An organizational justice-based view of self-control and agency costs in family firms - Archive ouverte HAL
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Management Studies Année : 2007

An organizational justice-based view of self-control and agency costs in family firms

Yan Ling
  • Fonction : Auteur
William S. Schulze
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

By integrating insights from two seemingly disparate literatures – economics and organizational justice – within the general agency framework, we advance propositions that suggest a fine-grained explanation of agency costs at family firms. In so doing, we account for the differential effects of the controlling owners’ self-control (i.e. the governance mechanisms they adopt and how they administer those mechanisms) on the justice perceptions of the family and non-family employees. Our integrative view allows us to strike a realistic balance between the overly optimistic views about family firm governance that have been expressed by agency scholars and the overly pessimistic views expressed by management scholars in the past few years.
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Dates et versions

hal-02311795 , version 1 (06-12-2019)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02311795 , version 1

Citer

Michael Lubatkin, Yan Ling, William S. Schulze. An organizational justice-based view of self-control and agency costs in family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 2007, 44 (6), pp.955-971 P. ⟨hal-02311795⟩

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