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Class, Religion and Vote in Britain and France

Our aims in this paper are to compare the evolution over time of the principal French and British electoral cleavages. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century Britain has been a country where class has been the dominant cleavage with religion playing a relatively minor role, whereas in France religion has been dominant and class has played the minor role. But how far have these two cleavages persisted?

One widespread view among political scientists is that both the class and the religious cleavages have been losing their importance as general processes of social change have reduced the salience of traditional group identities, leading to more homogeneous, fragmented post-modern societies. Dalton for example, after studying Britain, France, Germany and America, argued that "The decline of sociologically based voting is most apparent for the class and religious cleavages, but a similar erosion of influence occurred for most other sociological characteristics" (p185). (Cf also Lipset and Clarke, Walters and Pakulski, Franklin, Mackie and Valen). On this view we would expect to find some convergence between France and Britain. We might expect to find that, under the pressure of global processes, secularisation would undermine the distinctively religious basis of voting in France while economic modernisation would undermine the distinctively class basis of voting in Britain.

An alternative theory would emphasise the enduring power of institutional arrangements (the Lipset / Rokkan approach). In this tradition Lewis-Beck found no decline in the social cleavages in France, and talked of the "stalled electorate".

A third theory would look at the specific political events in each country. In our own work we have argued the case for "trendless fluctuation" in class voting in Britain, the fluctuations deriving perhaps from the successes or failures of political parties to meet the aspirations of their class constituencies when in office. Trendless fluctuation, however, is something that we would expect primarily where a cleavage was highly politicised. A cleavage such as the religious one in Britain, which is more a

relic of past alignments, would not be expected to be so responsive to the changing political situation.

Data

Our data come from the series of post-election studies made in France and Britain, namely the British Election Studies (1964-1992) and the post-election surveys conducted in France in 1967 by Pierce and Converse (*Political representation in France*, 1986), in 1978, 1988, 1995 and 1997 by the Cevipof.

Due to our comparative approach, variables have to be standardized in order to have the same categories in the two countries and thus to facilitate comparison. For class position we have adopted, unlike many writers who subscribe to the thesis of decline in class voting, a detailed class schema in six categories. This class schema is an adaptation of the Heath-Goldthorpe 11 classes and is as follows:

- Higher salariat (I)
- Lower salariat (II)
- Routine non manual (clerks) (IIIa and IIIb)
- Petty bourgeoisie (employers and self-employed)
(IVa, IVb, and IVc)
- Skilled working class (foremen and skilled workers) (V,VI)
- Unskilled working class (semi and unskilled workers, labourers)
(VIIa and VIIb)

Religion was more complex to harmonize in the countries due to the large differences according to religious denomination and to church attendance practices. France is a Catholic country, Catholicism being dominant; Britain has more diversity and complexity in religious groups: The Church of England is institutionally dominant but other minority religions have a larger place than other religions in France (Roman Catholics, and non conformist churches in particular).

The differences in the distribution of denominational membership have inclined us to focus on the effects of church attendance rather than religion denomination. Moreover, church attendance has been highlighted in France as having a clear and strong impact on voting behaviour (Michelat and Simon, 1977). Attendance at church is a good indicator of religiosity and in France is often reported as being an indicator of « religious integration ». It is remarkable that this indicator is still an

efficient measure of religious integration in a context of changing and declining religious practices. Michelat and Simon have even shown that in this context church attendance is more relevant than before: to attend church is now probably, at least in the context of Catholicism in France, more discriminating. French electoral research has shown that religious integration as measured by church attendance is tied with a set of core values, a symbolic system of representations which is based on moral, ethical and socio-political values: family, tradition, patrimoine and respect for political order. British electoral researchers have not studied religion in the depth with which it has been done in France. With few exceptions (Wald, 1983; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1991) religion has never been placed in the explanation of voting behaviour as a relevant variable. When it has been studied, the effects of church denomination rather than of church attendance are analysed. Both for comparative purposes and because we suspect that integration into religion plays a role in Britain as well, we thus have decided to focus on religious integration in both countries. Our scale of religiosity is:

- regularly practising members of the established church
(Churches of England and Scotland in Britain, Catholic church in France)
- irregularly or rarely practising members of the established church
- people who never practice their religion plus people with no religion
- other religions

(We have to combine the people who never practice with those who have no religion because of question wording changes in the British election series. We should also note that the necessary data needed to construct this classification were not collected in the two 1974 British election surveys).

Voting has been recoded in the French case as three categories for the first round and two categories for second round of elections (first round: left / right / extreme right; second round: left / right. For 1967 and 1978, where extreme right voting was virtually non-existent, the first round is coded as a simple left / right contrast). In contrast to our previous analysis, in the current paper we thus have made a distinction in the first round of elections between extreme right and right. This is particularly important when studying the impact of class and religion.

In Britain we also use three categories - left, centre and right. the centre parties are the Liberal Party (before 1983), the Alliance between the Liberal and Social Democratic parties in 1983 and 1987, the Liberal Democratic Party in 1992. We exclude other minor parties, and non-voters.

Class, religion and vote: an overview

Class voting in the two countries

Inspection of tables 1 and 2 shows persistent patterns in the parties relative strength in particular social classes. In Britain, the Labour party is always strongest in the working class and in particular in its unskilled part (notably after 1979); the next strongest class for Labour is the routine non-manual and then the lower and higher salariat. The Conservatives are strongest in the petty bourgeoisie where they can reach scores as high as 80% as in 1979. The next strongest class for Conservatives is the higher salariat. The Liberals are strongest in the salariat. With few exceptions, these patterns show remarkable stability and hold true in every of the seven elections considered.

Table 1: Conservative voting according to class in Britain (percentages)

	High Sal.	Low Sal.	Routine NM	Petty B.	Sk. W	Unsk. W.	
1964	63	59	60	71	28	28	42
1966	65	52	46	66	25	25	39
1970	61	60	49	66	30	33	45
1979	57	57	51	80	34	33	47
1983	59	51	52	71	35	29	47
1987	61	47	51	64	33	30	44
1992	63	48	52	64	37	29	46
	59	50	50	68	31	28	

Table 2: Labour voting according to class in Britain (percentages)

	High Sal.	Low Sal.	Routine NM	Petty B.	Sk. W	Unsk. W.	
1964	18	21	25	17	63	63	46
1966	17	33	43	23	69	69	52
1970	23	28	42	21	64	59	45
1979	26	21	32	10	50	51	38
1983	8	16	20	12	41	48	29
1987	12	20	24	17	43	48	31
1992	16	21	29	16	48	55	34
	16	22	28	16	52	55	

The opposition between classes in term of voting are illustrated by table 3. Values of odds-ratios are, for every pair of social classes compared, quite high. In particular the odds-ratio of Labour voting among the working class (either skilled or unskilled), as compared to the petty bourgeoisie, is consistently well above 5. The same is true for other comparisons between classes.

Table 3: Odds-ratios of class voting in Britain

	1964	1966	1970	1979	1983	1987	1992
Lab / Cons (Unsk. W. / Petty B.)	9.39	7.92	5.61	12.36	9.79	6.02	7.58
Lab / Cons (Unsk. W. / Lower Sal.)	6.32	4.34	3.83	4.19	5.27	3.76	4.33
Lab / Cons (Unsk. W. / Higher Sal.)	7.87	10.55	4.74	3.38	12.20	8.13	7.47

Variations over time in the observed odds-ratios are also present. For instance every odds-ratio declined in 1970. Even without any log-linear modelling (see later) it is anyway apparent that the pattern of variations looks like the « trendless fluctuations » identified by Heath and his colleagues in their previous works (based on a slightly different version of the class schema). In particular there seems to be no sign of a linear and gradual decline in the relationship between class and vote as measured by odds-ratios.

France shares many particularities of class voting with Britain but shows strong differences as well. Tables 4 to 6 give the percentages of class voting in the first and second rounds of elections. The petty bourgeoisie is, as in Britain, the strongest place of right voting and this holds for every election considered. The working class is also the strongest place for a left wing vote in every election.

Table 4: Right voting according to class in France, 1st round

	High Sal.	Low Sal.	Routine NM	Petty B.	Sk. W	Unsk. W.	
1967	68	62	52	73	40	40	57
1978	66	51	49	72	33	34	52
1988	48	37	33	56	20	21	36
1995	44	39	40	60	27	27	40
1997	47	35	35	59	31	29	39
	53	43	41	65	29	31	

NB: for 1988, 1995 and 1997 « right » means « la droite modérée » which excludes voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 1988 and 1995 first round of Presidential election and voting for National front candidates in the first round of legislative elections in 1997. Percentages are calculated on the basis of a three categories voting variable (right / left / extreme right).

Table 5: Left voting according to class in France, 1st round

	High Sal.	Low Sal.	Routine NM	Petty B.	Sk. W	Unsk. W.	
1967	32	38	48	27	60	60	43
1978	34	49	51	28	67	66	48
1988	43	52	56	32	65	69	52
1995	51	51	43	25	53	56	46
1997	47	58	54	33	57	54	51
	42	51	51	28	60	53	

Table 6: Left voting according to class in France, 2nd round

	High Sal.	Low Sal.	Routine NM	Petty B.	Sk. W	Unsk. W.	
1967	28	36	46	31	62	57	44
1978	28	45	49	24	63	65	46
1988	50	60	64	39	73	75	60
1995	52	53	48	23	60	59	48
	42	51	53	29	65	65	

Note: only left voting is presented. Right voting can be calculated by subtraction from 100%.

If the main lines of political cleavages between classes are thus the same in the two countries, the differences are nevertheless very important. The salariat, and in particular the lower salariat (« les professions intermédiaires ») is considerably more left orientated in France. The same is true for employees (routine non manual). It means that distances between classes are weaker in term of voting and that the strength of class voting is far less in France than in Britain. The weaker impact of class in France is a well-known factor already revealed by Pierce and Converse (Political representation in France) (See also Dalton and Lewis-Beck).

Even if the values of the odds-ratios are weaker than in Britain, they are nonetheless quite substantial. As table 7 shows, the strongest odds-ratios values are obtained when comparing the working class and petty bourgeoisie: unskilled workers have between 3.3 and 5.7 times more chance to vote for a left party (or candidate) than for a right one.

Not only the strength of the relationship between class and vote is different in the two countries but also the evolution through time. Looking

at table 4 and 5 again, one can see that from 1995 left and right voting among the working class is changing quite a lot: working class support for the left weakened and, as Heath and Cautrès have shown, this evolution started at the beginning of the nineties (Heath and Cautrès, 1996). Even if still quite high, the odds-ratios comparing support for the left among working class and petty bourgeoisie are weaker in 1997 than in 1964.

Table 7: Class voting odds-ratios in France, 1st round

	1967	1978	1988	1995	1997
left / right (Higher Sal. / Petty Bgsie)	1.27	1.32	1.56	2.78	1.78
left / right (Lower Sal. / Petty Bgsie)	1.65	2.47	2.45	3.13	2.96
left / right (Unsk. W. / Petty Bgsie)	4.05	4.99	5.75	4.97	3.32
left / right (Unsk. W. / Higher Sal.)	3.18	3.76	3.66	1.78	1.86
left / right (Unsk. W. / Lower Sal.)	2.44	2.02	2.33	1.58	1.12
left / right (Routine / Higher Sal.)	1.96	2.02	1.89	0.92	1.54
left / right (Routine / Lower Sal.)	1.50	1.08	1.20	0.82	0.93

NB: for 1988, 1995 and 1997 « right » means « la droite modérée » which excludes voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 1988 and 1995 first round of Presidential election and voting for National front candidates in the first round of legislative elections in 1997. Odds-ratios are calculated on the basis of a three categories voting variable (right / left / extreme right).

The other very important change in France is due to the process of class realignment occurring between the mid-sixties and the mid-nineties. This process, analyzed previously (Heath and Cautrès, 1996), is illustrated by the evolution of odds-ratios comparing different classes of employees. There is a progressive convergence between the values of these odds-ratios and some are even lower than 1 in 1995. In other words, there is a reduction in the propensity of employees to differently support the left. As can be seen when comparing the odds-ratios among the salariat and the petty bourgeoisie, this process is accompanied by a larger divergence in voting of employees and self-employed. The above evolution shows that by the end of the period the main class cleavage in France divide the electorate according to a salaried / self-employed line.

If class voting has significantly changed in France in the recent period, part of the explanation lies in the success of the extreme-right

among the working class in particular. As table 8 shows, extreme right voting grew between 1988 and 1995 among the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and the routine non manual class while it actually declined somewhat among the salariat (note that our class schema is probably not the best one regarding extreme right voting since it combines in the petty bourgeoisie the small artisans and shopkeepers with farmers who are less likely to support the National front or Jean Marie Le Pen).

Table 8: Extreme-right voting according to class in France, 1st round

	High Sal.	Low Sal.	Routine NM	Petty B.	Sk. W	Unsk. W.	
1988	9	11	11	12	15	10	11
1995	4	9	16	15	21	17	14
1997	7	7	12	8	13	17	10

NB: in 1988 and 1995 extreme right means voting for Jean Marie Le Pen at the first round of Presidential election. In 1997 it means voting for National front candidates in the first round of legislative elections.

Table 9: Extreme-right class voting odds-ratios in France, 1st round

	1988	1995	1997
ext-right / left (Petty Bgsie / Unsk. W.)	2.58	1.17	0.77
ext-right / left (Unsk. W. / Higher sal.)	0.69	3.87	2.11
ext-right / left (Unsk. W. / Lower Sal.)	0.68	1.72	2.60
ext-right / right (Unsk. W. / Petty Bgise)	2.22	2.56	4.34
ext-right / right (Petty Bgsie / Higher Sal.)	1.14	2.75	0.91
ext-right / right (Petty Bgsie / Lower Sal.)	0.72	1.08	0.67

Variations in extreme-right voting according to class are not so strong as for right or left voting and the odds ratios in table 9 are generally weaker than those we have seen earlier. This suggests that extreme right voting is probably best explained by other socio-demographics, education in particular. But there are also some important class differences in table 9 in particular concerning the propensity of the petty bourgeoisie and working class to support the National Front or its leader. Because of our coding of vote (three categories) it is possible to calculate two sets of odds-ratios: one opposing the odds of voting for the extreme right as opposed to the odds of voting for the left; the other opposing the odds of voting for the extreme right to the odds of voting for the right.

As we can see, there are some interesting changes between 1988 and 1995 / 97. In particular, compared with the left, the National Front became relatively weaker among the petty bourgeoisie but relatively

stronger among the working class. This suggests that there has been some realignment of the National Front - from being a party of the petty bourgeoisie in 1988 it has become more a party of the working class (especially the of lower working class) in the 1990s. This may well be one source of the declining relative strength of the left in the working class over the same period.

Religious voting in the two countries

Even although our analysis focuses primarily on religious integration, as measured by church attendance, it is nevertheless of interest in the British case to look at denominational differences in voting behaviour.

Table 10: Conservative voting according to religious denomination in Britain

	C of E / Sct.	R. Catho	Non Conf.	Other	No+non p.	
1964	47	28	36	71*	37	42
1966	44	25	33	45	33	39
1970	55	33	34	43	35	45
1979	55	52	47	31	41	47
1983	55	34	42	37	41	47
1987	55	35	39	42	40	44
1992	57	34	52	42	42	46
	51	34	38	38	39	

Table 11: Labour voting according to religious denomination in Britain

	C of E / Sct.	R. Catho	Non Conf.	Other	No+non p.	
1964	42	61	46	14*	54	46
1966	46	71	55	55*	60	52
1970	37	61	45	50	56	45
1979	29	40	31	49	43	38
1983	19	40	22	36	34	29
1987	22	45	24	33	34	31
1992	21	50	27	38	38	34
	32	51	36	39	40	

Table 12: Liberal voting according to religious denomination in Britain

	C of E / Sct.	R. Catho	Non Conf.	Other	No+non p.	
1964	11	11	18	14	9	11
1966	9	3	12	7	17	9
1970	8	6	20	7	9	10

1979	16	8	21	20	15	15
1983	26	25	36	27	25	26
1987	23	20	37	25	25	25
1992	22	15	20	20	20	20
	17	15	25	22	20	

As tables 10 to 12 are showing, religious denomination has a clear impact which holds true in every election. Anglicans are more Conservative than any other religion: the difference in Conservative voting between them and Roman Catholics is (with the exception of 1979) always very large, 20 points more or less. The Labour party support among the Roman Catholics is also strong.: religion gives Labour voting percentages as high as working class occupation and no other religion is as Labour as it. Finally, it is worth noting in table 12 that the old link between non-conformism and Liberal party still holds in modern Britain: with few exceptions, Liberal voting is strongest in the Non conformists. The main results from tables 10 to 12 can be summarized in table 13 as odds-ratios.

Table 13: Religious denomination voting odds-ratios in Britain

	1964	1966	1970	1979	1983	1987	1992
Lab / Cons (Catho / C. Of E.)	2.43	2.71	2.74	1.45	3.40	3.21	3.99
Lib / Cons (Non Conf. / C. Of E.)	2.1	1.77	4	1.5	1.8	2.26	.99

Religiosity as measured by church attendance and no religion also produced in the British electorate clear and constant differences. Among Anglicans, the dominant religion, church attendance ranks perfectly Conservative and Labour voting: regular churchgoers are always more Conservative than irregular which are always more Labour (church attendance does not however produces strong differences in support for the Liberal). Those declaring themselves as having no religion or never practice and the less Conservative and the more Labour. Interesting is that religiosity produces quite often stronger differences than religion denomination as can be seen by comparing the odds-ratios in table 16 with the ones in table 13. Without giving odds-ratios as high as in table 3 (according to class), integration to the Anglicanism marks strong divisions in the electorate anyway. The pattern of this over time looks constant with some fluctuations. The Conservative lead over Labour among the regular Anglicans, compared to the no religion and never practice, is between 15 and 28 points over the period.

Table 14: Conservative voting according to religiosity in Britain

	Reg. C. Of E.	Irreg. C. Of E.	No rel. / non p.	Other	
1964	56	46	39	33	42
1966	52	43	35	30	39
1970	63	54	35	35	45
1979	57	54	42	45	47
1983	60	54	42	37	45
1987	56	55	41	37	44
1992	61	56	44	39	46
	58	51	41	36	

Table 15: Labour voting according to religiosity in Britain

	Reg. C. Of E.	Irreg. C. Of E.	No rel. / non p.	Other	
1964	30	44	52	53	46
1966	31	48	58	61	52
1970	31	37	57	51	45
1979	22	31	42	41	38
1983	14	20	32	37	29
1987	19	22	33	38	31
1992	9	24	37	42	34
	22	33	38	44	

Table 16: Odds-ratios according to religiosity in Britain

C. of E.	1964	1966	1970	1979	1983	1987	1992
Lab/Cons (Irreg/Reg)	1.78	1.82	1.39	1.48	1.58	1.17	2.90
Lab/Cons (No Rel/Reg)	2.48	2.77	3.30	2.59	3.26	2.37	5.69

Situation in France is comparable but religiosity gives even more clear and strong differences in voting. Here again, church attendance ranks perfectly voting behaviour: the order between the religion categories holds the same for the period. But now differences are bigger and percentages differences between regular churchgoers and no religion or never practice are very large: at least 34 points and up to 46 points. No variable is probably likely to gives such differences in France and one can see from table 17 and 18 that religion has still a very large impact on voting behaviour in France: the more frequent church attendance is, the more likely right voting is. It is worth noting that the increase in right wing voting looks as linearly related to the frequency of church attendance. This results hold when considering second round voting rather than first round (see in appendix the tables for second round not included here for presentation reasons).

Table 17: Right voting according to religiosity in France, 1st Round

	Reg. Catho	Irreg. Catho	No rel. / non pract.	Other	
1967	84	65	38	35	57
1978	84	65	39	53	52
1988	61	49	27	33	36
1995	71	55	31	34	40
1997	71	53	27	36	39
	75	57	32	39	

NB: for 1988, 1995 and 1997 « right » means « la droite modérée » which excludes voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 1988 and 1995 first round of Presidential election and voting for National front candidates in the first round of legislative elections in 1997. Percentages are calculated on the basis of a three categories voting variable (right / left / extreme right).

Table 18: Left voting according to religiosity in France, 1st Round

	Reg. Catho	Irreg. Catho	No rel. / non pract.	Other	
1967	16	35	62	65	43
1978	16	35	61	47	48
1988	29	41	61	55	52
1995	21	34	54	51	56
1997	24	39	61	56	51
	20	37	59	53	

As table 19 shows, the impact of religion on voting behaviour in France is indeed very strong: in particular, odds-ratios comparing regular churchgoers with non religion and never practice are of very high values. Two observations are worth doing. First, if we compare the odds-ratios of table 19 with the ones in table 7, it is immediately apparent that class counts less than religion in explaining voting behaviour in France; With the exception of the comparison between unskilled workers and petty bourgeoisie, the odds-ratios given by religion are always stronger than the one given by class.

Second, there are evolutions through time of the odds-ratios in table 19: 1988 in particular shows a decline in every odds-ratios. This decline is particularly strong in the odds-ratio comparing non religion or never attendance to church with regular attendance. The fact that this decline occurs in 1988 and that it is more accentuated in the comparison between no religion (combined with never practice) and regular church attendance suggests two explanations: a contextual effect due to the 1988

election specificities (President Mitterrand, the incumbent left candidate, has attracted part of an electorate which normally is supporting right wing candidate) and a more structural effect.

This latter effect is certainly due to the weakening of left support among the non religion or never practice category and this is also link to the changing sociology of the Socialist Party from the end eighties.

This weakening attachment to the left of a traditionally left orientated category, is partly due to context (disillusion with the incumbent left government and President) but mainly due to a trend factor: more and more person are considering themselves as non religious and this category probably lost its political cohesion and significance. Odds-ratios are raising after again but do not reach the values they add in 1967 or 1978. The difference between the 1988 and 1995 / 1997 odds-ratios probably gives the measure of the contextual phenomena explained above.

Table 19: Odds-ratios according to religiosity in France, 1st round

	1967	1978	1988	1995	1997
left / right (Irregular / Regular Catho.)	2.82	2.82	1.76	2.09	2.17
left / right (No rel. / Regular Catho.)	8.56	8.21	4.75	5.88	6.68
left / right (No Rel. / Irregular Catho.)	3.03	2.90	2.70	2.81	3.07

NB: for 1988, 1995 and 1997 « right » means « la droite modérée » which excludes voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 1988 and 1995 first round of Presidential election and voting for National front candidates in the first round of legislative elections in 1997. Odds-ratios are calculated on the basis of a three categories voting variable (right / left / extreme right).

Note that if a distinction is made between no religion and non practice, the odds-ratios are far larger. For instance the odds-ratios of a left voting (rather than a right voting) among the non religion as opposed to the regular Catholics are: 17.57 (1967), 19.75 (1978), 8.1 (1988), 13.24 (1995).

Voting for Jean Marie Le Pen or the National front is inversely related to church attendance. Our analysis shows clearly that extreme right voting and right wing voting are not the same phenomena in terms of religious values and practices. This is particularly shown by table 21: the odds-ratios of an extreme right voting, compare to a right voting, are always stronger in irregular churchgoers or non religious (never practice) categories.

More remarkably is the increasing differences between these categories; Everything happens like if the more National front is rooted in

the French electorate, the less likely « religious voter » are supporting it. This analysis clearly shows that the set of religious values and representations which goes with church attendance, « protects » the voter from extreme right influences and attraction.

Table 20: Voting for Jean Marie Le Pen according to religiosity in France, 1st Round

	Reg. Catho	Irreg. Catho	No rel. / non pract.	Other	
1988	10	10	12	11	11
1995	8	12	16	14	14
1997	5	8	12	8	10

Table 21: Extreme-Right voting odds-ratios according to religiosity in France, 1st round

	1988	1995	1997
ext-right / right (Irregular / Regular Catho.)	1.24	1.93	2.14
ext-right / right (No rel. / Regular Catho.)	2.71	4.58	6.31
ext-right / right (No Rel. / Irregular Catho.)	2.17	2.36	2.94

The analysis reported above are based on percentages tables are have shown differences in Britain and France. We now have to use more complex techniques to compare the class and religion impacts on voting in the two countries and to examine the evolution of it through time in a more complete way.

Multivariate analysis: modelling the relation between class, religion and vote in Britain and France

We begin by using separate Logit models for Britain and France. We use these models to analyse the four-way table of class, religion, vote and election. In Britain we look at the 7 elections for which we have data; in France we look at the 4 elections for which we have second-round data, in order to avoid the complications of the National Front. We therefore have 3 categories of vote in Britain but only two in France.

Our principal interest with these models is to test the hypothesis of constant class or religious voting over time. In other words, do we need to include a class*election or religion*election in our models? In this way we

can test whether the changes suggested by our inspection of the bivariate analyses above are still apparent when we control for both cleavages simultaneously and when we test for statistical significance.

Table 22: Multivariate Analysis

	GB	France
0. Baseline	2577 (334)	1685 (95)
1. + election	2092 (322)	1528 (92)
2. + class	640 (312)	937 (87)
3. + religiosity	394 (306)	167 (84)
4. + class*religiosity	330 (276)	140 (69)
5 + election*class	254 (216)	85 (54)
6 + election*religiosity	211 (180)	67 (45)

Model 4 is the best-fitting model for GB, whereas models 5 and 6 provide improved fits for France. We can check the differences between the two countries more rigorously by doing a pooled analysis. Using backward elimination we find that the best-fitting model is one which contains the three-way interactions class*religiosity*country, election*class*country and election*religiosity*country.

Bruno Cautrès *, Anthony Heath +, David Firth +

Appendix

Left voting according to religiosity in France, 2nd Round

	Reg. Catho	Irreg. Catho	No rel. / non pract.	Other	
1967	16	36	62	64	44
1978	15	33	58	41	46
1988	34	49	69	64	60
1995	20	33	57	57	48
	21	39	61	55	

* Maison Française d'Oxford / Nuffield College.

+ Nuffield College, University of Oxford.

+ Nuffield College, University of Oxford.

Religious voting odds-ratios in France, 2nd Round

	1967	1978	1988	1995
left / right (Irregular / Regular Catho.)	2.82	2.82	1.64	2.18
left / right (No rel. / Regular Catho.)	8.56	8.21	4	6.13
left / right (No Rel. / Irregular Catho.)	3	2.99	2.43	2.80