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## - To cite this version:

Qiuping A. Wang. Deriving Zipf's law: principle of least effort vs. maximum efficiency. 6th International Workshop on Statistical Physics and Mathematics for Complex Systems, Jan 2020, Xiamen, China. hal-02503417v1

## HAL Id: hal-02503417 <br> https://hal.science/hal-02503417v1

Submitted on 9 Mar 2020 (v1), last revised 2 Oct 2021 (v3)

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# Deriving Zipf's law: principle of least effort vs. maximum efficiency 

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#### Abstract

This work provides a mathematical tool to derive Zipf-Pareto laws directly from the idea that living systems always follow the rule of least effort in their activities. In order to implement this idea in a general way taking into account the output of the effort as well, we introduce a functional of efficiency instead of effort. This efficiency is maximized simultaneously with the maximum of the total output of an ensemble of large number of agents all working for that output. The Zipf's and Pareto's laws naturally come out from this calculus of variation.


Keywords: Least effort, Maximum efficiency, Zipf's law, Pareto law, calculus of variation

PACS codes:
89.75.-k Complex systems
89.75.Da Systems obeying scaling laws
02.70.Rr General statistical methods
02.30.Xx Calculus of variation
05.90.+m Other topics in statistical physics, thermodynamics, and nonlinear dynamical systems

## 1) Introduction

Zipf's law is an empirical law describing the discrete distribution of some measured values $x$ as a function of their rank $r$. If all the measured values are binned into $W$ rank r in a decreasing order $\left(x_{1}>x_{2}>x_{3} \ldots>x_{r} \ldots>x_{W}\right)$, Zipf's law is in the following form [1][2]

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{r}=\frac{x_{1}}{r^{\alpha}} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\alpha$ is a parameter to be determined experimentally. For many systems, language for example, $\alpha \approx 1$. For others it is quite different from unity. This regularity was first discovered by Jean-Baptiste Estoup [3] and then popularized by Zipf 30 years later.

Zipf gave a first interpretation of this law[2] by considering the fact that all human being minimizes effort in his activities to get some fulfillment. This rule was first formulated in 1894 by Guillaume Ferrero in his paper discussing the mental inertia of human being[4]. But Zipf was the first to explore its possible application to quantitative study. He wrote : "The power laws in linguistics and in other human systems reflect an economical rule: everything carried out by human being and other biological entities must be done with least effort (at least statistically)". This rule was obviously an intuition from the observation of the behaviors of human being himself and probably of other animals. A summary is given in [5] about several experimental works checking the rule of least effort.

The idea of least effort for human and animal systems is very appealing and even fascinating especially if it can be used for quantitative study in the same way as many variational principles in physics (stationary action, least time, maximum entropy etc.). However, no such implementation has been realized to date to our knowledge. The relationship between this beautiful principle and the Zipf's law remains a sort of speculation without mathematical proof. In the past several decades, much attempt was made to interpret or derive this power law with different mechanisms and models. There are almost as many models proposed as the systems in which Zipf's law and near-Zipf's laws have been observed. The reader can easy find relative information. The most recent model is, to our knowledge, about the origin of the Zipf's law in language by considering the interaction between syntax and semantics [6].

Zipf's law is closely related to Pareto distribution which is a power law originally describing the wealth distribution of a population in a given society [7]:

$$
\begin{equation*}
P(X>x)=\left(\frac{x_{m}}{x}\right)^{\beta} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $X$ is a random variable representing the income, $P(X>x)$ the probability of finding a person with income larger than a value $x, x_{m}$ the smallest income and $\beta$ a constant characterizing the distribution. This distribution law is the origin of the famous 20-80 rule of Pareto. It is believed that there is an intrinsic link between Zipf's and Pareto's laws. If one is observed in a system, another must exist simultaneously [5].

The aim of this work is to derive these laws in a generic way from the idea of least effort. For this purpose, a universal functional of effort is necessary for the minimum calculus of variation. However, an effort is a cost whose nature differs in different domains. It can be an expenditure of energy, time, information, an amount of money and so on. It is difficult to define and quantify an effort in a general manner. In this work we focus on another relative quantity instead: the efficiency. This latter is defined by the useful output divided by the input, or effort, to get that output. Instead of minimizing effort, we can maximize the efficiency. The maximum efficiency (MAXEFF) has double advantages: the first being minimizing effort for a given output, and the second being to maximize the output with given effort. Hence MAXEFF seems to be a more general tool than least effort.

The idea of maximum efficiency in science and engineering is not new. A good example is the derivation of the Betz limit of the efficiency of wind turbine from fluid mechanics ${ }^{1}$ [8]. The essential of the application of MAXEFF is to use an expression of efficiency as a function of some variables. We will adopt this method in this work. A functional of efficiency will be constructed by considering some nonadditive property of the efficiency in thermodynamics and the fact that we are tackling a large number of engines (agents) in a statistical way, with probability distribution of the agents over some output. It is shown that the application of MAXEFF to this functional of probability distribution naturally leads to the Zipf's and Pareto laws.

## 2) The Nonadditivity of efficiency

The definition of efficiency of a thermal engine in thermodynamics differs from one type of engines to another. For example, suppose an work engine absorbs an energy $Q_{1}$, produces a useful work $W$, and rejects an energy $Q_{2}$. In the ideal case without energy loss where all heat cost $Q_{1}-Q_{2}$ is converted into work $W$, we have $W=Q_{1}-Q_{2}$. The efficiency of this engine is defined by

[^0]\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=\frac{W}{Q_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

For a heat pump engine (conditioner for heating for example) which absorbs a heat $Q_{1}$, consumes a work $W$, and produces a heat $Q_{2}$ for heating. We have $W=Q_{2}-Q_{1}$ if all work is converted into heat. Its efficiency is defined by $E=\frac{Q_{2}}{W}=\frac{1}{1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}}$ or

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{E}=\frac{W}{Q_{2}}=1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

For a refrigerator (conditioner for cooling for example) which absorbs a heat $Q_{1}$, consumes a work $W$, and rejects a heat $Q_{2}$ for cooling, we have $W=Q_{2}-Q_{1}$ if all work is converted into heat. Its efficiency is defined by $E=\frac{Q_{1}}{W}=\frac{1}{\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1}$ or

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{E}=\frac{W}{Q_{1}}=\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1 \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

The nonadditivity relationships of $E$ and of $\frac{1}{E}$ are similar (see calculation in the Appendix). In what follows, we only give a summary of the nonadditivity of $E$ for two working engines. Suppose two engines are connected in such a way that the first engine absorbs an energy $Q_{1}$, does a work $W_{1}$, and rejects an energy $Q_{2}$, and the second engine absorbs an energy $Q_{2}$, does a work $W_{2}$, and rejects an energy $Q_{3}$, one has $E_{1}=\frac{W_{1}}{Q_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}, E_{2}=\frac{W_{2}}{Q_{2}}=1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}$. The overall efficiency $E$ of the ensemble of two engines is defined by $E=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}$. It is straightforward to calculate

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=E_{1}+E_{2}-E_{1} E_{2} . \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

If the engines cannot transform all the heat $\operatorname{cost}\left(Q_{1}-Q_{2}=W_{1}\right.$ for the first engine for example) due to energy loss (friction, vibration, heat conduction, heat radiation and so on), we can introduce a loss coefficient $a$ in such a way to write (see Appendix)

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=E_{1}+E_{2}+a E_{1} E_{2} . \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Formally, $a=-1$ corresponds to the case where the energy cost is totally converted into work. If $a<-1$, this is the case where the engines cannot transform all the heat cost into useful work, leading to a reduction of efficiency with respect to the case of $a=-1$. On the contrary, if $a>$ -1 , there is an enhancement of efficiency as if the collaboration created energy with respect to
the $a=-1$ case. This is possible only for processes in which the input and output are not energy or energy proportional quantities. This point will be discussed in the following section.

More complicated nonadditivity forms are possible for the more general case where, for example, the second engine does not consume all the heat $Q_{2}$ rejected by the first engine. A parameter can also be used for describing this partial collaboration (see Appendix). In any case, we can write $E=E_{1}+E_{2}+f\left(E_{1}, E_{2}\right)$ as a general nonadditive relationship.

## 3) Modeling an ensemble of thermal engines

Suppose an ensemble of a large number $N$ of engines (or agents). The functioning of each engine is independent. They can however collaborate in the sense that the output of one engine can be, at least partially, the input of others. We do not consider the case where engines have no communication or collaboration between them. Each engine has a certain efficiency $E_{n}$ with $n=1,2 \ldots N$. The total efficiency $E$ of the ensemble should be a function of all $E_{n}$ : $E=f\left(E_{1}, E_{2} \ldots E_{N}\right)$.

Efficiency is in general nonadditive, hence the total one $E=f\left(E_{1}, E_{2} \ldots E_{N}\right)$ cannot be a simple sum of the individual efficiencies. On the basis of the above analysis of the nonadditivity relationships for different type of engines (doing work, heating, cooling) and different collaboration type, we can model the whole system by using a simple nonadditivity given by Eq.(7) which also reads $(1+a E)=\left(1+a E_{1}\right)\left(1+a E_{2}\right)$. This equation can be written as, for the whole system of $N$ engines:

$$
\begin{equation*}
(1+a E)=\prod_{n=1}^{N}\left(1+a E_{n}\right) \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $a$ is a parameter that characterizes collaboration between the engines as well as the energy loss during the processes from input to output. For many systems, $a$ can be free from energy connection for non-thermodynamic processes for which the input and the output are not connected to energy. For these processes, there is no necessarily energy conservation condition. For example, for agents trying to get connected to some objects (sites, friends, cities, richness etc.), the output can be frequency of connection, the population or the agents' richness. There is no energy conservation between these quantities and the inputs which can be energy cost, expenditure of time or money, used materials and so forth. Another example is the economic process of investment. This process is similar to the process of heating engine. The invested amount of money can be assimilated to the input heat $Q_{1}$, the consumed input work $W$ is the
effort to increase the profit, and the total turnover can be considered as the heat production $Q_{2}$. In thermodynamics there would be a conservation condition: $Q_{2}-Q_{1}=W$. But this relationship does not exist for the economic process of investment because there is no quantitative measure of the effort $W$ and of its conversion to $Q_{2}$.

Eq.(8) is obviously the simplest model for the efficiency as a nonadditive quantity. The mathematical advantage of this model will be shown later. A little bit more complicated model can be

$$
\begin{equation*}
(1+a E)=\prod_{n=1}^{N}\left(1+a_{n} E_{n}\right) \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $a$ is the parameter characterizing the whole ensemble and $a_{n}$ is the parameter of the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ subsystem or agent. This composite model can be used when it is necessary to consider the composite effect of subsystems. In what follows, we focus on the ensemble as a whole, the one parameter model Eq.(7) or (8) will be used.

## 4) Efficiency as a functional of probability

Suppose that all agents in the ensemble are making effort to achieve as much as possible a measurable quantity represented by a variable $X$ having $w$ discrete values $x_{i}$ with $i=1,2, \ldots w$. More they get that quantity, larger is $x_{i}$. This quantity can be income, wealth, city population, firm size, frequency of events, and so forth. At equilibrium (or stationary) states of the whole systems, all agents are distributed over the whole range of $X$ with $n_{i}$ agents at the value $x_{i}$. We have $\sum_{n=1}^{w} n_{i}=N$. The probability $p_{i}$ of finding an agents at the value $x_{i}$ is $p_{i}=\frac{n_{i}}{N}$. The normalization condition is $\sum_{i=1}^{w} p_{i}=1$.

Due to the statistical nature of the model with a large number of agents distributed over all the values of $X$, it is reasonable to suppose that the total efficiency $E_{i}$ of the agents on the value $x_{i}$ depends on the number $n_{i}$ with $E_{i}=f\left(n_{i}\right)$ or on the probability distribution $E_{i}=f\left(p_{i}\right)$. The average efficiency $E$ of the whole system reads $E=\sum_{i=1}^{w} p_{i} E_{i}$.

Now let us separate the whole ensemble of agents into two independent subsystems $A$ and $B$, with efficiency $E_{k}(A)$ and $E_{j}(B)$, respectively. The probability distribution of the agents in $A$ is $p_{k}(A)$ and that in $B$ is $p_{j}(B)$. The probability distribution of the whole ensemble can be written as

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{i}=p_{k}(A) p_{j}(B) \text { with } i=k j \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

We choose Eq.(7) as the efficiency nonadditivity. This implies a total efficiency given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{i}=E_{k}(A)+E_{j}(B)+a E_{k}(A) E_{j}(B) \tag{11}
\end{equation*}
$$

or $\left(1+a E_{i}\right)=\left[1+a E_{k}(A)\right]\left[1+a E_{j}(B)\right]$. It is straightforward to show that Eq.(10) and Eq.(11) together imply $\left(1+a E_{i}\right)=p_{i}^{b}$ or

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{i}=\frac{p_{i}^{b}-1}{a} . \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

Obviouly $E_{k}$ and $E_{j}$ have the same functional of $p_{k}$ and $p_{j}$, respectively.
The parameter $b$ is related to $a$ by the following considerations. First, due to the fact that the efficiency $E_{i}$ is positive and that $p_{i}$ is smaller than unity, $b$ should have opposite sign of $a$. Secondly, from Eq.(11), if $a$ goes to the zero limit $a \rightarrow 0$, the efficiency tends to additive limit $E_{i} \rightarrow E_{k}(A)+E_{j}(B)$. Taking into account Eq.(10), the only possible relationship is $b=-a$, i.e.

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{i}=\frac{p_{i}^{-a}-1}{a} \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

which tends to $E_{i}=-\ln p_{i}$ as $a$ tends to zero, allowing the additive efficiency relationship $E_{i}=$ $-\ln p_{k} p_{j}=-\ln p_{k}-\ln p_{j}=E_{k}(A)+E_{j}(B)$. Finally, the average efficiency of the whole ensemble of $N$ agents reads

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=\sum_{k=1}^{w} p_{i} E_{i}=\frac{\sum p_{i}^{1-a}-1}{a} \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which the normalization $\sum p_{i}=1$ is considered. From now on, if not specified, the summation is over all the $w$ possible values (states) of $X$ for the whole ensemble.

## 5) Maximization of efficiency

As mentioned in the introduction, following the idea of least effort, we propose to maximize the efficiency, meaning that a calculus of variation applied to the functional of the average efficiency in Eq.(14) with respect to the probability $p_{i}(i=1,2 \ldots w)$. However, it is easy to verify that the maximization of $E$ alone cannot lead to correct probability distribution. Indeed, $\delta E=0$ means $\frac{\partial E}{\partial p_{i}}=0$ for all $i$, leading to $p_{i}=\infty$ for $a>0$ and $p_{i}=0$ for $a>0$. If we introduce the normalization as a constraint of the variation, $\delta\left(E+\sum p_{i}\right)=0$ will lead to uniform distribution $p_{i}=1 / w$ for all $i$, which is of course not what we are looking for.

This is because the maximum efficiency is not an isolated property. The efficiency is at maximum when fulfillment is the best due to the effort of the agents. Hence there must a connection between the efficiency and the fulfillment or the output. It is quite reasonable to
associate the maximum of efficiency to the maximum output. The output is represented by the variable $X$. As a consequence, its average, $\bar{x}=\sum p_{i} x_{i}$, should be maximized at the same time as the efficiency. As mentioned above, $X$ can be the income, the frequency of events, the population of cities, the size of companies representing their wealth and so forth. In the case of income for example, if the maximum total efficiency is achieved, then the total income of the population should reach its maximum as well. In other words, the two maximums are mutually conditioned. The functional to be maximized should be the sum $(E+c \bar{X})$. We write now

$$
\begin{equation*}
\delta(E+c \bar{X})=0 \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $c$ is a constant multiplier characterizing the balance between the two maximums.

## 6) Deriving Pareto law

Eqs.(14) and (15) means $\frac{\partial}{\partial p_{i}}\left(\frac{p_{i}^{1-a}-1}{a}+c p_{i} x_{i}\right)=0$ for all $i$. After the normalization, the result is

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{i}=C x_{i}^{-\frac{1}{a}} \tag{16}
\end{equation*}
$$

where the normalization constant $C=1 / \sum x_{i}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$. Remember that $p_{i}$ is the probability of finding an agent at the value $x_{i}$ of $X$. The continuous version of the discrete distribution Eq.(16) is the probability density function $\rho(x)=C x^{-\frac{1}{a}}$ with $d p(x)=\rho(x) d x=C x^{-\frac{1}{a}} d x$ the probability of finding an agent in the interval from $x$ to $x+d x$. The Pareto law follows from the integral of $d p$ from $x$ to the maximum value of $X$ or infinity for simplicity: $p(X>x)=\int_{x}^{\infty} C x^{-\frac{1}{a}} d x=$ $\frac{c}{\frac{1}{a}-1} x^{-\left(\frac{1}{a}-1\right)}$. Since $p\left(X>x_{\text {min }}\right)=1$ with $x_{\text {min }}$ the minimum value of $X$, one gets

$$
\begin{equation*}
p(X>x)=\left(\frac{x_{\min }}{x}\right)^{\frac{1}{a}-1} \tag{17}
\end{equation*}
$$

which is the Pareto distribution Eq.(2) with $\beta=\frac{1}{a}-1$. $p(X>x)$ is a decreasing distribution, it follows that $0<a<1$ and $0<\beta<\infty$.

## 7) Deriving Zipf's law

Now let us put the values of $X$ into $W$ bins. These bins are ranked in a decreasing order in the magnitude of $x$. Let $x_{r}$ be the benchmark value of the bin of rank $r$, we have $x_{1}>x_{2} \ldots>$ $x_{r}>\ldots>x_{W}$. The Zipf's law Eq.(1) describes the relationship between $x_{r}$ and $r$. As mentioned
above, the Zipf's law and the Pareto law are regarded as two sides of the same thing. In the literature [5], they are connected one to another by the hypothesis that the probability $p(X>x)$ is proportional to the rank $r$.

By definition, the population (number of agents) having more income than $x_{r}$ increases with increasing $r$. In other words, $p\left(X>x_{r}\right)$ increases when $r$ increases until the maximum $W$ at which $X$ reaches its minimum value $x_{W}$ and $p\left(X>x_{W}\right)=1$. But saying that the probability $p(X>x)$ is always proportional to the rank $r$ seems to be just an observation from some empirical results but not a general rule. In what follows, Zipf's law will be derived from MAXEFF without the assumption of $p\left(X>x_{r}\right) \propto r$.

We now use the average of the rank in the MAXEFF. However, if an agent increases its income $X$, its rank value decreases. Hence whenever $\bar{x}=\sum p_{i} x_{i}$ has a maximum, the average rank $\bar{r}=\sum p\left(x_{r}\right) r$ should reach its minimum where $p_{r}=C x_{r}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$ given by Eq.(16). The calculus of variation applies with $\delta\left(E-c^{\prime} \bar{r}\right)=0$ which should be maximum because $(E-c \bar{r})$ is a difference between the maximum $E=\frac{\sum_{r} p_{r}^{1-b}-1}{b}$ ( $b$ is not necessarily equal to $a$ ) and the minimum $\bar{r}$. This leads to $\frac{\partial}{\partial p_{r}}\left(\frac{p_{r}^{1-b}-1}{b}-c^{\prime} p_{r} r\right)=0$ and $p_{r}=C^{\prime} r^{-\frac{1}{b}}$. By definition of rank distribution, $p_{r}$ must be increasing function of $r$, hence $b$ must be negative. For simplicity, let $\gamma=-\frac{1}{b}>0$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{r}=C^{\prime} r^{\gamma} \tag{18}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting this equation into $p_{r}=C x_{r}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$ gives $C^{\prime} r^{\gamma}=C x_{r}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$ and $x_{r}=\left(\frac{C^{\prime}}{C}\right)^{-a} r^{-a \gamma}$. Notice that $x_{1}=\left(\frac{c^{\prime}}{c}\right)^{-a}$, Zipf's law reads

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{r}=\frac{x_{1}}{r^{\alpha}} \text { with } \alpha=a \gamma \tag{19}
\end{equation*}
$$

An example of this relationship comes from the Zipf-Pareto distributions of American city populations [5]. The Pareto distribution Eq.(17) shows $\beta=1.366$, leading to $a=0.423$. While the Zipf's distribution shows $\alpha=0.823$, meaning that $\gamma=1.95$ or $p_{r}=C^{\prime} r^{1.95}$ for the system of city population.

## 8) Zipf-Pareto efficiency as a measure of performance

The efficiency given by Eq.(14) (let it be Zipf-Pareto or ZP efficiency) provides a possible measure of performance of the ensemble of agents as a whole all making effort for some fulfillment. Using the probability density function $\rho(x)=\frac{1}{z} x^{-\frac{1}{a}}$, the efficiency reads:

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=\frac{\int_{x_{\min }}^{\infty} \rho^{1-a} d x-1}{a} \tag{20}
\end{equation*}
$$

The partition function $Z=\int_{x_{m}}^{\infty} x^{-\frac{1}{a}} d x=\frac{1}{\beta} x_{\min }^{-\beta}$. Choosing $x_{\min }=1$, we get $Z=\frac{1}{\beta}=\frac{a}{1-a}$. Since $0<a<1$ and $0<\beta<\infty$, the partition function is increasing function of $a$ in the interval $0 \leq Z<\infty$. The average of $x$ is given by $\bar{x}=\int_{x_{\text {min }}}^{\infty} x \rho d x=\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}=\frac{1-a}{1-2 a}$ which increases with increasing $a$ up to infinity for $a=0.5$ and becomes negative for $0.5<a \leq 1$. If we impose the condition of $\bar{x} \geq 0$, then $0<a \leq 0.5$ and $1<\beta<\infty$.

Finally, the integral in Eq.(20) gives $E=\frac{Z^{a} \bar{x}-1}{a}=\frac{1}{a}\left[\left(\frac{1}{1-a}\right)^{a} \frac{1-a}{1-2 a}-1\right]$. This is an monotonically increasing function of $a$. $E$ becomes negative for $0<a<\sim 0.2(\sim 4<\beta<$ $\infty)$, positive for $0.2 \leq a<0.5$ and infinity at $a=0.5(\beta=1)$. This evolution of the ZP efficiency is plotted in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Evolution of the efficiency of Eq.(20) as a function of the parameter $a$ in the interval $0<a<0.5$ or $1<\beta<\infty$. $E$ diverges for $a=0.5$ or $\beta=1$.

It is worth noticing that the ZP efficiency increases when $\beta$ decreases from infinity to 1 , and that, in economy, decreasing $\beta$ implies increasing Gini coefficient $G$. This coefficient is a measure of the inequality in many fields such as economy, sociology, education, health science, ecology and so on ${ }^{2}$. For Pareto distribution, $G=\frac{1}{2 \beta-1} . \beta=\infty$ corresponds to $G=0$. This is the case of absolute equality (all agents have the same income for example). $\beta=1 \mathrm{implies} G=$ 1 , the case of maximum inequality. The ZP efficiency is very large when inequality reaches its maximum, decreases with decreasing inequality, and becomes negative when the inequality is roughly smaller than $G=\frac{1}{2 * 4-1}=0.14$. This observation only shows a mathematical property of the ZP efficiency. Further investigation is necessary to explore the relationship between the ZP efficiency and other properties (inequality, 80-20 rule, 20/20 ratio, performance, opportunity etc.), and to see whether this property is useful for the investigation of the relationship between inequality and growth in economy and other domains [9].

## 9) Conclusion and remarks

We have implemented the idea of least effort via a calculus of variation for maximum efficiency to derive Zipf-Pareto laws. A functional of the efficiency for this purpose is proposed from the consideration of a simple nonadditive relationship of the efficiency of thermal engines in thermodynamics. The Zipf's and Pareto's laws come out naturally from this calculus of variation. This efficiency functional also provides a possible measure of the performance of the systems pursuing some fulfillment.

One of the underlying meaning of this approach is that Zipf-Pareto laws are ubiquitous for all systems composed of a large number of agents, no matter what are their nature and behavior, human beings, animals or objects recipient of effort, whenever they try to achieve something or become objects of effort, Zipf-Pareto laws take place. As objects recipient of effort, one can think about words, webpages, cities, firms, books, phone numbers and so on. From this universality of power laws, we understand why the Pareto's 80-20 rule or similar distributions happen so often everywhere whenever an effort is involved to achieve or to produce some quantities.

We used the nonadditivity Eq.(7) or (8) of the efficiency of the heat engines delivering work. The reader can notice in the appendix that, for the heating engine or the cooling engine, it is the inverse of the efficiency $1 / E$ which has similar nonadditivity. This means that $1 / E$

[^1]instead of $E$ will have a functional similar to Eq.(14). But this problem does not change the calculus of variation of least effort and maximum efficiency, because if $E$ has a maximum, $1 / E$ should have a minimum, and the calculus of variation $\delta\left(\frac{1}{E}+c \bar{X}\right)=0$ will produce the same probability distribution if $1 / E$ has the same functional as $E$ used in the calculus $\delta(E+c \bar{X})=0$. This means that the result of the MAXEFF is independent of the type of the engines in the ensemble.

It should be noticed that the results of this work are single power laws, showing a straightline in the log-log plot. In practice, most systems claimed to have Zipf-Pareto laws only show near-Zipf's laws with more or less rapid cutoff (curve down) tails. It is possible to account for this behavior within this framework by separating the ensemble of agents into two or more subsystems which differ in behavior. This composite approach will be developed in another work. It is also possible to explain the exponential distributions of certain complex systems [10] since the efficiency functional approaches logarithm form for small $a$. The MAXEFF can generate near-exponential probability distribution in this case.

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## Appendix

Analysis of the nonadditivity of efficiency of some thermal engines.
a) Nonadditivity of the efficiency of heat engine doing work

The definition of efficiency of a thermal engine in thermodynamics differs for one type of engines to another. For example, suppose an engine absorbs an energy $Q_{1}$, does a useful positive work $W$, and rejects an energy $Q_{2}$. In the ideal case without energy loss where all heat cost $Q_{1}-Q_{2}$ is converted into work $W$, we have $W=Q_{1}-Q_{2}$. the efficiency of this engine is defined by

$$
E=\frac{W}{Q_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}
$$

If two engines are connected in such a way that the first engine absorbs an energy $Q_{1}$, does a work $W_{1}$, and rejects an energy $Q_{2}$, and the second engine absorbs the energy $Q_{2}$, does a work $W_{2}$, and rejects an energy $Q_{3}$, one has $E_{1}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}, E_{2}=1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}$, and the efficiency $E$ of the ensemble of two engines is given by

$$
E=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}} \frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}=1-\left(1-E_{1}\right)\left(1-E_{2}\right)=E_{1}+E_{2}-E_{1} E_{2}
$$

If the second engine absorbs a part of the energy $Q_{2}$, say, $b Q_{2}(\mathrm{~b}<1)$, does a work $W_{2}$., and rejects an energy $Q_{3}$, one has $E_{1}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}, E_{2}=\frac{W_{2}}{b Q_{2}}=\frac{b Q_{2}-Q_{3}}{b Q_{2}}=1-\frac{Q_{3}}{b Q_{2}}$, and the overall efficiency $E$ of the ensemble of two engines:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{1}} & =\frac{Q_{1}-Q_{2}+b Q_{2}-Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}=\frac{(b-1) Q_{2}+Q_{1}-Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}=\frac{(b-1) Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}+1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{1}} \\
& =(b-1)\left(1-E_{1}\right)+1-\left(1-E_{1}\right)\left(1-E_{2}\right) \\
& =(b-1)\left(1-E_{1}\right)+E_{1}+E_{2}-E_{1} E_{2} \\
& =(b-1)+E_{1}-(b-1) E_{1}+E_{2}-E_{1} E_{2} \\
& =E_{1}+E_{2}-E_{1} E_{2}+(b-1)\left(1-E_{1}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Now suppose not all heat $Q_{1}-Q_{2}$ is converted into work $W$ due to some lost, we can write $W=\frac{1}{a}\left(Q_{1}-Q_{2}\right)$ and $E_{1}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}\right), E_{2}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}\right)$,
where $\mathrm{a}>1$ characterizes the loss of heat energy of the engines,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{1}}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}\right)=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}} \frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}\right) \\
= & \frac{1}{a}\left[1-\left(1-a E_{1}\right)\left(1-a E_{2}\right)\right]=E_{1}+E_{2}-a E_{1} E_{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

or

$$
(1-a E)=\left(1-a E_{1}\right)\left(1-a E_{2}\right)
$$

If the two engines have different loss coefficients, say, $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$, we have $E_{1}=\frac{1}{a_{1}}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}\right)$, $E_{2}=\frac{1}{a_{2}}\left(1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}\right)$, then

$$
\begin{gathered}
E=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{1}}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}\right)=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}} \frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}\right) \\
=\frac{1}{a}\left[1-\left(1-a_{1} E_{1}\right)\left(1-a_{2} E_{2}\right)\right]
\end{gathered}
$$

One gets

$$
(1-a E)=\left(1-a_{1} E_{1}\right)\left(1-a_{2} E_{2}\right)
$$

b) Nonadditivity of the efficiency of heat pump

The definition of efficiency of a heat pump (heating engine) in thermodynamics is the following. Suppose heat pump absorbs a heat $Q_{1}$, consumes a work $W$, and provides a heat $Q_{2}$ for heating. We have $W=Q_{2}-Q_{1}$ if all work is converted into heat. Its efficiency is defined by

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E=\frac{Q_{2}}{W}=\frac{1}{1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}} \\
& \frac{1}{E}=\frac{W}{Q_{2}}=1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}
\end{aligned}
$$

If two pumps are connected in series in such a way that the first pump absorbs an energy $Q_{1}$, uses a work $W_{1}$, and supplies $Q_{2}$, and the second engine absorbs $Q_{2}$, consumes a work $W_{2}$, and supplies $Q_{3}$, one has $\frac{1}{E_{1}}=1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}, \frac{1}{E_{2}}=1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{3}}$, and the overall efficiency $E$ of the ensemble of two engines:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{1}{E}=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{3}}=1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{3}}=1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}} \frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{3}} \\
=1-\left(1-\frac{1}{E_{1}}\right)\left(1-\frac{1}{E_{2}}\right) \\
=\frac{1}{E_{1}}+\frac{1}{E_{2}}-\frac{1}{E_{1}} \frac{1}{E_{2}}
\end{gathered}
$$

or

$$
\left(1-\frac{1}{E}\right)=\left(1-\frac{1}{E_{1}}\right)\left(1-\frac{1}{E_{2}}\right)
$$

If not all the work $W$ is converted into heat $Q_{1}-Q_{2}$ due to some loss, let $W=a\left(Q_{1}-Q_{2}\right)$

$$
\begin{gathered}
E_{1}=a \frac{Q_{2}}{W_{1}}=a \frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{2}-Q_{1}}=\frac{a}{\left(1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}\right)} \\
\frac{1}{E_{1}}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

and

$$
\frac{1}{E_{2}}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{3}}\right)
$$

where $\mathrm{a}>1$ characterizes the loss of heat energy of the engines.

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{1}{E}=\frac{1}{a} \frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{3}}=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{3}}\right) \\
=\frac{1}{a}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}} \frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}\right)=\frac{1}{a}\left[1-\left(1-a \frac{1}{E_{1}}\right)\left(1-a \frac{1}{E_{2}}\right)\right] \\
=\frac{1}{E_{1}}+\frac{1}{E_{2}}-a \frac{1}{E_{1}} \frac{1}{E_{2}}
\end{gathered}
$$

Or

$$
\left(1-a \frac{1}{E}\right)=\left(1-a \frac{1}{E_{1}}\right)\left(1-a \frac{1}{E_{2}}\right)
$$

If now the two pumps have different loss coefficients, say, $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{1}{E_{1}}=\frac{1}{a_{1}}\left(1-\frac{Q_{1}}{Q_{2}}\right) \\
& \frac{1}{E_{2}}=\frac{1}{a_{2}}\left(1-\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{3}}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

then

$$
\left(1-a \frac{1}{E}\right)=\left(1-a_{1} \frac{1}{E_{1}}\right)\left(1-a_{2} \frac{1}{E_{2}}\right)
$$

c) Nonadditivity of the efficiency of refrigerator

The definition of efficiency of a refrigerator (cooling engine) is the following. Suppose a refrigerator absorbs a heat $Q_{1}$, consumes a work $W$, and rejects a heat $Q_{2}$ for cooling. We have $W=Q_{2}-Q_{1}$ if all work is converted into heat. Its efficiency is defined by

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E=\frac{Q_{1}}{W}=\frac{1}{\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1} \\
& \frac{1}{E}=\frac{W}{Q_{1}}=\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1
\end{aligned}
$$

If two refrigerators are connected in such a way that the first one absorbs an energy $Q_{1}$, uses a work $W_{1}$, and rejects $Q_{2}$, and the second one absorbs $Q_{2}$, consumes a work $W_{2}$, and rejects $Q_{3}$, one has $\frac{1}{E_{1}}=\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1, \frac{1}{E_{2}}=\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}-1$, and the overall efficiency $E$ of the ensemble of two engines reads:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{1}{E}=\frac{W_{1}+W_{2}}{Q_{1}}=\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{1}}-1=\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}} \frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1 \\
=\left(\frac{1}{E_{1}}+1\right)\left(\frac{1}{E_{2}}+1\right)-1 \\
=\frac{1}{E_{1}}+\frac{1}{E_{2}}+\frac{1}{E_{1}} \frac{1}{E_{2}}
\end{gathered}
$$

or

$$
\left(\frac{1}{E}+1\right)=\left(\frac{1}{E_{1}}+1\right)\left(\frac{1}{E_{2}}+1\right)
$$

And in case of loss with a coefficient $a$, we have $E_{1}=\frac{1}{a}\left(\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1\right), E_{2}=\frac{1}{a}\left(\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}-1\right)$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{1}{E}=\frac{1}{E_{1}}+\frac{1}{E_{2}}+a \frac{1}{E_{1}} \frac{1}{E_{2}} \\
\left(\frac{a}{E}+1\right)=\left(\frac{a}{E_{1}}+1\right)\left(\frac{a}{E_{2}}+1\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

And in case of loss with two different coefficients $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$, we have $E_{1}=\frac{1}{a_{1}}\left(\frac{Q_{2}}{Q_{1}}-1\right), E_{2}=$ $\frac{1}{a_{2}}\left(\frac{Q_{3}}{Q_{2}}-1\right)$, one gets

$$
\left(\frac{a}{E}+1\right)=\left(\frac{a_{1}}{E_{1}}+1\right)\left(\frac{a_{2}}{E_{2}}+1\right)
$$


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_195_Uq3dU, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betz\%27s_law

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient

