Konrad Adenauer

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Konrad Adenauer
Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F078072-0004, Konrad Adenauer.jpg
Chancellor of Germany
In office
15 September 1949 – 16 October 1963
President Theodor Heuss
Heinrich Lübke
Deputy Franz Blücher
Ludwig Erhard
Preceded by Lutz von Krosigk
(Leading Minister)
Succeeded by Ludwig Erhard
Personal details
Born (1876-01-05)5 January 1876
Cologne, German Empire
Died 19 April 1967(1967-04-19) (aged 91)
Bad Honnef, West Germany
Political party Centre Party
(1906-1933)
Christian Democratic Union
(1945-1967)
Spouse(s) Emma Weyer
(1904-1916)
Auguste Zinsser
(1919-1948)
Children 8
Alma mater University of Freiburg
University of Munich
University of Bonn
Religion Roman Catholicism

Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer (German pronunciation: [ˈkɔnʁaːt ˈhɛɐman ˈjoːzɛf ˈaːdənaʊɐ]; 5 January 1876 – 19 April 1967) was a German statesman. As the first post-war Chancellor of Germany (West Germany) from 1949 to 1963, he led his country from the ruins of World War II to a productive and prosperous nation that forged close relations with old enemies France and the United States.[1] In his years in power Germany achieved prosperity, democracy, stability and respect.[2] He was the first leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a Christian Democratic party that under his leadership became, and has since remained, the most powerful party in the country.

Adenauer, dubbed "Der Alte" ("the old one"), belied his age as the oldest elected leader in world history by his intense work habits and his uncanny political instinct. He displayed a strong dedication to a broad vision of market-based liberal democracy and anti-communism. A shrewd politician, Adenauer was deeply committed to a Western-oriented foreign policy and restoring the position of West Germany on the world stage. He worked to restore the West German economy from the destruction of World War II to a central position in Europe, founded the Bundeswehr in 1955, and to come to terms with France, which made possible the economic unification of Western Europe. Adenauer opposed rival East Germany and made his nation a member of NATO and a firm ally of the United States.

A devout Roman Catholic, he was a leading Centre Party politician in the Weimar Republic, he served as Mayor of Cologne (1917–1933) and president of the Prussian State Council (1922–1933).

The 1968–1969 academic year at the College of Europe was named in his honour.

The Cologne years[edit]

Early life and education[edit]

Konrad Adenauer was born as the third of five children of Johann Konrad Adenauer (1833–1906) and his wife Helene (née Scharfenberg; 1849–1919) in Cologne, Rhenish Prussia, on 5 January 1876.[3] His siblings were August (1872–1952), Johannes (1873–1937), Lilli (1879–1950) and Elisabeth, who died shortly after birth in c. 1880. One of the formative influences of Adenauer's youth was the Kulturkampf, an experience that as related to him by his parents left him with a lifelong dislike for "Prussianism", and led him like many other Catholic Rhinelanders of the 19th century to deeply resent the Rhineland's inclusion in Prussia.[4]

In 1894, he completed his Abitur and started to study law and politics at the universities of Freiburg, Munich and Bonn. He was a member of several Roman Catholic students' associations under the K.St.V. Arminia Bonn in Bonn. He graduated in 1900[3] and afterwards worked as a lawyer at the court in Cologne. Adenauer had ill health as a young man, had been rejected for military service at age 20 because of his lungs. He was greatly interested in the use of medicinal herbs, according to famous French herbalist Maurice Messugue, whom he met and befriended. Adenauer credited his strong health in older age to the use of an infusion of barley water taken at night, but also maize stigma, mallow, sage, and yellow roses, which he used for coughs he was prone to. These were his favourite medicinal plants according to Messugue, though he had extensive knowledge of a wide range of plants. He agreed with MM that plants had to be free of sprays and not grown too artificially. He told Messugue that he owed his good health to "the plants, to nature."

Adenauer found relaxation and great enjoyment in the Italian game of bocce and spent a great deal of his post political career playing this game. His favorite holiday place to do this was in Cadenabbia, Italy, in a rented villa overlooking Lake Como, which has since been acquired as a conference centre by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the political foundation established by Adenauers political party Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

Leader in Cologne[edit]

Cöln Notgeld Banknote 10 Pfennig 1918, signed by Mayor Konrad Adenauer, on the reverse the historical town hall of Cologne (Rathaus).
In Wilhelmshaven in 1928, when a new cruiser was given the name of Adenauer's (centre, with left hand visible) town Köln

As a devout Catholic, he joined the Centre Party in 1906 and was elected to Cologne's city council in the same year. In 1909, he became Vice-Mayor of Cologne, an industrial metropolis with a population of 635,000 in 1914. Avoiding the extreme political movements that attracted so many of his generation, Adenauer was committed to bourgeois common-sense, diligence, order, Christian morals and values, and was dedicated to rooting out disorder, inefficiency, irrationality and political immorality.[5] From 1917 to 1933, he served as Mayor of Cologne and became qua office a member of the Prussian House of Lords.

Heinrich Hoerle: Zeitgenossen (contemporaries). An expressionist painting with mayor Adenauer (in grey) together with artists and a boxer.

Adenauer headed Cologne during World War I, working closely with the army to maximize the city's role as a rear base of supply and transportation for the Western Front. He paid special attention to the civilian food supply, as the city financed large warehouses of food that enabled the residents to avoid the worst of the severe shortages that beset most German cities during 1918–1919. He set up giant kitchens in working-class districts to supply 200,000 rations per day.[6] In the face of the collapse of the old regime and the threat of revolution and widespread disorder in late 1918, Adenauer maintained control in Cologne using his good working relationship with the Social Democrats. As a Catholic Rhinelander who deeply disliked Prussia, in a speech on 1 February 1919 Adenauer called for the dissolution of Prussia, and for the Prussian Rhineland to become a new Land (state) in the Reich.[7] Adenauer made it clear that he expected the new Land to be an autonomous state with very wide-ranging powers, and argued that the Reich government would accept this under the grounds that this was the only way to prevent France from annexing the Rhineland (at the time the Paris peace conference was still in session, and many believed that the French would demand the annexation of the Rhineland as one of the peace terms).[7] Both the Reich and Prussian governments were totally against Adenauer's plans for breaking up Prussia.[8] When the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were presented to Germany in June 1919, Adenauer again suggested to Berlin his plan for autonomous Rhineland state, arguing that if Berlin agreed to this, then perhaps the Allies might modify the terms of the Versailles treay, and again his plans were rejected by the Reich government.[9]

He was mayor during the postwar British occupation. He established a good working relationship with the British military authorities, using them to neutralize the workers' and soldiers' council that had become an alternative base of power for the city's left wing.[10] During the Weimar Republic, he was president of the Prussian State Council (Preußischer Staatsrat) from 1921 to 1933, which was the representation of the provinces of Prussia in its legislation. Since the early 20th century, a major debate within the Zentrum concerned the question if the Zentrum should "leave the tower" (i.e. allow Protestants to join to become a multi-faith party) or "stay in the tower" (i.e. continue to be a Catholic only party). The debate had been started in 1906 when the Catholic journalist and Cologne politician Julius Bachem wrote a widely publicized article under the title "We Must Come Out Of The Tower!", which had sparked much debate within the Zentrum.[11] Adenauer was one of the leading advocates of "leaving the tower", which lead to a dramatic clash between him and Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber at the 1922 Katholikentag, where the Cardinal publicly admonished Adenauer for wanting to take the Zentrum "out of the tower".[12]

Adenauer flirted with Rhenish separatism (a Rhenish state as part of Germany, but outside Prussia). Adenauer's relations with France and the Rhinish separatist movement in 1923 was to be the source of considerable controversy both at the time and later in his career with many accusing Adenauer of treason while Adenauer's defenders have argued that he was a loyal German who merely was coping with very difficult conditions caused by the hyper-inflation of 1923 that had destroyed the German economy.[13] In October–November 1923, Adenauer was involved in talks with the French and the Reich government under what terms might an autonomous Rhineland state be created, arguing that this was the only way to save the economy.[14] This was especially the case when in mid-October 1923, the Chancellor Gustav Stresemann announced that Berlin would cease all financial payments to the Rhineland and that the new Rentemark, which had replaced the now worthless Mark would not circulate in the Rhineland, a policy in effect would economicially sever the Rhineland from the rest of Germany by forcing the Rhinelanders to use the worthless mark while the rest of Germany was using the new Rentemark.[15] On 24–25 October 1923, Adenauer met with Stresemann to discuss the ramifications of the new currency policy with Adenauer arguing that Stresemann had abandoned the Rhineland, and if this continued, then he would have no other choice, but to reach an accommodation with the French to save the Rhineland economy and Stresemann telling Adenauer that in effect that he could care less about the Rhineland, and that the Rhinelanders have to do whatever necessary to survive.[16] From Stresemann's viewpoint, his first priority was to save the German economy, and the Rhineland would to be written off for the moment with the additional caveat that the Rhinelanders would have to engage in talks with the French that could be disallowed if Stresemann disapproved of their direction that they were going.[17] Adenauer for his part remained loyal to Germany, but at the same time his first priority was in rescuing the Rhineland economy from the effects of the hyper-inflation by working out whatever arrangement with the French necessary to save the Rhineland economy.[18]

Faced with this situation, Adenauer opened talks with the French in late October 1923 for a Rhinish republic, using Cardinal Karl Joseph Schulte as his middle-men to arrange talks with the French High Commissioner Paul Tirard.[19] During his talks with Tirard, Adenauer showed himself to be one of the few German politicians who were sensitive to French concerns about sécurité ("security" i.e. the French fear if Versailles were to be undone, then that Germany's greater population and larger economy would allow Germany to destroy a France gravely weakened by the war), and argued for a "grand design" which would achieve Franco-German reconciliation.[19] Adenauer maintained to Tirard that to sever the Rhineland from Germany as opposed to Prussia would end any possibility of Franco-German reconciliation and that the best way of achieving that reconciliation would was a Rhineland republic which would be in a sort of economic union with France.[19] At the same time, Adenauer clung to the hope that the Rentemark might still circulate in the Rhineland. Adenauer protested furiously against the new currency policy at a Cabinet meeting in Berlin that he was allowed to attend on 13 November 1923, arguing to the Reich Finance Minister Hans Luther had abandoned the Rhineland, stating that: "the Rhineland must be worth more than one or two or even three new currencies. But if the Reich Finance Minister wants to save the new currency, his ulterior motive is to abandon the Rhineland in order to rid of reparations".[20] The meeting ended with Stresemann telling Adenauer again that the Rentemark would not circulate in the Rhineland, and that the Rhinelanders were on their own for the time being, a policy that encouraged Adenauer to expand upon his talks with Tirard.[20] Adenauer's plans came to nought when Stresemann, who was resolutely opposed to Adenauer's "grand design", which he viewed as borderline treason and who seems to have regretted his advice to Adenauer to work out an arrangement with the French when he learned how far he was prepared to go, was able to negotiate an end to the crisis on his own.[19] The fear that Adenauer might be able to successfully negotiate his "grand design" with the French, which Stresemann believed would set in motion not only the dissolution of Prussia, but also the Reich played a major role in motivating Stresemann to reach his own settlement with the French.[19] In 1926, the Zentrum suggested that Adenauer become Chancellor, an offer that he was interested in, but in the end he rejected when the German People's Party insisted that one of the conditions for entering into a coalition under Adenauer's leadership was Gustav Stresemann stay on as a Foreign Minister.[21] Adenauer who disliked Stresemann as "too Prussian" rejected that condition, which marked the end of his chance of becoming Chancellor in 1926.[22]

Years under Nazi regime[edit]

Adenauer in 1951, reading in his house in Rhöndorf he built in 1937. It is now a museum.

Election gains of Nazi party candidates in municipal, state and national elections in 1930 and 1932 were significant. Adenauer, as mayor of Cologne and president of the Prussian State Council, still believed that improvements in the national economy would make his strategy work: ignore the Nazis and concentrate on the Communist threat. He was "surprisingly slow in his reaction" to the Nazi electoral successes,[23] and even when he was already the target of intense personal attacks, he thought that the Nazis should be part of the Prussian and Reich governments based on election returns. Political manoeuvrings around the aging President Hindenburg then brought the Nazis to power on 30 January 1933.

By early February Adenauer finally realized that all talk and all attempts at compromise with the Nazis were futile. Cologne's city council and the Prussian parliament had been dissolved; on 4 April 1933, he was officially dismissed as mayor and his bank accounts frozen. "He had no money, no home and no job."[24] After arranging for the safety of his family, he appealed to the abbot of the Benedictine monastery at Maria Laach for a stay of several months. His stay at this abbey, which lengthened to a full year, was cited by the abbot after the war when the monastery was accused by Heinrich Böll and others of collaboration with the Nazis. According to Albert Speer in his book Spandau: The Secret Diaries, Hitler expressed admiration for Adenauer, noting his civic projects, the building of a road circling the city as a bypass, and a "green belt" of parks. However, both Hitler and Speer concluded that Adenauer's political views and principles made it impossible for him to play any role in Nazi Germany.

Adenauer was imprisoned for two days after the Night of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934, but already on 10 August 1934, manoeuvring for his pension, he wrote a 10-page letter to Hermann Göring (the Prussian interior minister) stating among other things that as Mayor he had even violated Prussian laws in order to allow NSDAP events in public buildings and Nazi flags to be flown from city flagpoles, and added that in 1932 he had declared publicly that the Nazis should join the Reich government in a leading role.[25][26] Indeed at the end of 1932, Adenauer had demanded a joint government by his Zentrum party and the Nazis for Prussia.[27] And on 29 June 1933, i.e., several months after Hitler was made Chancellor and the Nazis were given full police power over Germany, and while the Nazis were still busy terrorizing and murdering Communists, Social Democrats, and Labor Union officials, Adenauer wrote in a letter: "In my opinion the only salvation is a monarch, a Hohenzollern[...], even Hitler in my opinion, a lifetime Reichpresident [...]“.[28]

During the next two years, Adenauer changed residences often for fear of reprisals against him, while living on the benevolence of friends. With the help of lawyers in August 1937 he was successful in claiming a pension; he received a cash settlement for his house, which had been taken over by the city of Cologne; his unpaid mortgage, penalties and taxes were waived. With reasonable financial security he managed to live in seclusion for some years. After the failed assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944, he was imprisoned for a second time as an opponent of the regime. He fell ill and credited Eugen Zander, a former municipal worker in Cologne and communist, with saving his life. Zander, then a section Kapo of a labor camp near Bonn discovered Adenauer's name on a deportation list to the East and managed to get him admitted to a hospital. Adenauer was subsequently rearrested (and so was his wife), but in the absence of any evidence against him was released from prison at Brauweiler in November 1944.

Post World War II and the founding of the CDU[edit]

Shortly after the war ended the American occupation forces installed him again as Mayor of heavily bombed Cologne. After the transfer of the city into the British zone of occupation the Director of its Military Government, General Gerald Templer, dismissed Adenauer for incompetence in December 1945.[29] As Mayor, Adenauer clashed with the British military government a number of times in the summer and fall of 1945, and a speech lamenting the devastation of Cologne by Allied bombing was seen as implicitly anti-British since it was British bombers that wreaked the devastation that Adenauer bemoaned.[30] Adenauer always believed that the Labour government in Britain had favored their fellow socialists in the SPD in their zone of occupation in Germany, and that he was sacked by the British to improve the SPD's odds.[31] In a 1962 television interview, Adenauer commented that his sacking was a blessing in disguise, and that would never had become Chancellor if he not been sacked.[32] Adenauer's sacking by the British military government gave him a reputation as a man who would stand up to the Allies, and contributed much to his subsequent political success and allowed him to pursue a policy of alliance with the West in the 1950s without facing charges of being a "sell-out". Adenauer never forgave the British for firing him, and in the 1950s-60s, many British officials believed that Adenauer's unfriendly attitude towards them was due to his resentment of the humiliation of being ordered out of the Lord Mayor's office by British officers.[33]

After his dismissal as Mayor of Cologne, Adenauer devoted himself to building a new political party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which he hoped would embrace both Protestants and Roman Catholics in a single party. In January 1946, Adenauer initiated a political meeting of the future CDU in the British zone in his role as doyen (the oldest man in attendance, Alterspräsident) and was informally confirmed as its leader. Adenauer had become a leader almost by default. During the Weimar Republic, Adenauer had often been considered a future Chancellor and after 1945, his claims for leadership were even stronger.[34] Of the other surviving leaders of the Zentrum Wilhelm Marx was too old and in bad health; Heinrich Brüning's austerity policies during his time as Chancellor in 1930-32 had earned the name the "Hunger Chancellor" and had made him into one of Germany's most hated men; and Andreas Hermes lacked Adenauer's national reputation, and had began his post-war political career in the Soviet zone, which led many people to see him as a Soviet "collaborator".[35] Since the core of the new CDU was formed by men who served in the Zentrum, it was considered essential to have a Catholic leader, which ruled out Protestant conservatives such as Robert Lehr and Hans Schlange-Schöningen who had belonged to the German National People's Party.[36]

Reflecting his background as a Catholic Rhinelander who had long chaffed under Prussian rule, Adenauer believed that Prussianism was the root cause of National Socialism, and that only by driving out Prussianism could Germany become a democracy.[37] In a December 1946 letter, Adenauer wrote that the Prussian state in the early 19th century had become an "almost God-like entity" that valued state power over the rights of individuals.[37] Adenauer continued that after German unification was unfortunately achieved by Prussia in 1871, the Prussian-German state had become an inhuman "sovereign machine" that cared nothing for "Christian natural law" and freely tramped over the rights of individuals.[37] Adenauer concluded that "National Socialism was nothing, but a logical further development of Prussian statism".[37] In a September 1948 speech, Adenauer said "Prussia is identical to centralism, and centralization is identical to depersonalization."[37] In December 1945, Adenauer told the British historian Noel Annan that the greatest mistake Britain had done with Germany was "It at the Congress of Vienna, when you foolishly put Prussia on the Rhine as a safeguard against France and another Napoleon".[38]

Through he did not use the term Sonderweg, Adenauer like most of the other Zentrum veterans who formed the core of the CDU believed in a Sonderweg version of German history, where the Reformation had led to the Protestant areas of Germany to diverge from Western civilization (seen here as identical with Catholicism), and that in its turn Lutheranism led to the oppressive Prussian state with its materialist, state-worshipping ideology of Prussianism and the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf, and Prussianism in its turn culminated in National Socialism.[39] Adenauer's dislike of Prussia led him to oppose Berlin as a future capital because as he wrote in 1946: "We in the West reject much of what generally is called the Prussian spirit. Our former war enemies have no reason to handle us particularly kindly. It is up to us to slowly destroy that mistrust. As soon as Berlin becomes the capital again, that distrust abroad will be inextinguishable. Whoever makes Berlin the new head creates spiritually a new Prussia".[40]

Despite Adenauer's dislike of Protestantism, he was determined to build a new Zentrum that would be "out of the tower", and allow Protestants in to form a new political party that would represent all Christians in Germany, not just Catholics. Adenauer took the view that the decision to keep the Zentrum "in the tower" before 1933 had been a huge mistake, and to revive the Zentrum within "the tower" again would inevitably lead to German politics being dominated again by the Social Democrats, the Communists or the Nazis.[41] Adenauer argued that only a party that united conservative Catholics and Protestants would stop these possible outcomes.[42] The need for a cross-confessional right-of-the-center party was the more pressing in Adenauer's viewpoint because most of the conservative German Protestants had been National Socialists, and even those were not were still followers of the ideology of Prussianism.[42] As such what was needed was a party led by Catholic politicians such as himself which would save conservative Protestants from themselves by weaning away from Prussianism.[42] Furthermore, it was understood by Adenauer that only a party that won the vote of the millions who were National Socialists or the Mitläufer who went along with the regime would win a majority in post-war elections, and that to bring back Zentrum "within the tower" would leave right-wing Protestant voters open to the appeal of National Socialism or an ideology like it.[42] Adenauer argued that it was better to integrate right-wing Protestant voters into a "responsible Christian party" in order to have a better future without much thought as whom these voters had supported in the past.[42] Adenauer's determination to integrate the right-wing nationalists who supported the Nazis into the CDU and thus into an acceptance of democracy explains much of the apparent paradox between his dislike of National Socialism and his willingess to accept men who had very active in supporting the National Socialist dicatorship.[43]

Adenauer viewed the most important battle in the post-war world as between the forces of Christianity and Marxism, especially Communism, writing in August 1945 that Germany needed a Christian alliance to provide: "strong resistance against the state system and ideology from the East-Russia-and a thoughtful and cultural and with that also a foreign policy alliance with the Western Europe. Only a planned integration of all Christian and democratic forces can protect us from the dangers threatening from the East."[44] In May 1946, Adenauer wrote that "great battle between Christianity and materialistic Marxism" meant all Christians needed to join forces to fight for the "freedom and dignity of the individual".[45] The same anti-Marxist viewpoints led Adenauer to denounce the Social Democrats as the heirs to Prussianism and National Socialism. In a speech, Adenauer declared: "As a German, I can only with the greatest regret establish that the old Prussian spirit, that ruthless undemocratic aspiration to exclusive power, speaks through the official announcements of the SPD in a way in which it has, up until now, only obsessed Prussian Junkerdom".[45]

Adenauer worked diligently at building up contacts and support in the CDU over the next years, and he sought with varying success to impose his particular ideology on the party. His was an ideology at odds with many in the CDU, who wished to unite socialism and Christianity; Adenauer preferred to stress the dignity of the individual, and he considered both communism and Nazism materialist world views that violated human dignity.[46]

Adenauer's leading role in the CDU of the British zone won him a position at the Parliamentary Council of 1948, called into existence by the Western Allies to draft a constitution for the three western zones of Germany. He was the chairman of this constitutional convention and vaulted from this position to being chosen as the first head of government once the new "Basic Law" had been promulgated in May 1949.

Chancellor of West Germany[edit]

First government[edit]

Election poster, 1949: "With Adenauer for peace, freedom and unity of Germany, therefore CDU"
Adenauer speaking in the Bundestag, 1955.

The first election to the Bundestag of West Germany was held on 15 August 1949, with the Christian Democrats emerging as the strongest party. During the 1949 election, Adenauer-who was something of an Anglophobe-charged that the British government was backing the Social Democrats because a socialist government would ruin Germany economically, and thus eliminate a potential British economic rival.[47] There were two clashing visions of a future Germany held by Adenauer and his main rival, the Social Democrat Kurt Schumacher. Adenauer looked towards the West, and favored integrating the Federal Republic with other Western states, especially France and the United States in order to fight the Cold War, even if the price of this was the continued division of Germany. Schumacher by contrast, through an anti-Communist, was in favor of neutrality in the Cold War, and wanted to see a united, socialist and neutral Germany. As such, Adenauer was in favor of joining NATO, something that Schumacher was adamantly opposed to.

The Free Democrat Theodor Heuss was elected the first President of the Republic, and Adenauer was elected Chancellor (head of government) on 16 September 1949 with the support of his own CDU, the Christian Social Union and the liberal Free Democratic Party. At age 73,[48] it was initially thought that he would only be a caretaker Chancellor. However, he would go on to hold this post for 14 years, a period spanning most of the preliminary phase of the Cold War. During this period, the post-war division of Germany was consolidated with the establishment of two separate German states, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

As part of his politics of integration, where those had supported the Nazis were to be inegrated into the democratic system, Adenauer's first important speech as Chancellor occurred on 20 September 1949, where he denounced the entire denazification process pursued by the Allied military governments between 1945-49.[49] Adenauer attacked the "much misfortune and mischief" that he alleged had caused by denazification.[50] Adenauer stated that those "truly guilty" of crimes during the National Socialist era deserved to be punished, he argued that denazification was wrong as it sought to punish the millions of Germans who supported the Nazi regime, which Adenauer claimed was unjust.[50] Adenauer ended that it was time for the distinction between "two classes of human beings in Germany", those were "politically objectionable" because they had supported the Nazi regime and those were "politically unobjectionable" because they had opposed the Nazi regime needed to "vanish as fast as possible".[50] Despite his claim that he believed in punishing those guilty of crimes, Adenauer announced in the same speech that he was to bring in an amnesty law for the Nazi war criminals and he planned to apply to "the High Commissioners for a corresponding amnesty for punishments imposed by the Allied military courts".[50] Adenauer's speech caused some controversy outside of Germany because his sole reference to the Holocaust in his entire speech was to the "anti-Semitic endeavors manifest here and there."[51]

In the controversial selection for a "provisional capital" of the Federal Republic of Germany, Adenauer championed Bonn over Frankfurt am Main. The British had agreed to detach Bonn from their zone of occupation and convert the area to an autonomous region wholly under German sovereignty; the Americans were not prepared to grant the same for Frankfurt.[52] At the Petersberg Agreement in November 1949 he achieved some of the first concessions granted by the Allies, such as a decrease in the number of factories to be dismantled, but in particular his agreement to join the International Authority for the Ruhr led to heavy criticism. In the following debate in parliament Adenauer stated:

The Allies have told me that dismantling would be stopped only if I satisfy the Allied desire for security, does the Socialist Party want dismantling to go on to the bitter end?[53] The opposition leader Kurt Schumacher responded by labeling Adenauer "Chancellor of the Allies".[54]

Right from the beginning of his Chancellorship, Adenauer refused to accept the Oder–Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier, and made it quite clear if Germany ever reunified, the Federal Republic would lay claim to all of the land that had belonged to Germany as of 1 January 1937 that now belonged to Poland and the Soviet Union.[55] In pursuit of this, the Adenauer government went to the Constitutional Court to receive a ruling that declared that legally speaking the frontiers of the Federal Republic were those of the German Reich as of 1 January 1937, that the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 which announced that the Oder-Neisse line was Germany's "provisional" eastern border was invalid, and that as such the Federal Republic considered all of the land east of the Oder-Neisse line to be "illegally" occupied by Poland and the Soviet Union.[56] The American historian Gerhard Weinberg pointed out that in claiming the frontiers of 1937 that these were the frontiers established by the Treaty of Versailles-which the entire interwar German leadership had claimed to be totally unacceptable-which perhaps indicated that Versailles was no-where near as harsh as claimed, especially when compared with the Oder-Neisse line.[57] Hans Peter Schwarz claims Adenauer's refusal to accept the Oder-Neisse line was in large part motivated by domestic politics, namely his desire to win the votes of the right-wing nationalists who once voted for the Nazis to the CDU.[55] The various groups that represented the Germans who fled or were expelled from Eastern Europe formed a powerful lobby in the Federal Republic in the 1950s that no politician was willing to anger as 16% of the electorate in 1950 were people who fled or were expelled after the war.[58] As a result, the CDU, the CSU, the FDP and the SPD all issued statements opposing the Oder-Neisse line and supporting Heimatrecht ("right to one's homeland", i.e. that the expelles be allowed to return to their former homes).[59] Adenauer greatly feared the power of the expellee lobby, and told his cabinet in 1950 that he was afraid of "unbearable economic and political unrest" if the government did not champion all of the demands of the expelle lobby.[59] In addition, Adenauer's rejection of the Oder-Neisse line was intended to be a deal-breaker if negotiations ever began to reunite Germany on terms that Adenauer considered unfavorable such as the neutralization of Germany as Adenauer knew well that the Soviets would never consider revising the Oder-Neisse line.[55] Finally Adenauer may have genuinely believed that Germany had the right to retake the land lost east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, despite all of the image problems this created for him in the United States and western Europe.[55] Adenauer's stance on the Oder-Neisse line was to create major image problems for him in the Western countries in the 1950s, where many regarded his revanchist views on where Germany's eastern borders ought to be with considerable distaste, and only the fact that East Germany was between the Federal Republic and Poland prevented this from becoming a major issue in relations with the West.[55]

By 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. and Britain agreed that West Germany had to be rearmed to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. What was needed was a viable democratic German Army, free of the militarism and outlook of its wartime predecessor. The idea was that it would be essential for the defense of Germany and indeed all of Western Europe. Adenauer was able to overcome grave French objections and created the non-nuclear "Bundeswehr" based on democratic principles and practices that met the Allies' criteria.[60]

In 1950, a major controversy broke out when it emerged that Adenauer's State Secretary Hans Globke, who been a high ranking civil servant under the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich had a dubious past under the latter.[61] Globke had played a major role in drafting anti-Semitic laws in Nazi Germany and was praised in 1938 by the Reich Interior Minister Dr. Wilhelm Frick as "the most capable and effcient official in my ministry".[62] On 12 July 1950, a SPD member of the Bundestag mentioned Globke's career in Nazi Germany and accused him of having "committed mass murder with the help of legal paragraphs".[63] In his reply, Adenauer stated he was saw nothing wrong with Globke's past that warranted his dismissal.

During the early years of his chancellorship and with a broad consensus within the West German establishment in favor of amnesty and integration, Adenauer pressed for the ending of denazification efforts. The denazification process was viewed by the United States as counterproductive and ineffective, and its demise was not opposed.[64] Adenauer's intention was to switch government policy to reparations and compensation for the victims of NS rule (Wiedergutmachung), claiming that the main culprits had been prosecuted.[65][66] On 16 November 1950, Adenauer met with the three Allied High Commissioners for Germany, namely John J. McCloy, André François-Poncet and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, where he demanded that the Allies stop all war crimes trials, end the extradition of war crimes suspects to eastern Europe and free all of the men already imprisoned or facing execution for war crimes, which he maintained was the basic quid pro quo for German rearmament and alliance with the West against the Soviet Union.[67] Adenaur was especially insistent that McCloy pardon all of the war criminals sentenced to death by American military courts at the Landsberg prison arguing to most Germans the Landsberg prisoners were heroes and if the Americans were to hang those men, it was impossible for West Germany to play its part if World War III were to break out with the Soviet Union.[68] To prove Adenauar's point about popular support for the condemned of Landsberg, in the last half of 1950 and the first half of 1951, thousands of Germans took part in demonstrations outside of Landsberg prison to demand pardons for all of the war criminals while the German media coverage was overwhelmingly on the side of the condemned.[69] In response to this pressure, McCloy on 31 January 1951 reduced the sentences of most of 102 men at Landsberg, confirming only 7 of the death sentences while the rest of the condemned to death were spared.[70] The seven death sentences confirmed by McCloy were the so-called "worst of the worst" namely Oswald Pohl, Paul Blobel, Otto Ohlendorf,Werner Braune, Eric Naumann, Georg Schallermair and Hans Schmidt. Neither Adenauer nor German public opinion was satisfied by McCloy's decision, and as a result, throughout the first half of 1951 the Federal Republic continued to lobby McCloy to pardon the seven condemned men while the huge demonstrations for amnesty continued at Landsberg.[71] Despite Adenauer's best efforts to save them together with massive pressure from German public opinion, on 7 June 1951 the Americans hanged Pohl, Blobel, Ohlendorf, Braune, Naumann, Schallermair and Schmidt.

Adenauer made a historic speech to the Bundestag in September 1951 in which he recognized the obligation of the German government to compensate Israel, as the main representative of the Jewish people, for The Holocaust. This started a process that led to the Bundestag approving a pact between Israel and Germany in 1953 outlining the reparations Germany would pay to Israel. As a result, Germany started negotiations with Israel for restitution of lost property and the payment of damages to victims of the Nazi persecutions. In the Luxemburger Abkommen, Germany agreed to pay compensation to Israel. Jewish claims were bundled in the Jewish Claims Conference, which represented the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. Germany then initially paid about 3 billion Mark to Israel and about 450 million to the Claims Conference, although payments continued after that, as new claims were made.[72] Israel was divided in accepting the money.The agreement was condemned by some Israelis as simply an expedient whereby Germany would buy off Jewish survivors to regain credibility on the international stage, and Adenauer was criticised for being too lenient towards politically compromised individuals whose past treatment of Jews was at best questionable.[73] But ultimately the fledgling state under David Ben-Gurion agreed to take it, opposed by more radical groups like Irgun, who were against such treaties. Those treaties were cited as a main reason for the assassination attempt by the radical Jewish groups against Adenauer.[74]

By 1951 laws were passed by the Bundestag ending denazification. Officials were allowed to retake jobs in civil service, with the exception of people assigned to Group I (Major Offenders) and II (Offenders) during the denazification review process.[66][75] The amnesty legislation had benefited 792,176 people, among them:

  • 3,000 functionaries of the SA, the SS, and the Nazi Party who participated in deporting victims to prisons and camps
  • 20,000 other Nazi perpetrators sentenced for "deeds against life" (presumably murder);
  • 30,000 sentenced for causing bodily injury
  • 5,200 charged with "crimes and misdemeanors in office."[76]

Moreover, Adenauer promoted and protected several high-profile ex-Nazis and Wehrmacht criminals in his administration, the newly created Bundeswehr, the justice system, and local public administrations, despite his declarations that former Nazis would be tolerated only if they have been passive party members.[77][78] Among the most publicly denounced former Nazis promoted by Adenauer were Hans Globke, who rose to become one of his closest aides, and the former Nazi general Reinhard Gehlen, whom Adenauer made head of the new West German Secret Service. Globke, in particular, had misused his public official powers to harass Jews already before the Nazis took power and during the war he helped organize the deportation of 20,000 Jews from Greece to extermination camps in Poland.[79][80] Adenauer's massive promotion and defense of ex-Nazis, criminal and not, included suppressing book publications and harassing whistle-blowing journalists.

However, most German conservatives had collaborated enthusiastically with the Nazis so that many historians have argued that "it would have been folly to deprive the fledgling republic of the services of [these civil servants and professionals] for that reason alone."[81] Officially Adenauer pressured his rehabilitated ex-Nazis by threatening that stepping out of line could trigger the reopening of individual de-Nazification prosecutions. The construction of a "competent Federal Government effectively from a standing start was one of the greatest of Adenauer's formidable achievements".[81] This can hardly be said of Gehlen's "services" which were repeatedly accused of misinforming and misleading NATO partners and were full of former Nazi mass murderers.[82][83]

Contemporary critics accused Adenauer of cementing the division of Germany, sacrificing reunification and the recovery of territories lost in the westward shift of Poland and the Soviet Union with his determination to secure the Federal Republic to the West. "In his view, he said with the greatest emphasis, full integration into Western Europe was a precondition of the reunification of Germany."[84] During the Cold War, the United States was "aiming for a West German armed force, after their [U.S.] costly experience in the Korean War".[85] and Adenauer linked this rearmament concept to West German sovereignty and entry into NATO. In 1952, the Stalin Note, as it became known, "caught everybody in the West by surprise".[86] It offered to unify the two German entities into a single, neutral state with its own, non-aligned national army to effect superpower disengagement from Central Europe. Adenauer and his cabinet were unanimous in their rejection of the Stalin overture; they shared the Western Allies' suspicion about the genuineness of that offer and supported the Allies in their cautious replies. In this, they were supported by leader of the opposition Kurt Schumacher (a very rare occurrence), and recent (21st century) findings of historical research[citation needed].

Adenauer's flat rejection was, however, still out of step with public opinion; he then realized his mistake and he started to ask questions. Critics denounced him for having missed an opportunity for German reunification. The Soviets sent a second note, courteous in tone. Adenauer by then understood that "all opportunity for initiative had passed out of his hands,"[87] and the matter was put to rest by the Allies. Given the realities of the Cold War, German reunification and recovery of lost territories in the east were not realistic goals as both of Stalin's notes specified the retention of the existing "Potsdam"-decreed boundaries of Germany.

As chancellor, Adenauer tended to make most major decisions himself, treating his ministers as mere extensions of his authority. While this tendency decreased under his successors, it established the image of West Germany (and later reunified Germany) as a "chancellor democracy".

On 27 March 1952, a package addressed to Chancellor Adenauer exploded in the Munich Police Headquarters, killing one Bavarian police officer. Two boys who had been paid to send this package by mail had brought it to the attention of the police. Investigations led to people closely related to the Herut Party and the former Irgun armed organization. The West German government kept all proof under seal in order to prevent antisemitic responses from the German public. Five Israeli suspects identified by French and German investigators were allowed to return to Israel.

One of the participants, Eliezer Sudit, later revealed that the alleged mastermind behind this assassination attempt was Menachem Begin, who would later become the Prime Minister of Israel.[88] Begin had been the former commander of Irgun and at that time headed Herut and was a member of the Knesset. His goal was to put pressure on the German government and prevent the signing of the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany, which he vehemently opposed.[89]

David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, appreciated Adenauer's response in playing down the affair and not pursuing it further, as it would have burdened the already-delicate relationship between the two new states.

In June 2006 a slightly different version of this story appeared in one of Germany's leading newspapers, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, quoted by The Guardian. Begin had offered to sell his gold watch as the conspirators ran out of money. The bomb was hidden in an encyclopedia and it killed a bomb-disposal expert, injuring two others. Adenauer was targeted because of the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany, signed at that time, which was violently opposed by Begin. Sudit, the story's source, explained that the "intent was not to hit Adenauer but to rouse the international media. It was clear to all of us there was no chance the package would reach Adenauer". The five conspirators were arrested by the French police, in Paris. They "were [former] members of the ... Irgun" (the organisation had been disbanded in 1948, 4 years earlier).[90]

Second government[edit]

When a rebellion in East Germany was harshly suppressed by the Red Army in June 1953, Adenauer took full advantage of the situation and was handily re-elected to a second term as Chancellor.[91] During the 1953 election, the CDU released a controversial poster with a sinister figure in red with series of red roads leading to him, under which was written "All Marxist roads lead to Moscow".[92] Many saw the poster with its message that there was no difference between the Social Democrats and the Communists as red-baiting.[92] The CDU/CSU came up one seat short of an outright majority. Adenauer could have governed alone without the support of other parties, but retained the support of nearly all of the parties in the Bundestag that were to the right of the SPD. For all of his efforts as West Germany's leader, Adenauer was named Time magazine's Man of the Year in 1953. In 1954, he received the Karlspreis (English: Charlemagne Award), an Award by the German city of Aachen to people who contributed to the European idea, European cooperation and European peace.

The German German Restitution Laws (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) were passed in 1953 that allowed some victims of Nazi prosecution to claim restitution.[93] Under the 1953 restitution law, those who had suffered for "racial, religious or political reasons" could collect compensation, which were defined in such a way as to sharply limit the number of people entitled to collect compensation.[94] A study done in 1953 showed that of the 42, 000 people who been held at the Buchenwald concentration camp, only 700 were entitled to compensation under the 1953 law.[95] The German historian Alf Lüdtke wrote that Adenauer's Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer "tried to save every last penny" when it came to compensating Nazi victims.[96] To be eligible for collecting compensation, one had to prove that one was part of the "realm of German language and culture", a requirement that excluded millions of people from Eastern Europe who taken to Germany to work as slave laborers during the war as most of the survivors did not know German or at least enough German to considered part of "realm of German language and culture".[97] Communist concentration camp survivors were excluded from compensation under the grounds that in 1933 the KPD had been seeking "violent domination" by working for a Communist revolution.[95] In 1956, the law was amended to allow Communist concentration camp survivors to collect compensation if they could prove that they not associated with Communist causes after 1945, but as almost all the surviving Communists belonged to the Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime, which had been banned in 1951 by the Hamburg government as a Communist front organisation, the new law did not help many of the KPD survivors.[95] The same law excluded homosexuals, the Roma and the Sinti, Asoziale ("Asocials"-people considered by the National Socialist state to be anti-social, a broad category comprising anyone from petty criminals to people who just were merely eccentric and non-conformist), and homeless people for their suffering in the concentration camps under the grounds that all these people were "criminals".[98] Lüdtke wrote that the decision to deny that the Roma and the Sinti had been victims of National Socialist racism and to exclude the Roma and Sinti from compensation under the grounds that they were all "criminals" reflected the same anti-Gypsy racism that made them the target of persecution and genocide during the National Socialist era.[99] The decision to deny compensation to gay survivors of the concentration camps was not surprising given that the 1935 version of Paragraph 175 was not repealed until 1969.[100] As a result, German homosexuals-in many cases survivors of the concentration camps-between 1949-69 continued to be convicted under the same law that had been used to convict them between 1935–45, through in the period 1949-69 they were sent to prison rather a concentration camp.[100] Aside from that, other global treaties for compensation were made with other European states in the following decades, to compensate for the Nazi crimes.[72]

Adenauer's achievements include the establishment of a stable democracy in West Germany and a lasting reconciliation with France, culminating in the Élysée Treaty. His political commitment to the Western powers achieved full sovereignty for West Germany, which was formally laid down in the General Treaty, although there remained Allied restrictions concerning the status of a potentially reunited Germany and the state of emergency in West Germany. Adenauer firmly integrated the country with the emerging Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation). Adenauer is closely linked to the implementation of an enhanced pension system, which ensured unparalleled prosperity for retired people. Along with his Minister for Economic Affairs and successor Ludwig Erhard, the West German model of a "social market economy" (a mixed economy with capitalism moderated by elements of social welfare and Catholic social teaching) allowed for the boom period known as the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle") that produced broad prosperity. The Adenauer era witnessed a dramatic rise in the standard of living of average Germans, with real wages doubling between 1950 and 1963. This rising affluence was accompanied by a 20% fall in working hours during that same period, together with a fall in the unemployment rate from 8% in 1950 to 0.4% in 1965.[101] in addition, an advanced welfare state was established.[102]

Adenauer with the mother of a German POW brought home in 1955 from the Soviet Union, due to Adenauer's visit to Moscow
Konrad Adenauer with minister of economics Ludwig Erhard, 1956. Adenauer acted more leniently towards the trade unions and employers' associations than Erhard.

In return for the release of the last German prisoners of war in 1955, the Federal Republic opened diplomatic relations with the USSR, but refused to recognize East Germany and broke off diplomatic relations with countries (e.g., Yugoslavia) that established relations with the East German régime.[103] In 1956, during the Suez Crisis, Adenauer completely supported the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, arguing to his Cabinet that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to cut down to size.[104] Adenauer went on to tell his Cabinet that the French were justified because of Nasser's support for the FLN in Algeria, but the British were partly to blame because they "inexplicably" shut down their Suez Canal base in 1954.[105] What appalled Adenauer about the Suez crisis was that the United States had come against the attack on Egypt, when led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests with no thought for European interests.[105] As a result of the Suez crisis, Adenauer reached the conclusion that the United States was not as dependable ally as he had believed, and the Europeans would have to do more to look after their own defense, and above all the link with France needed to be strengthened.[106] Adenauer was deeply shocked by the Soviet threat of nuclear strikes against Britain and France, and even more by the apparent quiescent American response to the Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation against two of NATO's key members.[107] The Bulganin letters threatening Soviet nuclear strikes against the main British and French cities showcased Europe's utter dependence upon the United States for its security against Soviet nuclear threats while at the same time seeming to show that the American nuclear umbrella was not as reliable as billed.[108] Adenauer was especially worried by the fact that the American embassy in Bonn would not provide a clear answer as to what was the American policy in response to the Bulganin letters.[109] As a result, Adenauer through not abandoning the idea of an Atlantic alliance with the United States, become more interested in the French idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War as an alternative security policy.[110] This helped to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, which was intended to be the foundation stone of the European "Third Force".[111]

When, in 1967, after his death at the age of 91, Germans were asked what they admired most about Adenauer, the majority responded that he had brought home the last German prisoners of war from the USSR, which had become known as the "Return of the 10,000". Adenauer reached an agreement for his "nuclear ambitions" with a NATO Military Committee in December 1956 that stipulated West German forces to be "equipped for nuclear warfare".[112] Concluding that the United States would eventually pull out of Western Europe, Adenauer pursued nuclear cooperation with other countries. The French government then proposed that France, West Germany and Italy jointly develop and produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and an agreement was signed in April 1958. With the ascendancy of Charles de Gaulle, the agreement for joint production and control was shelved indefinitely.[113] President John F. Kennedy, an ardent foe of nuclear proliferation, considered sales of such weapons moot since "in the event of war the United States would, from the outset, be prepared to defend the Federal Republic."[114] The physicists of the Max Planck Institute for Theoretical Physics at Göttingen and other renowned universities would have had the scientific capability for in-house development, but the will was absent,[115] nor was there public support. With Adenauer's fourth term election in November 1961 and the end of his chancellorship in sight, his "nuclear ambitions" began to taper off.

Third government[edit]

Signing the NATO treaty in Paris, 1954 (Adenauer at the left)

1957 saw the reintegration of the Saarland into West Germany . The election of 1957 essentially dealt with national matters.[115] His re-election campaigns centered around the slogan "No Experiments".[48] Riding a wave of popularity from the return of the last POWs from Soviet labor camps, as well as an extensive pension reform, Adenauer led the CDU/CSU to the first—and as of 2013, only—outright majority in a free German election.[116] In 1957, the Federal Republic signed the Treaty of Rome and become a founding member of the European Economic Community. In September 1958, Adenauer first met President Charles de Gaulle of France, who was to become a close friend and ally in pursuing Franco-German rapprochement.[117]

The famous election poster of 1957: "No experiments"

Briefly considered running for the office of Federal President in 1959. Adenauer's biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz commented that through Adenauer was normally very cautious and careful when making decisions, but at times, Adenauer would act recklessly and impulsively with no thought for the consequences.[118] Adenauer had tarnished his image when he announced he would run for the office of federal president in 1959, only to pull out when he discovered that under the Basic Law, the president had far less power than he did in the Weimar Republic. Adenauer believed that he could re-reinterpret the powers of the presidency in such a way as to be an effective power-player instead holding a merely ceremonial post.[119] In a letter that showed signs of much anger, President Heuss wrote to Adenauer that he had always worked to prevent him from attending cabinet meetings, and argued that having established that precedent, was now very annoyed by Adenauer's idea if he was elected president, he would chair cabinet meetings.[120] Additionally, the departing and respected Theodor Heuss had established the precedent that the president be nonpartisan, which clashed with Adenauer's vision.[121] After his reversal he supported the nomination of Heinrich Lübke as the CDU presidential candidate whom he believed weak enough not to interfere with his actions as Federal Chancellor. For a couple of weeks in 1959, Adenauer considered leaving the chancellorship and becoming Federal President. He initially believed the office could be fulfilled in a more politically active way than president Heuss did. He reconsidered, among other reasons, because he was afraid that Ludwig Erhard, whom Adenauer thought little of, would become the new chancellor.

In late 1959, a controversy broke out when it emerged that Theodor Oberländer, the Minister of Refugees since 1953 had committed war crimes against Jews and Poles during World War II.[122] Despite his past, on 10 December 1959, a statement was released to the press declaring that "Dr. Oberländer has the full confidence of the Adenauer cabinet".[123] Der Spiegel ran a cover-story on Oberländer and an editoral commented that "This man should never have been appointed a minister".[123] Even other Christian Democrats made it clear to Adenauer that they would have liked to see Oberländer out of the cabinet, and finally in May 1960 Oberländer resigned[124]

Fourth government[edit]

The mood had changed by election time in September 1961. Over the course of 1961, Adenauer had his concerns about both the status of Berlin and US leadership confirmed, as the Soviets and East Germans built the Berlin Wall. Adenauer had come into the year distrusting the new US President, John F. Kennedy. He doubted Kennedy's commitment to a free Berlin and a unified Germany and considered him undisciplined and naïve.[125]

For his part, Kennedy thought that Adenauer was a relic of the past, stating "The real trouble is that he is too old and I am too young for us to understand each other." Their strained relationship impeded effective Western action on Berlin during 1961.[126] The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the sealing of borders by the East Germans made his government look weak. His "reaction was ... lame;" he eventually flew to Berlin, but he appeared to have "lost his once instinctive, ultra-swift power of judgement".[127] After failing to keep their majority in the general election 36 days after the wall went up, the CDU/CSU again needed to include the FDP in a coalition government. To strike a deal, Adenauer was forced to make two concessions: to relinquish the chancellorship before the end of the new term, his fourth, and to replace his foreign minister.[128] In his last years in office, Adenauer used to take a nap after lunch and, when he was traveling abroad and had a public function to attend, he sometimes asked for a bed in a room close to where he was supposed to be speaking, so that he could rest briefly before he appeared.[129]

Plaque commemorating the restoration of relations between Germany and France, showing Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle.
Konrad Adenauer with Israeli President Zalman Shazar, 1966.

In October 1962, a scandal erupted when police arrested five Der Spiegel journalists, charging them with espionage for publishing a memo detailing weaknesses in the West German armed forces. Adenauer had not initiated the arrests, but initially defended the person responsible, Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, and called the Spiegel memo "abyss of treason". After public outrage and heavy protests from the coalition partner FDP he dismissed Strauss, but the reputation of Adenauer and his party had already suffered.[130][131]

Adenauer managed to remain in office for almost another year, but the scandal increased the pressure already on him to fulfill his promise to resign before the end of the term. Adenauer was not on good terms in his last years of power with his economics minister Ludwig Erhard and tried to block him from the chancellorship. In January 1963, Adenauer privately supported General Charles de Gaulle's veto of Britain's attempt to join the European Economic Community, and was only prevented from saying so openly by the need to preserve unity in his cabinet as most of his ministers led by Ludwig Erhard supported Britain's application.[132] A Francophile, Adenauer saw a Franco-German partnership as the key for European peace and prosperity and shared de Gaulle's view that Britain would be a disputative force in the EEC.[133] Adenauer failed in his efforts to block Erhard as his successor, and in October 1963 he turned the office over to Erhard. He did remain chairman of the CDU until his resignation in December 1966.[134]

Adenauer ensured a truly free and democratic society, which had been almost unknown to the German people before — notwithstanding the attempt between 1919 and 1933 (the Weimar Republic) — and which is today not just normal but also deeply integrated into modern German society. He thereby laid the groundwork for Germany to reenter the community of nations and to evolve as a dependable member of the Western world. It can be argued that because of Adenauer's policies, a later reunification of both German states was possible; and unified Germany has remained a solid partner in the European Union and NATO. The British historian Frederick Taylor argued that Federal Republic under Adenauer retained many of the characteristics of the authoritarian "deep state" that existed under the Weimar Republic, and that in many ways the Adenauer era was a transition in values and viewpoints from the authoritarianism that characterized Germany in the first half of the 20th century to the more democratic values that characterized the western half Germany in the second half of the 20th century.[135]

The German student movement of the late 1960s was essentially a left-wing protest against the conservatism that Adenauer—by then out of office—had personified. Radical student protesters and Marxist groups were further inflamed by strong Anti-Americanism fueled by the Vietnam War and opposition to the conservative Nixon administration.[136]

In retrospect, mainly positive assessments of his chancellorship prevail, not only with the German public, which voted him the "greatest German of all time" in a 2003 television poll,[137] but even with some of today's left-wing intellectuals, who praise his unconditional commitment to western-style democracy and European integration.[138]

Death[edit]

Adenauer delivering a speech at the March 1966 CDU party rally, one year before his death
Funeral service for Adenauer in Cologne Cathedral
Adenauer's grave

Adenauer died on 19 April 1967 in his family home at Rhöndorf. According to his daughter, his last words were "Da jitt et nix zo kriesche!" (Cologne dialect for "There's nothin' to weep about!")

Konrad Adenauer's state funeral in Cologne Cathedral was attended by a large number of world leaders, among them United States President Lyndon B. Johnson. After the Requiem Mass and service, his remains were taken upstream to Rhöndorf on the Rhine aboard Kondor, with two more Jaguar class fast attack craft of the German Navy, Seeadler and Sperber as escorts, "past the thousands who stood in silence on both banks of the river".[139] He is interred at the Waldfriedhof ("Forest Cemetery") at Rhöndorf.

Honours[edit]

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the German Wikipedia.

Time magazine named Adenauer as Man of the Year in 1953.

Legacy[edit]

Adenauer was the main motive for one of the most recent and famous gold commemorative coins: the Belgian 3 pioneers of the European unification commemorative coin, minted in 2002. The obverse side shows a portrait with the names Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and Konrad Adenauer.

Adenauer cabinets[edit]

First ministry[edit]

Changes

  • 13 October 1950 – Robert Lehr (CDU) succeeds Heinemann as Minister of the Interior.
  • 15 March 1951 – Konrad Adenauer becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Chancellor when the Allies allow this post to be revived.
  • 19 July 1952 – Fritz Neumayer (FDP) succeeds Wildermuth (died 9 March) as Minister of Construction.

Second ministry[edit]

Changes

  • 7 June 1955 – Theodor Blank (CDU) becomes Minister of Defense when that post is revived.
  • 8 June 1955 – Heinrich von Brentano (CDU) succeeds Adenauer as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (DP) succeeds Hellwege as Minister of Bundesrat Affairs.
  • 19 October 1955 – Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) becomes Minister of Atomic Affairs
  • 12 November 1955 – Tillmanns leaves the cabinet.
  • 16 October 1956 – Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) succeeds Blank as Minister of Defense. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz succeeds Neumayr as Minister of Justice. Kraft and Schäfer leave the Cabinet. Siegfried Balke (CSU) succeeds Strauss as Minister of Atomic Affairs.
  • 15 November 1956 – Ernst Lemmer (CDU) succeeds Balke as Minister of Posts and Communications.

Third ministry[edit]

Changes

  • 13 September 1959 – Werner Schwarz (CDU) succeeds Lübke as Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry.
  • 5 April 1960 – Oberländer resigns as Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims.
  • 4 May 1960 – Hans Wilhelmi (CDU) succeeds Lindrath (died 27 February) as Minister of Federal Economic Possessions.
  • 27 October 1960 – Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (CDU) becomes Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims.

Fourth ministry[edit]

Changes

  • 19 November 1962 Ewald Bucher (FDP) succeeds Stammberger as Minister of Justice. Werner Dollinger (CSU) succeeds Lenz as Minister of Federal Treasure.
  • 14 December 1962 – Rolf Dahlgrün (FDP) succeeds Starke as Minister of Finance. Bruno Heck (CDU) succeeds Wuermeling as Minister of Family and Youth Affairs. Hans Lenz (FDP) enters the ministry as Minister of Scientific Research. Rainer Barzel (CDU) succeeds Lemmer as Minister of All-German Affairs. Alois Niederalt (CSU) succeeds Merkatz as Minister of Bundesrat and State Affairs. The Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Water is abolished, and Balke leaves the cabinet.
  • 9 January 1963 – Kai-Uwe von Hassel (CDU) succeeds Strauss as Minister of Defense.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ "Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967)". 
  2. ^ Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer era (1975) p. 290
  3. ^ a b David W. Del Testa, ed. (2001). "Adenauer, Konrad". Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists. Westport, CT: Oryx Press. p. 4.   – via Questia (subscription required)
  4. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 p. 81
  5. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer (1995) 1:94
  6. ^ Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer (1995) 1:97–99
  7. ^ a b Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 539.
  8. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 539-540.
  9. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 540-541.
  10. ^ Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer (1995) 1:128–31
  11. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 17.
  12. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 20.
  13. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 536.
  14. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 541.
  15. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 541-542.
  16. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 179-182.
  17. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 182.
  18. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 183.
  19. ^ a b c d e Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 542.
  20. ^ a b Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 184.
  21. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 88
  22. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 pages 81 & 88
  23. ^ Williams, p. 201.
  24. ^ Williams, p. 212.
  25. ^ Cited by Peter Koch: Adenauer. Reinbek 1985
  26. ^ Letter to the Prussian Interior Minister of 10th August 1934 (after his firing), available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10045. Additional letter of 18th September 1962 that confirms the content of the 1934 letter, both reproduced in: Delmer, Sefton; Die Deutschen und ich; Hamburg 1963, S.751 (1962 Faksimilie), 752-60 (1934)
  27. ^ http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521797.html.  Missing or empty |title= (help)
  28. ^ 29. Juni 1933: Letter to Dora Pferdmenges, Köln, of Maria Laach, available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10048 and also in the book review: Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. Der Aufstieg 1876–1952. In: Der Spiegel, Nr 40, 1986 online at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521797.htm
  29. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 322-323
  30. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 321-323
  31. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 323
  32. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 320-321
  33. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 320
  34. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 345-346
  35. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 344-346
  36. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 344
  37. ^ a b c d e Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 96.
  38. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 308
  39. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 98.
  40. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 97.
  41. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 335-337
  42. ^ a b c d e Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 336
  43. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages xii-xv.
  44. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 132.
  45. ^ a b Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 133.
  46. ^ Williams, p. 307
  47. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 371.
  48. ^ a b Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York, New York: Basic Books. p. 8. ISBN 0-465-04195-7. 
  49. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 3.
  50. ^ a b c d Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 3.
  51. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 4.
  52. ^ Williams, p. 340
  53. ^ A Good European Time 5 December 1949
  54. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, p. 450 (Google books)
  55. ^ a b c d e Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 638.
  56. ^ Duffy, Christopher Red Storm on the Reich, Routledge: London, 1991 page 302
  57. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 page 11.
  58. ^ Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31-63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 pages 41-42.
  59. ^ a b Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31-63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 42.
  60. ^ Daugherty, Leo J. (2011). "'Tip of the Spear': The Formation and Expansion of the Bundeswehr, 1949–1963". Journal of Slavic Military Studies 24 (1): 147–177. doi:10.1080/13518046.2010.549052. 
  61. ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 pages 37-40.
  62. ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 page 39.
  63. ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 page 40.
  64. ^ The Nazi-ferreting questionnaire cited 136 mandatory reasons for exclusion from employment and created red-tape nightmares for both the hapless and the guilty; see The New York Times, 22 February 2003, p. A7.
  65. ^ Steinweis, Alan E., Rogers, Daniel E. The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2003, p. 235
  66. ^ a b Art, David, The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 53-55
  67. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 153-154.
  68. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 154-155.
  69. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 156-159.
  70. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 164-165.
  71. ^ Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 168-169.
  72. ^ a b Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung - Wiedergutmachung
  73. ^ The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History, Spencer Tucker, Priscilla Mary Roberts, p. 33, 2008
  74. ^ Harding, Luke (15 June 2006). "Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor'". Guardian (London). 
  75. ^ Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personen - 11 May 1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I 22/1951, p. 307 ff.)
  76. ^ Jeffrey Herf in The New Republic, 10 March 2003; book review of Frei, Norbert, Amnesty and Amnesia, Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration
  77. ^ Williams, p.390
  78. ^ Ozment, Steven. A Mighty Fortress. A New History of the German People. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 2004, p.291
  79. ^ ""E EICHMANN TRIAL"". Central Intelligence Agency (in German). 6. April 1961. Retrieved 18. April 2010. 
  80. ^ Wolfgang Breyer (2003). ""Dr. Max Merten - ein Militärbeamter der deutschen Wehrmacht im Spannungsfeld zwischen Legende und Wahrheit"". Inauguraldissertation, Universität Mannheim (in German). Retrieved 18. April 2010. 
  81. ^ a b Williams, p. 391
  82. ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/index.htm.  Missing or empty |title= (help)
  83. ^ http://www.3sat.de/page/?source=/ard/thementage/165494/index.html.  Missing or empty |title= (help)
  84. ^ Williams, p. 375
  85. ^ Williams, p. 373
  86. ^ Williams, p. 376
  87. ^ Williams, p. 378
  88. ^ Interview with H. Sietz, investigator (German)
  89. ^ Background history of assassination attempt (German)
  90. ^ Harding, Luke (15 June 2006). "Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor'". London: The Guardian. 
  91. ^ Williams, p. 406
  92. ^ a b Banchoff, Thomas The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999 page 52
  93. ^ Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung
  94. ^ Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542-572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 pages 564.
  95. ^ a b c Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542-572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 page 564.
  96. ^ Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542-572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 page 569.
  97. ^ Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542-572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 pages 567.
  98. ^ Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542-572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 pages 564- 565.
  99. ^ Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542-572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 pages 565 & 568-569.
  100. ^ a b Burleigh, Michael & Wippermann, Wolfgang The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 page 183.
  101. ^ Contemporary World History by William J. Duiker
  102. ^ The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, edited by Wolfgang Mommsen
  103. ^ Williams, p. 450; this principle became known as the Hallstein Doctrine
  104. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 241-242.
  105. ^ a b Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 242.
  106. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 242-243.
  107. ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008 p. 273
  108. ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, p. 273.
  109. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 244.
  110. ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, pp. 273–274.
  111. ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, p. 274.
  112. ^ Williams, p. 442
  113. ^ Williams, p. 458
  114. ^ Williams, p. 490
  115. ^ a b Williams, p. 444
  116. ^ Williams, p. 445
  117. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 365-366
  118. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 421
  119. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 421-422
  120. ^ Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952-1967 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 422
  121. ^ Williams, p. 464
  122. ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 pages 191-192
  123. ^ a b Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 page 192
  124. ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 pages 192-193
  125. ^ Kempe, Frederick (2011). Berlin 1961. Penguin Group (USA). p. 98. ISBN 0-399-15729-8. 
  126. ^ Kempe, Frederick (2011). Berlin 1961. Penguin Group (USA). p. 101. ISBN 0-399-15729-8. 
  127. ^ Williams, pp. 492–493
  128. ^ Williams, p. 494; Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano was considered too subservient to the Chancellor and Gerhard Schröder became foreign minister [Williams, p. 495]
  129. ^ John Gunther: Inside Europe Today, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1961; Library of Congress catalog card number: 61-9706
  130. ^ Eleanor L. Turk, The history of Germany (1999) p. 154
  131. ^ Ronald F. Bunn, German politics and the Spiegel affair: a case study of the Bonn system (1968) pp. 159–60
  132. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 83
  133. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 97
  134. ^ Ronald J. Granieri, The ambivalent alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966 (2004) p. 191 online
  135. ^ Taylor, Frederick Exorcising Hitler, London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 371.
  136. ^ Time, 3 July 1972, p. 37
  137. ^ http://unserebesten.zdf.de/
  138. ^ Williams, p. 403
  139. ^ Williams, p. 537.
  140. ^ a b c d e f Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Biographie, Orden und Ehrenzeichen.
  141. ^ "Dr. Adenauer Grand Cross". Catholic Herald. 11 January 1957. Retrieved 2 October 2012. 
  142. ^ "Reply to a parliamentary question" (pdf) (in German). p. 26. Retrieved 2 October 2012. 
  143. ^ Ehrenlegion
  144. ^ Konrad Adenauer, Orden und Ehrenzeichen, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

References and bibliography[edit]

  • Cudlipp, E. Adenauer (1985)
  • Granieri, Ronald J. The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966 (2004) 250 pages excerpt and text search
  • Heidenheimer, Arnold J. Adenauer and the CDU: the Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party (1960)
  • Hiscocks, Richard. The Adenauer Era (1966)
  • Rovan, Joseph. Konrad Adenauer (1987) 182 pages excerpt and text search
  • Schwarz, Hans-Peter. Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952.
  • Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (2001), 624pp
  • "Konrad Adenauer" in Encyclopædia Britannica (Macropedia) © 1989
  • Tammann, Gustav A. and Engelbert Hommel. (1999). Die Orden und Ehrenzeichen Konrad Adenauers,

Primary sources[edit]

  • Adenauer, Konrad. Memoirs, (4 vols. English edition 1966–70)

External links[edit]

Political offices
Vacant
Title last held by
Dietlof von Arnim-Boitzenburg
as President of the Prussian House of Lords
President of the Prussian State Council
1921–1933
Succeeded by
Robert Ley
Vacant
Title last held by
Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
as Leitender Minister
Federal Chancellor of West Germany
1949–1963
Succeeded by
Ludwig Erhard
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
1951–1955
Succeeded by
Heinrich von Brentano di Tremezzo