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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2010

The reign of the shareholder value under the rise of the fair value convention

Résumé

Associated with neo-liberalism, shareholder value stands accused of being at the origin of the financialisation of the economy which has precipitated the current financial crisis. Indoctrinated by the precepts of positive economics, accountants set themselves the target of total disclosure to investors to ensure the efficient functioning of financial markets instead of broadening accountability to other stakeholders. The IASB project is in line with this logic. The introduction of the fair value convention contributed to the widespread acceptance of the principle of governance by markets. In order to limit the impact of the crisis on global economies, the IASB published in October 2008 an educational guidance on the application of fair value measurement when markets become inactive. Instead of reforming this convention yet criticized by many professionals and academics in the past, this amendment amounts to an argument that the shareholder value concept is not responsible for the crisis, and that henceforth the financial reporting requirements of listed institutions to the market should be decoupled from the prudential requirements of financial institutions as required by the regulator. This answer contributes to maintaining the status quo and the primacy of the shareholder value as corporate governance model. More problematic is the fact that by its action, the IASB is abolishing the sacred principle of conservatism.
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Dates et versions

hal-02439580 , version 1 (14-01-2020)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02439580 , version 1

Citer

Nihel Chabrak, Ines Bouden. The reign of the shareholder value under the rise of the fair value convention. EURAM 2010 : 10th European Academy of Management Annual Conference, May 2010, Rome, Italy. ⟨hal-02439580⟩
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