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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2020

Bad cycles in iterative Approval Voting

Résumé

This article is about synchronized iterative voting in the context of Approval Voting. Assuming that, before an election, successive polls occur to which voters react strategically, we shall exhibit examples showing the possibility of cycles with strong negative properties (in particular, non election of an existing Condorcet winner, or possible election of a candidate strongly rejected by a majority of the electorate). We also show that such cycles persist if only a proportion of the voters adjust their ballot at each iteration and if their strategy changes when close ties occur.
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Dates et versions

hal-02434670 , version 1 (10-01-2020)
hal-02434670 , version 2 (19-11-2020)
hal-02434670 , version 3 (05-01-2022)
hal-02434670 , version 4 (09-02-2022)

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Benoît Kloeckner. Bad cycles in iterative Approval Voting. 2020. ⟨hal-02434670v1⟩
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