of the 2000 election show that they were less of a major factor in Wade's actual victory. Wade has tried to break the PS patron-client networks in the countryside by weakening established peasant organisations through the creation of rival peasant movements. This strategy bore a striking resemblance to that of his PS predecessors. The denizens of the countryside can be forgiven for thinking that democratisation simply means the replacement of one patronage organisation by another!

The political manoeuvres of the PDS in the countryside created tensions, which were made even worse by the agricultural crisis which began with the 2002 drought. The Council for Intra-Rural Dialogue (CNCR) of the PS era organised a well-attended demonstration in Dakar to defend peasant rights, forcing the government to renew the dialogue with truly representative peasant organisations. This created a more favourable environment in which the Council could defend its interests within the government's rural development programme. Donor pressure also meant that it was included in the implementation of a number of development programmes, most of which were initiated as part of a poverty reduction strategy.

Despite these positive developments, problems between an organised peasant force and the state resurfaced with the introduction of a new law in 2004 on the future of the agricultural sector. The law fell short of what was expected of an agricultural policy and consisted merely of a list of growth targets dependent on support from local development institutions and extension services, insurance mechanisms, and land reform (Dahou & Ndiaye forthcoming). It radicalised positions among the peasantry, who asked for the land reform section to be removed on the grounds that any such initiative requires widespread consultations beforehand. The peasantry were concerned that the creation of a land agency would deprive local authorities of their right to control the allocation of land. The precedent of allocating extensive plots of land for agribusiness projects exacerbated these concerns. The CNCR set up a participatory negotiation process that went down to the local level. Land privatisation, which seemed to be the real motive behind the reform, poses a threat to the CNCR's grassroots base, most of whom are dependent on small family farms. The negotiation

process blocked attempts at the hasty reform of the land ownership system. By demanding a nation-wide consultation on what was such an important question, the CNCR stymied the land privatisation process. In spite of the coherence of the arguments put forward by the peasant movement, their demands on the state have fallen on deaf ears. Although the PDS government may have overcome its initial mistrust of the peasantry, it is still a victim of its own technocratic vision of rural development and there is little inclination to engage in a serious dialogue with peasant representatives.

The Prince and the Marabouts: the Forging of a New Alliance?

As seen above, *alternance* owed something to the weakening of the links between the marabouts and the PS state. On this count too, Wade has been adept at reviving the old alliance, but in a transformed way. During the 1990s, the rules of the game between the state and the head khalifs of the main Sufi brotherhoods changed. The khalifs used to express open support for the government, while maintaining a subtle distance to preserve their legitimacy. Now they have withdrawn from politics for fear of undermining their legitimacy and the unity of the brotherhoods they lead, and they have grown increasingly reluctant to instruct their followers on how to vote. In so doing, they have opened up space for new politico-religious actors. In a context where struggles for succession are brewing within the brotherhoods, younger marabouts who hail from minor or controversial lineages within the Sufi hierarchies or may even not be from the original maraboutic descent lines, have embraced politics enthusiastically, to the point of creating their own parties or engaging directly in support of Wade's PDS. The Murid Modou Kara Mbacké and Cheikh Béthio Thioune, the Tijani Mamoune Niasse and Ahmed Khalifa Niasse are cases in point. All of them eventually sided with Wade in the 2007 elections, a powerful indication of the President's interest in these new religious brokers. As in other parts of Africa, in the uncertain context of electoral politics and changing religious hierarchies, the social capital of religion and religious movements is a coveted resource.

Wade has been more open than his predecessor about his religious affiliation, and has even toyed with the suppression of the principle of religious neutrality enshrined in the Constitution, harping on the growing intellectual influence of Islamic reformism. His pilgrimages to Mecca and his visits to the head khalif of his brotherhood, the Muridiyya, have been widely broadcast. This has stirred up controversy about the connections between the Wade government and the Muridiyya. The name of the Murid head khalif even made a brief appearance on a list of PDS candidates for the 2002 local elections. Among the Tijaniyya brotherhood, resentment has been expressed about the government's lack of impartiality. With discrete calls for support from the Muridiyya, Wade obtained no less than 84 per cent of the votes in the constituency of Mbacké, the Murid heartland, in the 2007 election. Conversely, in the largely Tijani constituency of Tivaouane, Wade had one of his poorest results, earning only 44 per cent of the votes, while his protégé turned arch opponent, Idrissa Seck, gained 29 per cent.

Wade has met with some success in his attempts to reorganise his government's relationship with Islam, co-opting a new generation of religious figures, whose largely urban followers are worth canvassing. While reformist Islam remains a minority current with an essentially intellectual appeal, tensions between and within the Sufi brotherhoods have a greater potential for future trouble.

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Factionalism and the Personalisation of Power

With the recourse to presidentialism, clientelism, and the attempted reconstruction of a state/marabout linkage as means of managing power, Wade's PDS has basically been reconstructing the post-colonial state of the PS era under new conditions. But Wade has brought to new heights the personalisation of power already inherent in Senegalese politics. As the example of Houphouët-Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire shows, this personalisation is not without risk, particularly as the time of succession approaches. Just as the political strategies used by the PDS government resemble those of the PS, the problems facing both parties in government are also very similar. The intra-party factional pressures that were a strong feature of the old government have intensified within the new PDS government, despite its relative financial security. The same factional dualism that characterised the PS years in office is once again apparent. A study by Olivier Legros (2004) of electoral contests in Yeumbeul, a commune in the Dakar suburbs, clearly shows how within the presidential party two major tendencies are at war with each other. Factionalism is equally present at the higher echelons of the government, as is shown by the split between Abdoulaye Wade and his number two, Idrissa Seck. The expulsion of Seck from the PDS was not enough to put an end to the factional infighting. Initially considered a political lightweight within the PDS, Macky Sall replaced Seck as Prime Minister in 2004, but was in turn sacked in 2007, and replaced by Cheikh Hadjibou Soumaré, a technocrat with no known political affiliation. The growing publicised tensions between Sall and Karim Wade, the President's son, who is seen as a potential heir to his father, played a key part in this episode. Competition between factions in the PDS has on many occasions degenerated into violence and accusations of misappropriation of public funds are frequently made.

Factionalism is closely related to clientelism, and it has reached alarming proportions under the new regime. The advanced age of President Wade, and speculations about his health, pose the question of succession in the context of an unconsolidated ruling elite. The heterogeneous nature of this elite is partly to blame: an unsteady coalition of Wade loyalists, former PDS activists who had switched camp to the PS and later returned to join the *alternance* bandwagon, young party supporters mobilised for the 2000 elections, PS carpet-crossers, enterprising marabouts and seasoned politicians of the small allied parties. A host of support movements, groups and associations have also grown both inside and on the margins of the PDS. They are all busy demonstrating and renegotiating their political weight within the coalition. This cuts a contrast to Diouf, who had used – and indeed created and sponsored – these kinds of para-partisan structures to develop a base *outside* the PS party structure so as to counter the PS *barons* and avoid too close an association with a discredited PS (Diop & Diouf 1990).

The situation has grown so complicated and the dangers of factionalism for the PDS so great that even local factional struggles can often be resolved only with the intervention of the President or the Prime Minister himself (Legros 2004). In order to avoid the outbreak of open factional warfare, positions in the PDS hierarchy have gone unchanged since 1996, and carpet-crossers and new militants have been incorporated through the designation of posts from above. Tensions within the PDS are so problematic that the legislative elections scheduled for April 2006 were postponed twice (to June 2007), so as to secure Wade's re-election prior to the PDS primaries.

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In the case of the PDS as in that of KANU under Kenyatta, the factionalisation of the ruling party and the casting of the President as an arbiter in factional contests often led to the accretion of presidential powers and the increased personalisation of that power. This impetus to personalise power within the ruling party is indeed a long-standing characteristic of the Senegalese political system. President Senghor had needed personalisation to balance the complex coalition he put together in the late colonial era, and his heir Diouf used it to take over the PS apparatus. For Wade, it has been a way to rebuild the PDS and to take over the state. Classically, this personalisation also means that kinship is called on to play a part. Wade's two children, Karim and Sindiély, are important advisers, and his nephew, Doudou, presides over the PDS group in the National Assembly.

Whether or not Idrissa Seck, Wade's protégé and first PDS Prime Minister, was actually involved in attempts to hasten Wade's retirement is a moot point. His position in the PDS, his intimate knowledge of the party structures, the pressure he exerted to become Prime Minister, his efforts to guarantee his position as Wade's likely successor, and his attempts to build up his own independent networks earned him the sack. Dismissed in April 2004, Seck was arrested in July 2005, charged with corruption and with being a security threat to the state, and released after 200 days in jail. As in the immediate post-colonial regimes in Kenya and Senegal, ambitious deputies often fell foul of equally ambitious presidents.

The Authoritarian Temptation

Despite all the borrowings from the armoury of PS statecraft and governance, and the favourable international and fiscal climate, the PDS under Wade has yet to develop an unassailable hegemony. For reasons of the inchoate nature of the ruling group and the undimmed instinct of pluralism within society of which *alternance* itself was the most striking demonstration, the Wade government enjoys an incomplete hegemony marked by uncertainties. This has led to a tendency to adopt an authoritarian attitude, partly the result of the strong sense of legitimacy felt by the PDS leadership, born of their long struggle, as well as of the scale of their 2000 victory. Furthermore, President Wade does seem to bear the imprint of his beginnings in politics, in the 1950s and 1960s, times of nationalism, voluntarism and state intervention. But it is not only a question of political culture, for bouts of authoritarianism are a classic tool in the toolbox of Senegalese politics, present also under the PS.

In Senegal just as in Nigeria, the 'fight against corruption' has been used as an instrument for settling political scores rather than purely as a means of improving governance. Since the arrival of the new government, civil service and state company audits have been carried out and have played an important role in 'bringing round' those close to the PS and occupying strategic sites within the Senegalese economy. In this respect, Wade has behaved exactly like Abdou Diouf when he succeeded President Senghor (Diop & Diouf 1990). It would seem that changes in governmental leadership, even as a result of democratisation, call forth the use of underhand measures to secure power.

Apart from the punitive audits, the Justice Ministry plays an important role in the unfolding mode of domination and is the subject of tight control. Trouble-making politicians, public figures, and journalists have been subjected to unexpectedly high levels of pressure by the Wade government through a range of legal measures such as temporary closure of newspapers, suing for libel or for threatening the security of the state (according to Article 80 of the Penal Code)

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and police investigations. A number of journalists have received anonymous threats or have been victims of assaults about which little has usually been done (Havard 2004; Wittmann 2006). The official state media, which in 2000 had gained a little more room to report freely, have also been reined in. *Le Soleil*, the state daily, which tried to free itself from state control immediately after the change in ruling party, has subsequently become a praise-singing mouthpiece of the President. The Wade government has also been behind the creation of new so-called independent papers, like *Le Messenger* and *Il est midi*, which are renowned for their particularly salacious line against opposition figures.

Though violence has always been part of Senegalese politics, the public sphere now seems to be much less pacified than before, and insults and threats are prominent political currencies under Wade. A law granting amnesty for political crimes and offences committed between 1983 and 2004 was passed in January 2005, guaranteeing total immunity for those found guilty. The stabbing of Talla Sylla, a famous opposition figure, in October 2003, of which some presidential aides were suspected, the raid in May 2005 against Idrissa Seck's Dakar home, the clashes in Fatick at the end of May 2006 between supporters of Mamoune Niasse (then an ally of Idrissa Seck) and PDS militants, are all evidence of the regime's nervousness. Many public figures have received death threats following their criticism of the government. The regime has allowed a climate of tension to develop or is deliberately creating it, as a way of dealing with the complexities of building its hegemony.

Conclusion

The defeat of the old PS order in 2000 offered the prospect of the deepening of Senegalese democratisation. What has happened, however, is the maintenance of the same mechanisms of control which the PS had perfected in its forty-year strangle-hold over Senegalese society and state. Overbearing presidentialism, clientelism, intermediation by the marabouts, and occasional violence and intimidation have continued despite democratisation. While *alternance* has given a formidable boost to the state and its budget, it could also be interpreted as a promise postponed, insofar as it has failed to institutionalise more democratic and pluralist norms within Senegalese state and society.

The February 2007 presidential election is the obvious epilogue for this chapter. It indicates unmistakably that criticisms of Wade's governance by a divided opposition and 'civil society' organisations do not make for real mass mobilisation. For reasons of the fiscal health of the state, the deployment of clientelism, and the successful manipulation of symbols of the political culture, mobilisation has been on Wade's side. While the electoral body had substantially increased from about 2.8 million in 2002 to 4.9 million in 2007, the turnout was around 70 per cent in 2007, and Wade won 55 per cent of the votes. Following the results, the opposition reiterated its criticism of the new electoral roll and denounced fraud and vote-buying. Whatever the truth in these accusations, and no doubt there is some, the vote did express the existence of support for Wade. This indicates the depth of the gap between the urban educated elites who took the lead in criticising Wade's governance and the broader electorate. This gap is confirmed by the defeat of all the old parties (the PS, AFP and the historical left-wing parties) and by the fact that it was the young

Idrissa Seck who, on his first candidacy, came second in the presidential race with about 15 per cent of the votes. But despite his age (he was born in 1926), it is Wade who still seems to be the best at connecting with the Senegalese youth: their revenge against the old elites, their hope for successful globalisation through migration, their support for marabouts. Lucky shifts in the global context (the growth of remittances and international assistance, a new aid paradigm) have been essential to Wade's success, since they have increased his room for manoeuvre well beyond his predecessor's wildest dreams, allowing him to refurbish the clientelistic state, placate strategic groups and fulfil some social commitments in the fields of health, education and roads. *Alternance* has thus allowed for a revamping of the mechanisms of political domination: a case of passive revolution.

Over the longer term, while there is no doubt that the Wade years have contributed to the embeddedness of elections as a procedure, of political pluralism as a system and of regime change as an acceptable outcome, it remains to be seen what the personalisation of power at the expense of institutionalisation, the increasingly direct participation of marabouts in politics, and the growing heterogeneity of political elites may produce. Will these tendencies ensure an increased connection of state and society? What will the quality of this connection be? The future of Senegalese democratisation will be decided by the answers to these questions.

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