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Monk Officials as Military Officers in the Tibetan Ganden Phodrang Army (1895–1959)

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Résumé

De la même façon que l'administration du Ganden Phodrang en général était composée de fonctionnaires laïcs et ecclésiastiques, le secteur militaire du Ganden Phodrang incluait également ces deux types de fonctionnaires. Basé sur des biographies et des autobiographies tibétaines et sur des archives britanniques, cet article analyse le rôle des fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques (*rtse drung*) dans l'organisation militaire gouvernementale de la première moitié du XXe siècle. Après une présentation des diverses positions militaires qui leur étaient ouvertes, que ce soit dans des fonctions purement administratives ou bien de commandement des troupes, ou encore des fonctions mixtes, l'article se concentre sur les fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques nommés Commandants en chef des troupes et en particulier sur deux d'entre eux qui ont cumulé cette charge la plus élevée dans la hiérarchie militaire tibétaine avec celle de ministre, les Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (1870–1923) et Tenpa Jamyang (1888–1944). L'article tente d'évaluer la signification et l'implication, sur le plan idéologique, de la participation des fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques aux activités militaires du gouvernement.

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MONK OFFICIALS AS MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE TIBETAN GANDEN PHODRANG ARMY (1895–1959)

Alice TRAVERS*

De la même façon que l'administration du Ganden Phodrang en général était composée de fonctionnaires laïcs et ecclésiastiques, le secteur militaire du Ganden Phodrang incluait également ces deux types de fonctionnaires. Basé sur des biographies et des autobiographies tibétaines et sur des archives britanniques, cet article analyse le rôle des fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques (rtsedrung) dans l'organisation militaire gouvernementale de la première moitié du XX^e siècle. Après une présentation des diverses positions militaires qui leur étaient ouvertes, que ce soit dans des fonctions purement administratives ou bien de commandement des troupes, ou encore des fonctions mixtes, l'article se concentre sur les fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques nommés Commandants en chef des troupes et en particulier sur deux d'entre eux qui ont cumulé cette charge la plus élevée dans la hiérarchie militaire tibétaine avec celle de ministre, les Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (1870–1923) et Tenpa Jamyang (1888–1944). L'article tente d'évaluer la signification et l'implication, sur le plan idéologique, de la participation des fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques aux activités militaires du gouvernement.

Introduction

When one thinks of monks taking arms in pre-1959 Tibet, the category of “fighting-monks” (*ldab ldob/ldob ldob*) generally comes to mind.¹ Still, one might also consider another category of monks taking arms, in this case, one directly related to Tibetan military history: the *sermak* (*ser dmag*), monks who voluntarily fought as soldiers on various occasions during the history of the Ganden Phodrang (Dga' ldan pho brang), generally under the command of government army officers. These monk soldiers, who represent just one of the possible kinds of recruitment in the Tibetan army during times of war, are sometimes presented as the monk counterpart of

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1. On these monks, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, “A Study of the *ldab ldob*,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 9, no. 2 (1964): 123–41.

the militia (*yul dmag*).² Contrary to the regular and permanent army regiments, these monk soldiers had received no training and were only recruited in case of emergency and on a voluntary basis.

A look at the history of the Ganden Phodrang leads one to observe that there was, in practice, no incompatibility between being a monk and fighting for the Ganden Phodrang government. A number of monks and reincarnate figures (*sprul sku*) are mentioned in various war episodes of the Ganden Phodrang's history, using both their religious skills—performing prayers and rituals³—and taking part in the actual fighting, sometimes ensuring the successful outcome of the war through their military skills.⁴ Monasteries were even sometimes presented as warmongers, if we take the example of the British Younghusband expedition that invaded Tibet in 1904, as described by the historian Shakabpa:

The cabinet and the Tibetan National Assembly convened many times in Lhasa. The cabinet sought a peaceful resolution to the problem; seeing that the British army was superior in their territory, army, and weaponry, they knew that Tibet could not triumph over them. However, the representatives of Drepung, Sera, and Ganden monasteries in the Tibetan National Assembly, without understanding the actual circumstances of their enemy, carried their arguments forcefully. Their only concern was for Buddhism; they obstinately said that Tibet should fight and not talk with the British.⁵

However, there was in principle a doctrinal incompatibility between monastic vows and the taking of arms and killing, a reason that apparently led some monks

2. The British sometimes referred to them as the “Golden army,” as the *ser* of *ser dmag* meaning “yellow,” i.e. the colour of the monks, can also mean gold (*gser*), cf. *Notes on Tibetan Institutions and Personalities, Confidential Document Prepared by Mr. Caccia (Peking), Transmitted to the Foreign Office by E. Teichman the 1st July 1935* (British National Archives [hereafter BNA]/FO/371/19254, ex. F5488/12/10), 151. Although the topic of *sermak* is central to our understanding of the relationship that forms the central topic of this volume, Tibetan military history and Buddhism, no research on *sermak* has been published so far.

3. For a presentation of this kind of religious involvement in war, see George FitzHerbert's paper in this volume.

4. See for instance the description by Shakabpa of a specific episode, when the Tibetan government first sent its army against Gönpo Namgyel (Mgon po rnam rgyal, 1799–1865) and the Nyak (Nyag) army in 1863. According to Shakabpa, the military support of the Géluk (*dge lugs*) incarnate lama Drakyab Dongkam Trülku Ngawang Damchö Gyatso (Brag g.yab Gdong kam *sprul sku* Ngag dbang dam chos rgya mtsho), leader of the volunteer militia from Markham and Drakyab (*rmar kbams dang brag g.yab nas dang blangs yul dmag gi 'go 'dzin*), combined with the prayers and services (*bsnyen sgrub*) offered by great superior beings, like the non-sectarian (*ris med*) master Kongtrül Yönten Gyatso (Kong sprul Yon tan rgya mtsho, 1813–99), led to the victory of the Lhasa army in seizing a number of territories. Cf. Dbang phyug bde ldan Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs: An Advanced Political History of Tibet*, vol. 2 (Kalimpong: T. Tsepal, Taikhang, 1976), 44; Tsepon Wangchuk Deden Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet*, vol. 2, trans. Derek F. Maher (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 607. For a general description of the war between the Lhasa government and Gönpo Namgyel, see Yudru Tsomu, *The Rise of Gönpo Namgyel in Kham: The Blind Warrior of Nyarong* (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), 191–206.

5. Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 666.

to temporarily relinquish their vows during fighting.⁶ The presence of monks in the military sphere, while being obviously accepted as a practical necessity in order to protect the Buddhist government and the *dharmā*, needed to be elaborated from the point of view of Buddhism, as it seems to have raised at the same time concerns about endangering the *dharmā*. This is, at least, the way the twentieth-century Tibetan historian Shakabpa presents various historical episodes involving monk soldiers. He sometimes quotes from primary sources and shows either that the ideological Tibetan reluctance to send monks to war remained continuous from the period just before the Ganden Phodrang and throughout it, from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, or at least that it was perceived in such way by him. To cite just some of the evidence of this type of narrative in Shakabpa's history: in the early seventeenth century, while civil war was raging in Central Tibet, the future Regent of the Ganden Phodrang, Sönam Raptan (Bsod nams rab brtan, 1595–1658) is mentioned as having regretted that “even the mention of the term ‘monk soldier’ obscured religious teachings.”⁷ Again, in later times during the Gurkha attack in 1855:

The day Cabinet Minister Trashi Khangsarva returned to Lhasa, he was appointed as general commander to resist the Gurkha campaign. Many young monks from Drepung, Sera, and Ganden monasteries volunteered for service and left for war. Since this was overwhelming for the [Eleventh] Dalai Lama, he repeatedly said: “Each of us must work for the benefit of Buddhism. If monks are called into military service, this will diminish the monastic discipline. The diminishment in the vows of many beings will be tremendously harmful to Buddhism. Thus, there must be no recruitment.”⁸

However, in this paper, I will focus neither on the topic of “fighting monks” nor monk soldiers/*sermak*, about whom we hope that future research based on primary sources will soon appear. The focus here will be the involvement and role of yet another category of monks in the military context, who were even more closely related to the Ganden Phodrang government and its ideology: the monk officials, or *tsédrung* (*rtse drung*), who were appointed to positions in the army of the Lhasa government, and among whom were several well-known Commanders-in-Chief of the Tibetan army.

The idea for the present study came from reading, in Shakabpa, of the above-mentioned concerns regarding *sermak*, and especially the episode of the Eleventh

6. Or to relinquish them entirely, see the example of Ganden Tsewang described by Federica Venturi in this volume.

7. Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 1, 328, quoting from Rdo rje 'dzin pa dpal 'byor lhun grub's biography (*Rdo rje 'dzin pa dpal 'byor lhun grub kyi nam thar skal bzang dad pa'i shing rta*, *The Chariot of Faith for Those in the Fortunate Aeons*).

8. Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 594. See the Tibetan original: “Zhabs pad bkra shis khang gсар ba rgyal khab tu 'byor nyid stod phyogs gor shar dpung 'jug gi spyi khyab bsko gzhang gnang ba ltar thon pa dang gdan sa ser 'bras dga' gsum nas dge 'dun lo gzhon khyon che dang blangs kyi dmag thog zhugs par/ gong sa skyabs mgon mchog thugs yid phyung pa'i tshul gyis bka' las/ rang re'i las ka 'di/ bstan don yin zhes zer dgos kyang/ ser dmag 'di 'dra bskul na dge 'dun so so'i sgrig khrims nyams rkyen dang 'gro mi mang po sdom par nyams chag gis bstan par gnod tshabs che bas bskul ma dgos pa zhis byung na zhes yang yang bka' phebs pa dang/,” Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs*, vol. 2, 23.

Dalai Lama's critique of monks being sent into military service. Indeed, it raises the following question: if the recruitment of volunteer monks in the army was not deemed desirable by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government from a Buddhist perspective at times of national emergency (which we could consider as a "*cas de force majeure*"), why would they chose to appoint monks to their government army, in long-term positions and during times of peace, when appointing more civilians (lay officials) to army positions, including at the highest level, would have been a perfectly possible alternative?

Three possible hypotheses come to mind, which this paper will aim to explore. The first one is that monk officials/*tsédrung* were considered to be different from other monks. Let us briefly recall the status of monk officials. The officials (*gzhung zhabs*) of the Tibetan government were divided into a lay branch, whose members were lay officials (*drung 'kbor* or *shod skor*) and a monastic branch, whose members were monk officials, each branch having a theoretical size of 175 officials.⁹ The members of the lay branch were recruited almost exclusively from the aristocracy, while those of the monastic branch were recruited in various ways, on a more socially open basis: first, by selecting the best young monks from around ten monasteries of the Géluk (*dge lugs*) school;¹⁰ second, the *tsédrung* could be part of monk households (*shag tshang*),¹¹ and thus belong to families of existing monk officials.¹² Last, a few aristocratic families—who had to send at least one son as a lay official to serve the government—also enrolled sons in the government as monk officials, who were in such cases called *jédrung* (*rje drung*). After training in the Potala school (*rtse slob grwa*), the apprentice monk officials would formally enter government service and would be appointed, like the lay officials, to one of the many positions in the four

9. In reality, each group was larger: during the first half of the twentieth century, the number of officials increased greatly and, according to my own calculations, reached at least 430 (in total, for both lay and monk officials) in the 1940s and 1950s, cf. Alice Travers, "La noblesse tibétaine du Ganden phodrang (1895–1959): Permanences et transitions" (PhD diss., University Paris Ouest-Nanterre La Défense and INALCO, 2009). This dissertation focussed on lay officials' service and as such did not include the study of the monk officials' careers.

10. See Melvyn C. Goldstein and Gelek Rimpoche, *A History of Modern Tibet*, vol. 1, *The Demise of the Lamaist State, 1913–1951* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1993 [1989], 8), where he quotes an interview with Surkhang giving the list of eligible Géluk monasteries as follows: "Sera, Drepung, Ganden, Riwa Dechen, Pho Lamrim, Riwo Chöling, Ganden Chökor, Tshe tshog, Namdra, and Nechung."

11. The term *shaktsang* was used for any household that was headed by a monk, including monk officials. Thus, there were *shaktsang* in monasteries as well as outside monasteries, in the case of monk officials' *shaktsang*.

12. Ibid. According to our research, some of these houses were Parkhang (Par khang), Chokteng (Lcog steng), Dingkhar (Lding mkhar) or Drukgyeltsang ('Brug rgyal tshang). They would recruit new house members through adoption, most commonly nephews, or else sons of non-related families. Among these *shaktsang*, only five enjoyed the privilege of nobility (*sku drag sger pa'i thob thang*): Trékhang (Bkras khang), Barzhi (Bar zhi), Tara (Rta ra), Mönдрong (Smon grong/sgrol?) and, later on, Neushak (Sne'u shag); see Travers, "La noblesse tibétaine du Ganden phodrang (1895–1959)," 134.

domains of activity in the administration, including the army.¹³ They would follow the career path of all officials, receiving positions in government service as well as honorific titles, both of which correlated to ranks (*rim pa*) on a ladder from the seventh up to the third grade.¹⁴

And indeed, the monk officials were not considered to be the same as other monks. According to Goldstein, “although they were required to be celibate, monk officials differed considerably from other monks in outlook, training, and comportment.”¹⁵ He calls them “. . . ‘token monks,’ since most of them had merely registered in one of the big monasteries without actually having lived and studied there. One night’s stay in a monastery was sufficient to have one’s name registered in its rolls and thereby achieve eligibility for entering the ranks of the monk officials.”¹⁶ According to Goldstein, the consequence was that they lacked the same loyalty to the monastery to which they belonged as did other monks. In addition to this, Leonard van der Kuijp writes that *tsédzung* were not considered as monks in the sense of fully ordained monks (Skt. *bhikṣu*; Tib. *dge slong*), but in the sense of novice monks (*dge tshul*) who had only taken the thirty-six novice vows (*sdom pa*).¹⁷ This distinction might have been important in a Tibetan military context.

Nonetheless, one cannot help but remark that not killing is part of the thirty-six vows taken by novice monks, as well as of the even more limited vows taken by a layman. Thus, this distinction in the status based on vows, between fully ordained monks and others, though probably meaningful, cannot entirely account for the choice made by the government to enrol monk officials in the military domain.

A second hypothesis would be that, despite the impression conveyed by Shakabpa’s discourse on *sermak*, the Tibetan government did not actually differentiate between lay and monk officials, when it came to filling army-related positions (as well as a number of other positions, in fact, an observation that helps to understand the interweaving or, rather, the actual *continuity* of the political and religious in Tibetan governmental and administrative thought).¹⁸

13. The other three being the administration offices in Lhasa, the territorial administration and the House of the Dalai Lama. Cf. *ibid.*, for a description of the Ganden Phodrang administration and its various offices.

14. The rank system, introduced in 1792, was modelled after the Manchu system, with the particularity that only five (the seventh to the third) out of nine ranks were in use, cf. Luciano Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet, 1728–1959*, Serie Orientale Roma 45 (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1973), 8. When an official received an honorific title conferring him a higher rank than the position alone gave him, he held the highest rank attached to his honorific title. For more explanations on the enacting of the system of ranks in the Ganden Phodrang administration in the early-twentieth century, see Travers, “La noblesse tibétaine du Ganden phodrang (1895–1959),” 265–71. I have attached as an appendix to this paper a list of honorific titles a monk official could receive.

15. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*, 8.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Leonard van der Kuijp, “The Yoke is on the Reader: A Recent Attempt at Studying Tibetan Jurisprudence,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 43, no. 2 (1999): 277.

18. One has to bear in mind that the majority of positions in the Ganden Phodrang government were held concurrently by both monk and lay officials, with the idea of ensuring the best

A third hypothesis would be that the involvement of monk officials in military activities was specifically encouraged and valued by the Tibetan government—and if so, for what reasons?

In order to assess these hypotheses, we need a more accurate understanding of the actual practice of appointing monk officials to active army-related positions. Therefore, this paper will attempt to document the significance and range of monk officials' involvement in various kinds of government military activities from 1895 to 1959.¹⁹ It will investigate whether the pattern of administrative rules for monks, including implementation, differed from that of lay officials in the military activities of the Ganden Phodrang government. It will try to understand to what extent the involvement of monk officials was allowed, or valued, and if so, under which circumstances and in which types of military activities.

It will first describe the career opportunities in the military domain that government service offered to monk officials, according to normative information gathered in general descriptions of the Ganden Phodrang administration,²⁰ in Tibetan accounts dedicated to the organisation of specific army-related offices²¹ and

possible (i.e. honest and impartial) administrative work (both types of officials thus belonged to social groups having divergent interests, and they could check upon each other).

19. This is the period of the last two Dalai Lamas and their regents. The available sources do not allow one to go back farther than the end of the nineteenth century.

20. Bshad sgra Dga' ldan dpal 'byor, Chab tshom 'Chi med rgyal po, Sreg shing Blo bzang don grub, "De snga'i bod sa gnas srid gzhung gi srid 'dzin sgrig gzhi" [Structure of the Former Local Tibetan Government's Administration], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 13, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1991); Dge rgyas pa Bstan 'dzin rdo rje, "De snga'i bod sa gnas srid gzhung gi srid 'dzin sgrig gzhi" [Structure of the Former Local Tibetan Government's Administration], in *Bod ljongs zhib 'jug* 2, 3, 4 (1988); Zhe bo Blo bzang dar rgyas, "Dga' ldan pho brang pa'i khriims dang sgrig gzhi'i skor che long tsam gleng ba" [Short Description of the Law and Structure of the Ganden Phodrang], in *Bod mi'i khrims mthun gzhung dga' ldan pho brang dbu brnyes nas lo 360 'khor ba'i bka' drin rjes dran dang ma ongs mdun bskyod kyi kha phyogs*, vol. 1 (Dharamsala: Bod gzhung phyi dril las khungs nas yongs khyab 'grems spel zhus, 2002), 79–118.

21. They will be listed in the respective treatment of these offices. Most of them come from chapters of the collection *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* (literally, "Selection of Source Materials for the Study of the Culture and History of Tibet"; Ch.: *Xizang wenshi ziliao xuanji*). Published between 1981 and 2014, it comprises testimonies written by Chinese and Tibetans at the request of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference through its local office in the Tibet Autonomous Region (once it was reconstituted after 1979), and in conjunction with an *ad hoc* committee, the Committee for Historical and Cultural Materials of the TAR (Bod ljongs chab gros rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha zhib 'jug u yon lhan khang). For a general discussion of that collection, see Alice Travers, "La fabrique de l'histoire au Tibet contemporain: Remarques préliminaires sur les contours et articulations d'une mémoire collective dans les *Matériaux pour l'histoire et la culture du Tibet*," *Journal Asiatique* 301, no. 2 (2013): 481–99. An updated English version of this paper is to appear as "The Production of Collective Memory in the Tibetan-language *Materials for the Study of the Culture and History of Tibet* (1981–2014)," in *Conflicting Memories: Retellings of Tibetan History under Mao*, ed. Robbie Barnett, Françoise Robin, and Benno Weiner (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

according to actual occurrences of such positions occupied by *tsédzung* in primary and secondary Tibetan and English sources.

As much information as possible was extracted and gathered on forty *tsédzung* involved in the military sphere from various primary sources, i.e. oral (interviews) and written autobiographies and biographies of soldiers published in Tibetan in India and Tibet, and British archives (diaries and eleven different *Who's Who*),²² as well as from published Tibetan language autobiographical accounts and Western language secondary sources.²³ The sample thus formed includes the long-term positions, from military Paymaster to Commander-in-Chief of the army (see explanations later), as well as temporary missions of commanding troops;²⁴ though certainly not exhaustive or fully representative, it shows the particularities of these monk officials' careers. The paper will start by presenting the more "administrative" military positions open to monk officials, then the active commanding positions, and last the highest military position, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army, which included a number of monk officials, with the discussion of two historical examples.

22. Most kept in the India Office Library (IOR, British Library), in the Foreign archives (FO, British National Archives) or in the India National Archives (INA, New Delhi). Though imperial archives, and as such requiring a critical approach (see Travers, "La noblesse tibétaine du Ganden phodrang" for a thorough discussion of this), the comparative advantage of these British archives is that they were produced in a very precise way at the exact time of the events discussed. They do not rely on memory and do not suffer from the same risk of imprecision regarding dates (or sometimes even oblivion) attached to the Tibetan language autobiographical sources used for this paper, which were mostly produced at least thirty years after the events, but which, of course, offer a much more accurate "insider understanding" of the Tibetan administration and its subtleties.

23. These will be listed in the respective sections of the paper.

24. The corpus includes twelve *tsédzung*, occupying a military Paymaster (*phogs dpon*) position, five Commanders-in-Chief, three Commissioners of Kham (*mdo spyi*), two Commissioners of the Northern Province (*byang spyi*) and the rest in temporary commanding missions. Its limited size could be explained by the fact that Tibetan and British sources tend to under-represent (by under-mentioning) low ranking officers, which was the case for the *tsédzung* working as clerks in the military headquarters, or as Paymaster in fifth and fourth ranking positions. For the same reason, the *tsédzung* who actually climbed up the administrative ladder and were rewarded with honorific titles like *khenchung* (*mkhan chung*) or *khenchen* (*mkhan chen*), or *dzasa* (*dza sag*), are over-represented in the corpus.

Military Related Career Opportunities for Monk Officials in Ganden Phodrang Service: The Military Administration

The above-mentioned primary and secondary sources indicate that there were at least six different types of government positions linked to the military area to which a Ganden Phodrang monk official could be regularly appointed, namely Secretary in the army headquarters (*dmag spyi las khungs las bya rtse drung*), military Paymaster (*phogs dpon*)—either attached to the Lhasa main Pay Office or to regional pay offices, as we will see—Officer commanding troops,²⁵ Commissioner of Kham (*mdo spyi*), Commissioner of the Northern Province (*hor spyi* and then *byang spyi*) and Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army (*dmag spyi*). These positions were in both the administrative side of the army management and in the active command of troops; they will be presented in detail beginning with the administrative side.

First of all, a monk official could be appointed to three different purely administrative positions, holding the fourth rank to sixth rank, reserved for them in the staff of the Army Headquarters (*dmag spyi khang/ dmag spyi las khungs*). The Army Headquarters, an office in charge of military affairs and located on the ground floor of the Potala Palace, in a building opposite the Dorjéling armoury (Rdo rje gling go mdzod), was founded in 1913.²⁶ According to an account by the lay aristocrat Nornang (Nor nang), who served as secretary in this office (*dmag drung*) for more than ten years, its tasks included the recruitment of new soldiers in case of vacancy,

25. By this generic term, I here refer to any positions of military command, either as an *ad hoc* appointment for a mission or as a long-term position, including the various ladders of the officers' position: *dapön* (*mda' dpon*), *riipön* (*ru dpon*), *gyapön* (*brgya dpon*), *dingpön* (*lding dpon*) or *zbelngo* (*zhal ngo*) and *chupön* (*bcu dpon*). We will discuss in more detail later to what extent monk officials could be appointed to such positions.

26. Bshad sgra et al., “De snga'i bod dmag gi gnas tshul” [The Situation of the Former Tibetan Army], in “De snga'i bod sa gnas srid gzhung gi srid 'dzin sgrig gzhi” [Structure of the Former Local Tibetan Government's Administration], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 13, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1991), 53; the Dungkar dictionary's entry on the Army Headquarters contains an exact reproduction of the previous reference, in addition to a subsequent description of the state of the Tibetan army before the twentieth century: Dung dkar Blo bzang 'phrin las, “Dmag spyi las khungs” [The Army Headquarters], in *Mkhas dbang dung dkar blo bzang 'phrin las mchog gis mdzad pa'i bod rig pa'i tshig mdzod chen mo shes bya rab gsal zbes bya ba bzbugso* (Delhi: Sherig Parkhang, 2005 [Beijing edition, 2002]), 1627; see also the part on the Army Headquarters in Sding bya Tshe ring rdo rje, “Nye rabs kyi bod dmag dang bod ljongs dmag spyi khang gi skor sogs 'brel yod 'ga' zhig” [History of the Tibetan Armed Forces and the Tibetan Army Command Structure], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 17, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1994), 161–80; and the shorter passage on this office in Sreg shing Blo bzang don grub, “Bod dmag gi gnas tshul gang dran bkod pa” [Memories on the Situation of the Tibetan Army], in *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 8, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs chab gros rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha zhib 'jug u yon lhan khang (Lhasa: Bod ljongs shin hwa par 'debs bzo grwa khang, 1986), 54–56.

the management of the Dorjéling armoury, the preparation of monthly payment slips for the regiment soldiers' salary, etc.²⁷ In the 1930s, after what seems to be presented by Nornang as a reorganisation of the staff, the officials in charge of this office were two lay (*dmag drung*) and two monk officials (*las bya rtse drung*), one lay official of the fourth rank (*rim bzhi*) and one monk official (*rtse skor*) of the fifth or sixth rank (*las tshan pa*), as well as a few "scribe-officers" (*yig 'bri lding dpon*) coming from the regiments posted in Lhasa, a *dingpön* (*lding dpon*) in charge of cleaning, and one regimental military officer of the *riipön* (*ru dpon*) rank serving as treasurer.

A second possible appointment for monk officials in the military administration was to one of the two positions (holding either the fourth rank or the fifth rank) reserved for them in the main Zhöl General Military Pay Office (Zhol spyi phogs khang), located near the Eastern gate of the Zhöl area, at the foot of the Potala in Lhasa, or in regional pay offices. The date of creation of the main Military Pay Office varies in the available Tibetan secondary sources. According to Dungkar, when the Manchu Emperor Qianlong (1711–99) created the so-called "gyajong (*rgya sbyong*; lit. 'trained by the Chinese') regiments" in 1782, he also established a Lhasa Military Pay Office to manage a capital fund, and with the money thus generated paid the salaries of soldiers. Both lay and monk officials of two different ranks worked in this office.²⁸ Another author links the creation of the Lhasa Military Pay Office to 1793, at the same time as the 29-Point Reform, when the practice of giving salaries was first created, and it was staffed by a monk official of the *khenchung* (*mkbhan chung*) rank, a lay official of the *rimsbi* (*rim bzhi*) (fourth) rank, and four other lay and monk officials.²⁹ Therefore, the twentieth-century Zhöl General Military Pay Office, which was created in 1919,³⁰ might be a later recreation or revival of the one started in 1782/93. According to the testimony of Penpa (Spen pa), who worked in this office

27. His account is reproduced in Dwang slob mda' zur spyi 'thus Rgyal rtse Rnam rgyal dbang 'dus [hereafter Rgyal rtse Rnam rgyal dbang 'dus], *Bod rgyal khab kyi chab srid dang 'brel ba'i dmag don lo rgyus* [A Political and Military History of Tibet], vol. 1 (Dharamsala: Bod dmag rnying pa'i skyid sdug, 2003), 46–79; English translation in Gyaltsé Namgyal Wangdue, *Political and Military History of Tibet*, trans. Yeshe Dhondup (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2012), vol. 1, 36–47. Nornang also writes that the Dorjéling armoury, created under the Fifth Dalai Lama, functioned as the army headquarters before the creation of the Army headquarters in 1913, cf. Rgyal rtse Rnam rgyal dbang 'dus, *Bod rgyal khab kyi chab srid dang 'brel ba'i dmag don lo rgyus*, vol. 1, 60. On the Dorjéling armoury, see also Federica Venturi's paper in this volume.

28. Dung dkar Blo bzang 'phrin las, "Phogs khang las khungs" [The Military Pay Office], in *Mkhas dbang dung dkar blo bzang 'phrin las mchog gis mdzad pa'i bod rig pa'i tshig mdzod chen mo sbes bya rab gsal zhes bya ba bzugs so*, 1343.

29. Bshad sgra et al., "De snga'i bod dmag gi gnas tshul," 51–52.

30. Dung dkar, "Dmag spyi las khungs," 1628; Bshad sgra et al., "De snga'i bod dmag gi gnas tshul," 54.

for three years from 1943 to 1946,³¹ and two other accounts on this office,³² the two officials in charge, with the title of *pokpön* (*phogs dpon*), would be one fourth-rank monk official (holding the honorific title of *khenchung*) and one fourth-rank lay official (*rim bzhi*), each with their own caretaker (*gnyer pa*) to assist them, as well as two monk and lay officials (*las bya ser skya*) of lower rank, and non-official ranking workers—again, one being in charge of the building (*khang gnyer*), another in charge of measuring the grain (*'bo kba*) and cleaning. Their chief task was to use the funds generated by the capital money and distribute to each regiment—on time—the money needed for the soldiers' pay. They also managed a number of estates whose profits were entirely dedicated to producing military salaries. The *khenchung* and the *rimshi* took it in turn to go to Tsang (Gtsang) and pay the wages in money and grain.

Other local military pay offices were created later, such as the Military Pay Office of Sokdé (Sog sde; Sog phogs khang), close to Nakchu (Nag chu), in 1916, in order to pay the soldiers who were guarding (*sa srung*) the northern frontier of Tibet,³³ but also other pay offices (*phogs khang*) in regional areas like Chamdo, where one monk official, *pokpön*, holding either the title of *khenchung* (lower fourth rank) or *kbenchen* (*mkhan chen*, higher fourth rank), worked under the Commissioner of Kham. This will be discussed in more detail later.

At this point, one has to bear in mind that the work of military Paymaster does not seem to have been a purely bureaucratic task, as *pokpön* are not infrequently mentioned in primary and secondary sources as finding themselves in the middle of a battlefield.³⁴ It seems logical that paymasters were needed on the field during times of war, when it was necessary to levy additional soldiers and when one wanted to avoid last minute withdrawal of soldiers who might not have received their rightful salary. We will now turn to more “active” positions.

31. The author, Spen pa, was a servant of *mkhan chung* Bkras mthong Blo bzang rnam rgyal (Khenchung Trétong Lozang Namgyel), who had been appointed as the joint head (with another lay *rim bzhi* official) of the General Military Pay Office (*spyi phogs khang*) in 1946. When the latter had to take leave from government service due to chronic illness, after just a few months, he received from the Regent (Stag brag; r. 1941–50) the authorisation to have Spen pa replace him in his position, cf. Gzhis rtse sa khul srid gros u yon Spen pa, “De snga'i bod sa gnas srid gzhung gi dmag phogs 'go 'doms zhol spyi phogs khang zhes pa'i sgrig gzhi dang/'gan dbang/khyab khongs sogs skabs de'i dngos don mdor bsdus” [Factual Summary of the Responsibility Domains of the Military Pay Officer and the General Payroll Office in Zhol, in the Former Local Tibetan Government], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 20, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1998), 356–62.

32. Bshad sgra et al., “De snga'i bod dmag gi gnas tshul,” 54; Dung dkar, “Phogs khang las khungs,” 1343.

33. Bshad sgra Dga' ldan dpal 'byor, Chab tshom 'Chi med rgyal po, Sreg shing Blo bzang don grub, “Mdo smad sgyi khyab” [The Commissioner of Kham], in “De snga'i bod sa gnas srid gzhung gi srid 'dzin sgrig gzhi,” in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 13, 86.

34. To give just one example: “As Lhasa troops were closing in on Gönpo Namgyel's fortress, yet another division of Lhasa's troops under the command of the Lhasa paymaster Pünrabpa was marching toward Rinup . . .” Yudru Tsomu, *The Rise of Gönpo Namgyel*, 200.

Military Related Career Opportunities for Monk Officials in Ganden Phodrang Service: The Command of Troops

The scarcity of monk officials among the several ladders of the “long-term” military officers’ positions³⁵ is a striking element that might be explained by the fact that these particular positions were considered, in Western secondary sources at least, as the preserve of lay officials only.³⁶ These commissioned and non-commissioned military officers were the *dapön* (*mda’ dpon*; often translated in English as “General”), fourth rank official, usually head of 500 and in a few cases of 1,000 soldiers; the *rüpön* (*ru dpon*; often translated in English as “Colonel”), fifth rank official, head of 250 soldiers; the *gyapön* (*brgya dpon*; a title that could be translated as “Captain”), sixth rank official officer, head of 100 soldiers; the *dingpön* or *zbelngo* (*zhal ngo*; a title that could be translated as “Lieutenant”), seventh rank officer, head of 25 soldiers; and *chupön* (*bcu dpon*; a title that could be translated as “Sergeant”), head of 10.³⁷

Nonetheless, a first significant point is that historical sources show a few occurrences which suggest that if there was such a rule, it might have been lax. The

35. Only a few government positions in the Ganden Phodrang government were held on a permanent, lifelong basis, which only demotion or death would terminate; these were the charges of prime minister, minister, Grand Secretary (*drung yig chen mo*) and Finance officer (*rtsis dpon*). All other positions were granted for a varying length of time, which was renewable, so in practice a government official would stay in the same position from one to twenty years, with an average length of around three years (for more on this topic see Travers, “La noblesse tibétaine du Ganden phodrang [1895–1959],” 301–3). I call these positions “long-term” in contrast to the temporary missions any official could receive from the government, without being deprived of the main long-term position he was first appointed to, and to which duties he would come back after the end of his temporary mission. Thus, the distinction here made between long-term position and temporary mission means that a *tsédzung* holding a civil long-term position could be sent as head of troops on a temporary military mission, as will be explained below.

36. Ram Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet* (Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1969), 48, who states that “all army officers were laymen.” Petech presents the position of *mda’ dpon* as being only for laymen, and does not specify if the other officers’ positions (*ru dpon*, *brgya dpon*, *lding dpon/zhal ngo*, *bcu dpon*) were open to monk officials, cf. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet, 1728–1959*, 237 (explicitly), 201 (implied). However, one Tibetan source states that military officers were chosen from both monk and lay officials’ ranks: “*dmag dpon de rnams mang che ba gzhung zhabs ser skya’i khongs nas bsko bzbag gnang srol yod*,” cf. Stag Iha Phun tshogs bkra shis, *Mi tshe’i byung brjod pa* (Dharamsala: Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang, 1995), vol. 2, 140.

37. The fact that all these army officers hold government ranks does not imply that they were all considered as full-status government officials (*gzhung zhabs*). In our current understanding, there was a difference: the *dapön* and some *rüpön* ranks could be considered as full officials, while the lower military officers—called “outer ranks” (*spyi’i rim pa*)—held government ranks, but inferior to those of full status officials; see for instance one mention of these outer ranks for the other *rüpön* (*phyi’i rim pa lnga pa*), *gyapön* (*phyi’i gnas rim drug pa*) and *dingpön* (*phyi’i gnas rim bdun pa*) in Stag Iha, *Mi tshe’i byung brjod pa*, 141. The translated English titles proposed here are purely conventional, as their use in British sources of the time varied and the much smaller size of the Tibetan army, compared with the size of European armies of the time, forbids us to build a strict correspondence of Tibetan and English military officer titles that would be based only on the number of men taking their orders from each level of officer.

observation of our sample of *tsédzung* occupying army positions is useful since we find three *tsédzung* apparently officially placed in long-term positions commanding troops with either the title of *dapön* or *rüpön*. According to British archive sources from 1915, for instance, one monk referred to as “Yeshe Ngawang Depon” was integrated into the government service as *tsédzung* because of military services he rendered to the government and became a General (*dapön*) in the Tibetan army.³⁸ There is also one *rüpön*, “Changkyimpa” (Chang kyim being a monk officer’s house or *shaktsang*), who died at Guru in 1903/4.³⁹ There is also one “*rtse drung* ’Phyongs ’phyos rdo rje g.yu rgyal” described by Shakabpa as leading the troops of the Ja regiment in 1932 without apparently holding a rank as officer.⁴⁰ The small number of cases found could signify that there was indeed a rule forbidding *tsédzung* to be appointed to these positions of *dapön*, *rüpön*, etc. and that only a few exceptions were made to this rule.

We also find two cases of monks who disrobed in order to become General (*dapön*). The first one, Lheding *dapön* (Lha sdings *mda’ dpon*) Gönpo Nyendrak (Mgon po snyan grags) was actually induced to do so by the government itself. A British source notes the following:

Lheding depon: Personal name unknown. Born 1868. Is the younger brother of the Lheding depon who was killed at Guru in 1904. He spent nineteen years as a monk in the Drepung monastery, near Lhasa, but on the death of his brother, he was called upon by the Tibetan Government to fill the vacant office of titular general in the Tibetan army. He married a young wife, but has no children, and adopted the son of his deceased brother (born in 1901). He is the cousin of the Dowager Maharani Kesang La of Sikkim, and regarded by the ruling Maharaja as his uncle. Is now Tibetan trade agent at Yatung, being considered as the junior partner of the Tibetan trade agent at Gyantse. Represented at Gyantse by the monk official Lobzang Chotrak (Chundzela). A man of old-fashioned stamp and literary tastes.⁴¹

We find his first name in a family account published by a descendant of the Lheding family, confirming the birth date from the above-mentioned story, but with a variation in chronology: when his brother Lheding Drala (Dgra lha), General of Ü Province (Dbus *mda’ dpon*), was killed in 1904 in the British military camp, Gönpo Nyendrak disrobed and only later, in 1912, was he appointed General and sent along with troops and another monk colleague, *khenchung* Ngawang la (*mkhan*

38. “Born about 1886, was formerly a common monk of She-di Monastery in Lhasa. Assisted in raising troops at Shigatse in 1911–1912. Fought against the Chinese at Gyantse in March 1912, and subsequently at Lhasa. Promoted Depon by the Dalai Lama in autumn of 1912,” cf. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1915*, 22 p. (with *Addenda and Corrigenda*) September 1915 (BNA/FO/371/2318, ex. file 1933, 10/141275/15), 21.

39. Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 674.

40. *Ibid.*, 826; Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs*, vol. 2, 303. Regiments were named by the letters of the alphabet from *ka* to *ma*, the Ja regiment being in charge of the Riwoché (Ri bo che) area in Eastern Tibet.

41. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1920* (BNA/FO/371/6652, ex. 1463/1463), 5.

chung Ngag dbang lags), to fight the Chinese on the Sichuan border, where he was made prisoner (and later released).⁴²

The second one, Tupten Wangchuk (Thub bstan dbang phyug), born in 1908, entered government service as a monk official, but later disobeyed, married into the Zompü (Zom phud) family, became a lay official and was immediately after appointed *dapön*, in 1938. Thus, we can at least wonder if there was any link between the two events or if it was pure coincidence.⁴³

Our sample thus shows that the appointment of monk officials to *long-term* commanding and fighting positions of intermediate rank seems to have been rare. However, monk officials were much more frequently appointed to *temporary* commanding missions during times of war. To begin with, in several descriptions of wartime in Shakabpa and Gyaltse Namgyal Wangdue's history, one also finds monk officials in commanding positions, most of the time in charge of regional levies (*yul dmag*) and not regular regimental troops, and termed "*yul dmag 'go 'dzin rtse drung*." To give a few examples, in 1913 three monk officials, named *kbenchung* Dawa (*mkhan chung* Zla ba), Serngak Tsédzung Zhapchung (Ser ngags *rtse drung zhabs chung*) and Tsédzung Ngödrup (*rtse drung* Dngos grub),⁴⁴ are described as commanding units that were drawn from regional militia (*yul dmag*) in Kham, from Shotarlosum [Sho star lho gsum],⁴⁵ Mardzosangsum [Smar mdzo gsang gsum]⁴⁶ and Richabpasum [Ri chab dpa' gsum].⁴⁷ Later, in 1950, "The Gadang Regiment leader Mujawa (Mu bya ba) and the Podrak militia commander ('Spo brag yul dmag 'go 'dzin) Tsédzung Ludrup Namgyel (*rtse drung* Klu sgrub rnam rgyal) made excellent headway against the enemy."⁴⁸

42. Lha sding Rnam rgyal rdo rje dang dge slong Blo bzang bstan 'dzin, "Sger phag mo lha sding pa'i lo rgyus mdor bsduś" [Condensed History of the Aristocrat Family Pakmolading], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgriś*, vol. 25, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros kyi khriś lugs mi rigs chos lugs lo rgyus rig gnas u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2005), 9.

43. "Somp-hü. Personal name Thupten Wangchuk. Born in 1908. Was formerly a monk official and worked as Yik-tshang nyerpa (Secretary to the Ecclesiastical Chief Secretary) from 1928–1938. In 1938 he became a lay official and was made a Kusung De-pön (General of the Dalai Lama's Bodyguard). He is the adopted son of Khen-chhen Lobsang Jungne," *Who's Who in Tibet, Corrected with a Few Subsequent Additions up to 30th September 1948*, printed by the Government of India Press, Calcutta, India, 1949 (IOR/L/P&S/20 D 220/2), 116.

44. Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs*, vol. 2, 230; Rgyal rtse Rnam rgyal dbang 'dus, *Bod rgyal khab kyi chab srid dang 'brel ba'i dmag don lo rgyus*, vol. 2, 35.

45. Abbreviation for Sho pa mdo, Star rdzong and Lho rdzong. Gyaltse Namgyal Wangdue has *star* for Star rdzong, cf. *ibid.*, but Shakabpa has *ltar*, cf. Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs*, vol. 2, 230.

46. Abbreviation for Smar khams, Mdzo sgang and Gsang sngags chos rdzong. Both Zhwa sgab pa and Gyaltse Namgyal Wangdue use the old spelling Rmar khams instead of the more recent one used here, i.e. Smar khams, cf. *ibid.*

47. Abbreviation for Ri bo che, Cha mdo, and Dpa' shod.

48. Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 936; Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs*, vol. 2, 432.

In Petech, one also finds another monk official, Chankhyim Tupten künkhyen (Chang khyim Thub bstan kun mkhyen, 1893–1939), sent in the context of the border wars with China in 1932, “with a considerable body of troops to Skye rgumdo (Jyekundo), as a sort of military governor of Northern Khams.”⁴⁹

We can therefore deduce that it was, in case of war, possible to appoint a monk official to a temporary *ad hoc* mission to command the militia that was also levied specially for that occasion. The government practice of appointing monk officials to such positions parallels the practice of recruiting monk soldiers in time of war, and could be justified—this is an assumption on my part—by the pressing need to defend the Buddhist government by all means and available talent.

A closer look at the sources indicates that though they clearly did not form the major contingent of the long-term intermediate army leadership, monk officials were certainly part of its temporary intermediate army officers. Much more significantly in this discussion, sources show that monk officials were commonly appointed to the highest ranking long-term commanding positions of Commissioner of Kham (*mdo spyi*), Commissioner of the Northern Province (*byang spyi*)⁵⁰ and Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army (*dmag spyi*).

To begin with, the position of Commissioner of the Northern Province, holding the fourth rank with combined civil and military responsibilities, was open to monk officials.⁵¹ First, from 1916 onwards, based in Khyungpo Tengchen (Khyung po steng chen) and called *horchi* (*hor spyi*), and then from 1942 onwards, based in Nakchu (Nag chu) and called *changchi* (*byang spyi*), the Commissioner of the Northern Province was the head of a particular body of regular troops. This comprised between 50 and 2,000 soldiers, depending on the types of soldiers considered in the sources used and possibly the period, as the troops’ size probably varied through time.⁵²

49. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 109.

50. These positions in the territorial administration of Tibet at the regional level, termed *chikyap* (*spyi khyab*), are sometimes translated as “Governor General,” but I follow the habit of British sources of the time, which use “Commissioner,” and keep “Governor” for the position of *dzongpön* (*rdzong dpon*), at the district level.

51. On the history of this office, see Rdo sbis Tshe ring rgyal, “Gzhung sa dga’ ldan pho brang gi sa gnas srid ’dzin byang spyi dang byang spyi sde khag gi lo rgyus yig tshags la dpyad pa” [A Study of Documents Related to the History of the Commissioner of the Northern Province and Its Territory, in the Local Administration of the Ganden Phodrang], in “Revisiting Tibetan Culture and History, Proceedings of the Second International Seminar of Young Tibetologists, Paris 2009,” part 1, ed. Tim Myatt et al., *Revue d’Études Tibétaines* 21 (October 2011): 219–41.

52. Rdo sbis Tshe ring rgyal gives a permanent bodyguard (*srung bya dmag mi*) of 50 soldiers with a *rüppön* during the *horchi* years, and 100 soldiers with a *gyapön* during the *changchi* years, in both cases also having leadership over larger local militia, cf. *ibid.*, 205; Tsering Shakya gives a figure of 2,000 soldiers supporting the *horchi/changchi*, cf. Tsering Shakya, “Ga rgya ‘gram nag: A Bandit or a Proto-rebel? The Question of Banditry as Social Protest in Nag chu,” in “Papers for Elliot Sperling,” *Revue d’Études Tibétaines* 31 (February 2015): 367. The significance of the military responsibilities of the *changchi* seems to have faded after 1951: according to Melvyn Goldstein, the incumbent Governor in 1958 had only a small bodyguard force of Tibetan army troops and his work was basically that of a district/province head, not an army head (Melvyn Goldstein, private correspondence).

The first Governor appointed to this position, *khenchung* Tsawa Drakpa Namgyel (*mkhan chung* Tsha ba grags pa rnam rgyal/Tsha ba grags rnam), born 1867, had had prior experience in the military: in the British *Who's Who* of 1915 and 1920, he is described as a *khenchung* “commanding Tibetan soldiers in Kham” and is said to have been first an ordinary monk who was integrated into the *tsédrung* corps because of his bravura in fighting.⁵³ Later, as Commissioner of the Northern Province from 1916 to 1921,⁵⁴ he became famous by fighting aggressively against robbers in the Northern area and earned himself, according to Tsering Shakya, a reputation as the most brutal of all Governors, before he was eventually, according to this author, assassinated.⁵⁵ Interestingly enough, the former soldier Gyaltse Namgyal Wangdue, author of the *Political and Military History of Tibet*, remembers that this monk official was popularly praised for his military skills: “What a military skill and honesty of Drakpa Namgyal, the Governor of the Hor states!” (*hor spyi grags rnam gyi drag rtсал drang shugs*).⁵⁶ Out of the nine known *horchi* between 1916 and 1942, five were monk officials. From 1942 to 1959, a monk official was systematically appointed as *changchi*, being joint to a lay official colleague; there were thus, for this period, another five monk officials out of the ten known *changchi*.⁵⁷

A similar appointment open to monk officials in the territorial administration, with military responsibilities, was that of Commissioner of Kham (*mdo smad spyi khyab* or *mdo spyi*), based in Chamdo in Eastern Tibet, and usually holding a high rank (the third rank). This position was created in 1913 after the expulsion of the Sino-Manchu forces from Tibet, and most obviously in the context of the pressing need to better organise the military protection of Tibet's border with China. From 1922 onwards, the Commissioner of Kham office was extended and became known as the “Chamdo Minister Cabinet” (*chab mdo sa gnas su bka' shag spyi khyab*

53. “Is a man of high family in Kham, was Lab-nyer (steward of the monastery) of Dze-to in Kham, born about 1867. He was engaged [*sic*] several times with the Chinese and defeated them in Men-kang. The Dalai Lama promoted him to Ken-chung and he is now commanding Tibetan soldiers in Kham,” *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915, 20 and Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1920*, 8.

54. Rdo sbis Tshe ring rgyal, “Gzhung sa dga' ldan pho brang gi sa gnas srid 'dzin byang spyi dang byang spyi sde khag gi lo rgyus yig tshags la dpyad pa,” 212.

55. Tsering Shakya, “Ga rgya 'gram nag: A Bandit or a Proto-rebel?” 368. Tsering Shakya mentions also the biographical account of Drakpa Namgyel: Shag ru Shes rab rgya mtsho, “Mkhan chung grags pa rnam rgyal gyi 'byung khungs dang des hor spyi byas pa'i lo rgyus rags bsdu shig” [Short History of Khenchung Drakpa Namgyel's Origins and of When He Was Acting as Horchi], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 23, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2003), 122–35.

56. Gyaltse Namgyal Wangdue, *Political and Military History of Tibet*, vol. 2, 68; Rgyal rtse Rnam rgyal dbang 'dus, *Bod rgyal khab kyi chab srid dang 'brel ba'i dmag don lo rgyus*, vol. 2, 90.

57. See the list of successive *horchi* and *changchi* from 1916 to 1959 provided in Rdo sbis Tshe ring rgyal, “Gzhung sa dga' ldan pho brang gi sa gnas srid 'dzin byang spyi dang byang spyi sde khag gi lo rgyus yig tshags la dpyad pa,” 212–15 and 219–21.

las khangs or *chab mdo bka' sbag*).⁵⁸ We find as Commissioner of Kham war leaders that included monk officials; at its creation, the office was tailored for the monk official Jampa Tendar (Byams pa bstan dar, 1870–1922/23), who will be presented in detail in the third part of this paper. He was appointed as “monk Minister in charge of general civil and military affairs” (*zhi drags spyi 'doms bka' blon bla ma*), with troops under his direct command.⁵⁹ Several monk officials formed part of his office in military positions, but also as assistant to the Commissioner, and they usually held the rank of *khenchen* (higher fourth rank).

Last, most significantly, a monk official could be appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the entire Ganden Phodrang army.

At the Top of the Military Hierarchy: Monk Officials as Commanders-in-Chief of the Tibetan Army

The position of Commander-in-Chief of the whole Tibetan army, which was not specifically designed for monk officials, was progressively established in the early-twentieth century,⁶⁰ first with the title of *chikhyap dapön* (*spyi khyab mda' dpon*), abridged to *chida* (*spyi mda'*), and later changed into *makchi* (*dmag spyi*, abbreviation of *dmag mi'i spyi khyab* or *dmag don spyi khyab*).⁶¹ The position probably began in the aftermath of the British Younghusband expedition of 1904, at least in practice: during that war, two Tibetan officials became entrusted with the responsibilities and title of Commander-in-Chief of the whole Tibetan army, the General (*mda' dpon*) Lhading (Lha sding) and the monk Minister Jampa Tendzin (Byams pa

58. Dge rgyas pa, “De snga'i bod sa gnas srid gzhang gi srid 'dzin sgrig gzhi,” in *Bod ljongs zhib 'jug* 3, 158.

59. The office comprised two lay and monk officials of the fourth rank (*las bya rim bzhi ser skya*), plus two Paymasters (*phogs dpon*), at least one monk with the rank of *khenchen/chung*, two *mgron las* (*rtse mgron/las tshan pa*), plus one (lay) *bka' (sbag) mgron (gnyer)* and one (lay) *bka' (sbag) drung (yig)*, ten *las bya dkyus ma rtse shod ser skya* (thus at least five monk officials), cf. Bshad sgra et al., “Mdo smad spyi khyab,” 86.

60. And not suddenly in 1913, as it is often stated; see for instance Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, 69.

61. Another title is to be found in earlier British sources: “The whole army is controlled by a General Officer Commanding called *Maga Yong kyab* [*dmag sgar yongs khyab*] and by an Assistant General Officer Commanding known as *Maga Chikhyab Chung wa* [*dmag sgar spyi khyab chung ba*], under the orders of the Kashag council,” cf. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915*, 15. In another English language source, we find that Zurkhang Sönam Wangdü (Zur khang Bsod nams dbang 'dus, 1901–72), after being sent as a groom (*mag pa*) to the Kémé/Künsangtsé (Khe smad/Kun bzang rtse) family, “was later made *gosa* or commander-in-chief of the armed forces,” Dorje Yudon Yuthok, *House of the Turquoise Roof* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1995 [1990]), 39.

bstan 'dzin).⁶² They were probably appointed to positions created *ad hoc* because of the war.⁶³

A few years later, in 1908, and for the first time in a context of peace, the General Tréling (Bkras gling), who had distinguished himself in battle against the British in 1904, is reported to have been appointed “General in Chief of the whole Tibetan troops,” with the other generals under his authority, a fact probably linked to the Sino-Manchu project of modernising the Tibetan army.⁶⁴ The first mention of this position in Tibetan sources appears only later, when Dazang Dradül (Zla bzang dgra 'dul), who would later take the name Tsarong (Tsha rong), was sent by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876–1933) back from India to Tibet with the mission to fight and expel the Chinese troops there. Before his departure, he was granted the title of *chida* (*spyi mda'*; Commander-in-Chief), most probably in 1911.⁶⁵

62. Petech gathered biographical data on him from a variety of sources: “Byams-pa-bstan-'dzin was a *rtse-mgron* in 1882, when he directed some repairs at gDan-sa-thil, and in 1888, when he together with Phun khang *sras* led some 1000 men of Brag-g.yab coming through Lhasa on their way to the Sikkim border. He was *mkban-drung* in 1897, on the staff charged with preparations for the forthcoming visit of the Dalai-Lama to the great monasteries and thus in 1898 accompanied him to dGa'-ldan. On 17. III, 1900, he was present at a great solemn audience. In 1903, after the dismissal of Chang-khyim-pa, the Dalai-Lama appointed him acting *bka'-blon bla-ma*. In 1904 he became also Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army and in July negotiated with Colonel Younghusband at Gyantse; having failed to stem the British advance, he lost his head and fled away. In July and August of that year he negotiated the treaty of Lhasa. But immediately after the departure of the British he was dismissed and arrested. He died in 1914 or 1915,” cf. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 223–24. He is also the “Commander-in-Chief lama” mentioned in Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 671, 676–78.

63. And indeed, in pre-twentieth-century times, Commanders-in-Chief of the Tibetan army would be only appointed at times of war, by choosing among the ministers or the highest officials of the government and by giving them these military duties in addition to their other position. See Petech, who writes that there was no permanent central command of the troops, and when troops needed to be dispatched, a Minister would take command (Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 11). See for instance the example already mentioned in the early part of this paper of the 1855 Gurkha campaign, when the monk Minister Trékhang (Bkras khang) was appointed as General Commander to resist the Gurkha Campaign, cf. Zhwa sgab pa, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs*, vol. 2, 594.

64. This particular enterprise is also apparent in British archives, including a plan to turn all monks into soldiers, which the British reported to be deeply resented by the Tibetans, cf. “Proposed enlistment of monks in the Tibetan army,” *Diary of Lieutenant F. M. Bailey, Officiating British Trade Agent, at Gyantse, for the Week Ending on the 12th (Received 22nd) October 1907* (INA/Sec. E February 2008/467–482). For a detailed study of this late Sino-Manchu military project, see a forthcoming paper by Ryōsuke Kobayashi (presented at the second conference of the TibArmy project, *Military Culture in Tibet during the Ganden Phodrang Period [1642–1959]: The Interaction between Tibet and Other Asian Military Traditions*, Oxford, 19 June 2018).

65. This year is given in the biography of Tsarong, written by his daughter-in-law: Tsha rong Dbyangs can sgröl dkar, *Bod kyi dmag spyi che ba tsha rong zla bzang dgra 'dul* [Tsarong Dazang Dradül, the Great Commander-in-Chief of Tibet] (Dehradun: Tsarong House, 2014), 24. It is corroborated by another account, where it is described as happening after events taking place in 1910 and before others in 1912: Shen kha ba 'Gyur med bsod nams stobs rgyal, *Rang gi lo rgyus lhad med rang byung zangs* [My Autobiography, as Genuine as Natural Copper] (Dharamsala:

In 1913, when the Army Headquarters (*dmag spyi las kbungs*) was created, the new head of this office—also leader of the Tibetan army—was relabelled into *makchi*, usually with one senior (*dmag spyi che ba*) holding the third rank (being, as we will see later, either already a minister, or holding the honorific title of *dzasa*) and one junior (*dmag spyi chung ba*) incumbent, holding the fourth rank (with the honorific title of *kbenchung* if he was a monk minister).

The position of Commander-in-Chief underwent subsequent changes in the early-twentieth century, with sometimes only one office-holder, and short periods with none.⁶⁶ After 1934, and the appointment of Tenpa Jamyang, which will be discussed below, the position was officially and permanently redesigned with two *makchi*, one monk and one lay official.⁶⁷ However, at least since the early-twentieth century, monk officials could be chosen for this highest long-term military position in the Ganden Phodrang army either when it was an *ad hoc* position during times of war (in the case of monk Minister Jampa Tendzin, acting Commander-in-Chief during the fighting in 1903–4) or a long-term position during times of peace: indeed, the first incumbent of the newly termed *makchi* position in 1913 was the monk official *kbendrung* (*mkban drung*)⁶⁸ Jampa Tendar, who, in addition to the responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, was soon promoted to monk Minister (*bka' blon bla ma*). With his three lay counterparts, he formed the Tibetan Cabinet of Ministers, the highest political and administrative institution under the Dalai Lama.⁶⁹

The Commander-in-Chief combining his position concurrently with that of Minister was not a rule, though it was repeated several times—and not only for monk officials, since the lay official Tsarong, for instance, was himself appointed Commander-in-Chief *cum* Minister later.⁷⁰ It seems to have been a way to ensure that the army was closely tied in the hierarchical chain to the Cabinet of ministers,

Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang, 1990), 27. See also the description of the circumstances around the bestowing of the position, but without a date, in Dundul Namgyal Tsarong, *In the Service of His Country: The Biography of Dasang Damdul Tsarong, Commander General of Tibet* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2000), 36. Rahul also has Tsarong being termed *chida* until 1913, when he becomes a *makchi*, cf. Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, 69.

66. Rahul states that there was no Commander-in-Chief from 1929 to 1932 (*ibid.*, 69). Later, when army reforms were dropped after the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933, there was again no Commander-in-Chief apparently for a few months, cf. *List of Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, Third Edition, 1933* (IOR/L/P&S/20/D216, London).

67. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 11–12.

68. Abbreviated form of *mkban po drung yig*, one of the four monk members of the Ecclesiastical Affairs Office (*yig tshang las kbungs*).

69. The system of having the Cabinet composed of three lay Ministers and one monk Minister started in 1751 on proposition of the Manchu *amban*; it was then discontinued from 1791 and during most of the nineteenth century; the monk Minister was reinstated but as a supernumerary member of the Cabinet in 1878; in 1894 the Tibetan assembly chose to return to the former system (four members, three lay and one monk), cf. *ibid.*, 221–22.

70. Of the twelve monk Ministers of the period 1895–1959, only three were Commander-in-Chief at the same time, and one of them only “acting Commander-in-Chief” (the official did the job without having been appointed to the full position). Several other monk officials were Commander-in-Chief, but without concurrently being monk Ministers.

as it had been before the creation of a military high command, and that it would not grow into a separate power overshadowing civil authority. In addition to this, the fact that the monk official chosen as Commander-in-Chief was in several occasions the same chosen as monk Minister can be interpreted in several ways: it confirms that the position of Commander-in-Chief would be a stepping stone towards the position of Minister; it ensured a partial control of the religious hierarchy over the military (we will see below that Tenpa Jamyang's appointment has already been interpreted in this way); and it might have been a way for the government to confer the most prestigious religious sanction to the military enterprise.

According to our review, at least five monk officials appear to have been appointed as Commander-in-Chief between 1913 and 1959:⁷¹

- 1) Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (Byams pa bstan dar, 1870–1923), monk Minister (*bka' blon bla ma*, 1912–23) and Commander-in-Chief (*dmag spyi*, 1913–?);
- 2) Kalön Lama Tenpa Jamyang (Bstan pa 'jam dbyangs, 1888–1944), Commander-in-Chief (1933–44) and monk Minister (1939–44);
- 3) Khenchung Kelsang Tsültrim (Skal bzang tshul khriims), at least from 1946 (August)⁷² to 1947. A former military Paymaster (*phogs dpon*), reputed to be pious and honest, promoted to dzasa rank (third rank), he had a stroke⁷³ in 1950 and had to take leave from government service due to his health;⁷⁴
- 4) Khenchung Gadrang Lozang Rinchen (Dga' brang Blo bzang rin chen) who succeeded him in 1950;⁷⁵
- 5) Khenchung Lozang Kelzang (Blo bzang skal bzang), apparently the last one, from 1956–59.⁷⁶

71. The list is certainly not exhaustive and only reflects our current state of knowledge.

72. *Lhasa Weekly Letters from the British Trade Agent, Gyantse and Officer I/C, British Mission, Lhasa, to Political Officer in Sikkim, Camp Yatung, for the Week Ending 25 August 1946* (BNA/FO/371/53616, ex. F14566/71/10).

73. See the *Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, for the Period Ending 15th September 1950, from H.E. Richardson, the Indian Trade Agent, Gyantse, and Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa, PO Gyantse, Tibet, to the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok* (BNA/FO/371/84453, ex FT1021/8): "The Monk Commander-in-Chief had a stroke on his way to Nagchuka where he had been posted to accompany Ragashar Shape. He was brought back to Lhasa and no substitute has yet been sent in his place."

74. Sding bya Tshe ring rdo rje, "Nye rabs kyi bod dmag dang bod ljongs dmag spyi khang gi skor sogs 'brel yod 'ga' zhig," 164.

75. *Ibid.* He is probably identical to the *makchi khenchung* named Lozang Rindzin (Blo bzang rig 'dzin; born 1905) in the British archives, said to have taken charge in 1950, cf. *Who's Who in Tibet, Corrected to the Autumn of 1937, with a Few Subsequent Additions up to February 1938 (Plus Addenda)*, Calcutta, Government of India Press, 1938 (IOR/L/P&S/12/4185A), 68.

76. Sding bya Tshe ring rdo rje, "Nye rabs kyi bod dmag dang bod ljongs dmag spyi khang gi skor sogs 'brel yod 'ga' zhig," 164. A monk official *makchi* was mentioned in interviews Melvyn

Among these five monk Commanders-in-Chief of the Tibetan army, two—Jampa Tendar and Tenpa Jamyang—are slightly more documented in primary and secondary sources and their appointments seem to have had a lasting impact; they will therefore retain our attention. Both of these *tsédzung* happen to have been monk Ministers, combining this position with the one of Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army.⁷⁷

Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (Byams pa bstan dar, 1870–1923)

The first one, the monk Minister/Kalön Lama (*bka' blon bla ma*) and Commander-in-Chief/*makchi* (*dmag spyi*) Jampa Tendar, is an emblematic figure in Tibetan military history (see figs. 1 to 3).⁷⁸ Information on him is available in several primary and secondary sources (in one Tibetan autobiography,⁷⁹ in the British archives⁸⁰ and in published accounts by British witnesses of his time, such as Eric Teichman,⁸¹ Louis Magrath King⁸² and Lt. Col. F. M. Bailey),⁸³ which each individually show a number of lacunae in the description of his career, but together are quite complementary. As for secondary literature, there is a short biography of him in a recently published biography of the current Dalai Lama by the Norbulingka Institute,⁸⁴ many passages

Goldstein conducted in Tibet with Chichak Tashi Dorjé (Spyi lcags Bkra shis rdo rje) in 1993: *tsédzung* Jangjenlokho Lodrö Kelzang (Lcang can blo khog Blo gros skal bzang), who was *makchi kbenchung* in 1958–59 (cf. personal communication with Melvyn Goldstein). Our understanding is that he would be the same as *kbenchung* Lozang Kelzang, mentioned in Sding bya Tshe ring rdo rje's account. If not, he would be a sixth known *makchi tsédzung*.

77. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Tashi Tsering Josayma (AMI) for his help in locating Tibetan and English visual and written sources regarding Jampa Tendar.

78. I have included in this paper reproductions of Jampa Tendar's photographs, found in rarely available books. In addition, see also the beautiful photograph of Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar in grand military uniform, reproduced by Jamyang Norbu in his online publication: Jamyang Norbu, "Black Annals: Goldstein and the Negation of Tibetan History (Part 1)," July 2008, accessed June 1, 2017, <https://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2008/07/19/black-annals-goldstein-the-negation-of-tibetan-history-part-i-tris/?hilite=%27black%027%02C%027annals%027>.

79. *Rdo rje chang drag shul pbrin las rin chen gyi rtogs brjod bzhugs so* [The Autobiographical Reminiscence of *trichen* Drakshül Trinlé Rinchen], glegs bam gnyis pa (TBRC P979), published by Sakya Centre, 1974, Dehradun.

80. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915; Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1920.*

81. Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consul Officer in Eastern Tibet* (1922; repr., Kathmandu: Pilgrims, 2000).

82. Louis Magrath King, *China in Turmoil, Studies of Personality* (London: Heath Cranton Limited, 1927).

83. Lt.-Col. Frederick Marshman Bailey, *No Passport to Tibet* (London: The Travel Book Club, 1957).

84. Nor gling mdzad rnam sde tshan nas rtsom sgrig dang nor gling bod kyi rig gzhung gces skyong khang nas dpar skrun zhus, "Bka' blon bla ma byams pa bstan dar," in *Mdzad rnam rgya chen snying rje'i rol mtsho* [Official Biography of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tendzin Gyatso] (Dharamsala: Norbulingka Institute, 2009), 528–31.

on him in Shakabpa's history⁸⁵ and, in addition, Luciano Petech, Jamyang Norbu, Carole McGranahan and Tsering Shakya also have short passages on him in their writings, as we will see.⁸⁶

Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar was born about 1870 and came to Lhasa as a young novice monk (*dge tshul*) in 1883 in the train of the "Chaghan Nomin Han."⁸⁷ Later, he entered government service as a monk official beginning with the position of secretary in the Cabinet of Ministers (*bka' drung*) (with the sixth rank). At the end of 1911, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama instructed him to make secret preparations for the Tibetan revolt against the disorganised Sino-Manchu occupation forces. He was then appointed a Grand Secretary (*drung yig chen po*), i.e. one of the four fourth grade monk officials in the Secretariat for ecclesiastical affairs (*yig tshang las khungs*) to the Dalai Lama.⁸⁸ In recognition of the prominent part he had played in the fighting at Lhasa in 1911–12, in July 1912⁸⁹ he was appointed cabinet Minister (*bka' blon*), a position he would hold until his death ten years later. He entered Lhasa, and on 6 December 1912, he went to Nyétang (Mnyes thang) to meet the Dalai Lama and to accompany him back to the capital. In the same year he was sent to Kham to organise the resistance of the local officials against the Chinese.⁹⁰

This seems to be the moment when he received a position of military command, though sources differ somewhat in the chronology. Shakabpa and Bshad sgra Dga' ldan dpal 'byor et al.⁹¹ place his appointment as Minister later; they write that he was first Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army, termed *makchi* (*dmag don spyi khyab mkhan drung* Byams pa bstan dar), in 1913—and indeed, had he already been Minister (*bka' blon*), this higher title would have been added to the one of *makchi* instead of *khendrung*—and also the first one to hold the position.⁹² Shortly after, in the same year,⁹³ he became Commissioner of Kham (*mdo spyi*) as well,

85. Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 738, 749, 762.

86. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 225; Carole McGranahan, "Arrested Histories: Between Empire and Exile in 20th Century Tibet" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2001), 95–109; Tsering Shakya, "Ga rgya 'gram nag: A Bandit or a Proto-rebel?"; Jamyang Norbu, "Centennial of a Historic Tibetan Victory over a Chinese Invasion Force," April 2018, accessed June 1, 2017, <https://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2018/04/29/celebrating-the-centennial-of-chamdos-true-liberation/>; and Jamyang Norbu, "Black Annals: Goldstein and the Negation of Tibetan History (Part 1)."

87. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915*, 16; *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1920* (BNA/FO/371/6652, ex. 1463/1463/10), 4.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915*, 16. Petech also has him appointed in 1912, cf. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 233.

90. *Ibid.*, 225.

91. Bshad sgra et al., "De snga'i bod dmag gi gnas tshul," 52; Shakabpa, *One Hundred Thousand Moons*, vol. 2, 749 and 762.

92. Petech does not mention this, nor does he mention the Grand Secretary (*drung yig chen mo*) position, as they were not recorded in the sources he consulted.

93. The British *Who's Who* indicates he was appointed "General Officer Commanding all the Tibetan troops in Eastern Tibet" in 1913, which could indicate his appointment as Commissioner of Kham (*mdo spyi*), *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915*, 16.

and being already monk Minister *cum* Commissioner of Kham, based in Eastern Tibet, he relinquished his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief. Tsarong Dazang Dradül replaced him as senior Commander-in-Chief (*dmag spyi che ba*) and the Finance officer (*rtsis dpon*) Trimön Norbu Wanggyel Téji (Khri smon Nor bu dbang rgyal *tha'i ji*) was appointed junior Commander-in-Chief (*dmag spyi chung ba*).⁹⁴ Teichman describes him alternatively as “Kalon lama, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army”⁹⁵ in 1913 and as “the head of the Tibetan army on the frontier” only, which he most probably was already when he met him.

As monk Minister and Commissioner of Kham, Jampa Tendar appears in the sources as a very efficient administrator of Tibet, controlling his territory in an impressive manner. We find a mention of him in the diary kept by Colonel (then Captain) Bailey, a member of Younghusband’s expedition to Lhasa in 1904, who, without permission from the Tibetan Government and no official support from the Government of India, entered Tibet from Assam with one companion in 1913 (this adventure and his findings there won him the Royal Geographical Society’s Gold Medal). In his account *No Passport to Tibet*, Bailey recalls the following when he and his companion crossed the Assam border, reaching the Pémakö (Padma bkod) area in southeastern Tibet (site of the great bend of the Brahmaputra River):

The next morning, just as we were starting, a letter came for us from the Kalon Lama, Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army. It was written from Pembar Gompa in Kham and had been sent to Showa. There it had been put in a fresh envelope, sealed and sent to Tsela, where it was sealed up in another cover and dispatched to us. The total effect was very impressive. It was to ask us who we were and what we were doing; and to make sure that we couldn’t say that we were unable to read it, an English translation was attached.⁹⁶

Later, we find him in 1915 asserting Lhasa authority through military means over the territory of the “Thirty-nine tribes of Hor” (Hor tsho pa so dgu).⁹⁷ Soon after, in 1918, concurrently as Commissioner of Kham (*mdo spyi*), Jampa Tendar was famously responsible for Tibetan military success in the face of Chinese troops.⁹⁸

British sources describe Jampa Tendar in very positive terms: “A man of strong character and of much influence and tact.”⁹⁹ Two British diplomats had close contact and collaboration with him and developed a strong sense of admiration towards him. The first one, Eric Teichman, a British consular officer in Chengdu who helped mediate the 1918 truce, depicts Jampa Tendar as someone inspiring the

94. Each source seems to miss one position. In the *Who’s Who*, he was never a Commander-in-Chief (*dmag spyi*), but directly Commissioner of Kham (*mdo spyi*) *cum* Minister (*bka’ blon*).

95. Teichman, *Travels of a Consul Officer in Eastern Tibet*, 42 and 116.

96. Bailey, *No Passport to Tibet*, 163.

97. Tsering Shakya, “Ga rgya ’gram nag: A Bandit or a Proto-rebel?” 366: “It was not until 1915 that an army led by Kalon Lama Jampa Tendar, who headed one of the best trained and equipped sectors of the Tibetan army at the time, managed to gain total control of the Hor Sogu.”

98. The historiographical significance of the 1918 Tibetan victory has been reassessed in two essays by Jamyang Norbu, see “Centennial of a Historic Tibetan Victory over a Chinese Invasion Force,” and “Black Annals: Goldstein and the Negation of Tibetan History (Part 1).”

99. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915*, 16; *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1920*, 4.

greatest respect, who would have preferred a diplomatic way to handle the Chinese attack in order to spare lives; yet he was also prepared to fight to protect Tibet's territory and rights.¹⁰⁰ Open-minded, he had hired for his troops a Mongol instructor in Russian military drills, who had travelled to Russia, China and Japan.¹⁰¹ He is depicted as a military leader who declared being "anxious that the Chinese in his hands should be well treated in accordance with the precepts of his religion."¹⁰² Jampa Tendar's respected style of ruling (and fighting) was certainly related to his particular qualities, including his religious devotion.



Fig. 1: Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (1870–1923). "The Kalon Lama, Tibetan Commander-in-Chief," reproduced in Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet* (Kathmandu: Pilgrims 2000 [1922]), 139.

100. Teichman, *Travels of a Consul Officer in Eastern Tibet*, 52, 53. This whole episode described by Teichman is also reported in Carole McGranahan, "Arrested Histories," 95–109.

101. Teichman, *Travels of a Consul Officer in Eastern Tibet*, 122.

102. *Ibid.*, 119. According to the same author: "The Tibetans have undoubtedly behaved very well at Chamdo, treating their Chinese military prisoners with humanity and kindness, judging by oriental standards, and leaving the civilians Chinese unharmed, except for a little mild looting when the victorious Tibetan soldiery first entered the town," cf. Teichman, *Travels of a Consul Officer in Eastern Tibet*, 118.

The second one, Louis Magrath King,¹⁰³ the then Consul of Tachienlu (Tib. Dar rtse mdo; Chin. Kangding), devoted in 1927 a whole chapter of his book to Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar,¹⁰⁴ describing his encounter with him between 1919 and 1922 and drawing the following colourful portrait:

The Governor-General and the priest were in no conflict in the soul of the Kalon Lama. . . . He was a man of great dignity, imposing presence and outstanding character, . . . a born leader of men—that stood out all over him. He was a vigorous man in the prime of life, tall, large-boned and heavily built and obviously of great physical strength, hirsute, virile, massive, with a dominant air about him of authority. The heroes of old must have been, one imagines, like this, and the Moor of Venice. Othello to the life—that was the impression he gave one, but there was no Desdemona in his case, for he was celibate, a priest. Astonishing in any country but Tibet that a priest should hold the offices he held, or that such a man as he should be a priest at all, but the Tibetan priesthood is *sui generis*, not, as in other countries, a body of men more or less cut off from secular employment and confined to religious duties, but rather of the nature of a special order of men, the elect of heaven, permeating the body politic and engaging, many of them, in mundane occupations, almost as though it were imagined that religion was a thing apart from everyday life.¹⁰⁵



Fig. 2: Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (1870–1923). “A High Tibetan Official (the Late Kalon Lama). A Councillor of State, Civil Administrator of a Province and Commandant of an Army, and Yet a Priest,” in Rinchen Lhamo (Mrs. Louis King), *We Tibetans* (London: Seeley Service and Co., 1926).

103. Louis Magrath King was Consul of Tachienlu in Sichuan, from 1913–15 and from 1919–22. He married the Tibetan Rinchen Lhamo, author of *We Tibetans* (cf. figs. 3 and 4 of Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar reproduced from their respective books).

104. King, *China in Turmoil, Studies of Personality*, 180–208.

105. *Ibid.*, 190.

King also recounts a dilemma faced by Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar during what the author calls a “frontier incident,” when the Chinese Commissioner decided to have a military convoy of his own cross Tibetan territory. This in itself was a *casus belli*, in an area under the direct command of Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar, who chose not to fight rather than taking this incident as an opportunity for war against China:

What ought he to do? As a Buddhist priest he was, on principle, opposed to war, but that did not prevent him waging it when it was thrust upon him. It was he who had commanded the Tibetan armies in the successful campaign of 1917–18. . . . Was he justified in plunging the frontier into hostilities, in bringing upon the people all the horrors of war, in casting the Tibetan question once more into the melting pot, just for that? He came to the conclusion that he was not . . .¹⁰⁶

A few references give Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar’s death as taking place in Chamdo in 1922, but it is recorded in the Water Pig (*chu phag*) year, which more probably was 1923, in the diary of Drakshül Trinlé Rinchen Rinpoche (Drag shul phrin las rin chen *rin po che*, 1871–1936), who became the throne holder of Sakya (Sakya *khri chen*) in 1915.¹⁰⁷ Louis Magrath King recounts that Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar passed away after a visit to Lhasa, and that many thought he had been poisoned by enemies because of his decision during the above-mentioned frontier incident, or simply because of his power. King himself suggests that gout was the cause of death.

According to the analysis of Jamyang Norbu:

The policy direction of Jampa Tendar’s administration can perhaps be gauged by the new official seal he had engraved after the victory. He incorporated his name Jampa meaning “love” and Tendar meaning “spread of religion” into the message of the new seal, which read in Tibetan: “*gyal-khab jam-pae kyang, diki ki tempa dhar-pae thamga*.” The wordplay makes an exact translation difficult but could be roughly rendered as: “Rule the nation with love. The religion of happiness will prevail.”¹⁰⁸

One can observe that the career of this monk official was closely related to his military skills, crucial in the expulsion of the Sino-Manchus in 1912 and the victory over the Chinese in 1918, and that his military success was itself rooted in his religious inclination and status.¹⁰⁹

106. *Ibid.*, 205.

107. *Rdo rje chang drag shul phrin las rin chen gyi rtogs brjod bzbugs so*, folio 7. I am very grateful to Tashi Tsering Josayma (AMI) for having pointed out this passage to me.

108. Jamyang Norbu, “Black Annals: Goldstein and the Negation of Tibetan History (Part 1).”

109. Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar’s activities are also discussed in two other chapters of the present volume, respectively by Stacey Van Vleet and Ryōsuke Kobayashi.



Fig. 3: Kalön Lama Jampa Tendar (1870–1923). “The Kalon Lama, Councillor of State, and Governor General of Kham,” in Louis Magrath King, *China in Turmoil, Studies of Personality* (London: Heath Cranton Limited, 1927), facing page 190.

Kalön Lama Tenpa Jamyang (Bstan pa ’jam dyangs, 1888–1944)

The second similar figure, the monk Minister and Commander-in-Chief Tenpa Jamyang,¹¹⁰ though far less famous, bears some common points in his biography (see fig. 4). Details on him are to be found in one Tibetan biographical account, in British archives and in works by Petech and Shakabpa.

110. Photographs of Tenpa Jamyang are rare. The online *Tibet Album* (Pitt Rivers Museum) includes two of them, one of which I have reproduced in this paper, and another whose copyright it was not possible to secure. The reference to this photograph is: “Lama Commander-in-Chief,” photograph by Neame (Pitt Rivers Museum, 2006.1.37.6–O, photograph on loan from the Neame estate).



Fig. 4: “Kashag Members and Other Officials at Dekyi Lingka Party,” photograph by H. Staunton, 1940–41. Kalön Lama Tenpa Jamyang is in the front row on the right (Pitt Rivers Museum 1999.23.1.31.5).

Kalön Lama Tenpa Jamyang was born in 1888 in the area of Yarlung phodrang (Yar klung pho brang) under Neudong district (Sne’u gdong rdzong). In 1904, he entered government service as a monk official. Then he became District governor (*rdzong sdod*) of Samyé (Bsam yas), then Chamberlain for the Dalai Lama’s private apartments in the Potala (*rtse mgon*, abbreviated form of *rtse po ta la’i gzims chung ’gag gi mgon gnyer*, a position bestowing the fifth rank), and then treasurer in the Potala with the fourth rank title of *kbenchung* (*rtse phyag mkhan chung*).

According to his biographer and witness Dönwang Sötob (Don dbang bsod stobs), while Tenpa Jamyang was a treasurer in the Potala, he supervised the renovation of the eastern side of the Potala Palace, and because he mishandled this assignment, he was demoted to ordinary monk official (seventh rank).¹¹¹ Dönwang Sötob believes this action might be related to the fact that Tenpa Jamyang—“not a man skilled in artificial means like sweet words”¹¹²—was not one to agree with the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s favourite, Künpella (Kun ’phel lags).¹¹³ His biographer praises his service to

111. Don dbang bsod stobs, “Bka’ blon bla ma bstan pa ’jam dbyangs kyi lo rgyus” [History of the Kalön Lama Tenpa Jamyang], in *Bod kyi lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi’i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, vol. 20, ed. Bod rang skyong ljongs srid gros lo rgyus rig gnas dpyad gzhi’i rgyu cha u yon lhan khang (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1998), 277–81.

112. Ibid.

113. This is confirmed by Richardson, who writes that as a result of his criticism of Künpella, his domains were confiscated, something which he endured with “contemptuous equanimity,”

the government: “Without regarding the profit and risk for himself, his superior attention was driven towards serving the government straightforwardly.”¹¹⁴ In 1931 he left for Kham as a replacement for a general (*mda' tshab*). He later worked in the Mint at Trapchi (Grwa bzhi).

Tenpa Jamyang was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief in 1933. In 1934, he was a *kbendrung* and was almost at once concurrently appointed as ecclesiastical Commander-in-Chief (*dmag spyi*), this time with full rank.¹¹⁵ He was thus termed *makchi kbendrung* (*dmag spyi mkhan drung*). Dönwang Sötob writes that he was the first *tsédzung* to become a *makchi* at the same time as being a *kbendrung*.¹¹⁶ In September 1939,¹¹⁷ under the Réting (Rwa sgreng; r. 1934–41) regency, the monk cabinet Minister Changkhyim (Chang khyim) took leave and he was appointed to replace him. His biographer specifies that Tenpa Jamyang owed this appointment to nothing else than his work abilities and attachment to the government, and not to any gifts (*zhu rten*) he would have made to get the position. Thereafter, he was a strong supporter of Réting Rinpoche and held the seat until his death in 1944.¹¹⁸ The historian Ram Rahul erroneously remarks that prior to him, monk official did not participate in the military administration of the country, which might have been true in the early 1930s, but, as we have seen with Jampa Tendar, not in the early years of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's rule. Nonetheless, Rahul interprets this nomination in an interesting way, that of a new trend or will of the monastic government segment to control military affairs:

The government also appointed, in the summer of 1934, Drunyg Chemo Tenpa Jamyang (1888–), the right-hand man of the Regent, as Nagkarwa's [i.e. the lay Commander-in-Chief] counterpart in the monk cadre on the ground that there should be an equal distribution of Government functions between the religion and the State at every level of authority. It did so at the instance of the Drepung and Sera monasteries. . . . The appointment of an official of the monk cadre to a position corresponding to that of a lay Commander-in-Chief and the appointment of Tenpa Jamyang to the rank and position of Dzasa and Magchi immediately after the passing away of the Dalai Lama marked the sharp ascendancy of the conservative forces, consisting principally of the lamas, in the country's affairs of State. This retrogressive turn endangered Dalai lama XIII's secular reforms and caused great anxiety among the younger generation.¹¹⁹

Rahul's description and interpretation of Tenpa Jamyang's appointment concurs with the information available in British records, in which it is reported that he was appointed as joint Commander-in-Chief (working together with a lay official

cf. *Lhasa Weekly Letters from the British Mission, Lhasa to Political Officer in Sikkim, Memorandum Dated 10 August 1944* by H. E. Richardson (BNA/FO/371/41588, ex. F4790/38/10).

114. Don dbang bsod stobs, “Bka' blon bla ma bstan pa 'jam dbyangs kyi lo rgyus,” 277–81.

115. Ram Rahul also has him appointed *makchi* in 1934, cf. Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, 71.

116. Don dbang bsod stobs writes “bka' drung,” i.e. *bka' shag drung yig*, which is probably a mistake since two other sources confirm the *kbendrung* position instead.

117. *Lhasa Mission Diary for the Month of September 1939* (IOR/L/P&S/12/4193).

118. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet*, 233.

119. Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, 71–72.

Commander-in-Chief) of the Tibetan army “at the request of the monks of the Sera and Drepung monasteries.”¹²⁰

Nonetheless, sources let us know that his personality was certainly not unanimously liked, as that of his predecessor. He was dismissed from his position as Commander-in-Chief apparently for neglect of duty again, when an important letter was found missing at the Army headquarters.¹²¹ He was accused of corruption by the Lhasa people in 1944:

An anonymous notice in Tibetan was stuck up close to a Nepali's shop in Lhasa on May 8th in which all the Shaps were accused of taking bribes and doing nothing for the people. Although all Shaps were mentioned, the Bka' blon bla ma and Zur khang *zhabs pad* (minister) were more severely dealt with. The police took the notice down, and it has not yet been found out who was responsible.¹²²

His death is reported in the British Archives, in a diary and in a telegram. Early in August 1944, he was described as being sick but far too conservative to dare consult the British doctor at Lhasa,¹²³ and he passed away not long after, on 12 August 1944.¹²⁴

The British archive offers a slight change in their representation of him, from September 1938, when he was only Commander-in-Chief, until his death:

He is influential with the Regent and reputedly pro-Chinese but is a capable official. . . . The Kalon Shape as I have said owns his appointment to reasons other than his ability. At one time he was considered to be pro-Chinese but I think this was based on nothing more than a liking for Chinese culture. He is slow, conservative, and religious. He and his family are on most friendly terms with us but it cannot be expected that he will be of much help to us in the Kashag. . . . The new Shape, at present officiating, is Tempa Jamyang, formerly Trunyk Chempo and Commander-in-Chief. He is reputed to be pro-Chinese and have influence with the Regent. How far we tend to dub a man pro-Chinese if he is not actually favourable to us is open to question. He, at any rate, has never shown any signs of seeking or welcoming friendly relations with us; but he has never displayed hostility. He is a man of undoubted ability and experience and may well dominate the Kashag before long.¹²⁵

120. “Situation in Tibet” by the Political Officer in Sikkim, *Copy of a Letter Dated Gangtok, the 3rd May 1934* (BNA/FO/371/18105, ex. F3396/137/10).

121. *Lhasa Letter for the Week Ending 23 April 1944 from Major G. Sheriff, Add Ass, Political Officer Sikkim, Officer in Charge, British Mission, Lhasa* (IOR/L/P&S/12/4201). In this document, the British refer to the Army headquarters as the “War office,” as is frequently the case in the British archives.

122. *Lhasa Letter for the Week Ending 14 May 1944 from the Add Ass, Political Officer Sikkim, Officer in Charge, British Mission, Lhasa* (IOR/L/P&S/12/420).

123. *Lhasa Weekly Letters from the British Mission, Lhasa to Political Officer in Sikkim for the Week Ending the 6 August 1944* by H. E. Richardson (BNA/FO/371/41588, ex. F4324/38/10).

124. *Telegram from H. E. Richardson to B. Gould* (BNA/FO/371/41588, ex. F4276/38/10).

125. *Report on Tibetan Affairs from October 1938 to September 1939* (BNA/FO/371/24693, ex. F462/272/10).

Their respect seems to have increased with time, to the point that, upon his death, he was described by Richardson as “the eldest and most competent member of the *bka’ shag* [Cabinet of ministers].”¹²⁶ He is depicted as a great man, having helped his predecessor the “Great Kalon Lama” (most probably the monk Minister Jampa Tendar) to get rid of the Chinese between 1912 and 1918; having stood as a strong critic of Künpella and, since his appointment as Minister in 1939, having fought against Chinese pretensions, as well as strongly supporting the project of establishing a British school in Lhasa.¹²⁷

Concluding Remarks

To conclude this survey of the involvement of monk officials in the military domain of the Ganden Phodrang administration between 1895 and 1959, it is notable that the careers of *tsédruṅ* resemble those of lay officials, in the sense that they would be appointed to military positions, as well as to other types of civil positions and in rotation with them.¹²⁸ As with lay officials, military positions for monk officials could represent a stepping stone to reach higher positions, including the ultimate appointment as monk Minister, as we have seen in the two examples described of Jampa Tendar and Tenpa Jamyang. Such positions could likewise lead to the highest honorific titles bestowed on monks, like *kbenchung*, *khenchen*, *dzasa* and *talama*.

It is clear that there was no contradiction, from the Tibetan point of view, in involving monk officials in military government activities, be it the more administrative side of the army, or in the active commanding of troops.¹²⁹ The only visible difference in monk and lay officials military careers, as far as the commanding positions are concerned, was that monk officials were preferably not appointed to the long-term

126. *Lhasa Weekly Letters from the British Mission, Lhasa to Political Officer in Sikkim, for the Week Ending 13 August 1944* (BNA/FO/371/41588, ex. F4376/38/10).

127. *Lhasa Weekly Letters from the British Mission, Lhasa to Political Officer in Sikkim, Memorandum Dated 10 August 1944 by H. E. Richardson* (BNA/FO/371/41588, ex. F4790/38/10).

128. Contrary to what Petech has written, an official, whether lay or monk, would not “follow the military career” in the sense that he would be appointed only to military positions, and rise from the seventh rank to higher ranks only by occupying military positions. I have made this point clear for lay officials elsewhere, cf. Alice Travers, “The Careers of the Noble Officials of the Ganden Phodrang (1895–1959): Organisation and Hereditary Divisions within the Service of State,” in “Revisiting Tibetan Culture and History, Proceedings of the Second International Seminar of Young Tibetologists, Paris, 2009,” part 1, ed. Tim Myatt et al., *Revue d’Études Tibétaines* 21 (October 2011): 155–74.

129. Interestingly, it seems that the urgency of the 1950 Chinese threat even made the Tibetan government consider involving monk officials in warfare to a larger extent. According to the British archives: “Twenty young monk officials and twenty young lay officials are receiving training at Lhasa in the use of Bron guns. Military training for monk officials is an innovation. The trainees are said to be enthusiastic and able,” cf. *Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, for the Period Ending 15th August 1950, from H. E. Richardson, the Indian Trade Agent, Gyantse, and Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa, Political Officer, Gyantse, Tibet, to the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok* (BNA/FO/371/84453, ex. FT1021/7).

positions of intermediate commanding officers (*dapön/rüppön/gyapön/dingpön/chupön*). This quasi-exclusion might be explained by their monastic status, but one should not overinterpret it since monk officials would frequently, in case of war, be placed by the government at the head of troops in temporary commanding—and fighting—positions. In addition, monk officials would also be regularly placed in long-term commanding positions, in this case not at an intermediate level, but at the highest level of the military chain of command, as Commander-in-Chief, as Commissioner of Kham and of the Northern Province.

Thus, after examination, it seems that the various hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this paper might have all worked at different practical and ideological levels to explain the involvement of monk officials in military affairs in the Ganden Phodrang government. The ideal principle according to which a lay official and a monk official should jointly work, in order to assure the highest quality of administration, would have been so pervasive that it resulted in involving monks in the military domain—despite the fact that even their reduced monastic status could have theoretically prevented them from taking part in it. Finally, the information on the known careers clearly shows that a number of monk officials were promoted to higher government positions for the very reason that they had shown great skill in military matters. To give one example, a *tsédzung* named Lozang Talama (Blo bzang *ta bla ma*), born about 1882, is reported by the British records to have

assisted in raising Tibetan troops at Shigatse, Penam and Gyantse, in 1911, 1912, and fought against the Chinese in these places in 1912. Did especially good work with Teling Depon and Te-je Nag-Wang Depon, in securing the surrender of the Chinese at Gyantse in March 1912, and subsequently took an active part in the fighting at Lhasa. Was granted the title of Ta-Lama (big Lama) by the Dalai Lama in August 1912, and was sent to Kham as Chi-khyab (Tibetan Commissioner). Is friendly, well educated, and has considerable military talent.¹³⁰

The possibility that the status of monk officials in commanding positions actually contributed to an increased respect towards them from their soldiers was certainly valuable in a military context. Could the official purpose of war activities in the Ganden Phodrang administration—i.e. defending the *dharma*—make it appear as a necessity that those at the fore of this concern, the monks, should also be preferably involved in war despite the obstacle that their monastic status poses? Jampa Tendar's career appears as a striking example of an efficient combination of military skills and religious charisma. One could make the hypothesis that the presence of monk officials among the military ranks and in the army administration conferred official religious sanctioning to the military activities, and might have made the rank and file soldiers feel more motivated to fight. In any case, the appointment of monk officials in the military domain of the Ganden Phodrang administration is an excellent illustration of the way the religious and military projects supported each other.

¹³⁰. *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1915*, 18; *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 1920*, 5.

Appendix

Table 1: Honorific titles bestowed on monk officials in the Ganden Phodrang administration.

Honorific titles	Rank
<i>dzasa (dza sag)</i>	Third
<i>darben (dar han)</i>	Third
<i>dargen (dar rgan)</i>	Third
<i>hutuktu (bu thug thbu)</i>	Third
<i>talama (ta'a bla ma)</i>	Third
<i>khenchen (mkhan chen)</i>	Upper fourth
<i>khenchung (mkhan chung)</i>	Fourth
<i>létsenpa (las tshan pa)</i>	Fifth and Sixth

NB: *dzasa* is the only one that could be bestowed on lay officials as well; lay officials have also specific honorific titles.