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# The Inverse Product Differentiation Logit Model\*

Mogens Fosgerau<sup>†</sup>    Julien Monardo<sup>‡</sup>    André de Palma<sup>§</sup>

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## Abstract

This paper proposes an empirical model of inverse demand for differentiated products: the Inverse Product Differentiation Logit (IPDL) model. The IPDL model generalizes the commonly used nested logit model to allow richer substitution patterns, including complementarity. Nevertheless, the IDPL model can be estimated by two-stage least squares using aggregate data. We apply the IDPL model to data on ready-to-eat cereals in Chicago in 1991-1992, and find that complementarity is pervasive in this market. We then show that the IPDL model belongs to a wider class of inverse demand models in which products can be complements, and which is sufficiently large to encompass a large class of discrete choice demand models. We establish invertibility for this wider class, thus extending previous results on demand inversion.

**Keywords.** Demand estimation; Demand invertibility; Differentiated products; Discrete choice; Nested logit; Random utility; Representative consumer

**JEL codes.** C26, D11, D12, L

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# 1 Introduction

Estimating the demand for differentiated products is of great empirical relevance in industrial organization and other fields of economics. It is important for understanding consumer behavior and for analyzing major economic issues such as the effects of mergers and changes in regulation. Ideally, one would like to employ a model that accommodates rich patterns of substitution, while requiring just regression for estimation.

This paper proposes the Inverse Product Differentiation Logit (IPDL) model, which generalizes the nested logit model by allowing richer patterns of substitution and in particular complementarity (i.e., a negative cross-price elasticity of demand), while being estimable by linear instrumental variables regression.

The IPDL model is relevant for estimating demands for differentiated products that are segmented along multiple dimensions. It generalizes the nested logit models by allowing the segmentation to be non-hierarchical, which is often desirable in applications. At the same time, it maintains the important advantages of the nested logit model. First, its inverse demand has closed form such that numerical inversion of demand is not required. Second, it can be estimated by two-stage least squares regression of market shares on product characteristics and shares related to product segmentation. Third, it is consistent with utility maximization. The IDPL model may therefore be an attractive option in the many empirical applications where the nested logit model would otherwise be used.

The current practice of the demand estimation literature with aggregate data is to assume an additive random utility model (ARUM) (McFadden, 1974) and to estimate it using Berry (1994)'s method to deal with endogeneity of prices and market shares. The logit model is the simplest option, but exhibits the Independence of Irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. This implies that an improvement in one product draws demand proportionately from all the other products and makes cross-price elasticities independent of how close products are in characteristics space, which is unreasonable in most applications.

The nested logit model with two or more levels generalizes the logit model (see Goldberg, 1995; Verboven, 1996a). This model is commonly used to estimate aggregate demand for differentiated products; some recent examples are Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) and Berry et al. (2016). The nested logit model has closed-form inverse demand and is conveniently estimated by two-stage least squares. It imposes, however, the restriction that the segmentation of products, i.e., the nesting structure, must be hierarchical, meaning that each nest on a lower level must be contained within exactly one nest on a higher level.

This severely constrains the substitution patterns that the nested logit model can accommodate, since the IIA property still holds within nests and at the nest level. Furthermore, the sequence of segmentation dimensions in the hierarchy is not unique and often not obvious.<sup>1</sup>

The logit and nested logit models belong to the wider class of Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) models developed by [McFadden \(1978\)](#).<sup>2</sup> A number of recent papers have proposed members from this class in order to obtain models with richer substitution patterns. The product differentiation logit model of [Bresnahan et al. \(1997\)](#) extends the nested logit model by allowing the grouping of products to be non-hierarchical. The ordered logit model of [Small \(1987\)](#) and the ordered nested logit model of [Grigolon \(2018\)](#) describe markets having a natural ordering of products.<sup>3</sup> The seminal paper by [Berry et al. \(1995\)](#) overcomes the limitations of the nested logit model by specifying a random coefficient logit model, which breaks IIA at the population level. However, the inverse demands of these more general models do not have closed form.

The richer substitution patterns of these models is obtained at the cost of more complex and time-consuming nonlinear estimation procedures such as the nested fixed point (NFP) approach of [Berry et al. \(1995\)](#) or the Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) approach of [Dubé et al. \(2012\)](#), which are associated with issues of local optima and choice of starting values (see e.g., [Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2014](#)).

In this paper, we depart from the standard practice by specifying a model in terms of the inverse demand. Given linear-in-parameters utility indexes, the model can then be directly estimated by linear regression using [Berry \(1994\)](#)'s method. More specifically, we propose the IPDL model for products that are segmented along multiple dimensions. The IPDL model extends the nested logit model by allowing arbitrary, non-hierarchical grouping structures (i.e., any partitioning of the choice set in each dimension). It improves on the nested logit model by allowing for richer patterns of substitution and, as we show, even complementarity. This improvement is achieved by removing the constraint that the segmentation should be hierarchical, and it is therefore costless. While the IPDL model

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<sup>1</sup>[Hellerstein \(2008\)](#) writes, concerning the beers market, "[D]emand models such as the multistage budgeting model or the nested logit model do not fit this market particularly well. It is difficult to define clear nests or stages in beer consumption because of the high cross-price elasticities between domestic light beers and foreign light and regular beers. When a consumer chooses to drink a light beer that also is an import, it is not clear if he categorized beers primarily as domestic or imported and secondarily as light or regular, or vice versa."

<sup>2</sup>GEV models are ARUM in which the random utilities have a multivariate extreme value distribution ([Fosgerau et al., 2013](#)).

<sup>3</sup>Other papers provide generalizations of the logit model by using semiparametric or nonparametric methods, see [Davis and Schiraldi \(2014\)](#) for more details.

requires modelers to define the segmentation, the relative importance of segmentation dimensions can be estimated.

Another important approach in demand estimation is the flexible functional form approach (e.g., the AIDS model of [Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980](#)), where the error term has no immediate structural interpretation. By contrast, in this paper, the error term has the structural interpretation of [Berry \(1994\)](#) that it represents product/market-level characteristics unobserved by the modeller but observed by consumers and firms.

The IPDL model belongs to a wider class of inverse demand models, that we label Generalized Inverse Logit (GIL) models. We show that any GIL model is consistent with a representative consumer model (RCM) in which a utility-maximizing representative consumer chooses a vector of nonzero demands, trading off variety against quality. We also show that any ARUM is equivalent to some GIL model. However, the converse is not true, since some GIL models exhibit complementarity, which cannot occur in an ARUM. We establish a new demand inversion result, which extends [Berry \(1994\)](#) and [Berry et al. \(2013\)](#) by allowing complementarity. It is often desirable to allow complementarity as important economic questions hinge on the extent to which products are substitutes or complements. In particular, this directly affects the incentives to introduce a new product on the market, to bundle, to merge, etc.<sup>4</sup>

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the context, introducing the role of demand inversion with the inverse demand of the logit and nested logit models as examples. Section 3 introduces the IPDL model as a generalization of the inverse demand of the nested logit model and shows how to estimate it with aggregate data. Section 4 applies the IPDL model to estimate the demand for ready-to-eat cereals in Chicago, finding that complementarity is pervasive in this market. Section 5 introduces the wider class of GIL models. Section 6 studies its linkages with the ARUM and RCM. Section 7 concludes. A supplement provides Monte Carlo evidence on the IPDL model as well as general methods and examples for building GIL models that go beyond the IPDL model.

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<sup>4</sup>See [Gentzkow \(2007\)](#), [Ershov et al. \(2018\)](#), and [Iaria and Wang \(2019\)](#) who investigate these issues empirically.

## 2 Motivation

### 2.1 General Setting: the Role of Demand Inversion

Consider a population of consumers choosing from a choice set of  $J + 1$  differentiated products, denoted by  $\mathcal{J} = \{0, 1, \dots, J\}$ , where products  $j = 1, \dots, J$  are the inside products and product  $j = 0$  is the outside good. We consider aggregate data on market shares  $s_{jt} > 0$ , prices  $p_{jt} \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $K$  product/market characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_{jt} \in \mathbb{R}^K$  for each inside product  $j = 1, \dots, J$  in each market  $t = 1, \dots, T$  (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001). For each market  $t$ , the market shares  $s_{jt}$  are positive and sum to 1, i.e.,  $\mathbf{s}_t = (s_{0t}, \dots, s_{Jt}) \in \text{int}(\Delta)$ , where  $\text{int}(\Delta)$  is the interior of the unit simplex in  $\mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ .

Based on Berry and Haile (2014), let  $\delta_{jt} \in \mathbb{R}$  be an index given by

$$\delta_{jt} = \delta(p_{jt}, \mathbf{x}_{jt}, \xi_{jt}; \boldsymbol{\theta}_1), \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (1)$$

where  $\xi_{jt} \in \mathbb{R}$  is the  $jt$ -product/market unobserved characteristics term and  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_1$  is a vector of parameters.

Consider the system of demand equations

$$\mathbf{s}_t = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2), \quad t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (2)$$

which relates the vector of observed market shares,  $\mathbf{s}_t$ , to the vector of product indexes in market  $t$ ,  $\boldsymbol{\delta}_t = (\delta_{0t}, \dots, \delta_{Jt})$ , through the model,  $\boldsymbol{\sigma} = (\sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_J)$ , where  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_2$  is a vector of parameters and

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma}(\cdot; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \text{int}(\Delta)$$

is an invertible function, with domain  $\mathcal{D} \subset \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ .<sup>5</sup>

The market share of the outside good is determined by the identity

$$\sigma_0(\boldsymbol{\delta}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^J \sigma_k(\boldsymbol{\delta}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2), \quad t = 1, \dots, T. \quad (3)$$

We normalize the index of the outside good, setting  $\delta_{0t} = 0$  in each market  $t = 1, \dots, T$ .

Several remarks regarding the demand system (2) are in order. First, the unobserved

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<sup>5</sup>Restricting the domain of  $\sigma$  to  $\mathcal{D}$  enables the model to be normalized. E.g.,  $\mathcal{D} = \{\boldsymbol{\delta}_t \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1} : \delta_{0t} = 0\}$  or  $\mathcal{D} = \{\boldsymbol{\delta}_t \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1} : \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \delta_{jt} = 0\}$ .

characteristics terms  $\xi_{jt}$  are scalars. Second, there is no income effect, since  $\sigma$  does not depend on income, and income is implicitly assumed to be sufficiently high that  $y > \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_j$ . Last, prices  $p_{jt}$  and characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_{jt}$  enter only through the indexes (in particular, we rule out random coefficients on prices and product characteristics).

Since the function  $\sigma$  in Equation (2) is invertible in  $\delta_t$ , then the inverse demand, denoted by  $\sigma_j^{-1}$ , maps from market shares  $\mathbf{s}_t$  to each index  $\delta_{jt}$  with

$$\delta_{jt} = \sigma_j^{-1}(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2), \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad t = 1, \dots, T. \quad (4)$$

For simplicity, we assume a linear index,

$$\delta_{jt} = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} - \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt}, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad t = 1, \dots, T. \quad (5)$$

Then the unobserved product characteristics terms,  $\xi_{jt}$ , can be written as a function of the data and parameters  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_1 = (\alpha, \boldsymbol{\beta})$  and  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_2$  to be estimated,

$$\xi_{jt} = \sigma_j^{-1}(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) + \alpha p_{jt} - \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta}, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad t = 1, \dots, T. \quad (6)$$

The unobserved product characteristics terms  $\xi_{jt}$  represent the structural error terms of the model, since we assume that they are observed by consumers and firms but not by the modeller. In addition, prices and market shares in the right-hand side of Equation (6) are endogenous, i.e., they are correlated with the structural error terms  $\xi_{jt}$ .<sup>6</sup> Then, following [Berry \(1994\)](#), we can estimate demands (2) based on the conditional moment restrictions

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi_{jt} | \mathbf{z}_t] = 0, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (7)$$

provided that there exists appropriate instruments  $\mathbf{z}_t$  for the endogenous prices and market shares.

## 2.2 Closed-form and Linear-in-Parameters Inverse Demands

Since the seminal papers by [Berry \(1994\)](#) and [Berry et al. \(1995\)](#), the standard practice of the demand estimation literature with aggregate data has been to specify an ARUM and

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<sup>6</sup>Prices are likely to be endogenous since firms may consider both observed and unobserved product characteristics when setting prices. Market shares are endogenous by construction since they are defined by the system of equations (2), where each demand depends on the entire vectors of endogenous prices and unobserved product characteristics.

to compute the corresponding demands, which then must be inverted numerically during estimation.<sup>7</sup> In this paper, we instead directly specify inverse demands of the form

$$\sigma_j^{-1}(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) = \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) + c_t, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (8)$$

where the vector function  $\mathbf{G} = (G_0, \dots, G_J)$  is invertible as a function of  $\mathbf{s}_t \in \text{int}(\Delta)$ , and where  $c_t \in \mathbb{R}$  is a market-specific constant.<sup>8</sup> Combining with Equation (4), this amounts to

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) = \delta_{jt} - c_t. \quad (9)$$

When  $\ln G_j$  is linear in parameters  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_2$ , estimation amounts to linear regression, which makes two-stage least squares (2SLS) easily applicable and (empirical) identification clear.

The logit and the nested logit models have closed-form and linear-in-parameters inverse demands that satisfy Equation (8). For the logit model,

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t) = \ln(s_{jt}), \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (10)$$

so that its inverse demand is given by the following well-known expression (Berry, 1994)

$$\sigma_j^{-1}(\mathbf{s}_t) = \ln\left(\frac{s_{jt}}{s_{0t}}\right) = \delta_{jt}. \quad (11)$$

For the two-level nested logit model, which partitions the choice set into groups,

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t; \mu) = (1 - \mu) \ln(s_{jt}) + \mu \ln\left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}(j)} s_{kt}\right), \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (12)$$

where  $\mathcal{G}(j)$  is the set of products grouped with product  $j$  and  $\mu \in (0, 1)$  is the nesting parameter (see Berry, 1994).

For the three-level nested logit model, which extends the two-level nested logit model

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<sup>7</sup>To our knowledge, the logit and the nested logit models are the only ARUM that yield closed-form inverse demands.

<sup>8</sup>Compiani (2019) adopts a similar approach, but proposing to nonparametrically estimate inverse demands for differentiated products based on aggregate data.



by further partitioning groups into subgroups,

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t; \mu_1, \mu_2) = \left(1 - \sum_{d=1}^2 \mu_d\right) \ln(s_{jt}) + \mu_1 \ln\left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}_1(j)} s_{kt}\right) + \mu_2 \ln\left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}_2(j)} s_{kt}\right), \quad (13)$$

where the parameters satisfy  $\sum_{d=1}^2 \mu_d < 1$ ,  $\mu_d \geq 0$ ,  $d = 1, 2$ , and where  $\mathcal{G}_1(j)$  and  $\mathcal{G}_2(j)$  are the sets of products belonging the same group and to the same subgroup as product  $j$ , respectively.<sup>9</sup>

The logit and nested logit models have the important advantage that they boil down to linear regression models (Berry, 1994). For example, for the logit model,

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_{jt}}{s_{0t}}\right) = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} - \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt}, \quad j = 1, \dots, J, \quad t = 1, \dots, T. \quad (14)$$

The logit model requires just one instrument for price and the two-level nested logit model requires one instrument for price and one for the endogenous shares. As a consequence, both models allow very large choice sets involving thousands of products. However, the logit and nested logit models impose strong restrictions on the substitution patterns that can be accommodated.

In the next section, we introduce the inverse product differentiation logit (IPDL) model, which extends the inverse demand of the nested logit model in the same way that the product differentiation logit model of Bresnahan et al. (1997) extends the nested logit model; we take the IPDL model to data on ready-to-eat cereals in Section 4.

### 3 The Inverse Product Differentiation Logit (IPDL)

**Specification of the Model** Suppose that each market exhibits product segmentation along  $D$  dimensions, indexed by  $d$ . Each dimension  $d$  defines a finite number of groups of products, such that each product belongs to exactly one group in each dimension. The grouping structure is exogenous and, for simplicity, assumed to be common across markets.

Let  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 = (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_D)$ , where  $\sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d < 1$  and  $\mu_d \geq 0$ ,  $d = 1, \dots, D$ , and let  $\mathcal{G}_d(j)$  be the set of products grouped with product  $j$  on dimension  $d$ . The IPDL model has inverse

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<sup>9</sup>Indeed, setting  $\gamma_1 = \mu_1 + \mu_2$  and  $\gamma_2 = \mu_1$ , we recover Equation (10) of Verboven (1996a) and the model satisfies the constraint  $0 \leq \gamma_2 \leq \gamma_1 < 1$  that makes it consistent with random utility maximization.

demands that are given by Equation (8), where  $\ln G_j$  is defined as

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) = \left(1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d\right) \ln(s_{jt}) + \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d \ln\left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}_d(j)} s_{kt}\right). \quad (15)$$

We show below that inverse demands (15) are invertible, such that it is possible to compute the IPDL demands.<sup>10</sup> We show in Section 6 that the IDPL demand is consistent with utility maximization.

We say that two products are of the same *type* if they belong to the same group on all dimensions. We assume that the outside good is the only product of its type, which implies that

$$\ln G_0(\mathbf{s}_t; \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) = \ln(s_{0t}) = \delta_{0t} - c_t = -c_t. \quad (16)$$

The IPDL model extends the nested logit model by allowing arbitrary, non-hierarchical grouping structures, i.e., any partitioning of the choice set in each dimension. Figure 1 illustrates the competing hierarchical and non-hierarchical grouping structures used for the empirical application in Section 4. The freedom in defining grouping structures can be used to build inverse demand models that are similar in spirit to GEV models based on nesting, which have proved useful for demand estimation purposes (Train, 2009, Chap. 4). For example, like Small (1987) and Grigolon (2018), it is possible to define grouping structures that describe markets where products are naturally ordered.

It is important to note that the parametrization of the IPDL model does not depend on the number of products, but instead on the number of segmentation dimensions. This is important because it implies that the IPDL model can handle markets involving very many products.

**Estimation of the IPDL Model** Combining Equations (15) and (16), the IPDL model boils down to a linear regression model of market shares on product characteristics and share terms

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_{jt}}{s_{0t}}\right) = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} - \alpha p_{jt} + \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d \ln\left(\frac{s_{jt}}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}_d(j)} s_{kt}}\right) + \xi_{jt}, \quad (17)$$

for all inside products  $j = 1, \dots, J$  in each market  $t = 1, \dots, T$ .

<sup>10</sup>Invertibility of  $\ln \mathbf{G} = (\ln G_0, \dots, \ln G_J)$  is shown using Proposition 1. The key assumption that ensures invertibility is that  $\sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d < 1$ , which means that a positive weight is assigned to the terms  $\ln(s_{jt})$ .

Equation (17) has the same form as the logit and nested logit equations (see [Berry, 1994](#); [Verboven, 1996a](#)), except for the share terms. Under the standard assumption that product characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_{jt}$  are exogenous, we must therefore find at least  $D+1$  instruments: one instrument for price and for each of the  $D$  share terms.

Following the prevailing literature (see e.g., [Berry and Haile, 2014](#); [Reynaert and Verboven, 2014](#); [Armstrong, 2016](#)), both cost shifters and BLP instruments are good candidates for instruments. Cost shifters are appropriate instruments for prices but may not be appropriate for market shares because costs affect the market shares only through prices. BLP instruments, which are functions of the characteristics of competing products and are commonly used to instrument prices, are also useful to instrument market shares. In theory, BLP instruments generally suffice for identification.<sup>11</sup> However, in practice they may be weak and then cost shifters are required.

Following [Verboven \(1996a\)](#) and [Bresnahan et al. \(1997\)](#), the BLP instruments of the IPDL model include, for each dimension, the sums of characteristics for other products of the same group as well as the number of products within each group. These instruments reflect the degree of substitution and the closeness of products within a group and are therefore likely to affect prices and within-group market shares. The same instruments can also be computed for products of the same type. Lastly, we can exploit the ownership structure of the market and compute the same instruments while distinguishing products of the same firms from products of competing firms. The idea is that prices, and thus market shares, depend on the ownership structure since multi-product firms set prices so as to maximize their total profits.

**Links to Discrete Choice Models** We show below that the IPDL model is consistent with a representative consumer model (RCM) with taste for variety and without income effect. The RCM assumes the existence of a variety-seeking representative consumer who aggregates a population of consumers and chooses some quantity of every product, trading off variety against quality. It has been a workhorse of the international trade literature since [Dixit and Stiglitz \(1977\)](#) and [Krugman \(1979\)](#), and has also been used for demand estimation purposes (e.g., [Pinkse and Slade, 2004](#)).

Specifically, as shown below, the IPDL model is consistent with a representative consumer, endowed with income  $y$ , who chooses a vector  $\mathbf{s}_t \in \text{int}(\Delta)$  of nonzero market

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<sup>11</sup>See [Armstrong \(2016\)](#) for a discussion on the validity of BLP instruments as the number of products increases.

shares in market  $t$  so as to maximize the utility

$$\alpha y + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \delta_{jt} s_{jt} - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_{jt} \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}_t), \quad (18)$$

where  $G_j$  is defined by Equations (15) and (16), and where  $\delta_j$  is a linear-in-price index. The second term in Equation (18) captures the net utility derived from the consumption of  $\mathbf{s}_t$  in the absence of interaction among products and the last term expresses taste for variety.

As mentioned above, the IPDL model has the nested logit model, and thus the logit model, as special cases: the logit is obtained when product segmentation does not matter, and the nested logit model is obtained when the grouping structure is hierarchical. Thus some IDPL models are ARUM. On the other hand, as shown below and in contrast to any ARUM, some IDPL models allow complementarity.<sup>12</sup>

**Complementarity** We use the standard definition of complementarity and substitutability in the absence of income effect (Samuelson, 1974), defining complementarity (resp., substitutability) as a negative (resp., positive) cross-price derivative of demand.<sup>13</sup> Proposition 4 in Appendix A.3 provides some properties of the IPDL model regarding the patterns of substitution, including the matrix of price derivatives of demand.

The IPDL model allows complementarity. To see this, suppose there are 3 inside products and one outside good. Inside products are grouped according to two dimensions: for the first dimension, product 1 is in one group, and products 2 and 3 are in a second group; for the second dimension, products 1 and 2 are in one group, and product 3 is in a second group. Products 1 and 3 are complements if the derivative of the demand for product 3 with respect to the price of product 1 is negative, that is, if<sup>14</sup>

$$(1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)(s_1 + s_2)(s_2 + s_3) - \mu_1 \mu_2 s_0 s_2 > 0, \quad (19)$$

which simplifies to  $4/3 > \mu_1 \mu_2 / (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)$  for  $s_0 = 1/2$  and  $s_1 = s_2 = s_3 = 1/6$ . In particular, products 1 and 3 are complements for  $\mu_1 = \mu_2 = 1/3$ , but are substitutes for  $\mu_1 = \mu_2 = 0.45$ . With the representative consumer interpretation, the parameter  $\mu_0 = 1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d$  measures taste for variety over all products of the choice set and each

<sup>12</sup>It would be of interest to establish conditions under which the IDPL model is equivalent to an ARUM.

<sup>13</sup>This definition is different from the one used by Gentzkow (2007) in the context of an ARUM defined over bundles of products.

<sup>14</sup>See Proposition 4 in Appendix A.3.

parameter  $\mu_d$ , for  $d \geq 1$ , measures taste for variety across groups of products according to dimension  $d$ : higher  $\mu_d$  means that variety at the level of groups of products matters more, meaning that products in the same group in dimension  $d$  are more similar (see [Verboven, 1996b](#), for a similar interpretation of the nesting parameter of the nested logit model). Then complementarity in the IPDL model arises in a very intuitive way, due to taste for variety at the group level.

In Section 1 of the supplement, we provide some simulation results investigating the patterns of substitution. We find that: (i) products of the same type are always substitutes, while products of different types may be substitutes or complements; and (ii) closer products into the characteristics space used to form product types (i.e., higher values of  $\mu_d$  and/or whether products belong to the same groups or not) have higher cross-price elasticities.

## 4 Empirical Illustration: Demand for Cereals

In this section, we illustrate the IPDL model by estimating the demand for ready-to-eat (RTE) cereals in Chicago in 1991 – 1992. This market has been studied extensively (see e.g., [Nevo, 2001](#); [Michel and Weiergraeber, 2019](#)) and it is known to exhibit product segmentation. We compare the results (in terms of elasticities and goodness-of-fit) from the IPDL model to those from two alternative nested logit models.

### 4.1 Data

**Databases** We use store-level scanner data from the Dominick’s Database, made available by the James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Business. We supplement with data on the nutrient content of the RTE cereals (sugar, energy, fiber, lipid, sodium, and protein) from the USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference and with monthly sugar prices from the website [www.indexmundi.com](http://www.indexmundi.com).

For our analysis, we use data from 83 Dominick’s stores and focus on the 50 largest products in terms of sales (e.g., Kellogg’s Special K), where a product is a cereal (e.g., Special K) associated to its brand (e.g., Kellogg’s). We define a market as a store-month pair. Prices of a serving (i.e., 35 grammes) and market shares are computed following [Nevo \(2001\)](#). See Appendix B for more details on the data.


**Product Segmentation** Based on the observations below, we consider two segmentation dimensions. The first dimension is brand, where the brands are General Mills, Kellogg's, Nabisco, Post, Quaker, and Ralston. The second dimension is market segment, where the market segments are family, kids, health/nutrition, and taste enhanced (see e.g., Nevo, 2001). These two dimensions are combined to form 17 product types among the 50 products.

Brands play an important role: Kellogg's is the largest company and has large market shares in all market segments; and General Mills, the second largest company, is especially popular in the family and kids segments. Taken together, Kellogg's and General Mills account for around 80 percent of the market. As regards market segments, the family and kids segments dominate and account for almost 70 percent of the market.

Table 1 shows the average nutrient content of the cereals grouped by brand and market segment. As expected, cereals for health/nutrition contain less sugar, more fiber, less lipid, and less sodium, and are less caloric. By contrast, cereals for kids contain more sugar and more calories. Moreover, Nabisco offers cereals with less sugar and less calories, while Quaker and Ralston offer cereals with more calories. The two dimensions therefore proxy, at least partially, for the nutrient content of the cereals.

Figure 1 illustrates the grouping structure of the IPDL model (left panel) and of the three-level nested logit model where products are grouped first by brand and then by market segment (right panel).

Figure 1: PRODUCT SEGMENTATION ON THE CEREALS MARKET



Each dot illustrates the location of a cereal in the grouping structure.

Table 1: AVERAGE BY MARKET SEGMENT AND BY BRAND

Dimensions	Sugar g/serve	Energy kcal/serve	Fiber g/serve	Lipid g/serve	Sodium mg/serve	Protein g/serve	N
<b>Brand (dimension 1)</b>							
General Mills	9.92 (4.67)	132.09 (7.69)	1.99 (0.98)	1.51 (0.82)	230.69 (60.83)	2.65 (0.83)	17
Kellogg's	9.58 (5.52)	127.50 (11.16)	2.47 (2.81)	0.85 (0.96)	228.49 (103.93)	2.88 (1.43)	18
Nabisco	0.25 (0.09)	125.48 (0.74)	3.43 (0)	0.58 (0)	2.10 (1.98)	3.83 (0.02)	2
Post	12.02 (4.64)	130.76 (14.83)	2.09 (2.02)	1.03 (0.78)	212.03 (22.31)	2.49 (1.15)	5
Quaker	8.50 (4.04)	139.44 (9.20)	2.26 (0.66)	2.43 (1.86)	159.88 (94.60)	3.59 (1.15)	5
Ralston	7.09 (6.61)	138.48 (1.41)	0.58 (0.08)	0.51 (0.65)	305.43 (71.57)	2.04 (0.39)	3
<b>Market Segment (dimension 2)</b>							
Family	7.54 (5.27)	130.41 (9.83)	2.22 (2.61)	0.99 (0.71)	269.66 (88.64)	2.88 (1.03)	17
Health/nutrition	5.03 (3.69)	122.54 (5.78)	3.16 (1.31)	0.54 (0.21)	168.54 (133.62)	3.84 (1.35)	9
Kids	13.40 (4.17)	137.75 (3.80)	1.00 (0.69)	1.35 (0.79)	211.38 (44.77)	2.01 (0.87)	16
Taste enhanced	9.70 (2.05)	129.28 (15.50)	3.32 (1.12)	2.22 (1.93)	166.43 (76.38)	3.16 (0.34)	8
Total	9.31 (5.21)	131.16 (10.21)	2.17 (1.92)	1.22 (1.08)	216.29 (93.53)	2.82 (1.15)	50

*Notes:* Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Column "N" gives the number of products by market segment and by brand. Averages and standard deviations are computed over products (without taking into account of their market shares).

## 4.2 Demand Estimation

**Specification** We estimate Equation (17), where  $\mathbf{x}_{jt}$  includes a constant, the nutrients mentioned above and a dummy for promotion. Following [Bresnahan et al. \(1997\)](#), we include fixed effects for brands ( $\xi_b$ ) and market segments ( $\xi_s$ ), which capture market-invariant observed and unobserved brand-specific and market segment-specific characteristics, respectively. The advantages provided by the two dimensions are therefore parametrized by the fixed effects  $\xi_b$  and  $\xi_s$ , which measure the extent to which belonging to a group shifts the demand for the product, as well as the parameters for groups  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$ , which measure the extent to which products within a group are protected from substitution from products in other groups along each dimension. Lastly, we include fixed effects for month ( $\xi_m$ ), and store ( $\xi_{st}$ ), which capture monthly unobserved determinants of demand and time-invariant store characteristics, respectively.

The unobserved product characteristics terms are therefore given by

$$\xi_{jt} = \xi_b + \xi_s + \xi_m + \xi_{st} + \tilde{\xi}_{jt}, \quad (20)$$

where  $\tilde{\xi}_{jt}$ , the structural error that remain in  $\xi_{jt}$ , capture the unobserved product characteristics varying across products and markets that are not included into the model (e.g., changes in shelf-space, positioning of the products among others), which affect consumers utility and that consumers and firms (but not the modeller) observe so that they are likely to be correlated with prices and market shares.

**Instruments** We use two sets of instruments. First, as cost-based instruments, we form the price of the cereal’s sugar content of a serve (i.e., sugar content in a serve times the sugar monthly price), which we interact with brand fixed effects. Multiplying the price of sugar by the sugar content allows the instrument to vary by product; and interacting this with fixed effects allows the price of sugar to enter the production function of each firm differently.

Second, we form BLP instruments by using other products’ promotional activity in a given market, which varies both across stores for a given month and across months for a given store: for a given product, other products’ promotional activity should affect consumers’ choices, and should thus be correlated with the price and market share of that product, but not with the error term.<sup>15</sup> Specifically, we use the number of other promoted products of rival firms and the number of other promoted products of the same firm, which we interact with brand name fixed effects. We also use these numbers over products belonging to the same market segment, which we interact with market segment fixed effects.

A potential problem is weak identification, which occurs when instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. With multiple endogenous variables, the standard first-stage F-statistic is no longer appropriate to test for weak instruments. We therefore use [Sanderson and Windmeijer \(2016\)](#)’s F-statistic to test whether each endogenous variable is weakly identified. In each estimated model, the F-statistics are far larger

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<sup>15</sup>We do not use functions of the nutrient content of the cereals as instruments since by construction of the data they are invariant across markets. We treat promotion as an exogenous variable since, at Dominick’s Finer Foods, the promotional calendar is known several weeks in advance of the weekly price decisions. One concern about the use of promotions to form instruments is that promotions could be advertised. If it was the case, this would mean that promotions are not exogenous and cannot be used as instruments. However, we do not observe advertising in the data, which is therefore part of the error term, and, in turn, we assume that promotions are not followed by advertising. See [Michel and Weiergraber \(2019\)](#) who also use promotion to form instruments.



than 10, implying that we can be confident that instruments are not weak.

**Parameter Estimates** Table 2 presents the 2SLS demand estimates from the IPDL and the three-level nested logit models with groups for market segment on top (3NL1) and with groups for brand on top (3NL2), in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively.

Table 2: PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF DEMAND

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	IPDL		3NL1		3NL2	
Price ( $-\alpha$ )	-1.83	(0.12)	-2.91	(0.12)	-4.10	(0.16)
Promotion ( $\beta$ )	0.088	(0.003)	0.102	(0.003)	0.144	(0.004)
Constant ( $\beta_0$ )	-0.697	(0.059)	-0.379	(0.065)	-0.195	(0.076)
Nesting Parameters ( $\mu$ )						
Market Segment/Group ( $\mu_1$ )	0.626	(0.009)	0.771	(0.008)	0.668	(0.011)
Brand/Subgroup ( $\mu_2$ )	0.232	(0.009)	0.792	(0.007)	0.709	(0.010)
FE Brands ( $\xi_b$ )						
Kellogg's	0.024	(0.005)	-0.056	(0.003)	0.104	(0.006)
Nabisco	-0.754	(0.024)	-0.218	(0.011)	-2.11	(0.02)
Post	-0.485	(0.014)	-0.187	(0.008)	-1.36	(0.01)
Quaker	-0.553	(0.015)	-0.329	(0.014)	-1.51	(0.01)
Ralston	-0.732	(0.025)	-0.200	(0.011)	-2.13	(0.02)
FE Market Segments ( $\xi_s$ )						
Health/nutrition	-0.672	(0.010)	-0.855	(0.008)	-0.069	(0.005)
Kids	-0.433	(0.009)	-0.529	(0.009)	0.071	(0.005)
Taste enhanced	-0.710	(0.010)	-0.903	(0.007)	-0.088	(0.006)
Observations	99281		99281		99281	
RMSE	0.210		0.242		0.270	

*Notes:* The dependent variable is  $\ln(s_{jt}/s_{0t})$ . Regressions include fixed effects (FE) for brands, market segments, months, and stores, as well as a constant, the nutrients (fiber, sugar, lipid, protein, energy, sodium) and a dummy for promotion. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The values of the F-statistics in the first stages suggest that weak instruments are not a problem.

Consider first the results from the IPDL model. As expected, the estimated parameters on the negative of price ( $\alpha$ ) and on promotion ( $\beta$ ) are significantly positive. The estimated parameters for groups have magnitude and sign that conform to the assumptions of the IPDL model,  $\mu_1 \geq 0$ ,  $\mu_2 \geq 0$  and  $1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2 > 0$ ; no constraints were imposed on the parameters during the estimation. These estimates imply that there is product segmentation along both dimensions: for cereals of the same market segment, cereals of the same brand are closer substitutes than cereals of different brands; and for cereals of the same brand, cereals within the same market segment are closer substitutes than cereals from different market segments. Overall, cereals of the same type are closer substitutes.

We find that the brand reputation of the cereals confers a significant advantage to products from General Mills and Kellogg’s and that cereals for family have a significant advantage. In addition, we find that  $\mu_1 > \mu_2$ , which means that the market segments confer more protection from substitution than brand reputation does (cereals of the same market segment are more protected from cereals from different market segments than cereals of the same brand are from cereals of different brands).

**Model Selection and Robustness** The estimates from the two nested logit models satisfy  $\mu_2 > \mu_1$ , which means that they are both consistent with random utility maximization. Neither nested logit model can then be rejected on this criterion.

The three estimated models are non-nested and have the same number of estimated parameters. Then the non-nested test of [Rivers and Vuong \(2002\)](#) can be used to determine which best fits the data. We find that the test strongly rejects both nested logit models in favor of the IPDL model.<sup>16</sup>

In many situations, consumers face choices involving a very large number of products (e.g., choice of a car or of a RTE cereal). We have estimated an alternative specification in which we define products as cereal-brand-store combinations, as it is commonly done in the vertical relationships literature (see e.g., [Villas-Boas, 2007](#)), and markets as months. The resulting specification, which has more than 4,000 products, leads to very similar parameter estimates, thereby indicating that the results are fairly robust to the definitions of products and markets.

**Substitution Patterns.** Figure 2 presents the estimated density of the own- and cross-price elasticities of demands of the IPDL and the two nested logit models (see Section 3 of the supplement for the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities of demands, averaged across markets and product types).

The estimated own-price elasticities are in line with the literature (see e.g., [Nevo, 2001](#)). On average, the estimated own-price elasticity of demands is  $-2.815$  for the IPDL model,

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
<sup>16</sup>The test statistic is given by  $\sqrt{J \times T} (\hat{Q}_1 - \hat{Q}_2) / \hat{\sigma}$ , where  $\hat{Q}_i$  is the value of the 2SLS objective function of model  $i$  evaluated at the demand estimates, and  $\hat{\sigma}^2$  is the estimated value of the variance of the difference between  $\hat{Q}_i$ ’s. The null hypothesis is that the two non-nested models are asymptotically equivalent; the first (resp., second) alternative hypothesis is that model 1 (resp., model 2) is asymptotically better than model 2 (resp., model 1). This statistic must be evaluated against the standard normal distribution and we estimate  $\hat{\sigma}^2$  using 500 bootstrap replications. The test statistics of the two nested logit models (model 1 against the IDPL model (model 2) are 1509.77 and 3644.43, respectively.

−3.187 for the 3NL1 model and −3.124 for the 3NL2 model. However, there is an important variation in price responsiveness across product types: for the IPDL model, own-price elasticities range from −3.560 for cereals for kids produced by General Mills to −1.388 for cereals for health/nutrition produced by Post; for the 3NL1 model, they range from −3.923 for cereals for kids produced by Ralston to −1.868 for cereals for health/nutrition produced by Post; and for the 3NL2 model, they range from −3.975 for cereals for kids produced by General Mills to −1.488 for cereals for health/nutrition produced by Post.

Consider now the cross-price elasticities. Among the  $50 \times 50$  different cross-price elasticities that the IPDL model yields, 49.5 percent (resp., 50.5 percent) are negative (resp., positive), meaning about one half of all pairs of cereals are complements. Note that the presence of complementarity is likely to reduce competition in the cereals market compared to a case with no complementarity. [Iaria and Wang \(2019\)](#) also find that complementarity is pervasive in the RTE cereals market. Complementarity can arise for many reasons, including taste for variety and shopping costs.

Products of the same brand are always substitutes, which means that there is cannibalization effect; likewise, products from the same market segment are all substitutes. Products of different brands and of different market segments may or may not be complements.

Figure 2: ESTIMATED PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMANDS



## 5 The Generalized Inverse Logit Model

In this section, we introduce the Generalized Inverse Logit (GIL) class of models, which includes the IPDL model as a special case and hence also the logit and nested logit models. Proofs for this section are provided in Appendix A.4 along with formal statements of the results. To ease exposition, we omit notation for parameters  $\theta_2$  and market  $t$ .

**Definition.** GIL models are inverse demands of the form (9), i.e.,

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) = \delta_j - c, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (21)$$

where  $c \in \mathbb{R}$  is a market-specific constant and  $\ln \mathbf{G} = (\ln G_0, \dots, \ln G_J)$  is an inverse GIL demand.

An inverse GIL demand is a function  $\ln \mathbf{G}$ , where  $\mathbf{G} : (0, \infty)^{J+1} \rightarrow (0, \infty)^{J+1}$  is homogeneous of degree one and where the Jacobian  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is positive definite and symmetric.

This definition immediately implies that the IDPL model is also a GIL model. Section 2 of the supplement provides a range of general methods for building inverse GIL demands along with illustrative examples that go beyond the IPDL model, which is the focus of the paper. As stated in the following proposition, an inverse GIL demand is injective and hence invertible on its range.

**Proposition 1.** Let  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  be an inverse GIL demand. Then  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is injective on  $\text{int}(\Delta)$ .

We denote the inverse function as  $\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{G}^{-1}$ . Inverting Equation (21) and using that demands sum to one together with the homogeneity of  $\mathbf{G}$  leads to the demand functions

$$s_j = \sigma_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \frac{H_j(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} H_k(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (22)$$

This expression generalizes the logit demands in a nontrivial way through the presence of the function  $\mathbf{H}$ .

In addition, consider any vector of market shares  $\mathbf{s} \in \text{int}(\Delta)$ . Then, holding  $\delta_0 = 0$ , the injectivity of the inverse GIL demand ensures that there exists a unique vector of indexes  $\boldsymbol{\delta} = (0, \delta_1, \dots, \delta_J)$  that rationalizes demand, i.e.,  $\mathbf{s} = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ .

Using that demands satisfy Roy's identity  $\partial CS(e^\boldsymbol{\delta}) / \partial \delta_j = \sigma_j(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ , it can easily be

shown that the consumer surplus is

$$CS(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \ln \left( \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} H_k(e^{\boldsymbol{\delta}}) \right), \quad (23)$$

up to an additive constant. Note that the consumer surplus is simply the logarithm of the denominator of the demands in Equation (22), just as in the case of the logit model.

Using that demands sum to one, we obtain that the market-specific constant is equal to the consumer surplus  $c = CS(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ , which combined with Equation (21), shows that GIL models satisfy

$$\delta_j = \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) + CS(\boldsymbol{\delta}), \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (24)$$

Differentiating (24) with respect to  $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ , we find that the matrix of demand derivatives  $\partial \sigma_j / \partial \delta_i$  is given by

$$\mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1} - \mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}^{\top}, \quad (25)$$

where  $\mathbf{s} = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ . Given the absence of income effects, the matrix (25) is the Slutsky matrix. This is symmetric and positive semi-definite, which implies that GIL demands are non-decreasing in their own index  $\delta_j$ ,  $\partial \sigma_j / \partial \delta_j \geq 0$ .

The class of GIL models accommodates patterns that go beyond those of standard ARUM. In particular, it allows for complementarity: this is for example the case of the IPDL model, which is a member of the class of GIL models. Our invertibility result in Proposition 1 therefore extends Berry (1994)'s invertibility result, which restricts the products to be strict substitutes. Proposition 1 also extends Berry et al. (2013), who show invertibility for demands that satisfy their ‘‘connected substitutes’’ conditions, which rule out complementarity.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The connected substitutes structure requires two conditions: (i) products are weak gross substitutes, i.e., everything else equal, an increase in  $\delta_i$  weakly decreases demand  $\sigma_j$  for all other products; and (ii) the ‘‘connected strict substitution’’ condition holds, i.e., there is sufficient strict substitution between products to treat them in one demand system. In contrast to ours, Berry et al. (2013)'s result does not require that demand  $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$  is differentiable. Demand systems with complementarity may be covered by Berry et al. (2013)'s result in cases where a suitable transformation of demand can be found such that the transformed demand satisfies their conditions. They provide no general result on how such a transformation could be found. Our result allows complementarity without requiring such a transformation to be found.

## 6 Relationships between Models

This section puts the GIL and the IPDL models into perspective by showing how they relate to the representative consumer model (RCM) and to the additive random utility model (ARUM).

### 6.1 Representative Consumer Model

Consider a representative consumer facing the choice set of differentiated products,  $\mathcal{J}$ , and a homogeneous numéraire good, with demands for the differentiated products summing to one. Let  $p_j$  and  $v_j$  be the price and the quality of product  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ , respectively. The price of the numéraire good is normalized to 1 and the representative consumer's income  $y$  is sufficiently high ( $y > \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_j$ ) to guarantee that consumption of the numéraire good is positive.

In this subsection, we show that the inverse GIL demand  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is consistent with a representative consumer who chooses a consumption vector  $\mathbf{s} \in \Delta$  of market shares of the differentiated product and a quantity  $z \geq 0$  of the numéraire good, so as to maximize her direct utility

$$\alpha z + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} v_j s_j - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) \quad (26)$$

subject to the budget constraint and the constraint that demands sum to one,

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_j s_j + z \leq y \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j = 1, \quad (27)$$

where  $\alpha > 0$  is the marginal utility of income. The first two terms of the direct utility (26) describe the utility that the representative consumer derives from the consumption  $(\mathbf{s}, z)$  of the differentiated products and the numéraire in the absence of interaction among them. The third term is a strictly concave function of  $\mathbf{s}$  that expresses the representative consumer's taste for variety (see Lemma 4 in Appendix A.5.1).

Let  $\delta_j = v_j - \alpha p_j$  be the net utility that the consumer derives from consuming one unit of product  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ . The utility maximization program (26)-(27) leads to first-order conditions for interior solution

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) + c = \delta_j, \quad (28)$$

which are of the form of Equation (21) defining the inverse GIL demand.

We state this observation as a proposition and give a detailed proof in Appendix A.5.1.

**Proposition 2.** The GIL model (28) is consistent with a representative consumer who maximizes utility (26) subject to constraints (27).

This proposition thus extends Anderson et al. (1988) and Verboven (1996b)'s results that the logit and the nested logit models are consistent with a utility maximizing representative consumer.

## 6.2 Additive Random Utility Model

We now turn to the Additive Random Utility Model. A population of consumers face the choice set of differentiated products,  $\mathcal{J}$ , and associate a deterministic utility component  $\delta_j = v_j - \alpha p_j$  to each product  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ . Each individual consumer chooses the product that maximizes her indirect utility given by<sup>18</sup>

$$u_j = \delta_j + \varepsilon_j, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (29)$$

where the vector of random utility components  $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_0, \dots, \varepsilon_j, \dots, \varepsilon_J)$  follows a joint distribution with finite means that is absolutely continuous, fully supported on  $\mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  and independent of  $\delta$ . These assumptions are standard in the discrete choice literature. They imply that utility ties occur with probability 0, that the choice probabilities are all everywhere positive, and that random coefficients are ruled out. Specific distributional assumptions for  $\varepsilon$  lead to specific models such as the logit model, the nested logit model, the probit model, etc.

The probability that a consumer chooses product  $j$  is

$$P_j(\delta) = \Pr(u_j \geq u_i, \forall i \neq j), \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (30)$$

Let  $\overline{CS} : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be the consumer surplus, i.e. the expected maximum utility given by

$$\overline{CS}(\delta) = \mathbb{E} \left( \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}} u_j \right). \quad (31)$$

---

<sup>18</sup>Note that income does not enter utility (29), which means that there is no income effect. This is equivalent to the case in which income enters linearly. The deterministic utilities,  $\delta_j$ , are common across all consumers, which rules out heterogeneity in preferences apart from the random utilities  $\varepsilon_j$ .

By the Williams-Daly-Zachary theorem (McFadden, 1981), the conditional choice probabilities are equal to the derivatives of the consumer surplus, i.e.  $P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \partial \overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) / \partial \delta_j$ . Define a function  $\overline{\mathbf{H}} = (\overline{H}_0, \dots, \overline{H}_J)$ , with  $\overline{H}_j : (0, \infty)^{J+1} \rightarrow (0, \infty)$  as the derivative of the exponentiated surplus with respect to its  $j$ th component, i.e.,

$$\overline{H}_j(e^\delta) = \frac{\partial e^{\overline{CS}(\delta)}}{\partial \delta_j} = P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) e^{\overline{CS}(\delta)}, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (32)$$

Summing over  $k \in \mathcal{J}$  and using that probabilities sum to one, we can write the ARUM choice probabilities and the consumer surplus in terms of  $\overline{\mathbf{H}}$  as

$$P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \frac{\overline{H}_j(e^\delta)}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \overline{H}_k(e^\delta)}, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (33)$$

and

$$\overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \ln \left( \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \overline{H}_k(e^\delta) \right). \quad (34)$$

Lemma 6 in Appendix A.5.2 shows that  $\overline{\mathbf{H}}$  is invertible, with inverse  $\overline{\mathbf{G}} = \overline{\mathbf{H}}^{-1}$ , and that  $\ln \overline{\mathbf{G}}$  is an inverse GIL demand. Then we can invert Equations (33) to obtain the inverse ARUM demands, which coincide with the inverse GIL demands (21) when  $\mathbf{G} = \overline{\mathbf{G}}$ ,

$$\ln \overline{G}_j(\mathbf{s}) + c = \delta_j, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}, \quad (35)$$

with  $c = \overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ .

Products are always substitutes in an ARUM. In contrast, some GIL models allow for complementarity and cannot therefore be rationalized by any ARUM. This is in particular the case of the IPDL model introduced in Section 3 and used in the empirical illustration in Section 4. We summarize the results as follows.

**Proposition 3.** The ARUM choice probabilities in Equation (33) coincide with the GIL demands defined by Equation (22) when  $\mathbf{G} = \overline{\mathbf{G}} = \mathbf{H}^{-1} = \overline{\mathbf{H}}^{-1}$ .

Then any ARUM is consistent with some GIL model. The converse does not hold, since some GIL models are not consistent with any ARUM.

Lastly, any GIL model is consistent with some perturbed utility model (PUM).<sup>19</sup> In a

<sup>19</sup>See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), McFadden and Fosgerau (2012) and Fudenberg et al. (2015) for more details on PUM. PUM have been used to model optimization with effort (Mattsson and Weibull, 2002),



PUM, the consumer chooses a vector of choice probabilities  $\mathbf{s} \in \text{int}(\Delta)$  to maximize her utility function defined as the sum of an expected utility component and a concave and deterministic function of  $\mathbf{s}$ , labeled as perturbation. Specifically, the GIL model (28) can be rationalized by a PUM with utility given by

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \delta_j s_j - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}), \quad (36)$$

without the explicit structure of income and prices. However, the converse does not hold. For example, for the concave perturbation function  $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \ln s_j$ , the corresponding candidate inverse GIL demand is  $\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) = \frac{1}{s_j} \ln(s_j)$ , which is not homogeneous of degree one and thus is not an inverse GIL demand.

Proposition 3 shows that the choice probabilities generated by any ARUM can be derived from some GIL model. As the class of GIL models is a strict subset of the class of PUM models, we have therefore strengthened Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)'s result that the choice probabilities generated by any ARUM can be derived from some PUM by showing that the GIL structure is sufficient to recover any ARUM.

### 6.3 Overview of Relationships

The relationships between the GIL, IDPL, ARUM and RCM classes of models are illustrated in Figure 3.


We have established that any GIL model is an RCM. An example suffices to show that there are RCM that are not consistent with any GIL model. In particular, when  $\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) = \frac{1}{s_j} \ln(s_j)$ , the direct utility (26) is consistent with a RCM but not with a GIL model.

As mentioned above, the IPDL model is a GIL model and admits the logit and nested logit models as special cases. We have also shown that any ARUM is observationally equivalent to some GIL model. However, the special case of IPDL model shows that the converse does not hold, since it allows for complementarity which is ruled out by any ARUM.

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stochastic choices (Swait and Marley, 2013; Fudenberg et al., 2015), and rational inattention (Matejka and McKay, 2015; Fosgerau et al., 2018). Allen and Rehbeck (2019) show that some PUM allow for complementarity

Figure 3: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RCM, ARUM AND GIL MODELS



Altogether, as Figure 3 shows, the class of GIL model is strictly larger than the class of ARUM, but strictly smaller than the class of RCM.

## 7 Conclusion

This paper has introduced the IPDL model, which is an inverse demand model for differentiated products that are segmented according to multiple dimensions. The IDPL model allows for more complex patterns of substitution than the nested logit model, it even allows for complementarity, while being easily estimated by linear regression using [Berry \(1994\)](#)'s method. The IDPL model provides an attractive modelling framework in applications where the priority is to maintain the computational simplicity of logit and nested logit models, while allowing more realistic patterns of substitution that do not constrain products to be substitutes.

The IDPL model belongs to the wider class of GIL models, which is a class of representative consumer models, large enough to comprise equivalents of all ARUM as well as models in which products may be complements. Finding that GIL demands are invertible even in the presence of complementarity extends the previous literature on invertibility of demand.

There is ample room for future research on the IDPL model and the more general GIL class of models. Generally, it is of interest to develop GIL models for various applications, exploiting the possibilities for constructing models with structures that are tailored to specific circumstances. On the methodological level, it is of interest to develop methods for estimating GIL models with individual-level data. Another issue is to determine conditions on the inverse GIL demand under which products are substitutes. Finally, the link to rational inattention, pointed out in [Fosgerau et al. \(2018\)](#), remains to be explored theoretically and empirically.

# A Proofs and Additional Results

## A.1 Mathematical Notation

We use italics for scalar variables and real-valued functions, boldface for vectors, matrices and vector-valued functions, and calligraphic for sets. By default, vectors are column vectors:  $\mathbf{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_J)^\top \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ .

$\Delta \subset \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  is the  $J$ -dimensional unit simplex:  $\Delta = \left\{ \mathbf{s} \in [0, \infty)^{J+1} : \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j = 1 \right\}$ , and  $\text{int}(\Delta) = \left\{ \mathbf{s} \in (0, \infty)^{J+1} : \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j = 1 \right\}$  is its interior.

Let  $CS : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be a function. Then,  $\nabla_{\delta} CS(\delta)$ , with elements  $j$  given by  $\frac{\partial CS(\delta)}{\partial \delta_j}$ , denotes its gradient with respect to the vector  $\delta$ .

Let  $\mathbf{G} = (G_0, \dots, G_J) : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  be a vector function composed of functions  $G_j : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ . Its Jacobian matrix  $\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  at  $\mathbf{s}$  has elements  $ij$  given by  $\frac{\partial G_i(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_j}$ .

A univariate function  $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  applied to a vector is a coordinate-wise application of the function, e.g.,  $\ln(\mathbf{s}) = (\ln(s_0), \dots, \ln(s_J))$ .  $\mathbf{1}_J = (1, \dots, 1)^\top \in \mathbb{R}^J$  is a vector consisting of ones and  $\mathbf{I}_J \in \mathbb{R}^{J \times J}$  denotes the  $J \times J$  identity matrix.

## A.2 Preliminary Results

This section states some preliminary mathematical results that are used in the proofs below.

**Lemma 1** (Euler equation for homogeneous functions). Suppose that  $\phi : (0, \infty)^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is homogeneous of degree one. Then

$$\phi(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_{i=0}^J \frac{\partial \phi(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_i} s_i, \quad \text{for all } \mathbf{s} \in (0, \infty)^{J+1}. \quad (37)$$

**Definition.** A matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{(J+1) \times (J+1)}$  is positive quasi-definite if its symmetric part, defined by  $\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{A}^\top)$ , is positive definite.

It follows that a symmetric and positive definite matrix is positive quasi-definite.

**Lemma 2** (Gale and Nikaido 1965, Theorem 6). If a differentiable mapping  $\mathbf{F} : \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ , where  $\Theta$  is a convex region (either closed or non-closed) of  $\mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ , has a Jacobian matrix that is everywhere quasi-definite in  $\Theta$ , then  $\mathbf{F}$  is injective on  $\Theta$ .

**Lemma 3** (Simon and Blume, 1994, Theorem 14.4). Let  $\mathbf{F} : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  and  $\mathbf{G} : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  be continuously differentiable functions. Let  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  and  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{y}) \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ . Consider the composite function

$$\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{F} \circ \mathbf{G} : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{J+1}.$$

The Jacobian matrix  $\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{C}}(\mathbf{y})$  is given by

$$\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{C}}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{F} \circ \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{F}}(\mathbf{x}) \mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{y}).$$

### A.3 Properties of the IPDL Model

Let  $\Theta_d$  be the matrix encoding the grouping structure for dimension  $d$  with elements  $ij$  given by

$$(\Theta_d)_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{G}_d(j), \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (38)$$

where we recall that  $\mathcal{G}_d(j)$  is the set of products that are grouped with product  $j$  in dimension  $d$ . Let  $s_{\mathcal{G}_d(j)} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} (\Theta_d)_{jk} s_k$  denote the market share of the group  $\mathcal{G}_d(j)$ .

**Proposition 4.** The IPDL model has the following properties.

1. The IIA property holds for products of the same type; but does not hold in general for products of different types.
2. The matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives is given by

$$\mathbf{J}_{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = -\alpha (\boldsymbol{\Psi} \text{diag}(\mathbf{s}) - \mathbf{s} \mathbf{s}^{\top}), \quad (39)$$

where

$$\boldsymbol{\Psi} = \left[ \left( 1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d \right) \mathbf{I}_{J+1} + \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d \boldsymbol{\Theta}_d \mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{G}_d} \right]^{-1}, \quad (40)$$

where  $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{G}_d}$  is the diagonal matrix with elements  $jj$  given by  $\frac{s_j}{s_{\mathcal{G}_d(j)}}$  with  $s_j = \sigma_j(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ .

3. Products can be substitutes or complements.

**Proof of Proposition 4.**

1. Using the relation (15) between indexes  $\delta$  and market shares  $s$ , we obtain for any pair of products  $j$  and  $k$  that

$$\frac{\sigma_j(\delta)}{\sigma_k(\delta)} = \exp \left( \frac{\delta_j - \delta_k}{1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d} + \sum_{d=1}^D \frac{\mu_d}{1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d} \ln \left( \frac{\sigma_{\mathcal{G}_d(k)}(\delta)}{\sigma_{\mathcal{G}_d(j)}(\delta)} \right) \right). \quad (41)$$

For products  $j$  and  $k$  of the same type (i.e., with  $\mathcal{G}_d(k) = \mathcal{G}_d(j)$  for all  $d$ ), Equation (41) reduces to  $\frac{\sigma_j(\delta)}{\sigma_k(\delta)} = \exp \left( \frac{\delta_j - \delta_k}{1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d} \right)$ , which is independent of the characteristics or existence of all other products, i.e., IIA holds for products of the same type. When products are of different types, the ratio can depend on the characteristics of other products, which means that IIA does not hold in general.

2. Use Equation (48) in Proposition 5 below to show that the matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives is given by Equations (39) and (40).
3. Suppose there are 3 inside products and one outside good. Inside products are grouped according two dimensions. For the first dimension, product 1 is in one group, and products 2 and 3 are in a second group. For the second dimension, products 1 and 2 are in one group, and product 3 is in a second group.

Using Equation (39), we show that

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_1(\delta)}{\partial p_3} = -\alpha \left( (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) (s_1 + s_2) (s_2 + s_3) - \mu_1 \mu_2 s_0 s_2 \right), \quad (42)$$

meaning that products 1 and 3 are complements if

$$(1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) (s_1 + s_2) (s_2 + s_3) - \mu_1 \mu_2 s_0 s_2 > 0.$$

□

## A.4 Results for Section 5

**Proof of Proposition 1.** The function  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is differentiable on the convex region  $\text{int}(\Delta)$  of  $\mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ . In addition,  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}$  is positive quasi-definite on  $\text{int}(\Delta)$ , since by assumption it is symmetric and positive definite on  $\text{int}(\Delta)$ . Then  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is injective by Lemma 2. □

**Proposition 5.** The GIL models defined by Equation (21) satisfy the following properties.

1. The market-specific constant  $c$  is equal to

$$c = \ln \left( \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} H_k(e^\delta) \right), \quad (43)$$

where  $\mathbf{H}(e^\delta) = (H_0(e^\delta), \dots, H_J(e^\delta)) = \mathbf{G}^{-1}(e^\delta)$ .

2. The market shares functions are given by

$$\sigma_j(\delta) = \frac{H_j(e^\delta)}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} H_k(e^\delta)}, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (44)$$

3. The Euler-type equation

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \frac{\partial \ln G_j(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_k} = 1, \quad k \in \mathcal{J}, \quad \mathbf{s} \in \text{int}(\Delta) \quad (45)$$

holds and can be written in matrix form as

$$\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s}) \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{1}_{J+1}, \quad \mathbf{s} \in \text{int}(\Delta). \quad (46)$$

4. Roy's identity implies that the consumer surplus is given by the convex function

$$CS(\delta) = \ln \left( \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} H_k(e^\delta) \right). \quad (47)$$

5. With  $\mathbf{s} = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\delta)$ , the matrix of demand derivatives is given by

$$\mathbf{J}_\sigma(\delta) = [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1} - \mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}^\top, \quad (48)$$

which is symmetric and positive semi-definite. This implies that GIL demands have symmetric cross effects and are non-decreasing in their own index.

### **Proof of Proposition 5.**

1. Exponentiating and applying  $\mathbf{H}$  on both sides of Equation (21) leads to

$$\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{H}(e^\delta e^{-c}) = \mathbf{H}(e^\delta) e^{-c}, \quad (49)$$

where the last equality uses the homogeneity of  $\mathbf{H}$ . Using that demands sum to 1 leads to Equation (43).

2. Combine Equations (43) and (49) and use  $\sigma_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = s_j$  to obtain Equation (44).
3. Note that

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \frac{\partial \ln G_j(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_k} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \frac{\partial \ln G_k(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_j} = \frac{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \frac{\partial G_k(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_j}}{G_k(\mathbf{s})} = \frac{G_k(\mathbf{s})}{G_k(\mathbf{s})} = 1, \quad (50)$$

where the first equality relies on the symmetry of the Jacobian of  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  and the third equality uses the Euler equation for the homogeneous function  $\mathbf{G}$ .

4. We verify that Roy's identity holds. Set  $\boldsymbol{\delta} = \ln \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s})$ . Then  $(\ln \mathbf{G})^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \mathbf{H} \circ \exp(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \mathbf{s}$ , and by Lemma 3,

$$\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s}) = \left[ \mathbf{J}_{(\ln \mathbf{G})^{-1}}(\ln \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s})) \right]^{-1} = [\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{H} \circ \exp}(\boldsymbol{\delta})]^{-1}. \quad (51)$$

By assumption, the Jacobian  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is positive definite and symmetric. Then its inverse  $\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{H} \circ \exp}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$  exists and is symmetric, i.e.,

$$\frac{\partial H_i(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_j} = \frac{\partial H_j(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_i}. \quad (52)$$

Then Roy's identity can be verified via

$$\frac{\partial CS(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \frac{\partial H_k(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_i}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} H_j(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})} = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \frac{\partial H_i(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_k}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} H_j(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}, \quad (53)$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \frac{\partial H_i(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial e^{\delta_k}} e^{\delta_k}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} H_j(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})} = \frac{H_i(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} H_j(e^\boldsymbol{\delta})} = \sigma_i(\boldsymbol{\delta}), \quad (54)$$

where the second equality uses symmetry of  $\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{H} \circ \exp}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$  and the fourth equality uses the Euler equation for the homogeneous function  $\mathbf{H}$ .

Convexity of the consumer surplus follows by property 5 since the Hessian,  $\mathbf{J}_\sigma(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ , is positive semidefinite.



5. Differentiate  $\delta_j = \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) + CS(\boldsymbol{\delta})$  with respect to  $\boldsymbol{\delta}$  to find that

$$\mathbf{I}_{J+1} = \mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s}) \mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) + \mathbf{1}_{J+1} \mathbf{s}^\top, \quad (55)$$

where  $\mathbf{s} = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ . Solving for  $\mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ , we obtain that

$$\mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1} [\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{1}_{J+1} \mathbf{s}^\top] = [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1} - [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1} \mathbf{1}_{J+1} \mathbf{s}^\top, \quad (56)$$

since  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is invertible. Finally, use Equation (46) to show that  $[\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1} \mathbf{1}_{J+1} \mathbf{s}^\top = \mathbf{s} \mathbf{s}^\top$ . Then  $\mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$  is symmetric.

As  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is positive definite, the square-root matrix  $[\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{1/2}$  exists and is also positive definite. Then

$$[\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{1/2} \mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{1/2} = [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{-1/2} (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{1}_{J+1} \mathbf{s}^\top) [\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})]^{1/2},$$

is symmetric and idempotent and hence positive semidefinite. Then also  $\mathbf{J}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$  is positive semidefinite. □

## A.5 Results for Section 6

### A.5.1 Representative Consumer Model

**Lemma 4.** Let  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  be an inverse GIL demand. Then the function  $\mathbf{s} \rightarrow -\mathbf{s}^\top \ln \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s}) = -\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \ln G_j(\mathbf{s})$  is strictly concave on  $\text{int}(\Delta)$ .

**Proof of Lemma 4.** Consider  $\mathbf{s} \in \text{int}(\Delta)$ . By property 3 of Proposition 5, the Hessian of  $-\mathbf{s}^\top \ln \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s})$  is  $-\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$ , which is negative definite by assumption. □

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Consider the representative consumer maximizing utility (26) subject to constraints (27). The budget constraint is always binding since  $\alpha > 0$  and  $y > \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_j$ . Substituting the budget constraint into the direct utility (26), the representative consumer then chooses  $\mathbf{s} \in \Delta$  to maximize

$$u(\mathbf{s}) = \alpha y + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \delta_j s_j - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}), \quad (57)$$

where  $\delta_j = v_j - \alpha p_j$ .

The Lagrangian of the utility maximization program given by

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{s}, \lambda) = u(\mathbf{s}) + \lambda \left( 1 - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \right), \quad (58)$$

yields  $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j = 1$  and the first-order conditions

$$\delta_j - \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} s_k \frac{\partial \ln G_k(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_j} - \lambda = 0, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (59)$$

By property 3 of Proposition 5, the first-order conditions can be simplified to

$$\delta_j - \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) - 1 - \lambda = 0, \quad j \in \mathcal{J}. \quad (60)$$

The first-order condition for an interior solution has a unique solution, since the objective is strictly concave by Lemma 4, hence the utility maximizing demands exist uniquely.

Setting  $c = 1 + \lambda$  then shows that the representative consumer model leads to the inverse GIL demand

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) + c = \delta_j. \quad (61)$$

□

### A.5.2 Additive Random Utility Model

Since shifting all the  $\delta_j$ 's by a constant amount  $c \in \mathbb{R}$  shifts the maximum expected utility  $\overline{CS}$  by the same amount and does not affect choice probabilities  $\mathbf{P}$ , we may use the normalization  $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \delta_j = 0$ , i.e., we consider at no loss of generality the restrictions of  $\overline{G}$  and  $\mathbf{P}$  to  $\Lambda = \left\{ \boldsymbol{\delta} \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1} : \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \delta_j = 0 \right\}$ .

The following lemma collects some properties of the expected maximum utility  $\overline{CS}$ .

**Lemma 5.** The expected maximum utility  $\overline{CS}$  has the following properties.

1. It is twice continuously differentiable, convex and finite everywhere.
2. It satisfies the homogeneity property

$$\overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta} + c\mathbf{1}_{J+1}) = \overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) + c, \quad c \in \mathbb{R}. \quad (62)$$

3. Its Hessian is positive definite on  $\Lambda$ .
4. It is given in terms of the expected residual of the maximum utility product by

$$\overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) \delta_j + \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{j^*} | \boldsymbol{\delta}), \quad (63)$$

where  $j^*$  is the index of the chosen product.

**Proof of Lemma 5.** [McFadden \(1981\)](#) establishes convexity, finiteness, and the homogeneity property (62). He also shows the existence of all mixed partial derivatives up to order  $J \geq 2$ , meaning that all second order mixed partial derivatives are continuous. [Hofbauer and Sandholm \(2002\)](#) show that the Hessian of  $\overline{CS}$  is positive definite on  $\Lambda$ .

Let  $j^*$  be the index of the chosen product. Property (63) follows from the law of iterated expectations,

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) &= \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \mathbb{E} \left( \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \{ \delta_j + \varepsilon_j \} | j^* = j, \boldsymbol{\delta} \right) P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}), \\ &= \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} (\delta_j + \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{j^*} | j^* = j, \boldsymbol{\delta})) P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}), \\ &= \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} P_j(\boldsymbol{\delta}) \delta_j + \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{j^*} | \boldsymbol{\delta}). \end{aligned}$$

□

It is well-known in the convex analysis literature that, for the logit model, the convex conjugate of the negative Shannon entropy  $-\overline{CS}^*(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j \ln(s_j)$  is the log-sum  $\overline{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \ln \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} e^{\delta_j} \right)$  (see e.g., [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004](#)). [Fosgerau et al. \(2018\)](#) extend this result to a class of "generalized entropies" which has the Shannon entropy as special case. See also [Matejka and McKay \(2015\)](#), [Chiong et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Galichon and Salanié \(2015\)](#) who use convex analysis in different contexts.

**Lemma 6.** The function  $\overline{\mathbf{H}}$  is invertible, and its inverse  $\overline{\mathbf{G}} = \overline{\mathbf{H}}^{-1}$  is an inverse GIL demand.

Lemma 6 is proved in [Fosgerau et al. \(2018\)](#) in a very similar setting. The proof provided here applies to the exact setting of the current paper and has independent value by being simpler.

**Proof of Lemma 6.** We first show that  $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$  is injective. Note that  $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$  is differentiable. Consider the function  $\boldsymbol{\delta} \rightarrow \bar{\mathbf{H}}(e^{\boldsymbol{\delta}})$ . Its Jacobian is positive definite on  $\Lambda$  since it has elements  $ij$  given by

$$\left\{ e^{\bar{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta})} \frac{\partial \bar{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_i} \frac{\partial \bar{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_j} \right\} + \left\{ e^{\bar{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta})} \frac{\partial^2 \bar{CS}(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_i \partial \delta_j} \right\},$$

where the first term is a positive semi-definite matrix and where, by property 3 of Lemma 5, the second term is a positive definite matrix on  $\Lambda$ . As it is also symmetric, it follows that the Jacobian is positive quasi-definite. Then  $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$  is invertible by Lemma 2. By Norets and Takahashi (2013), the range of  $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$  is  $\text{int}(\Delta)$ , which then is the domain of the inverse function  $\bar{\mathbf{H}}^{-1}$ .

We now show that  $\ln \bar{\mathbf{G}}$  is an inverse GIL demand. Note that  $\bar{\mathbf{G}}$  is linearly homogeneous and that, as shown above, the Jacobian of  $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$  is symmetric and positive definite. Then, by Lemma 3, the same is true for the Jacobian of  $\ln \bar{\mathbf{G}}$ .  $\square$

## B Data

**Databases** We use data from the Dominick’s Database made available by the James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This is weekly store-level scanner data, comprising information on 30 categories of packaged products at the UPC level for all Dominick’s Finer Foods chain stores in the Chicago metropolitan area over the period 1989-1997. For the application, we consider the RTE cereals category during the period 1991–1992.

We supplement the data with the nutrient content of the RTE cereals using the USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference. This dataset is made available by the United States Department of Agriculture and provides the nutrient content of more than 8,500 different foods including RTE cereals (in particular, we use releases SR11 (year 1996) and SR16 (year 2004) for sugar). We have collected six characteristics: fiber, sugar, lipid and protein in g/serve, energy in kcal/serve, and sodium in mg/serve. We also supplement the data with monthly sugar prices from the website [www.indexmundi.com](http://www.indexmundi.com) to form cost-based instruments.

**Markets, Products, Market shares and Prices** We aggregate UPCs into products (e.g., Kellogg’s Special K), so that different size boxes are considered one product, where a product is a cereal (e.g., Special K) associated to its brand (e.g., Kellogg’s). We focus

attention on the top 50 products in terms of sales, which account for 73 percent of sales of the category in the sample we use.

We define a market as a store-month pair. Following Nevo (2001), we define market shares of the inside products by converting volume sales into number of servings sold, and then by dividing it by the total potential number of servings at a store in a given month.

To compute the total potential number of servings at a store in a given month, we assume that (i) an individual in a household consumes around 15 servings per month, and (ii) consumers visit stores twice a week. Indeed, according to USDA's Economic Research Service, per capita consumption of RTE cereals was equal to around 14 pounds (that is, about 6350 grammes) in 1992, which is equivalent to 15 servings per month (without loss of generality, we assume that a serving weight is equal to 35 grammes). Then, the potential (month-store) market size (in servings) is computed as the weekly average number of households which visited that store in that given month, times the average household size for that store, times the number of servings an individual consumes in a month. The market share of the outside good is then the difference between one and the sum of the inside products market shares. As a robustness check, we have also estimated the models with the alternative assumption that consumers visit stores once a week; results do not change significantly.

Lastly, following Nevo (2001), we compute the price of a serving by dividing the dollar sales by the number of servings sold, where the dollar sales reflect the price consumers paid; we also convert the six nutrients into nutrients for a serving.

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# Supplement to "The Inverse Product Differentiation Logit Model"

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## Abstract

We first present Monte Carlo simulations investigating some properties of the Inverse Product Differentiation Logit (IPDL) model. Next, we provide a range of general methods for building members of the class of Generalized Inverse Logit (GIL) models along with illustrative examples that go beyond the IPDL model. Finally, we provide more information on the dataset we use in the empirical illustration as well as additional tables of results.

**Notation** We use italics for scalar variables and real-valued functions, boldface for vectors, matrices and vector-valued functions, and calligraphic for sets. By default, vectors are column vectors:  $\mathbf{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_J)^\top \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ .

$\Delta_J \subset \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  is the  $J$ -dimensional unit simplex:  $\Delta_J = \left\{ \mathbf{s} \in [0, \infty)^{J+1} : \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j = 1 \right\}$ , and  $\text{int}(\Delta_J) = \left\{ \mathbf{s} \in (0, \infty)^{J+1} : \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} s_j = 1 \right\}$  is its interior, where  $\mathcal{J} = \{0, 1, \dots, J\}$ .

Let  $CS : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be a function. Then,  $\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} CS(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ , with elements  $j$  given by  $\frac{\partial CS(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_j}$ , denotes its gradient with respect to the vector  $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ .

Let  $\mathbf{G} = (G_0, \dots, G_J) : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  be a vector function composed of functions  $G_j : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ . Its Jacobian matrix  $\mathbf{J}_{\mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  at  $\mathbf{s}$  has elements  $ij$  given by  $\frac{\partial G_i(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_j}$ .

A univariate function  $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  applied to a vector is a coordinate-wise application of the function, e.g.,  $\ln(\mathbf{s}) = (\ln(s_0), \dots, \ln(s_J))$ .  $\mathbf{1}_J = (1, \dots, 1)^\top \in \mathbb{R}^J$  is a vector consisting

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of ones and  $\mathbf{I}_J \in \mathbb{R}^{J \times J}$  denotes the  $J \times J$  identity matrix. Let  $|\tilde{\mathbf{s}}| = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} |\tilde{s}_j|$  denotes the 1-norm of vector  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}$ .

## 1 Simulation Results for the IPDL Model

Let  $\Theta_d$  be the matrix encoding the grouping structure for dimension  $d$ , with elements  $ij$  given by

$$(\Theta_d)_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{G}_d(j), \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathcal{G}_d(j)$  is the set of products that are grouped with product  $j$  in dimension  $d$ . Let  $s_{\mathcal{G}_d(j)} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} (\Theta_d)_{jk} s_k$  be the market share of  $\mathcal{G}_d(j)$ .

Recall that the matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives for the IPDL model is

$$\mathbf{J}_\sigma(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = -\alpha (\boldsymbol{\Psi} \text{diag}(\mathbf{s}) - \mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}^\top), \quad (2)$$

where

$$\boldsymbol{\Psi} = \left[ \left( 1 - \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d \right) \mathbf{I}_{J+1} + \sum_{d=1}^D \mu_d \boldsymbol{\Theta}_d \mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{G}_d} \right]^{-1}, \quad (3)$$

and where  $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{G}_d}$  is the diagonal matrix with elements  $jj$  given by  $\frac{s_j}{s_{\mathcal{G}_d(j)}}$  with  $s_j = \sigma_j(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ . We cannot obtain closed-form formulae for the entries of the matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives. We therefore perform simulations to better understand the substitution patterns of the IPDL model.

**Simulated Data** We simulate

- A market with 20 inside products and an outside good;
- 20 different grouping structures (i.e. allocations of products in groups) along 3 dimensions, and with 3 groups per dimension. We obtain a grouping structure by simulating a  $20 \times 3$  matrix of random numbers following a generalized Bernoulli distribution;
- 20 different vectors of grouping parameters  $\boldsymbol{\mu} = (\mu_0, \dots, \mu_3)$ . We obtain a vector of  $\boldsymbol{\mu}$  by simulating a 4-vector of uniformly distributed random numbers, where the first element is  $\mu_0$ , then normalizing so that  $\boldsymbol{\mu} \in \text{int}(\Delta_3)$ ;

- 20 different vectors of market shares  $\mathbf{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_{20})$ . We obtain a vector of market shares by simulating a 21-vector of uniformly distributed random numbers, where the first element is  $s_0$ , then by normalizing the vector of market shares of inside products so that  $\mathbf{s} \in \text{int}(\Delta_{20})$ .

This way of normalizing ensures that we simulate markets with very low and very high values for  $\mu_0$  and  $s_0$ . Combining the grouping structures, the grouping parameters, and the market shares, we form 8,000 markets. The following table gives summary statistics on the simulated data.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON THE SIMULATED DATA

Variable	Mean	Min	Max
$s_0$	0.5253	0.0064	0.9906
$s_j$	0.0158	3e-06	0.0697
$\mu_0$	0.4662	0.0697	0.9532
$\mu_1$	0.2014	0.0135	0.8480
$\mu_2$	0.1420	0.0175	0.4036
$\mu_3$	0.1904	0.0059	0.5212

**Grouping Structure** Table 2 shows the distribution of the own- and cross-price derivatives according to the number of common groups.

Own-price elasticities are always negative, while cross-price elasticities can be either negative (complementarity) or positive (substitutability). Products of the same type are always substitutes. Products that are very similar (i.e., that are grouped together according to all dimensions, but one) are also always substitutes. Products that are very different can be either substitutes or complements. Products are less likely to be substitutes as they become more different.

Table 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PRICE DERIVATIVES ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF COMMON GROUPS

Common groups	$\mathbf{J}_\sigma > 0$	Median	Min	Max	Freq.
<i>Own-price derivatives</i>					
–	0.00%	-0.0222	-0.7781	-3e-06	100.00%
<i>Cross-price derivatives</i>					
0 (None)	45.33%	-7e-07	-0.1539	0.0251	25.09%
1	90.38%	0.0002	-0.1114	0.2082	43.59%
2	100.00%	0.0006	-1e-09	0.2641	26.47%
3 (All)	100.00%	0.0009	-1e-09	0.3100	4.85%
Total	82.09%	0.0002	-0.1539	0.3100	100.00%

Notes: Column " $\mathbf{J}_\sigma > 0$ " gives the percentage of positive cross-price elasticities according to the number of common groups (e.g., the row "2" concerns products that are grouped together into 2 groups). Column "Freq." gives the frequencies (in percentage) of the cross-price elasticities (e.g., 4.85 percent of the cross-price elasticities involve products of the same type).

**Grouping Parameters** Table 3 shows the distribution of cross-price derivative according to the proximity of products into the characteristics space used to form product types, as measured by the sum of grouping parameters  $\mu_{jk} = \sum_{d=1}^3 \mu_d \mathbf{1}\{j \in \mathcal{G}_d(k)\}$  for two products  $j$  and  $k$ .

As the parameter  $\mu_{jk}$  becomes larger, we observe that (i) the derivatives increase in values, and that (ii) the share of substitutes increases. This is because higher  $\mu_d$  means that products of the same group in dimension  $d$  become more similar.

Table 3: PERCENTAGE OF SUBSTITUTES ACCORDING TO THE VALUE OF  $\mu_{jk}$

$\mu_{jk}$	$\mathbf{J}_\sigma > 0$	Median	Min	Max
[0, 0.1[	65.60%	0.0000	-0.1539	0.0286
[0.1, 0.2[	96.37%	0.0002	-0.0538	0.1462
[0.2, 0.3[	93.52%	0.0003	-0.1114	0.1670
[0.3, 0.4[	94.16%	0.0007	-0.0673	0.2082
[0.4, 0.5[	93.89%	0.0009	-0.0432	0.2049
[0.5, 1[	100.00%	0.0020	1e-08	0.3100

**Summary** In the IPDL model,

1. (Grouping structure) Products of the same type are always substitutes. Products of different types may be substitutes or complements, depending on the degree of closeness between products as measured by the value of the parameters  $\mu_d$  and by the

closeness of the products into the characteristics space used to form product types. The closer two products are, the more likely they are to be substitutes.

2. (Grouping parameters) The size of the cross-derivatives depends on the degree of closeness. The closer two products are, the higher is their cross-derivative.

## 2 Construction of GIL Models

In this section, we provide a range of general methods for building members of the class of GIL models, along with illustrative examples. They allow us to obtain alternative models to the logit and nested logit models that have interesting features: some of them can accommodate complementarity, others have closed form for both the demands and their inverse.

**Definition A.** An inverse GIL demand is a function  $\ln \mathbf{G}$ , where  $\mathbf{G} : (0, \infty)^{J+1} \rightarrow (0, \infty)^{J+1}$  is homogeneous of degree one and where the Jacobian  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is positive definite and symmetric.

**Definition B.** An almost inverse GIL demand is a function that satisfies the requirements for being an inverse GIL demand, except the Jacobian  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is only required to be positive semi-definite rather than positive definite.

### 2.1 General Methods and Illustrative Examples

The first result in this section shows that averaging an almost inverse GIL demand with an inverse GIL demand yields a new inverse GIL demand.

**Proposition A (Averaging).** Let  $\mathbf{G}_k, k \in \{1, \dots, K\}$ , be almost inverse GIL demands with at least one being an inverse GIL demand. Let  $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_K) \in \text{int}(\Delta_{K-1})$ . Then

$$\ln \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \ln \mathbf{G}_k(\mathbf{s}) \quad (4)$$

is an inverse GIL demand.

**Proof of Proposition A.** The function  $\mathbf{G}$  is homogeneous of degree one since for  $\lambda > 0$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{G}(\lambda \mathbf{s}) &= \prod_{k=1}^K G_k(\lambda \mathbf{s})^{\alpha_k} = \prod_{k=1}^K \lambda^{\alpha_k} G_k(\mathbf{s})^{\alpha_k}, \\ &= \left( \prod_{k=1}^K \lambda^{\alpha_k} \right) \left( \prod_{k=1}^K G_k(\mathbf{s})^{\alpha_k} \right), \\ &= \left( \lambda^{\sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k} \right) \left( \prod_{k=1}^K G_k(\mathbf{s})^{\alpha_k} \right) = \lambda \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s}),\end{aligned}$$

where the second equality uses the homogeneity of the functions  $G_k$  and the fourth equality uses the restrictions on parameters  $\sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k = 1$ .

The Jacobian of  $\ln \mathbf{G}$ , given by  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}} = \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \mathbf{J}_{\ln G_k}$ , is symmetric as the linear combination of symmetric matrices, and positive definite as the linear combination of at most  $K - 1$  positive semi-definite matrices and at least one positive definite matrix.  $\square$

Proposition A leads to the following corollary.

**Corollary A (General grouping).** Let  $\mathcal{G} \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{J}}$  be a finite set of groups with associated parameters  $\mu_g$ , where  $\mu_{0j} + \sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \mu_g = 1$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{J}$  with  $\mu_g \geq 0$  for all  $g \in \mathcal{G}$  and  $\mu_{0j} > 0$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ . Let  $\ln \mathbf{G} = (\ln G_0, \dots, \ln G_J)$  be given by

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) = \mu_{0j} \ln(s_j) + \sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \mu_g \ln \left( \sum_{i \in g} s_i \right). \quad (5)$$

Then  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is an inverse GIL demand.

**Proof of Corollary A.** Let  $T_j^0(\mathbf{s}) = s_j$  and for each  $g \in \mathcal{G}$ ,  $\mathbf{T}^g = (T_1^g, \dots, T_J^g)$  with  $T_j^g(\mathbf{s}) = \left( \sum_{i \in g} s_i \right)^{\mathbf{1}_{\{j \in g\}}}$ . The Jacobian of  $\ln \mathbf{T}^g$  has elements  $jk$  given by  $\frac{\mathbf{1}_{\{j \in g\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{k \in g\}}}{\sum_{i \in g} s_i}$ , and thus  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{T}^g} = \frac{\mathbf{1}_g \mathbf{1}_g^\top}{\sum_{i \in g} s_i}$  where  $\mathbf{1}_g = (\mathbf{1}_{\{1 \in g\}}, \dots, \mathbf{1}_{\{J \in g\}})^\top$ . Each  $\mathbf{T}^g$  is an almost inverse GIL demand while  $\mathbf{T}_0$  is the logit inverse demand. Lastly,  $\sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \mu_g + \mu_{0j} = 1$ . Then the conditions for application of Proposition A are fulfilled.  $\square$

The grouping structure in Corollary A is arbitrary and therefore allows the grouping structure that defines the IPDL model. The presence of the logit inverse demand, due to  $\mu_0 > 0$ , ensures that the Jacobian  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s})$  is always positive definite and hence that the inverse demand is indeed invertible.

If the outside good 0 belongs only to one group and is the only member of that group, then  $\ln G_0(\mathbf{s}) = \ln(s_0) = \delta_0 + c$ . Setting  $\delta_0 = 0$  and assuming a linear index, the model of Corollary A boils down to the linear regression model

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_j}{s_0}\right) = \mathbf{x}_j\boldsymbol{\beta} - \alpha p_j + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}(j)} \mu_g \ln\left(\sum_{k \in g} s_k\right) + \xi_j, \quad j = 1, \dots, J. \quad (6)$$

The following proposition shows how an inverse GIL demand can be transformed into another inverse GIL demand by application of a location shift and a matrix with non-negative elements that sum to one across rows and columns. Let unnormalized demands  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}$  be demands obtained before normalizing their sum to one, i.e.,  $\mathbf{s} = \tilde{\mathbf{s}}/|\tilde{\mathbf{s}}|$ .

**Proposition B (Transformation).** Let  $\mathbf{T}$  be an inverse GIL demand and  $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$  be a location shift vector. Let  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{(J+1) \times (J+1)}$  be an invertible matrix such that  $a_{ij} \geq 0$  and  $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} a_{ij} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} a_{ij} = 1$ . Then the function  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  given by

$$\ln \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{A}^\top [\ln(\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s}))] + \mathbf{m} \quad (7)$$

is an inverse GIL demand, and the corresponding unnormalized demands are given by

$$\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \mathbf{A}^{-1} \mathbf{T}^{-1} \left( \exp \left[ (\mathbf{A}^\top)^{-1} (\boldsymbol{\delta} - \mathbf{m}) \right] \right). \quad (8)$$

**Proof of Proposition B.** The function  $\mathbf{G}$  defined by Equation (7) is homogeneous of degree one since for  $\lambda > 0$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{G}(\lambda \mathbf{s}) &= \exp(\mathbf{A}^\top \ln \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{A}(\lambda \mathbf{s})) + \mathbf{m}), \\ &= \exp(\mathbf{A}^\top \ln \lambda + \mathbf{A}^\top \ln \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s}) + \mathbf{m}), \\ &= \exp(\ln \lambda + \mathbf{A}^\top \ln \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s}) + \mathbf{m}) = \lambda \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{s}), \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality uses the homogeneity of  $\mathbf{T}$ , and the third equality uses the feature that columns of  $\mathbf{A}$  sum to 1.

The Jacobian of  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is  $\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{A}^\top \mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{T}}(\mathbf{s}) \mathbf{A}$ , which is symmetric and positive definite. Unnormalized demands (8) follow from solving  $\ln \mathbf{G}(\tilde{\mathbf{s}}) = \boldsymbol{\delta}$ .  $\square$

Proposition B provides models where both demand and inverse demand have closed form, as it is the case of the logit and nested logit models. We illustrate this proposition with an inverse GIL demand that allows for complementarity.



**Example A.** Let  $J + 1 = 3$ ,  $\mathbf{m} = \mathbf{0}$ ,  $\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{s}$ , and

$$\mathbf{A} = \begin{pmatrix} p & 1-p & 0 \\ 1-p & p & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

with  $p < 0.5$ . Then we obtain that

$$\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \mathbf{A}^{-1} \left( \exp \left[ (\mathbf{A}_\top)^{-1} \boldsymbol{\delta} \right] \right) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{p}{2p-1} e^{\frac{p}{2p-1} \delta_1 - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} \delta_2} - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} e^{\frac{p}{2p-1} \delta_2 - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} \delta_1} \\ \frac{p}{2p-1} e^{\frac{p}{2p-1} \delta_2 - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} \delta_1} - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} e^{\frac{p}{2p-1} \delta_1 - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} \delta_2} \\ e^{\delta_3} \end{pmatrix},$$

so that

$$s_3 = \sigma_3(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \frac{e^{\delta_3}}{e^{\frac{p}{2p-1} \delta_1 - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} \delta_2} + e^{\frac{p}{2p-1} \delta_2 - \frac{1-p}{2p-1} \delta_1} + e^{\delta_3}},$$

and  $\frac{\partial \sigma_3(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_1} > 0$  if and only if  $\delta_2 - \delta_1 > (2p - 1) \ln \left( \frac{1-p}{p} \right)$ .

## 2.2 Zero Demands

The constructions above rule out zero demands (this is also the case of the models discussed in the main text). The following proposition shows how we can build models that allow zero demands by slightly modifying Proposition A and applying it to functions  $\mathbf{G}$  defined on  $[0, \infty)^{J+1}$  instead of just  $(0, \infty)^{J+1}$ .

**Proposition C** (Invertible grouping). Let  $\mathcal{G} = \{g_0, \dots, g_J\}$  be a finite set of  $J + 1$  groups (i.e., the number of groups is equal to the number of products). Let  $\mu_g > 0$ , for all  $g \in \mathcal{G}$ , be the associated parameters, where  $\sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \mu_g = 1$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ . Let  $\mathbf{G} = (G_0, \dots, G_J) : [0, \infty)^{J+1} \rightarrow (0, \infty)^{J+1}$  be given by

$$\ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \mu_g \ln \left( \sum_{i \in g} s_i \right). \quad (9)$$

Let  $\mathbf{W} = \text{diag}(\mu_{g_0}, \dots, \mu_{g_J})$  and let  $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{R}^{(J+1) \times (J+1)}$  with entries  $M_{jk} = \mathbf{1}_{\{j \in g_k\}}$  (where rows correspond to products and columns to groups). If  $\mathbf{M}$  is invertible, then  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  has all the properties of an inverse GIL demand, except that it is defined on  $\Delta_J$ , and the

unnormalized demands satisfy

$$\boldsymbol{\delta} = \ln \mathbf{G}(\tilde{\mathbf{s}}) \Leftrightarrow \tilde{\mathbf{s}} = (\mathbf{M}^\top)^{-1} \exp(\mathbf{W}^{-1} \mathbf{M}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\delta}).$$

**Proof of Proposition C.** Following the proof of Proposition A, the function  $\mathbf{G}$  given by Equation (9) clearly has all the properties of an almost inverse GIL demand. Thus, it remains to show that the Jacobian of  $\ln \mathbf{G}$  is positive definite if  $\mathbf{M}$  is invertible.

Observe that

$$\begin{aligned} \ln G_j(\mathbf{s}) &= \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \mu_{g_k} \mathbf{1}\{j \in g_k\} \ln \left( \sum_{i \in g_k} s_i \right) \\ &= \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \mu_{g_k} \mathbf{1}\{j \in g_k\} \ln \left( \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \mathbf{1}\{i \in g_k\} s_i \right), \end{aligned}$$

and, in turn, that

$$\frac{\partial \ln G_j(\mathbf{s})}{\partial s_l} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \mu_{g_k} \frac{\mathbf{1}\{j \in g_k\} \mathbf{1}\{l \in g_k\}}{\sum_{i \in g_k} s_i},$$

which can be expressed in matrix form as

$$\mathbf{J}_{\ln \mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{M} \mathbf{V} \mathbf{M}^\top,$$

with  $\mathbf{V} = \text{diag} \left( \frac{\mu_{g_0}}{\sum_{i \in g_0} s_i}, \dots, \frac{\mu_{g_J}}{\sum_{i \in g_J} s_i} \right)$ . This is positive definite since all  $\mu_g$  are strictly positive and  $\mathbf{M}$  is invertible.

Lastly, with  $\mathbf{M}$  invertible, unnormalized demands solve  $\ln \mathbf{G}(\tilde{\mathbf{s}}) = \mathbf{M} \mathbf{W} \ln(\mathbf{M}^\top \tilde{\mathbf{s}}) = \boldsymbol{\delta}$  and are given by  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = (\mathbf{M}^\top)^{-1} \exp(\mathbf{W}^{-1} \mathbf{M}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\delta})$ .  $\square$

As it is illustrated in the following example and as it is the case in ARUM where error terms have bounded support, Proposition C allows for zero demands when there is no degenerate group (i.e, a group containing only one product). Note that this proposition also allows to build models with closed form for both the demands and their inverses.

**Example B.** Define groups from the symmetric matrix  $\mathbf{M}$  with entries  $M_{ij} = \mathbf{1}_{\{i \neq j\}}$ , so that each product belongs to  $J + 1$  groups. Its inverse,  $\mathbf{M}^{-1}$ , has entries  $ij$  equal to  $\frac{1}{J+1} - \mathbf{1}_{\{i=j\}}$ .

Let  $\mu_g = 1/(J + 1)$  for each group  $g = 0, \dots, J$ . Then the unnormalized demands are

given by  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = (\mathbf{M})^{-1} \exp [(J + 1)\mathbf{M}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\delta}]$  and lead to the following demands

$$\sigma_i(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \frac{\tilde{s}_i}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \tilde{s}_j} = \frac{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} e^{-(J+1)\delta_j} - (J+1)e^{-(J+1)\delta_i}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} e^{-(J+1)\delta_j}}. \quad (10)$$

Demands (10) are non-negative only for values of  $\boldsymbol{\delta}$  within some set. To ensure positive demands, it is sufficient to average with the simple inverse logit demand. Demands (10) are not consistent with any ARUM since they do not exhibit the feature of the ARUM that the mixed partial derivatives of  $\sigma_i(\boldsymbol{\delta})$  alternate in sign. Indeed, products are substitutes

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_1(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_2} = -J^2 e^{-J(\delta_1 + \delta_2)} / \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} e^{-J\delta_j} \right)^2 < 0,$$

but

$$\frac{\partial^2 \sigma_1(\boldsymbol{\delta})}{\partial \delta_2 \partial \delta_3} = -2J^3 e^{-J(\delta_1 + \delta_2 + \delta_3)} / \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} e^{-J\delta_j} \right)^3 < 0.$$

### 3 Supplemental Material for the Empirical Illustration

**Elasticities for the Main Specifications.** Tables 5 and 6 give the estimated average (over product types and markets) price elasticities of demands for the main specifications.

Table 4: TOP 50 BRANDS

Nb.	Brand	Product Type	Brand name	Market segment	Shares (%)	
					Dollars	Volume
1	Apple Cinnamon Cheerios	1	General Mills	Family	2.23	2.02
2	Cheerios	1	General Mills	Family	7.67	6.76
3	Clusters	1	General Mills	Family	1.03	0.89
4	Golden Grahams	1	General Mills	Family	2.28	2.12
5	Honey Nut Cheerios	1	General Mills	Family	4.82	4.47
6	Total Corn Flakes	1	General Mills	Family	0.87	0.59
7	Wheaties	1	General Mills	Family	2.59	2.75
8	Total	2	General Mills	Health/nutrition	1.29	1.00
9	Total Raisin Bran	2	General Mills	Health/nutrition	1.61	1.49
10	Cinnamon Toast Crunch	3	General Mills	Kids	2.16	1.94
11	Cocoa Puffs	3	General Mills	Kids	1.22	0.98
12	Kix	3	General Mills	Kids	1.68	1.29
13	Lucky Charms	3	General Mills	Kids	2.35	1.94
14	Trix	3	General Mills	Kids	2.43	1.75
15	Oatmeal (Raisin) Crisp	4	General Mills	Taste enhanced	2.05	2.09
16	Raisin Nut	4	General Mills	Taste enhanced	1.60	1.60
17	Whole Grain Total	4	General Mills	Taste enhanced	1.77	1.29
18	All Bran	5	Kellogg's	Family	0.97	1.11
19	Common Sense Oat Bran	5	Kellogg's	Family	0.49	0.46
20	Corn Flakes	5	Kellogg's	Family	4.12	6.96
21	Crispix	5	Kellogg's	Family	1.88	1.70
22	Frosted Flakes	5	Kellogg's	Family	6.01	6.77
23	Honey Smacks	5	Kellogg's	Family	0.85	0.84
24	Rice Krispies	5	Kellogg's	Family	5.58	6.06
25	Bran Flakes	6	Kellogg's	Health/nutrition	0.90	1.16
26	Frosted Mini-Wheats	6	Kellogg's	Health/nutrition	3.35	3.69
27	Product 19	6	Kellogg's	Health/nutrition	1.06	0.86
28	Special K	6	Kellogg's	Health/nutrition	3.07	2.53
29	Apple Jacks	7	Kellogg's	Kids	1.67	1.32
30	Cocoa Krispies	7	Kellogg's	Kids	0.99	0.85
31	Corn Pops	7	Kellogg's	Kids	1.80	1.52
32	Froot Loops	7	Kellogg's	Kids	2.66	2.22
33	Cracklin' Oat Bran	8	Kellogg's	Taste enhanced	1.91	1.66
34	Just Right	8	Kellogg's	Taste enhanced	1.07	1.12
35	Raisin Bran	8	Kellogg's	Taste enhanced	3.96	4.83
36	Shredded Wheat	9	Nabisco	Health/nutrition	0.77	0.88
37	Spoon Size Shredded Wheat	9	Nabisco	Health/nutrition	1.59	1.63
38	Grape Nuts	10	Post	Health/nutrition	2.27	3.06
39	Cocoa Pebbles	11	Post	Kids	1.11	0.92
40	Fruity Pebbles	11	Post	Kids	1.14	0.94
41	Honey-Comb	11	Post	Kids	1.05	0.90
42	Raisin Bran	12	Post	Taste enhanced	0.93	1.10
43	Oat Squares	13	Quaker	Family	0.91	1.02
44	CapNCrunch	14	Quaker	Kids	1.00	1.10
45	Jumbo Crunch (Cap'n Crunch)	14	Quaker	Kids	1.27	1.35
46	Life	14	Quaker	Kids	1.73	2.24
47	100% Cereal-H	15	Quaker	Taste enhanced	1.42	1.84
48	Corn Chex	16	Ralston	Family	0.81	0.72
49	Rice Chex	16	Ralston	Family	1.15	1.03
50	Cookie-Crisp	17	Ralston	Kids	0.89	0.68

Table 5: AVERAGE PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR THE IPDL MODEL

Type	Own																	Cross																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17		
1	-3.107	0.195	0.091	0.071	0.078	0.077	-0.026	-0.047	-0.039	0.004	0.010	-0.011	-0.003	0.108	-0.016	-0.008	0.064	-0.060	-3.203	0.059	0.323	0.064	0.068	-0.036	0.227	-0.032	0.028	0.095	0.186	-0.073	-0.066	-0.008	-0.004	0.000	-0.006	-0.001
2	-3.560	0.068	0.093	0.334	0.084	-0.031	-0.006	0.235	-0.015	0.003	-0.055	0.186	-0.063	-0.110	0.157	-0.094	-0.051	0.216	-2.651	0.062	0.082	0.070	0.355	-0.037	-0.017	-0.028	0.256	0.003	-0.020	-0.032	0.249	-0.051	-0.042	0.242	-0.006	0.002
3	-2.513	0.062	-0.047	-0.027	-0.039	0.142	0.034	0.053	0.042	-0.006	-0.011	0.009	-0.003	0.085	-0.004	-0.016	0.050	-0.038	-2.581	-0.025	0.324	-0.006	-0.020	0.038	0.386	0.056	0.042	0.127	0.244	-0.086	-0.095	-0.013	0.005	-0.009	-0.009	0.009
4	-3.319	-0.035	-0.037	0.183	-0.028	0.047	0.046	0.266	0.055	-0.005	-0.063	0.158	-0.052	-0.090	0.129	-0.083	-0.043	0.176	-2.651	-0.032	-0.036	-0.013	0.259	0.043	0.038	0.061	0.334	-0.005	-0.036	-0.013	0.251	-0.055	-0.037	0.236	-0.006	0.012
5	-1.945	0.002	0.077	0.002	0.002	-0.004	0.072	-0.004	-0.003	0.912	0.060	-0.016	-0.014	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-1.388	0.009	0.266	-0.051	-0.021	-0.013	0.244	-0.073	-0.043	0.107	-	0.489	0.501	0.036	-0.024	0.006	0.019	-0.040
6	-3.238	-0.005	-0.051	0.089	-0.020	0.004	-0.042	0.098	-0.011	-0.013	0.247	0.386	0.270	-0.029	0.065	-0.045	-0.012	0.082	-3.238	-0.005	-0.051	0.089	-0.020	0.004	-0.042	0.098	-0.011	-0.013	0.247	0.386	0.270	-0.029	0.065	-0.045	-0.012	0.082
7	-2.097	-0.002	-0.044	-0.029	0.146	-0.001	-0.044	-0.029	0.146	-0.011	0.233	0.248	-	-0.005	-0.032	0.143	0.011	-0.017	-2.097	-0.002	-0.044	-0.029	0.146	-0.001	-0.044	-0.029	0.146	-0.011	0.233	0.248	-	-0.005	-0.032	0.143	0.011	-0.017
8	-2.379	0.043	-0.005	-0.047	-0.027	0.043	-0.006	-0.047	-0.027	0.004	0.015	-0.026	-0.006	-	0.199	0.219	0.036	-0.053	-2.379	0.043	-0.005	-0.047	-0.027	0.043	-0.006	-0.047	-0.027	0.004	0.015	-0.026	-0.006	-	0.199	0.219	0.036	-0.053
9	-2.492	-0.008	-0.003	0.086	-0.029	-0.003	0.002	0.092	-0.024	0.005	-0.015	0.075	-0.040	0.287	0.381	0.266	-0.013	0.081	-2.492	-0.008	-0.003	0.086	-0.029	-0.003	0.002	0.092	-0.024	0.005	-0.015	0.075	-0.040	0.287	0.381	0.266	-0.013	0.081
10	-1.760	-0.006	0.001	-0.061	0.185	-0.012	-0.006	-0.067	0.179	0.007	0.004	-0.057	0.184	0.338	0.282	-	0.013	-0.041	-1.760	-0.006	0.001	-0.061	0.185	-0.012	-0.006	-0.067	0.179	0.007	0.004	-0.057	0.184	0.338	0.282	-	0.013	-0.041
11	-2.631	0.027	-0.004	-0.022	-0.003	0.027	-0.004	-0.022	-0.003	0.004	0.009	-0.009	0.010	0.040	-0.009	0.010	0.784	0.734	-2.631	0.027	-0.004	-0.022	-0.003	0.027	-0.004	-0.022	-0.003	0.004	0.009	-0.009	0.010	0.040	-0.009	0.010	0.784	0.734
12	-3.287	-0.022	-0.001	0.084	0.001	-0.017	0.004	0.089	0.006	0.004	-0.018	0.067	-0.016	-0.049	0.057	-0.026	0.663	-	-3.287	-0.022	-0.001	0.084	0.001	-0.017	0.004	0.089	0.006	0.004	-0.018	0.067	-0.016	-0.049	0.057	-0.026	0.663	-

Notes: Elasticities are averaged over product types and over markets.

Table 6: AVERAGE PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR THE THREE-LEVEL NL MODELS

Type	3NL1				3NL2			
	Own	Cross			Own	Cross		
		Same subgroup	Same group	Different group		Same subgroup	Same group	Different group
1	-3.442	0.152	0.118	0.005	-3.440	0.177	0.131	0.007
2	-3.462	0.378	0.207	0.003	-3.547	0.316	0.085	0.004
3	-3.907	0.314	0.234	0.004	-3.975	0.234	0.125	0.006
4	-2.900	0.372	0.269	0.004	-3.034	0.244	0.103	0.005
5	-2.758	0.119	0.095	0.004	-2.776	0.116	0.084	0.006
6	-2.865	0.370	0.296	0.004	-3.156	0.194	0.094	0.006
7	-3.632	0.270	0.182	0.003	-3.714	0.196	0.077	0.005
8	-2.898	0.346	0.272	0.004	-3.008	0.185	0.086	0.006
9	-2.807	0.307	0.167	–	-2.026	1.106	–	0.003
10	-1.868	–	0.307	0.005	-1.488	–	0.624	0.007
11	-3.718	0.231	0.116	0.002	-3.503	0.468	0.313	0.003
12	-2.334	–	0.163	0.002	-2.139	–	0.286	0.003
13	-2.595	–	0.048	0.002	-2.333	–	0.234	0.003
14	-2.888	0.211	0.132	0.002	-2.709	0.440	0.333	0.004
15	-2.060	–	0.207	0.003	-1.842	–	0.360	0.004
16	-3.501	0.219	0.051	0.002	-2.723	1.019	0.790	0.003
17	-3.922	–	0.096	0.002	-3.186	–	0.717	0.003

Notes: Elasticities are averaged over product types and over markets.