HAL CCSD
Online Budgeted Truthful Matching
Vaze, Rahul
Coupechoux, Marceau
School of Technology and Computer Science [TIFR] ; Tata Institute for Fundamental Research (TIFR)
Réseaux, Mobilité et Services (RMS) ; Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information (LTCI) ; Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Télécom Paris-Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Télécom Paris
Département Informatique et Réseaux (INFRES) ; Télécom ParisTech
International audience
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation
hal-02287584
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02287584
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02287584
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation , 2016, 44 (3), pp.3-6
en
[INFO.INFO-NI]Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]
[MATH.MATH-CO]Mathematics [math]/Combinatorics [math.CO]
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Journal articles
An online truthful budgeted matching problem is considered for a bipartite graph, where the right vertices are available ahead of time, and individual left vertices arrive sequentially. On arrival of a left vertex, its edge utilities (or weights) to all the right vertices and a corresponding cost (or bid) are revealed. If a left vertex is matched to any of the right vertices, then it has to be paid at least as much as its cost. The problem is to match each left vertex instantaneously and irrevocably to any one of the right vertices, if at all, to find the maximum weight matching that is truthful, under a payment budget constraint. Truthfulness condition requires that no left vertex has any incentive of misreporting its cost. Assuming that the vertices arrive in an uniformly random order (secretary model) with arbitrary utilities, a truthful algorithm is proposed that is 24ß- competitive (where ß is the ratio of the maximum and the minimum utility) and satisfies the payment budget constraint. Direct applications of this problem include crowdsourcing auctions, and matching wireless users to cooperative relays in device-to-device enabled cellular network.
2016-12