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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2010

Modelling, Verification, and Formal Analysis of Security Properties in a P2P System

Résumé

We present a security analysis of the SPREADS 1 system, a distributed storage service based on a centralized peer-to-peer architecture. We formally modelled the salient behavior of the actual system using ABCD, a high level specification language with a coloured Petri net semantics, which allowed the execution states of the system to be verified. We verified the behavior of the system in the presence of an external Dolev-Yao attacker, unearthing some replay attacks in the original system. Furthermore, since the implementation is also a formal model, we have been able to show that any execution of the model satisfies certain desirable security properties once these flaws are repaired.
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Dates et versions

hal-02310070 , version 1 (09-10-2019)

Identifiants

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Sam Sanjabi, Franck Pommereau. Modelling, Verification, and Formal Analysis of Security Properties in a P2P System. 2010 International Symposium on Collaborative Technologies and Systems, May 2010, Chicago, France. pp.499-508, ⟨10.1109/CTS.2010.5478474⟩. ⟨hal-02310070⟩

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