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► **To cite this version:**

Jen Nelles, Jill Simone Gross, Loraine Kennedy. The role of governance networks in building metropolitan scale. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 2018, Constructing metropolitan scales: economic, political and discursive determinants, 6 (2), pp.159-181. 10.1080/21622671.2017.1421478 . hal-02178323

HAL Id: hal-02178323

<https://hal.science/hal-02178323>

Submitted on 22 Aug 2023

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The role of governance networks in building metropolitan scale

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Abstract: The broad aim of this comparative study is to examine the relationship between governance networks and the emergence (or lack thereof) of metropolitan scales, through analysis of metropolitan development policy processes. This article explores the

characteristics and substance of policies that purport to be metropolitan in scope through a set of six case studies of global city regions lacking a formal metropolitan scale government: Berlin, Delhi, New York, Paris, Rome and Shenzhen. We do this to get a better sense of the networks, strategies and approaches used in various contexts to tackle boundary-spanning issues in regions. In three paired case studies we analyse what interests and actors were involved, how central each of these actors was to the policy process, and what territorial scales and interests dominated to identify commonalities across cases and look for evidence of the emergence of new actors in metropolitan policy making and of political rescaling.

Introduction

This comparison aims to explore the relationship between governance networks and the emergence (or lack thereof) of metropolitan scales, through analysis of metropolitan development policy processes.¹ Our assumption is that development occurs within complex governance spaces that incorporate state and non-state actors (Hambleton and Gross, 2007; Pierre, 2014). What remains understudied is which groups of actors are central in this process, and what are the implications? Is metropolitan development policy the outcome of a plurality of actors operating across scales as some researchers assert (Ansell and Gash, 2009; Bramwell and Pierre, 2017; Clarke, 2017; Gross, 2017), is it the outcome of top-down processes (Rhodes, 2008); is it a response to economic globalization and decentering (Bevir, M 2013)? Do metropolitan development policies reflect scalar shifts in power or business as usual (Brenner, 2004; Cox, 1998, Mayer, 2012)?

To engage with these questions this paper examines the *characteristics and substance of policies* that purport to be metropolitan in scope through a set of six case studies of global city regions lacking a formal metropolitan scale government: Berlin, Delhi, New York, Paris, Rome and Shenzhen. We examine the networks, strategies and approaches across three paired comparisons. Clustering and economic growth policies are explored in the Shenzhen and Rome metro regions. The New York and Delhi cases analyze coordinated public transportation across jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, the Berlin-Brandenburg and Paris cases reflect efforts to construct formal institutional structures around planning and governance functions beyond local jurisdictions. Of primary interest were the characteristics of the network – the interests and actors involved, how central they were to the policy process, and the territorial scales and interests that dominated. We were particularly interested to see if there was evidence of new types actors, of shifting roles over time, and of rescaling.

We would expect to see evidence of *rescaling* if we observe change in the scale at which policies are made or state functions are assigned. Without subscribing to the thesis of a diminished national state, it is generally observed that globalization processes have enhanced the significance of both supranational and subnational scales with respect to economic governance. However, the extent to which an actual shift in state scales transpires and the modalities of that shift vary widely. State spaces are produced by socio-political forces emanating from various geographical scales, through processes that are contested (Swyngedouw 1997). This is because the organizational scales for political,

economic and social relations are constantly ‘worked’ by social forces.² We use this conception of state space to comparatively examine processes of metropolitan scale formation (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Jessop, 2001).

In what follows, we briefly present six case studies, that explore these core hypotheses:

- H¹ Metropolitan scaled development policies are the product of network governance.

In the absence of formal metropolitan governments, we expect that policies that address boundary spanning issues will involve a wide variety of actors at multiple political scales.

- H² The composition of actors in these networks shapes the agenda around the metropolitan policy.

We expect that the types of actors involved in policy formation will influence how the policy is framed and implemented.

- H³ The territorial scale of the policy – the definition of what is “metropolitan” – will be shaped by the most dominant actors in the policy process.

We expect that the most politically dominant and central actors in the network will have the most influence on dictating the scale and scope.

- H⁴ These metropolitan processes are likely to show that the roles of actors have

been influenced by the imperatives of globalization, shifts consistent with rescaling.

Because there are no metropolitan governments in the case regions we expect that metropolitan policies will be the result of bargaining between a wide variety of actors acting on the perceived imperatives of international competitiveness.

Our analysis revealed both surprising and expected results. While we found evidence of governance networks with relatively broad participation in each case, we also found that governmental actors dominated, reinforcing traditional socio-political hierarchies, while servicing the interests of the most central political and private sector actors. While we acknowledge that there are some inherent biases in our case study selections (see methodology), the degree of consistency in our findings across cases suggests that the novelty of metropolitan governance in major global city regions should be approached critically. The existence of broad-based political networks around boundary spanning policy issues is not, in itself, evidence that traditional political power structures are in flux, or that new metropolitan scales are being institutionalized.

Methodology

This analysis of network governance was derived through a process of reverse engineering. We began with the dependent variable: metropolitan policy. In each of the six case studies we focused on policies intended to solve problems at the metropolitan scale. We selected cases from the iMRC study - Berlin, Delhi, New York, Paris, Rome

and Shenzhen – and paired them according to their primary policy goals, recognizing that in most cases there were secondary goals as well. This approach yielded a pair of cases in transportation (New York and Delhi), economic restructuring (Shenzhen and Rome³); and territorial reorganization and place making (Paris and Berlin).

Our comparative research was conducted between 2012-2016 by the “International Metropolitan Research Consortium” (a multidisciplinary and global group of 11 researchers) (d’Albergo and Lefèvre, XXXXX). Each case study was constructed through analysis of the relevant secondary literature and research. Teams developed primary data through analysis of core government documents (legislation, project reports, budgetary and planning documents), transcripts of public hearings, textual analysis of newspapers, and interviews with key informants. Though each team approached their research through their respective disciplines, all explored what drives metropolitan development, path dependency or globalization. This comparative analysis builds off the detailed local knowledge and case material of the iMRC team, presented at research meetings and their own case publications

Comparative case study allows for more nuanced study of common phenomenon, despite cross-national variation in governmental forms. Paired case analysis permitted us to explore the drivers of metropolitan development policies, looking specifically at the question of whether such comparison would reveal the existence of policy networks, and if so whether variations in our dependent variable (policy) might be explained by the characteristics of those networks (composition, scale and complexity). Though cases are

drawn from a wide range of political systems: unitary, federal, presidential, parliamentary, Democratic, and Communist, our interest was in uncovering the nuances of these processes amidst difference. Following researchers such as Przeworski and Teune (1970), we approach comparison through the lens of difference. Working inductively, we sought to explore the degree to which similar outcomes were viable, despite systemic differences.

Dependent variable: Policies and programs

We began by generating a basic summary of the problem (or opportunity) at which the policy was aimed (i.e. content, history and evolution). All were metropolitan development initiatives in place or in the process of implementation.

We then sought to operationalize the dependent variables through analysis of:

- The territorial scope of the policy/program (Extent).
- The primary goals of the policy/program (Agenda)
- How comprehensive the policy and program was (Ambition).

Given the lack of a universally understood conception of the territorial scope of “metropolitan” policies, we focused on those that were designed to operate at the “statistically” or “state defined” metropolitan scale.

We then sought to understand the core goals of the policy itself (agenda orientation).

Was the policy tied to economic development (growth and competitiveness), social investment (equity, welfare and redistribution), post materialism (quality of life), or a

hybrid mix?

Finally, we considered the question of whether the size of a project and its complexity were related to the complexity of the network itself. We then evaluated the ambition of the project. We considered large infrastructure projects to be highly ambitious whereas projects that required members to sacrifice fewer resources were considered less ambitious.

Independent variable: Networks

We expected that the mix of actors (nodes) and their relationships to one another (ties) would shape the capacity of the network to get metropolitan policies on the political agenda, to formulate and implement them.

To operationalize the independent variable, we:

- Identified the mix of actors in each case (i.e. the nodes).
- Considered which ones were central (leaders), secondary (involved but not in leadership roles) and peripheral (interested, but not formally involved) in initiating, developing, or implementing, recognizing that some actors might play oppositional roles that were equally important in understanding these processes.
- Third, given our interests in understanding “agenda orientation” in the dependent variable, we explored what policy sectors these actors came from and what resources they brought to bear on decision making (political, economic or social

power). We assumed this would add to our understanding of power within networks, allowing us to see if sector based interests affected the types of policies being pursued, and how ambitious they were.

Case Studies

For the three sets of case studies we utilized the primary problem/opportunity that the policy aimed to address as the basis for our pairing, while still cognizant of the fact that agenda orientations were not always synched with the problem/opportunity structure. These cases are summarized in Table 1.

The cases of New York and Delhi addressed regional transit. In both cases, policies were targeted at the creation of major new transportation infrastructure, aimed at increasing connectivity with the region. The cases of Shenzhen and Rome explored the conditions and policies that situated cities as nodal points within their respective metropolitan regions. In Paris and Berlin, the emphasis was on territorial reorganization itself and international promotion of the region.

[Table 1 here]

As we demonstrate below, across all six case studies the dominant agenda orientations were largely economic growth. Thus, regional transit, nodal points, and territorial reorganization, were all viewed as means of growing local economies and enhancing

competitiveness of the region within the larger global economic system. Social investment and post-material agendas though present were secondary concerns.

Regional Transit Cases

New York: East Side Access in Midtown Manhattan

The problem: The New York (NY) metropolitan area (the MSA is defined by the US census as New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA) is heavily transit dependent. While regional rail and subway lines are used in all directions, they are under pressure to provide greater access to Manhattan, the region's core. During weekdays Manhattan's population increases from 1.6 million to 3.1 million (Roberts, 2013), 84% of trips are via public transit (Moss & Qing, 2012). Suburban rail lines have struggled to maintain adequate service. Delays and inefficient routing threaten to increase congestion on other modes of transit, impacting worker productivity and the competitiveness of Midtown Manhattan as a center of employment.

One chokepoint for travelers coming from the eastern suburbs of Long Island (LI) on commuter rail – serving approximately 100,000 passengers a day (Galloway, 2015) – has been that the terminus of the Long Island Railroad (LIRR) is Penn Station (located in Midtown West). This is problematic as many of these travelers are destined for offices in Midtown East, requiring them to backtrack using other forms of transportation such as subway, bus or taxi. Commuters whose final destinations are to the Northeast or Southeast of Midtown are also forced to travel long distances, retracing ground covered

by rail. These inconveniences paired with overcrowding at Penn Station precipitated the aptly named East Side Access (ESA) project.

The ESA project extends some LIRR lines into Grand Central Terminal on the east side of Midtown. The result will be a more convenient commute for passengers bound for the east side, and the alleviation of some of the capacity issues at Penn Station. The current iteration of the project secured federal funding in 2006 and construction began the following year. This is the most recent attempt to provide an LIRR outlet on the east side. Various connections had been discussed since the 1950s. One plan began construction in 1969 only to be halted during the financial crisis in 1975. Fortunately, the current project leverages some of the tunnels that were abandoned. Even with this legacy infrastructure, officials estimate that the project will not be completed until 2023 (Flegenheimer, 2014). Total costs are estimated to top \$10.8 billion.

Although this infrastructure project is localized to a small section of the City of NY, when completed this project will positively impact commuters entering the core from all points of the region. As such, the policy can be reasonably said to affect all of the areas served by commuter rail. However, because there are counties in the region that are not served by rail transit, the *extent* of the policy is sub-metropolitan. The ESA project is aimed at serving an economic development *agenda* by maintaining the competitiveness of Midtown job centers. It is a high *ambition* project that combines a large capital investment, long project timeline, and requires the cooperation of multiple public and

private actors and levels of government.

Nodes and centrality: The networks operate both horizontally within the NY MSA, as well as vertically between locality and the Federal scale. State actors (including city, state and federal elected officials representing constituencies that are either directly or indirectly impacted by ESA construction or by anticipated ESA economic impacts) dominate the ESA networks, vertically, and horizontally. The horizontal network includes a broader mix of actors - state, market and civil society. To the extent that the projects funding is largely funneled through the Metropolitan Transportation Council (the region's MPO), there is a formally constituted metropolitan entity involved in the initiation and funding of the project. Alongside of this, one finds an informally constituted ensemble of actors (civic groups, private sector actors, and locally elected officials) operating horizontally who have actively engaged in shaping, tweaking, speeding up and delaying the project at various points in time.

The central actors making up the ESA network node are state actors, stretching from NY City to Washington DC via Albany - the NY State capitol. They have been responsible for funding and re-initiating the ESA project. At the subnational state level, NY Governor George Pataki who came to office in 1995, put rail service development as one of his core priorities with ESA as a lynchpin of his planned investments. Funding was secured with the support of US Senators and Representatives. The MTA, a NY State controlled entity, was the core agency responsible for project implementation and development.

At the scale of the municipality, where the vertical network of state actors intersects with the horizontal network of municipal, private and civic actors, a group of actors plays a secondary role, shaping but not driving the project. This group threatened to hold the ESA project hostage in the absence of state support for other transit projects. The state actors in this group were led by NY State Assemblyman Sheldon Silver representing lower Manhattan, NYC Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and a bipartisan coalition of East side local government council members. On the private sector side two of the most powerful property developers in New York, Lewis Rudin and Douglas Durst, banded together with the NYC Partnership and the Chamber of Commerce to advocate for East side transit development. This group threatened to block the ESA project by withholding political support for the Executive budget and financial support for campaigns unless the Governor supported the construction of a second transit mega project – the Second Avenue subway. Using a mix of political and economic power, this group was important not only for moving the project forward, but also for tying what was viewed as a largely suburban project to urban interests. Powerful civic groups like the Regional Plan Association also supported this larger vision. This secondary group helped define the contours of the project, timing and scale.

Peripheral actors include suburban LI town council members, only partially involved in both vertical and horizontal networks, advocating against the placement of additional rail yards in their localities to accommodate the increased rail capacity that ESA, but with little real power over the project itself. Economic interests like the LI Association (a Chamber of commerce) supported ESA as critical not only for the mobility of

commuters, but also as potentially opening up the region to additional commerce and investment due to its enhanced connectivity to region's core. Interestingly, AMTRAK the publicly subsidized national rail operator, and technically the entity in control of a core aspect of the switching mechanism needed for the whole system to function, played only a peripheral role in the ESA network. While this is clearly a simplification of the contours of the network itself, one begins to see that it is driven by state, secondarily by private sector actors and civic actors play peripheral roles.

Policy domains: The ESA network operates within two policy domains – transportation and real estate development. It crosses policy domains through ESA project implementation. It is a network focused on transit development, which dabbles in those areas that will facilitate or hinder its progress.

Globalization, while an important driver of the ESA development and shaper of its network, is still secondary to the politics of path dependency. Entrenched institutional constructs that evolved out of historical rivalries and relationships indicative of the US Federal –state and local political systems, continue to shape what, how and when that development occurs.

From Metro to Regional Transit System in Delhi

Problem: The metro rail policy for Delhi emerged in the early 1990s when population growth, traffic congestion linked to the rapid increase of private vehicles, and air

pollution became major challenges for the region. Built to improve mobility and relieve the inadequate bus network, the metro was also an opportunity for policy-makers to project Delhi as a modern city, “a vehicle for societal transformation” (Siemiatycki 2006: 278), at a time when strong growth was fueling aspirations for change. The first metro line opened in 2002 on schedule and subsequent lines were rolled out without significant cost overruns. Currently in its third phase of development, the metro network covers nearly 200 km and is used by approximately 2.5 million commuters daily. The success of the metro’s first phases in the core city, created political and societal pressure for extension into the greater metropolitan area.

Policy: This case focuses on current plans for a massive extension of the metro rail network into the National Capital Region (NCR), via a Regional Rapid Transit System (RRTS). Phase I, approved in 2013, will add approximately 380 km of rail to the existing network. It will link central Delhi to secondary cities located within the metropolitan region including Panipat, Meerut and Alwar . By the end of Phase II (2017-2022) the total length of the network will be 640 km. This design reflects political realities and the role that state governments will have in raising funds and implementation (land acquisition, choice of contractors, institutional arrangements). In contrast to the metro, largely financed through soft loans, private sector investment is expected to cover 30% of the cost of the RRTS.

Like the NYC case, the *extent* of the RRTS project is sub-metropolitan as it will only serve those areas located near the rail line, but it will have wide-ranging consequences for

spatial integration and structuring, as the corridors dictate the location of commercial and residential property investments, as well as major public infrastructure projects. Although economic development is a major justification (*agenda*), RRTS is an *ambitious* policy conceived in response to rapid population growth and the grossly inadequate conventional transport network (road, rail, bus). From the point of view of the States, transit oriented development (TOD) is driving their commitment to the policy, as transport infrastructure provides an opportunity to partner with private capital and equip urban areas. Given that much of the NCR is low-density and under-equipped, there is tremendous potential for large projects (Delhi's territory is only 5% of NCR area).

Nodes: The 1995 decision to build a metro in Delhi was taken after decades of discussion over jurisdictional prerogatives between Delhi and the Union (federal) government (Siemiatycki 2006). Tensions in the vertical network appear structural, given that the National capital territory of Delhi (aka Delhi State) does not enjoy the full status of a state in India's federal system. Policing, land management and planning are directly controlled by the Union government, the latter via the powerful Delhi Development Authority. The land reserves in the city and the regulation of private sector housing construction is under control of this agency, effectively expanding the reach of the Union government over Delhi State. The vertical governance network of Delhi's metro project is comprised of various state actors and para-statal agencies, with the Union government playing the dominant role. A large share of funding for the metro has been provided by the Japan International Cooperation Agency through soft loans (60% of total costs in Phase I, 40% in the current Phase III). This external actor has shaped some aspects of the

project, including the choice of suppliers and sub-contracting firms, as the policy envisages a supporting role for private property developers, subordinate to state actors.

Centrality: The central actor in the network is an ad hoc agency, the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC), set up for planning, building and operating the metro. It is a joint venture, with equal equity stakes between Delhi State and the Union government.

All operational decisions are taken within the DMRC, and although it is positioned at the center of the governance network, it is insulated from the pressures of everyday politics (Bon 2015). The Union government facilitates the tasks of the DMRC by making land available at below-market rates for the transport component of the project. The DMRC is also exempt from paying most taxes levied by various levels of government. The waiver on property tax was hotly disputed by the municipality and resulted in a court case, an indication of the tensions between actors at the local scale.

Significantly, it was the Union Government who spearheaded the decision to extend the Delhi metro to the wider metropolitan region, via the RRTS. The authorities in Delhi State were initially opposed because it would generate additional maintenance costs for the DMRC, in which Delhi State has a 50% stake. The national Planning Commission argued that from an economic point of view the NCR, and not the boundary of Delhi, is the relevant geographical scale for the metro rail.⁴ This position was supported by the National Capital Region Planning Board, a professional body, which recommends an integrated multimodal transport system for the region (NCRPB 2013: 57).

As this makes clear, the Union government (via the agencies it controls), asserts a dominant position in the governance hierarchy, notably in Delhi State. The situation is more nuanced in the NCR because it encompasses territory from three other states (Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh), which, unlike Delhi, enjoy wide-ranging constitutional powers with regard to land. This positions them as key players in the RRTS where they are situated at the intersection of vertical and horizontal governance networks. In 2013 they joined together with Delhi State and the Union government to form a Transport Corporation to coordinate regional rail corridors. Each state holds 12.5% stake, and the Union government a 50% stake. The RRTS project requires additional policy measures and legislation, for which the Union government has again taken the lead. For realizing the project on the ground, state governments, through their control over land management, will be the key players. Governance networks will probably extend to property developers with whom state governments have more or less institutionalized relations, although their participation may be more informal than formal. Property developers stand to reap significant profits through rising land values and advantageous building rules in proximity to rail lines and stations. The specific characteristics of these regional governance networks, driven by the respective state governments, will significantly shape the the RRTS within the metropolitan region. Here, the Union government will not be in a position to exert the same degree of influence over the network as it has for the core city.

Globalization is an important factor driving the agenda to position Delhi as a global city (Dupont 2011), but it has not substantially reconfigured governance networks, which are marked by path dependency. In particular, the Union government controls the powerful

transport agency (DMRC) at the center of the governance network in the core city, marginalizing both local state actors and civic society groups. In the National Capital Region, state governments play a decisive role in implementation within a broad policy framework largely imposed from above.

Clustering/Growth Pole Cases

Shenzhen Building a Mega Region to Consolidate Growth

Policy and Problem: This case examines the policy of regional scale-building in through territorial reforms and strategic planning. The Chinese central government established its first Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen in 1979, authorizing foreign firms to set up production units mainly for export.⁵ Shenzhen's economy has grown spectacularly since, making it one of China's most compelling economic development success stories. From clusters of fishing villages, Shenzhen grew into a sprawling urban agglomeration with more than 10 million inhabitants. This metropolitan city, contiguous to Hong Kong, is nested within an urbanized, densely populated and economically dynamic region, the Pearl River Delta (PRD).

Starting in the late 1990s the formation of mega urban regions, comprised of large cities and their hinterland of smaller cities and rural areas, received a strong push from the Chinese state. This policy was a response to 'contradictions' that had arisen from a first round of devolution to municipalities, which resulted in fierce inter-city competition producing redundant infrastructures and industries (Wu, Zhang 2010). Regionalization was formally adopted as a national strategy in the 9th Five Year Plan (1996-2000) (Ye

2013: 293). The concept of the PRD Mega Region dates from 2007 and was formally adopted with a regional plan called ‘Outline Plan for the Reform and Development of the PRD (2008-2020)’, hereafter Outline Plan (OP).

In the mid-1990s, prior to the adoption of the OP, strategic development plans conceived by the Guangdong provincial government focused on two main corridors radiating out from Guangzhou, one towards Shenzhen the other towards Zhuhai. Subsequent plans, including the OP, challenged Guangzhou’s position as the core city by promoting a multi-centric growth trajectory in the PRD Mega Region. The aim was to ‘maximize the showcase effect of the Shenzhen and Zhuhai special economic zones’ and make them ‘the national laboratory for in-depth reform and institutional innovation’ (Yang and Jin 2011, cited by Ye 2013: 295). Today the Mega Region encompasses three city regions and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao). The city regions are: Guangzhou–Foshan–Zhaoqin, Shenzhen–Dongguan–Huizhou, and Zhuhai–Zhongshan–Jiangmen. In 2010, this mega region had an area of 54,733 km², 52 million people, and it produced approximately 10% of China’s GDP.

In terms of reach, the OP *extends* to the entire PRD Mega Region, encompassing the three metropolitan regions cited above. Its *agenda* is primarily economic, and reflects national priorities. It was adopted in late 2008 when the effects of the global financial crisis were being felt in the region. At this same time, the economic integration of Hong Kong and Macao into national territory via the PRD region was given high importance at the national level. The OP is extremely *ambitious in scope*; its goals are to equalize basic

public services in the region, generate infrastructure ‘unification’, economic restructuring and environmental protection. The policy’s importance can be inferred from the extensive efforts that have been made to ensure compliance through frequent reporting and evaluation.

Nodes and Centrality: The governance network of the PRD Mega Region comprises a range of actors spanning the public-private spectrum. Although state actors are the main drivers, private firms are playing increasingly important roles in the governance network. Ultimately, the success of policy goals (growth, innovation, sustainability) is dependent on economic actors, state-owned and private firms, domestic and foreign. In this context, state actors situated at various levels are increasingly attentive to the demands of firms, and include them in the governance network. Large firms have shown that they can be responsive to local needs by partnering with local government in urban development projects, as discussed below.

In this emerging governance arrangement, a formal network of institutional state actors co-exists alongside informal networks, which include large firms. Large firms negotiate directly with state actors at various spatial scales, from national to local.

Vertically, the governance network is primarily comprised of Communist Party officials at various government levels. In the case of the PRD Mega Region policy the main promoter was the Guangdong provincial party secretary, Wang Yang, who served in this position from 2007 until he was promoted to the central government in late 2012 as Vice Premier. Because of the OP’s strategic importance, mayors in the region are held

accountable for its implementation, and are required to file reports every six months. Thus mayors represent secondary actors in the network, shaping outcomes but not necessarily consulted with regard to the overall policy. They draw up local development plans in conformity with the OP and more importantly, exert influence on the ground through various interventions. To anchor large firms, like Huawei, local government customizes policies and targets public investments to meet their needs. In this way, large firms indirectly influence local policy and planning, and help municipalities and provincial governments realize their goals by investing directly in urban space. This was observed in Shenzhen, where large technology firms linked up with real estate companies to develop commercial and residential property on the city outskirts, creating employment and attracting new investments from service companies (Lefèvre, d'Albergo, and Ye 2015: 9). Private firms have contributed in other ways to economic development in Shenzhen, by taking charge of redevelopment projects in urban villages in partnership with the government and by driving efforts to restructure the economy. These actions contribute to the consolidation of the PRD Mega Region as a major hub in the global economy.

In the horizontal governance network, there is continuing evidence of rivalry among the region's mayors. Although cities are expected to coordinate their development plans, in practice they compete to attract investment. For instance, Shenzhen lost a branch of the Huawei Company when it moved its headquarters from Longgang District to an industrial park in neighboring (and less-developed) Dongguan. One of the challenges faced by planners is to coordinate urban development in a region marked by significant internal

differences, including economic structure and growth prospects (Ye 2013:295). Spatial inequalities, and efforts by local officials to overcome them, are obstacles to a top-down approach to region-building.

In Shenzhen, globalization is a driving force behind the decision to create the PRD Mega Region. This policy, which requires a degree of re-centralization at the regional scale (rescaling), is both a corrective response to decentralization and a proactive measure to reach national objectives. The presence of huge corporations in Shenzhen and the region's strategic position in China's economy have contributed to forging a hybrid governance arrangement where private firms are increasingly important partners in the policy process.

Rome: The Fragmented Metropolis, and the Dominance of the Core

Policy and Problem: A Master Plan for the municipality of Rome was adopted in 2003, approved in 2008, but never fully implemented. Though the language of the document contended that it was metropolitan in scope, and incorporated the idea of planned centers and sub-centers to enhance mobility and development within the metropolitan region, in reality it was completely set within the existing boundaries of the Rome province. The policy was loosely framed by national government, while implementation was left to the locality. The broad goal was the realignment of economic relationships between urban cores and their peripheries, decentralizing and equalizing. In 2014, a governance structure was created, the Città Metropolitana di Roma Capitale (CMRC). And with this Rome took over the responsibilities of the existing Province, and the Province itself was abolished. The boundaries of the CMRC make it the largest in area for the entire country

(5,352 km²). The CMRC concentrates much of the region's economic activities.⁶ But, even with this reform, little real change occurred in the underlying governance network.

Although at the national level, business associations supported the creation of metropolitan scales in order to better 'market' their territories and position themselves globally⁷, firms in Rome have not demanded changes in the scale of urban development and are involved only indirectly in metropolitan governance processes (especially compared to Paris). This relative lack of involvement has been explained by the Rome's economic base, which has few large firms (Lefèvre, d'Albergo and Ye, 2016: 8), and is less 'globalized' than Paris or Shenzhen, making the metropolitan scale a weak 'space of dependence' for firms. In this context, "metropolitanization beyond the borders of the central municipality is not really necessary for land rent and real estate interests." (Lefèvre, d'Albergo and Ye, 2015: 12).

The policy examined here was one aimed at creating a system of metropolitan 'centralities' or 'sub-centres', nodal points of a new polycentric organization within Rome. It was expressed in Rome's Master Plan, a first version of which was released in 2003 and officially approved in 2008, replacing the 1962 plan. The Master plan proposed three main pillars: transport and mobility through investments in transport infrastructure; protection of rural and natural habitats from development; and new urban "poles", to ensure a denser pattern of growth. This last pillar, consisting of large-scale projects in 18 localities, gave expression to the national goal of promoting a polycentric urban structure. In Rome this was designed to reverse the established spatial dominance of the urban core and 'mono-direction centre-periphery relationships'. The policy was not implemented as

planned, despite a rhetoric supporting the virtue of polycentrism. As the case of Ponte di Nona (Pizzo, Bon, Moina, 2015:7), one of the 18 intended new poles shows, residential development was facilitated by private real estate interests, but never fully supported by broader public investments in infrastructure to facilitate the intended decentering process across the region. A major reason was the failure to institute governance arrangements supporting the planned ‘multi-polar’ configuration of interests. In its place, there were much less ambitious administrative reforms, driven by the national state, partially in response to demands from the EU.

These reforms created the illusion of Rome as ‘metropolitan’ in scope (*extent*), but in practice the plan failed to promote coordination with neighboring municipalities. The metropolitan ‘centralities’ were in fact all located within the boundaries of Roma Capitale. The *agenda* has primarily served local economic interests related to property development. Although there was an *ambitious* vision to transform the strong duality between the core city and the suburbs by creating new poles of economic activity, this has not materialized.

Nodes and centrality: Public (particularly national government) and private sector (particularly real estate) actors dominate Rome’s CMRC network. This is not surprising, given its politically dominant position as the capital of Italy. Its economy has long been shaped by national government, and supported by private sector land interests. Funded by national government, and managed by intergovernmental boards, its economic base is undergirded by tertiary services (public administration, information, real estate, and

tourism). It has never been a center for manufacturing. The CMRC is wider in scope than its predecessor but weaker politically and administratively. Funding perpetuates this relationship. The CMRC suffers from lack of resources and reductions in transfers from national government.

The central actors in the CMRC network node are public (primary national government) actors operating at the newly defined CMRC scale. Mayors (Veltroni (2001-8), Alemanno (2008-13), and Morino (2013-2015)), have served to move CMRC policies forward. Landowners and real estate interests have also played fundamental roles in the CM network, a situation explained diachronically, as one dating back to the turn of the century (d'Albergo and Moini, 2014). The Mayors have been supported by partnerships with the private sector. The strategies of the CM network were developed by “project boards” composed of strategic Mayoral appointees representing economic interests from real estate, construction, crafts, and labour, with the support of Rome’s largest universities. (d'Albergo and Moini, 2014: 12). The Vatican, as a core property interest in the City of Rome, has also been a prominent actor in the network. Civic actors are weak due to their lack of capacity, and inability to coordinate their claims with the CMRC network.

While this is clearly a simplification of the Rome case, one can see that its CMRC network is driven by strong locally situated national government and economic interests. Property has served as a significant aspect of power in the Rome case, through rent-seeking. Thus, though on paper the CMRC network was to operate in three policy domains - transportation infrastructure, ecological protection, and economic development

- the reality is that it has only been active narrowly in regard to economic development through investments in the creation of new residential growth poles (Pizzo, Bon, Moino, 2015: 7).

Like the New York case, path dependency rather than globalization drives the development and shape of the CMRC network. The historic dominance of the central city, a legacy of fragmentation, and the functional differentiation of Rome as a center of government rather than as a location for global investment have reinforced this pattern. Rome's CMRC network therefore appears to be anchored in the locality. It is horizontal rather than vertical in its orientation. The role of international capital and influence is far less pronounced here than in virtually all the other cases in this collection. Rome displays a far more localized and closed network of locally rooted state and market actors.

Place Making and the Spatial Organization of Regions Cases

Le Grand Paris: (Re-)Reimagining the Paris Metropolitan Area

Problem and Policy: The Paris region, as the capital and its most populous city (and metropolis), has always had a complex relationship with the French state. In a nation built on *égalité*, the capital was often minimized in policies that sought to spread growth and prosperity around, while the state exercised control over key administrative and technical bodies (Bourdeau-Lepage, 2013; Kantor, Lefèvre, Saito, Savitch, & Thornley, 2012). As a result, successive administrations have made their mark on the territorial and political organization of the Paris region. The most recent of these – the Métropole du Grand Paris

(MGP) – is a departure from the French tradition of layering new authorities to suit differing territorial and political needs. It is poised to consolidate and replace existing joint authorities and profoundly change the balance of power in the planning and development of the capital.

The impetus for the “Greater Paris” project was a series of conferences convened by the mayor of Paris between 2006 and 2008. These were meant to provide a forum for the elected representatives of the densest part of the metro core to discuss issues of common concern, such as economic development and housing. This forum, the Syndicat Paris-Métropole, lacked power and funding but reflected the recognition on the part of local leaders that existing governance structures were inadequate for managing development within the region. At same time the Sarkozy administration was also thinking about the problem of governing the capital and in 2008 created the Ministry for the Capital Region (Kantor et al., 2012).

In 2014 legislation was passed mandating the creation of the MGP. According to its website (Métropole du Grand Paris: Mission de Préfiguration, 2015), as of the 1st of January, 2016 the MGP encompassed 124 municipalities and 3 départements in the densest central part of the region⁸ and will govern 7 million inhabitants. This reform replaces 19 existing intermunicipal partnerships. This new body will be responsible for regional coordination of economic, social and cultural development; housing; the environment and quality of life. Its central structure consists of a metropolitan council

headed by a president elected by the councilors. The larger structure also includes subsidiary territorial councils, a mayor's assembly, and an external advisory council.

While the MGP project is the largest and most comprehensive reform of Parisian territorial governance its *extent* is sub-metropolitan: it does not cover the entirety of the Paris-Île-de-France region, which contains eight départements and over 12 million inhabitants (INSEE, 2015). The MGP initiative's *agenda* is broad, including social equity, economic development and sustainability goals. Although some analyses of the project reject the notion that it is anything but an exercise to bolster competitiveness (Garnier, 2014), we categorize it as having a hybrid agenda. Finally, it is a highly *ambitious* public project enabled by state legislation, involving meaningful government reform, and the reconfiguration of authority within the Parisian metropolitan core (Enright, 2016).

Nodes and Centrality: Bourdin (2013) notes that the most central actors are political. The national government led the process by passing enabling legislation. Although the initiative for an informal enlargement of Paris to encompass more of the region originated in the "metropolitan" conferences led by *local* officials (Jérôme, Lebeau, & le Brot, 2006), the project to formalize the initiative was ultimately adopted and driven, by the French State.

While most political actors are in agreement that some form of metropolitan solution is required to tackle collective concerns, the process of establishing MGP institutions has

been marked by considerable discord. Political opposition is most notable from local authorities – often represented by Paris Métropole and from the Île-de-France Région (the authority for the larger region encompassing the MGP). Paris Métropole, and much of its membership, objects primarily to the degree of political centralization in the MGP plan, the abolishment of intercommunal authorities, and the reduction in local autonomy. The Region has numerous concerns about the interplay between the MGP and its own planning and development priorities and jurisdictions. There has also been some suggestion that the Region is wary of the degree to which the political power of the rich urbanized area might compete with its own (Subra, 2014). In an interesting twist the enabling legislation mandated that the transitional task force made up of locally elected officials from the metro – responsible for defining the metropolitan interest, budgetary, and legal processes– be co-chaired by a representative of Paris Métropole and the state’s representative (Préfet) of Île-de-France. While local authorities did not have much of a role in shaping the MGP they have been central actors in debating the details of its implementation.

Aside from political actors, Bourdin (2013, pp. 620-621) also lists transit authorities, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, private sector actors related to economic development, real estate interests, and hospitals and universities, as secondary interests in the MGP project. The transit entities – STIF and RATP⁹ - have been central to the development of the Grand Paris Express. The Caisse plays a key role as an investor in economic development projects. Real estate interest groups have been particularly vocal in advancing and highlighting the housing development function of the new metropolitan

authority (FFB, FPI, & FNAIM, 2013). The Chambre de Commerce et Industrie Paris Ile-de-France has also been supportive of the MGP project as a mechanism of competitiveness and growth (CCI Paris Ile-de-France, 2013). Civic actors and organizations and the general public, though deeply affected by the emergent MGP, have not been as influential in the project (Epstein, 2013).

Policy domains: Overall, the governance networks supporting the MGP agenda is centered on economic development, infrastructure and real estate interests and led by the French National State. While equity and civic development remain relevant long-term goals they are couched as elements of the broader development agenda. Given the centralized nature of the French State and its role in the capital's development, it is not surprising that the national scale has been dominant in the MGP process. However, as MGP has transitioned from concept to reality it has shifted to a secondary role in the governance of the region.

The influence of globalization in this metropolitan project is evident in its quite overt agenda to promote Paris as a competitive world metro that competes with other global cities both in terms of physical scale and market characteristics. This case comes the closest of any in exhibiting evidence of rescaling: it created and legitimized a new political entity at the metropolitan scale. It remains to be seen whether this will result in meaningful rescaling, or whether traditional hierarchies will simply play out in and around this new actor. However, it is clear from the case that in the creation of the MGP policy there was little evidence of new roles or dynamics of political power.

Berlin-Brandenburg: Negotiating the Capital Region

Problem and Policy: The Berlin-Brandenburg region is geographically and politically unique among the regions discussed here. Berlin, the largest city in Germany with a population of 3.47 million (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2014a), has functioned as a city-state since 1990. It is even more remarkable that the entire city-state of Berlin completely surrounded by Brandenburg. Brandenburg is a state in its own right with a population of 2.46 million¹⁰ (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2014b). Because the urbanized area of the capital region is not completely contained within the boundaries of the city-state of Berlin, governing has necessitated coordination between the two states. It has also given rise to successive, and sometimes competing, definitions of the composition and limits of the metropolitan region (Fricke and Gualini, 2016). The shape and functions of a formal regional authority in the Berlin-Brandenburg region remains contested.

Several attempts have been made to consolidate spatial planning and governance functions of Berlin and Brandenburg. One of the earliest attempts to institutionalize joint planning between Berlin and the surrounding municipalities of Brandenburg (*Zweckverband Berlin Brandenburg*) failed due to the opposition of Brandenburg. In 1992 the two states appointed a commission to explore unification. Public opinion and the political process ultimately halted the effort in 1996, after Brandenburg defeated the proposition in a referendum (Berlin supported it). Since that defeat the appetite for formal

government reorganization among political elites and the broader population has declined (Fricke and Gualini, 2014).

While territorial reorganization has failed, political cooperation for regional governance has not. In 1993 a form of joint planning between the two states emerged, which required “pie-slice” shaped bi-state sub-regions to table territorial development plans. In the wake of the failed merger the two state governments agreed to set up joint cabinet meetings to discuss policies of mutual benefit.¹¹ A joint Land Regional Planning Body (Landesplanungsabteilung) was established to develop a non-binding regional plan for the inner ring of Brandenburg state; and a joint employment office was created to improve access to regional jobs (Hauswirth, Herrschel, & Newman, 2003). Joint interest in establishing regional economic development policies based on industrial clustering and growth poles resulted in the production of a formally binding joint spatial program and development plan, the *Landesentwicklungsplan*, adopted in 2007 (Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung, 2009). In 2011, the two governments launched a joint innovation strategy – the *Gemeinsame Innovationsstrategie der Länder Berlin und Brandenburg* (innoBB) – that deepened cooperation on regional development anchored in clustering and spaces of innovation. The plans have been updated annually and used as the basis for bids for European development funding.

These initiatives mark the emergence of a durable consensus around spatial planning and economic development in the Berlin-Brandenburg region that recognizes the interdependence of the two states and the joint benefit of collaboration. While Fricke and

Gualini (2014) argue that the definition of the metropolitan region remains in flux, the *extent* of these development initiatives can be considered metropolitan as they engage both states¹². The *agenda* has remained focused on issues of economic development. Finally, the *ambition* of these initiatives is moderate. Cooperation in this area imposes legally binding planning requirements on both states, but only in this narrow policy area.

Nodes and centrality: In Berlin-Brandenburg, state actors coalesced around an economic development, competitiveness and innovation agenda. The principal state actors were Länder authorities. Territorial cooperation never progressed to the level of institutionalization found in the Paris case. Nevertheless, relatively robust collaborative governance processes in planning and economic development in the Berlin capital region was made possible by a network of policy actors.

The 1996 merger effort was state-led, but strongly championed by the leadership of the city of Berlin and a coalition of private sector actors seeking a territory large enough to be competitive in the “big league” of world cities (Bonn, 1996). The collaborative economic agenda has been described as the outcome of “a more or less spontaneous process of regionalization, mostly driven by market forces and the competitive interests of municipalities around the city of Berlin, all of them aiming at attracting investors and wealthy families” (Kujath, 2005, p. 132). However, this regionalism was built on a set of unusual political and socio-economic alliances.

Politically, the merger was supported by the odd pairing of Christian Democratic Union (CDU – center-right) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) governing coalition of Berlin and the SPD in Brandenburg, and opposed by the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Greens and a coalition of smaller parties in both states (McKay, 1996). Local authorities in Brandenburg were generally opposed to the alliance based on a fear that they would be subsumed by Berlin’s interests (Herrschel & Newman, 2004).

The merger movement also featured an “unusual” alliance between the private sector, represented by Berlin and Brandenburg business associations and labor represented by the Confederation of German Trade Unions and the German Union of Salaried Workers (McKay, 1996). Both labor and employers hoped to reap a windfall from the anticipated growth of investment and development following a successful merger. Real estate and financial actors also recognized the benefits of the expected cost saving and regulatory simplification of a merger.

Policy domains: The current collaborative planning and development environment owes a great deal to supporters and architects of the failed territorial reform. The current joint innovation strategy – innoBB – is an outgrowth of earlier development initiatives. It includes a broad spectrum of supporters and partners, from hospitals, universities and training organizations; start-up associations and incubators; Chambers of Commerce and other financial interests; as well as environmental actors (particularly in the area of innovation and research) (Innovative Capital Region, 2015).

The actors involved in formulating and supporting metropolitan governance initiatives in Berlin-Brandenburg were a coalition of primarily state and private sector interests. The initiatives were driven by actors interested in, and located within, the two relevant states. Labour and environmental (enterprise) actors emerged as influential secondary actors. Local authorities have also been significant players in blocking, and later not opposing, deepening political and institutional entanglement.

Globalization and the desire to increase competitiveness by eliminating political duplication were strong motivators for territorial unification. However, this did not result in a meaningful reorganization of political activity or power. The joint institutions created to manage planning coordination and policy were not a new and powerful node of decision making. Rather, these collaborative bodies function simply as intergovernmental agencies wherein each actor maintains control over its own territorial interests. It is possible that these evolving partnerships will blur the boundaries between existing power structures in the future, but the process of creating them, and functioning within them offers very little evidence of active rescaling.

Analysis

Networks

Our analysis reveals both horizontal and vertical networks at play in the metropolitan development policy cases explored, with notable commonalities in their configuration. First, state actors were central to the development of metropolitan policies, and largely top-down vertical networks were core in policy implementation. Secondly, horizontal

networks of non-state actors at the metropolitan scale were engaged in shaping policy development, but did not drive the process. The role of private (and other non-state actors) was important but secondary. Thirdly, the type of issue and (crucially) the framing of the issue, influence the composition of the networks and the role of different categories of actors within them.

In each case, government was the central actor in metropolitan policy. While we had expected that the state would play a prominent role, we had expected more engagement with the private sector, associational actors and/or civic groups. In reality, however, the development and implementation of these policies were largely a government-led enterprise. This is certainly the case in Paris where, despite cooperation between local authorities, the central state instituted a process of territorial reform. In Berlin, while the federal government played only a supportive role, the two sub-national states of Berlin and Brandenburg were the architects of their own attempts at territorial reorganization (and later joint planning). Chinese state actors were also described as ‘at the summit’ of the vertical networks that dominate economic development efforts in the PRD. In Delhi the Union government was dominant in the policy process via agencies under its control and in partnership with state governments, whereas the local state actor (municipality) was absent. In NY the MTA (a state agency), was central in the development and implementation of the ESA project, made viable by the close participation of federal politicians and agencies. And in Rome, the high dependence on state resources and actors was key in shaping the way the CMRC network operated, and its weak administrative capacity at the metropolitan scale.

It is interesting to note that in each case the role of political actors at federal/central state levels and sub-national state levels largely eclipsed that of local authorities. In all cases, local authorities function as secondary actors, fighting to shape, or even block, the top-down efforts in conformity with their own interests. This is not entirely surprising given that local authorities, like other non-state actors in the metropolis, are often fated to be policy takers rather than policy makers. Yet it was surprising that there were not more metropolitan initiatives in this sample that emerged from horizontal networks to be adopted and enabled by sub-national or national/federal state authorities. This suggests that, contrary to intuition, senior levels of government may be more adept at thinking regionally, at least in these few policy areas, than local actors – state or non-state.

In no case was the influence or engagement of non-governmental actors completely absent. They served to shape rather than drive policy. They were either consulted, involved in implementation, or were advocates that attempted to steer projects to benefit their own interests. None initiated, designed, or championed these metropolitan projects. In each case the state responded to perceived economic development needs by adopting a regional approach largely on its own and did not just adapt the message or partner with non-governmental groups with similar views. Real estate, business associations, interest groups, and individual enterprises were vocal supporters of metropolitan initiatives and active in publicly advocating (or privately negotiating, as the case in Shenzhen) policy changes for their benefit. Interestingly, civil society actors were conspicuously peripheral to policy development and implementation. To be sure, civil society groups expressed

views about these projects. However, it was difficult to pinpoint any cases where those views were decisive in molding policy outcomes. We surmise that this is partly an outgrowth of the deliberate framing of these policies as economic development initiatives. The territorial reforms proposed in Paris and Berlin, and the policies focused on development through growth poles and clusters in Rome and Shenzhen were clearly dominated by arguments about maximizing regional growth and competitiveness. Even the infrastructure projects in New York and Delhi were justified primarily as economic development initiatives, despite their potential impacts on regional equity. While this policy frame does not, by definition, exclude other voices, it does tend to give primacy to commercial and development interests.

Rescaling

In all cases, state actors expressed an intention to construct, enhance or support metropolitan scale initiatives, although the state scale driving the process, the degree of political commitment, the instruments deployed and the outcomes varied. As stated above, in most cases, except Berlin, the national state was the dominant actor in the governance network. Action was undertaken through institutional reform that created a metropolitan scale Master Plan (2008) and a loose governance structure (Città Metropolitana di Roma Capitale in 2014) in the case of Rome, and a Mega Region in China's Pearl River Delta. In both cases, the stated aim was to promote economic growth and competitiveness by improving coordination among disparate local authorities and rationalizing infrastructure investments. In China, the detailed OP, which involved both spatial and economic planning, sought to reduce competition between the large cities of the region and allow

Shenzhen to specialize in innovation and high tech industries (Ye 2013: 297). Although driven by the national state scale, large firms in Shenzhen contributed to its implementation, thereby participating in the consolidation of a regional scale. In Rome, in contrast, neither state nor private sector actors appear committed to the construction of a metropolitan scale. The metropolitan ‘centralities’ in the 2008 Master Plan were all located within the boundaries of Roma Capitale; to the extent they were developed, in partnership with private real estate investors, it primarily served local property interests rather than metropolitan scale integration.

In Paris, a new political entity with an indirectly elected council was created, covering the densest urbanized areas in the metropolitan region. This scale-making process was led by the national state with support from private sector actors, transit authorities and civic groups. Although formal territorial reorganization represents a ‘narrow’ conception of state space (Brenner 2004) we expect that the Métropole Grand Paris will gain in salience as a scale over time as it is appropriated by various categories of state and non-state actors. In Berlin, a metropolitan scale may be progressively emerging as a result of policies and initiatives pursued largely by horizontal governance networks. Current institutions clearly replicated existing interstate power dynamics, but it is also clear that the notion of a ‘natural’ Berlin-Brandenburg territorial scale has become more embedded in the processes and consciousness of policy makers.

In New York and Delhi, large-scale transport projects are contributing to the spatial integration of metropolitan regions, thereby reinforcing their saliency as a functional

scale. However, in neither city is there an agenda to make the metropolitan region a political scale, which has occurred in Paris. Nevertheless, in New York, metro scale institutions (the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council) played an active role in initiating and funding the project, alongside city, state and national state actors. In Delhi, local state scales (municipal and Delhi State) remain subordinate to national state agencies, and initial scale-making efforts in the form of a regional transit system were opposed by the local state. States surrounding Delhi enjoy considerable political power over land development and exert authority in their respective territories, a situation that contributes to fragmenting state space at the metro scale. Thus, while metropolitan scale is supported in principle, it remains a contested, variable and relatively weak outcome across cases.

Globalization and Path Dependency

Though global pressures are important in understanding some of the motivations behind metropolitan scaled policies, this research suggests that path dependency is far more significant for understanding the structure, form and evolution of metropolitan policy networks and scale.

Metropolitan policy networks were engaged in efforts to support the positioning, maintenance and growth of their cities in the ‘global’ marketplace. However, in each case, they acted through existing institutions. In all cases, bar Rome, policy actors recognized the need for cities to have a competitive edge globally, but networks tended to operate through entrenched institutional patterns. Rome’s network lacked ties to global

markets, but was also characterized by path dependencies. Its network appeared to be motivated by local as opposed to global business interests.

Globalization shaped views about how regions function in a global market place, through competitiveness, but it has not meant that political policy processes are changing. This suggests convergence, not a shedding of the national. Thus, even in cases such as Berlin, where joint institutions were created to facilitate coordination, and enhance competitiveness, networks continued to be controlled by powerful territorial interests deeply rooted in the jurisdictional divisions of the Federal system.

Large firms – global firms – continue to function in ways that are typical of private sector actors – lobbying and partnerships. But, across the cases, there appeared to be little evidence that these firms were at the table to formulate policy. Shenzhen alone stood out as a case in which large firms were involved earlier in the life cycle of the networks suggesting that globalization may be slowly altering paths in China, but the ongoing role of a powerful state is always an interceding factor.

The role of real estate and tertiary sector business interests are important to metro development, but our research suggests that they are far more likely to be parochial in their orientation rather than global. This was certainly true of the New York case. Thus, in networks, they appear to be more likely to seek out advantages within existing policy spaces, and occasionally try to expand or shrink those spaces, but there is little evidence of a direct role in agenda setting or policy formulation.

Political cultures may also be relevant here in understanding path dependencies in metropolitan policy networks. Neo-corporatist traditions underlying the Berlin case appear relevant in explaining the actors forming nodes in their networks, specifically the role of labour. Political fragmentation and a localist tradition may help to explain the challenges faced by networks in Rome and New York and the difficulties each case revealed in bringing their metro policies forward. And, the strong state traditions underlying Delhi, Paris and Shenzhen may explain the ability of networks there to push through national directives.

Conclusions

Our findings contained elements of both the expected and unexpected. Networks were active in the construction and implementation of metropolitan policies (H¹), but they were governed by traditional political relationships, and were more top-down than we had initially expected. The actors involved in governing networks shaped the agendas and justifications for the metropolitan projects (H²). However, in all cases, state (e.g. governmental) actors were the most important in framing the issues and dictating the project while secondary actors played a more reactive role in refining the policy's course once it was set. This was also true in the scope of projects. Central actors were instrumental in establishing the boundaries of the metropolitan initiative against the sometimes, competing perception of secondary actors (H³). Finally, the evidence for meaningful political rescaling is relatively weak. In most cases state actors have retained their principal functions, largely resisting the creation of new spaces of engagement

(Paris is the exception) and conserving existing hierarchies (H⁴).

This small number of cases is hardly a deep enough sample from which to draw robust conclusions, but these findings do challenge the increasingly accepted notion that metropolitan regions have emerged as ‘new’ policy spaces that reconfigure political engagement, political power dynamics, and governing rationales. The fact that we find such similar patterns across widely varying political contexts (centralized versus federal structures), geographical locations, and political cultures suggests that these findings might, in fact, be significant. At the same time that these findings are specific to the cases, in the sense that they are grounded empirically, together they challenge dominant paradigms and offer theoretical insights for other city regions, where there is no metropolitan government per se. At the very least, these cases provide some justification of the value of pursuing comparative research across widely varied contexts, and validates the work pursued under the aegis of the iMRC project and other ambitiously comparative research initiatives.

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¹ To avoid repetition with the introduction to this special issue (see d’Albergo and Lefèvre) we do not include a detailed review of the literature.

² Following Brenner, “territorialization, is viewed as a historically specific, incomplete, and conflictual *process* rather than as a given, natural, or permanent condition” (2004: 43).

³ The Rome case represented an outlier in that it did not succeed in the implementation of policy that was metropolitan in scope. This failure offered important comparative lessons regarding scale and power, thus warranting inclusion. Thus, the Rome case must be understood as one in which metropolitan policy was aspirational.

⁴ ‘Plan panel thumbs up for Metro expansion in NCR’, *Times of India*, 31 May 2013.

Retrieved from <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Plan-panel-thumbs-up-for-Metro-expansion-in-NCR/articleshow/20372923.cms>

⁵ Foreign-owned firms, particularly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, contributed overwhelmingly to the industrial output in Shenzhen, accounting for over 80% from 1995 to 2004 (Yang 2015).

⁶ It occupies approximately 25% of the total area of the metropolitan region, and 33% of its total population.

⁷ Network of the Metropolitan Industrial Association.

⁸ Surrounding municipalities were given the option to join under the conditions laid out in the enabling legislation.

⁹ The Syndicat des transports d'Île-de-France (STIF) and Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), respectively.

¹⁰ Though with a much lower population density than the city of Berlin belying the fact that it is generally a more rural territory.

¹¹ Some scholarship is critical of the level of actual cooperation that has been achieved through this mechanism (see Hauswirth, Herrschel and Newman, 2003).

¹² Not all of the plans focus on the totality of the bi-state region, but the intent is to establish a stronger position for both states by investing planning capital in targeted locations.

The authors are grateful to their colleagues in the International Metropolitan Research Consortium for inputs on earlier drafts of this paper. Loraine Kennedy acknowledges generous support from the CNRS SMI programme for her stay in New York during 2016-17.